Full opinion text
KING, Circuit Judge: In 1998, Plaintiff Billy Mullins sold all the assets of his company to Defendant TestAmerica, Inc. in exchange for cash and an unsecured promissory note payable to Mullins’s company, renamed Faraway Enterprises. TestAmerica’s obligation to pay the note was subordinated and subject to the prior payment in full of all of TestAmerica’s “debt facilities.” TestAmerica fell on hard times, winding up with approximately $50 million in debt. In 2003, TestAmerica sold all of its assets to a third party in exchange for $33.5 million. Secured and senior debt was paid, and at the direction of the secured creditor, approximately $3 million due it was paid to retire part of TestAmerica’s debt to Sagaponack Partners LP, the majority shareholder of TestAmerica. Faraway’s note and the balance of Sagaponack’s debt remain unpaid. Mullins and Faraway filed suit against TestAmerica claiming breach of contract and fraud and against TestAmerica and Sagaponack alleging a violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The jury found that the contract was breached, that TestAmerica defrauded Faraway, and that TestAmerica and Sagaponack violated TUFTA. The jury awarded no actual damages but imposed punitive damages against TestAmerica and Sagaponack. In large part, we reverse. I. Factual Background A. The 1998 sale of METCO to TestAmerica Plaintiff Billy Mullins, a resident of Texas, owned Mullins Environmental Testing Co., Inc. (“METCO”), a Texas company that specialized in testing air from smokestacks. Early in 1998, Mullins began marketing his company to potential buyers. A business broker put Mullins in touch with TestAmerica, Inc. (“TestAmerica”), then known as Hydrologic, an environmental testing company based in North Carolina that was seeking to expand the scope of its business. Thomas Barr served as TestAmerica’s President, as its CEO, and as one of five directors on its board. Of TestAmerica’s four other directors, two— Barry Rosenstein and Defendant Marc Weisman (“Weisman”)' — were also limited partners in Sagaponack Partners LP (“Sagaponack”), a private equity group, a third was chosen by Barr from a slate of individuals proposed by Sagaponack, and the fourth was unaffiliated with Sagaponack. On December 18, 1998, TestAmerica purchased METCO and two other companies. TestAmerica financed these acquisitions by issuing both debt and equity. First, Fleet Capital Corporation (“Fleet”), both as a lender and as agent for a syndicate of other lenders, agreed to make available to TestAmerica a “Total Credit Facility” of $37 million consisting of revolving credit loans, letters of credit, and term loans. These loans were secured by all of TestAmerica’s assets. Key Mezzanine Capital, L.L.C. (“Key”) and Regis Capital Partners, L.P. (“Regis”) also provided a total of $7 million in mezzanine financing, a hybrid of debt and equity financing. By agreement, Fleet’s loan had priority in right of payment over that of Key and Regis. TestAmerica also issued three “amended and restated” promissory notes totaling $555,000, and three “earnout” promissory notes totaling $350,000 to Louis, Rami, and Firas Mishu (the “Mishus”). The Mishu notes were secured by approximately $2 million of equipment belonging to Geotek Drilling Company, Inc., one of TestAmerica’s existing subsidiaries. Sagaponack, under a “Second Securities Purchase and Loan Agreement,” contributed $3,700,000 in cash and agreed to cancel two prior notes from January 13, 1998, in exchange for a bridge note of $3,000,000, a term note of $700,000, and a replacement note of $5,311,094. Sagaponack also received enough shares of TestAmerica’s common stock to become the majority shareholder of TestAmerica. Significantly, the agreement included a change of control provision that prohibited TestAmerica from selling its assets without Sagaponack’s approval. Closing occurred at the offices of Fleet’s attorneys in New York City. Mullins, who signed the documents in Texas and sent them to the closing, executed five contracts with TestAmerica governing the sale of METCO: (1) an employment agreement under which Mullins would serve for three years as President of the new METCO entity, METCO Environmental, Inc. (“METCO Environmental”) and receive a yearly salary of $150,000; (2) a non-compete agreement; (3) an asset purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”); (4) an “8% subordinate convertible note” (the “Note”); and (5) a subordination agreement (the “Subordination Agreement”). After the sale of its assets, MET-CO changed its name to Faraway Enterprises (“Faraway”), a Texas corporation wholly owned and controlled by Mullins with its principal place of business in Texas. The parties’ dispute centers around the payment and priority terms in the Note, Purchase Agreement, and Subordination Agreement (collectively, the “Agreements”). As required by the Purchase Agreement, TestAmerica paid Mullins $8.25 million in cash at closing. TestAmerica’s obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for METCO’s assets was evidenced by the Note. Pursuant to a formula based on METCO Environmental’s profits over the following three-year period, the Note’s initial principal amount of $2 million would be adjusted to an amount between $1 million and $6.75 million. This calculation was to be provided to Faraway in a “Period Income Statement” within 90 days of December 31, 2001, ie., on or before March 31, 2002. The Note also required TestAmerica to make annual interest payments of $160,000 starting on December 31, 2000, and three annual principal payments starting on December 31, 2001. Both the Note and Purchase Agreement included Texas choice of law provisions and provided for exclusive venue and jurisdiction in Dallas County, Texas. Faraway’s priority in payment in relation to TestAmerica’s other creditors is defined by several provisions in the Agreements. According to the Purchase Agreement, the Note shall be subordinated and subject in right of payment to the prior payment by [TestAmerica] in full of all of [TestAmeriea’s] debt facilities. The indebtedness evidenced by the ... Note shall be expressly subordinated to the extent and the manner set forth in the Subordination Agreement dated December 18, 1998 among TestAmerica Incorporated (“TAI”), Key Mezzanine Capital L.L.C. (“KMC”), Regis Capital Partners, L.P[.] (“Regis”), [and] Fleet Capital Corporation (“Fleet”).... The Subordination Agreement, which was drafted by the attorneys for Key and Regis, delineates two categories of creditors: (1) “Senior Creditors” Fleet, Key, and Regis (the “Senior Creditors”), and (2) “Subordinated Creditors,” defined as “the parties signing below as Subordinated Creditors.” During the course of litigation, the parties disputed which of two versions of the Subordination Agreement is the operative agreement. The day before closing, Mullins signed a copy of the agreement, which Mullins’s counsel sent to TestAmerica’s counsel in New York City. That document is labeled in the footer as “v.6” (“Version 6”), and the only signature reflected on the signature page is that of Mullins, as a “Subordinated Creditor.” The version that surfaced later during the course of litigation, however, is identified in the footer as “v.7” (“Version 7”). The footer on the two signature pages to