Full opinion text
LUCERO, Circuit Judge. This litigation concerns the environmental fate of New Mexico’s Otero Mesa, the largest publicly-owned expanse of undisturbed Chihuahuan Desert grassland in the United States. From 1998 to 2004, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM” or “the Agency”) conducted a large-scale land management planning process for federal fluid minerals development in Sierra and Otero Counties, where the Mesa is located. Ultimately, the Agency opened the majority of the Mesa to development, subject to a stipulation that only 5% of the surface of the Mesa could be in use at any one time. Invoking the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), and the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), the State of New Mexico and a coalition of environmental organizations led by the New Mexico Wilderness Association (“NMWA”) challenged in federal district court the procedures by which BLM reached this determination. NMWA also challenged BLM’s decision not to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) regarding possible impacts of the planned development on the Northern Aplomado Falcon. The district court rejected these challenges, save for the plaintiffs’ argument that BLM erred in beginning the leasing process on the Mesa before conducting additional analysis of site-specific environmental impacts flowing from the issuance of development leases. Discerning serious flaws in BLM’s procedures, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that NEPA requires BLM to conduct site-specific analysis before the leasing stage but reverse its determination that BLM’s plan-level analysis complied with NEPA. Moreover, we affirm its conclusion that BLM complied with public comment provisions in FLPMA, and we vacate as moot the portion of the district court’s order addressing NMWA’s ESA claims. I Within Sierra and Otero counties in southern New Mexico lie the northern reaches of the richly biodiverse Chihuahuan Desert. Among the several habitats comprising this desert ecosystem is the Chihuahuan Desert grassland, much of which has depleted to scrubland over the past century and a half. A New Mexico State University biology professor identifies this grassland as the most endangered ecosystem type in the United States. The Otero Mesa, which BLM seeks to open to oil and gas development upon conclusion of the planning process that is the subject of this litigation, is home to the endangered Northern Aplomado Falcon, along with a host of other threatened, endangered, and rare species. Only a few, unpaved roads traverse the Mesa. Lying beneath it is the Salt Basin Aquifer, which contains an estimated 15 million acre-feet of untapped potable water. Recognizing the importance of this valuable resource, the state of New Mexico and many citizens and environmental groups have sought to prevent development. A BLM manages some 1.8 million acres of surface land and 5 million acres of subsurface oil, gas, and geothermal resources in Sierra and Otero Counties. This includes the 427,275-acre Otero Mesa. Until recently, these resources were managed under the terms of a 1986 resource management plan (the “RMP”), see 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n), which contained no overall guidance on the management of fluid minerals development, leaving management decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Because the area saw relatively little oil and gas exploration, BLM relied on the plan without incident for a decade and issued few development leases during this time. This state of affairs was upended in 1997, when a Harvey E. Yates Company (“HEYCO”) exploratory well struck natural gas on the Otero Mesa. The strike occurred on- a parcel designated the Bennett Ranch Unit (“BRU”). Oil and gas companies quickly responded by nominating over 250,000 acres in the area for federal leases. See § 3120-3.1. BLM determined that under the terms of then-existing internal policy, the increased development interest required the Agency to issue a management plan specifically governing fluid mineral resources. See BLM Handbook H-1624-1 (1990); BLM Manual §§ 1620.06(A), 1620.2 (1986). Accordingly, BLM asked existing leaseholders to voluntarily suspend their leases and began the process of amending the RMP to address possible oil, gas, and geothermal development. See Notice of Intent to Prepare a Resource Management Plan Amendment and Environmental Impact Statement, 63 Fed.Reg. 55404. (Oct. 15, 1998). The stated goals of the amendment process were to determine which public lands in Sierra and Otero Counties should be available for leasing and development and to direct how leased lands would be managed. Id. at 55405. Amending a resource management plan is a “major federal action” whose potential environmental impacts must be assessed under NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); see also Utah Shared Access Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1131 (10th Cir.2006). Consequently, in October 2000, BLM issued a “Draft Resource Management Plan Amendment and Environmental Impact Statement for Federal Fluid Minerals Leasing and Development in Sierra and Otero Counties” (the “Draft EIS”). As NEPA requires, the Draft EIS analyzed several possible alternative management schemes for oil and gas development in the area. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. Of the five alternatives identified, three were fully-analyzed in the Draft EIS. The other two were eliminated without further analysis. Both eliminated alternatives would have increased the level of environmental protection for the entire plan area beyond the level provided under existing management or any of the fully analyzed alternatives. One would have done so through a blanket ban on minerals development leasing; the other, through a “no surface occupancy” (“NSO”) stipulation allowing minerals development only by slant drilling from non-BLM lands. These alternatives were “considered initially but eliminated prior to further analysis” based on the conclusion that adopting a plan which so limited development would be arbitrary and capricious under FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). BLM also discounted one of the three alternatives analyzed in the Draft EIS: the “No-Action Alternative,” or the option of taking no new planning action. After fully analyzing its likely impacts, BLM determined that the No-Action Alternative was not in compliance with its own policies. Thus, BLM was left with two possible management schemes, “Alternative A” and “Alternative B.” Of the two, Alternative A placed fewer restrictions on development, and BLM selected it as the preferred alternative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e). Alternative A opened 96.9% of the plan area but placed limitations on possible development, subjecting 58.9% of the area to a combination of NSO stipulations, controlled surface use stipulations, and timing stipulations. Of particular relevance to this litigation, Alternative A subjected 116,206 acres of the Otera Mesa and 16,256 acres of the adjoining Nutt Desert Grasslands to an NSO provision allowing surface disturbance only within 492 feet of existing roads. BLM crafted this NSO restriction “[t]o protect portions of the remaining desert grassland community by minimizing habitat fragmentation.” Also relevant to this litigation, the Draft EIS analyzed the potential impact