Full opinion text
B.D. PARKER, JR., Circuit Judge: Defendants Mohammed Ali Al-Moayad (“Al-Moayad”) and Mohammed Mohsen Zayed (“Zayed”) appeal from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, /.). Both were convicted of conspiring to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations Ha-mas and Al-Qaeda, and attempting to provide material support to Hamas. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l). Al-Moayad was also convicted of attempting to provide material support to Al-Qaeda and providing material support to Hamas. Id. Al-Moayad was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 180 months’ imprisonment on each count, which the district court directed would run consecutively for a total period of incarceration of 900 months. The district court also sentenced Zayed to the statutory maximum of 180 months on each count to run consecutively, for a total of 540 months’ imprisonment. We conclude that the district court committed evidentia-ry errors that were sufficiently prejudicial as to deprive the defendants of a fair trial. We therefore vacate the convictions and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. Government’s Evidence Against the Defendants 1. FBI investigation The convictions arose from an investigation and sting operation conducted principally by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At trial, the jury heard testimony from various witnesses describing the operation and the events that led to the prosecution, and viewed video tapes of FBI-orchestrated meetings between the defendants and government informants that took place in Frankfurt, Germany in January 2003. In investigating the defendants, the government relied heavily on the assistance of a confidential informant named Mohammed Al-Anssi, a Yemeni national who later played a central role in the sting operation. The government did not call Al-Anssi as a witness, but the defendants did, as the main thrust of their defense was that they were entrapped by Al-Anssi. Al-Anssi testified that in November 2001, prompted by the events of September 11, 2001, he approached the FBI to offer information relating to terrorism. He described meeting with FBI Special Agent Brian Murphy in Washington, D.C. and giving him a list of individuals about whom he claimed to have information, including defendant Al-Moayad. Al-Anssi testified that he first met AlMoayad in Yemen in 1995. According to Al-Anssi, they were neighbors in Yemen, and Al-Moayad was the imam of a mosque. Al-Anssi stated that Al-Moayad also ran a bakery and a school. Al-Anssi further testified that in 1996 or 1997, he learned from Al-Moayad that he was involved in supplying money, arms, and recruits to terrorist groups. After Al-Anssi relayed this information to Murphy, Murphy enlisted Al-Anssi as his principal informant and used him to help develop the government’s case against Al-Moayad, and later Zayed. Al-Anssi did not offer his assistance for free. Rather, he admitted that he was in difficult financial circumstances when he approached the FBI and that he sought compensation in exchange for information. Al-Anssi testified that in 2001, he was in the United States on a tourist visa. He was heavily in debt, looking for work, and in need of assistance for himself and his family. Al-Anssi initially asked the FBI for 5 million dollars in exchange for his assistance, “hoping that it will go up, no problem.” He also requested United States citizenship and that his family be brought to the United States from Yemen. In describing his motive for seeking compensation, Al-Anssi testified, “the issue was the truth, the whole issue, and after I chase the terrorists and to bring him here to America, I deserve even 10 million dollars.” Al-Anssi stated that he was paid $100,000 by the FBI for his assistance. However, he believed that he deserved millions, “[a]nd I expect more than that.” Al-Anssi admitted that, because he was upset about his small payment from the FBI, he falsely told the Washington Post that the FBI promised to pay him 5 million dollars. He also testified that in November 2004, in an attempt to coerce the FBI into paying him more money, he set himself on fire in front of the White House. With regard to this incident, Al-Anssi testified that he did not intend to commit suicide, but that he “wanted to put the government and the world on notice,” and that “[i]t is my right to get as much as I can from the FBI.” As part of its investigation of Al-Moayad, the FBI sent Al-Anssi to Yemen three times in 2002. In January 2002, Murphy sent Al-Anssi to re-establish contact with Al-Moayad, who was then serving as head of an organization called the Al-Aqsa foundation. Al-Anssi took a second trip to Yemen in May 2002 to gather information about people in the United States who might be involved in funding terrorist organizations, and to introduce the idea of a wealthy American named “Saeed” (actually another government informant) who wanted to donate money to support militant Islamic jihad and the mujahidin (ie., armed fighters). Al-Anssi testified that during that trip, Al-Moayad told him that he had met with Osama bin Laden at some point in Afghanistan. Al-Moayad also gave Al-Anssi a list of contacts in the United States who could send money, introduced Al-Anssi to defendant Zayed, who was his assistant, and gave Al-Anssi a tour of his bakery. Al-Anssi testified that during both of these trips, he took notes of his conversations with Al-Moayad and delivered them to Murphy when he returned to the United States. As discussed below, the admissibility of these notes was a central, hotly contested issue at trial. Al-Anssi took a third trip to Yemen in August 2002. During that trip, he attended a group wedding hosted by Al-Moayad on September 19, 2002. At the FBI’s behest, Al-Anssi videotaped and photographed the wedding. According to Al-Anssi, Al-Moayad asked him to show Saeed the pictures “to prove that this a part of the effort to prepare the youth for El Jihad.” During the wedding, Mohammed Siyam, who was identified at trial as the representative of Hamas in Yemen, gave a speech that Al-Anssi videotaped. Among other things, Siyam said the following: Thanks be to God ... The Father, the Mujahid Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, benefactor of this honorable celebration, the Honorable Sheikh Mohammed bin Ali Ali al-Moayad, president of the high committee of group weddings. May God join us to him, meaning, may we be joined to him in helping others get married and not to get married ourselves, God willing.... I greet you with Islam’s [traditional] greeting: peace be with you and God’s mercy and blessings. Either those who organized the celebration found out about the timing of Hamas’s operation in Tel Aviv, that it will be today — and this is leaking the news — so they held the wedding here to coincide with the wedding there. An organized operation, God willing, you will hear about it, you will read about it tomorrow in the newspapers and hear about it in the media. It brought down many of the invading occupiers, and thanks be to God, Lord of the universe. At trial, the government established through the testimony of a witness, a young Scottish law student named Gideon Black, that a suicide bombing occurred on a bus in Tel Aviv that same day. Black was a passenger on the bus along with his cousin Yoni, who was killed in the attack. As discussed