Version 7, however, indicates that they are from Version 6. The first of these pages includes the signatures of the Senior Creditors; Thomas Barr for TestAmerica; and, as a “Subordinated Creditor,” Robert Juneja, the authorized signatory for Sagaponack. The second signature page contains only Mullins’s signature. According to Mullins, he neither authorized anyone to attach his signature to Version 7, nor anticipated that it would be so attached. Although several witnesses suggested that Version 7 was assembled by counsel to one of the lenders, at trial no one definitively identified the responsible lender. Both versions of the Subordination Agreement establish the priority of TestAmerica’s debts to the Senior Creditors (“Senior Debt”) over all “Subordinated Debt” but permit certain payments on Subordinated Debt while the Senior Debt remains outstanding so long as other conditions within the agreement are satisfied: 2. Subordinated Debt Subordinated to Senior Debt (a) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of any instruments or agreements evidencing or relating to Subordinated Debt, [TestAmerica] covenants and agrees, and each holder of Subordinated Debt by its signature hereon likewise covenants and agrees, for the benefit of the holders from time to time of Senior Debt, that all payments of Obligations and Claims in respect of Subordinated Debt shall be subject and subordinate in right of payment ... to the prior payment in full in cash of all Obligations in respect of (1) Designated Senior Debt [ie., debt to Fleet] and (2) other Senior Debt.... (b) Unless and until all Obligations in respect of the Senior Debt have been finally paid in full in cash, and subject to the provisions of this Agreement, including without limitation Section 3, 4, and 5, no direct or indirect payments shall be made on, under or with respect to any Obligations or Claims under, relating to or in respect of any Subordinated Debt except for the payments set forth as Permitted Schedule Payments on Exhibit 1 hereto. “Subordinated Debt” is defined as “all Obligations under the Subordinated Debt Documents,” which, in turn, means all agreements ... governing the indebtedness or other liabilities of [TestAmerica] or any affiliate to each party signing below as a Subordinated Creditor, including without limitation those listed on Exhibit 1 hereto. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all agreements or other instruments between [TestAmerica] ... and Sagaponack ... shall be a Subordinated Debt Document. (emphasis added). In Version 6, the only “Subordinated Creditor” listed in Exhibit 1 is METCO (ie., Faraway), but the spaces provided for METCO’s address, subordinated debt, permitted payments, and subordinated documents are blank. According to Mullins’s attorney, he anticipated that TestAmerica’s counsel would fill in this information. Exhibit 1 to Version 7, in contrast, provides the information missing from Version 6 but also includes payments for the bridge, term, and replacement notes to Sagaponack and for management fees to Sagaponack Management. According to TestAmerica’s counsel, Key and Regis’s attorneys most likely added Sagaponack and Sagaponack Management to Exhibit 1. Both versions suspend TestAmerica’s obligations to pay “Subordinated Debt” in the event that TestAmerica defaults on its obligations to the Senior Creditors, although the italicized words in the first sentence below are found only in Version 7: 4. Subordination on Default in Senior Debt. No direct or indirect payments by or on behalf of [TestAmerica] shall be made on, under or with respect to any Obligations or Claims under, relating to or in respect of any Subordinated Debt ... (a) if, at the time specified for such payment, (i) there exists ... a default in the payment ... of any Obligation in respect of Senior Debt or any other Default ... of any kind or nature shall have occurred and be continuing under the Senior Debt Documents, whether or not a payment default, and (ii) [Fleet] and the other Senior Creditors shall not have delivered to the holders of Subordinated Debt a written notice of waiver to the benefits of this sentence and consent to the making of payments on Subordinated Debt.... In addition to the foregoing, the liability of [TestAmerica] to pay any Obligation or Claims under, relating to or in respect of Subordinated Debt shall be suspended for the period specified below upon the occurrence of events or circumstances constituting a Default ... under any instrument or agreement creating or evidencing any Senior Debt ... and, during such suspension period, no default, event of default, breach or other right to payment shall arise or exist under the Subordinated Debt Documents, by reason of [TestAmerica’s] failure to pay such suspended Subordinated Debt. The suspension period ... shall commence upon the occurrence of events or circumstances constituting a Default ... under ... any Senior Debt and shall end upon the occurrence of a Proceeding or indefeasible payment in full of the Senior Debt. During such suspension period, [TestAmeriea] shall not pay any Subordinated Debt, whether pursuant to the terms of the Subordinated Documents or otherwise, and, the holders of Subordinated Debt shall not ... commence ... any Proceeding, or take any action to demand or enforce payment of any Subordinated Debt. Immediately following the expiration of any such period of suspension, any Subordinated Debt which, but for such suspension, would have become and would then be due and payable shall become immediately due and payable subject to the provisions of this Agreement. Under both versions of the agreement, a “Proceeding” means, in pertinent part: (a) any insolvency, bankruptcy, receivership, liquidation, reorganization, readjustment, arrangement, composition or other similar proceeding relating to [TestAmeriea], its property or its creditors .... Finally, both versions also include the following, identical clauses: 7. Subrogation If any payment or distribution to which the holders of Subordinated Debt would otherwise have been entitled, but for the provisions of this Agreement, shall have been applied, pursuant to the provision of this Agreement, to the payment of Obligations in respect of Senior Debt, then and in such case following the final and indefeasible payment in full in cash of all Obligations and Claims in respect of Senior Debt, the holders of Subordinated Debt shall be subrogated to the rights of the holders of Senior Debt to receive payments or distributions of assets of [TestAmeriea] and/or its subsidiaries made on such Senior Debt until all Subordinated Debt shall be paid in full.... 8. Obligations of [TestAmeriea] Unconditional Nothing contained in this Agreement (a) is intended to or shall impair, as between [TestAmeriea] and the holders of Subordinated Debt, the obligations of [TestAmeriea], which are absolute and unconditional, to pay to the holders of Subordinated Debt all Obligations in respect of Subordinated Debt as and when the same shall become due and payable in accordance with their terms, or (b) is intended to or shall affect the relative rights of the holders of Subordinated Debt, on the one hand, the creditors of [TestAmeriea] other than the holders of Senior Debt, on the other hand. B. TestAmerica’s financial troubles