on groundwater in the plan area only in general terms, without identifying or discussing specific aquifers such as the Salt Basin Aquifer. The Draft EIS concluded that in the construction phase of development: The possibility for degradation of fresh water aquifers could result if leaks or spills occur from pits used for the storage of drilling fluids, or if cathodic protection wells associated with pipelines are installed in a manner that allows for the commingling of shallow surface aquifers. However, since impacts would occur only if the governing regulations fail to protect the resource, the impact is not quantifiable. As for the production phase, the Draft EIS was equally cursory. It stated that “[production of an oil and gas well typically would not have a direct impact on groundwater resources” because regulations require that “[a]ll oil and gas wells must have a casing and cement program ... to prevent the migration of oil, gas, or water ... that may result in degradation of groundwater.” Id.; see 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-2(d). Finally, the Draft EIS concluded that disposal wells, which are “used for the disposal of waste [by injection] into a subsurface stratum,” 40 C.F.R. § 146.3, would not lead to significant impacts because applicable casing and cement construction requirements and aquifer criteria would be followed and would prevent contamination. § 146.22 (listing construction requirements for Class II wells, including casing and cementing); see generally § 144 (“Underground Injection Control Program”). After releasing the Draft EIS, BLM accepted public comments for a 195-day period and held six public meetings to discuss it. See Notice of Availability and Public Hearings, 65 Fed.Reg. 69329 (Nov. 16, 2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b) & (c) (requiring agencies to provide public notice of the availability of environmental documents and hold public meetings “whenever appropriate”). Nearly 300 oral and written comments were received, and BLM recognized that a majority of these addressed the need to protect the Otero Mesa grassland. Numerous public comments expressed concern that the NSO stipulation, which exempted areas within 492 feet of existing roads, was insufficient to prevent fragmentation of the Otero Mesa grassland habitat. A Vice President of HEYCO commented that the resources underlying Otero Mesa would not likely be accessible via directional drilling, and thus, “Alternative A has the effect of closing 160,000+ acres to fluid mineral development.” In response to all of these comments, BLM announced that it would reevaluate Alternative A in the Final EIS. B Among the species for which the Chihuahuan Desert grasslands provide habitat is the Northern Aplomado Falcon (“Aplomado Falcon” or “Falcon”), listed as an endangered species since 1986. See Determination of the Northern Aplomado Falcon to Be an Endangered Species, 51 Fed.Reg. 6686, 6686-88 (Feb. 25, 1986). Although Falcons have only “sporadically” been seen in the United States in recent decades, the presence of breeding Falcons just across the border in Mexico led biologists to believe that the Falcon might be poised to repopulate portions of the plan area. Repopulation by the Falcon would depend on the preservation of suitable grassland habitat. In June 2003, during the ongoing resource management plan amendment process, BLM concluded that revisions to the management plan were “likely to adversely affect” the Falcon. Accordingly, it requested in writing that FWS begin formal consultation, pursuant to § 7 of the ESA, regarding whether BLM’s proposed action might jeopardize the Falcon’s continued existence. 16 U.S.C. § 1536; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (detailing formal consultation requirements). Three months later, the Agency reversed course, retracted its determination that the RMP revisions were “likely to adversely affect” the Falcon, and informed FWS of its conclusion that formal consultation was therefore unnecessary. FWS concurred in this revised determination, thus ending the formal consultation process and the agencies’ study of likely effects on the Falcon. C Three years after issuing the Draft EIS, in December 2003, BLM issued a Proposed Resource Management Plan Amendment (“RMPA”) and Final EIS. Rather than selecting from among the alternatives analyzed in the Draft EIS, however, the abstract of the Final EIS explained that BLM had selected “a modified version (as a result of public input) of preferred Alternative A described and analyzed in the Draft RMPA/EIS.” This “modified version” of Alternative A (“Alternative A-modified”) differed in a crucial respect from Alternative A: Rather than limiting surface disturbances to areas within 492 feet of existing roadways, Alternative A-modified would instead limit disturbances to any 5% of the surface area of a leased parcel at a given time, regardless of location. In addition to the 5% disturbance cap, Alternative A-modified required “unitization,” a management scheme under which different operators cooperate in exploration and well development' with the goal of minimizing surface impacts. “Unitization” was a new creation, never previously used by BLM in managing surface resources. Although the sections of the Final EIS describing the management plan itself were modified to reflect these new requirements, the sections describing the plan’s impacts on vegetation and wildlife were not substantially modified, because the EIS concluded that the changes “do not significantly alter ... the analysis of the environmental consequences.” Alternative A-modified did offer greater protection of the Otero and Nutt grasslands in one respect: It prohibited development on 35,790 acres of “core habitat” for five years pending further study and development of an adaptive management strategy. Thus, BLM presented the new alternative as responsive to the concerns of both industry and the environmental community. The Agency reiterated in response to public questions that it was unnecessary to analyze the impacts of A-modified because the overall “impact assessment,” judged based on the “anticipated level of surface disturbance,” “remained essentially the same” as under Alternative A. Based on this conclusion that the same or less surface acreage would be disturbed under Alternative A-modified, BLM reasoned, there was no substantial change from an environmental standpoint. Regarding groundwater concerns, the Final EIS added a discussion of the effects of leasing on specific basins, including the Salt Basin Aquifer, but again concluded that “the impacts on groundwater resources are expected to be minimal,” adding that “[t]ypically, natural gas wells make little water and the water produced can be disposed through the use of evaporation ponds.” D In response to these changes, three New Mexico state agencies, a group of environmental organizations, and more than twenty-five members of the public filed formal protests with BLM. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2 (“Any person who participated in the planning process and has an interest which is or may be adversely affected by the ... amendment of a resource management plan may protest such ... amendment.”). Of those protests reflected in the record, nearly all expressed concern regarding the changes to the Otero and Nutt grassland NSO stipulation. The New Mexico Energy, Mineral and Natural Resources Department, Earthjustice, and several citizens also objected to the level of assessment of likely impacts on groundwater. All protests were reviewed by BLM and ultimately dismissed. Not long after these protests were filed, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson released a review of the consistency of the Final EIS with state law. See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (giving governors of affected states 60 days in which to “identify inconsistencies and provide recommendations in writing” to the BLM State Director); Governor Bill Richardson’s Consistency Review of and Recommended Changes to the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt.’s Proposed Resource Mgmt. Plan Amend, and Final Envtl. Impact Statement for Fed. Fluid Minerals Leasing and Dev. in Sierra and Otero Counties, March 5, 2004, available at http://www.emnrd. state.nm.us/MAIN/Administration/News/ GovsPlanforOteroMesa.pdf [hereinafter “Consistency Review”]. Governor Richardson concluded that the proposed management of the Otero Mesa was inconsistent with “numerous ... state laws, rules, policies, programs, and plans, particularly those that relate to protecting the Chihuahuan Desert and New Mexico’s ground water.” The Governor accordingly proposed an alternate management plan. His plan closed roughly the same areas to leasing and imposed roughly the same NSO, controlled surface use, and timing stipulations as those proposed in Alternative B, along with some increases in protection compared to that alternative. Most important to this appeal, the Governor proposed NSO stipulations that, unlike those proposed in Alternative B, would cover large portions of the Otero Mesa and Nutt grasslands. The governor also proposed the imposition throughout the entire plan area of various surface use limitations not considered by BLM. BLM declined to adopt the majority of the Governor’s suggested modifications to the Final EIS and concluded that the EIS was consistent with “officially approved and adopted resource-related [state] policies and programs.” However, the Agency did accept one major alteration proposed by the Governor, making the closure of 35,790 acres of core habitat on the Otero Mesa and Nutt grasslands permanent rather than temporary. The Agency announced this modification in a 23-page “supplement” to the Final EIS (the “SEIS”), issued on May 19, 2004. In response to the public outcry over the adoption of Alternative A-modified in the Final EIS, the SEIS provided a summary of changes between the Draft and Final EIS and some explanation of the reasons for the switch to Alternative A-modified. First, a segment addressing the Otero Mesa and Nutt grasslands explained that public comments led BLM to conclude that directional drilling — as required to access resources beneath the Mesa under either Alternative A or B — would not be feasible in the area, and accordingly, “there was a need to reevaluate the No Surface Occupancy stipulation, and consider a different approach that would similarly meet the resource objectives.” Moreover, “BLM analysis indicates the grassland areas could be adequately protected utilizing a 5 percent maximum surface disturbance stipulation.” Second, a subsection entitled “Further Analysis of Existing Data” concluded that because BLM predicted that the “reasonable foreseeable development” acreage would be 1,600 acres under any management scheme, the impacts of Alternatives A and A-modified on habitat would not appreciably differ. Notably, BLM based its prediction of likely development solely on the exploration history and current lease status of lands in the plan area, without accounting for the management scheme in effect. Because BLM anticipated the same habitat impacts under either alternative, the SEIS concluded that the adoption of A-modified was within “the scope and analysis of the Draft RMPA/ EIS and d[id] not significantly alter the alternatives or analysis of the environmental consequences.” The SEIS did include a chart comparing the potential environmental impacts of Alternative B, Alternative A-modified, and the No-Action Alternative. However, the chart did not estimate likely surface impacts under the 5% and unitization requirements. Thus, the SEIS included no new environmental impacts analysis beyond that in the Final EIS — which itself simply adopted the analysis of the Draft EIS on relevant points. BLM published a notice of availability of the SEIS in the federal register and held a 30-day public comment period. Notice of Change to Proposed Resource Management Plan Amendment; Notice of Public Comment Period, 69 Fed.Reg. 30718 (May 28, 2004). Governor Richardson appealed the rejection of the majority of his proposed modifications to BLM’s National Director (“Director”). See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e). In addition, several environmental groups sent a joint letter to the Director requesting that BLM allow public review and comment on the Governor’s recommendations. See id. The Director declined to do so and issued a decision rejecting the Governor’s appeal. Notice of BLM Director’s Response to an Appeal From the Governor of New Mexico, 70 Fed.Reg. 3550 (Jan. 25, 2005). In the Record of Decision issued in January 2005 upon final adoption of the RMPA, BLM explained that there was no need for a separate comment period given the similarity between the Governor’s proposal and Alternative B. E In April 2005, the State of New Mexico filed suit against BLM, raising claims under NEPA, FLPMA, the NHPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (the “New Mexico suit”). On May 20, BLM scheduled for July 20 a competitive oil and gas lease auction covering a 1600-acre parcel within the Bennett Ranch Unit (the “BRU Parcel”), adjacent to the parcel on which HEYCO found natural gas triggering the cascade of lease nominations that led to the RMPA process. Six days later, a coalition of environmental groups filed a second suit (the “NMWA suit”). As amended, this suit raised claims under NEPA, the ESA and FLPMA. BLM went ahead with the July 20 auction, and HEYCO, the sole bidder, purchased the lease. During the course of litigation, however, BLM agreed not to execute the lease until resolution of the case. HEYCO has continued to prepare for the possibility of drilling, obtaining permits to build a pipeline to service wells on this lease and others it holds nearby. The NMWA suit was later consolidated with New Mexico’s suit. Before the two matters were consolidated, however, the Independent Petroleum Association of New Mexico (“IPANM”), an organization promoting the interests of independent oil and gas producers in the state, moved to intervene in the New Mexico suit. After consolidation, IPANM moved to intervene in the NMWA suit as well. Both motions were unopposed. On August 8, 2005, the district court granted the motion to intervene in the State’s suit. Although the court later denied as moot IPANM’s intervention in the NMWA suit, we now grant its request to intervene in that case from this point forward. After oral argument and an evidentiary hearing regarding Aplomado Falcon sightings in the plan area, the district court issued a September 27, 2006, opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ NEPA, ESA, FLPMA, and NHPA challenges to the RMPA process. However, the court also held that BLM violated NEPA when it failed to conduct a site-specific environmental analysis of the likely