Full opinion text
SELYA, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant-appellant Stephen A. Saccoceia on racketeering, money laundering, and related charges arising from his leadership of an organization that laundered well over $100,000,000 in drug money during the years 1986 through 1991. On appeal, Saccoceia challenges his extradition, the timing of his trial, his conviction, the forfeiture of certain assets, and the 660-year sentence that the district court imposed. Finding that his arguments do not wash, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND We sketch the bareboned facts in the light most amiable to the government, see United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 710-11 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993), leaving much of the flesh and sinew for fuller articulation in connection with our discussion of particular issues. Appellant formerly controlled a network of precious metals businesses located in Rhode Island, New York, and California. He became enmeshed in money laundering through his involvement with a fellow metalman, Barry Slomovits. At a point in the mid-1980s, Slomovits was accepting millions of dollars in cash each week from Duvan Arboleda, who represented a group of Colombian drug lords (the Cali cartel). Slomovits used some of this cash to purchase gold from appellant. By special arrangement, the transactions were accomplished without documentation. In 1987, Arboleda and appellant agreed that they would deal directly with each other. From that juncture forward, appellant used his various businesses to cleanse money fun-nelled to him by the Cali cartel and its emissaries (including Arboleda, Fernando Dueñas, and Raoul Escobar). Typically, Ar-boleda would make large quantities of cash available to appellant; appellant would send some of it to Slomovits in New York; Slomo-vits would buy gold with the funds, resell the gold, and wire the proceeds to accounts that appellant controlled. Slomovits received apocryphal invoices from appellant’s companies purporting to show sales of gold for sums corresponding to the amounts of the wire transfers. Ahron Sharir, a manufacturer of gold chain, also washed money for appellant. Appellant used Sharir’s New York factory as a drop-off point for incoming shipments of currency, and Sharir laundered the cash by methods similar to those employed by Slomo-vits. The shipments to Sharir’s factory continued until 1988. From then on, the two men forsook the New York factory, but continued to deal with each other. Appellant delivered cash totalling over $35,000,000 to Sharir at other locations between 1988 and 1990. By 1990, appellant’s operations had expanded and had become largely independent of Slomovits. Appellant would bid for opportunities to launder money on behalf of the Cali cartel. When the cartel accepted a bid, he or his couriers would receive sacks of currency at prearranged delivery points. These shipments ordinarily ranged between $50,000 and $500,000 (although one delivery totalled $3,000,000). The bills were usually in small denominations. They would be counted, transported to one of appellant’s offices in California or Rhode Island, then counted again, smurfed, and used to buy cashier’s checks payable to one of appellant’s companies. These purchases were made at various banks by underlings {e.g., David Izzi, Anthony DeMarco, James Saecoccio, Kenneth Saccoecio) in accordance with instructions received from appellant or his wife, Donna Saccoceia. After the cheeks had been deposited in a company account, the money would then be wired to a foreign bank designated by Arboleda or Dueñas. Along the way, appellant would deduct a commission that usually approximated ten percent of the laundered cash. This completed “la vuelta,” the term used by the Cali cartel to describe a complete cycle of drug smuggling activities. The spring of 1991 marked the beginning of the end of appellant’s career in high finance. During the early stages of his operation, the money received in New York was transported to Rhode Island by armored car and then deposited in an account standing in the name of a controlled corporation, Trend Precious Metals (Trend), at Citizens Bank. Between January 1, 1990 and April 2, 1991, appellant and his wife wired over $136,000,-000 out of the Trend account to an assortment of foreign banks. Citizens became suspicious and closed the account. In approximately the same time frame, an employee of an armored car service warned Richard Giza-relli, an unindicted coconspirator, that appellant was under investigation. Gizarelli promptly informed appellant. Notwithstanding these omens, appellant persisted. He did, however, alter his modus operandi. Instead of using private couriers to transport cash from New York to Rhode Island, he sent any of four men—Izzi, Carlo DeMarco, Anthony DeMarco, or Vincent Hurley, often (but not always) operating in pairs — to haul the money to Rhode Island. And, although appellant’s cohorts continued to purchase bank checks from various Rhode Island financial institutions, appellant began to send the cheeks to his offices in California by air courier, often in canisters labeled as containing gold (to which appellant’s henchmen added slag or scrap metal to increase weight). Accomplices used the money to purchase gold, which was then sold on the open market. The proceeds were eventually wired back to one of appellant’s remaining Rhode Island accounts. In August of 1991, appellant convened a meeting at his mother’s home. He showed the conferees (who included Donna Saccoccia, Izzi, and the two DeMarcos) a videotape that had been discovered accidentally in a nearby building. The tape reflected an ongoing surveillance of the back entrance to appellant’s Cranston coin shop. He advised his colleagues to start using the store’s front entrance. Soon thereafter, appellant departed for Switzerland. In short order, the authorities indicted and extradited him. After unsuccessfully seeking to postpone prosecution on health-related grounds, appellant went to trial on November 4, 1992, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, along with several other indicted coconspirators (including his wife). Appellant’s attorney became ill during trial, and the court declared a mistrial as to appellant. The new trial began on February 17, 1993, and resulted in his conviction. These appeals followed. Saceoccia’s appeals were consolidated for oral argument with the appeals arising out of the first trial. See supra note 3. Notwithstanding the obvious differences in the trial records and in the posture of the prosecutions — for example, appellant was the leader of the money laundering organization; unlike most of the others, he was not tried for currency transaction reporting, (CTR) offenses; and he was convicted in a trial separate from that of his codefendants — appellant seeks to incorporate by reference eight arguments advanced by other defendants. Because appellant’s position is not substantially similar to that of the codefendants, and because he has failed to develop the idiosyncra-eies of his own situation, we deem five of those arguments to have been abandoned. See United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 737 (1st Cir.1991) (“Adoption by reference, however, cannot occur in a vacuum; to be meaningful, the arguments adopted must be readily transferrable from the proponent’s case to the adopter’s case.”