Full opinion text
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge: Defendants-appellants Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-’Owhali and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh challenge their convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Leonard B. Sand, Judge) on numerous charges arising from their involvement in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (the “August 7 bombings”). In this opinion we consider their challenges to the District Court’s rulings that denied, for the most part, their respective motions to suppress statements each of them made overseas to U.S. and non-U.S. officials. Other challenges and those of their co-defendant, Wadih El-Hage, are considered in two separate opinions filed today, In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.2008), and In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.2008). Al-’Owhali and Odeh contend that neither the “Advice of Rights” form (“AOR”) that they received nor the subsequent oral warnings of an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) satisfied Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In addition, Al-’Owhali asserts that the conditions of his confinement made his statements involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. He also contends that the District Court abused its discretion by withdrawing its initial grant of his suppression motion and holding further hearings pursuant to the government’s application. For his part, Odeh claims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the District Court permitted him to withdraw his initial suppression motion and his attorneys failed to renew that motion promptly thereafter. As explained in greater detail below, all of these claims lack merit. The AUSA’s oral warnings fulfilled, and the AOR substantially complied with, the government’s obligations, insofar as it had any, under Miranda, and the admission of Al-’Owha-li’s and Odeh’s statements did not otherwise run afoul of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court’s decision to conduct further hearings on Al-’Owhali’s suppression motion was well within its discretion, as was its decision to grant, without prejudice to renewal, Odeh’s application to withdraw his initial suppression motion. Accordingly, the District Court’s resolution of Al-’Owhali’s and Odeh’s respective motions did not violate any of their constitutional rights. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Overview 1. Al-’Owhali Al-’Owhali was detained on August 12, 1998 by Kenyan authorities in “an arrest [that] was valid under Kenyan law.” United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Within one hour of his arrest, Al-’Owhali was transported to Kenyan police headquarters in Nairobi and interrogated by two members of the Joint Terrorist Task Force — an FBI Special Agent and a New York City police detective — operating out of New York City and two officers of Kenya’s national police. Id. The New York police detective presented Al-’Owhali with an Advice of Rights form often used by U.S. law enforcement when operating overseas. The AOR, written in English, read in its entirety as follows: We are representatives of the United States Government. Under our laws, you have certain rights. Before we ask you any questions, we want to be sure that you understand those rights. You do not have to speak to us or answer any questions. Even if you have already spoken to the Kenyan authorities, you do not have to speak to us now. If you do speak with us, anything that you say may be used against you in a court in the United States or elsewhere. In the United States, you would have the right to talk to a lawyer to get advice before we ask you any questions and you could have a lawyer with you during questioning. In the United States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wish, before any questioning. Because we are not in the United States, we cannot ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for you before any questioning. If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You should also understand that if you decide not to speak with us, that fact cannot be used as evidence against you in a court in the United States. I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. Id. at 173-74. Al-’Owhali told the American law enforcement agents that he could not read English and had a limited understanding of spoken English. Id. at 174. Accordingly, the police detective “read the AOR aloud in English, going slowly and checking for visual signs of comprehension. Al-’Owhali appeared to [the detective to] understand, replied that he understood when asked, and signed his alias at the bottom of the AOR in Arabic when requested to do so.” Id. A one-hour interrogation ensued, in which Al-’Owhali responded in “broken English.” Id. Finding their ability to communicate with Al-’Owhali limited by the end of that hour, the agents decided to continue Al-’Owhali’s interrogation with the assistance of an interpreter. The special agent began this interview by reading the AOR in English, which the interpreter translated into Arabic. Id. Al-’Owhali stated that he “understood that the warning was the same one as from the morning session,” “understood his rights as described therein,” and “agreed to answer questions.” Id. Al-’Owhali was then interviewed for about three hours and, thereafter, was questioned on eight other days: August 13, 14, 17, and 21-25. Id. At the start of each of the interviews on August 13, 14, 17 and 21, the agents showed Al-’Owhali the signed AOR, asked whether he remembered his rights, and whether he would continue to answer their questions. Id. at 175. Al-’Owhali consented on each occasion. Until August 21, he denied any involvement in the embassy bombings. Id. During the August 21 interview, the U.S. agents described the inculpatory evidence they had gathered on Al-’Owhali, and “[a]fter acknowledging that the agents ‘knew everything,’ Al-’Owhali said that he would tell the truth about his involvement in the bombing if he could be tried in the United States.” Id. at 176. He explained that the reason he wanted to stand trial in the United States was “because the United States was his enemy, not Kenya.” Id. The agents then terminated the interview in order to determine whether Al-’Owhali’s request could be met. The next day, August 22, an AUSA, in the company of the two U.S. agents and two Kenyan police officers, provided Al-’Owhali with a document of understanding (“DOU”), approved by the U.S. Department of Justice, stating: I ... have been fully advised of my rights, including my right to remain silent and my right not to answer questions without a lawyer present. As I have been previously told, I understand that anything I say or have said can be used against me in court in the United States. I also understand that if I choose not to answer questions my refusal to answer questions cannot be held against me in court. I further understand that if I choose to answer questions, I can always change my mind and decide not to answer any further questions. I understand that both Kenyan and American authorities are investigating the murder of the various American and Kenyan victims in and around the United States [E]mbassy in Nairobi. I