Full opinion text
DENNIS, Circuit Judge: The plaintiff brings this putative class action on behalf of persons who allegedly (1) bought the common stock of US Unwired, Inc. (“US Unwired” or “the Company”) between May 23, 2000 and August 13, 2002, at prices falsely inflated by the defendants’ material misrepresentations that violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5; and (2) suffered economic loss when the true facts about the company’s operations and programs were publicly disclosed and its stock price declined as a result. The defendants are US Unwired and a number of its executive officers and directors. The plaintiff alleges two main fraud claims: (a) a claim regarding defendants’ implementation of subprime subscriber programs; and (b) a claim regarding defendants’ drastic alteration of the relationship between US Unwired and the Sprint network, of which US Unwired is an affiliate. They moved to dismiss the plaintiffs second amended complaint (“SAC”) on grounds that (1) the alleged misleading statements are not actionable as a matter of law; (2) the facts pleaded do not give rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter; (3) the complaint fails to allege “loss causation,” 1. e., a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the stock’s subsequent depreciation; and (4) the complaint did not plead with sufficient particularity the factual basis for their allegations of misrepresentation. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) after concluding that (1) some of the alleged misleading statements were not actionable because they are protected by the “safe harbor” provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), and (2) the plaintiffs SAC fails to sufficiently allege loss causation. Reviewing the defendants’ motion to dismiss de novo, we conclude that the plaintiffs SAC adequately pleads the subprime subscriber program claim upon which relief can be granted, but fails to adequately plead loss causation as to his other claim. The district court’s decision must be reversed in part and the case remanded for further proceedings. 1. Factual and Procedural Background We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.2007). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir.2005). When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a § 10(b) action, courts must, as with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which relief can be granted, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993)). We must also draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir.2004). “[A] complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiffs grounds for entitlement to relief — including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Cuvillier, 503 F.3d at 401 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The plaintiffs SAC alleges the following facts: In the mid-1990s, Sprint Corporation (“Sprint”), a nationwide telecommunications company, obtained licenses from the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to establish a wireless communications network. Sprint established an “affiliate program” through which it contracted with third-party affiliates to construct networks in designated areas in exchange for the exclusive right to sell Sprint products and services in each area. Sprint offered three types of affiliations (Types I, II, and III) that involved varying levels of Sprint control over the third party affiliate’s operations. Type III affiliation granted an affiliate the maximum amount of autonomy and control over its operations and customer base. Types I and II affiliations, in effect, gave' Sprint control of an affiliate’s customer care, servicing and billing. In 1998, US Unwired, a Louisiana corporation, contracted with Sprint to become a Type III affiliate, rejecting Type I and II affiliations because US Unwired’s management knew US Unwired’s success depended on maintaining direct control of operations, billings, revenues, and customer relations. In exchange, Sprint granted US Unwired the exclusive right to provide Sprint products and services to over 500,-000 customers in parts of 14 states. As the complaint details: in 1999, Sprint began to pressure US Unwired to convert to a Type II affiliation by improperly delaying US Unwired’s ability to market new services and the latest products, such as Wireless Web technology. Sprint allowed its Type I and II affiliates to market these new services first. As a result, US Unwired, as a Type III affiliate, became out-of-sync with the nationwide marketing of Sprint services and programs. Sprint then demanded that US Unwired pay some $30 million to finance its integration into the Sprint systems. But Sprint offered to waive this fee if US Unwired converted to a Type II affiliate. US Unwired initially elected to remain a Type III affiliate and attempt to negotiate more favorable terms for the cost and scope of its integration with Sprint. US Unwired was determined to retain control over its customer billings and service, which it knew was essential to its business plan. Throughout the negotiations, US Unwired’s management internally voiced numerous concerns to its board about Sprint’s coercive tactics aimed at forcing US Unwired into a Type II affiliation. For example, in July 2000, Henning wrote to the Board recommending that the Board put the company up for sale rather than transfer its core functions to Sprint as a Type II affiliate. However, each time US Unwired disagreed with Sprint, Sprint threatened to declare that US Unwired had breached its affiliation contract. According to the complaint, at a March 10, 2000 meeting, Sprint conducted a presentation that effectively informed US Unwired that if US Unwired did not convert into a Type II affiliate, it would face a future of exorbitant fees, threatened contractual breach, and indefinite withholding of products. In a separate instance, US Unwired signaled its desire to operate a Type III affiliate out of Jackson, Mississippi. Sprint wanted a Type II affiliate to service the Jackson market. In an effort to force US Unwired to serve the Jackson market as a Type II affiliate, Sprint threatened to issue a public letter declaring US Unwired in breach of its contract for failing to supply Wireless Web technology to its customers even though Sprint’s refusal to supply the technology to US Unwired, unless exorbitant integration fees were paid, was the cause of the failure. Such a public letter would have devastated US Unwired’s public offering plans. On May 23, 2000, US Unwired (after filing its Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) registration on May 17, 2000) issued 8 million shares of its common stock at the price of $11 per share. US Unwired received net proceeds of $80.6 million after an underwriting discount of $6.2 million and expenses of $1.2 million. In the prospectus for the stock offering filed with the SEC (attached as an exhibit to the complaint), US Unwired noted that it planned to use the proceeds to “accelerate the construction” of its network and “for other general corporate purposes.” Throughout the class period, US Unwired subsequently-conducted several stock offerings to fund its corporate acquisitions. After protracted negotiations, Sprint