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 955, 112 S.Ct. 2301, 119 L.Ed.2d 224 (1992). Nevertheless, we are left with no shortage of food for thought. Appellant has served up a bouillabaisse of other offerings. We address his meatier propositions below, including the three “incorporated” contentions that arguably have been preserved. And although we do not deem detailed discussion desirable, the record should reflect that we have masticated appellant’s remaining points and found them indigestible. II. EXTRADITION As a threshold matter, appellant maintains that his trial and ensuing conviction violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland, and, in the bargain, transgressed the principles of dual criminality and specialty. We reject these importun-ings. A. Gaining Perspective. Further facts are needed to place appellant’s extradition-related claims into a workable perspective. On November 18, 1991, a federal grand jury returned the indictment that inaugurated this prosecution. Count 1 charged appellant, his wife, and eleven associates with RICO conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988). A RICO conspiracy, of course, requires the government to prove, inter alia, an illicit agreement to conduct-a pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 503 (1st Cir.1990); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). Proof of a pattern demands that the prosecution show “at least two acts of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). These acts, which must themselves comprise violations of specified criminal statutes, see id. § 1961(1)(B), are commonly referred to as “predicates” or “predicate acts.” See, e.g., Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 503. In the instant indictment, the alleged racketeering activity comprised, among other specified predicate acts, incidents of money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956,1957, CTR violations, see 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1)-(3), and using travel and facilities in interstate commerce to promote these money laundering ventures, see 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). The grand jury also averred that the RICO conspiracy had been accomplished by means that included failing to file the necessary CTRs for cash transactions over $10,000. Counts 2-53 of the indictment charged appellant and others with failing to file CTRs in specific instances, see 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1); counts 54-68 charged appellant with illegally structuring monetary transactions in order to avoid the CTR reporting requirements, see id. § 5324(a)(3); counts 69-129 charged appellant and his wife with the use of property derived from unlawful activities while engaging in monetary transactions affecting interstate commerce, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956; counts 130-142 charged appellant and his wife with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2); and counts 143-150 charged appellant and others with Travel Act violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). The indictment also contained forfeiture allegations under the applicable RICO and money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 982, 1963. Six days after the grand jury returned the indictment, Swiss authorities arrested the Saccoecias in Geneva. They contested extradition on counts 1 through 68, and counts 143 through 150. On June 11, 1992, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) granted extradition on all charges except those contained in counts 2 through 68. The SFT reasoned that these 67 counts constituted nonextraditable offenses because Swiss law did not prohibit the underlying conduct. The SFT’s discussion did not specifically mention the forfeiture allegations. The Swiss surrendered appellant to the United States. He was transported to Rhode Island and arraigned on July 15. One week later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment. On July 30, the Justice Department, in the person of Michael O’Hare, wrote to Tania Cavassini, a Swiss official, enclosing a copy of the superseding indictment and inquiring whether it required a waiver of the rule of specialty. On December 1, 1992, apparently in response to an inquiry from Cavassini, O’Hare transmitted a written assurance that, although the court papers still formally listed appellant as a defendant in respect to the CTR counts (for which extradition had been denied), the prosecution did not intend to press those counts. O’Hare explained that the prosecutor would offer no evidence of appellant’s guilt on those charges, with the result that “American law [will require] the judge to direct the jury to find the defendant not guilty.” The following day, Cavassini advised that, under a “final decision” dated November 20, 1992, the SFT had “granted extradition of [appellant] for the facts enclosed in the Count Nr. 1 of the Superseding Indictment.” Cavassini also indicated that appellant’s local counsel in Geneva agreed with the SFT’s decision and had scotched any possibility of a further appeal. On February 2, 1993, before the start of the trial with which we are concerned, the government moved to dismiss those counts of the superseding indictment (counts 2-37) that charged appellant with CTR offenses. The district court complied. The matter resurfaced in a slightly different shape ten days later when appellant’s Swiss lawyer, Paul Gully-Hart, wrote to Cavassini expressing concern that appellant’s impending prosecution on charges in which CTR violations were embedded as predicates for other offenses would insult the rule of specialty. On March 2, Gully-Hart wrote again, this time enclosing a copy of the prosecution’s opening statement to the petit jury. Cavassini forwarded both of these letters to O’Hare. On March 8, Cavassini spoke with O’Hare and voiced her concern that appellant might be convicted under count 1 solely on the basis of CTR offenses. The next day, Assistant United States Attorney James Leavey, a member of the prosecution team, advised Judge Torres that he had spoken with O’Hare. Without conceding the legal validity of Gully-Hart’s point, Leav-ey asked the court to instruct the jury that CTR violations could not serve as predicates for purposes of either the RICO or Travel Act counts. When the court acquiesced, the government submitted a redacted indictment that deleted all references to CTR offenses from the RICO and Travel Act counts. Appellant nonetheless moved for a mistrial, invoking the rules of dual criminality and specialty. The district court denied the motion, explaining that it had agreed to the government’s proposal purely as an accommodation. In the judge’s view, the precautions were not legally required because the SFT had been pellucid in authorizing prosecution on the RICO count even though the claimed CTR violations were prominently displayed therein as potential predicates. The judge noted, moreover, that evidence of appellant’s CTR violations was in all events admissible in connection with the substantive money laundering counts (as to which extradition had been approved). Appellant resurrected the issue in his motion for a new trial following the adverse jury verdict. The court stood firm. B. Dual Criminality and Specialty. Although the principles of dual criminality and specialty are closely allied, they are not coterminous. We elaborate below. 