have a strong preference to have my case tried in an United States Court because America is my enemy and Kenya is not. I would like my past and present statements about what I have done and why I have done it to be aired in public in an American courtroom. I understand that the American authorities who are interviewing me want to know who committed the bombing of the embassy and how it was carried out. I am willing to waive my rights and answer the questions of American authorities upon the condition that the undersigned law enforcement authorities make all best efforts to see that I am brought to the United States to stand trial. I understand that the undersigned prosecutor is only empowered to make recommendations to the Attorney General of the United States and other executive officials of the United States Government and I further understand that the United States Government only intends to act with the mutual agreement of the Kenyan government. No other agreements or promises have been made other than as set forth in this document. Id. at 176. After being shown this document, but before it was read to him, Al-’Owhali indicated that “he might wish to have an attorney review the DOU to make sure it was enforceable.” Id. In response, the AUSA, through a translator, advised Al-’Owhali of his Miranda rights, “recited entirely from [the AUSA’s] memory of a domestic Miranda warning” and without “reference to the AOR utilized on the first day of interrogation.” Id. Specifically, the AUSA informed Al-’Owhali: that he had the right to remain silent; that he had the right “to have an attorney present during this meeting;” that even if Al-’Owhali decided to talk he could always change his mind later; that Al-’Owhali’s statements could be used against him in court, though the fact of his silence could not. AUSA [redacted] also said that he was an attorney for the U.S. government, not for Al-’Owhali. It was repeatedly stressed to Al-’Owhali that he was the “boss” at all times as to whether he wished to answer questions without a lawyer present. Id. at 176-77 (redaction signal in original). The AUSA further explained that no American lawyer was available at that time in Kenya. Id. at 177. After Al-’Owhali stated that he understood his rights, the AUSA read the DOU to Al-’Owhali, through a translator, verifying after each paragraph that Al-’Owhali understood the contents of the document. Id. Al-’Owhali did not “assert his rights” or object to any provision of the DOU except for the “uncertainty associated with [the paragraph indicating that U.S. officials would make] just a ‘recommendation’ that he be brought to the United States.” Id. The AUSA agreed to investigate the possibility of accommodating Al-’Owhali’s request, and before exiting the room to consult with his superiors at the Department of Justice, verified (twice) that Al-’Owhali was willing to proceed without counsel. Id. During the AUSA’s absence, Al-’Owhali withdrew his request, stating that “he would be willing to talk even without a full guarantee because he trusted the U.S. officials to do the best they could to bring him to the United States.” Id. The AUSA then returned to the interview room, verified again that Al-’Owhali was willing to proceed without counsel and, upon Al-’Owhali’s request, handed him the DOU to sign. Id. Al-’Owhali signed the statement, after explaining that the document would have to be amended to include his true name and nationality. Id. He was then interrogated for the next three-and-a-half hours; after that, he was interrogated for three hours on August 23 and 24, and for nine hours on August 25. Id. During these interviews, Al-’Owhali admitted his participation in the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi. Id. During the August 25 interrogation, Al-’Owhali claimed that he possessed “time-sensitive information regarding an issue of public safety” and would disclose this information only if he was guaranteed a trial in the United States rather than Kenya. Id. Accordingly, the AUSA, after obtaining the necessary approvals, prepared a second document of understanding (“second DOU”), which read: I ... have been fully advised of my rights, including my right to remain silent and my right not to answer questions without a lawyer present. As I have been previously told, I understand that anything I say or have said can be used against me in court in the United States. I also understand that if I choose not to answer questions my refusal to answer questions cannot be held against me in court. I further understand that if I choose to answer questions, I can always change my mind and decide not to answer any further questions. I have answered a number of questions of the American authorities and have provided truthful information after initially providing incorrect information. However, I have also indicated that there is additional information that I have which I stated I would share with the United States authorities upon my arriving in America and obtaining an attorney. I have also indicated that the information concerns a public safety issue. Because I would otherwise not make this disclosure before arriving in the United States and speaking to an attorney, but because American authorities do not wish to take the risk that the delay concerning the information I intend to impart later will cause loss of life, it is hereby agreed that I will tell the United States authorities about this information prior to returning to America. In turn, the American authorities agree not to use the fact that I disclosed this particular information against me as evidence in the Government’s case in chief if I should demand a trial of the charges that will be filed against me. I understand that the United States intends to pursue appropriate investigative leads based upon this information I am now agreeing to provide. I also understand that the United States is free to use any evidence gained in following up the investigative leads but will not advise any jury that hears my case of the fact that I revealed this particular information to the United States government, unless: (1) I testify falsely (or otherwise elicit false or misleading evidence or testimony) and revealing this fact will serve to correct false or misleading evidence; or (2) I request that the jury be advised of the fact that I disclosed this particular information and the Court overrules objection, if any, by the Government. The Government hereby agrees that if the Defendant is convicted, the Government will disclose the fact that I provided this information to the judge or jury determining or imposing sentence if requested to do so by the defendant. There is no promise that providing such information will affect my sentence. No other agreements or promises have been made other than as set forth in this document and the prior agreement dated August 22,1998. I have decided to sign this document because I have been advised by the undersigned that I am now scheduled to be removed to the United States within the next 24 hours, travel conditions permitting, and the undersigned is aware of no objections from either the United States or Kenya governments to such removal. Id. at 177-78. The AUSA read the second DOU to Al-’Owhali, through a translator, and then Al-’Owhali signed it. Id. at 178. After the Kenyan police left the room, at Al-’Owhali’s request, he disclosed the time-sensitive information to the U.S. agents. Id. The next morning, Al-’Owhali was flown from Kenya to the United States and, during the flight, was again advised of his Miranda rights. Al-’Owhali “stated that he knew his rights, signed the advice of rights form, and invoked his right to appointed counsel.” Id. 2. Odeh On August 7, 1998, Pakistani immigration officials detained Odeh, following his arrival at the Karachi airport on a flight from Kenya, on the ground that he used a false passport. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y.2001). Odeh was held in Pakistani custody until August 14, during which time he was interrogated by Pakistani officials. Id. On August 14, Odeh was transported to Nairobi, Kenya, and transferred from Pakistani custody to Kenyan custody. Id. The next day, he was interrogated by two special agents of the FBI, an AUSA, and three Kenyan police officers. Id. at 203. Odeh communicated with his interrogators, without difficulty, entirely in English. Id. The U.S. officials explained to Odeh that whether or not he spoke with Pakistani authorities during his detention in Karachi had no bearing on his decision to speak to them. Id. “Thereafter, when Odeh raised the issue of his admissions to the Pakistani authorities, he was told that the Americans did not know or care about what had transpired in Pakistan.” Id. One of the FBI special agents read Odeh an AOR similar in all material respects to the one read to Al-’Owhali: We are representatives of the United States Government. Under our laws, you have certain rights. Before we ask you any questions, we want to be sure that you understand those rights. You do not have to speak to us or answer any questions. Even if you have already spoken to the Pakistani authorities, you do not have to speak to us now. If you do speak with us, anything that you say may be used against you in a court in the United States or elsewhere. In the United States, you would have the right to talk to a lawyer to get advice before we ask you any questions and you could have a lawyer with you during questioning. In the United States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wish, before any questioning. Because we are not in the United States, we cannot ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for you before any questioning. If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You should also understand that if you decide not to speak with us, that fact cannot be used as evidence against you in a court in the United States. I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. Id. As the FBI special agent read the AOR, Odeh asked about the availability of a lawyer but did not specifically request one. Id. After further discussion of the AOR and Odeh’s willingness to speak to U.S. officials, the interview temporarily ceased so that the AUSA could investigate whether Kenyan counsel was available to Odeh. Id. at 204. Believing that Odeh lacked financial resources, the AUSA inquired into the availability of appointed — but not privately retained — Kenyan counsel. Id. A “high-ranking” Kenyan law enforcement officer informed the AUSA that under Kenyan law, appointed counsel was not provided at the investigative stage and it was their “practice to continue questioning a person who requests an appointed attorney.” Id. The AUSA informed Odeh of what he had learned from the Kenyan police officer, verified that Odeh had not already retained an attorney, and then orally informed him of his rights under Miranda: Odeh was told that he had the right to remain silent and that invocation of the right to silence could not be used against him in court. He was also told that if he did speak to the American officials, statements that he made could be used against him. With respect to the right to counsel, AUSA [redacted] told Odeh that he was entitled to have an attorney present and to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford one. However, AUSA [redacted] informed Odeh that no American attorney was currently available to represent him in Kenya. AUSA [redacted] emphasized that Odeh was “the boss” with respect to answering questions without an attorney present. Id. (redaction signals in original). The AUSA explained that Odeh could (1) exercise his right to remain silent; (2) invoke his right to have an attorney present, in which case the Americans would leave the room and he could then decide whether or not to speak with the Kenyan police; or (3) speak to both the American and Kenyan authorities without the presence of an attorney. Id. Odeh suggested a fourth possibility: “speaking with the American officials outside the presence of the Kenyans.” Id. While the U.S. and Kenyan authorities were investigating the viability of Odeh’s proposal, Odeh changed his mind and decided to speak to both the U.S. and Kenyan officials. Id. Odeh then signed the AOR. Id. Odeh never stated a desire to hire an attorney, and “[i]n fact, he asked the officials what would happen if he subsequently decided that he did not want to speak without a lawyer present.” Id. In response, the AUSA “informed him that he always had the right to stop talking with the American officials.” Id. at 204-05. After signing the AOR on August 15, Odeh was interviewed for about seven hours. Id. During the interrogation the next day, the AUSA again informed Odeh that he had the right to the presence of an attorney at the interview, even though no American attorney was available, and that if Odeh wanted an attorney, the Americans would not interrogate him. Id. at 205. Odeh expressed his willingness to answer questions and did not request an attorney, but he did make inquiries into the status of property confiscated upon his arrest. Id. Odeh was interrogated on a daily basis from approximately 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. until he was taken to the United States on August 27, 1998. Id. During these sessions, “Odeh admitted that he was a member of al Qaeda but denied any participation in (or foreknowledge of) the embassy bombings.” Id. When Odeh was transferred to American custody on August 27, he was given the standard Miranda warnings. Id. B. Al-’Owhali’s and Odeh’s Pretrial Suppression Motions On June 20, 2000, Odeh filed a motion to suppress, inter alia, statements that he made to U.S. officials in Kenya and to Pakistani law enforcement agents in Pakistan, on the grounds that the statements were made involuntarily and, with respect to the statements made to U.S. officials, pursuant to an inadequate Miranda warning. See Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 201. In support of this motion, Odeh filed a sworn affidavit. Id. Shortly thereafter, Odeh expressed reservations about this motion in letters to the District Court and the government. Id. at 201 & n. 3. In response, the District Court held a sealed and ex parte hearing on August 1, 2000 at which “it became clear that Odeh wished to withdraw his affidavit on grounds relating to his religious beliefs.” Id. at 201. The District Court permitted Odeh to do so and “deem[ed] as similarly withdrawn the motion to suppress itself, but ... granted [leave] for Odeh’s counsel to renew the suppression motion in a way that did not rely on Odeh’s own affidavit.” Id. Odeh’s counsel did not renew the suppression motion for over five months. In the interim, Al-’Owhali moved to suppress, inter alia, statements that he made to U.S. officials while held in the custody of Kenyan authorities, on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 171-72. In a sealed opinion dated January 9, 2001, the District Court granted Al-’Owhali’s motion because of its determinations that the AOR presented to Al-’Owhali did not satisfy the requirements of Miranda and, under the circumstances, Al-’Owhali’s statements were not made voluntarily. The next day, January 10, Odeh re-filed his previously withdrawn motion to suppress the statements that he made in Kenya and, on January 18, moved to suppress the statements that he made in Pakistan. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 201. Both motions were supported by sworn affidavits executed by Odeh. Id. At the same time, the government moved for (1) reconsideration of the District Court’s January 9 ruling granting Al-’Owhali’s motion and (2) reopening of the suppression hearing on that motion. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 172. The District Court granted the government’s motions and withdrew its opinion granting Al-’Owhali’s motion because the “[g]overnment’s proffer sufficiently indicated the need to further develop the factual record.” Id. After conducting a hearing on the circumstances of both Al-’Owhali’s and Odeh’s overseas detention, the District Court resolved the suppression motions in two opinions issued on February 13, 2001. C. The District Court’s Rulings on the Motions The District Court granted in part and denied in part Al-’Owhali’s motion and denied in full Odeh’s motions. The Court held that the oral warning given to Al-’Owhali satisfied Miranda but the AOR did not fully comply with Miranda. Because Al-’Owhali made statements prior to receiving that oral warning, his motion was granted as to those un-warned statements but denied as to the statements made after the oral warning. Odeh’s motion to suppress statements made in Pakistan was denied as untimely, and his motion to suppress statements made after receiving an oral Miranda warning and waiving his rights was denied on the merits. 1. Al-’Owhali Turning first to Al-’Owhali’s motion, the District Court found the following facts related to the conduct of Al-’Owhali’s interrogators and the conditions of his confinement: (1) Al-’Owhali was held for fourteen days by Kenyan authorities in “incommunicado detention” — that is, without communication with anyone outside the prison; (2) his cell for the first two days, which he shared with another detainee, was ten-feet-by-eleven-feet, with a two-foot-by-five-foot window and a concrete bed; (3) his cell for the other twelve days was sixty-four square feet, containing a thin mat and at least one blanket; (4) Al-’Owhali was never handcuffed during the interviews; (5) the interviews were held in a “library-like room”; (6) “frequent” breaks were allowed for prayer, eating, and using the restroom; (7) the agents provided bottled water upon request, as well as food; (8) U.S. officials made no threats or promises; and (9) Al-’Owhali received medical care as needed. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 178-79. The District Court also observed that “Al-’Owhali ha[d] two years of university education and significant military experience” and that “[a]t the time of the interrogations, Al-’Owhali had a basic understanding of spoken English [and] would sometimes answer the simpler questions posed to him before the Arabic interpreter had even finished translating [them].” Id. at 179. Recognizing that Al-’Owhali’s motion presented a question of first impression, the District Court held that both the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a form of the Miranda rule applied to the determination of “the admissibility of a defendant’s admissions at his criminal trial in the United States, where that defendant is a non-resident alien and his statements were the product of an interrogation conducted abroad by U.S. law enforcement representatives.” Id. at 181. With respect to the applicability of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, the District Court rejected the government’s characterization of the issue as one of “extraterritorial application,” explaining that “any violation of the privilege against self-incrimination occurs, not at the moment law enforcement officials coerce statements through custodial interrogation, but when a defendant’s involuntary statements are actually used against him at an American criminal proceeding.” Id. at 181-82. The District Court explained that, based on the text of the Amendment, “these protections seemingly apply with equal vigor to all defendants facing criminal prosecution at the hands of the United States, and without apparent regard to citizenship or community connection.” Id. This reading was confirmed, in the District Court’s view, by “the Supreme Court’s own explicit treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination as a ‘fundamental trial right of criminal defendants,’” id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990)), and because the animating purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination — in, fairness, reliability, prevention of abuses — “are no less relevant when the criminal defendant at issue is an unconnected, non-resident alien,” id. at 185. Accordingly, the District Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination applied to Al-’Owhali notwithstanding his status as a “non-resident alien[] whose only connections to this country [are his] alleged crimes and ... domestic prosecution therefor.” Id. Turning to the applicability of Miranda, the District Court held that, in prosecutions such as the one brought against Al-’Owhali, “a principled, but realistic application of Miranda’s familiar warning/waiver framework, in the absence of a constitutionally-adequate alternative, is both necessary and appropriate under the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 185-86. Referencing the Miranda Court’s observation that “compulsion [was] inherent in custodial settings,” id. at 186 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), the District Court noted that “the inherent coerciveness of that police technique [i.e., custodial interrogation] is clearly no less troubling when carried out beyond our borders and under the aegis of a foreign stationhouse,” id. The District Court also relied on a line of cases recognizing that Miranda does not apply to overseas interrogations conducted by foreign police unless U.S. officials also take part in the questioning or use foreign officials as their agents. Id. at 187. In the District Court’s view, the existence of this “joint venture exception” to the admissibility of overseas statements taken in the absence of such warnings “is based on the assumption that Miranda must apply to any portion of an overseas interrogation that is, in fact or form, conducted by U.S. law enforcement.” Id. Having determined that the Miranda framework applied to overseas interrogations conducted by U.S. agents, the District Court set forth the content of the warnings a foreign detainee must receive. It