impacts of leasing the BRU Parcel and ordered BLM to prepare such an analysis. IPANM now appeals the district court’s determination regarding the necessity of site-specific analysis. The State and NMWA cross-appeal all other matters save the NHPA claim. F Since the issuance of the district court’s opinion, the regulatory status of the Northern Aplomado Falcon has changed in a manner that affects this litigation. At the time of BLM’s decisions to adopt the RMPA and to issue the July 20 lease, the Falcon was listed as an endangered species. Accordingly, in the district court, NMWA challenged BLM’s ESA consultation process regarding effects of the RMPA on the Falcon. After the district court entered its order below, rejecting NMWA’s argument on the merits, FWS reclassified the Falcon population in the area. In summer 2006, FWS issued a formal ruling in which it decided to reintroduce the Falcons into New Mexico and Arizona. See Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population of Northern Aplomado Falcons in New Mexico and Arizona, 71 Fed.Reg. 42298 (July 26, 2006). We must address whether these changes affect the liveness of NMWA’s ESA challenge. II We begin, as we must, by considering jurisdictional issues. Because no other statute confers jurisdiction, our jurisdiction must flow from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which allows appeal from all “final decisions” of the district courts. BLM argues that the district court’s order was not a final decision, but rather, an unreviewable remand under the administrative remand doctrine. In addition, BLM and IPANM argue that the plaintiffs’ ESA claim is moot. A “[A] decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under § 1291 only if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996) (quotation omitted). The finality requirement is designed to avoid the waste and confusion engendered by piecemeal review of cases. See Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1426 (10th Cir.1984). “[R]emand by a district court to an administrative agency for further proceedings is ordinarily not appeal-able because it is not a final decision.” Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 441 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Bender, 744 F.2d at 1426-27). In this case, the district court determined that BLM failed to conduct sufficient site-specific environmental analysis before auctioning leases for lands within the plan area and instructed the Agency to conduct further assessment if it wished to execute the lease in the Bennett Ranch Unit. All other challenges raised by the plaintiffs were resolved in BLM’s favor. On its face, this order has all requisite components of a final order: It resolved all issues and granted the plaintiffs relief, enjoining issuance of the HEYCO lease until such analysis is complete. As the State points out, BLM is not bound to conduct a new EIS in response to the court’s order; it could opt to refrain from granting any leases and thus obviate the need for an EIS. Even assuming that BLM completes a site-specific EIS, any challenge thereto must be brought in a new lawsuit. BLM argues, however, that despite the appearance of finality, the court’s order amounts to a “remand” to BLM and is thus non-final under administrative law principles. See, e.g., Bender, 744 F.2d at 1426-27. In effect, BLM argues that whenever a court order requires further action by an agency, the order constitutes a “remand,” and we cannot review the matter until the agency acts and the parties return to court. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of a “remand” in an administrative case. Typically, a “remand” from a district court to an agency occurs when an agency has acted in an adjudicative capacity: A party to the adjudication appeals the agency’s determination to a district court, and the district court instructs the agency to conduct further proceedings. Accordingly, when considering whether a remand has occurred in a given case, appellate courts must consider the nature of the agency action as well as the nature of the district court’s order: [Jjudicial review of administrative action comes in many forms. The administrative action may be essentially adjudicatory, essentially legislative, or some non-adversarial action such as grant of a license. The issue of finality is affected by the nature of the administrative proceeding and the framework of judicial review as well as the character of the remand order. 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 3914.32, at 237 (2d ed.1992); see also Caesar v. West, 195 F.3d 1373, 1374 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“Remands to administrative agencies, because they mark a continuation of the case, are not generally considered final decisions for jurisdictional purposes.” (emphasis added)); Horizons Int’l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154, 158-59 (3d. Cir.1987) (“The governing statute may authorize judicial review of agency action that is essentially adjudicatory[,] ... of legislative rulemaking which is neither adjudicatory nor adversarial!]] ... [or] of the non-adversarial grant of a license. Each of these different kinds of agency actions may present the issue of finality differently.” (citations omitted)). Although our own circuit has not explicitly elucidated these criteria in the past, our precedent indicates that we view the remand rule as most appropriate in adjudicative contexts. E.g., Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.2001) (discussing exceptions to the remand rule which exist because “if a district court remands an issue to an administrative agency and essentially instructs the agency to rule in favor of the plaintiff,” the agency may be precluded from appeal (emphasis added)); Baca-Prieto v. Guigni, 95 F.3d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir.1996) (remanding a case to an Immigration Judge for further adjudication and noting that “this circuit follows the prevailing view that a district court order remanding an action to an administrative agency for further proceedings is generally considered a nonfinal decision” (emphases added)); Bender, 744 F.2d at 1426 (explaining that the district court, rather than making any final determination itself, had remanded for the agency to apply a different legal standard when adjudicating the determination at issue). Looking to the characteristics that influence finality, including the nature of the agency proceeding and the character of the dispositive district court order, Wright, supra, the order below does not share the features of a typical remand. Here, the agency proceeding underlying the RMPA was a policymaking process based on the exercise of BLM expertise, better described as quasi-legislative than adjudicative. In challenging that proceeding, the plaintiffs did not contend that BLM wrongfully adjudicated their rights, but rather that its policymaking process was contrary to law and injured their interests. For that reason, BLM appeared in the district court as a traditional adversarial party, defending its own actions against challenges by the State and NMWA, rather than defending a ruling made by the Agency in a controversy between parties appearing before it. As for the nature of the district court’s order, it simply does not square with the traditional notion of a “remand,” wherein the reviewing court returns an action to a lower court