TestAmeriea made only one payment on the Note: the first interest payment of $160,000, which it paid in January, 2000, after the December 31, 1999 due date. By September, 2000, TestAmeriea was in default of its obligations to the Senior Creditors, although it continued to make quarterly payments on its notes to the Mishus. During this period, Fleet threatened to force TestAmeriea into bankruptcy. TestAmeriea began seeking a buyer for METCO Environmental. According to testimony of Mullins at trial, Barr offered to sell the company back to Mullins, but Mullins balked at the asking price of $13 million. Mullins, through Barr, learned that General Electric had offered to buy METCO Environmental for $10.5 million and had expressed an interest in having Mullins stay on to run the company. Mullins offered to speak to General Electric to see if the company would be willing to assume the Note. But, according to Mullins, Barr later informed him that Weisman refused to permit the company to be sold to General Electric if any money were to go to Mullins. On February 14, 2001, some of TestAmerica’s lenders, including Sagaponack, Key, and Mullins attended a meeting at Key’s offices in Cleveland, Ohio. Weisman, as a representative of Sagaponack, conducted the meeting and informed the lenders of TestAmerica’s default to Fleet and its ramifications. According to Weisman, he also discussed the hierarchy amongst the creditors and specifically told Mullins that he was at the bottom behind the Senior Creditors and Sagaponack. Fleet and two other syndicate members entered into a forbearance agreement with TestAmerica in November, 2001. Based on TestAmerica’s calculation of Mullins Environmental’s average profits from 1999 through 2001 in a “Period Income Statement” faxed and sent to Mullins on April 1, 2002 — one day after the prescribed deadline — the principal amount of the Note was to be $1,000,000. As will be seen infra, Mullins and Faraway disputed that amount. C. TestAmerica’s sale to HIG In mid-2002, TestAmerica accepted an offer from H.I.G. Capital, LLC (“HIG”) to purchase substantially all of its assets for $33.5 million, an amount significantly less than TestAmerica’s total outstanding debt of $50 million. TestAmerica’s board of directors, which then consisted of Barr, Weisman, Rosenstein, and another director unaffiliated with Sagaponack, unanimously approved the sale to HIG. The transaction closed on January 3, 2003, at the offices of HIG’s counsel in New York City. The proceeds of the sale were allocated as follows. Key and Regis received $3,480,000 and $870,000, respectively — about $2 million less than the amount owed under their loans to TestAmerica. Several secured creditors, including the Mishus, were also paid in exchange for their release of security interests in various properties of TestAmerica or its subsidiaries. As stated in a January 2, 2003 pay-off letter addressed to HIG, although Fleet was owed, and thus entitled to, $26,336,585.64 of the proceeds from the sale, it agreed to release its lien against TestAmerica’s assets upon receiving a “Payoff Amount” of $23,133,785.64 that would constitute “payment in full” of TestAmerica’s obligations. In that letter, Fleet directed that HIG pay directly to Sagaponack the remaining $3,202,800 which it would otherwise have been entitled to receive “[i]n consideration for (a) the consent of Sagaponack ... to the Sale and (b) Sagaponack’s agreement to cooperate and assist with certain post-closing matters arising from and in connection with the Sale.... ” This transfer was negotiated by Weisman on Sagaponack’s behalf. According to Weisman, Sagaponack also agreed to provide HIG the indemnifications and warranties that Fleet and Key would not. HIG paid Sagaponack $2.3 million in cash and placed approximately $700,000 in escrow accounts to cover the wind-up expenses. Only $200,000 from those accounts has been disbursed to Sagaponack. To date, Sagaponack has not made any distributions to Weisman or any of its other limited partners from the funds received from HIG. After the sale, TestAmerica changed its name to Asheville, Inc., and moved its headquarters from North Carolina to New York City. Weisman took over as President in charge of winding up the company’s affairs, and he and Rosenstein served as the company’s sole directors. II. Procedural History On December 13, 2001, at the end of Mullins’s three-year employment contract with METCO Environmental but more than two years before the HIG transaction, Mullins and Faraway (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in Texas state court against TestAmerica and Sagaponack, asserting state law claims for, among other things, breach of contract and fraud. Defendants removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, stating in their notice of removal that Plaintiffs are Texas citizens, that TestAmerica is a citizen of Delaware and of North Carolina — the states of its incorporation and principal place of business, respectively — and that Sagaponack “is a limited partnership existing under” and with its “principal place of business” in New York and “is now and was at the time this action was commenced a citizen of the State of New York and of no other state.” Sagaponack promptly moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). The motion was granted on June 25, 2002, following an evidentiary hearing. In June, 2003, Faraway and TestAmerica arbitrated their dispute over the principal amount of the Note. The arbitrator determined that amount to be $2,233,102.80, which was confirmed by the district court on November 14, 2003. It was around this period that Sagaponack and TestAmerica first disclosed Version 7 of the Subordination Agreement to Mullins. Later that year, the instant suit was reassigned intra-district to a different judge. Shortly thereafter, the district court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to assert new causes of action arising out of the sale of TestAmerica to HIG, to join numerous additional defendants — including Weisman — and to plead Sagaponack back into the suit. In addition to realleging their breach of contract and fraud claims against TestAmerica, Plaintiffs, construing the Subordination Agreement to give them priority to payment behind the Senior Creditors and ahead of Sagaponack, asserted that Sagaponack’s receipt of proceeds from the HIG transaction constituted a fraudulent transfer by Sagaponack, TestAmerica, and Weisman, in violation of Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 24.005(a)(1) (“TUFTA”). TestAmerica asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract, alleging that Plaintiffs breached their obligations under the Subordination Agreement by filing suit during the suspension period, thereby affecting the sale price for METCO Environmental received by TestAmerica and causing TestAmerica to incur attorneys’ fees. Although Sagaponack, this time joined by Weisman, again moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the motion was summarily denied. The parties later cross-moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fraudulent transfer claims based, in critical part, on their divergent constructions of the relevant agreements as they relate to Plaintiffs’ priority in payment vis-a-vis other TestAmerica creditors. The