below, Black testified at length and in considerable detail about the bombing, and his testimony was a prominent feature of the government’s case. The testimony was admitted over the defendants’ objections that it was unrelated to the charges against them and enormously prejudicial; the admissibility of the testimony is a central issue in this appeal. During the August 2002 trip, Al-Moayad gave four paper receipts to Al-Anssi, documenting donations to various organizations. Al-Anssi testified that Al-Moayad told him these groups were fronts for Ha-mas. Al-Anssi further claimed that Al-Moayad admitted having delivered more than $20 million to Bin Laden and $3.5 million to Hamas in the past. Whether these donations occurred, and when, was a significant issue at trial, especially with regard to the alleged contributions to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. During his third trip to Yemen, Al-Anssi again took notes purportedly memorializing his conversations with Al-Moayad. These notes did not specify when Al-Moayad’s alleged donations to Hamas occurred, but suggested that the donations to Al-Qaeda were relatively recent. The notes recorded that the Al-Qaeda donations occurred “during last few years and before the Sept. 11th 2001.” However, during his trial testimony Al-Anssi could not, in contrast to his notes, specify when Al-Moayad allegedly provided money to either Al-Qaeda or Hamas. As to Hamas, Al-Anssi stated that Al-Moayad “did not give me specific dates.” Similarly, with regard to the Al-Qaeda donations, Al-Ans-si said that Al-Moayad “did not give me dates” and conceded that it could have been delivered “[p]ossibly in the 80s,” and that “I don’t know what year or over what years. He did not decide.” When asked to explain what he meant in his notes by “a few years,” Al-Anssi stated, “I cannot be specific. It could be few years, could be less than five years or less than ten years, or ten years.... I would say it is before 20 years.” As discussed below, other evidence presented at trial suggested that any support that Al-Moayad may have provided to Al-Qaeda lasted only through the Afghan conflict in the 1980s. 2. Sting operation in Germany — video tapes In collaboration with German law enforcement agencies, the FBI arranged for Al-Moayad and Zayed to meet with Al-Anssi and the second informant, “Saeed,” in Frankfurt, Germany in January 2003. Many of the conversations that occurred among the defendants and the two informants over the next few days were captured by audio and video recorders hidden in the defendants’ hotel rooms. The tapes showed the following. On the morning of January 7, Al-Anssi met Al-Moayad and Zayed at the Frankfurt airport and brought them to their hotel. When they arrived, Al-Moayad expressed his desire to secure money for his charity projects, including the bakery. During this conversation, no one explicitly mentioned funding terrorist activity. The government repeatedly argued at trial, however, that the defendants’ references to Al-Moayad’s charitable endeavors were actually code for various forms of support for terrorism. (The government also argued that Al-Moayad’s references to going to Germany for medical treatment were similarly coded allusions to conspiring to support terror.) The defendants maintain on appeal that throughout the Germany meetings, they were referring to actual charitable endeavors. The tapes showed that the next day, January 8, Al-Moayad and Zayed met with Al-Anssi and Saeed. Saeed invoked verses of the Qu’ran referring to jihad, in order to establish that jihad is “basically our business.” He also said, “I believe, we’re working in the same field.” Al-Moayad responded, “[t]he same field. But ... the most important thing for the Muslims is to know and learn their religion.” At Saeed’s request, Al-Moayad discussed his prior relationship with Bin Laden, whom he said he financially supported and instructed in Islamic law. Al-Moayad did not, however, state that he had given $20 million to Bin Laden, nor did he provide any other figure. Al-Moayad and Zayed both clarified verbally that this relationship dated back to the 1980s, “before all these crises happened. A long time ago ____ [black in the days of Afghanistan .... [w]ith the Russians.” Al-Moayad also mentioned his ties to Khaled Meshal, who was identified at trial as the head of Hamas’s political and military bureau. When Saeed asked what he could do for Al-Moayad, Al-Moayad described five goals: (1) teaching people their religion; (2) uniting Muslims; (3) raising young men in a manner of which God approves; (4) helping young people in need; and (5) doing everything for God’s sake. Al-Moayad also discussed more specific projects, including the charitable bakery, educating Muslim women, and aiding the families of people who have been jailed or martyred. Saeed said that he was willing to support these projects, but that he primarily wanted to fund mujahidin. Al-Moayad replied, “[l]et me tell you that I want to be honest with you.... We can’t say ‘yes, yes’ to what you’re asking then lie to you. It’s not right. And it is also not right to say ‘no, no’ which may cause him to be discouraged, and that is a sin.” He then added that he would work “in these fields, as they are my fields with God’s permission.” The rest of the meeting revolved mainly around how Al-Moayad and Zayed would meet with their Hamas contacts and arrange for Saeed’s money to be used according to his wishes. That night, Al-Anssi and the defendants discussed, again on tape, how Saeed’s money would be sent. They talked about the various projects for which the money could be designated, including the bakery, educating women, helping orphans and the elderly, and others. Al-Anssi referred a few times to these projects as codes, but it is not clear from the tapes whether the defendants were also referring to the charities as codes. The three men also discussed the need to transfer Saeed’s money in several people’s names. Al-Moayad and Zayed met again with Al-Anssi and Saeed on January 9. Saeed asked for clarification as to how his money would be spent, and Al-Moayad once again described his charitable projects. Al-Moayad also explained, at Saeed’s request, that although he had delivered money to Bin Laden during the “Afghani Jihad,” he distanced himself from Al-Qaeda once that conflict was over. In response to Saeed’s questions about the Al-Aqsa foundation, Al-Moayad described it as a charitable organization that aids needy Palestinian Muslims. Saeed then asked whether his money would go to Hamas, Al-Qaeda, or other groups. Al-Moayad replied, “Ha-mas, Al-Qaeda, Massajins [prisoners], Mu-jahidins, and such. Anyone who we know of, who is in the Jihad field.” The men also discussed the four receipts that Al-Moayad gave to Al-Anssi during his third trip to Yemen. The government argued at trial that the receipts documented contributions to groups that were fronts for Hamas and its terrorist activities. The transcript of the conversation, however, does not clearly reflect that conclusion. At one point, Al-Moayad did say of one of the receipts, “this one we deliver it to Hamas.” About another contribution, however, he said, “it supports everyone who needs it in Palestine, for example, someone’s house in Palestine was ruined, a check is issued to him immediately to help him in rebuilding his house.” In addition, Al-Moayad never stated during the Frankfurt meetings