for further proceedings. The court’s order did not require BLM to recommence a proceeding, or indeed to take any action at all — it simply enjoined BLM from further NEPA violations. If the Agency wishes to allow oil and gas leasing in the plan area it must undertake additional analysis based on the district court’s memorandum opinion, but it retains the option of ceasing such proceedings entirely. Thus, the nature of the court’s injunction is wholly unlike a traditional remand. As NMWA points out, if we accepted BLM’s argument that an order of this sort constitutes a “remand” simply because an agency is involved, the practical consequences would be drastic: “[E]very victory by a plaintiff in a case brought pursuant to the APA [would] necessarily [be] a non-final ‘remand’ order.” NMWA Reply Br. at 3. Had Congress wished to allow appeal under the APA only when an agency prevails on all claims in the district court, it could have done so explicitly. It is unsurprising, then, that we have often treated district court orders requiring further agency action under NEPA as final and reviewable in the past. See, e.g., Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Norton, 294 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir.2002) (reviewing a district court decision requiring FWS to conduct an environmental impact study); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1074 (10th Cir.1988) (reviewing a district court decision requiring BLM to conduct environmental analysis), overruled on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 973 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc); see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 640 (9th Cir.2004) (reviewing a district court decision requiring the Forest Service to conduct environmental analysis); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir.1998) (reviewing a district court decision requiring the Department of Agriculture to consult under the ESA); Nat'l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 12, 19 (2d Cir.1997) (reviewing a district court decision requiring the Forest Service to conduct environmental analysis). Both the nature of BLM’s proceeding and the character of the decision below indicate that viewing that decision as a “remand” would strain common sense. Our treatment of similar orders in past cases bolsters that conclusion. We hold that the district court’s order was not an administrative remand, but rather a final order that we have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. B BLM and IPANM argue that FWS’s summer 2006 decision to reintroduce the Aplomado Falcon into the plan area moots NMWA’s challenge under the ESA. We agree and vacate the portion of the district court’s order addressing this issue. 1 NWMA argues that BLM failed to comply with § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, which requires all federal agencies to formally consult with the federal wildlife agencies to “insure that any [agency action] is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (providing for “all ... listed species” other than those overseen by the National Marine Fisheries Service, agencies “shall contact the FWS”). Despite the name, consultation is more than a mere procedural requirement, as it allows FWS to impose substantive constraints on the other agency’s action if necessary to limit the impact upon an endangered species. Natural Res. Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.1998); see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (d). NMWA argues that BLM’s September 2003 about-face regarding the likelihood of the RMPA adversely affecting the Falcon was arbitrary and capricious. Because of the summer 2006 reintroduction decision, however, the Falcon’s status under the ESA has changed. At the time of BLM’s issuance of the Final EIS, the Falcon was listed as an endangered species, to which § 7(a)(2) applied. See Determination of Northern Aplomado Falcon to Be an Endangered Species, 51 Fed.Reg. at 6686-88; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (defining the term “endangered species”), § 1533(a) (empowering the Secretary of the Interiof to “determine whether any species is an endangered species”). Since the promulgation of the reintroduction rule, the Falcon population in the plan area falls under § 10(j) of the ESA, applicable to populations which are artificially introduced into an area outside the naturally existing range of a species. These populations are classified as “experimental.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j); Establishment of Nonessential Experimental Population of Northern Aplomado Falcons in New Mexico and Arizona, 71 Fed.Reg. at 42298. The ESA provides that nonessential experimental populations outside the National Park and National Wildlife Refuge system are treated as “proposed to be listed” rather than endangered or threatened. § 1539(j)(2)(C); 50 C.F.R. § 17.83(a). As discussed, the § 7(a)(2) formal consultation process applies only to species listed as threatened or endangered and not to species that are merely proposed for listing. Compare § 1536(a)(2) (requiring agencies to consult with the wildlife agencies regarding endangered and threatened species), with (a)(4) (requiring agencies to confer with the wildlife agencies regarding any species “proposed to be listed”); see Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1367-69 (9th Cir.1985) (interpreting the term “confer” as requiring only an informal discussion process rather than formal § 7 consultation). Accordingly, BLM and IPANM ask us to conclude that NMWA’s ESA challenge is moot because the Falcon population at issue is no longer subject to consultation, a contention we review de novo. See Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir.2008). In order for the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction, Article III of the Constitution requires that the controversy between the parties remain live throughout all stages of litigation. United States v. Seminole Nation of Okla., 321 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.2002), “A federal court has no power to give opinions upon moot questions or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997). Attempting to persuade us that the controversy regarding the Falcon’s ESA status remains live, NMWA directs us to a lawsuit currently pending before our court challenging the legality of FWS’s decision to reclassify the Falcon on the basis that the “reintroduction” area is already within the existing range of the species. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 08-2226 (10th Cir. filed Sept. 24, 2008); see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j); 50 C.F.R. § 17.80(a) (defining the term “experimental population” to include an introduced population “only when, and at such times as the [introduced] population is wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental populations of the same species”). A favorable outcome for the appellant environmental group in that case would mean that the Falcon population at issue would once again be categorized as “endangered” and subject to the formal consultation requirement. But because mootness requires a live controversy at all stages, we must consider whether the controversy is live at the current phase of litigation under current law. Nor do we think it appropriate to prejudge the merits of another case before our court in order to determine whether the outcome the plaintiffs hope for can be considered “likely.” Absent an applicable exception, the ESA challenge is moot, and we may proceed no further. 