and US Unwired still could not agree on the details of the integration plan. In order to force concessions, Sprint stopped all marketing activities for US Unwired. On July 22, 2000, US Unwired informed Sprint that it wanted to remain a Type III affiliate. Sprint refused to accept this decision and threatened to declare US Unwired in breach unless US Unwired fully funded the integration plan. The complaint asserts that ultimately, in September 2000, US Unwired succumbed to Sprint’s coercive economic pressure and abusive tactics, and agreed to become a Type II affiliate, thus giving Sprint control of US Unwired’s customer service and billing operations. In becoming a Type II affiliate, US Unwired ceded to Sprint control of billing and the receipt of customer payments, which amounted to approximately $800 million dollars annually. Sprint thereby gained control of US Unwired’s cash-flow and its relationships with its subscribers. US Unwired no longer had direct access to subscriber payments and data. With control over US Unwired’s cash-flow, Sprint withheld payments or under-paid US Unwired based on Sprint’s revenue estimates rather than its actual collections from US Unwired customers. Despite fierce economic struggles and the personal acrimony between US Unwired and Sprint management, US Unwired’s officers, throughout the class period in this case, disseminated positive public representations. For example, as alleged in the complaint, in a November 8, 2000 press release, US Unwired noted that integration into Sprint would “position[] [US Unwired] to fully capitalize on Sprint’s successes ----” US Unwired publicly disclosed the transfer of billing and customer services to Sprint, but never accurately disclosed the known risks involved. In fact, US Unwired stated, in an August 8, 2001 press release, that any success could be attributed to an “adherence to the sound fundamentals of our business plan over the last two years ...” even when management knew at the outset that the forced migration of customer care, billing and cash flow control to Sprint would be disastrous for the company. In a March 5, 2002 report filed with the SEC, US Unwired disclosed some of the general risks involved with the transfer of customer care and billing to Sprint, but did not disclose the potential magnitude of those risks nor the fact that some of those risks had already materialized. The complaint notes that in May 2001, Sprint instituted a nationwide calling program for subprime credit class customers called the “no-deposit account spending limit,” or the NDASL. Sprint launched this program to increase its national market share by targeting the sub-prime credit class customers. Prior to this program, Sprint required sub-prime credit class customers to pay a deposit of $125 to $250 as a condition. of subscription. Under NDASL, Sprint would waive the deposit except in extraordinary circumstances. The “ClearPay” program soon replaced the NDASL program. Under “ClearPay,” customers could subscribe without a deposit or a credit check. Instead, as long as their accounts were current, customers would be able to use the phone within spending limits. The complaint alleges that based on US Unwired’s previous unsatisfactory experience with sub-prime credit class customers, US Unwired’s management adamantly protested the decision to implement these programs in its designated areas. Piper noted that US Unwired viewed the Clear-Pay program as a “colossal mistake.” US Unwired’s management knew that it was not going to work and told Sprint that it did not want to offer the ClearPay program. Piper also noted that US Unwired told Sprint that these programs would generate bad debt and churn levels beyond the levels the company could support. US Unwired was concerned about the implementation of these programs in its service areas, because those areas contained a higher percentage of potential sub-prime credit subscribers as compared to other markets and other Sprint affiliates. The complaint alleges that US Unwired saw huge increases in deactivations and a significant rise in churn and debt levels for its sub-prime credit class customers after the programs’ implementation. A former employee later testified that US Unwired, at the time, knew that many of these sub-prime credit class subscribers used their initially allotted minutes and then never paid for them, causing increased bad debt and churn, or turnover, of subscribers. However, as a recent Type II convert, US Unwired no longer had the ability to refuse implementation. Nevertheless, its management, from the outset, sought to renegotiate for permission from Sprint to stop offering the programs. The complaint provides several examples: Piper, in an August 2, 2001 letter to Clint Slusher, Sprint’s Director of Affiliate Management, noted that the no-deposit program produced “unacceptable and inconclusive results” for US Unwired in test trials. In that same letter, Piper warned that, by adding so many no-deposit subscribers, the Company expected “high churn rates and bad debt percentages” that would cause “our business plan to fail.’ ” Piper also stated that, if forced to take such subscribers, US Unwired “will do all [it] can to limit the appeal of [the no-deposit program].” In an internal email to US Unwired executives on August 7, 2001, Piper stated his belief that “it is critically important to stop the sale of [the no deposit program] immediately” because “[the no deposit program] ... has the potential for double-digit churn .... ” In early 2002, a former Director of US Unwired had a conversation with Piper wherein they agreed that US Unwired needed to “sell to quality customers” and not just focus on the quantity of subscribers, an ongoing problem with Sprint’s no-deposit initiative that was aimed at creating subscriber growth with sub-prime credit class customers. In a January 21, 2002 email to Sprint and US Unwired representatives, Piper stated, “Our position on NDASL has been clear from the beginning. We have never approved of eliminating the deposit.” Despite US Unwired’s protests, Sprint refused US Unwired’s requests for permission to stop the program. Finally, in February 2002, Sprint permitted US Unwired to reinstate the deposit for NDASL and ClearPay customers. Nevertheless, US Unwired continued to offer by choice the no-deposit program in certain areas and US Unwired continued to face ClearPay and NDASL’s ill effects. Despite the foregoing, in a March 2002 public conference call, which is referenced and quoted in the complaint, US Unwired’s management continued to tout the no-deposit programs’ long-term benefits. As the complaint alleges, in this call, Piper misrepresented to the public that “[w]e think these [no-deposit] customers are necessary to reach our full market penetration potential and we think you can do it profitably.” In the same press conference, and in connection with the no-deposit customer market, Piper also misrepresented that “we think we’re still getting our market share and we think our growth opportunity is alive and well.” Moreover, Piper, reinforcing his public predictions of positive growth, indicated that the churn rate “top[ped] out” at 3.5% in the first quarter. Chief Financial Officer Vaughn also indicated in the