Full opinion text
GOULD, Circuit Judge: A federal jury convicted Defendants-Appellants Randall Treadwell, Ricky Sluder, and Larry Saturday (collectively “defendants”) of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1343. The charges stem from a massive four-year Ponzi scheme in which more than 1,700 investors across the United States lost over $40 million. Sluder and Saturday appeal their convictions; Tread-well, Sluder, and Saturday appeal their sentences. We disagree with the defendants on all counts. We affirm the convictions of Sluder and Saturday and the sentences of all three defendants. I On September 8, 2005, Randall Tread-well, Ricky Sluder, and Larry Saturday were indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and four counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The indictment alleged that the trio, along with their attorney, Arnulfo Acosta, were involved in an extravagant four-year Ponzi scheme that ultimately defrauded investors out of more than $40 million. Treadwell, Sluder, and Saturday were tried jointly. At trial, the government alleged that beginning in ■ 2001, Treadwell and Sluder set up a series of investment companies, including Qwest International (“Qwest”), Wealth Builders Club (“WBC”), Learn Waterhouse, Inc. (“LWI”), and Grande Belgravia (“GB”). Between 2001 and 2005, Treadwell, Sluder, and Saturday-—Saturday joining the scheme sometime near the end of 2003 or the beginning 2004—pitched these companies to prospective investors in restaurants and motel conference rooms. Their pitch was simple, though fraudulent: Temporarily “loan” money to these investment companies, they said, and in exchange you will be rewarded with very large future financial returns, and with no risk. It may seem surprising that investors would be so foolish as to fall for such a line, but they did, and in large numbers. According to the misrepresentations made by the defendants, the loans were “zero risk,” often paying returns of 50% interest per month and 2% interest compounded monthly. The defendants claimed that their companies were making investments with “the top three banks in the United States,” had “clients in twenty-nine countries,” made investments guaranteed by the United States government, had invested $2 billion in a gold mine in Mexico, and were working on a billion-dollar Columbus-era “find” on the bottom-of the ocean. In a meeting in October of 2004, Sluder stated that the companies were directing investments towards “humanitarian” projects, including projects benefitting “people that are hungry and ... in various needs throughout the world.” The defendants’ sales pitch convinced many victims of the fraud; the government alleged, and the defendants did not dispute, that over the course of the four-year operation investors “loaned” over $50 million to the defendants’ companies. Treadwell often claimed that he had a God-given ability to make money, but in hindsight it appears that his talents lay in extracting funds from duped investors. The purported investments did not exist at all. By the time the defendants’ far-reaching Ponzi scheme collapsed, more than 1,700 investors throughout the United States had lost their investments. At trial, the defendants produced no evidence to suggest that any investment profit was generated by their companies. In contrast, the government’s expert testified that after analyzing the Qwest, WBC, and LWI bank records, the only sources of funds in those bank accounts were investor deposits. The government portrayed Treadwell as the mastermind of the scheme, with Sluder as his second-in-command and Saturday acting as a salesman and sales-force trainer. Evidence also suggested that as state regulators in Florida and Alabama began to investigate the scheme, Treadwell and Sluder attempted to evade legal action by moving the investment program offshore under the guise of a new company called “Grande Belgravia.” Videotaped conversations between an FBI informant and Treadwell captured Treadwell’s attempt to pay the informant in exchange for not talking to the FBI. The defendants’ response was that although they misrepresented the nature of the various corporations’ earnings, the defendants always believed that their investors would eventually make money. However, the jury instructions defined “intent to defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 as “an intent to deceive or cheat” and stated that it is no defense to fraud that “[the defendant] honestly holds a certain opinion or belief, [but] also knowingly makes false or fraudulent promises, representations, or promises to others.” The defendants did not object to that instruction before they were convicted. The jury convicted Treadwell and Sluder on the conspiracy count and all four counts of wire fraud as pleaded in the indictment. Saturday was convicted on the conspiracy count and three of the four wire fraud counts. Treadwell was sentenced on December 11, 2008, to 300 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release and a mandatory restitution order of $44,872,152. At sentencing, the district court calculated an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 324 to 405 months. That range included a twenty-two level upward adjustment for between $20 million and $50 million in losses caused by fraud. See USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(l)(L) (2008). It also included a two-point upward adjustment for misrepresentations that Treadwell was “acting on behalf of a charitable ... organization,” see USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A), on the basis of Sluder’s statements regarding “humanitarian” projects. Considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court subsequently concluded that “protection of the public” and “deterrence” justified imposing a 300-month sentence on Treadwell. The court based its imprisonment calculations on 60 months’ imprisonment for the conspiracy count, followed by four concurrent sentences of 240 months’ imprisonment for each of the wire fraud counts. Sluder and Saturday were sentenced in a joint sentencing hearing on January 12, 2009. The district court calculated, for Sluder, an advisory Guidelines range of 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment, and for Saturday, a range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. Both calculations included the same twenty-two point upward adjustment for losses from fraud between $20 million and $50 million that was imposed on Treadwell. However, in considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded that the amount of loss had “a disproportionate