2 Despite its jurisdictional nature, mootness does admit of certain exceptions. See United States v. Seminole Nation of Okla., 321 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir.2002). NMWA argues that the Falcon’s reclassification, and the resulting inapplicability of the formal consultation requirement, amounted to a voluntary cessation of illegal behavior on the part of BLM and FWS. When a party moots a case by voluntarily changing its own conduct, the Supreme Court instructs us to view mootness arguments with suspicion because the offending party might otherwise resume that conduct as soon as the case is dismissed. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693. This voluntary cessation exception derives from “the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review ... by temporarily altering questionable behavior.” City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 743, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001); Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 893. Thus, for a case to become moot, it must be “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693. This sensible rule does not apply to BLM, for a simple reason: FWS, not BLM, made the decision to' alter the Falcon’s status by reintroducing it to the plan area. Within the ESA context, BLM must engage in interagency consultation with FWS. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01. Thus, for consultation purposes, BLM and FWS operate as different actors, each with its own goals and responsibilities, and it was FWS that decided to reintroduce and thus reclassify the Falcon. We see no attempt by BLM to alter its conduct and thereby evade judicial review. As for FWS, we agree that it was that agency’s voluntary decision to release Falcons into the plan area that led to the Falcon’s change in regulatory status. Based on that decision, FWS granted $295,793 to nonprofit organization the Peregrine Fund to begin releasing birds on BLM lands in New Mexico in 2007. Forest Guardians, J.A. at 461-72 (copy of grant agreement between FWS and the Peregrine Fund). The Fund has released some 100 birds altogether, of which at least 50 have successfully reached independence in the wild and some have begun to reproduce. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Rare Falcons Back in New Mexico, http://www.blm.gov/nm/st/ en/fo/Socorro_Field_Office/features/rare_ falcons_back.html (last visited March 17, 2009) [hereinafter Rare Falcons Back]; Patricia Zenone, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Northern Aplomado Falcon Reintroductions in New Mexico in 2008, Fish & Wildlife Journal, Sep. 5, 2008, http://www. fws.gov/arsnew/regmap.cfm?arskey=24842 [hereinafter Falcon Reintroductions]. The presence of these birds makes it á practical impossibility for FWS to reverse reintroduction because an actual experimental population of Falcons now exists in the area at issue Thus, FWS cannot voluntarily reclassify the Falcon population in the area as “endangered” and thus revive plaintiffs’ ESA challenge. We have before us an example of the rare case where it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693. Accordingly, NMWA’s ESA challenge to the consultation process between BLM and FWS regarding the Northern Aplomado Falcon is moot. 3 Given that NMWA has lost the opportunity to appeal from the district court’s order rejecting its challenge to BLM’s ESA consultation process, NMWA requests that we vacate the portion of that order on point. “Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through happenstance— circumstances not attributable to the parties — or ... the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower court.” Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 891 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71-72, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (omission in original)). Thus, we vacate that portion of the district court’s decision. Ill Turning to the merits of those issues over which we have jurisdiction, we first consider the plaintiffs’ NEPA claims. The centerpiece of environmental regulation in the United States, NEPA requires federal agencies to pause before committing resources to a project and consider the likely environmental impacts of the preferred course of action as well as reasonable alternatives. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (congressional declaration of national environmental policy); U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756-57, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir.2007). By focusing both agency and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed actions, NEPA facilitates informed decisionmaking by agencies and allows the political process to check those decisions. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371, 109 S.Ct. 1851; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983) (identifying the facilitation of informed agency decisionmaking and public involvement as the “twin aims” of NEPA). The requirements of the statute have been augmented by longstanding regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), to which we owe substantial deference. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 372, 109 S.Ct. 1851. Before embarking upon any “major federal action,” an agency must conduct an environmental assessment (“EA”) to determine whether the action is likely to “significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Carpenter, 463 F.3d at 1136 n. 4; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. If not, the agency may issue a “finding of no significant impact” (“FONSI”) stating as much. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. But if so, the agency must prepare a thoroughgoing EIS, as BLM did here, assessing the predicted impacts of the proposed action on all aspects of the environment, including indirect and cumulative impacts. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502 & §§ 1508.11, 1508.25(c). In addition, an EIS must “rigorously explore and objectively evaluate” all reasonable alternatives to a proposed action, in order to compare the environmental impacts of all available courses of action. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. For those alternatives eliminated from detailed study, the EIS must briefly discuss the reasons for their elimination. Id. At all stages throughout the process, the public must be informed and its comments considered. § 1503.1(a)(4) (public comment must be requested after publication of a draft EIS); § 1503.1(b) (public comment may be requested after publication of a final EIS but before a decision is made); § 1506.10 (requiring notice of draft and final EISs to be published in the federal register and setting time periods for public comment); § 1505.2 (requiring publication of a record of decision after the decision is made). NEPA is silent, however, regarding the substantive action an agency may take — the Act simply imposes procedural requirements intended to improve environmental impact information available to agencies and the public. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371, 109 S.Ct. 1851. Even if scrupulously followed, the statute “merely prohibits uninformed — rather than unwise — agency action.