that he had given $3.5 million to Hamas. Al-Anssi told Al-Moayad and Zayed that Saeed had $2.5 million to donate. Saeed offered to give five percent for AlMoayad’s charitable projects, which he raised to ten percent at Al-Moayad’s insistence. They discussed how best to send the money, including the possibility that Saeed could transmit it directly to Hamas without Al-Moayad’s and Zayed’s involvement. Al-Anssi explained that Saeed would provide Al-Moayad and Zayed with a book of pre-signed checks so that they could withdraw money directly from his account. Near the end of the meeting, the informants raised the topic of the September 2002 group wedding in Yemen. AlAnssi explained that Saeed had enjoyed Siyam’s speech and his reference to the suicide bombing, at which point the defendants and the informants laughed and clapped. At trial, Al-Anssi admitted the possibility that he had started laughing before the defendants, and stated that “I want to make them believe that I’m happy because of the that [sic] suicide.” Later that evening, the tapes showed Al-Moayad and Zayed privately expressing reservations about the arrangement with Saeed. Al-Moayad stated that “[t]he problem is Hamas ... this guy ... I don’t know.” They agreed, however, to keep their word, and discussed further how to make arrangements with Hamas. Al-Moayad and Zayed continued the conversation with Al-Anssi the next morning, January 10. They also contemplated asking for more money for their charitable work. Al-Moayad said, “[w]e’ll tell him to loosen it up a bit, let us [unintelligible] for our efforts .... we’ll tell him let us do jihad ... we want to do jihad, but let us do jihad our way.” He also said, “[o]ur work is clear: charity, the charitable bakery, and education.” The defendants’ last meeting with Saeed took place later that morning. In response to a query from Saeed, Al-Moayad and Zayed disavowed any knowledge as to a future terrorist attack being planned in New York. They also reviewed how they should use the checks that Saeed would provide. At the conclusion of the meeting, the informants gave the checkbook to Al-Moayad and left the defendants’ room. German law enforcement agents arrested Al-Moayad and Zayed shortly thereafter. 3. Post-arrest statements After their arrests, Al-Moayad and Zayed were questioned by law enforcement officers and gave statements. Agent Murphy interviewed Al-Moayad in November 2003. According to Murphy, Al-Moayad denied ever having given money directly to Hamas, but also said that he might possibly have done so as head of the Al-Aqsa foundation. Al-Moayad confirmed having met with and given money to Osama bin Laden during the conflict with the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, he said that the relationship ended sometime after that conflict ended, that he had since spoken publicly against Bin Laden, and that Bin Laden issued a fatwah, or religious ruling, calling for his death. During the interview, Al-Moayad did not state how much 10 money he had given to either Al-Qaeda or Hamas. With regard to the Frankfurt meetings, Al-Moayad asserted that his intention was to take his portion of Saeed’s money for his charities and that it would be up to Al-Anssi to get the rest of the money to Hamas. Speaking to German police in January 2003, Zayed described himself as Al-Moay-ad’s escort and the person in charge of the charitable bakery. He also described the Al-Aqsa foundation as a charitable organization that “supports people in Palestine who have suffered from the war.” Zayed stated that he first learned about the true purpose of the Frankfurt meetings during the defendants’ first face-to-face conversation with Saeed, not while he was in Yemen. When he was interviewed by Murphy in November 2003, Zayed told him that while he was still in Yemen, Al-Moayad told him only that one of Al-Anssi’s contacts wanted to donate money to Al-Moay-ad’s causes. B. Prosecution Case Al-Moayad and Zayed were indicted on charges of conspiring to provide material support to Hamas and Al-Qaeda and attempting to provide material support to Hamas and Al-Qaeda, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l). In addition, AlMoayad was charged with providing material support to Hamas and Al-Qaeda. Trial commenced in the Eastern District of New York on January 28, 2005 and ended on March 11, 2005. The government’s principal evidence during its case-in-chief consisted of tapes and translations of the Frankfurt meetings in January 2003. 1. Al-Moayad’s Crawford objection to Zayed’s post-arrest statement During the government’s case-in-chief, Agent Murphy testified about, among other things, his post-arrest interview of Zayed. According to Murphy, before the trip to Germany, “Al-Moayad advised Zayed that one of [Al-Anssi’s], one his [sic] associates, had a significant amount of money looking to donate that money to Al-Moayad’s causes.” During his cross-examination of Murphy, Zayed’s counsel attempted to demonstrate that before arriving in Germany, Zayed thought that the meetings would revolve entirely around possible donations for Al-Moayad’s charities, not merely his “causes.” Defense counsel asked, “[n]ow, in fact, what Mr. Zayed told you was that Al-Moayad had told him that an individual wanted to provide a lot of money to AlMoayad [sic] charity; isn’t that what he told you?” Murphy responded, “I remember there were two answers he gave, one in the beginning and then he completely contradicted this statement you are referring to.” Murphy then said that “Zayed stated Al-Moayad at the interview that [sic] an individual wanted to provide lots of money to Al-Moayad’s charity,” but later in the interview, Zayed “advised that once they had reached the hotel room in Germany, he knew from discussions about [sic] Al-Moayad that Al-Moayad told him they were there to collect money for Hamas.” Al-Moayad’s attorney objected under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The court asked Al-Moayad’s counsel to suggest a remedy, but he never followed up. When Zayed’s counsel resumed his cross-examination of Murphy, he clarified “that there was no contradiction whatsoever in what Mr. Zayed told you about what he knew the reason for going to Germany was when he was in Yemen.” Murphy agreed that “there was no contradiction.” 2. Testimony of Gideon Black The government’s final witness in its case-in-chief was Gideon Black. Black was on a bus in Tel Aviv on September 19, 2002 — the same day as the group wedding in Yemen — when a Hamas suicide bomber detonated his explosives, killing Black’s cousin. Black testified at considerable length about the attack. Furthermore, the government highlighted his testimony during its opening and closing arguments. Early on in the trial, Zayed’s counsel moved in limine to exclude Black’s upcoming testimony. He argued in essence that because the defendants conceded that they knew Hamas and Al-Qaeda had engaged in terrorist activity and offered to stipulate to that fact, Black’s testimony about the bombing — with which the defendants were not charged or shown to be connected— would be far more prejudicial than probative. The government contended that it was entitled to put on evidence proving the defendants’ knowledge that Hamas and Al-Qaeda were terrorist groups. The court ruled, without further explanation, that the testimony was more probative than prejudicial, and that it would allow the testimony with “[n]o gory