effect” on Sluder’s and Saturday’s recommended Guidelines ranges. The court’s sentencing variation for Sluder was “the equivalent” of a five-level downward departure. The variation for Saturday was “the equivalent” of a seven-level downward departure. Sluder was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years’ supervised release and a mandatory restitution order of $44,872,152.38. Saturday was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release and a mandatory restitution order of $22,436,076.19. All defendants timely appealed. On appeal, Sluder and Saturday challenge their jury conviction, arguing that the jury instructions violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights because “intent to defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires an intent to cause an actual loss. Sluder and Saturday also appeal their sentences, arguing that: (1) the district court incorrectly calculated their Guidelines ranges by finding the amount of loss based on only a preponderance of the evidence and attributing to them the entire loss caused by the conspiracy; (2) the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of the Supreme Court’s remedial holding in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), to their pre-Booker conduct; and (3) their sentences cannot be upheld as “substantively reasonable” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) without reliance on judge-found facts— such as the amount of loss caused by the fraud—in violation of their Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Treadwell joins Sluder and Saturday’s Sixth Amendment argument, and also argues that: (1) it was error for the district court to impose a two-point upward adjustment for misrepresentations that he was acting on behalf of a charitable organization; and (2) his sentence is substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We have jurisdiction to review Sluder and Saturday’s convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and jurisdiction to review all three defendants’ sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review each of the defendants’ claims in turn. II We first consider Sluder and Saturday’s challenge to their convictions. Sluder and Saturday argue that their Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated by jury instructions that did not define “intent to defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1348 to require an intent to cause a financial loss to the victims. Sluder and Saturday did not object to the jury instructions at trial, so we review those instructions for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d), 52(b); United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir.2009). On plain error review, we correct an error not raised at trial only if it is plain, affects substantial rights, and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 973 n. 6. These requirements are not met by the facts here presented. According to the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, any person who “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice,” is guilty of wire fraud. Conviction under § 1343 means a defendant must have intended “to defraud” his victim. See United States v. Oren, 893 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.1990). “To defraud” under § 1343 encompasses “any scheme to deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27, 108 S.Ct. 316, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987); see also United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he offense’s specific intent element ... require[s] proof of intent to deprive the victim of money or property.”). It means to “wrong[] one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes, and usually signifies] the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.” Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27, 108 S.Ct. 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). Sluder and Saturday readily admit the district court’s jury instructions were in accord with our precedents. Section 1343 requires that one specifically intend “to deprive” the victim of money or property, but one can intend to “deprive” a victim of property within the meaning of the statute without intending to cause pecuniary loss. The common understanding of the verb “to deprive” is to take away something, such as property, from another. See Black’s Law Dictionary 473 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “deprivation” as “[a]n act of taking away”). In accordance with this understanding, we held in United States v. Oren that intent “to defraud” under § 1343 does not require an intent to cause a pecuniary loss to the victim. See 893 F.2d at 1062 (holding that even if the defendant believed that the property was worth what the victim of the fraud paid for it, the fact that the seller made a false representation to inflate the purchase price constituted “intent to defraud” under § 1343). “[The defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged is entirely independent of and unrelated to his belief of the property’s value.... Because he has conceded that he intentionally created a false statement, it was no defense here for him to argue that he genuinely believed that the property was worth what the [victim] paid for it.” Id. Similarly, the intended deprivation under § 1343 need not be a permanent “taking away” of money or property. One can intentionally “deprive” another of property while at the same time intending to restore it at a later date. Thus, in United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1986), we upheld jury instructions that stated a good-faith intent to repay money acquired through misrepresentation is not a defense to mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341—a statute which, like § 1343, applies only to wrongdoers “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud.” See id. at 1417. “While an honest, good-faith belief in the truth of the misrepresentations may negate intent to defraud, a good-faith belief that the victim will be repaid and will sustain no loss is no defense at all.” Id. Sluder and Saturday ask us to reconsider our precedents, arguing that the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits define intent to defraud under § 1343 to require deprivation with the “intent to harm,” that “harm” in this ease means pecuniary loss, and that those circuits’ interpretation of § 1343 is the better view. See, e.g., United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 812 (8th Cir.2006) (“The essential elements of wire fraud are a