same call that the churn rate “will start to decrease” in subsequent quarters. However, soon thereafter, on July 24, 2002, Piper sent a private letter to Chuck Levine, Sprint’s President, noting that US Unwired’s conversion to Type II affiliation created long-term challenges and US Unwired was still “reeling from the damage” caused by ClearPay and NDASL. At about the same time, between June 6, 2002 and August 13, 2002, several public disclosures reached the marketplace related to the no-deposit and ClearPay programs’ detrimental effects upon US Unwired’s financial condition, causing its stock price to decline from $4.94 to $0.90 per share. Throughout the class period, after US Unwired began implementing the no-deposit programs in May 2001, US Unwired engaged in a series of acquisitions using its stock price revenues. On February 28, 2001, US Unwired purchased from Cameron Corporation its minority interest in Louisiana Unwired in exchange for approximately 4.63 million Class A shares of common stock for a total price of $36.5 million. On the same day, US Unwired purchased a 20% minority interest in Texas Unwired with 307,664 shares of Class A common stock for a purchase price of approximately $2.4 million. On December 20, 2001, US Unwired acquired all outstanding shares of IWO Holdings and issued a public offering of approximately 45.9 million shares with an aggregate value of $459 million based on US Unwired’s December 19, 2001 stock price of $10.00 per share to cover the acquisition. On February 11, 2002, US Unwired acquired another Sprint affiliate, Georgia PCS. US Unwired issued approximately 5.5 million shares of common stock with a value of $35.7 million based on US Unwired’s closing price on February 8, 2002 of $6.49. Pursuant to an October 1, 1999 agreement with its lenders, US Unwired’s ability to obtain credit with those lenders was specifically tied to its ability to maintain a certain level of subscriptions. During the class period, US Unwired’s ability to issue debt to fund its acquisitions and to obtain credit from lenders was directly dependent on its maintaining certain levels in both its customer subscriptions and its stock prices. During the class period, members of US Unwired management also sold over 463,-000 of them personally-owned shares at inflated prices ranging from $5 to $13 and pocketed more than $4.94 million. Henning, Piper, and Vaughn sold 73%, 82%, and 100% respectively of their actual stock holdings at inflated prices. In a private email in October 2002 shortly after the class period, Piper recounted management’s state of mind when the no-deposit program was rolled-out and its collective foresight that the program would cause US Unwired’s stock to decline. This email, sent to Tom Mateer, Sprint’s Vice President of the Affiliations group, as quoted in the complaint, stated that: US Unwired finds itself in a precarious position today. Our growth rate has declined to almost zero, our churn and bad debt lead the industry, our free cash flow timeline has been pushed out indefinitely, and our stock and bonds are perceived to be virtually worthless. This is exactly the business environment US Unwired (USU) predicted it would be in when Sprint rolled out NDASL. USU’s plea with Sprint not to offer NDASL fell on deaf ears. On August 12, 2004, plaintiff Clodile Romero filed a securities fraud class action against US Unwired and certain directors of the company — the named individual defendants — seeking to recover for persons who purchased US Unwired securities between May 23, 2000 and August 13, 2002, i.e., the class period. Later, Billy Lormand became the lead plaintiff and amended the complaint to add claims for violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act. On August 25, 2004, Don Feyler filed a shareholder derivative action on behalf of US Unwired against the same defendants for breach of fiduciary duties, abuse of control, mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and against Sprint for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. On November 11, 2004, the Lormand and Feyler actions were consolidated. After the Supreme Court decision on securities pleadings in Dura Pharmas., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005) issued, Lormand successfully moved to amend his consolidated complaint, which is now the second amended complaint (“SAC”) filed on September 16, 2005. In sum, the plaintiffs SAC alleges that US Unwired and the individual defendants misled the public by concealing material facts of which they were aware, viz., that Sprint was forcing US Unwired against its will and business judgment to enlist low income and credit risky subscribers without deposits or credit checks; and that, as the defendants knew from previous experience, this business strategy would be financially disastrous for US Unwired, given the demographics of its designated network areas. The plaintiff also alleges the defendants misrepresented to the public the nature of US Unwired’s relationship with Sprint and concealed the fact that Sprint had coerced US Unwired into a Type II affiliation, which enabled Sprint to force US Unwired to adopt the sub-prime credit class strategy and to take away from US Unwired its control over customer care, billing, and cash-flow. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants also continued to mislead the public regarding the financially harmful nature of these programs even as they received adverse financial information confirming their dire predictions in respect to the affiliation conversion and the no-deposit programs. The plaintiff alleges that the concealment and misrepresentation of these facts caused US Unwired’s stock to be falsely inflated and that the later disclosures of the truth caused a stock decline from a high of $4.94 to a low of $0.90 per share. In response, the defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim relying on four arguments: (1) the complaint does not plead with sufficient particularity the factual basis for their allegations of misrepresentation; (2) the alleged misleading statements are not actionable as a matter of law, because the PSLRA’s safe harbor applies to their alleged misrepresentations and the defendants had no duty to disclose the alleged material omissions; (3) the facts pleaded do not give rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter; (4) the complaint fails to allege loss causation, i.e., a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the stock’s subsequent depreciation. On August 11, 2006, the district court “dismissed without prejudice” Lormand’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) after ruling on three of the defendants’ arguments. The district court: (1) decided that plaintiffs SAC satisfied the particularity requirement; (2) decided that some of the alleged misrepresentations were not actionable as they were protected under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision; (3) pretermitted deciding whether, under the SAC’s charges, the defendants had a duty to disclose the alleged material omissions in the misrepresentations; (4) pretermitted deciding whether plaintiffs SAC adequately alleged scienter; (5) decided that the SAC failed to sufficiently plead loss causation under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff then requested leave to amend the complaint for a third time, but the district court denied leave to amend, concluding that any further amendment would be futile. Based on its decision that further amendment would be futile, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff timely appealed. 