stuff.” Just before Black’s testimony, the court viewed photographs of the destroyed bus and viewed a DVD of a news story about the bombing, which the government also sought to introduce. The defendants objected to the graphic nature of the images. The court concluded, “[tjhere are splatter-ings of blood in all of them and if you object to places where there is blood, and I don’t think it is that gory, then the only thing you’d be able to show is the outside, I’m going to admit it.” The court also stated that it would allow all three photographs of the bus to be admitted over defense counsel’s objection that they were cumulative. On the stand, Black described his background and his studies in Israel in the early 2000s. He recounted the events of September 19, 2002, on which he and his cousin Yoni planned to travel from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv to celebrate a Jewish holiday with Black’s family. Black stated that when they arrived in Tel Aviv, they almost took a cab, but decided instead to take a bus. While they were aboard, the bus stopped to pick up passengers. As the bus pulled away, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at the front of the vehicle. After Black stated that there was an explosion, defense counsel objected “to any further questions.” The court allowed the government to proceed. Black testified that he saw, “[a]mongst other things, glass, metal and shrapnel flying in all directions particularly towards the back of the bus from the center of the bus.” He also described the scene immediately after the explosion, testifying that “there was an eerie silence for a few moments and then sirens, screaming, panic.” He turned around and saw Yoni crouched on the floor, unconscious. Black also testified that as he absorbed what had happened, he cried. At this point, defense counsel again objected to further questioning, arguing that “[t]his terrible tragedy has now been described, we know what happened and I think that to further dwell on these events is only to reinforce the prejudice which is being attempted to be injected into the record by this testimony.” However, the court allowed the government to proceed. The government asked Black to view the photographs of the scene and describe them to the jury, during which Black again described the events immediately before the attack and its aftermath. The government also played the DVD containing the newscast about the bombing. After Black’s testimony, Al-Moayad’s counsel asked the court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence or allegation that either defendant was involved in the bombing. The court refused to give the instruction and proposed alternative language instead. Al-Moayad’s counsel withdrew his request for a jury instruction, and the jury received none. C. Defense Case The defendants’ case-in-chief revolved mainly around their view that they had been entrapped by the government through its informants Al-Anssi and Saeed. To make out a defense of entrapment, “a defendant must first prove government inducement by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden then shifts to the government to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2007). At trial, the government never seriously disputed the proposition that AlMoayad was induced to participate in the Germany meetings by Al-Anssi. Therefore, the defense and the prosecution both focused on the issue of the defendants’ predisposition. “A defendant is predisposed to commit a crime if he is ‘ready and willing without persuasion to commit the crime charged and awaiting any propitious opportunity’ to do so.” United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 547 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 992 (2d Cir.1993)). The government may show that a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime charged by demonstrating: “(1) an existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for which [the defendant] is charged, (2) an already formed design on the part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, or (3) a willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by the accused’s ready response to the inducement.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1167 (2d Cir.1980)). The defendants began their presentation with two character witnesses from Yemen, Abdeh Al Zahr and Karim Ahmed A1 Faisal. Both men testified about Al-Moayad’s and Zayed’s numerous charitable projects, including the bakery and other endeavors, and confirmed Al-Moayad’s reputation in Yemen as the “father of the poor.” They also stated that neither Al-Moayad nor Zayed condoned violence and that both had spoken out against terrorist acts. The witnesses denied any knowledge that Al-Moayad or Zayed had ever given money to or solicited money for Hamas or Al-Qaeda. 1. AUAnssi’s notes The defendants called Al-Anssi during their case-in-chief and elicited significant impeachment testimony from him, including admissions of his heavy indebtedness, fínancial difficulties, and his attempts to obtain large sums of money from the FBI in exchange for information. Al-Anssi also conceded that he had a prior felony conviction, having pled guilty in the Eastern District of New York to bank fraud (specifically, writing bad checks). Al-Ans-si further testified that he had purchased a dry cleaning business with a portion of the $100,000 he received from the FBI, but the business failed and he returned it to the seller in June 2004. Al-Anssi admitted that, after this failure, he had run out of money, leading to his attempt in November 2004 to get more money from the FBI by setting himself on fire at the White House. Impeaching Al-Anssi’s credibility was important to the defendants’ entrapment defense. Defense counsel examined Al-Anssi extensively about his meetings with Al-Moayad in Yemen, during which he had gathered, at the behest of the FBI, much of the government’s background evidence against the defendants. Al-Moayad’s attorney queried Al-Anssi about whether he had made notes of his conversations with Al-Moayad, and Al-Anssi indicated that he had. Defense counsel then asked about the list of American contacts that Al-Moayad gave to Al-Anssi. Al-Moayad’s counsel pressed Al-Anssi to admit that he did not know whether those contacts sent money to Al-Moayad for armed jihad or for his charities, but Al-Anssi repeatedly insisted that Al-Moayad was funneling money into jihad. Defense counsel asked, “[i]s there one recording or one piece of paper that’s prior to Frankfurt that says that?” In response, Al-Anssi pointed to the four receipts that Al-Moayad gave him. Defense counsel followed up, “[i]s there any other document aside from these four documents that shows that Mr. Ad-Moayad donated money to Hamas, Al-Qaeda or any other organization involved in the Jihad organization?”, and then, “I ask you before you went to Frankfurt, was there anything, any document or any recording supporting what you’ve told this jury today?” After Al-Anssi answered that the Frankfurt videos supported his testimony, Al-Moayad’s attorney asked once more, “[bjetween the first time you met with the FBI and the time you went to Frankfurt, is there any document or any recording supporting the truthful testimony that you’ve given today?” During its examination of Al-Anssi, the government moved to introduce Al-Anssi’s handwritten notes into evidence, arguing that defense