scheme to defraud, the use of interstate wires incident to the scheme, and an intent to cause harm.”); United States v. Dupre, 339 F.Supp.2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (“The Government must prove that the defendant [had] a purpose of causing actual financial harm to another.”), aff'd, 462 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir.2002) (“We believe that, given the legislative intent, harm or loss to the bank must be contemplated by the wrongdoer....”); United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir.1996) (“Intent to defraud requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause some harm to result from the deceit.”). We disagree with Sluder and Saturday’s reading of the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits’ precedents. Whether or not § 1343 requires that the deprivation involve an “intent to harm”—and we express no opinion on that issue—our present holding is entirely consistent with such a requirement. The intent to induce one’s victim to give up his or her property on the basis of an intentional misrepresentation causes “harm” by depriving the victim of the opportunity to weigh the true benefits and risks of the transaction, regardless of whether or not the victim will suffer the permanent loss of money or property. See United States v. Carlo, 507 F.3d 799, 802 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that even though the defendant believed the real estate projects he misrepresented were viable, his belief “[did] not negate his intent to inflict a genuine harm on the victims by depriving them of material information necessary to determine for themselves whether to continue their development projects, thereby continuing or increasing their exposure to the risk of the projects’ failure”); United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 488 (6th Cir.2003) (“We agree that the intent must be to injure or harm.... It is sufficient that the defendant by material misrepresentations intends the victim to accept a substantial risk that otherwise would not have been taken.”). We can say with confidence that our analysis of “intent to harm” is consistent with the analysis of at least three of the circuits relied on by defendants. See, e.g., Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 812 (holding that a defendant’s good-faith belief that he intended to repay the “loans” he procured through misrepresentation was not a defense to wire fraud); Carlo, 507 F.3d at 802; United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1414 (5th Cir.1989) (“[Supreme Court precedent] is read much too broadly when it is claimed to require that mail and wire fraud convictions can be sustained only if motivated by intent to cause financial loss to another.”). To our knowledge, our precedents establishing that § 1343 does not require an intent to cause pecuniary loss are consistent with the views of all other circuits that have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Carlo, 507 F.3d 799, 802 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Hamilton, 499 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 488 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Bailey, 327 F.3d 1131, 1143 (10th Cir.2003); United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1414 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C.Cir.1979); United States v. Painter, 314 F.2d 939, 943 (4th Cir.1963). For example, in United States v. Hamilton, the defendant in a wire fraud prosecution challenged a jury instruction stating that “if money or property is obtained through knowingly false representations, the scheme to defraud is established, regardless of whether the defendant hoped, intended, or even expected that the victims would eventually be satisfied.” 499 F.3d at 735. The Seventh Circuit upheld the instruction, observing as follows: “If you embezzle from your employer you are not excused just because you had an honest intention of replacing the money, maybe with interest.... You imposed a risk of loss on the employer—deliberately, fraudulently, and without a shadow of excuse or justification—and that is harm enough to trigger criminal liability.... The same principle that covers embezzlement covers [wire] fraud.” Id. at 736-37. Similarly, in United States v. Daniel, the defendant argued that he lacked the intent to defraud under § 1343 because the jury could have found either that he planned to repay the money he had obtained by misrepresentation, or alternatively that he believed in good faith that he was acting in his victim’s best interests. 329 F.3d at 488. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument. “[The defendant] contends that the intent must be to injure or harm the victim____ But neither law nor policy supports this approach, which would have the jury look beyond his bad conduct to his overall motives. It is sufficient that the defendant by material misrepresentations intends the victim to accept a substantial risk that otherwise would not have been taken.” Id. We therefore see no error in the district court’s “intent to defraud” jury instructions. The district court’s instructions were taken from Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 3.17 and the comments appended thereto. See United States v. Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.2004) (upholding a jury instruction because “[i]ts charge—that intent to defraud is an intent to deceive or cheat—comes directly from Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 3.17”). That model jury instruction states that “intent to defraud is an intent to deceive or cheat,” and that “a defendant’s belief that the victims of the fraud will be paid in the future or will sustain no economic loss is no defense to the crime.” Those instructions are consistent with applicable Supreme Court precedent. See Carpenter; 484 U.S. at 27, 108 S.Ct. 316. They are also consistent with the pattern jury instructions used in many other circuits. See, e.g., Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.1341^4 (“To act with an ‘intent to defraud’ means to act knowingly and with the intention or the purpose to deceive or to cheat.”); Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction 2.60 (“An ‘intent to defraud’ means an intent to deceive or cheat someone.”); Sixth Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction 10.04(3) (“A defendant does not act in good faith if, even though he honestly holds a certain opinion or belief, that defendant also knowingly makes false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises to others.”); Tenth Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction 2.57 (“An ‘intent to defraud’ means an intent to deceive or cheat someone.”); Eleventh Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 17 (“[A]n honest belief on the part of the Defendant that a particular business venture was sound and would ultimately succeed would not, in and of itself, constitute ‘good faith’ as that term is used in these instructions if, in carrying out that venture, the Defendant knowingly made false or fraudulent representations to others with the specific intent to deceive them.”). A jury found that Sluder and Saturday, through misrepresentation, intentionally deprived their victims of the opportunity to decide for themselves, on the basis of true and accurate information, whether or not to invest in companies like Qwest, WBC, and LWI. That is all that an “intent to defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires. There was no plain error in the jury instructions which, as a whole, fairly presented the element of intent to defraud upon which Sluder’s and Saturday’s wire fraud convictions depend. III We next consider the defendants’ challenges to the district court’s calculation of their respective Guidelines ranges. A district court must begin a sentencing proceeding by calculating the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). The Guidelines are “the starting point and the initial benchmark” for determining an appropriate sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and they are “to be kept in mind throughout the process.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Failure to calculate correctly the Guidelines range therefore constitutes reversible error, as we explained explicitly in Carty. See id. at 993; see also United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1280 (9th Cir.2006). We review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Lambert, 498 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir.2007). It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to apply the Guidelines to the facts in a way that is “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc). A Sluder and Saturday first argue that the district court used the incorrect standard of proof when it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss for which they were individually responsible. They contend due process required clear and convincing proof of the amount of loss. The standard of proof required by due process is an issue of law that we review de novo. United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.2009). The Guidelines require a district court to calculate the amount of loss caused by fraud, and correlate the severity of the sentence to the amount of the loss. See USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(l). “[T]he sentences of defendants convicted of federal offenses should reflect the nature and magnitude of the loss caused or intended by their crimes.... [L]oss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability and is a principal factor in determining the offense level.... ” Id. comment (backg’d.). Ordinarily, a district court uses a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof when finding facts at sentencing, such as the amount of loss caused by a fraud. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir.2008). However, “where an extremely disproportionate sentence results from the application of an enhancement, the government may have to satisfy a ‘clear and convincing’ standard.” United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir.2007). Our requirement that certain sentencing facts be found by clear and convincing evidence is to ensure that criminal defendants receive adequate due process. See United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 717 (9th Cir.2006). Thus, where a severe sentencing enhancement is imposed on the basis of uncharged or acquitted conduct, due process may require clear and convincing evidence of that conduct. See United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.1992). We impose this requirement to ensure that legislatures “cannot evade [the constitutionally required standard of proof] by reclassifying an element of a crime as a sentencing factor,” id., thereby depriving a defendant of important criminal procedural protections. “[W]here the enhancement represents the overwhelming proportion of the punishment imposed, a court cannot reflexively apply the truncated procedures that are perfectly adequate for all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing determinations.” Staten, 466 F.3d at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted). “To accommodate these concerns ... a district court is required to ‘ratchet up certain, though not necessarily all, of the procedural protections afforded a defendant at sentencing, so as more closely to resemble those afforded at trial, by applying the clear and convincing evidence standard....’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a sentencing enhancement causes a disproportionate impact warranting clear and convincing proof necessitates a look at the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.2001). Circumstances considered include (1) whether the enhanced sentence falls within the maximum sentence for the crime alleged in the indictment; (2) whether the enhanced sentence negates the presumption of innocence or the prosecution’s burden of proof for the crime alleged in the indictment; (3) whether the facts offered in support of the enhancement create new offenses requiring separate punishment; (4) whether the increase in sentence is based on the extent of a conspiracy; (5) whether an increase in the number of offense levels is less than or equal to four; and (6) whether the length of the enhanced sentence more than doubles the length of the sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline range in a case where the defendant would otherwise have received a relatively short sentence. Id. Sluder and Saturday argue that the amount of loss found by the district court—which resulted in a twenty-two level increase in their Guidelines ranges— required clear and convincing evidence because it had a “disproportionate impact” on their sentences. We disagree. We have repeatedly held that sentencing determinations relating to the extent of a criminal conspiracy need not be established by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Berger, 587 F.3d at 1047-49 (“[A] number of our cases squarely address the factual situation presented here. Those cases involve a defendant’s fraudulent conduct where sentencing enhancements