Full opinion text
Judge CALABRESI concurs, and also files a separate concurring opinion. Judge WALKER concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion. SACK, Circuit Judge: Defendants Lynne Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, and Ahmed Abdel Sattar appeal from judgments of conviction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (John G. Koeltl, Judge) for various crimes arising from their contacts with and behavior relating to government restrictions on communications and other contacts with Sheikh Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman. Rahman is serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison for terrorism-related crimes of seditious conspiracy, solicitation of murder, solicitation of an attack on American military installations, conspiracy to murder, and a conspiracy to bomb. He is subject to “Special Administrative Measures” (“SAMs”) restricting his ability to communicate with persons outside of the prison in which he is incarcerated so as to prevent him from continuing to lead terrorist organizations and their members. The government cross-appeals from the defendants’ sentences. We would be remiss if we did not, at the outset, commend the district court for its thoroughness, thoughtfulness, and effectiveness in the conduct of these unusually lengthy, difficult, and sensitive proceedings. Much of what follows simply reports what it did and tracks what it said. We affirm the judgments of conviction. We also affirm the sentences of Yousry and Sattar. We remand the case, however, with respect to the sentence of Stewart, and also with respect to the sentences of Yousry and Sattar in light of the resentencing of Stewart. In particular, we affirm the judgments as to each defendant’s conviction of conspiring to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, by violating SAMs imposed upon Abdel Rahman. Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, the evidence is sufficient to sustain these convictions. Moreover, we reject both Stewart’s argument that, as a lawyer, she was not bound by the SAMs, and her belated argument collaterally attacking their constitutionality. We affirm as to Sattar’s conviction of conspiring to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956, and his conviction of soliciting persons to commit crimes of violence — viz., murder and conspiracy to commit murder — in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain these convictions, especially in light of testimony establishing that Sattar attempted to undermine a unilateral cease-fire by an Egyptian terrorist organization and to draft a fatwa calling for, inter alia, the killing of “Jews and Crusaders.” We affirm as to Stewart’s and Yousry’s convictions of providing and concealing material support to the conspiracy to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and of conspiring to provide and conceal such support in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. We conclude that the charges were valid — that 18 U.S.C. § 2339A is neither unconstitutionally vague as applied nor a “logical absurdity,” as Stewart asserts— and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. We also reject Stewart’s claims that her purported attempt to serve as a “zealous advocate” for her client provides her with immunity from the convictions. Finally, we affirm Stewart’s convictions for knowingly and willfully making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 when she affirmed that she intended to, and would, abide by the SAMs. In light of her repeated and flagrant violation of the SAMs, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Stewart’s representations that she intended to and would abide by the SAMs were knowingly false when made. We reject the remaining challenges to the convictions. We affirm the district court’s rejection of Sattar’s vindictive prosecution claim because there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the government’s pre-trial decision to add new charges against Sattar amounted to an effort to punish him for exercising his constitutional rights. And, because Stewart’s conduct was materially different from, and more serious than, the conduct of other lawyers representing Abdel Rahman who may also have violated the SAMs, we affirm the district court’s rejection of Stewart’s claim that she was selectively prosecuted on account of her gender or political beliefs. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever the trial of Stewart and Yousry from that of Sattar in light of the general preference for joint trials, the specific charges at issue here, and the district court’s curative instructions. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury in light of the particular allegations of criminal wrongdoing at issue, involving the corruption of the judicial process, and the widespread publicity about the case. We find no fault with the district court’s resolution of allegations of juror impropriety. We also agree with the district court’s treatment of confidential information, including its denial of Stewart’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), its ex parte, in camera examination of FISA wiretap applications, and its rejection of Stewart’s more general challenges to the constitutionality of FISA. Finally, we find no fault with the district court’s treatment, in accordance with the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), of Stewart’s motion to compel disclosure of information related to potential surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency. We therefore affirm the convictions in their entirety. We also affirm the sentences of Sattar and Yousry. We conclude that the district court committed neither procedural error in calculating the applicable Guidelines ranges, nor substantive error in varying from those ranges pursuant to its consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We nonetheless remand their cases to the district court to allow it to reconsider their sentences should it choose to do so in light of the resentencing of Stewart. We cannot affirm Stewart’s sentence on the basis of the record before us. Because the district court declined to find whether Stewart committed perjury at trial, we cannot conclude that the mitigating factors found to support her sentence can reasonably bear the weight assigned to them. This is so particularly in light of the seriousness of her criminal conduct, her responsibilities as a member of the bar, and her role as counsel for Abdel Rahman. We therefore remand the cause to the district court for further consideration of her sentence, in light of, among other things, the charges of perjury against her and of any other matter it deems necessary or advisable, and direct the court to revoke Stewart’s and Yousry’s bail pending appeal and to order them to surrender to the United States Marshal to begin serving their sentences forthwith. BACKGROUND The transcript of the trials in the cases on appeal runs in excess of thirteen thousand pages. The district court issued nine opinions and a wide variety of orders addressing issues presented during the course of the proceedings. See principally, United States v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“Sattar I”); United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395(JGK), 2003 WL 22137012, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16164 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (“Sattar II”); United States v. Sattar, 314 F.Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (“Sattar III”); United States v. Sattar, 395 F.Supp.2d 66 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Sattar IV’); United States v. Sattar, 395 F.Supp.2d 79 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“Sattar V”). The filings in this Court reflect the massiveness of the record. We therefore describe the proceedings in the district court and the relevant facts only in the detail we think necessary to explain our decision. In reviewing the conviction, we set forth the facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 292 (2d Cir. 2002). The SAMs In October 1995, Sheikh Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman was convicted of a variety of terrorism-related crimes in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. According to the government’s evidence at his trial, Abdel Rahman, a blind Islamic scholar and cleric, was the leader of [a] seditious conspiracy, the purpose of which was “jihad,” in the sense of a struggle against the enemies of Islam. Indicative of this purpose, in a speech to his followers Abdel Rahman instructed that they were to “do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile ... against God’s enemies.” Abdel Rahman’s role in the conspiracy was generally limited to overall supervision and direction of the membership, as he made efforts to remain a level above the details of individual operations. However, as a cleric and the group’s leader, Abdel Rahman was entitled to dispense fatwas, religious opinions on the holiness of an act, to members of the group sanctioning proposed courses of conduct and advising them whether the acts would be in furtherance of jihad.[ ] United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88,104 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094, 120 S.Ct. 830, 145 L.Ed.2d 698 (2000) (citations omitted). The crimes of conviction included soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was visiting New York City; attacking American military installations; conspiring to murder President Mubarak; conspiring to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993, which succeeded; conspiring subsequently to bomb various structures in New York City, including bridges, tunnels, and the federal building containing the New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), which did not succeed; and conspiring to commit crimes of sedition. Id. at 103-04,107-11. For these crimes, Abdel Rahman was sentenced to be incarcerated for the remainder of his life. Id. at 148. Following his conviction and appeal therefrom, Abdel Rahman’s legal team focused on two goals: improving his conditions of confinement, and obtaining his transfer from prison in the United States to Egypt. The government asserts that Abdel Rah-man was linked to various other acts of violence: He is said to be, or to have been, a spiritual leader of what the indictment in the instant prosecution refers to as “ ‘alGama’a al-Islamiyya,’ a/k/a ‘ax-Gama’at,’ a/k/a ‘Islamic Gama’at,’ a/k/a ‘Egyptian alGama’at al-Islamiyya’ ” (hereinafter, “alGama’a”), also referred to by the district court and the parties in English as the “Islamic Group” or “IG.” See Superseding Indictment ¶ 8. Al-Gama’a was designated a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”) by the United States Secretary of State in 1997 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189, see Notices, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 62 Fed.Reg. 52650 (Oct. 8, 1997), was redesignated an FTO in 1999 and 2001, see Notices, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 64 Fed.Reg. 55112 (Oct. 8, 1999); Notices, Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 51088 (Oct. 5, 2001), and remains so designated today, see Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Fact Sheet, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392. htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). “Federal regulations provide that the Bureau of Prisons may implement SAMs, ‘[u]pon direction of the Attorney General,’ when ‘reasonably necessary to protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury.’ 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a).” In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 954 (2d Cir.2008) (alteration in original), cert. denied, — U.S. ——, 129 S.Ct. 1401, 173 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009). The Bureau of Prisons, following Abdel Rahman’s remand to its custody in August 1997, imposed severely restrictive SAMs upon him. They were designed to prevent him from directing or facilitating yet more violent acts of terrorism from his prison cell. The SAMs have been renewed, and sometimes modified, every 120 days since they were first imposed. The May 11, 1998, SAMs applicable to Abdel Rahman “prohibited [him] from having contact with ... others (except as noted in this document) that could foreseeably result in [his] communicating information (sending or receiving) that could circumvent the SAM intent of significantly limiting [his] ability to communicate (send or receive) terrorist information.” SAMs of May 11, 1998, ¶ 3. To enforce this general prohibition, the measures regulated Abdel Rahman’s telephone contacts, id. ¶ 4, his mail, id. ¶ 5, and his visitors’ visits, id. ¶ 6. The measures limited his telephone contacts solely to his attorneys of record and his wife, id. ¶ 4(a), and prevented matters discussed in those calls from being “divulged in any manner to any third party,” id. ¶ 4(e)(i). The measures required the screening of all his outgoing and incoming non-legal mail, id. ¶ 5, and prohibited him from “talking] with, or otherwise communicat[ing] with, any representative of the news media,” including “through [his] attorney(s)/staff, or otherwise,” id. ¶ 8. The measures also provided for the monitoring of all non-legal visits. Id. ¶ 6. On the condition that his attorneys would not divulge any information to third parties, Abdel Rahman was permitted to communicate with his legal team by telephone, id. ¶¶ 4(a) & 4(d), mail, id. ¶ 5(a), and in person, id. ¶ 6, with fewer restrictions than with other persons. Members of this legal team included lawyers Ramsey Clark, Abdeen Jabara, Lawrence Schilling, and defendant Lynne Stewart. Subsequent versions of the SAMs retained similar prohibitions and screening mechanisms including the prohibition against communications with the news media. See, e.g., SAMs of Apr. 7, 1999, ¶ 9; SAMs of Dec. 10, 1999, ¶ 9. They retained similar provisions regarding legal communications, and incorporated provisions requiring Abdel Rahman’s attorneys to sign affirmations acknowledging their receipt of the version of the SAMs in effect. See, e.g., SAMs of Apr. 7, 1999, ¶ 4; SAMs of Dec. 10, 1999, ¶ 4. By virtue of those affirmations, counsel agreed to abide by the terms of SAMs then in effect. See, e.g., Unsigned Affirmation of Abdeen Jabara, Apr. 2000; Unsigned Affirmation of Ramsey Clark, Apr. 2000; Affirmation of Ramsey