counsel had opened the door to their admission with his questioning. The notes memorialized, among other things, the following information that AlAnssi purportedly gathered while he was still living in Yemen, and during the FBI investigation: Al-Moayad was “the right hand” to Sheikh Abdul Majid Al-Zindani ; at some point in the past, Al-Moayad was “the main person choosing the volunteers” to send to fight in the conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Bosnia; during Al-Anssi’s first trip to Yemen, AlMoayad provided him with information about foreign arms dealers; Al-Moayad asked Al-Anssi not to call him on the phone, and to refer only to medical treatment if he did so; Al-Moayad was aware while still in Yemen that Saeed intended to give a substantial sum of money ($2 million) specifically to support the armed mujahidin; Al-Moayad visited and supported Bin Laden in Afghanistan; he knew young volunteers who were ready for training in jihad; and he gave $3.5 million to Palestine and $20 million to Al-Qaeda “during last few years and before the Sept. 11th 2001.” Defense counsel objected to admission of the notes on hearsay grounds. The government contended that the notes constituted a prior consistent statement after impeachment and that the jury had been left with the false impression that no documents supported Al-Anssi’s testimony. The court admitted the notes without limitation — and, therefore, as substantive evidence — and without specifying the ground for their admission. 2. Siyam wedding speech At the same time that the court admitted Al-Anssi’s notes, it also admitted Al-Anssi’s video of the September 2002 group wedding in Yemen, which included Mohammed Siyam’s speech. Before trial, the court had granted a defense motion to suppress the video. Prior to cross-examining Al-Anssi, the government signaled its intent to re-offer the video “to corroborate [Al-Anssi’s] version of events as disputed by the defense through his direction [sic] examination.” Zayed’s counsel objected on the grounds that he did not open the door to introduction of the video, and that it would be more prejudicial than probative. The government contended that the video was relevant to predisposition and the entrapment defense, and that it was admissible to counteract the impression that no document or recording supported Al-Anssi’s testimony about Al-Moayad’s previous support for terrorism. The court permitted the government to play the video for the jury and to provide an English translation of its contents. Again, the court admitted this evidence without limitation. D. Prosecution Rebuttal Case The government’s rebuttal case focused largely on countering the defendants’ entrapment defense by showing that Al-Moayad and Zayed were predisposed to support terrorist activities. 1. Mujahidin form Against Al-Moayad only, the court admitted without limitation' — over hearsay, relevance, and authenticity objections, and without explaining the grounds for its ruling — a document that appeared to be an application form for a mujahidin training camp (the “mujahidin form”). It had been partially filled out in 1999 by an individual who called himself “Abu Jihad,” and who listed “Sheikh Mohammed Al Moayad” next to the question, “[w]ho recommended you, and how do you know him.” The government did not present any evidence about who Abu Jihad was, and he was not available at trial. Instead, the government authenticated the form through the testimony of FBI Special Agent Jennifer Hale Keenan, who stated that she was stationed in Islamabad, Pakistan on September 11, 2001 and during the ensuing United States invasion of Afghanistan. Hale Keenan recounted that in December 2001, she received a number of items collected by American personnel in Afghanistan, including materials seized from an Al-Qaeda training facility. The mujahidin form was among these documents. Hale Keenan then described the process of receiving, inventorying, and shipping the documents to Washington D.C. 2. Goba testimony The government also called Yahya Goba, an American citizen of Yemeni heritage who attended an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 2001, to testify about the form. Goba had pled guilty to providing material support to Al-Qaeda in September 2002 pursuant to a cooperation agreement. In response to concerns expressed by defense counsel about his testimony, the government proffered that he would explain the significance of the form from personal experience without directly implicating Al-Moayad. Al-Moayad’s counsel objected on the grounds that his testimony would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and would constitute inadmissible hearsay. The court allowed the testimony to proceed, but again did not explain the basis for its ruling. Goba’s testimony went far beyond the scope of the government’s proffer. He testified that in 1998, he met an individual who later arranged for him to attend an Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 2001. Goba described flying to Pakistan and journeying across the border to an Al-Qaeda guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At the guest house, Goba was given a form to fill out that he testified was identical to the mujahidin form. The government asked Goba about the importance of indicating who had recommended him for the camp. He stated, among other things, that without the assistance of the recommender, he would not have been able to attend the camp. Goba then went on to testify about traveling to the Al-Qaeda camp, the camp layout, and the type of training (weapons, tactics, explosives, topography) that he received there. Al-Moayad’s counsel objected periodically to the relevance of Goba’s continued testimony, but the court allowed the government to continue. Goba was permitted to testify, for example, that Bin Laden had visited the camp on two occasions. He was also allowed to describe what occurred at the camp during Bin Laden’s first visit and to summarize for the jury a speech that Bin Laden gave, in which he talked about the “importance of unifying and performing jihad.” The government also played an Al Jazeera news video documenting Bin Laden’s visit, which included images of Bin Laden standing with his bodyguards and various associates, including Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and asked Goba to provide commentary. As discussed further below, Al-Moayad’s counsel objected to the video on a variety of grounds going to its prejudicial nature, but the court allowed the video to be shown. The court also permitted Goba, over objection, to describe photographs of the Al-Qaeda guest houses and the camp. At the beginning of the second day of Goba’s testimony, Al-Moayad’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on Goba’s accounts of the training camp and the references to and images of Bin Laden, arguing that “the court very carefully instructed each juror during voir dire that this case was not about 9[/]ll, not about Osama bin Laden ... I think the line was crossed yesterday with this testimony.” The court responded, “[y]ou made the application. The application is denied. I will instruct the jury that the defendant will have to be judged guilty or not guilty based upon what is charged in the indictment.” During the remainder of his testimony, Goba stated, among other things, that he had attended a rally in 1995 co-hosted by the Al-Aqsa foundation. Goba