for financial loss are based on the extent of the fraud conspiracy. They hold that facts underlying the disputed enhancements need only be found by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Armstead, 552 F.3d at 777 (“[Sentencing enhancements based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy do not require the heightened standard of proof.”); United States v. Riley, 335 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir.2003); Harrisovr-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1523. Although “disproportionate impact” may require a clear and convincing standard of proof, the touchstone underlying this heightened burden of proof has always been due process. See Staten, 466 F.3d at 717. Those due process concerns are absent here. The jury convicted Sluder and Saturday of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The district court’s amount-of-loss finding was based on the evidence presented at trial on the conspiracy charge, and Sluder and Saturday cannot contend that they were denied adequate procedural protection in contesting that evidence. “[T]he distinction between a quantity determination and uncharged criminal conduct places [a defendant convicted of conspiracy] on a fundamentally different plane” than a defendant who has not been convicted of conspiracy. Harrisortr-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1523. An analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” of Sluder’s and Saturday’s loss enhancement underscores our point. Sluder’s and Saturday’s sentences, even after the loss enhancement, fall within the maximum sentence authorized for the crimes alleged in the indictment. The loss enhancement neither negates the presumption of innocence nor alters the burden of proof for wire fraud or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Nor does it hold Sluder and Saturday responsible for any offenses for which they have not been convicted by a jury. Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2297-98, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (holding that, in the context of federal immigration law, the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit “does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit,” but rather refers to “the particular circumstances in which an offender committed” fraud or deceit). The loss enhancement is based on a conspiracy conviction, and Sluder and Saturday had ample opportunity at trial to challenge the government’s evidence of the extent of losses caused by the conspiracy. The only circumstance weighing in favor of a heightened standard of proof is the size of the loss enhancement itself. The enhancement was large, but that alone does not raise the due process concerns that urge “clear and convincing” proof. We hold that “preponderance of the evidence” was the appropriate standard of proof for determining the amount of loss caused by the conspiracy. B Sluder and Saturday next argue that the district court incorrectly attributed to them the entire loss caused by the conspiracy, failing to determine the scope of each defendant’s “jointly undertaken” criminal activity and the amount of loss “reasonably foreseeable” to each defendant. They contend that, because Sluder and Saturday received a substantially smaller proportion of the conspiracy’s profits than Treadwell and Acosta, this indicates that the scope of their “joint undertaking” was correspondingly limited. Sluder and Saturday further argue that the full amount of loss caused by the fraud was not “reasonably foreseeable” to them because they do not have a background in finance and therefore believed Treadwell’s claims that he had a God-given gift for making money. Guidelines § 2BI.I requires the district court to calculate the amount of loss attributable to an individual defendant’s conduct in perpetrating a fraud. Where the amount of loss is the result of “jointly undertaken criminal activity”—such as a conspiracy—the relevant amount of loss must be determined on the basis of “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction.” USSG § lB1.3(a)(l)(B). The application notes to § 1B1.3 elaborate on this point: Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant ... is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy .... In order to determine the defendant’s accountability for the conduct of others ... the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (ie., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). In accordance with this provision, we have held that a district court may not automatically hold an individual defendant responsible for losses attributable to the entire conspiracy, but rather must identify the loss that fell within the scope of the defendant’s agreement with his co-conspirators and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See, e.g., Riley, 335 F.3d at 928; United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1346 (9th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir.2003) (amount of drugs attributable to defendant’s participation in drug conspiracy); United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 189 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.1999) (“Under the Guidelines each conspirator ... is to be judged not on the distribution made by the entire conspiracy but on the basis of the quantity of drugs which he reasonably foresaw or which fell within ‘the scope’ of his particular agreement with the conspirators.”). However, to comply with USSG § lB1.3(a)(l)(B), a district court is not required to proceed item-by-item through a complete list of all losses attributed to a criminal conspiracy and to then make an individualized determination whether or 1696 not each item was within the scope of the defendant’s “joint undertaking” and was “reasonably foreseeable” to that defendant. Section lB1.3(a) is a general provision that prescribes the relevant range of conduct a district court should consider when calculating the applicable Guidelines range, and must be interpreted in conjunction with the specific guideline being applied. See USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. (backg’d) (“Subsection (a) establishes a rule of construction by specifying, in the absence of more explicit instructions in the context of a specific guideline, the range of conduct that is relevant to determining the applicable offense level....”). “The provisions of § 1B1.3 are written broadly to provide sentencing judges maximum discretion, allowing flexibility in their application to a variety of crimes and circumstances. It is the provisions’ interactions with numerous other guidelines, however, that determine what conduct is ‘relevant’ to each specific guideline.... ” United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.2009). In this case, the applicable guideline for calculating the amount of loss caused by fraud, § 2B1.1, requires only that a district court “make a reasonable estimate of the loss.