Clark, Jan. 10, 2001; Affirmation of Abdeen Jabara, Jan. 10, 2001; Affirmation of Ramsey Clark, Apr. 24,1997. Stewart repeatedly executed such statements. On May 1, 1998, she signed a document entitled “Attorney Affirmation,” in which she affirmed, under penalty of perjury, the truth of specified statements regarding the then-applicable SAMs: that she had read the May 11, 1998, version of the SAMs; that she “understood] the restrictions contained in that document and agree[d] to abide by its terms”; that during her visits to Abdel Rahman she would “employ only cleared translators/interpreters and [would] not leave [any] translator/interpreter alone with inmate Abdel Rahman”; and that she would “only be accompanied by translators for the purpose of communicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning legal matters.” Affirmation of Lynne Stewart, May 1, 1998. Stewart also affirmed that neither she nor any member of her office would “forward any mail received from inmate Abdel Rah-man to a third person” nor would she “use [her] meetings, correspondence or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman.” Id. On May 16, 2000, and again on May 7, 2001, Stewart signed similar affirmations under penalty of perjury, again affirming that she had read the most recent versions of the SAMs, and that she would not use her contact with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between him and third parties, including members of the media. Affirmation of Lynne Stewart, May 16, 2000; Affirmation of Lynne Stewart, May 7, 2001. Defendant Mohammed Yousry, a middle-aged New York University graduate student who served as one of the legal team’s translators had also been, in that capacity, a member of Abdel Rahman’s trial team. As a translator, Yousry was permitted to read to Abdel Rahman, who is blind, and to take dictation from him. Various members of the team, including Stewart and Yousry, also maintained contact with defendant Ahmed Abdel Sattar, who had served as a paralegal during Abdel Rahman’s trial. The evidence established that Sattar was in continual contact with various members of al-Gama’a abroad. See, e.g., Transcript of Conversation between Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa, May 9, 2000. The Visits to Abdel Rahman Sometime in 1997, more than three years after Abdel Rahman was taken into federal custody, a faction of al-Gama’a declared a unilateral “cease-fire,” i.e., a halting of violent operations, in Egypt. When the cease-fire was first announced, Abdel Rahman was understood to support it. In November 1997, despite the ceasefire, a group associated with al-Gama’a attacked, killed, and mutilated the bodies of more than sixty tourists, guides, and guards at the Hatshepsut Temple in Lux- or, Egypt. Rifa’i Taha Musa (“Taha”) — a military leader of al-Gama’a, a follower of Abdel Rahman, and an unindicted co-conspirator herein — was involved in the incident. Alaa Abdul Raziq Atia (“Atia”), later a leader of al-Gama’a’s military wing in Egypt, was also involved in the killings. Al-Gama’a later claimed responsibility for the attack and demanded Abdel Rahman’s release from prison in the United States. In January 1998, Abdel Rahman was assigned by the Bureau of Prisons to the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota (“FMC Rochester”). In March 1999, Stewart and Yousry visited him there. Prior to the visit, Stewart signed and delivered to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York a document in which she affirmed, under penalty of perjury, that she would abide by the SAMs imposed by the Bureau of Prisons on Abdel Rahman. At about this time, defendant Sattar was in contact with members of al-Gama’a, who were divided over their support for what remained of the cease-fire. Pro-cease-fire and anti-cease-fire factions developed, and members of the organization wanted Abdel Rahman to take a position on the matter. To that end, several wrote messages addressed to Abdel Rahman, which they sent to Sattar for delivery to Abdel Rahman. Sattar gave the messages to Stewart and Yousry, who surreptitiously brought the messages with them to Abdel Rahman during a subsequent visit in May 2000. Yousry read the messages to Abdel Rahman during the visit, and Abdel Rah-man dictated to Yousry responses to some of them. Yousry and Stewart then smuggled the responses out of FMC Rochester among their legal papers, and sent them to Sattar. As directed by Abdel Rahman, Sattar informed various members of alGama’a that Abdel Rahman was willing to reconsider the effectiveness of the ceasefire and had rejected the associated idea that al-Gama’a should form a political party in Egypt. News of Abdel Rahman’s purported position spread. But some members of the media in the Middle East expressed skepticism about the veracity of Sattar’s representations, questioning whether they in fact came from Abdel Rahman or whether Sattar had fabricated them himself. To refute those reports, Sattar and Yousry asked one of Abdel Rahman’s lawyers, former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to tell a reporter for an Arabic-language newspaper that Abdel Rahman opposed al-Gama’a’s formation of a political party. Clark, they thought, would be perceived as more authoritative than Sat-tar. Clark eventually agreed to talk to the reporter. He told the reporter that “[t]he Sheikh has said he believes that the formation of a new political party to engage in politics in Egypt at this time is ... not correct and should not be done.” Transcript of Conversation between Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Mohammed Yousry, Ramsey Clark, and Muhammad Al-Shafi’i, Nov. 5, 1999, at 15. In September 1999, Farid Kidwani, the then-leader of al-Gama’a’s military wing, was killed along with three other members of the group in a shootout with Egyptian police. Kidwani’s death precipitated further tension and debate within al-Gama’a regarding the advisability and efficacy of the cease-fire. Taha sent another message to Sattar to be relayed to Abdel Rahman urging Abdel Rahman to support the termination of the cease-fire and noting that Taha and his associates needed a “powerful word” from Abdel Rahman to achieve this goal. Taha told Sattar that such support from Abdel Rahman would “strengthen me among the brothers.” Sattar agreed to send the message to Abdel Rahman and prepared a letter to Abdel Rahman for that purpose. In mid-September 1999, Clark and Yousry surreptitiously took the letter, along with newspaper articles relating to the killing of Kidwani in Egypt, with them during a visit to Abdel Rahman in FMC Rochester. Yousry read the letter and newspaper clippings aloud to Abdel Rahman. From these documents, Abdel Rahman first learned of Kidwani’s death. Abdel Rahman dictated a letter to Yousry in response. To those against whom war is made, permission is given to fight, because they are wronged (oppressed) — and verily God is most powerful for their aid----The latest thing published in the newspapers was about the Egyptian regime’s killing of four members of the Group. This is ... enough proof that the Egyptian regime does not have the intention to interact with this peaceful Initiative [i.e., the cease-fire] which aims at unification. I therefore demand that my