found “uncontroversial” the requirements that a suspect be warned that “he has the right to remain silent ... even if he has already spoken to the foreign authorities ... [and] that anything he does say may be used against him in a court in the United States or elsewhere.” Id. at 187-88. More difficult were the warnings related to the rights to presence and assistance of counsel because a suspect may not actually have those rights under the law in the country where he is detained and “[n]o constitutional purpose is served by compelling law enforcement personnel to lie or mislead subjects of interrogation.” Id. at 188. In the District Court’s judgment, the existence of these rights turned on foreign law but that dependency did not render these warnings inapplicable. It determined that “[t]o the maximum extent reasonably possible, efforts must be made to replicate what rights would be present if the interrogation were being conducted in America.” Id. In effect, the District Court would require that “U.S. law enforcement ... do the best they can to give full effect to a suspect’s right to the presence and assistance of counsel, while still respecting the ultimate authority of the foreign sovereign.” Id. at 188-89. With respect to these rights, the District Court proposed the following warning: Under U.S. law, you have the right to talk to a lawyer to get advice before we ask you any questions and you can have a lawyer with you during questioning. Were we in the United States, if you could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wished, before any questioning. Because you are not in our custody and we are not in the United States, we cannot ensure that you will be permitted access to a lawyer, or have one appointed for you, before or during any questioning. However, if you want a lawyer, we will ask the foreign authorities to permit access to a lawyer or to appoint one for you. If the foreign authorities agree, then you can talk to that lawyer to get advice before we ask you any questions and you can have that lawyer with you during questioning. If you want a lawyer, but the foreign authorities do not permit access at this time to a lawyer or will not now appoint one for you, then you still have the right not to speak to us at any time without a lawyer present. Id. at 188 n. 16. The District Court then applied this standard of admissibility to Al-’Owhali’s statements, holding that “the AOR is facially deficient in its failure to apprise [defendants accurately and fully of their right, under Miranda, to the assistance and presence of counsel if questioned by U.S. agents, even considering the fact that [defendants were in the custody of foreign authorities.” Id. at 190. The AOR was misleading, in the District Court’s view, because it informed detainees that, if they were in the United States, they would have the rights to the presence and assistance of counsel, but because they were abroad, those rights could not be guaranteed. The AOR, the District Court concluded, “wrongly convey[s] to a suspect that, due to his custodial situs outside the United States, he currently possesses no opportunity to avail himself of the services of an attorney before or during questioning by U.S. officials” and, therefore, “prematurely forecloses the significant possibility that the foreign authorities themselves may, if asked, either supply counsel at public expense or permit retained counsel inside the stationhouse.” Id. In the District Court’s view, the AUSA’s oral recitation of a “traditional” Miranda warning at the August 22 interview accurately apprised Al-’Owha-li of his rights and this warning cured the deficiencies of the AOR at the point it was administered. The District Court explained that the “AOR was flawed in its message that the right to counsel during an interrogation by U.S. agents was geographically based, ... [but on] August 22 ... Al-’Owhali was explicitly apprised that he had the right to the presence of an attorney for purposes of the ensuing conversations.” Id. at 192 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the District Court concluded that, based on the AUSA’s oral advice of rights, “beginning on August 22, Al-’Owhali was apprised of his rights in compliance with the requirements of Miranda.” Id. The District Court also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Al-’Owha-li made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights after having been so warned. Id. at 193. The Court found that the “the conditions of confinement, although non-ideal, were far from oppressive.” Id. The District Court also observed that “Al-’Owhali’s behavior during the interrogations subsequent to August 22 made it clear that he was quite aware who was the ‘boss’ as to whether statements would or would not be made without a lawyer present.” Id. In addition, the District Court found that Al-’Owhali’s decision to speak with U.S. officials “was not the product of any duress, threat, promise, or coercion by his interrogators” and that, by contrast, “there is evidence that Al-’Owhali regarded his sessions with [one of the special agents] as a cat-and-mouse game between trained professionals.” Id. The District Court also clarified the basis for its changed view of the voluntariness of Al-’Owhali’s actions, explaining that in its initial (and subsequently withdrawn) decision of January 9, 2001, it “thought Al-’Owhali’s statements to be the product of a ‘Hobson’s choice’ that supposedly pitted his continued silence in Kenya against his access to an American attorney.” Id. at 194. In light of the additional evidence presented at the reopened suppression hearing, including the AUSA’s testimony, the District Court concluded: [W]hat truly motivated Al-’Owhali to inculpate himself was his own overriding desire that he be tried in the United States. As he declared to the U.S. agents interviewing him, it was the United States which was his enemy, not Kenya. Particularly significant is the fact that the suggestion that he be tried in America was initiated entirely by Al-’Owhali. And when Al-’Owhali was dissatisfied by the less-than-firm assurances offered in the first DOU, he demanded that AUSA [redacted] do better. All of the above confirms [the Court’s] belief that Al-’Owhali’s decision to waive his rights and confess to the Americans was a decision borne of his own volition. Id. (redaction signal in original). For these reasons, the District Court granted Al-’Owhali’s motion to suppress the statements that he made to U.S. officials prior to August 22 but denied the motion with respect to statements made after the oral warning and waiver of August 22. Id. at 192,194. 2. Odeh With respect to the conditions of Odeh’s overseas confinement, the District Court found that Odeh was held incommunicado in Kenyan custody for fourteen days, the maximum length of detention authorized by Kenyan law for individuals suspected of a capital offense. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d at 205. The District Court also found that “there were no threats or promises made to [defendant Odeh in exchange for the statements that he made.” Id. at 206. The Court also acknowledged that “[w]hile he was in Kenyan custody, [defendant Odeh’s wife and brother-in-law were also detained and interviewed by the Kenyan [police],” and that Odeh was not allowed to speak with them. Id. at 206. As to the personal characteristics relevant to this inquiry, the Court found that Odeh had three years of college-level education, principally in architecture and engineering, and that he had “spent several years in Afghanistan where he received military training and experience and where he served, for a time, as a medic.” Id. Turning to Odeh’s Fifth Amendment claim, the District Court restated its holding with respect to Al-’Owhali’s suppression motion: (1) the Fifth Amendment governed the admission of statements obtained overseas in a U.S. trial; (2) the Miranda warning/waiver framework applied to Odeh’s overseas interrogation by U.S. officials; and (3) the AOR “used in Kenya as part of the embassy bombing investigation was facially deficient because it prematurely foreclosed the possibility that counsel would in fact be allowed inside the foreign stationhouse.” Id. at 211. As with Al-’Owhali, the AUSA’s oral warning cured the deficient AOR. Id. The District Court explained: The detailed and patient explanations given by AUSA [redacted] affirmatively communicated the message that, no matter what, Odeh possessed the right to insist on the assistance and presence of counsel for purposes of questioning by U.S. law enforcement. There was no indication that such a right only existed if Odeh was actually inside the United States. Admittedly, Odeh was told that neither an American nor a Kenyan appointed lawyer was currently available, but that information was simply the truth. Miranda, after all, is not served when police make misrepresentations. Moreover, what was perhaps available— a private Kenyan attorney — was never limited in any way. And by asking Odeh if he had Kenyan counsel already retained, AUSA [redacted] certainly alerted Odeh as to the existence of that possibility. Id. at 212 (redaction signals in original). On the basis of this oral warning, the District Court concluded that Odeh had been informed of his Miranda rights “immediately after the administration of the written AOR and before any substantive questioning had yet taken place.” Id. The District Court also found “by a preponderance of the evidence, that Odeh made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.” Id. The waiver was knowing, in the District Court’s view, because Odeh understood his rights, including his right to counsel, and “fully appreciated the fact that he was the ‘boss’ as to whether he would accede to questioning by Americans.” Id. at 212-13. It was voluntary because Odeh “was driven to talk in order to distance himself from the embassy bombing” and not because of any compulsion. Id. at 213. Indeed, the District Court noted: “Odeh makes no claim that he was abused, mistreated, or threatened by either the Kenyans or Americans. He raises no complaint with respect to the objective conditions of his confinement \e.g., the size of his cell or frequency of meals]. Nor does he allege that his personal characteristics made him unduly vulnerable.” Id. His allegations of compulsion were instead based on (1) his “incommunicado detention” and (2) his fear of being left alone with the Kenyans if he invoked his right to counsel. Id. The District Court found neither argument persuasive, explaining (1) incommunicado detention “cannot be said to have induced his statements since he began confessing from the very first day of questioning”; and (2) his being left alone with Kenyan authorities without being questioned by U.S. agents “is precisely what Miranda requires: where no counsel is available, interrogation must cease.” Id. In light of these determinations, the District Court denied Odeh’s motion to suppress the statements he made in Kenya. Addressing Odeh’s motion to suppress the statements he made to Pakistani officials while detained in Karachi, the District Court denied it as untimely. Id. While recognizing that it had “never imposed a hard deadline by which Odeh was required to renew his withdrawn June 20, 2000 suppression motion,” the District Court observed that, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, such motions must be raised “prior to trial” and “the unique context of this case necessitates that the ‘prior to trial’ ... be interpreted as ‘prior to jury selection.’ ” Id. By the time Odeh renewed this portion of his motion, the District Court had already spent nine days selecting a jury for the trial. Id. Had the District Court held a suppression hearing on Odeh’s motion, “such action would certainly have resulted in great inconvenience to the 65 potential jurors the [District] Court had already selected and the 270 others who had yet to be subjected to individual voir dire” because their lives would be held in “abeyance” pending resolution of the suppression motion. Id. at 218-14. It would also have risked causing the District Court to cancel jury selection — the scope of which was the largest ever in the history of the Southern District of New York — and to begin the complicated process again after the conclusion of the suppression proceedings. Id. at 214. In addition, the District Court recognized the prejudice that holding a suppression hearing at the eleventh hour would cause the government, insofar as “any ruling in favor of suppression would have left the [government with insufficient time to alter its theory of the case in this sprawling prosecution.” Id. Accordingly, the District Court deemed Odeh’s motion untimely, and because Odeh offered “no valid reasons for his late submission,” declined to disregard the untimeliness of the motion. Id. On this basis, as reinforced by the government’s representation that it did not intend to use in its case-in-chief any of Odeh’s statements obtained by Pakistani authorities, the District Court denied Odeh’s motion to suppress the statements he made while in Pakistani custody. Id. at 215. II. DISCUSSION A. Odeh’s and Al-’Owhali’s Challenges to the District Court’s Procedural Decisions Odeh and Al-’Owhali challenge two procedural decisions of the District Court relating to their suppression motions, specifically the District Court’s decisions: (1) permitting Odeh to withdraw his first suppression motion and (2) granting the government’s motion to reopen Al-’Owhali’s suppression hearing. We see no error in the District Court’s rulings on these issues, nor do we perceive any merit in Odeh’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when pressing these motions. 