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). “Actual loss” is defined as the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense,” meaning monetary harm “that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known was a potential result of the offense.” Id. cmt. n.3(A)(i), (iv). In making this estimate, the district court must consider “available information ... as appropriate and practicable under the circumstances” including “general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense and revenues generated by similar operations.” Id. cmt. n.3(C). Given that “reasonable foreseeability” and the “scope and duration of the offense” are concepts incorporated into the estimate of loss itself under § 2B1.1, we interpret § 1B1.3 as a limit on what conduct may be considered in making the corresponding loss estimate for a conspiracy conviction, not as a requirement that the district court make additional, detailed findings in the record regarding specific amounts of loss attributable to each defendant. See USSG § lB1.3(a) (“Unless otherwise specified, ... specific offense characteristics ... shall be determined on the basis of the following...Cruz~Gramajo, 570 F.3d at 1172 (“Section 1B1.3 does not create a scope of relevant conduct that has independent significance. Rather, it merely defines the scope of conduct considered in determining the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, cross references, and adjustments involved.”). For losses resulting from a fraudulent conspiracy as extensive and long-lasting as the present Ponzi scheme—and for which Sluder and Saturday were both convicted—all that § 1B1.3 requires is that, in the context of calculating the amount of loss under § 2B1.1, the district court make factual determinations establishing the scope of each defendant’s joint undertaking and the amount of losses reasonably foreseeable to each defendant. See Riley, 335 F.3d at 928 (holding that the district court made sufficient factual findings and adequately determined the scope of defendant’s participation in a conspiracy under § 1B1.3 even though “the district court did not expressly determine the scope of [the defendant’s] participation”). To require anything greater would make criminal sentencing in cases like this unduly detailed, and given our deferential review of the district court’s estimate of the amount of loss, would serve little purpose. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) (“The sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence. For this reason, the court’s loss determination is entitled to appropriate deference.”). We are satisfied that the district court correctly found the scope of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 in attributing losses to Sluder and Saturday as a result of their conspiracy convictions. Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, the district court did not hold both Sluder and Saturday responsible for all losses caused by the conspiracy. Rather, it specifically found that Saturday’s responsibility for the “joint undertaking” was less than either Sluder’s or Treadwell’s and that it was not automatically coextensive with the amount of time Saturday was involved in the conspiracy. The trial court specifically limited Saturday’s responsibility for losses to the period during which he was involved in the conspiracy, beginning “sometime either in late 2003 or early 2004.” It made specific findings that at least $38 million was fraudulently obtained by the conspiracy during Saturday’s participation in the scheme, but ultimately attributed to Saturday only $22 million of that $38 million. The district court specifically found that Saturday was “responsible for half the loss” because he represented himself as “a founder of LWI,” participated in “senior member representative conference calls” pumping up the nationwide sales force, gave “sales advice,” and traveled throughout the country for various presentations. The trial court specifically addressed foreseeability, finding that “with regard to the amount of loss it probably wasn’t reasonably foreseeable to [Saturday] that the amount of loss was as great. However, from the evidence it was reasonably foreseeable to him that others were involved and others were getting money from investors.” In Sluder’s case, the district court held him responsible for all $44 million in losses caused by the conspiracy only after finding that Sluder was “involved in this conspiracy, basically, from start to finish,” that Sluder “was the president” of Qwest International and that Sluder declared he and Treadwell “were the owners of LWI,” and that Sluder “was a self-described leader, or manager, or supervisor of the scheme.” The judge specifically found that “there certainly is enough evidence to show that [Sluder] was aware of what was going on during the space of the conspiracy,” and that Sluder’s assertion “[that] the number of victims was not reasonably foreseeable is contrary to the evidence.” We are satisfied that the district court found the scope of the “joint undertaking” and losses “reasonably foreseeable” to Sluder and Saturday according to the requirements of § 1B1.3. Moreover, given the abundance of evidence in the record establishing Sluder and Saturday’s substantial involvement in the conspiracy, the district court’s findings regarding the scope of each defendant’s “joint undertaking” and losses “reasonably foreseeable” to each defendant were not clearly erroneous. Although a defendant’s comparative profits from a criminal scheme are relevant in determining the scope of what the defendant agreed to participate in, they are not dispositive. For example, in the context of a fraudulent telemarketing scheme, telemarketers can be held responsible for the money fraudulently obtained by other participants in the scheme, even if they received only a fixed salary. See United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir.1998). In Blitz, we held that the scope of a joint undertaking for sentencing purposes depended on whether the telemarketers “worked together,” “relied on one another to make a sale,” attended the same salesmeetings, and “depended on the success of the ... operation as a whole for their financial compensation.” Id.; see also