2. Discussion Private federal securities fraud actions are based on federal securities statutes and their implementing regulations. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341, 125 S.Ct. 1627. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids (1) the “use or employ[ment] ... of any ... deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” and (3) “in contravention of’ Securities and Exchange Commission “rules and regulations.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Commission Rule 10b-5 forbids, among other things, the making of any “untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission of any material fact “necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). The courts have implied from these statutes and Rule 10b-5 a private damages action, which resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 744, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976)). Congress has imposed statutory requirements on that private right of action. Id. In cases involving publicly traded securities and purchases or sales in public securities markets, the action’s basic elements are: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission), (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction causation”; (5) economic loss; and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss. Id. at 341-42, 125 S.Ct. 1627. In addition to pleading these basic elements, a plaintiff must also comply with the standards of the PSLRA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Among other things, the PSLRA requires a plaintiff to identify each allegedly misleading statement with particularity and explain why it is misleading, the so-called “particularity” requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). The PSLRA also provides that a plaintiff must allege facts “giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Only the last requirement alters the usual contours of a Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. Usually, under Rule 12(b)(6), we must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. However, for scienter only, as required by the PSLRA, “a court must take into account plausible inferences opposing as well as supporting a strong inference of scienter.” Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2509). “The inference of scienter must ultimately be ‘cogent and compelling,’ not merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible.’” Id. (quoting Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2510). In the present case, the defendants do not contend that the plaintiffs SAC fails to allege the basic elements of: a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, reliance or transaction causation, or economic loss. The defendants challenge only the SAC’s allegations of actionable material misrepresentations or omissions, scienter, and loss causation. I. Pleading Material Misrepresentations and Omissions. A. Specific allegations of misrepresentations and omissions. Cognizant of the strictures of the PSLRA and Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), the plaintiff alleges that the defendants made twenty-four specific material misrepresentations and omissions in press releases, conference calls, interviews, and filings with the SEC, as follows: 1. On April 4, 2000, US Unwired filed a registration statement with the SEC promoting an initial public offering of its common stock, which included statements emphasizing the beneficial relationship between US Unwired and Sprint. It listed the benefits of its affiliation contract with Sprint, essentially its access to Sprint’s marketing, national network, handset availability, traveling services, and technology. 2. The same April 4, 2000 filing also discussed US Unwired’s rights under its contract with Sprint, including the possibility of selling US Unwired’s business to Sprint or of buying a license from Sprint if Sprint breached the contract. 3. The same April 4, 2000 filing also discussed US Unwired’s reliance on Sprint and its contract with Sprint, noting that US Unwired was dependent on Sprint and had to maintain a good relationship with Sprint or else its “business may not succeed.” The plaintiff alleges these statements were materially misleading because US Unwired was already embroiled in a bitter dispute with Sprint. Sprint had threatened to declare US Unwired in breach of its affiliation contract and had demanded that US Unwired either undertake ruinous costs to integrate its operations or become a Type II affiliate and thereby give up control of its operations. The defendants, through these factual misrepresentations and concealments, artificially inflated the stock price. Thus, On June 14, 2000, Credit Suisse First Boston initiated coverage of US Unwired with a “Buy” rating and a 2001 target price of $25, stating that “[s]imilar to other Sprint PCS affiliates, we believe US Unwired will benefit financially and strategically from its relationship with Sprint.” 4. On August 9, 2000, US Unwired issued a press release announcing record second quarter revenues for the period ending June 30, 2000. Piper publicly commented: “We had a very productive second quarter. Operationally, we launched Sprint PCS service in nine new markets and added 109 cell sites to the network. Our sales team brought 11,000 new PCS subscribers onto the system. Financially, we executed a successful public offering during a very difficult market.” 5. On August 11, 2000, US Unwired filed with the SEC its Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2000, which repeated the financial results reported in the August 9, 2000 press release and several of the positive statements from the April 4, 2000 registration statement concerning US Unwired’s beneficial relationship with Sprint PCS. The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading because the defendants failed to disclose and otherwise omitted that Sprint had intensified its pressure on US Unwired to convert to a Type II affiliate by threatening to declare it in default of the affiliation contract and by giving it a deadline 'of August 31, 2000 to either convert or pay an exorbitant fee of up to $30 million to obtain access to Sprint systems. The stock price continued to be artificially inflated during this period. On September 6, 2000, First Union Securities issued a report on US Unwired, rating it as a “Strong Buy,” and concluding that “US Unwired’s affiliation with Sprint ... coupled with its attractive market footprint, allows it to receive many of the benefits of a national wireless service provider .... ” On October 2, 2000, Hibernia Southcoast Capital rated US Unwired a “Strong Buy” and concluded that “[a]s a network partner, [US Unwired] should be able to leverage its relationship with [Sprint], the fastest growing nationwide wireless provider, to grow its subscriber base faster than the industry average.” On October 6, 2000, Morgan Keegan also reviewed favorably US Unwired’s adoption of Sprint’s “pricing strategies.” 