1. Dual Criminality. The principle of dual criminality dictates that, as a general rule, an extraditable offense must be a serious crime (rather than a mere peccadillo) punishable under the criminal laws of both the surrendering and the requesting state. See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir.1980). The current extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland embodies this concept. See Treaty of Extradition, May 14, 1900, U.S.-Switz., Art. II, 31 Stat. 1928, 1929-30 (Treaty). The principle of dual criminality does not demand that the laws of the surrendering and requesting states be carbon copies of one another. Thus, dual criminality will not be defeated by differences in the instrumentalities or in the stated purposes of the two nations’ laws. See Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir.1989). By the same token, the counterpart crimes need not have identical elements. See Matter of Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir.1986). Instead, dual criminality is deemed to be satisfied when the two countries’ laws are substantially analogous. See Peters, 888 F.2d at 719; Branch, 618 F.2d at 851. Moreover, in mulling dual criminality concerns, courts are duty bound to defer to a surrendering sovereign’s reasonable determination that the offense in question is extraditable. See Casey v. Department of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C.Cir.1992) (observing that an American court must give great deference to a foreign court’s determination in extradition proceedings); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir.1987) (similar), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 773, 98 L.Ed.2d 859 (1988). Mechanically, then, the inquiry into dual criminality requires courts to compare the law of the surrendering state that purports to criminalize the charged conduct with the law of the requesting state that purports to accomplish the same result. If the same conduct is subject to criminal sanctions in both jurisdictions, no more is exigible. See United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049, 111 S.Ct. 759, 112 L.Ed.2d 778 (1991); see also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312, 42 S.Ct. 469, 471, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (“It is enough [to satisfy the requirement of dual criminality] if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.”). 2. Specialty. The principle of specialty — a corollary to the principle of dual criminality, see United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1158, 103 L.Ed.2d 217 (1989)—generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted, and none other. See Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d at 428; Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). The extradition treaty in force between the United States and Switzerland embodies this concept, providing that an individual may not be “prosecuted or punished for any offense committed before the demand for extradition, other than that for which the extradition is granted_” Treaty, Art. IX. Enforcement of the principle of specialty is founded primarily on international comity. See United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir.1987). The requesting state must “live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition” because preservation of the institution of extradition requires the continuing cooperation of the surrendering state. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 652, 93 L.Ed.2d 707 (1986). Since the doctrine is grounded in international comity rather than in some right of the defendant, the principle of specialty may be waived by the asylum state. See id. Specialty, like dual criminality, is not a hidebound dogma, but must be applied in a practical, commonsense fashion. Thus, obeisance to the principle of specialty does not require that a defendant be prosecuted only under the precise indictment that prompted his extradition, see United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 5.Ct. 938, 130 L.Ed.2d 883 (1995), or that the prosecution always be limited to specific offenses enumerated in the surrendering state’s extradition order, see Levy, 905 F.2d at 329 (concluding that a Hong Kong court intended to extradite defendant to face a continuing criminal enterprise charge despite the court’s failure specifically to mention that charge in the deportation order). In the same vein, the principle of specialty does not impose any limitation on the particulars of the charges lodged by the requesting nation, nor does it demand departure from the forum’s existing rules of practice (such as rules of pleading, evidence, or procedure). See United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 1484, 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990); Thirion, 813 F.2d at 153; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). In the last analysis, then, the inquiry into specialty boils down to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the court in the requesting state reasonably believes that prosecuting the defendant on particular charges contradicts the surrendering state’s manifested intentions, or, phrased another way, whether the surrendering state would deem the conduct for which the requesting state actually prosecutes the defendant as interconnected with (as opposed to independent from) the acts for which he was extradited. See Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435; United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427-28 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012, 109 S.Ct. 1122, 103 L.Ed.2d 185 (1989); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.1962). C. Applying the Principles. A district court’s interpretation of the principles of dual criminality and specialty traditionally involves a question of law and is, therefore, subject to plenary review in the court of appeals. See Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1434; United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 107, 121 L.Ed.2d 65 (1992). Marching beneath this banner, appellant urges that his conviction must be set aside for three related reasons. None has merit. 1. Predicate Acts. Appellant’s flagship contention rests on the postulate that an offense which is itself nonextraditable cannot serve as a predicate act in connection with other, extraditable offenses; and that, therefore, the government’s use of nonextraditable CTR offenses as predicate acts for purposes of the RICO and Travel Act counts crossed the line into forbidden territory. Even if we assume, however, that in some situations reb-anee on nonextraditable offenses as predicates for other, extraditable offenses might run afoul of dual criminality or specialty principles, the circumstances of this case present no such problem. In general, we do not believe that there can be a violation of the principle of specialty where the requesting nation prosecutes the returned fugitive for the exact cihnes on which the surrendering nation granted extradition. So it is here: the SFT twice approved appellant’s extradition on counts that prominently featured CTR offenses as predicates. This approval — to which we must pay the substantial deference that is due to a surrendering court’s resolution of questions pertaining to extraditability, see, e.g., Casey, 980 F.2d at 1477—strongly suggests that the RICO and Travel Act counts, despite their mention of predicates which, standing alone, would not support extradition, are compatible "with the criminal laws of both jurisdictions. Though a Swiss official may informally have fretted about the prospect of a RICO or Travel Act conviction based on nonextraditable predicates, we are reluctant to conclude on this gossamer showing that the SFT did not know and appreciate the clearly expressed contents of the indictment when it sanctioned extradition. To clinch matters, the prosecution avoided any potential intrusion on the principles of either dual criminality or specialty by taking a series of prophylactic actions at trial. The fourth redacted indictment removed all references to CTR offenses from the compendium of charges pressed against the appellant. The judge then reinforced this fumigation of the indictment by advising the jurors that they should not concern themselves with whether appellant had committed any CTR offenses. These precautions purged any taint, and knocked the legs out from under the line of reasoning that appellant seeks to pursue. 