brothers, the sons of [al-Gama’a] do a comprehensive review of the Initiative and its results. I also demand that they consider themselves absolved from it. Transcript of Conversation between Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa, Sep. 20, 1999, at 6-7 (emphasis omitted, parenthetical in original). Sat-tar expected Clark to make a public statement to similar effect, but Clark declined to do so. On February 18 and 19, 2000, Yousry and Abdeen Jabara, an Arabic-speaking lawyer and member of Abdel Rahman’s legal team, visited Abdel Rahman at FMC Rochester. They brought with them another letter which included another message from Taha, again asking for Abdel Rahman’s support for ending the ceasefire. But Jabara would not permit Abdel Rahman to dictate a letter to Yousry in response. And, notwithstanding pressure from Sattar and Taha, Jabara, like Clark before him, refused to issue any public statement regarding Abdel Rahman’s position on the matter. On May 16, 2000, defendant Stewart signed another affirmation that she and her staff would abide by the SAMs. She did not submit that affirmation to the United States Attorney’s Office until May 26. On May 18, 2000, Stewart met with Sat-tar, who gave her more letters for Abdel Rahman, including another message from Taha yet again seeking Abdel Rahman’s approval of an end to the cease-fire. Taha asked Abdel Rahman to take a “more forceful position” regarding the end of the cease-fire and to “dictate some points we can announce in a press conference with Lynne.” Transcript of Second Audiovisual Recording involving Omar Abdel Rahman, Mohammed Yousry, Lynne Stewart, and others, May 19, 2000, (“Video Tr. May 19, 2000, Tape 2”), at 36. On May 19 and 20, 2000, Stewart and Yousry visited Abdel Rahman, taking Sat-tar’s most recent letters with them, including the letter containing the message from Taha. Unbeknownst to them, the government, pursuant to a warrant, videotaped the meetings. Yousry told Abdel Rahman that Abu Sayyaf — an Islamic terrorist group in the Philippines- — -had taken hostages to be used in bargaining for the release of Abdel Rahman and others. When Yousry explained to Stewart that he was “telling the Sheikh about the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines” and how “they took hostages,” Stewart replied, “Good for them.” Transcript of First Audiovisual Recording involving Omar Abdel Rahman, Mohammed Yousry, and Lynne Stewart, May 19, 2000, at 27. From the beginning of the visit, Stewart was aware of the prison guards’ presence. For example, she asked Yousry, “Do they usually sit like this and watch us?” Id. at 10. And during this meeting, Stewart and Yousry took overt steps to ensure that the nature of their communication with Abdel Rahman would be concealed from the prison guards. As she suggested to Yousry, they “should give them [i.e., the guards] something to watch.” Id. at 11. When the guards were standing close to the window of the conference room in which Abdel Rahman, Stewart, and Yousry, were meeting Yousry told Stewart to “look at me and talk a little bit because they are watching us closely.” Id. at 51. While Yousry read the message to Abdel Rahman, Stewart uttered a meaningless series of phrases to Yousry so that it would appear to an observer as though she was taking part in a three-way conversation: “I am talking to you about ... him going to have a, uh, chocolate eh ... heart attack here.... Why don’t you stop a minute now. And (UI) say to him that, you know, ‘You understood what we are saying, (UI).’ ” Id. As Stewart spoke, Yousry said to Abdel Rahman, “I don’t know, Sir, they are standing very close by the glass.... Lynne says, (UI) when they look, you look at me a little, talk, then look at the Sheikh.” Id. Stewart continued to talk while Yousry read aloud Taha’s statement in Sattar’s letter. Yousry explained to Abdel Rah-man that “Lynne just says anything, [laughing] (UI) Sir.” Id. at 52 (bracketed material in original). Stewart remarked, “I can get an academy award for it.” Id. Stewart and Yousry then had this exchange: YOUSRY: ... Lynne, I think you should talk to him because they are looking at me. STEWART: (UI) there (UI), they, uh, (UI) ... [she taps Yousry’s pad with her pen] uhm, if he finds out what this is, then we’re ... [Laughs.] YOUSRY: [Laughs] In trouble. STEWART: [Laughing] Yeah, that’s right. Video Tr. May 19, 2000, Tape 2, at 29 (brackets in original). Stewart and Yousry also took evasive action when a guard appeared to take interest in their conversation. At one point, while Yousry was conversing with Abdel Rahman, Stewart touched Yousry’s hand and said “Why don’t you stop there and we’ll talk a minute urn, the, uh.... Ahmed’s youngest son needs glasses, did you know that?” Id. at 30. Yousry then explained to Abdel Rahman, “Lynne says, stop a little because they are by the glass.” Id. Not long afterwards, Stewart tapped with the pen on the paper in front of Yousry and told him to “continue reading this ‘cause this is setting up the organizational system around his conditions.’ ” Id. Yousry continued reading. Stewart then made a series of statements unrelated to the substance of the conversation between Yousry and Abdel Rahman. Yousry kept Abdel Rahman informed of what Yousry and Stewart were doing, noting that “Lynne continues to eh, she’s watching them, she’s watching them,” to which Abdel Rahman replied, “[v]ery good, very good.” Id. at 33. After Yousry finished reading Taha’s message to Abdel Rahman, he returned it to a notebook that he had brought with him and with which he left. On the second day of the same visit, Abdel Rahman dictated to Yousry, among other things, a letter to an al-Gama’a lawyer who favored the cease-fire, asking him to allow others in al-Gama’a to criticize it, and another to Taha asking him to “escalate the language” of criticism of the ceasefire. Video Tr. May 20, 2000, Tape 2, at 32. Meanwhile, Stewart and Yousry continued to engage in what Stewart later called “[c]overing noises,” Video Tr. July 13, 2001, Tape 2, at 12, and other tactics designed to obscure the nature of what they were doing. After one such incident, Yousry explained to Abdel Rahman, “[S]he just has to say that in order to break the ... The people are looking.” Video Tr. May 20, 2000, Tape 1, at 14. Stewart told Yousry, “I am making allowances for them looking in at us and seeing me never speaking and writing away here while you talk Arabic.” Id. at 17. She then directed Yousry to “talk back to me now, because otherwise it doesn’t make any sense.... So say something in English....” Id. As Yousry explained to Abdel Rahman, “We are now acting, I talk to her in Arabic, and she responds in English, and they don’t understand what is going on.” Video Tr. May 20, 2000, Tape 2, at 38. At the end of the visit, Stewart and Yousry took the Yousry-transcribed responses from Abdel Rahman with them from the prison, and later gave them to Sattar. Sattar then passed them along to Taha and another member of al-Gama’a. Sattar also spoke to various members of al-Gama’a, informing them that Abdel Rahman would have “no objection” to a return to violence. Transcript of Audio Recording of Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa, and Salah Hashim, May 29, 2000, at 3. At about this time, Sattar told members of al-Gama’a that Stewart would be making a public statement about Abdel Rah-man’s views on the cease-fire. Sattar and Stewart first discussed what Stewart would say to the press. Then, on June 13, 2000, Sattar and Stewart spoke to Esmat Salaheddin, a Reuters reporter based in Cairo. Stewart told Salaheddin that Abdel Rahman “is withdrawing his support for the ceasefire that currently exists.” Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”) at 5574, 5617, testimony of Salaheddin. She explained that Abdel Rahman had made the statement from prison two weeks before. The next day, other Middle Eastern press outlets carried the news that Abdel Rahman had withdrawn his support for the cease-fire. Many noted that for the ceasefire to hold, Abdel Rahman’s support was essential. On June 20, 2000, Stewart participated in a telephone conference with Abdel Rah-man. She then sent another statement on Abdel Rahman’s behalf via facsimile to Salaheddin, the Reuters reporter in Cairo. The telecopy said, “Everything said in the previous statements is correct” and quoted Abdel Rahman as saying, “I do withdraw my support to the [cease-fire] initiative.” Statement for Release, Abdel Rahman, June 20, 2000. Following Stewart’s statements on Abdel Rahman’s behalf, several members of al-Gama’a began preparations to engage anew in acts of violence. On October 4, 2000, Sattar and Taha completed a fatwa on Abdel Rahman’s behalf, imitating his style, “mandating the killing of the Israelis everywhere” and “the killing [of] the Jews wherever they are (UI) and wherever they are found.” Transcript of Audio Recording of Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Yassir Al-Sirri Oct. 4, 2000, (“Audio Tr. Oct. 4”) at 13-16. Sat-tar sent the fatwa to, among others, Atia, who had in the meantime become the military leader of al-Gama’a. Upon receiving the message, Atia began preparing for an attack. But, on October 19, 2000, before Atia could act, the Egyptian authorities raided his hideout, killing him and killing or arresting other al-Gama’a members. On July 13 and 14, 2001, Stewart again paid a visit to Abdel Rahman at FMC Rochester, having signed a revised affirmation agreeing to abide by the SAMs and having sent the affirmation by facsimile to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York on May 7, 2001. Stewart again, with Yousry’s assistance and contrary to provisions of the SAMs, surreptitiously brought messages to and from Abdel Rahman. Procedural History On April 8, 2002, the defendants were indicted in connection with these and related acts; a superseding indictment was filed on November 19, 2003. On February 10, 2005, a jury found the defendants guilty on all counts in the superseding indictment. Specifically, all three defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One) by violating SAMs imposed upon Abdel Rahman, and various related offenses. Sattar was convicted of conspiring with Taha, Abdel Rah-man, and others to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (Count Two), and with soliciting persons to commit crimes of violence — murder and conspiracy to commit murder — in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Count Three). Stewart and Yousry were convicted of providing and concealing material support to the Count-Two conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Five), and with conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four). Stewart was also convicted of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Counts Six and Seven). On October 16, 2006, following the denial of the defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal and other relief, the district court sentenced the defendants. See Sentencing Transcript of Oct. 16, 2006 (“Sent’g Tr.”). Sattar was sentenced to a 288-month term of incarceration to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release and a $300 special assessment; Stewart was sentenced to a 28-month term of incarceration to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release and a $500 special assessment; and Yousry was sentenced to a 20-month term of incarceration to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release and a $300 special assessment. Sattar is currently serving his sentence; Stewart and Yousry are free on bail pending appeal. All three defendants appeal, challenging the validity of their convictions on a variety of grounds. The government challenges the reasonableness of the sentences on cross-appeal. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions, including those interpreting and determining the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056, 125 S.Ct. 861, 160 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005). We also review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1040, 127 S.Ct. 600, 166 L.Ed.2d 445 (2006). Because the jury verdict will be upheld against a sufficiency challenge “if we find that ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’ ” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in Jackson)), a convicted defendant making such a claim “bears a very heavy burden,” United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir.2002). We are required to evaluate “all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 292 (2d Cir.2002). II. Count One Each defendant asserts that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to support his or her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for defrauding the United States and obstructing the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons in the administration and enforcement of the SAMs in force with respect to Abdel Rah-man. Stewart also argues that the SAMs do not apply to lawyers, and that the district court improperly prevented her from challenging the underlying validity of the SAMs. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence In order to establish a conspiracy-to-defraud offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 as charged in Count One of the indictment, a reasonable jury must have been able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) [that the defendants] entered into an agreement (2) to obstruct a lawful function of the government [in this case, the administration and enforcement of the SAMs] (3) by deceitful or dishonest means and (4) at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 832 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1150, 117 S.Ct. 1327, 137 L.Ed.2d 488 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘Both the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendant’s participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.’ ” United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir.2007)) (alteration omitted). 