6. On November 8, 2000, US Unwired issued a press release touting the benefits of migrating customer care and billing functions to Sprint. US Unwired noted that the migration would “help [US Unwired] to more fully use [Sprint’s] national sales efforts,” “to capitalize on [Sprint’s] successes,” and “to achieve full network compatibility.” 7. On November 9, 2000, US Unwired reported very good financial numbers and increased subscriptions. Piper publicly commented on the results noting that US Unwired had “executed [its] business plan.” 8. On November 13, 2000, US Unwired filed its Form 10-Q. It disclosed the migration of customer and billing services to Sprint only insofar as it noted that US Unwired “amended [its] management agreements with” Sprint, and that Sprint “will begin providing- substantially all of [US Unwired’s] billing and customer care services,” The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading, because the defendants knowingly concealed that Sprint had forced them into the new Type II relationship that fundamentally altered US Unwired’s business plan and its contractual relationship with Sprint. The defendants knowingly concealed their knowledge that the transfer of control of US Unwired’s billing and customer care — a consequence of the affiliation conversion— risked US Unwired’s financial failure. On December 14, 2000, investor advisory company Johnson Rice said US Unwired was a buy, because it stood out among other wireless stocks due to its growth potential.. 9. On January 17, 2001, US Unwired issued a press release reporting strong subscriber growth. Piper publicly commented that “US Unwired employees did a fantastic job in continuing to accelerate the expansion of [its] consumer base.” . 10. On February 22, 2001, US Unwired issued a press release touting its rapid growth in subscriptions. Piper commented that US Unwired “exceeded all the growth components of [US Unwired’s] business model.” The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading because they ignored the known problems associated with the Type II conversion and - omitted the known risks associated with conversion to its business model. 11. On March 26, 2001, US Unwired filed its Form 10-K Annual Report. It briefly reiterated without comment the fact that US Unwired had migrated billing and customer care functions to Sprint. The plaintiff alleges that this statement was materially misleading, because it omitted the known risk associated with the forced migration of these functions to Sprint, and the magnitude of that risk, i.e., the certain or high potential for company failure. 12. On May 7, 2001, US Unwired issued a press release announcing large net subscriber additions. Piper praised the reduced churn rate in the release. 13. On May 8, 2001, US Unwired filed with the SEC its Form 10-Q stating that US Unwired had migrated billing and customer care functions to Sprint. The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading, because they omitted disclosure of the company’s forced conversion to Type II affiliation and the defendants’ knowledge that US Unwired’s loss of control of its customer care, billing and cash flow functions would be financially disastrous for the company. 14. On August 8, 2001, US Unwired issued a press release stating that “[o]ur outstanding operational performance and adherence to the sound fundamentals of our business plan over the last two years positioned us for the early achievement of [earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, and non-cash compensation].” 15. Also on August 8, 2001, US Unwired filed with the SEC a Form 10-Q, which generally discussed the relationship with Sprint and the migration of billing and customer service operations, but omitted any specific discussion of risks and their magnitude. 16. On August 9, 2001, US Unwired hosted a conference call celebrating its positive earnings. Piper publicly noted that the conversion to Type II affiliation was “going quite well.” First Union Securities reacted by labeling US Unwired as a “strong buy.” 17. On November 8, 2001, US Unwired issued a press release that discussed the completion of the migration of. customer service and billing operations to Sprint. 18. On November 8, 2001, US Unwired filed with the SEC its Form 10-Q. US Unwired noted that because Sprint was responsible for customer service and billing, it depended on Sprint for the “reporting of a significant portion” of US Unwired’s “service and revenues and certain operating, selling, and administrative expenses.” The plaintiff alleges that these statements in the Form 10-Q and the press release were materially misleading, because members of US Unwired’s management knew that the transfer of services was contentious, coerced, and would cause enormous problems. US Unwired would depend on Sprint for the reporting of revenue, costs, and subscriber data and thus, the transfer of these functions would be financially disastrous for US Unwired as it would lose control over its core functions. They omitted any mention of that known risk and the magnitude of that risk. 19. On March 5, 2002 US Unwired issued a press release noting significant gains in subscriptions and a churn rate of approximately 2.5%. 20. On March 5, 2002 US Unwired filed with the SEC its Form 10-K Annual Report for 2001. The report reiterated previous statements regarding the benefits associated with Sprint affiliation. 21. In the same 10-K Report, US Unwired disclosed new potential risks associated with Sprint affiliation, including possible adoption of business decisions not in US Unwired’s best interests and the migration of customer service’s possible effects on customer satisfaction. 22. On March 6, 2002, US Unwired hosted a conference call with investors. Piper touted the “very successful conversion to Sprint’s billing and customer services.” He noted that US Unwired management thought sub-prime credit class customers “are necessary to reach [US Unwired’s] full market penetration potential and we think we can do it profitably.” The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading, because the US Unwired management was aware that Sprint was forcing US Unwired against its will and business judgment to enlist low income and credit risky subscribers without deposits or credit checks; that, as the defendants knew from previous experience, this business strategy would be financially disastrous for US Unwired, given the demographies within its designated network areas; that the defendants continued to mislead the public regarding the viability of this strategy even as they received adverse financial information confirming their dire predictions in respect to the no-deposit programs; that Sprint forced US Unwired to turn over control of its critical core functions of customer care, billing, and cash-flow; and that management knew relinquishing control over those core functions would lead to financial disaster. Piper’s comments in the public conference call misrepresented management’s view concerning the migration of billing and customer services to Sprint and the compelled marketing of these plans to sub-prime credit class customers. Piper continued to tout the past success and potential for both the forced migration of its core functions and coerced implementation of the no-deposit programs. 