testified that he had volunteered to guard a picture gallery, which featured photos “of the A1 Aqsa mosque, leaders of Hamas and pictures of suicide bombers.” Videos were shown at the rally, which Goba described as “contributes [sic] of suicide bombers.” In addition, Mohammed Siyam gave a speech. According to Goba, money was collected at the rally for Al-Aqsa. 3. Croatian documents Through a Croatian intelligence officer, the government offered various documents seized from two Yemeni men who were detained in 1995 by Croatian authorities as they were crossing into Croatia from Bosnia. The officer testified that the men were mujahidin fighters leaving the armed conflict in Bosnia. The government introduced these documents to demonstrate a connection between Al-Moayad and Al-Qaeda continuing into the 1990s (ie., after the end of the conflict with the Soviets in Afghanistan), which was relevant to the charge of providing material support to Al-Qaeda and to the government’s case on predisposition. Among the documents are photographs of the two Yemeni individuals, copies of their passports, a last will and testament belonging to one of the men, and both men’s address books. The intelligence officer affirmed that both address books included Al-Moayad’s name and phone number. Al-Moayad’s counsel objected to the documents on hearsay, relevance, and authenticity grounds. The government argued that the evidence was relevant to entrapment and was admissible either as non-hearsay or as co-conspirator statements. The court admitted the documents against Al-Moayad as substantive evidence, without limitation and without specifying the basis for their admission. E. Summations, Jury Charge, Verdict, and Sentencing 1. Derivative entrapment charge At trial, the government argued that Zayed was induced to commit the crimes charged not by a government agent, but by Al-Moayad, and he was therefore entitled only to a “derivative” entrapment (as opposed to a direct entrapment) defense. Zayed’s counsel contended that Zayed could assert a direct entrapment defense as no evidence suggested that he was induced by Al-Moayad, rather than directly entrapped by Al-Anssi. Zayed’s counsel objected to the court’s proposed entrapment charge, which incorporated the government’s requested instruction and read as follows (with the portion to which he objected in italics): The government inducement must be direct, unless the government used an unwitting middleman to induce another person. For example, if the government induces defendant A to commit a crime, and defendant A takes it upon himself to induce defendant B to participate in the crime, then there can be no entrapment with respect to defendant B. The court denied defense counsel’s application to remove the challenged language. Defense counsel submitted letter briefing in which he argued again that the instruction did not apply, and also that the proposed language did not correctly state the law. The court deferred revisiting its ruling until after closing arguments. Zayed’s attorney discussed derivative entrapment in his summation, as did the government. After summations, the court denied Zayed’s attorney’s motion for reconsideration of the derivative entrapment instruction. The court then began to charge the jury. During the charge, the government requested a sidebar and asked the court not to include the derivative entrapment language, “to avoid any possibility of an appellate issue.” Zayed’s counsel then asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the attorneys’ closing arguments as to derivative entrapment. The court gave the rest of the charge, instructing only on normal entrapment, but did not instruct the jury with regard to the attorneys’ closing arguments. Zayed’s counsel indicated that he had “[n]o objections or exceptions” to the charge. However, after jury deliberations had begun, another of Zayed’s attorneys asked to revisit the derivative entrapment issue. He requested “a curative charge that [Zayed’s counsel] was required to close under an incorrect charge,” that “closing arguments be reopened for the purposes of [Zayed’s counsel] to correctly address the standard of law,” and moved for a mistrial. The court denied the applications. 2. Verdict and sentencing The jury found Al-Moayad guilty of conspiring to provide and attempting to provide material support to Al-Qaeda and Ha-mas, and of providing material support to Hamas. Al-Moayad was acquitted of providing material support to Al-Qaeda. The jury convicted Zayed of conspiring to provide material support to Al-Qaeda and Ha-mas and attempting to provide material support to Hamas, but acquitted him of attempting to provide material support to Al-Qaeda. The district court sentenced Al-Moayad to the statutory maximum of 180 months’ imprisonment on each count to run consecutively, for a total of 900 months or seventy-five years, and imposed a fine of $1,250,000.00. Zayed also received the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months on each count to run consecutively, for a total of 540 months’ or forty-five years’ imprisonment, as well as a fine of $750,000. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION The defendants raise a number of issues on appeal. They contend that: (1) the district court erred in admitting AlAnssi’s notes as substantive evidence; (2) the court erred in admitting the mujahidin form, the video of Mohammed Siyam’s wedding speech, and the Croatian documents; (3) the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Gideon Black and Yahya Goba; (4) the court erred with respect to the derivative entrapment instruction issue; and (5) Al-Moayad’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated by admission of an incriminating portion of Zayed’s post-arrest statement. For the reasons that follow, we find that the district court committed prejudicial error with respect to the Black and Goba testimony and Al-Anssi’s notes. Further, the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors deprived the defendants of a fair trial. A. Testimony of Gideon Black and Yah-ya Goba The defendants contend that the testimony of Gideon Black about the Tel Aviv bus bombing and of Yahya Goba about the Al-Qaeda training camp was irrelevant, prejudicial, and highly inflammatory. They also contend that the district court permitted the government to elicit testimony from both witnesses that strayed far beyond the government’s proffered purpose in offering the evidence — as to Black, establishing the defendants’ knowledge that Hamas engaged in terrorist acts, and as to Goba, authenticating the mujahidin form. We agree that the district court should have excluded the challenged testimony under Rule 403, and that its failure to do so deprived the defendants of a fair trial. 