1. Evidence as to Stewart. Stewart argues that her defiance of the SAMs was open, not deceitful. One aspect of her defiance was undoubtedly public — the conveyance of Abdel Rahman’s statements regarding the cease-fire and related matters to the Reuters journalist. But we agree with the district court that “[a] reasonable jury could certainly [have found] that Stewart gained access to Abdel Rahman [and thereby the information that she conveyed to the journalist] by deceit and dishonest means.” Sattar V, 395 F.Supp.2d at 89. “Without [Stewart’s] agreement to abide by the SAMs and the other representations contained in her affirmations, she knew that she would not have been allowed to visit Abdel Rahman,” id.; see also id. at 84-89, and therefore would not later have been able to defy the regulations openly by publicizing messages on his behalf. Stewart insists that she acted with the intent, not to defraud the government, but to “zealously” represent her client. But the jury had a reasonable basis on which to disbelieve this, and to “disbelieve that zealous representation included filing false affirmations, hiding from prison guards the delivery of messages to Abdel Rah-man, and the dissemination of responses by him that were obtained through dishonesty.” Id. at 90. Moreover, even if Stewart acted with an intent to represent her client zealously, a rational jury could nonetheless have concluded that Stewart simultaneously acted with an intent to defraud the government. A genuinely held intent to represent a client “zealously” is not necessarily inconsistent with criminal intent. 2. Evidence as to Yousry. Yousry argues that, as a translator who was taking direction from others, he did only what he was told to do and acted in good-faith reliance on the guidance and conduct of the members of the bar for whom he worked. Based on the evidence admitted at trial, however, a rational jury could have found that Yousry knew of and understood the terms of the SAMs. Yousry had in his possession the December 1999 version of the SAMs as well as a copy of the underlying regulations. That version of the SAMs provided that Abdel Rahman’s legal team could pass along to him “only inmate case-related correspondence,” and set forth a process for screening all non-legal mail. SAMs of Dec. 10, 1999, ¶ 7. The SAMs in Yousry’s possession also specifically prohibited Abdel Rah-man’s communication with news media “in person, by telephone, by furnishing a recorded message, through the mails, through his attorney(s), or otherwise.” Id. ¶ 9. Yousry himself acknowledged that members of the legal team were not “to disclose any portion of their conversation with the Sheik to the media.” Excerpts from Draft of Dissertation of Mohammed Yousry at 29. Yousry also knew that Clark and Jabara had refused to relay messages from Abdel Rahman. From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Yousry knew that his assistance, by providing translation services, in facilitating Abdel Rahman’s continued contact with members of al-Gama’a violated the SAMs. Moreover, as with Stewart, Yousry’s deceptive and evasive conduct during the course of his visits to Abdel Rahman undercuts his claim of good faith. Yousry argues that the evidence established, at most, that he intended to violate the SAMs, not that he knew that doing so might constitute a crime. But even if he misunderstood the law in that respect, such a mistake provides no defense to a charge of criminal misbehavior. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). The fact that Yousry was aware that his acts, in knowing violation of the SAMs, would defraud the government is sufficient to sustain the conviction. The government need not also prove that he knew that there was a criminal statute — 18 U.S.C. § 371 — that criminalized such behavior. “The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199, 111 S.Ct. 604. B. Propriety of the SAMs 1. Stewart’s Argument. Stewart contends that the district court erred by preventing her from challenging the validity of the SAMs as part of her defense. She sought to argue that the Attorney General has no authority to have lawyers held criminally liable for violating the SAMs and that the SAMs are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. Under Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966), however, Stewart’s strategy of collaterally attacking the validity of the SAMs is futile. As the Supreme Court recognized in Dennis, there are “appropriate and inappropriate ways to challenge acts of government thought to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 867, 86 S.Ct. 1840. There is “no reason for [federal courts] to consider the constitutionality of a statute at the behest of petitioners who have been indicted for conspiracy by means of falsehood and deceit to circumvent the law which they now seek to challenge.” Id. at 866, 86 S.Ct. 1840. Stewart, like the defendants in Dennis, was indicted for engaging in a “voluntary, deliberate and calculated course of fraud and deceit.” Id. at 867, 86 S.Ct. 1840. This is a “prosecution directed at [Stewart’s] fraud[,] not an action to enforce the [law] claimed to be unconstitutional.” Id. The result may be different where the constitutionality of a law is “challenged by those who of necessity violate its provisions and seek relief in the courts,” id. at 865, 86 S.Ct. 1840, or where the governmental action at issue was taken with no “colorable authority,” United States v. Barra, 149 F.2d 489, 490 (2d Cir.1945). But, as with Dennis, “[t]his is not such a case.” 384 U.S. at 865, 86 S.Ct. 1840. We have no basis upon which to entertain a doubt as to the authority of the Attorney General of the United States to ensure that reasonable measures are designed and implemented in an attempt to prevent imprisoned criminals who are considered dangerous despite their incarceration from engaging in or facilitating further acts of criminality from their prison cells. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (setting forth the boundaries of that authority). Nor have we any reason to doubt the Attorney General’s conclusion that Abdel Rahman fits within that category of prisoner. He has demonstrated his willingness to engage in violent criminality not by acting violently himself, but by ordering, encouraging, and conspiring with others who would actually shed the blood. The likelihood that he would continue to order, direct, or encourage such acts from prison, if he could, was plain, and his incapacitation reasonably required not just his physical immobility, but also his virtual silence visa-vis the world at large. Stewart might have effectively challenged the SAMs by refusing to sign the affirmations in which she said she would abide by them. She might then have invoked the jurisdiction of the courts by bringing suit on Abdel Rahman’s or her own behalf to challenge their validity. She might have argued — as she forcefully does here — that the SAMs interfered with her capacity to effectively represent Rahman. But she did not. Instead, she signed the affirmations. Having chosen that path, she cannot be heard to attack the validity of those measures when called to account for violating them, especially where, as here, her fraudulent and deceptive conduct endangered people’s lives. The district court did not err in preventing Stewart from challenging the validity of the SAMs as part of her defense, and the jury acted within its province when it found that Stewart intentionally and fraudulently subverted them. £ Sattar’s Related Arguments on Appeal. Sattar relies on Stewart’s and Yousry’s arguments with respect to Count One. For the reasons set forth above addressing those arguments, we conclude that they are also unpersuasive as applied to him. III. Counts Two and Three Only Sattar was charged in Counts Two and Three of the superseding indictment. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his Count Two conviction for conspiring with Abdel Rah-man, Taha, and others to murder persons in a foreign country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956. Instead, he asserts that the district court should have dismissed this count on the grounds of vindictive prosecution. Similarly, Sattar does not challenge his conviction on Count Three for soliciting persons to engage in crimes of violence — murder and conspiracy to commit murder — in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373. He argues instead that he was denied a fair trial. These arguments are addressed below in the context of the defendants’ more general challenges to the probity of the proceedings. IV. Counts Four and Five Stewart and Yousry challenge their Count Five convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2 by providing and concealing material support for the Count-Two conspiracy for which Sat-tar was convicted and their Count Four convictions for conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. They argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their conviction on either count, and contend that their conduct was constitutionally protected in any event. A. History of the Charges By way of background, the initial indictment charged all three defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The defendants argued before the district court that “18 U.S.C. § 2339B is unconstitutionally vague ... with regard to the statute’s prohibition on providing material support or resources in the form of communications equipment and personnel.” Sattar I, 272 F.Supp.2d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court agreed, and therefore dismissed those charges. Id. at 361. The government then filed a superseding indictment alleging that by essentially the same course of conduct, i.e., coordinating the surreptitious passage of al-Gama’a messages to and from Abdel Rahman, Stewart and Yousry violated 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. The relevant version of section 2339A, entitled “Providing material support to terrorists,” provided in relevant part: Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [various enumerated statutes related to terrorism] or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be [subject to criminal punishment], 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000). For purposes of both sections 2339A and 2339B, “material support or resources” may be provided in the form of: currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(l) (2000); see also id. § 2339B (g)(4) (2000) (“[T]he term ‘material support or resources’ has the same meaning given that term in section 2339A....”). Section 2339A, however, in contrast to section 2339B, does not penalize the provision of material support without regard to what the support is for. Section 2339A requires instead that the defendant provide support or resources with the knowledge or intent that such resources be used to commit specific violent crimes. The government charged that the defendants provided “material support or resources” in the form of “personnel”— namely, Abdel Rahman — to the Counts Two conspiracy, knowing or intending that Abdel Rahman, as an active co-conspirator, would help commit crimes. See Sattar III, 314 F.Supp.2d at 296. The government further asserted that Stewart and Yousry “concealed] and disguise[d] the nature, location, and source” of their material support by means of the defendants’ covert conduct disguising Abdel Rahman’s participation as a co-conspirator. See id. The government had initially argued that Stewart and Yousry could be convicted for providing themselves as “personnel” to a foreign terrorist organization and by providing communications equipment to the conspiracy. After the dismissal of the section 2339B charges and following the filing of the superseding indictment, however, the government abandoned those contentions. See id. As an initial matter, Stewart and Yousry challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions on this count. They also argue that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of a violation of section 2339A. In addition, they raise more general challenges to the statute, arguing that section 2339A does not criminalize the behavior alleged in the indictment, that the provision is unconstitutional as a multi-level inchoate offense, and that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them. We examine their arguments in the context of the statutory elements of the crime, addressing first the sufficiency arguments. B. Elements of Section 2339A 1. Proof of the Underlying Conspiracy to Kill Persons Abroad. There was sufficient evidence of the existence of the predicate crime — the Count-Two conspiracy to kill or kidnap — for which Sattar was convicted. Indeed Sattar, the only defendant charged with and convicted of participating in the Count-Two conspiracy, does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to this count. The government offered evidence that Sattar and Taha composed a fatwa in Abdel Rahman’s name calling for “the killing [of] the Jews wherever they are (UI) and wherever they are found.” Audio Tr. Oct. 4, at 15. It also offered proof that this fatwa was communicated to Atia, an alGama’a military leader. Although the evidence may not have established any particular plan of action to execute the fatwa, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt from the fatwa’s exhortations and Atia’s readiness to act on it that there was a concrete, illegal objective to murder persons abroad. A review of the transcripts of various intercepted telephone conversations introduced into evidence, particularly the September 18, 2000, conversation involving Sattar, Taha, and another party, bolsters this conclusion. The discussion goes well beyond the abstract and contemplates the coordination with Atia of violent actions, presumably along the lines of the Luxor massacre. In light of such evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy as charged in Count Two existed. 2. Proof of Material Support to the Conspiracy. Stewart and Yousry also assert that they did not provide material support in the form of “personnel” to the Count-Two conspiracy. A reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise. There was evidence introduced at trial sufficient to support a reasonable juror’s inference that Stewart and Yousry helped Abdel Rahman participate covertly in the conspiracy to engage in violence abroad by communicating to members of al-Gama’a and others his withdrawal of support for the cease-fire. Abdel Rahman’s instrumental participation — indeed, his leadership— would, as the district court observed, have been unavailable to the Count-Two conspiracy “without the active participation of Stewart and Yousry.” Sattar V, 395 F.Supp.2d at 95. The defendants argue that the government established only that they provided the underlying conspiracy with Abdel Rah-man’s “pure speech” and therefore did not provide “personnel” within any constitutional interpretation of section 2339A. The government does not deny that section 2339A may not be used to prosecute mere advocacy or other protected speech, but contends that the defendants were prosecuted for criminal actions that did not amount to protected speech. Resolution of this dispute does not turn on whether the prosecution introduced evidence of “pure speech.” “Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed by speech alone,” and certain crimes “are characteristically committed through speech.” Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117. The issue is, instead, whether Abdel Rahman’s statements were protected speech. We conclude that the statements were not protected such as to cast doubt on the convictions. Words that are “the very vehicle of [a] crime” are not protected “merely because, in part, [the crimes] may have involved the use of language.” United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 828, 111 S.Ct. 87, 112 L.Ed.2d 59 (1990). As we recognized when affirming Abdel Rahman’s sentence, “freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes.” Abdel Rahman, 189 F.3d at 116-17. “[I]f the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.” Id. at 117. Words “that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence ... violate the law and may be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering the duties of a religious ministry.” Id. The dissemination of some of the speech introduced at trial might be viewed as nothing more than the expression of views on the broad political situation in Egypt. For example, in reaffirming that he was withdrawing his support for the cease-fire, Abdel Rahman said that he had “expressed [his] opinion and left the matters to [his] brothers to examine it and study it.” Statement for Release, Abdel Rah-man, June 20, 2000. But a reasonable jury could have found, in light of Abdel Rahman’s role as “spiritual” leader of al-Gama’a, that his messages were ultimately intended to sway alGama’a members to end the cease-fire, and by implication to commit criminal acts of violence. Abdel Rahman’s statements were therefore not an expression of opinion, but a call to arms. The evidence establishes, moreover, more than a one-way broadcast of Abdel Rahman’s views. Abdel Rahman’s comments were made in direct response to solicitations of his views from other alGama’a members who were seeking to effect an end to the cease-fire and to resume violence. In light of the information available to Abdel Rahman at the time, a reasonable jury could have read his statements as tailored to and necessary for alGama’a’s operations and increased use of violence. Viewed through this lens, Abdel Rahman’s statements were not materially different in substance from a crime boss making decisions about his criminal enterprise from prison and ordering a “hit.” 3. Proof Regarding Knowing or Intentional Provision of Material Support. Stewart and Yousry argue that the prosecution did not prove the requisite mental state to sustain their convictions. They contend that they were not aware of the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count Two and therefore could not have intended to aid it. These arguments are unavailing. From the evidence at trial, a reasonable factfinder could have concluded that Stewart and Yousry knew (1) that an active group of people within al-Gama’a including, most notably, Taha, sought to commit violent crimes but were hindered by the cease-fire and by those members of al-Gama’a who sought to adhere to it; (2) that the support of Abdel Rahman — a key leader of the group — was critical to the continued maintenance of the cease-fire; and (3) that, in light of the letters and messages from Taha and Sattar that Yousry read to Abdel Rahman in prison, Abdel Rahman’s particular opinion regarding the cease-fire — and not the view of any other person — would be dispositive on the question of whether al-Gama’a members would continue to abide by the cease-fire. A reasonable fact-finder could thus have concluded that Yousry and Stewart actively and intentionally facilitated communications between Abdel Rahman and al-Gama’a, in part by engaging in various ruses during the course of their visits to Abdel Rahman, and thereby effectively delivered Abdel Rahman’s order to commit violence. Stewart also did so by reaffirming to the press Abdel Rahman’s stated withdrawal of support for the cease-fire, thereby dispelling any notion that the message came not from Abdel Rahman himself, but was instead fabricated by members of the pro-violence faction of al-Gama’a. C. Other Challenges with Respect to 18 U.S.C. § 2839A 1. Vagueness. Section 2339A criminalizes the provision of material support or resources “knowing or intending” that they are to be used to assist in certain enumerated crimes of terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (full text set forth on page 113, supra). Stewart and Yousry assert that insofar as the statute does not require “conscious, knowing intent” or “knowledge and intent,” the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them. They argue that the district court should have dismissed the section 2339A charges for substantially the same reasons that it dismissed the section 2339B charges that were contained in the initial indictment. The government urges to the contrary that the text of section 2339A, which requires “knowing or intending,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (emphasis added), is sufficiently precise. In analyzing the defendants’ arguments in this regard, we must focus on two major differences between the initial and superseding indictment. First, the statutes upon which they were based differ. Unlike section 2339A, section 2339B penalizes the knowing provision of material support alone. Unlike section 2339A, section 2339B does not require for conviction proof that the defendant has provided support or resources with the knowledge or intent that such resources be used to commit specific violent crimes. Second, the factual bases for the charges differ. In the initial indictment, the government alleged that the defendants violated section 2339B by the “provision” of “communications equipment” to the conspiracy, Sattar I, 272 F.Supp.2d at 357, and the “provision” of themselves as “personnel” to the conspiracy, id. at 358. In the superseding indictment, the government charged instead that the defendants acted with the “knowledge or intent” to provide material support. And rather than proceeding on the theory that the defendants provided themselves as “personnel” to the conspiracy, the superseding indictment alleges that the defendants provided Abdel Rahman as the “personnel.” As we have explained, the district court dismissed the section 2339B charges on the ground that they were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. The basis for dismissal of the “communications equipment” charges was that the statute, as read to apply to the facts of this case, could “criminaliz[e] the mere use of phones and other means of communication [with] neither notice nor standards for [the statute’s] application.” Id. And the basis for the dismissal of the “personnel” charges, as framed in the initial indictment, was that such a charge could criminalize the actions of “ [s]omeone who advocates the cause of the [Foreign Terr