23. On May 9, 2002, US Unwired reported favorable increases in subscriber growth in a press release, which Piper publicly attributed to US Unwired’s “continued focus on operational excellence.” 24. On May 9, 2002, US Unwired filed with the SEC its Form 10-Q. In this filing, US Unwired discussed its allowances for subscribers canceling their subscriptions and also the debt collections costs in its accounting disclosures. US Unwired also noted that these allowance estimates were consistent with “historical trends.” The plaintiff alleges that these statements were materially misleading, because these statements failed to disclose the defendants’ certain knowledge from previous experience that the no-deposit programs would increase churn and bad debt because of US Unwired’s subscribers’ demographics; that subscriber growth figures were based on no-deposit subscribers who had a potential for high churn, and therefore were misleading; and that no-deposit programs would lead to higher costs caused by the increased churn and bad debt, and such costs would not be consistent with historical trends. A reasonable person may draw the plausible inferences from the foregoing allegations that the defendants made the material misrepresentations and omissions as described above. The defendants do not dispute this conclusion; instead, the defendants contend that the alleged misrepresentations are not actionable because the representations are protected by PSLRA’s safe harbor and, alternatively, the defendants were under no duty to disclose the omitted information. B. Safe Harbor. The defendants argue that certain of the misrepresentations and omissions were not actionable because they were “forward-looking” and subject to the “Safe Harbor” clause of the PSLRA; and that some of the omissions were not material because the defendants had no duty to disclose the omitted information. Under the Safe Harbor clause, a “forward-looking” statement is not actionable if: (1) the statement is “identified as ... forward-looking ... and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially ... ”; (2) it is “immaterial”; or (3) “the plaintiff fails to [plead] that the forward-looking statement ... was made with actual knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A-B); see also Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371-72 (5th Cir.2004) (applying clause to securities fraud allegations). The district court applied the safe harbor provision to alleged misrepresentations 6 through 10. As we noted earlier, the plaintiffs SAC alleges that US Unwired and the individual defendants misled the public by concealing from it material facts of which they were aware, viz., that Sprint was forcing US Unwired against its will and business judgment to enlist low income and credit risky subscribers without deposits or credit checks; and that, as the defendants knew from previous experience, this business strategy would be financially disastrous for US Unwired, given the demographics of its designated network areas. The plaintiff also alleges the defendants misrepresented to the public the nature of US Unwired’s relationship with Sprint and concealed that Sprint had coerced US Unwired into a Type II affiliation, which enabled Sprint to force US Unwired to adopt the sub-prime credit class strategy and took away US Unwired’s control over customer care, billings, and cashflow. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants also continued to mislead the public regarding the financially harmful nature of these programs and the affiliation conversion even as they received adverse financial information confirming their dire predictions. Because the plaintiff adequately alleges that the defendants actually knew that then statements were misleading at the time they were made, the safe harbor provision is inapplicable to all alleged misrepresentations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) — (B) (noting that the “safe harbor” would apply only if “the plaintiff fails to [plead] that the forward-looking statement ... was made with actual knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading.”); Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 371-72. The district court erroneously rejected this argument, stating that “beyond the blanket assertions by plaintiff that defendants knew that these statements had already become false when they were made, the Court can find no other suggestions of this alleged fraud.” The district court did not reach the issue of scienter in its opinion and provides no basis for its determination that the defendants did not know the statements were false as the plaintiff alleges. The district court is in error, because we must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint during the pleadings stage. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965; Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2509; Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir.2007). The defendants do not defend this part of the district court’s reasoning on appeal; instead they contend that the plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead scienter, and, for the same reasons, would lack actual knowledge. We address and reject this argument in the scienter section below. Even if the plaintiff had failed to plead actual knowledge, the safe harbor provision still would not apply here, because the alleged misrepresentations are not accompanied by “meaningful cautionary language.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing the application the safe harbor only if forward-looking statement “is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement”). The district court concluded that US Unwired’s generic disclaimer that accompanied the forward-looking statements amounted to meaningful cautionary language. The disclaimer says that US Unwired’s statements in its documents are “not guarantees of future performance ... and involve known and unknown risks and other factors that could cause actual results to be materially different from any future results expressed or implied by them.” We disagree with the district court’s conclusion, because the language urged here is boilerplate and does not qualify as meaningful cautionary language. Congress clearly intended that boilerplate cautionary language not constitute “meaningful cautionary” language for the purpose of the safe harbor analysis. Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, Conference Report, H. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,710, at 87,209 (1995) and 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730; Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 372 (“The requirement for ‘meaningful’ cautions calls for ‘substantive’ company-specific warnings based on a realistic description of the risks applicable to the particular circumstances, not merely a boilerplate litany of generally applicable risk factors.”). The disclaimer language cited by the district court is very similar to language we determined to be boilerplate and not meaningfully cautionary in Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690 (5th Cir.2005). In Plotkin, we considered the following broad disclaimer found in a company’s press releases to constitute boilerplate cautionary language: “These forward-looking statements involve numerous risks, uncertainties and assumptions, and actual results could differ materially from anticipated results.” Id. at 694. The disclaimer in this case is similarly generic and formulaic, and, likewise, is also boilerplate and not meaningful cautionary language. As further evidence that the disclaimer is mere boilerplate, the disclaimer, only with slight variations, was used in conjunction with each alleged misrepresentation the district court exempted from analysis under the safe harbor provision. The district court, in effect, granted blanket safe harbor protections for the statements, because each was perfunctorily accompanied by essentially nothing more than the same boilerplate language. The district court therefore erroneously neglected to. address how each excluded statement (or portions of those statements) is specifically and meaningfully protected by the safe harbor. Each statement that benefits from the safe harbor must be addressed individually. Cf. Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 379 (examining an individual statement and concluding that “[wjhile this is a forward looking statement, it cannot be ascertained from the record whether it was accompanied by meaningful cautionary language”); Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 215 n. 11 (5th Cir.2004) (“[Cjourts must assess the communication on a case-by-case basis.”) (quoting In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir.1993)).. Here, in not one instance did this generic language amount to “ ‘substantive’ company-specific warnings based on a realistic description of the risks applicable to the particular circumstances” specifically described in any of the alleged misrepresentation so as to constitute meaningful cautionary language. See Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 372. The generic language is merely a “litany of generally applicable risk factors” applied as boilerplate to every alleged misrepresentation the district considered to be protected under PSLRA’s safe harbor. Id. The district court fell into legal error in its application of the safe harbor provision to misrepresentations 6-10. Moreover, the defendants do not defend this part of the district court’s analysis on appeal. Instead, the defendants point to different disclaimers in documents (attached as exhibits to the complaint) that contain the alleged misrepresentations and contend that those disclaimers meaningfully warn about or fully disclose the potential specific risks allegedly omitted in the misrepresentations. The disclaimers they rely on provide: (1) “Our agreements with Sprint PCS are central to our business plan .... These agreements give Sprint PCS a substantial amount of control over the conduct of our business. Sprint PCS may make decisions that adversely affect our business like setting the prices for its national plans at levels that may not be economically sufficient for our business.” (2) “We will rely on Sprint PCS’s internal support systems, including customer care, billings and backoffice support, in some of our markets ____ Problems with Sprint PCS’s internal support systems could cause: delays or problems in our own operations or service^] delays or difficulty in gaining access to customer and financial information[,] a loss of Sprint PCS customers!;, and] an increase in the costs of customer care, billing and back-office services.” (3) “We currently have employees to handle billing, customer care, accounting, treasury and legal services in our markets where we currently offer PCS service and in most of our new markets. We believe that providing these functions ourselves is more cost-effective than having third parties provide them. In a limited number of markets, however, Sprint PCS will provide us on a contract basis with selected back office functions like billing and customer care. We anticipate that we may over time transfer control of these functions to Sprint PCS if Sprint PCS can provide them more cost effectively and efficiently than we can.” (4) “Changes in technology could adversely affect us .... If Sprint PCS changes its standard, we will need to change ours as well, which will be costly and time consuming. If we cannot change our standard, we may not be able to compete with other systems.” (5) “Each Sprint management agreement requires us to follow program requirements that are used throughout the nationwide Sprint PCS network. We must continue to follow these program requirements if Sprint PCS changes them. The program requirements involve ... our participation in Sprint PCS distribution programs on a national and regional basis [and] adherence to Sprint technical program requirements .... We will comply with Sprint PCS’s program requirements for technical standards, customer service standards, national and regional distribution, national accounts programs and traveling and inter-service area services. Sprint PCS can adjust the program requirements from time to time.” (6) “Our PCS business may suffer because more subscribers generally disconnect their service in the PCS industry than in the cellular industry .... We plan to keep our subscriber churn down by expanding network coverage, improving network reliability, marketing affordable plans and enhancing customer care. We cannot assure that these strategies will be successful. A high rate of PCS subscriber churn could harm our competitive position and the results of operations of our PCS services.” (7) “US Unwired is a leading proponent of prepaid products in the wireless industry. Industry experts believe that 70% of all new wireless activations will be prepay by 2002.” After surveying these warnings, and after drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiff, we conclude that the referenced precautionary language only warned the public that US Unwired’s affiliation conversion may cause a limited, general, and vague risk to customer satisfaction and to US Unwired’s independent discretion in business decisions in limited areas on a case-by-case basis. The cautionary language disclaimer (1) uses the phrase Sprint “may make decisions that adversely affect our business,” (emphasis added) which is a very vague and general warning. Disclaimer (2) stated that “[problems with Sprint[ ]’s internal support systems could cause” delays and costs to customer service, and disclaimer (5) represents that Sprint’s contractual authority over US Unwired was both limited in scope (“can adjust the program”) and limited temporally (“from time to time”). These disclaimers also limit the possible risk to certain areas, “delays and costs to customer service,” with a limited temporal scope. These warnings did not disclose that defendants knew from past experience that the sub-prime subscriber programs and US Unwired’s loss of control of customer care, billings and service posed an imminent threat of business and financial ruin and that some damage from these risks had already materialized. For example, cautionary language disclaimers (3) and (4) merely disclose the possibility of transferring functions to Sprint without disclosing any material risks. As for the no-deposit program, US Unwired publicly stated that its management believed the program would generally succeed and was necessary. Cautionary language disclaimer (7) actually promotes an impression that the no-deposit programs, if considered to be a pre-paid program, was necessary. Cautionary language disclaimer (6) states that US Unwired’s business “may suffer” as a result of churn, but also noted that they “plan to keep our subscriber churn down.” This warning does not disclose the specific risks and their magnitude, such as the sub-prime subscriber programs’ alleged certain grave threat to US Unwired’s entire business, which it was powerless to control, caused primarily by severe churn and bad debt. Moreover, warnings about the risks associated with the no-deposit programs were glossed over as a future risk of limited magnitude that would be averted rather than certain dangers that had already begun to materialize. These warnings failed to correct the false impression created by the defendants’ public statements or to supply the truth that they omitted, viz., that the defendants knew that the no-deposit programs and affiliation conversion threatened to severely harm the company financially by increasing churn and bad debt; that this insidious damage process had already begun; and that US Unwired was unable to contain it because its core operations had been transferred to Sprint. From the context of the alleged misrepresentations and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, these warnings, while somewhat specific, do not provide sufficiently meaningful caution about clearly present danger that was materializing. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that alleged misrepresentations and cautionary language must be analyzed in context and the presence of cautionary language is not per se dispositive) (“Under our precedent, cautionary language is not necessarily sufficient, in. and of itself, to render predictive statements immaterial as a matter of law.”); see also Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213 (1st Cir.1996), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir.1999) (noting how the “surrounding context” failed to caution “against such an implication with sufficient clarity to be thought to bespeak caution”). Viewing all of the statements in context, we conclude that the defendants’. safe harbor argument is without merit. The misrepresentations and omissions were not accompanied by specific, concrete explanations that clearly identified and quantified the clearly present financial dangers to US Unwired, i.e., the disastrous effects of the no-deposit programs and US Unwired’s loss of control of customer care, billings and cash flow. Because “reasonable minds could ... disagree as to whether the mix of information in the [allegedly actionable] document is misleading,” the statutory safe harbor provision cannot provide the basis for dismissal as matter of law. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)] that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 n. 8. C. Materiality — Duty to Disclose. “[T]o fulfill the materiality requirement ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.’ ” Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988) (quoting TSC Inds., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)). Accordingly, the disclosure required by the securities laws is measured not by literal truth, but by the ability of the statements to accurately inform rather than mislead prospective buyers. Cf. Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that “emphasis and gloss can, in the right circumstances create liability” under Rule 10b — 5). The omission of a known risk, its probability of materialization, and its anticipated magnitude, are usually material to any disclosure discussing the prospective result from a future course of action. See Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 969-70 (1st Cir.1992); see generally SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 768-71 (11th Cir.2007); Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns, 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C.Cir.1994). Once the defendants engaged in public discussions concerning the benefits of Type II affiliation and the no-deposit programs, they had a duty to disclose a “mix of information” that is not misleading. [W]e have long held under Rule 10b-5, a duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes a duty to say anything. Although such a defendant is under no duty to disclose every fact or assumption underlying a prediction, he must disclose material, firm-specific adverse facts that affect the validity or' plausibility of that prediction. Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 170 (internal quotations and citations omitted). As discussed earlier, the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the defendants omitted serious risks inherent to the no-deposit initiatives and the company’s conversion to Type II affiliation when they made statements regarding their benefits. They omitted known risks of severe magnitude, such as the known risk that long-term subscriber growth fueled by sub-prime credit class customers would almost certainly lead towards disaster. Their statements touting the benefits of US Unwired’s conversion to Type II affiliation also omitted known risks of severe magnitude to their business plan as a result of the transfer of core services and customer billing to Sprint. Company officials publicly touted the migration of services and the use of no-deposit programs although they recognized signs that the dangers they privately predicted had already materialized (i.e., churn, bad debt, lack of independent control) and they had protested privately to Sprint regarding both actions; further, they continued to tout the programs and the conversion even after reinstating deposits for certain customer areas. See Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 171 (“ ‘To warn that the untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent, to caution that it is only possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they have already occurred is deceit.’ ”) (quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543-44 (5th Cir.1981)); id. at 170 n. 41 (“[A]t least facially, it appears that defendants have a duty under Rule 10b-5 to correct statements if those statements have become materially misleading in light of subsequent events.”). We have also noted that: Perception of future events may take on a different cast as the future approaches, and, what is more important, later correspondence may act to bury facts previously disclosed. A balance once struck will not ensure a balance in the future. As new communications add a dash of recommendation, a pinch of promise, and a dusting of repetition, the scale may be tipped. To prevent an injustice to the shareholders, the elements must be weighed each time that the shareholders are requested (or encouraged) to make a new decision. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 605-06 (5th Cir.1974). Here, the total mix of information was misl