2. Keeping Faith. Next, appellant asserts that the government infringed on the principle of specialty by breaking its promise to the Swiss government and introducing evidence of CTR violations at appellant’s trial. Abstractly, we agree with the core element of appellant’s premise: the principle of specialty requires the requesting state to abide by the promises it makes to the surrendering state in the process of procuring extradition. See Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422. But, concretely, we are unable to discern any breach of faith in this instance. Thus, we resist the conclusion that appellant would foist upon us. To buttress the claim that the United States did not keep its word, appellant avers that O’Hare’s facsimile transmission, sent on December 1, 1992, was the functional equivalent of an assurance that the prosecutor would not present any evidence to the jury regarding Saccoceia’s noncompliance with CTR requirements. Fairly read, the document — despite its iteration that the prosecutor “would present no evidence regarding [Saccoecia’s] guilt ... on the charges for which extradition was not granted” — does not support appellant’s construction. O’Hare sent the transmittal in response to Cavassi-ni’s expression of concern that appellant might be convicted of charges for which extradition had been denied. His reply, taken in context, see supra p. 765, amounted to no more than an assurance against that possibility. To read a promise not to introduce any evidence relevant to CTR violations into O’Hare’s statement would necessitate wresting it from its contextual moorings and unreasonably stretching its literal meaning. We decline appellant’s invitation to indulge in such phantasmagoric wordplay. 3. The Claimed “Prosecution.” Appellant’s third contention is that the government violated the principle of specialty because it prosecuted him for CTR offenses. Since the nonextraditable CTR counts, as they pertained to appellant, were dismissed before the second trial began, his claim is founded on no more than the fact that his name appeared on the indictment during the first trial. While this may literally be “prosecution,” it is prosecution in name only — and we will not carry hollow formalism to a point at which it engulfs common sense. Consequently, we hold that the mere existence of an unredacted indictment, under the circumstances of this ease, is no reason to invalidate Saccoccia’s conviction. Cf. Tacket v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 937 F.2d 1201, 1202 (7th Cir.1991) (Bauer, C.J.) (quoting doggerel to the effect that “[s]ticks and stones may break your bones, but names can never hurt you”). This leaves appellant’s argument that he was illegally “prosecuted” because CTR offenses were included as predicate acts for purposes of the RICO and Travel Act counts until the fourth redacted indictment surfaced. As we have already observed, however, it would have been perfectly proper for the government to seek convictions on those counts based on CTR predicates. Hence, appellant’s argument is without merit. For these reasons, we find appellant’s conviction free from taint under the applicable extradition laws. III. THE COVETED CONTINUANCE Appellant contends that the district court arbitrarily refused him a lengthy continuance prior to the start of the second trial, leaving him with insufficient preparation time. Our analysis of the record indicates that the court acted within its discretion in scotching appellant’s request. A. Setting the Stage. At arraignment, two attorneys, Jack Hill and Brian Adae, entered appearances as appellant’s counsel. Soon thereafter, Austrian authorities arrested Hill for money laundering. Hill languished in prison from August through November of 1992. During that interval, he could not communicate with, or effectively assist, Saccoccia. Adae, who had originally been enlisted as local counsel, stepped into the breach and acted as lead counsel. Shortly after the first trial began, Adae became ill. The court granted appellant’s motion for a mistrial and ordered a severance. The case proceeded to verdict vis-a-vis the other defendants. See supra note 3. Naturally, the severance required a separate trial for appellant. The district court proposed to start in early February of 1993. Within a matter of days after the court announced the schedule, Hill, recently released from an Austrian prison, and Kenneth O’Donnell, a prominent Rhode Island defense lawyer, entered appearances as appellant’s counsel. On December 10, 1992, appellant signed an extensive waiver of the potential conflict of interest posed by Hill’s representation of him at a time when Hill himself faced charges of money laundering arising out of activities undertaken in conjunction with appellant. On the same day, the court held a hearing anent the waiver. Among other things, appellant requested that his trial be rescheduled to April of 1993 so that his defense team could have more time to prepare. He claimed this extra time was necessary to review financial documents, study surveillance tapes, glean exculpatory evidence, and analyze inconsistencies in the statements of government witnesses. The court granted only a two-week extension, from February 3 to February 17, noting that the original indictment had been returned in 1991 and that counsel already had enjoyed a considerable period for preparation. Subsequent requests for continuances were also denied. B. Applicable Legal Principles. Trial management is peculiarly within the ken of the district court. That court has great latitude in managing its docket, including broad discretion to grant or withhold continuances. Only “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay” constitutes an abuse of that discretion. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616-17, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United, States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that an appellate court “must show great deference” to district court decisions of this nature, and should overturn such decisions “only for a manifest abuse of discretion”). For present purposes, this means that the decision below must endure unless the party who moved for the continuance can demonstrate that, in withholding relief, the trial court indulged a serious error of law or suffered a meaningful lapse of judgment, resulting in substantial prejudice to the movant. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 708 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993); United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 653 n. 1 (2d Cir.1988). For the purpose of determining whether a denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion, each case is sui generis. See United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889, 107 S.Ct. 287, 93 L.Ed.2d 262 (1986). A reviewing court must look first at the reasons contemporaneously presented in support of the request for the continuance. See United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir.1991). Other relevant factors may include such things as the amount of time needed for effective preparation, the amount of time actually available for preparation, the amount of time previously available for preparation and how assiduously the movant used that time, the extent to which the movant has contributed to his perceived predicament, the complexity of the ease, the availability of assistance from other sources, the probable utility of a continuance, the extent of inconvenience to others (such as the court, the witnesses, and the opposing party) should a continuance ensue, and the likelihood of injustice or unfair prejudice attributable to the denial of a continuance. See United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 488 (1st Cir.1994); Lussier, 929 F.2d at 28; United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1814, 108 L.Ed.2d 944 (1990). C. Analysis. Here, balancing the relevant considerations leaves us confident that the eircum-stances justified the refusal to grant a continuance. And, moreover, the record belies appellant’s contention that the court’s obduracy unfairly prejudiced his rights by leaving him insufficient time to prepare for trial. Appellant’s most loudly bruited point is that the government produced 1600 hours of wiretap audio tapes, and that he had only 67 days, which he translates as equalling 1608 hours, to listen to them. Although this lament has some superficial plausibility, we agree with the district court that, notwithstanding the number of tapes, it was reasonable to expect defense counsel to be ready for trial in February. We explain briefly. The grand jury indicted appellant in November of 1991. Thus, appellant’s counsel, collectively, had far more than 67 days in which to work on the case. Moreover, the lawyers had the not inconsiderable benefit of a dress rehearsal, including unlimited access to the full record of the first trial (in which virtually the entire case against appellant was aired). O’Donnell, one of appellant’s new attorneys, was especially familiar with the situation because he had represented a codefendant who had been acquitted in a separate trial. Furthermore, Hill and O’Donnell could — and no doubt did — confer with counsel for the codefendants and with Attorney Adae. In short, the means for efficacious preparation were tidily at hand. Appellant’s other assertions of supposed prejudice also lack force. For example, his suggestion that a continuance might have enabled him to receive a complete transcript of Agent Shedd’s conversation with Dueñas overlooks the fact that the government provided him with the entire transcript. See infra Part IV(E). His claim that more time was needed to obtain a copy of a DEA report that he asserts would have bolstered the testimony of an expert witness overlooks the fact that the expert knew of the report and described its conclusions. See infra note 18. His claim that a continuance would have enabled him to obtain enhanced versions of two of the surveillance tapes before trial, see infra Part IV(F), is completely unpersuasive given his assertion that the enhanced tapes, when received, were “unclear” and “unintelligible.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. And, finally, appellant’s exhortation that a continuance would have allowed him to investigate whether the laundered cash represented gambling proceeds, as opposed to drug money, is unaccompanied by any colorable basis for assuming that his supposition was anything more than the most remote of possibilities. In a nutshell, appellant has not made a sufficient showing of undue prejudice to warrant us in second-guessing either the district court’s resolve to start the trial in mid-February of 1993 or its decision to grant appellant a far more modest delay than he requested. Since the record reflects no pressing need for an extended continuance, and likewise fails to demonstrate significant harm flowing from the lack of one, the denial of the motion for a continuance cannot be said to have substantially impaired appellant’s defense. See, e.g., Dennis, 843 F.2d at 653 n. 1. Thus, no cognizable error inheres. D. Conflict of Interest. Relatedly, appellant claims that the denial of a continuance saddled him with conflict-ridden counsel. This construct does not withstand scrutiny. To show an actual conflict of interest, a criminal defendant “must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy might have been pursued” and “that this alternative strategy was not pursued because of the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.” United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 231 (1st Cir.1989), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 377, 112 L.Ed.2d 391 (1990). Appellant cannot meet this standard. Appellant sees the conflict of interest as centered in. Hill’s need to protect himself at his client’s expense. Appellant supports this accusation by repeated reference to Hill’s indictment in Austria on charges that he conspired with appellant to launder the fruits of unlawful activity — but appellant does not suggest any way in which this alleged conflict of interest adversely affected Hill's representation of him at trial. What is more, appellant’s claim that he was faced with an intolerable dilemma — he could accept Hill as his counsel or proceed to trial with an attorney who was untutored in the case — is flatly contradicted by the record. Appellant insisted, time and again, despite the district court’s painstaking explanation of his right to conflict-free counsel, that Hill was the advocate of his choosing. Appellant told the court unequivocally that he understood the potential conflict, but desired Hill’s services. And he adhered to his position notwithstanding the court’s entreaty to reconsider and its advice that he would be “better off’ with an attorney free of any ties to the situation. Last — but surely not least — appellant executed a written waiver stating that, after “[h]aving been fully advised of the possible adverse consequences arising from the actual or potential conflicts with which Hill is or may be encumbered,” he “knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and irrevocably [wishes] to waive any and all such actual or potential conflicts of interest for the purpose of retaining Hill as his counsel.” When a defendant knowingly selects a course of action, fully cognizant of its perils, he cannot later repudiate it simply because his case curdles. In the circumstances at bar, it is neither unfair nor unjust to hold appellant to his words. Thus, the district court’s determination that appellant had voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to conflict-free representation is unimpugnable. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 n. 5, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (stating that “a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests”). Appellant has another arrow in this quiver. He reasons that the court should have overlooked his waiver of conflict-free counsel because Hill’s continued representation constituted an unwaivable constitutional transgression. To be sure, a few courts have found a per se Sixth Amendment violation “where trial counsel was implicated in the crime for which his client was on trial.” Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 487 n. 4 (citing eases). But these cases tend to involve circumstances in which an attorney has reason to fear that a vigorous defense of the client might unearth proof of the attorney’s criminality. See, e.g., United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984). Although Hill informed the court, in the vaguest of generalities, that he feared being charged or called as a witness in appellant’s case, he provided no substantiation of these assertions, nor was he able to explain how the hypothetical conflict would, at that time, affect his representation of the appellant. Therefore, the district court seems entirely justified in concluding that Hill’s representation of appellant would not be hampered by a realistic foreboding that vigorous advocacy would uncover evidence of his own crimes. Cf. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, sc. iii, ll. 133-34 (1605) (noting that “present fears are less than horrible imaginings”). The sockdolager is that, wholly apart from Hill’s status, appellant was also represented at trial by another lawyer, O’Donnell, who had no conflict of interest. In an effort to scale this rampart, appellant suggests that O’Donnell, too, had an actual conflict of interest arising out of his previous representation of a codefendant, Raymond Marotto. By December of 1992, however, Marotto, a bank employee charged with failing to file CTRs, had been acquitted in a separate trial. Appellant’s convoluted explanation of how O’Donnell’s concluded representation of Mar-otto created a conflict of interest is difficult to follow. He seems to be saying, without any citation to the record, that Marotto (who was not called to testify at appellant’s trial) could have been a material witness. We reject this unfounded speculation. As O’Donnell himself pointed out, Marot-to’s case turned on whether he did — or did not — have a responsibility to file CTRs. There is nothing in the record that suggests that Marotto had any knowledge that might have been useful in appellant’s defense. We have routinely dismissed analogous conflict of interest claims, see, e.g., Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d at 231 (so holding when defendant “provide[d] no substantiation” for his assertion that his counsel had a conflict of interest that manifested itself when he did not call as a witness a person whom he previously had represented), and we dismiss appellant’s claim on the same basis. • It is simply too flimsy. E. The Mid-Trial Motion. At the close of the government’s case, appellant submitted a proffer in support of a renewed motion for a continuance. The proffer suggested a global conspiracy “between the Israeli intelligence services and the CIA,” and asserted that he had witnesses who “would testify about such matters as the Israeli defense industry” and “[t]he method by which the building of Israeli religious schools is financed by Hasidic Jews in the United States who engage in money laundering.” Appellant claimed that his counsel needed time to investigate the matters described in the proffer. The district court found the proffer to be “too vague and unsubstantiated to constitute a basis for granting a continuance” because its “conclusory allegations” offered no explanation as to its relevancy to the ease. Moreover, the court found no evidence that diligent efforts had been made to assure availability of the testimony and documents in a proper time frame. Hence, the court determined that the proffer afforded an inadequate basis for the requested continuance. We discern no abuse of discretion. While the proffer weaves a tale of intrigue worthy of an Oliver Stone screenplay, we are unable to distill sufficient relevance or likelihood of success from its sinister allegations to suggest that a continuance, if granted, would have proven useful. IV. MONEY AND DRUGS In order to obtain a conviction on the money laundering counts, as charged in the superseding indictment, the government had the burden of proving that the laundered funds were derived from the narcotics trade. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). Appellant challenges both the admissibility and the sufficiency of the evidence introduced for this purpose. The challenge is unavailing. A. Standard of Review. A district court has considerable discretion when determining whether evidence is admissible. See United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1994); Zannino, 895 F.2d at 16-17; United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1126 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477 (1990). Where, as here, the court finds that evidence is relevant, Fed.R.Evid. 401, but the defendant nonetheless objects to it on the ground that its value is overborne by the potential mischief it may cause, Fed.R.Evid. 403, the trial court must “strike a balance between probative worth and likely prejudice.” Zannino, 895 F.2d at 16-17. The district court is the primary arbiter of how these scales should be calibrated. On appeal, we will reverse its determination only if admitting the evidence constituted a palpable abuse of discretion. See United States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 124 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 155-56 (1st Cir.1989). This is a difficult row to hoe: “Only rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.” Freeman v. Package Mach. Corp., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988). When no contemporaneous objection appears of record, the complaining party’s burden increases. In that situation, appellate review is for “plain error.” United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1187 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). When the plain error standard prevails, we reverse only if a miscue “so poisoned the well that the trial’s outcome was likely affected.” Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1188 (quoting United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir.1987)). A different standard of review takes center stage when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. In that connection, the inquiry turns on whether, “after assaying all the evidence in the light most amiable to the government, and taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, a rational factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the crime.” United States v. O’Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 706 (1st Cir.1994). In performing the requisite analysis, we do not assess the credibility of witnesses, see id., nor do we force the government to disprove every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, see United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.1993). B. National Origin Evidence. Appellant contends that the prosecution made unfair use of impermissibly suggestive innuendo and stereotypes about Colombians, thereby inviting reversal. Appellant’s argument focuses on evidence adduced, or remarks made, at four different points during his trial. First, appellant accuses the government ,of eliciting testimony concerning the birthplaces of Escobar and Garcia (both of whom were bom in Colombia), while not inquiring about any other individual’s place of birth. Second, the court permitted Sharir to testify that appellant told him to be careful because he was dealing with Colombians, who would go after his family if they were crossed. Third, when Donald Semesky, an IRS agent, offered expert testimony as to the modus operandi of Colombian drug cartels, he mentioned, among other things, that two Colombian cartels control the illegal importation of cocaine into the United States, and that their narcotics trafficking generates much cash, necessitating money laundering. Fourth, the government’s summation hammered these same points. Due to the singular importance of keeping our criminal justice system on an even keel, respecting the rights of all persons, courts must not tolerate prosecutors’ efforts gratuitously to inject issues like race and ethnicity into criminal trials. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 & n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1777 & n. 30, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C.Cir.1990). Emphasizing a person’s national origin not only may raise concerns of relevancy, undue prejudice, and prosecutorial misconduct, but also may pose issues of constitutional dimension. See, e.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1213 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 541 (1st Cir.1991). This does not mean, however, that all evidence touching upon race or national origin automatically must be excluded. A trial involves a search for the truth, and, as such, it cannot be entirely antiseptic. The trick is to separate impermissible uses of highly charged evidence from those uses that are proper and permissible. See United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1007-08 (1st Cir.1995); Doe, 903 F.2d at 25. Thus, while it has proven acceptable on occasion for a prosecutor to introduce evidence of oppressive Kuwaiti customs to buttress the reasonableness of the victim’s professed belief, see Alzanki, 54 F.3d at 1008, or to make an “unem-bellished reference to evidence of race simply as a factor bolstering an eyewitness identification of the culprit,” Doe, 903 F.2d at 25 (dictum), or to remark that an Iranian defendant likely assumed that his “American wife” would not be searched at customs, United States v. Tajeddini 996 F.2d 1278, 1285 (1st Cir.1993), or to describe drugs as coming from Colombia to give the jury a complete view of the conspiracy’s endeavors to import cocaine, see United States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 220 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1322, 131 L.Ed.2d 202 (1995), aggressive prosecutors sometimes go too far. When that occurs, courts must act. We have, for instance, reversed convictions when, as in Rodriguez Cortes, the government’s strategem blatantly invited the jury to find the defendant guilty by reason of his national origin. See Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d at 541 (finding abuse of discretion in admission of defendant’s Colombian identification card); see also Vue, 13 F.3d at 1212-13 (reversing conviction because district court admitted testimony tying defendant’s ethnic group, the Hmong, to 95% of the local opium trade); Doe, 903 F.2d at 23-27 (reversing conviction due to admission of testimony on modus operandi of Jamaican drug gangs and prosecutor’s inflammatory comments thereon). In determining the propriety of evidence implicating ethnicity or national origin, context is critical. In the ease at bar, all the evidence about Colombia, viewed in context, was properly admitted and used. By like token, the prosecutor’s comments were not beyond the pale. Appellant’s first contention is factually incorrect. The prosecutor asked several witnesses other than Escobar and Garcia (e.g., Sharir and Slomovits) where they were born. Seen in this light, the casual questioning about place of birth, not objected to at trial, cannot conceivably plunge to the plane of plain error. Similarly, Sharir’s testimony that Saccoccia told him to be wary because he was dealing with Colombians is highly probative on the issue of appellant’s knowledge that the laundered funds were derived from illegal activities. Moreover, common sense suggests that drug traffickers are more likely than, say, Avon ladies, to harm the families of business associates if a deal sours. It is, therefore, a gross exaggeration to declare that the evidence had no purpose other than to suggest that Colombians are prone to violence. Similarly, Agent Semesky’s testimony was relevant and appropriate in several respects. First, it went a long way toward explaining the nature of money laundering and the basis for appellant’s activities. This is a perfectly legitimate use of evidence. See Doe, 903 F.2d at 19 & n. 21 (citing cases). Even the testimony about the cartels’ control over the American drug trade was relevant on the issue of whether the cash that appellant scrubbed clean was in fact derived from illegal activities. The evidence could support a jury’s plausible, though circumstantial, inference of an illicit source of funds based on appellant’s repeated wire transfers of millions of dollars in laundered money to a country that functions as the nerve center of the world’s traffic in cocaine. The only remotely problematic references to Colombia are those contained in the summation. For example, a prosecutor stated: [Agent Semesky] told you as an expert, something you probably already knew, that cocaine comes from Colombia. That it’s run by cartels in Colombia. That they ship the money up here and it gets out into the streets. That’s the reason for all these ten and twenty dollar bills. These are grams of coke.... Later on, after reminding the jurors that the case involved roughly $100,000,000 “generated on the streets of New York that is sent back to Colombia,” a prosecutor posed a series of rhetorical questions: If we’re not talking about cocaine, what are we talking about? Is this from coffee vendors? Is this money coming from people out in the streets selling Colombian coffee? Oh, I have had a good day today. Five hundred thousand dollars, unfortunately, it’s all in twenty dollar bills. Think of the change they had to give. This is a ease about Roberto Juri and Tulio Alzate and Fernando Dueñas and Stephen Sac-coccia, not Juan Valdez, ladies and gentlemen. The evidence in this case and the only reasonable inference you can draw is drug money. Appellant did not interject a contemporaneous objection to any of these comments. It strains credulity to suggest, as Saccoccia does, that the prosecution was arguing that only drugs and coffee come from Colombia. The remark about coffee vendors was obviously intended to show the unlikelihood that any legitimate business would generate the volume of cash that flowed through appellant’s operation. The quip about Juan Valdez, while an unnecessary aside, cannot be said to emphasize emotion over facts. See Doe, 903 F.2d at 25. Viewed as a whole, the prosecution’s evidence and comments about Colombia provide no basis for disturbing the jury’s verdict. Before ending our elaboration we note, as an adscript, that appellant himself is not Colombian, but is of Italian ancestry. This mitigates one of the most serious dangers of evidence about a person’s national origin: that the jury will believe the defendant is guilty because of