court denied Defendants’ motions and granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part with respect to TestAmerica’s breach of contract counterclaim. The case was tried to a jury for six days between February 7 and 16, 2005. Notably, Sagaponack and Weisman did not renew their objections to personal jurisdiction in the joint pretrial report or in their motion for judgment as a matter of law following the close of Plaintiffs’ case in chief, which the district court held over until the conclusion of trial. At the close of all the evidence, the district court denied in part and granted in part Defendants’ joint Rule 50(a) motion for judgment with respect to several of Plaintiffs’ claims, including all those asserted individually by Mullins for failure to show damages. Faraway’s remaining claims for fraud and breach of contract by TestAmerica and for fraudulent transfer against all Defendants were submitted to the jury. Regarding Faraway’s breach of contract claim, the jury, over TestAmerica’s objection, was instructed that TestAmerica had the burden of proving that Faraway had agreed to be subox-dinated to all of TestAmerica’s other creditors and found the burden was not met. It further concluded that TestAmerica breached its contractual obligations by failing to make the prescribed interest and principal payments under the Agreements, and by failing to provide Faraway with a “Period Income Statement” as required under the Note and the Purchase Agreement. The jury also found that TestAmerica had committed fraud by misrepresenting to Faraway the creditors to which the Note would be subordinated. Additionally, the jury concluded that each of Defendants had fraudulently transferred assets in violation of TUFTA § 24.005(a)(1), that Weisman and Sagaponack were “insiders,” and that neither Weisman nor Sagaponack had taken assets from Fleet in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value. The jury assessed punitive damages of $400,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000 against Weisman, TestAmerica, and Sagaponack, respectively, based on the fraudulent transfer, and an additional $350,000 in punitives against TestAmerica for fraud. No instructions were given, and thus no findings were made, regarding Faraway’s actual damages for any of its claims. Following a post-trial hearing, the district court partially reconsidered its previous ruling on Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion, granting judgment in favor of Weisman on the fraudulent transfer claim because Faraway had not shown that Weisman received any portion of the funds that Fleet directed HIG to pay Sagaponack. The court refused to award actual damages against TestAmerica but adjudged TestAmerica and Sagaponack to be jointly and severally liable for the $3,202,800 fraudulently transferred to Sagaponack. The court also entered judgment in favor of Faraway on the breach of contract claim in the amount of $3,249,734.42, the principal amount set at arbitration plus annual interest at the contractual rate of 8% calculated from December 31, 1999. Since Faraway represented that it suffered no injury from TestAmerica’s breach of its obligations to provide a Period Income Statement apart from attorneys’ fees, the court awarded no actual damages, although it nonetheless entered judgment in Faraway’s favor on that claim. To preclude a double recovery, the court limited TestAmerica’s individual liability for breach of contract to the remaining difference between the amount fraudulently transferred and the $3,249,734.42 due under the Note. Finally, the court entered judgment in accox-danee with the jury verdict in favor of Faraway on the punitive damage award for the fraud claim, but no actual damages were awarded. TestAmerica and Sagaponack timely appealed the judgment with respect to Faraway’s claims for breach of contract, fraudulent transfer and punitive damages, and the dismissal of TestAmerica’s counterclaim on summary judgment. Faraway cross-appealed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Weisman on the fraudulent transfer claim. After the case was fully briefed and orally argued to this panel, we identified deficiencies in the pleadings regarding the citizenship of Sagaponack and remanded the case to the district court. See generally Mullins v. TestAmerica Inc., 300 Fed.Appx. 259 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). On remand, Sagaponack disclosed the citizenships of all its partners both as of the date of removal and the date of Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint pleading Sagaponack back into the suit. Based on these new disclosures, the district court concluded that diversity jurisdiction was proper. After amending the notice of removal and the complaint to incorporate the details pertaining to Sagaponack’s citizenship, the parties re-filed their appeal and cross-appeal, which, pursuant to this court’s previous order, was reassigned to this panel. III. Discussion A. Diversity jurisdiction We briefly revisit the issue of subject matter jurisdiction that was raised sua sponte on initial appeal. TestAmerica, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in North Carolina, is clearly diverse from Plaintiffs, who are Texas citizens. But as noted in our previous opinion, neither the original notice of removal nor the second amended complaint “distinctly and affirmatively alleged” the citizenship of all of Sagaponack’s partners, general and limited. Mullins, 300 FedAppx. at 259 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This information was crucial to determining whether complete diversity existed. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 108 L.Ed.2d 157 (1990). Although we declined to allow amendment on appeal of the parties’ pleadings to cure this deficiency, we remanded the case to the district court to permit supplementation of the record and to make findings regarding the parties’ citizenship. Mullins, 300 Fed.Appx. at 261. The district court, after evaluating Sagaponack’s undisputed disclosures, concluded that the parties are diverse. Plaintiffs’ newly-amended complaint reflects, and the parties agree, that Sagaponack’s citizenship as of December 16, 2003 is that of its sole general partner, RSP Capital, LLC, and 31 limited partners: 16 individuals, 6 corporations, 3 trusts, 4 general partnerships, a limited partnership, and a limited liability company. After applying the appropriate tests for citizenship to these individuals and entities, and further tracing their citizenships down the various organizational layers where necessary, the district court deemed Sagaponack to be a citizen of California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Canada, the British Virgin Islands, and Israel. Because none of Sagaponaek’s partners is a citizen of Texas, we agree with the district court that diversity jurisdiction exists. B. Personal jurisdiction Sagaponack first contends that the judgment against it on Faraway’s claim under TUFTA § 24.005(a)(1) must be reversed because Sagaponack lacked the requisite contacts with Texas to support personal jurisdiction. Weisman also asserts that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, but as an alternative basis for affirming the take-nothing judgment in his favor below with respect to the § 24.005(a)(1) claim against him. Based on our review of the record, and for the reasons that follow, we conclude that specific jurisdiction over both defendants exists because Sagaponack and Weisman purposefully aimed their conduct at Faraway in Texas by actively procuring for Sagaponack $3,202,800 of the proceeds from the 2003 sale of TestAmeriea to HIG, with the knowledge that their conduct would allegedly impair the rights of a single, major creditor and Texas resident under agreements that center around Texas. 