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). As with other challenges arising under the APA, we review an agency’s NEPA compliance to see whether it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a); accord Utah Shared Access Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., 288 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir.2002); see also Russell, 518 F.3d at 823 (NEPA challenges must be brought under the APA because NEPA provides no private cause of action). An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency (1) “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” (2) “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise,” (3) “failed to base its decision on consideration of the relevant factors,” or (4) made “a clear error of judgment.” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted). Deficiencies in an EIS that are mere “flyspecks” and do not defeat NEPA’s goals of informed decisionmaking and informed public comment will not lead to reversal. E.g., Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091, 1098 (10th Cir.2007); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir.2006). When called upon to review factual determinations made by an agency as part of its NEPA process, short of a “clear error of judgment” we ask only whether the agency took a “hard look” at information relevant to the decision. See Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted); see also 33 Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 8335, at 176 (2006) (“Without engaging in review of the actual resolution of factual questions of this variety, courts, by using the hard look standard, assure that the agency did a careful job at fact gathering and otherwise supporting its position.”). In considering whether the agency took a “hard look,” we consider only the agency’s reasoning at the time of decisionmaking, excluding post-hoc rationalization concocted by counsel in briefs or argument. Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir.2002) (citing Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1565 (10th Cir.1994)). “A presumption of validity attaches to the agency action and the burden of proof rests with the appellants who challenge such action.” Citizens’ Comm., 513 F.3d at 1176. We review the district court de novo, applying the APA standard of review to the agency’s actions without deferring to the district court’s application of that standard. Id. A According to the State and NMWA, NEPA requires BLM to complete a supplemental EIS specifically analyzing the likely environmental effects of Alternative A-modified before adopting that alternative as the new management plan for the area, and its failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious. An agency must prepare a supplemental assessment if “[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (emphases added). When “the relevant environmental impacts have already been considered” earlier in the NEPA process, no supplement is required. Friends of Marolt Park v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 382 F.3d 1088, 1096-97 (10th Cir.2004). In a guide to NEPA published in the Federal Register, the CEQ states that a supplement is unnecessary when the new alternative is “qualitatively within the spectrum of alternatives that were discussed in the draft” and is only a “minor variation” from those alternatives. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed.Reg. 18026, 18035 (Mar. 17, 1981) [hereinafter “Forty Questions”]. Rather than offer additional environmental analysis of Alternative A-modified, BLM concluded in the SEIS that no further analysis was necessary because the same or less surface area would ultimately be developed under Alternative A or A-modified. For this reason, BLM determined that the change from Alternative A to Alternative A-modified was within the scope and analysis of the Draft EIS and did not substantially alter the environmental consequences as required to trigger the § 1502.9 supplementation requirement. BLM and IPANM continue to argue that Alternative A-modified was within the scope of the previous analysis, although for different reasons than a similarity in the final number of acres likely to be developed. In its ruling, the district court found that the question of whether Alternative A-modified would lead to greater habitat fragmentation than Alternative A was a factual dispute. It then found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support BLM’s prediction; thus, the failure to conduct additional analysis in the SEIS was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that actual habitat fragmentation under Alternative A-modified was dependent on factors that could not be analyzed at the planning stage. On appeal, BLM and IPANM argue that BLM was not required to conduct further analysis in the SEIS because surface impacts were analyzed in the Draft EIS, and those impacts would differ only in degree, not in kind, under Alternative A-modified. Should we disagree, they urge us to adopt the district court’s latter rationale, that such impacts cannot practicably be analyzed until the leasing stage when those effects become more definitive. They further urge that, even if we reject these arguments, any error was harmless. BLM and IPANM no longer advance the position that analysis is excused because either the amount of surface development or the ultimate amount of habitat fragmentation is similar under Alternatives A and A-modified. This removes from the scope of our review one of the two rationales relied upon by the district court. DeJulius v. New Eng. Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 943 (10th Cir.2005) (“[T]he other ground asserted below ... has not been raised on appeal and is thus waived.”). 1 As described above, Alternative A and Alternative A-modified differ primarily in the restrictions they place on surface disturbances on the Otero Mesa. Alternative A proposed a qualitative restriction on development: Disturbances would only be allowed near existing roads. Thus, they would remain contiguous rather than scattering across the landscape. By contrast, A-modified imposes a quantitative restriction: Disturbances may occupy only five percent of the Mesa at any one time. By arguing that a difference in the degree of habitat fragmentation' did not require a fresh impacts analysis, BLM neglects the fundamental nature of the environmental problem at issue. As is well documented in the record before us, the location of development greatly influences the likelihood and extent of habitat preservation. Disturbances on the same total surface acreage may produce wildly different impacts on plants and wildlife depending on the amount of contiguous habitat between them. BLM’s analysis of Alternative A assumed the protections of large contiguous pieces of habitat from development. Alternative A-modified muddied this picture, doing away with any requirement of continuity of undisturbed lands. Although A-modified also requires developers to work together to minimize impacts — potentially increasing the continuity of surface developments — BLM provided so little explanation of this “unitization” restriction that it is impossible to tell whether it would create the same clustering of impacts as would the proximity restriction in Alternative A. Moreover, this is not a case where components of fully-analyzed alternatives were recombined or modified to create a “new” alternative whose impacts could easily be predicted from the existing analysis. Cf. Forty Questions, 46 Fed.Reg. at 18035 (noting that a decision to build 5,000 housing units would be within the scope of an EIS analyzing the effects of 4,000 or 6,000 houses and would not require a supplement). Nothing in the Draft EIS so much as hinted at a percentage-based surface occupancy restriction for the Otero Mesa, and there is no direct or reliable way to compare the fragmentation effects of that restriction to the effects of the restrictions analyzed in the EIS. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 772 (9th Cir.1982) (concluding that supplemental analysis is required when the selected alternative “could not fairly be anticipated by reviewing the draft EIS alternatives”). More generally, we cannot accept that because the category of impacts anticipated from oil and gas development were well-known after circulation of the Final EIS, any change in the location or extent of impacts was immaterial. Unsurprisingly, BLM provides no statutory or case law support for this proposition. If a change to an agency’s planned action affects environmental concerns in a different manner than previous analyses, the change is surely “relevant” to those same concerns. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i). We would not say that analyzing the likely impacts of building a dirt road along the edge of an ecosystem excuses an agency from analyzing the impacts of building a four-lane highway straight down the middle, simply because the type of impact — habitat disturbance — is the same under either scenario. See, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1291-92 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that a supplement was required where the adopted alternative “entail[ed] a different configuration of activities and locations, not merely a reduced version of a previously-considered alternative”). The situation at hand is no different. NEPA does not permit an agency to remain oblivious to differing environmental impacts, or hide these from the public, simply because it understands the general type of impact likely to occur. Such a state of affairs would be anathema to NEPA’s “twin aims” of informed agency decisionmaking and public access to information. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371, 109 S.Ct. 1851; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246; Citizens Comm., 513 F.3d at 1177-78. BLM’s unanalyzed, conclusory assertion that its modified plan would have the same type of effects as previously analyzed alternatives does not allow us to endorse Alternative A-modified as “qualitatively within the spectrum of alternatives” discussed in the Draft EIS. Because location, not merely total surface disturbance, affects habitat fragmentation, Alternative A-modified was qualitatively different and well outside the spectrum of anything BLM considered in the Draft EIS, and BLM was required to issue a supplement analyzing the impacts of that alternative under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i). 2 BLM and IPANM also argue that even if the changes in fragmentation impacts between Alternative A and A-modified require further environmental analysis, such analysis was impracticable until the leasing stage because the overall level of development could not be sufficiently predicted at the RMPA stage. All environmental analyses required by NEPA must be conducted at “the earliest possible time.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2; see also Kern v. BLM, 284 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir.2002) (“NEPA is not designed to postpone analysis of an environmental consequence to the last possible moment. Rather, it is designed to require such analysis as soon as it can reasonably be done.”). Because the record reveals that BLM conducted an internal analysis of the fragmentation impacts of Alternative A-modified in 2004, we are convinced that such analysis was possible. Accordingly, we hold that NEPA requires BLM to release a supplemental EIS thoroughly analyzing its newly minted alternative at the planning stage. 3 Finally, BLM asks that we hold any error in its analysis to be harmless. The Agency contends that because members of the public had access to the SEIS and record of decision and were allowed to comment on each of these, the purposes of NEPA were fulfilled without further analysis. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (establishing harmless error review of APA cases); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir.1993) (“The harmless error rule applies to judicial review of administrative proceedings, and errors in such administrative proceedings will not require reversal unless Plaintiffs can show they were prejudiced.”). While we agree that BLM’s communication with the public, as far as it went, furthered NEPA’s goals, it was no substitute for the substantive analysis required by section 1502.9(c)(1)(i). A public comment period is beneficial only to the extent the public has meaningful information on which to comment, and the public did not have meaningful information on the fragmentation impacts of Alternative A-modified. Informed public input can hardly be said to occur when major impacts of the adopted alternative were never disclosed. Thus, we cannot agree that the failure to thoroughly analyze the environmental impacts of Alternative A-modified in a public NEPA document was harmless. Of course, every change however minor will not necessitate a new substantive analysis and repetition of the EIS process. To make such a requirement would lead agencies into Xeno’s paradox, always being halfway to the end of the process but never quite there. The selection of Alternative A-modified was not a minor change or oversight presenting such a dilemma. B Aside from the need to analyze the specific land use plan BLM eventually selected, NMWA also charges that BLM analyzed an unduly narrow range of alternatives during the EIS process. The Agency disagrees, arguing that Alternatives A and B and the No-Action Alternative were representative of the full range of reasonable planning alternatives for the area. The “heart” of an EIS is its exploration of possible alternatives to the action an agency wishes to pursue. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. Every EIS must “[rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). Without substantive, comparative environmental impact information regarding other possible courses of action, the ability of an EIS to inform agency deliberation and facilitate public involvement would be greatly degraded. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246. While NEPA “does not require agencies to analyze the environmental consequences of alternatives it has in good faith rejected as too remote, speculative, or impractical or ineffective,” it does require the development of “information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives as far as environmental aspects are concerned.” Dombeck, 185 F.3d at 1174 (quotations and alteration omitted). It follows that an agency need not consider an alternative unless it is significantly distinguishable from the alternatives already considered. Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir.2004). We apply the “rule of reason” to determine whether an EIS analyzed sufficient alternatives