stereotyping. Appellant has not cited any case in which a court has reversed a conviction due to evidence touching upon a national origin not shared by the defendant. This is not to say that injustice and unfair prejudice may never result from a conviction based on improper use of evidence about the national origin of a defendant’s friends or business associates. But, the ricochet effect of such evidence is likely to do less harm, on average, than the direct impact of evidence about the defendant’s country of origin. C. The Dog Show. Appellant faults the district court for admitting evidence that Bosco von Sehleuder-sitz (Bosco), a nine-year-old German shepherd trained to detect narcotics, alerted to the presence of drugs in bundles of cash brought to local banks by appellant’s henchmen. At trial Bosco’s handler, Sgt. Edward Conley, testified that he took Bosco to a bank in Cranston, Rhode Island on March 23, 1990. Bosco “searched” several areas of the bank, such as the vault and teller stations, and did not react. Conley then took Bosco to a room in which a bag containing $9,000 was located, and, when he instructed Bosco to search for drugs, the dog “showed a strong, positive aggressive alert, shaking the bag, ripping it apart, grabbing the money in his mouth, and ripping the money.” According to Conley, a similar search, with similar results, took place on April 20, 1990, at a different bank in Johnston, Rhode Island. In each instance, the currency to which Bos-co reacted had been brought to the bank by appellant’s associates in order to purchase cashier’s checks. To meet this testimony, appellant called two experts who attacked the reliability of Bosco’s response. One of these witnesses, Thomas Knott, testified that the manner in which Conley orchestrated the sniff tests did not properly control against the possibility of a false alert. The second expert, Dr. James Woodford, criticized the testing protocol because the sniff tests were not verified by chemical field tests. Woodford also testified as to the widespread contamination of United States currency with illegal drugs and the tenuous nature of the link between a canine alert and a conclusion that particular currency derived from narcotics trafficking (“[I]f there were drugs on that money, it doesn’t mean that it is drug money.”). Appellant insists that the probative value of the dog sniff evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and that the district court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403. This claim deserves serious attention, for recent decisions about the evidentiary value of a trained dog’s alert to currency are not uniform. Compare, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041-43 (9th Cir.1994) (noting widespread contamination and concluding that “the probative value of a positive dog alert in currency forfeiture cases in Los Angeles is significantly diminished”); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1215 (3d Cir.) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “a substantial portion of United States currency now in circulation is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 742, 130 L.Ed.2d 643 (1994); and Jones v. DEA, 819 F.Supp. 698, 721 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (suggesting that “continued reliance of courts and law enforcement officers on dog sniffs to separate ‘legitimate’ currency from ‘drug-connected’ currency is logically indefensible”) with, e.g., United States v. $67,220.00 in U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 285-86 (6th Cir.1992) (noting that “a positive dog reaction [to currency] is at least strong evidence of a connection to drugs”); United States v. $215,300 U.S. Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir.1989) (upholding forfeiture based in part on a canine alert to currency), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 3242, 111 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990); and United States v. Hernando Ospi-no, 798 F.2d 1570,1583 (11th Cir.1986) (finding canine sniff evidence to be both probative and helpful to the jury in concluding that laundered money constitutes drug proceeds). In the end, we reject appellant’s asseveration. We do not think that the district court, based on the information of record in this case, abused its discretion in admitting the canine sniff evidence. Even though widespread contamination of currency plainly lessens the impact of dog sniff evidence, a trained dog’s alert still retains some probative value. Ordinary experience suggests that currency used to purchase narcotics is more likely than other currency to have come into contact with drugs. Here, moreover, the evidence supports an inference that Bosco’s frenzied reaction was caused by more than a mere trace of contamination. The record contains corroboration of Bos-co’s olfactory evidence. Several witnesses testified that ordinary human senses could detect something unusual about the money that appellant’s associates brought to the banks. One teller testified that he occasionally noticed that the money felt “dusty ... almost floury from pizza dough, that type of feeling.” Another teller reported that she noticed an odor or fragrance, akin to that of an orchid. This evidence, along with Conley’s testimony that the dog did not react in other areas of the banks, buttressed the lower court’s belief that the dog sniff evidence had probative force. Conversely, though the dog sniff evidence likely bolstered the prosecution’s case and served to inculpate the defendant, we are not convinced that it presented a substantial risk of unfair prejudice. See generally Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d at 156 (“By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided.”). After all, the court allowed appellant to call two expert witnesses who debunked Bosco’s reaction to the currency. If, on one hand, the jury believed the experts, it doubtless discounted the value of the canine alert. If, on the other hand, the jury disbelieved appellant’s experts, it was entitled to place a greater value on the canine sniff. See, e.g., Quinones-Pacheco v. American Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1992) (explaining that “expert opinion testimony, even if not directly contradicted, is not ordinarily binding on a jury”). In any event, considering the high degree of deference we owe to a district court’s balancing of probative value against unfairly prejudicial effects, see Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d at 156, we cannot say that the trial court abused its wide discretion in admitting the evidence of Boseo’s reaction to the currency delivered by appellant’s associates. D. Testimony of Juan Carlos Garcia. Juan Carlos Garcia, a participant in the money laundering activities, testified for the government at appellant’s trial. Garcia said that in 1987, while living in the United States, he began working for his brother-in-law, Fernando Dueñas. Following Dueñas’ orders, Garcia would respond when paged on his beeper, arrange to retrieve a quantity of cash, and deposit the money in one of several bank accounts maintained under the names of Dueñas, Dueñas’ wife (Garcia’s sister), or Dueñas’ brother. By the end of 1987 the cash had mushroomed from $10,000-$20,000 per shipment to $150,000-$200,000 per shipment. Garcia met appellant for the first time in May 1989. With Dueñas’ blessing, the two men agreed that appellant would accept bun-dies of cas