1. Gideon Black testimony Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[ajlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” When we are confronted with a Rule 403 issue, “so long as the district court has conscientiously balanced the proffered evidence’s probative value with the risk for prejudice, its conclusion will be disturbed only if it is arbitrary or irrational.” United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir.2006). “To avoid acting arbitrarily, the district court must make a ‘conscientious assessment’ of whether unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir.1982)). With regard to Black’s testimony, the record reflects that the district court did consider the balance between its probative value and probable prejudicial effect before allowing Black to take the stand. However, we must conclude that, given the highly charged and emotional nature of the testimony and its minimal evidentiary value, the court’s decision was arbitrary. The court also refused to give a limiting instruction proposed by the defense, which could have cabined the prejudicial effect of Black’s testimony. The defendants were not charged with planning or carrying out the Tel Aviv bus bombing. Indeed, the government did not introduce any evidence connecting Al-Moayad or Zayed to that or any other terrorist act, other than the fact that Si-yam mentioned the Tel Aviv incident during his speech at the group wedding. Nevertheless, Black was permitted to testify at length about the suicide bombing. Black spoke about his cousin Yoni, their shared experience studying in Jerusalem, their plans to visit family on the day of the bombing, the catastrophic explosion and subsequent chaotic scene aboard the bus, and Yoni’s death. Black also repeated certain parts of his narrative multiple times, such as when he viewed photos of the destroyed bus and described them for the jury, and when he commented on a video of a news story about the bombing. The government argued that the testimony was necessary to establish the defendants’ knowledge that Hamas engaged in terrorist activity, and was relevant to the issue of predisposition. However, neither Al-Moayad nor Zayed ever denied knowing about Hamas’s involvement in violent acts and they both offered to stipulate as to that knowledge, essentially eliminating the government’s burden of proof on that element. In light of these concessions, as well as the considerable testimony during other parts of the trial about notorious terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas, any probative value to be gained from Black’s testimony was significantly diminished. The Supreme Court has stated, in a case upon which the government heavily relied at trial, that “what counts as the Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence ... may be calculated by comparing evidentia-ry alternatives.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); see also United States v. Pepin, 514 F.3d 193, 206-07 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that Rule 403 “permits a judge to consider both the defendant’s willingness to stipulate and the potential for prejudice [in later phases] in conducting the requisite [Rule 403] balancing.”). The defendants offered an adequate evidentia-ry alternative at trial — to stipulate to their knowledge of Hamas’s terrorist activities. Therefore, the already questionable probative value of Black’s testimony was diluted even further in comparison with its considerable prejudicial effect. The government cited Old Chief at trial for the well-established proposition that “the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice.” Old Chief 519 U.S. at 186, 117 S.Ct. 644. However, in explaining this general rule, Old Chief emphasizes the importance of allowing the prosecution to maintain “the natural sequence of narrative evidence” in presenting its case, to ameliorate the concern that “[pjeople who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters.” Id. at 189, 117 S.Ct. 644. The Court’s concern in Old Chief has little to no application in this instance. The September 2002 bus bombing was almost entirely unrelated to the elements of the charges- — -and, therefore, the government’s “narrative evidence” — against Al-Moayad and Zayed, especially considering that the defendants never denied their knowledge of Hamas’s terrorist activities. In fact, Black’s testimony, during which he never referred to either defendant or to any aspect of the investigation or charges against them, constituted a significant break from the substance of the rest of the government’s case-in-chief. Black’s extended account of the tragedy could not reasonably be considered part of “the res gestae, the narrative” of the government’s case against the defendants. Pepin, 514 F.3d at 208. Therefore, omitting Black’s testimony would not have disrupted the narrative flow of the government’s trial evidence. Furthermore, an eyewitness account of a violent, destructive, and fatal suicide bombing seems quite clearly to “involve conduct more inflammatory than the charged crime[sj.” United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 223 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Livoti, 196 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir.1999)). Indeed, the government’s extended presentation of Black’s testimony, supplemented by photos and video, amounted to a blatant appeal to the jury’s emotions and prejudices. Even if the district court properly-admitted Black’s testimony for the proffered purpose — to show that a bombing actually occurred, just as Siyam said it had — the court erred in allowing the testimony to continue after that fact was established. After Black stated that a “huge explosion” occurred at the front of the bus, defense counsel repeatedly objected to any further testimony. The subsequent details about and images of the wreckage and the death of Black’s cousin were even less probative as to the issues at trial, and much more prejudicial. Nor can we find, as we typically have done in rejecting Rule 403 challenges to the admission of evidence, that a limiting instruction mitigated the prejudicial effect of the testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 127 (2d Cir.2008); Paulino, 445 F.3d at 223; United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.2002); Livoti, 196 F.3d at 326. The district court rejected the instruction proposed by AJ-Moayad’s counsel, which would have informed the jury that “there is no evidence nor allegation that either defendant had anything to do with the bus bombing [of] which Mr. Black and his cousin were victims.” Instead, the district court proposed the following vague, tendentious instruction: “You have heard the testimony of a bus bombing, you will determine based on the evidence or lack of evidence who was responsible for that incident. You will also determine what that incident has to do or not to do with the allegations in the indictment.” Because neither the bombing nor any other terrorist attack was part of the charges against the defendants, it would have been inappropriate for the jury to determine “based on the evidence or lack of evidence” who was responsible for the attack, and it was reasonable at that point for Al-Moay-ad’s counsel to withdraw his request for a limiting instruction. Therefore, the district court ultimately provided no guidance to the jury that might have mitigated the self-evident prejudicial effect of Black’s testimony. 