1. Standard of review We review the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction de novo. See Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 417-18 (5th Cir.2001). A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant (1) as allowed under the state’s long-arm statute; and (2) to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process, the two-step inquiry collapses into one federal due process analysis.” Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir.2008). To satisfy the requirements of due process, the plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that the nonresident purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing ‘minimum contacts’ with the state; and (2) that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994)). “Jurisdiction may be general or specific.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 484 (5th Cir.2008). Specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiffs claim against the non-resident defendant arises out of or relates to activities that the defendant purposefully directed at the forum state. Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Cop-co AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). In contrast, general jurisdiction requires the defendant to have maintained “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). The parties’ briefs conspicuously fail to address an important threshold question, namely, if and how procedural anomalies in Sagaponack’s and Weisman’s litigation of the jurisdictional question affect the evidentiary standard under which the district court’s jurisdictional ruling must be assessed. After Faraway amended its complaint to replead Sagaponack into the suit, Sagaponack and Weisman jointly moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.CivP. 12(b)(2). The district court denied that motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, impliedly concluding that the allegations in the complaint, together with the affidavits and other documentation, demonstrated a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over both defendants. See Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609 (explaining that a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction if the district court rules on the issue without an evidentiary hearing). This adverse jurisdictional ruling at the pre-trial stage did not foreclose either defendant from holding Faraway to its ultimate burden at trial of establishing contested jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir.1986) (“ ‘Whatever degree of proof is required initially, a plaintiff must have proved by the end of trial the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (quoting Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir.1978))), modified on other grounds, 836 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.1988). However, neither Sagaponack nor Weisman pressed its jurisdictional defense at any later point in the proceedings below. No mention of the defense is made in either defendant’s summary judgment motion, the joint pretrial order, motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Faraway’s case, response to Faraway’s post-trial motion for judgment, or in Sagaponack’s renewed motion under Fed. R.CrvP. 50(b) after entry of final judgment. Neither defendant objected to the district court’s statement in its final judgment that “it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this proceeding” — that is, not until this appeal. Several decisions, including an unpublished decision from this court, have held that a defendant’s failure to renew an objection to personal jurisdiction following the district court’s denial of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss either forecloses the defendant’s right to invoke the higher burden of proof otherwise applicable to jurisdictional facts established at trial, or waives the objection entirely. We would likewise be inclined to find that Sagaponack and Weisman’s wholesale failure to pursue their jurisdictional challenge beyond the 12(b)(2) stage, at a minimum, limits us to determining whether the record at that time demonstrated a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. But several factors counsel against our application of such a rule in this case. First and foremost, Faraway does not recognize, let alone argue, that either defendant’s litigation of its jurisdictional defense affects the applicable evidentiary burden or our ability to review the district court’s denial of the joint motion to dismiss. We also find significant that Faraway’s brief relies almost entirely on the evidence presented at trial and the jury’s finding of liability under TUFTA § 24.005(a)(1) to substantiate personal jurisdiction over Weisman. Faraway similarly refers to the jury’s finding that “Sagaponack’s receipt of money from HIG was ... a fraudulent transfer” in support of its argument that jurisdiction over Sagaponack was proper. We construe these references as an implied concession that the entire record is relevant to resolving the jurisdictional question. Under these circumstances, we deem Faraway to have waived any objection to these defendants’ failure to preserve their jurisdictional challenge and, accordingly, will review the entire record to determine whether Faraway established by a preponderance of the evidence that Sagaponack and Weisman possessed the requisite contacts with Texas to confer personal jurisdiction. 2. Personal jurisdiction over Sagaponack We first address whether the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Sagaponack with respect to Faraway’s TUFTA claim, which stems from Sagaponack’s receipt of a portion of the proceeds from TestAmerica’s sale to HIG. Faraway, invoking the “effects” test from Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), contends that specific jurisdiction exists because Sagaponaek’s conduct amounts to an intentional tort intended or highly likely to harm Faraway in its state of residence. Although Faraway advances alternative arguments in support of jurisdiction, we find this issue dispositive. Under Colder, “an act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant’s conduct.” Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Colder, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)). Colder involved a suit brought by a California actress in a California state court against two Florida employees of a tabloid magazine based on an allegedly libelous article featured in one of its issues. 465 U.S. at 785-86, 104 S.Ct. 1482. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendants, who wrote and edited the article, knew that its injurious effects would be felt by plaintiff in California and had therefore “expressly aimed” their intentional and allegedly tortious conduct at the forum state. Id. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482. Critically, the focal point of the article itself was also California, since it was drawn primarily from California sources and pertained to an actress whose career was centered in California. Id. at 788-89, 104 S.Ct. 1482. Thus, “[t]he key to Colder is that the effects of an alleged intentional tort are to be assessed as part of the analysis of the defendant’s relevant contacts with the forum.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are skeptical of Faraway’s suggestion that a non-resident defendant’s receipt of assets transferred with an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor ipso facto establishes personal jurisdiction in the state where a complaining creditor resides. The “effects” test in Colder does not supplant the need to demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment, that is, conduct by the nonresident defendant that invoked the benefits and protections of the state or was otherwise purposefully directed toward a state resident. See id. at 869. The premise of the fraudulent transfer claim asserted by Faraway, however, “requires only a finding of fraudulent intent on the part of the ‘debtor,’ ” not the transferee. See S.E.C. v. Res. Dev. Int’l, LLC, 487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir.2007) (discussing Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 24.005(a)(1)). Knowingly accepting a fraudulent transfer may subject a transferee to liability, but such conduct is not necessarily tantamount to committing a wrongful act purposefully aimed at a creditor of the transferor in his state of residence. Even with libel claims such as that addressed in Calder, we do not presume that the tortious act itself categorically satisfies the requirement of purposeful availment. See Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 425-26 (5th Cir.2005) (requiring a “case-by-case” analysis of the nexus between the forum state, the subject matter, and sources of the allegedly defamatory article). Moreover, any creditor of the transferor may challenge the transferor’s transfer as fraudulent, and the resulting injury would ordinarily be felt in the creditor’s state of residence. Under Calder, however, “the plaintiffs residence in the forum, and suffering of harm there, will not alone support [personal] jurisdiction.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir.2002). We are thus doubtful that personal jurisdiction exists over the recipient of a fraudulent transfer anywhere a complaining creditor files suit simply by virtue of the creditor’s residence in that forum. We need not resolve this question, however, primarily because Sagaponack has not argued that asserting personal jurisdiction in this case would potentially subject it to jurisdiction in any forum where a TestAmerica creditor happens to reside, but also because the evidence in this case demonstrates both that Faraway was no ordinary creditor of TestAmerica, and Sagaponack was far from a passive transferee. TestAmerica’s debt to Faraway was sizeable. As established at arbitration, TestAmerica owed $2,233,102.80 in principal on the Note. Of TestAmerica’s $50 million in total outstanding debt in 2003, approximately $32.6 million was owed to the Senior Creditors. The Note therefore accounted for roughly 13% of TestAmerica’s non-senior debt. But among all of TestAmerica’s creditors mentioned in the record, Faraway was the only one who received no share of the proceeds from TestAmerica’s sale to HIG. This was the case even though Sagaponack, who obtained $3,202,800 from the HIG Transaction was, like Faraway, an unsecured and non-senior creditor of TestAmerica. Thus, we are presented with a case in which the distribution of funds which gave rise to the challenged transfer singled out for denial of payment a specific, major creditor of the transferor. Sagaponack’s imprimatur on the challenged transfer is also unmistakable. As of 2003, Sagaponack was TestAmerica’s majority shareholder that, through its limited partners Weisman and Rosenstein, controlled half of the four-member board of directors that approved the HIG transaction. As Sagaponack concedes, Weisman acted on Sagaponack’s behalf when he negotiated an agreement with Fleet to direct HIG’s payment to Sagaponack of approximately $3.2 million that Fleet would otherwise have been entitled to receive. This arrangement was effected through Sagaponack’s contractual power to block TestAmerica’s sale, coupled with its agreement to provide post-transfer services and to indemnify HIG. Thus, the very transfer underlying Faraway’s claim was engineered by Sagaponack. Sagaponack, through its insider status and conduct, clearly knew of TestAmerica’s agreements with Faraway and consistently asserted that its own loans had priority. According to Mullins’s uncontroverted testimony, Tom Barr told him that Sagaponack would block any sale (inferentially, by exercising its contractual veto power) that included a distribution to Faraway. Weisman, as Sagaponack’s representative, also conducted the meeting in Cleveland at which Mullins was purportedly told that his right to payment was subordinated to that of Sagaponack. For jurisdictional purposes, we do not opine on the merits of the parties’ relative priority. However, Sagaponack’s conduct manifests that it was acutely aware of TestAmerica’s significant debt to Faraway under agreements that allegedly entitled Faraway to payment upon TestAmerica’s sale and nonetheless obtained for itself a share of the proceeds to which Faraway claims a superior right. Given Sagaponack’s level of involvement with the challenged transfer, we find particularly persuasive the analysis of Caldeas “effects” test as applied to tortious interference with contract claims. In that context, we determine whether the alleged tortfeasor expressly aimed his out-of-state conduct at the forum state by examining the nexus between the forum and the injured contractual relationship. See Cent. Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 383-84 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that the defendant shipper’s awareness of and interference with a contractual relationship between two Texas-based companies whose business relationship centers around Texas and that resulted in harm to plaintiff in Texas supported personal jurisdiction in Texas); Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d at 869-70 (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in Texas when the financing agreements with which the defendant allegedly interfered “are not governed by Texas law, are not to be performed in Texas, and have no relation to Texas other than the fortuity that Appellants reside there”); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir.1988) (rejecting specific jurisdiction under Colder when the injured contractual relationship was negotiated outside the forum, contemplated no performance in the forum, was not governed by the law of the forum state, and pertained to the sale of stock of a company that had no connection with the forum). Sagaponack allegedly thwarted Faraway’s right to payment from TestAmerica as provided under contracts governing the sale of METCO, a Texas company, that were executed by Faraway in Texas, where Faraway resides. Additionally, the Note and Purchase Agreement are expressly governed by Texas law. Thus, the debtor-creditor relationship between TestAmerica and Faraway is centered in Texas. Cf. Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d at 869; Southmark Corp., 851 F.2d at 772-73. Utilizing its veto authority over the HIG transaction, and with full awareness of the Note, Sagaponack purposefully aimed its conduct at Faraway in Texas by ensuring that a portion of its own notes would be paid while knowing that Faraway’s would not. It is therefore no “mere fortuity” that Sagaponack’s conduct would cause injury to Faraway in Texas. See Cent. Freight Lines, 322 F.3d at 384. Under these circumstances, we find that Sagaponack should reasonably have anticipated being haled into a Texas court for precipitating and directing an alleged fraudulent transfer at the expense of a known, major creditor in Texas whose right to payment arises out of contracts that share a strong connection with Texas. Finally, Sagaponack has not asserted, let alone made a “compelling case,” that assertion of personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528; see also Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.1999). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Sagaponack with respect to Faraway’s fraudulent transfer claim. 3. Personal jurisdiction over Weisman For the same reasons, we likewise find that the preponderance of evidence at trial demonstrates that specific jurisdiction over Weisman for his alleged commission of a fraudulent transfer is proper. The intentional conduct of Sagaponack discussed above and that was directed at Faraway’s contractual relationship with TestAmerica was effected through Weisman. It was Weisman who represented Sagaponack on TestAmerica’s board, had direct knowledge of the Note, asserted to Mullins Sagaponack’s alleged priority over the Note, threatened to veto any sale of METCO that allowed payment to Faraway, and ultimately obtained for Sagaponack the proceeds from TestAmerica’s sale that underlie Faraway’s fraudulent transfer claim. Without opining on the merits, we conclude that Weisman’s alleged conduct in engineering a transfer that knowingly impaired the rights of a Texas resident under agreements centered in Texas substantiates that he purposefully aimed his intentionally tortious conduct at the forum state. Accordingly, the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Weisman with respect to Faraway’s fraudulent transfer claim. C. Faraway’s state law claims Moving to the merits, TestAmerica challenges the district court’s denial of its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on Faraway’s breach of contract claims and on the punitive damages imposed for fraud, and both TestAmerica and Sagaponack appeal the denial of their Rule 50 motion on Faraway’s fraudulent transfer claim under TUFTA § 24.005(a). Faraway, in turn, appeals the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on its fraudulent transfer claim against Weisman. 1. Standard of review “We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.” Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 572 (5th Cir.2002). “In evaluating such a motion, the court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and leaving credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury.” Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir.1997). That said, the court “should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2. Breach of contract Pursuant to the jury’s verdict, the district court adjudged TestAmerica liable in the amount of $3,249,734.42 — the principal amount of $2,233,102.80 as established at arbitration and stipulated by the parties at trial, plus 8% interest accrued from December 31, 1999 through August 2, 2006— for breaching its obligations to Faraway under the Agreements by failing to make annual interest payments after December 31, 2000 and annual principal payments starting December 31, 2001. The district court also adjudged TestAmerica to have breached its contractual obligation under the Note and Purchase Agreement to provide Faraway a Period Income Statement on March 31, 2002, but awarded no actual damages. We address each aspect of Faraway’s contract claim separately below. a. TestAmerica’s payment obligations to Faraway Two jury findings underlie the district court’s judgment on the contract claim that arises from TestAmerica’s failure to make the payments to Faraway prescribed under the Agreements. First, the jury, responding to the court’s interrogatory instructing that TestAmerica bore the burden of proof on this issue, found that Faraway had not “agreed to be subordinate to all other of TestAmerica’s creditors, whether existing at the time” the agreements were signed or thereafter created. Second, the jury found that TestAmerica breached its obligations under the Agreements “by failing to make the interest and principal payments to [Faraway] due and owing under the [A]greement[s].” TestAmerica contends that the judgment must be reversed because language in the Note and Purchase Agreement subordinating the Note to “prior payment in full of all of TestAmerica’s debt facilities” expressly and unambiguously subordinated Faraway’s claim to all of TestAmerica’s debt, including the debt owed to Sagaponack. Since Sagaponack’s loans have undisputedly not been paid in full, TestAmerica asserts that Faraway had no right to payment, regardless of which of the two competing versions of the Subordination Agreement is valid. Faraway, in contrast, argues that Sagaponack’s notes cannot have priority over its own unless Sagaponack was a proper party to the Subordination Agreement. Whereas Version 6 of that agreement is signed only by Faraway, as a “Subordinated Creditor,” and lists only Faraway in the attached exhibit of permitted payments, both the signature page and exhibit to Version 7 include Sagaponack. Faraway thus construes the jury’s finding that Faraway did not agree to be subordinated to all of TestAmerica’s other creditors as a finding that Version 6 of the Subordination Agreement is the authentic agreement. Based on this finding, Faraway asserts that it is subordinated only to TestAmerica’s Senior Creditors, and not to Sagaponack. Faraway additionally asserts that TestAmerica breached its obligations under the Subordination Agreement by failing to make the payments on its Note prescribed in the attached schedule. When interpreting contracts, courts applying Texas law must strive to ascertain the parties’ intent as expressed in the written instrument. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 463 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir.2006); Matagorda County Hosp. Dist. v. Burwell, 189 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex.2006) (per curiam). “To achieve this object the [c]ourt will examine and consider the entire instrument so that none of the provisions will be rendered meaningless.” R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1980). If the wording of the instrument can be given a definite or certain meaning, then it is not ambiguous and must be construed as a matter of law. Cedyco Corp. v. Petro-Quest Energy, LLC, 497 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir.2007); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983). If, however, “its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, taking into consideration circumstances present when the particular writing was executed, then it is ambiguous and its meaning must be resolved by a finder of fact.” Lenape Res. Corp. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565, 574 (Tex.1996). Only when such ambiguity exists may the trier of fact consider evidence extrinsic’to the contract to ascertain the parties’ intent. See R & P Enters., 596 S.W.2d at 519. We first address Faraway’s contention that TestAmerica’s failure to make the principal and interest payments under the Note amounts to a breach of the Subordination Agreement. That agreement prescribes, in relevant part: 2. Subordinated, Debt Subordinated to Senior Debt (a) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of any instruments or agreements evidencing or relating to Subordinated Debt, [TestAmerica] covenants and agrees, and each holder of Subordinated Debt by its signature hereon likewise covenants and agrees, for the benefit of the holders from time to time of Senior Debt, that all payments of Obligations and Claims in respect of Subordinated Debt shall be subject and subordinate in right of payment, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, to the prior payment in full in cash of all Obligations in respect of (1) Designated Senior Debt [ie., TestAmerica’s debt to Fleet] and (2) other Senior Debt.... (b) Unless and until all Obligations in respect of the Senior Debt have been finally paid in full in cash, and subject to the provisions of this Agreement, including without limitation Section 3, k and 5, no direct or indirect payments shall be made on, under or with respect to any Obligations or Claims ... in respect of any Subordinated Debt except for the payments set forth as Permitted Scheduled Payments on Exhibit 1 hereto. (emphasis added). “Subordinated Debt” includes the loan agreements between TestAmerica and “each party signing below as a Subordinated Creditor,” and “all agreements ... between [TestAmerica] and Sagaponack.” Faraway was the only entity who signed Version 6 (as a “Subordinated Creditor”) and was the only holder of Subordinated Debt listed in the attached exhibit. However, the schedule itself is incomplete in that it does not identify Faraway’s loan documents, much less include any of the pertinent payment information. Even assuming, as Faraway contends, that Version 6 of the Subordination Agreement incorporates the payment obligations prescribed in the Note but that are omitted from the exhibit, it is undisputed that TestAmerica defaulted on its obligations to the Senior Creditors in September, 2000. This occurred before the December 31, 2000 due date of TestAmerica’s second of three annual interest payments on the Note and well before the prescribed annual payments of principal on the Note were to begin on December 31, 2001. TestAmerica’s default triggered the following suspension clause: 4. Subordination on Default in Senior Debt No ... payments by or on behalf of [TestAmerica] shall be made ... in respect of any Subordinated Debt, ... (a) if, at the time specified for such payment, (i) there exists ... a default in the payment ... of any Obligation in respect of Senior Debt ..., and (ii) the Designated Senior Creditor [ie., Fleet] and the other Senior Creditors shall not have delivered to the holders of Subordinated Debt a written notice of waiver of the benefits of this sentence and consent to the making of payments on Subordinated Debt.... Because the permitted payments under Paragraph 2 were conditioned on TestAmerica’s compliance with Paragraph 4, the latter provision prohibited TestAmerica from making further payments on the Note while.it was in default to the Senior Creditors. Moreover, no evidence in the record indicates that any of the Senior Creditors permitted TestAmerica to make payments on Faraway’s Note notwithstanding the default. While conceding that TestAmerica’s default in September, 2000 suspended its payment obligations on the Note, Faraway nonetheless contends that the suspension period terminated upon one of three events: (1) TestAmeriea’s waiver of the suspension clause through its quarterly payments on debt to the Mishus during the default period; (2) Fleet’s forbearance agreement with TestAmerica in November, 2001 in which Fleet and two syndicate lenders agreed to refrain temporarily from foreclosing on their security interest in all of TestAmerica’s assets; and (3) TestAmerica’s satisfaction of its debts to the Senior Creditors upon the company’s sale to HIG on January 3, 2003. We readily reject Faraway’s initial contention that TestAmerica waived the suspension period by making quarterly payments to the Mishus during the period of default. The Mishus were not parties to the Subordination Agreement. Hence, their secured loans were not “Subordinated Debt” whose payments were prohibited by the suspension clause. We find no evidence of conduct by TestAmerica manifesting an intent to relinquish its right to invoke the suspension clause, and its payment of debt not subject to the Subordination Agreement is not inconsistent with its reliance on the agreement’s suspension clause to cease payments on the Note. See Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Benton, 728 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex.1987) (explaining that waiver requires either “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right”). Faraway’s characterization of the November, 2001 forbearance agreement as an event that terminated the suspension period relies on language in Paragraph 4 stating that the suspension period “shall end upon the occurrence of a Proceeding or indefeas[i]ble payment in full of the Senior Debt,” at which time “any Subordinated Debt which, but for the suspension, would have become and would then be due and payable shall become immediately due and payable subject to the provisions of this Agreement.” (emphasis added). The agreement defines a “Proceeding” as “any insolvency, bankruptcy, receivership, liquidation, reorganization, readjustment, arrangement, composition or other similar proceeding relating to [TestAmerica], its property or its creditors.” (emphasis added). Faraway asserts that Fleet and the two other syndicate lenders “readjusted” or “arranged” a debt related to TestAmerica’s property within the meaning of a “Proceeding” by agreeing not to immediately foreclose on their security interest in TestAmerica’s assets. We disagree with Faraway’s characterization of the forbearance agreement as a “readjustment” or “arrangement” that amounts to a “Proceeding” under the Subordination Agreement. These words must be construed consistently with the magnitude of the other terms enumerated in the definition of a “Proceeding.” See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 218 (5th Cir.2007) (“Under the canon of ejusdem generis, ‘where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.’ ” (quoting In re Biloxi Casino Belle Inc., 368 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir.2004))). As used here, a “readjustment” or “arrangement” contemplates a comprehensive agreement with all of TestAmerica’s creditors, comparable to an insolvency, bank