1. Odeh’s Withdrawal of His First Motion to Suppress Odeh faults both the District Court for ruling that his first motion to suppress had been withdrawn and his attorneys for not renewing the motion promptly thereafter. He claims that the decisions of the District Court and his attorneys violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Odeh’s position lacks merit. Odeh’s own actions — in particular, his request, on religious grounds, to withdraw his affidavit in support of the suppression motion and his insistence, again on religious grounds, that his lawyers not re-file the motion — fully explain why his first suppression motion was deemed withdrawn by the District Court and not immediately renewed by his attorneys. Accordingly, he has no basis now to complain that his constitutional rights were violated. As described above, Odeh’s attorneys filed a motion to suppress on June 20, 2000 that was supported by an affidavit executed by Odeh. See Part I.B, ante. Shortly thereafter, Odeh contacted the District Court and the government to express his reservations about the motion. Id. Odeh’s defense team also wrote to the District Court, requesting that Odeh be allowed to withdraw his affidavit and that the District Court hold a hearing to determine whether Odeh’s constitutional rights were adequately protected. In light of these letters, the District Court held a sealed, ex parte hearing (in the absence of representatives of the government) on August 1, 2000, at which Odeh, through the assistance of an interpreter, stated that, because of religious law, he wished to withdraw his affidavit and did not want his attorneys to continue to press the suppression motion on the basis of his testimony. The District Court inquired whether Odeh would permit his attorneys to resubmit the motion based on evidence other than his testimony. After consulting with Odeh, defense counsel intimated that Odeh might be willing to permit the filing of such a motion but expected his lawyers to first obtain his permission before making any such filing. Accordingly, the District Court acceded to Odeh’s desire to withdraw his affidavit and, because the affidavit formed the basis for the suppression motion, deemed the motion withdrawn. One member of Odeh’s defense team objected to the District Court’s ruling, and the District Court responded that its decision was without prejudice to re-filing the motion based on other evidence. The dissenting defense attorney persisted in her objection, arguing that the decision whether to submit or withdraw Odeh’s affidavit was subject only to defense counsel’s strategic judgment. Noting that this assertion was contrary to defense counsel’s letter and made for the first time nearly an hour and thirty minutes into the hearing, the District Court did not alter its ruling but permitted counsel to brief the issue for the District Court’s further consideration. Three months passed without any further submission from defense counsel. On September 28, 2000, the District Court raised the issue in the course of a proceeding on the withdrawal application of one of Odeh’s counsel, explaining that it “ha[d] not ruled that no motion to suppress may be made absent Mr. Odeh’s approval or affidavit but rather ... explicitly deferred resolution of that matter, awaiting a further submission which [one of Odeh’s attorneys] ... advises the Court apparently will not be forthcoming.” Appellants’ App. 2775. The suppression application was ultimately renewed by two motions filed on January 10 and January 18, 2001, both supported by an affidavit of Odeh. Odeh contends that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by honoring his — that is, Odeh’S' — request to withdraw his affidavit and suppression motion despite his counsel’s objection. This contention is entirely without merit. The Supreme Court has explained that a court “violates [a defendant’s] right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The record shows no evidence — and Odeh has pointed to none— that the District Court interfered with the independent decisions of Odeh’s defense team with respect to this motion. Instead, the record shows that on the independent applications of both Odeh and Odeh’s attorneys, the District Court permitted the withdrawal of Odeh’s affidavit because its submission allegedly conflicted with Odeh’s religious beliefs. The District Court also held an ex parte hearing, at the request of Odeh’s attorneys, to evaluate the circumstances underlying Odeh’s decision. At this hearing, the District Court held that because Odeh wished to withdraw his affidavit and the suppression motion was dependent upon that affidavit, the motion would also be deemed withdrawn. As the District Court explained, Odeh could not “have it both ways” — by withdrawing the affidavit but continuing to press a motion raising claims supported almost entirely by that affidavit. Appellants’ App. 2758. The District Court nevertheless permitted defense counsel to file “a new motion without an affidavit from the defendant,” stating that the District Court “would defer decision on the adequacy of such a motion until after the [government had an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 2774. When one member of Odeh’s defense team challenged the ruling on the ground that the decision to withdraw an affidavit should be made by counsel and not the defendant, the District Court instructed her to brief the issue. She declined to do so. These rulings cannot constitute “interfere[nce] ... with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Nor did the District Court interfere in any way with the independence of Odeh’s defense team by noting in its August 1, 2000 Order that one of the defense attorneys had assured “Odeh with respect to this subject matter [that] nothing will be submitted to the Court that does not have his express approval.” Appellant’s App. 2764. Another member of the defense team construed this language as “instructing defense counsel not to file any motions without Mr. Odeh’s express approval.” Id. at 2769. The District Court corrected this misapprehension promptly, explaining: “the Court has not issued a broad pronouncement that a client’s wishes as to all matters must prevail ... [and] that no motion to suppress may be made absent Mr. Odeh’s approval.” Id. at 2775. Accordingly, the District Court’s August 1 Order cannot be read to interfere with defense counsel’s independent judgment. In essence, the requests made by Odeh and his defense team required the District Court to mediate between Odeh’s “right to control the presentation of his defense,” Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001), and his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (“The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.”). Recognizing Odeh’s absolute control over the decision to testify, see Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.1997), and defense counsel’s belief that a suppression motion was nevertheless warranted, we find no fault with the District Court’s decision to (1) deem withdrawn the suppression motion that was based principally on Odeh’s affidavit and (2) permit the motion’s renewal if supported by evidence other than Odeh’s affidavit. In so doing, the District Court admirably balanced Odeh’s right to control his defense and his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Asserting that “there is ample blame to be shared,” Odeh Br. 63, Odeh now also faults his defense team at trial for (1) improperly deferring to his wishes to withdraw his affidavit in support of the motion to suppress, (2) failing to respond to the District Court’s invitation for additional briefing on the withdrawal of the motion to suppress, and (3) neglecting, until the eve of trial, to re-file the suppression motion based on evidence other than his affidavit. Odeh’s first two arguments are foreclosed by our determination in United States v. Wellington that “to the extent that defendant instructed his counsel to pursue a course of action that defendant now complains of, there was no abridgement—constructive or otherwise— of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” 417 F.3d 284, 289 (2d Cir.2005). Deferring to the wishes of a client does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to Odeh’s third argument, defense counsel’s delay in re-filing the suppression motion was not prejudicial because the government represented that no statement from the interrogation conducted in Pakistan would be used at trial—and none of his statements was so used by the government. Because Odeh was not prejudiced by the delayed filing of the suppression motion, he cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel on that basis. 