2. Yahya Goba testimony The district court also erred in allowing Yahya Goba to testify about his experiences at the Al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. With regard to Goba, the district court seems simply to have failed to make the required “conscientious assessment” of the testimony’s prejudicial effect in comparison with its probative value, without which we have no adequate basis for deferring to the district court’s judgment. This omission stemmed, at least in part, from the government’s misleading proffer as to what Goba would say. In addition, the court repeatedly and over objection allowed Goba to continue testifying far beyond the proffer, without providing any indication of how (or whether) it had performed the Rule 403 assessment. In theory, the government offered Goba’s testimony to provide additional authentication of the mujahidin form, although the form had already been authenticated and admitted into evidence during Agent Hale Keenan’s testimony. Before Goba took the stand, Al-Moayad’s counsel raised a concern that “they intend to ask this gentleman what the business practices of this Al-Qaeda training camp was, what it means if your name is in a certain slot on one of these forms ... it seems to me this is beyond the scope of his ability to be able to testify....” Counsel for the government then assured the court that “we’re not going to ask him about the business practices of the Al-Qaeda training camp.... What he will specifically say is that in order to get into that camp, he knew he had to put down the name of somebody known to the camp leaders.” Goba did testify about filling out a form identical to the mujahidin form, and about listing as his reference the individual who sent him to the camp. However, as described above, Goba’s testimony continued well beyond the government’s proffer. Al-Moayad’s counsel interposed numerous objections throughout. While several of these were sustained, the court never appears to have assessed the probative value of the continuing narrative, or required the government to constrain the testimony to the scope of its proffer. For example, early in the examination but well after Goba discussed the application form, defense counsel stated, “we’re learning about this gentleman’s experience in the camp that is unrelated to anything involving the defendant in this case.” The court received that objection without comment, and the testimony continued. As to the Al Jazeera video of Bin Laden’s visit, defense counsel objected, “[tjhis is further evidence offered in support of testimony which was irrelevant to start with and much of which was already excluded.” The court responded that “[ijt’s only three minutes. I am going to allow it.” The court also summarily and without comment denied defense counsel’s Buie 403 objection. Goba’s testimony about the camp, and particularly the government’s presentation of images of Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, was highly inflammatory and irrelevant, and should not have been permitted by the district court. The government presented no evidence linking Goba to Al-Moayad, and yet his extensive testimony was admitted against Al-Moayad as part of the government’s rebuttal case. Even if Goba’s testimony had some value in authenticating the mujahidin form, we have no assurance that the court conscientiously balanced the probative value of the testimony against its prejudicial effect, given the court’s failure to explain. Nor do we think that, had the court performed that weighing analysis, it could have rationally concluded that the account of the events occurring at the training camp, including testimony about visits by Bin Laden and his associates, was admissible. Finally, as with Black’s testimony, the prejudicial effect of Goba’s statements was not mitigated by any limiting instruction to the jury. 3. Harmless error In sum, we conclude that the probative value of the Black and Goba testimony was far outweighed by its unfair prejudice, which the Supreme Court has described as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180, 117 S.Ct. 644 (quoting Fed.B.Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note). Further, the district court’s error in admitting the testimony was not harmless as to the issue of the defendants’ predisposition and, therefore, their entrapment defense. See Arlio v. Lively, 474 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that even when an evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion, “a new trial should be granted only if a substantial right of a party is affected — as when a jury’s judgment would be swayed in a material fashion by the error.”). Consequently, we must vacate the defendants’ convictions on the conspiracy and attempt counts. A district court’s erroneous admission of evidence is harmless “if the appellate court can conclude with fair assurance that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury.” United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 143 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir.1992)). In conducting a harmless error review of inadmissible evidence, we consider the following factors: “(1) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted [evidence]; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.” United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 468 (2d Cir.2004)); see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 217 (2d Cir.2005). All four harmless error factors tilt strongly in the defendants’ favor. First, the government’s evidence on predisposition was not overwhelming, and significant parts of it were inadmissible. See United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that a district court’s improper admission of evidence constituted harmful error where “the government’s properly admitted evidence, though sufficient, was not overwhelming.”). Much of the evidence that the government presented during its rebuttal case, which was expressly intended to counter the entrapment defense by demonstrating predisposition, was improperly admitted (including, of course, the Goba testimony, which was the centerpiece of the government’s rebuttal case). For example, we conclude below that the district court should not have admitted the mujahidin form, and the court’s error in admitting the Croatian will, while harmless when considered in isolation, nevertheless contributed to the cumulative unfairness of the trial. We also determine below that the district court erroneously admitted— during the government’s examination of Al-Anssi, when it was attempting to rehabilitate his crucial testimony as to the defendants’ predisposition' — the Siyam wedding speech and Al-Anssi’s notes. The notes in particular were highly probative as to Al-Moayad’s and, by extension, Zayed’s predisposition to support terrorism. As further evidence of predisposition, the government cited the portion of the Frankfurt tapes showing the defendants laughing after the informants brought up Siyam’s reference to the suicide bombing, arguing to the jury during its rebuttal summation that “[t]hey laugh because they support that type of activity.... You think for a moment prior to Frankfurt they weren’t inclined to support terrorist activities? Watch that video. Talk about a ready response, they’re all over it.” In our view, the fact that the defendants laughed with the informants constituted only equivocal evidence of predisposition, especially given Al-Anssi’s admission at trial that he might have laughed first to encourage the defendants to believe that he was happy about the suicide bombing. The government also points to Al-Moayad’s list of money sources in the United States as evidence of predisposition. However, no evidence at trial demonstrated that any money sent to Al-Moayad through these sources was tunneled into supporting terrorism. Further, although Al-Moayad stated during the Frankfurt meetings that he and Saeed were working in the same “field,” on balance Al-M