2. The District Court’s Reopening of Al-’Owhali’s Suppression Hearing Al-’Owhali argues that the District Court abused its discretion when, after granting his suppression motion, it then permitted the government to reopen the record in support of its motion for reconsideration. Relying on precedents from other circuits, Al-’Owhali faults the District Court’s decision to reopen the suppression hearing without requiring the government to offer a reasonable justification for not having presented this evidence at the earlier proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir.2000) (“In order to properly exercise its discretion [to reopen suppression hearings] the district court must evaluate [the government’s] explanation and determine if it is both reasonable, and adequate to explain why the government initially failed to introduce evidence that may have been essential to meeting its burden of proof.”). By reopening the suppression hearing and permitting the government to present additional evidence, the District Court afforded the government, in Al-’Owhali’s view, “the proverbial second bite of the apple.” Because of the substantial “deference properly accorded a district court’s decisions regarding evidentiary matters and the general conduct of trials,” we review a district court’s decision to reconsider an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir.2000). In Bayless, we neither endorsed nor rejected the position urged by Al-’Owhali—'that when the government seeks to introduce new evidence in reopened suppression proceedings, the government must offer a reasonable justification for its failure to present the evidence earlier. See id. We observed, however, that “[o]ther courts, citing a policy in favor of introduction of lawfully obtained evidence, have declined to impose such a justification requirement.” Id. In addition, we reiterated our view that “vague notions of unfairness, that the government should not have ‘two bites’ off the same apple, ought not [to] control.” Id. at 132 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206, 214 (2d Cir.1967)). As presaged by our earlier cases, we now hold that, on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing, there is no bright-line rule that necessarily and invariably requires the government to provide a reasonable justification for its failure to offer relevant evidence at an earlier suppression proceeding. Whether or not the government can justify its delay is simply one factor, among others, that a district court may consider when deciding whether to reopen a suppression hearing. We agree with the other circuits that have reached this conclusion. A “defendant is entitled to have evidence suppressed only if it was obtained unconstitutionally. If matters appearing later indicate that no constitutional violation occurred, society’s interest in admitting all relevant evidence militates strongly in favor of permitting reconsideration.” United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.1981). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[a] criminal defendant acquires no personal right of redress in suppressed evidence” because the rationale for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence is to deter official misconduct, not to compensate criminal defendants for the violation. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.1984). If the government possesses evidence showing that, in fact, no official misconduct occurred, the interests of justice militate strongly in favor of considering this evidence even if it is belatedly brought to the district court’s attention. In the last analysis, a district court should be permitted, in the exercise of its discretion and in light of the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether its suppression ruling should stand. While it may often be useful for the government to explain its reasons for not introducing evidence earlier, a district court may consider the evidence without first finding good cause for the government’s omission or delay. The case now before us illustrates the wisdom of consigning the decision to reopen evidentiary hearings to the sound discretion of the district court, unencumbered by bright-line rules. Here, the District Court recognized that its decision to grant Al-’Owhali’s suppression motion was based on “certain factual assumptions which [subsequently] appeared] to be inaccurate” in light of the evidence submitted in support of the government’s motion to reopen the suppression hearing. Supplemental App. 1119. In addition, the legal question — namely, the application of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda to statements taken overseas — was one “of first impression not only in this circuit but nationally.” Id. That the District Court chose to reopen the record in light of the government’s additional evidence and the significance of the legal question at issue strikes us as an eminently reasonable course of action. In addition, the courts that have imposed a rule requiring the government to show good cause to reopen evidentiary hearings appear to have done so because “from the beginning [of the proceedings] the government was fully aware of what it had to establish to successfully oppose [the defendant’s] suppression motion.” Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220. The suppression motion before the District Court in the instant case — involving the applicability of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda to overseas investigations — was, as noted, “of first impression” and, accordingly, the government cannot be said to have been aware “from the beginning ... of what it had to establish.” Even if we were to impose a “justification” requirement, the government surely met it here. In its motion, the government offered at least two justifications for not having introduced certain evidence at the initial suppression hearing. First, the government pointed to the shortened time frame for the suppression hearing associated with Al-’Owhali’s delay in filing his motion which “necessitated an expedited hearing during the midst of jury selection and final trial preparations,” Al-’Owhali App. 1207. The result of this schedule, according to the government, was that it “misperceived the disputed issues that most troubled the [District] Court” and, therefore, did not initially present evidence most relevant to the Court’s concerns. Id. Second, the government did not submit certain evidence at the initial suppression hearing out of concern, raised by Al-’Owhali’s own counsel, that news accounts of the hearing might taint the jury pool. Id. at 1211. It planned to offer those statements under seal in the reopened suppression