United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir.1995) (considering factors including whether or not the defendant helped “design or develop” the scam, “worked in any way to further the scheme outside of his sales efforts,” “furthered the objectives of the operation as a whole,” was paid on a “pure commission basis” as opposed to receiving “profits of the overall operation,” and “assisted other representatives with their sales”). Here, there was ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings. Both defendants described themselves as “founders” of the investment companies they were asking investors to support with funds. Both defendants led conference calls with the companies’ nationwide sales force. Both defendants traveled around the country selling their companies’ investment strategy. Both defendants misrepresented the investments made by their companies. And both defendants profited from the mutual efforts of them coconspirators in selling non-existent investments. It was therefore not clearly erroneous for the district court to hold Sluder and Saturday responsible for losses caused by other participants in the conspiracy, whatever Sluder and Saturday’s ultimate payout might have been. See Blitz, 151 F.3d at 1013. While Sluder and Saturday may contend that they were not aware of the conspiracy’s fraudulent activity, the district court was not required to adopt that contention where evidence in the record suggested just the contrary. See id. at 1013-14 (“[The defendants] claim that the district court erred when it held them responsible for loss caused during the entire period of their employment at Nortay because, they say, they did not have knowledge of fraud during that entire period.... We find no merit in their arguments. There was ample evidence that Nortay was a fraud from start to finish and that each of the Telemarketers knew that from start to finish.”). In sum, we hold that the district court did not err in attributing $22 million in losses to Saturday and $44 million in losses to Sluder in accordance with USSG § 2Bl.l(b). C Treadwell argues that the district court erred by imposing a two-level upward adjustment to his Guidelines range because he misrepresented that he was acting on behalf of a charitable organization. The district court held Treadwell responsible for Sluder’s statements to potential investors that “some of the programs that we’re involved in, a certain percentage of the returns that we do uh, gain from those projects do have to be returned into humanitarian needs,” and “just being able to see the benefits, to be able to see people that are hungry and, and in, in various needs throughout the world. To know that we are benefitting.... Uh, we are able to benefit them through what we are doing.” Treadwell argues that the “humanitarian theme” of Sluder’s solicitations does not constitute “acting on behalf of a charitable organization” within the plain meaning of the enhancement, because: (1) Treadwell’s investment companies were for-profit companies, not “charitable organizations,” and Sluder did not name any specific charitable organizations in which the for-profit companies were investing, and (2) Sluder did not claim to be acting as an agent or representative of any charitable organization. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, and the application of the Guidelines to Sluder’s misrepresentations for abuse of discretion. See Lambert, 498 F.3d at 966. Guidelines § 2B1.1 (b)(8)(A) requires district courts to impose a two-level upward adjustment for frauds that involved “a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization.” The section applies “in any case in which the defendant represented that the defendant was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable ... organization.” Id. cmt. n.7(B). As explained in the Guidelines commentary, the purpose of this enhancement is to punish defendants who take advantage of “the generosity and charitable motives of victims.” Id. cmt. (backg’d). “Taking advantage of a victim’s self-interest does not mitigate the seriousness of fraudulent conduct; rather, defendants who exploit victims’ charitable impulses ... create particular social harm.” Id. Stated another way, this guideline is aimed at enhancing punishment for those who prey upon and exploit a person’s tendency to be humanitarian. Treadwell admits that he and Sluder’s purpose in describing their companies’ investments as “humanitarian” was to entice investors to loan money on the basis of “generosity and charitable motives” within the meaning of the Guidelines commentary. Guidelines commentary is authoritative in interpreting the text of a guideline “unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” United States v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1063-64 (9th Cir.2007). The only issue on appeal, therefore, is whether applying the enhancement to Sluder’s misrepresentations in accordance with the purpose stated in the Guidelines commentary is “inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of’ the text of § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A) itself. “When commentary and the [guideline it interprets are inconsistent so that following one will violate the dictates of the other, the Sentencing Reform Act itself commands compliance with the guideline.” United States v. Rising Sun, 522 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We use traditional rules of statutory construction when interpreting the text of the Guidelines. United States v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam). This includes traditional canons of statutory construction. United States v. Soberanes, 318 F.3d 959, 964 n. 4 (9th Cir.2003). If the text of a guideline is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d at 869. We interpret the terms of statutes using their settled common-law meanings unless the statute dictates otherwise. United States v. Nash, 115 F.3d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997)). However, when we look to the plain language of a statute to interpret its meaning, “we do more than view words or subsections in isolation. We derive meaning from context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole.” Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir.1995). We are aware of no other circuit court decision resolving the precise issue presented here. Most of the circuit court cases interpreting USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A) involve defendants misrepresenting that they were acting as direct agents of specific charities. See, e.g., United States v. Reasor, 541 F.3d 366 (5th Cir.2008) (agent of church); Lambert, 498 F.3d at 965 (agent of indian tribe’s education department); United States v. Wiant, 314 F.3d 826 (6th Cir.2003) (agent of American Cancer Society of Ohio); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655 (4th Cir.1999) (agent of United Way of America); United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir.1998) (agent of “New Concepts in Philanthropy Program”); United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir.1995) (president of a non-profit corporation). In a closely analogous case, United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.2006), the Eighth Circuit upheld a sentencing enhancement where a defendant had solicited “bridge loans” to pay the operating expenses of her business. Id. at 798-801, 815. The Eight Circuit held that evidence that the defendant had misrepresented her business as “a non-profit, humanitarian project providing legal services to indigent criminal defendants,” and that some of the money “would be used for humanitarian projects” was sufficient to sustain the enhancement. See id. at 815. The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the enhancement was appropriate even though the defendant had also promised future “high returns” to lenders in exchange for the bridge loans. Id. We hesitate to adopt a rule that would diverge from the sensible approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in Edelmann. We hold that the district court did not err in applying the two-level upward adjustment to Treadwell on the basis of Sluder’s misrepresentations. It is not necessary to name a specific charitable organization, or to allude to an unnamed organization as a recipient, to misrepresent that one is “acting on behalf of’ such an organization for purposes of USSG § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A). Cf. Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 815 (upholding application of enhancement to defendant who had sought loans for her business and represented that “part of [the] money would be used for humanitarian projects”). Reading the words “charitable organization” in the context of the provision as a whole, it is clear that the emphasis of the provision is on the character of the misrepresentation made, not the specific words used. It is well-settled that a misrepresentation can be inferred from conduct as well as from words. See, e.g., Nash, 115 F.3d at 1436 (“[A] representation has long been held to consist of words, made orally or in writing, or other conduct manifesting to another the existence of a material present or past fact.” (quoting United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1989))). It is sufficient for purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(8)(A) that the defendant plainly intended victims to draw the inference that he or she was “acting on behalf of a charitable organization.” Were it otherwise, a creative defendant could easily evade the spirit and purpose of the provision. Cf. United States v. Ferrera, 107 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir.1997) (“[A]s a practical matter, these examples [in the Guidelines commentary] could not be exhaustive, as the devious mind would easily escape that limited net.”). Tread-well and Sluder solicited loans while representing that the money would be invested, in part, in projects serving humanitarian aims and helping people “in various needs throughout the world.” It was likely that if a part of the funds would be used for humanitarian aims, those aims would necessarily be advanced by some charitable organization pursuing them. The language ealculatingly used by defendants to extract funds must have naturally given investors the impression that charitable organizations were involved. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply the enhancement under § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A) because these statements were intended to lead victims to infer the involvement of a “charitable organization.” Nor does it matter that Treadwell and Sluder were foisting fraudulent for-profit investments on their unwitting victims, and that their victims may have been motivated by their own pecuniary gain, rather than by charitable motives. The text of § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A) requires only that the offense “involve” a misrepresentation about charities, not that the investors be misled or otherwise motivated by the misrepresentation. See Lambert, 498 F.3d at 971 (“[A] defendant’s exploitation of his victim’s charitable impulses is not required.”). “Taking advantage of a victim’s self-interest does not mitigate the seriousness of fraudulent conduct.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. (backg’d); see also Ferrera, 107 F.3d at 541 (“[T]hat the victims may have been motivated, in part, by self-interest does not mitigate the seriousness of [defendant’s] conduct.... Rather, the focus of our inquiry must be on the defendant’s motivation for making the prohibited misrepresentation.”). Finally, we conclude that the term “acting on behalf of’ does not require acting as a direct representative or agent of a charity. “On behalf of’ can be used either to mean an “agent or representative of,” or to mean “in the interest or for the benefit of.” Bryan A. Gamer, Gamer’s Modem American Usage 94 (3d ed. 2009); see also United States v. Romero, 293 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the term “on behalf of’ and determining that under the sentencing enhancement it can mean either acting in a representative capacity or acting “in the interest of’ a charity). Although the text of the guideline itself is ambiguous, it is clear from the Guidelines commentary that both usages of “on behalf of’ can satisfy the enhancement. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt.7(B) (“[The enhancement] applies in any case in which the defendant represented that the defendant was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable ... organization.” (emphasis added)); see also Romero, 293 F.3d at 1126. One can act to “obtain a benefit” for a charitable organization without being that organization’s representative or agent. For example, an unaffiliated fundraiser for a charitable organization acts “to obtain a benefit” for the organization and in the “interests of’ the organization and is within the purview of the enhancement. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.7(B)(i) (example). For the purposes of “acting on behalf of’ under § 2Bl.l(b)(8)(A), it was sufficient that Sluder represented that loans to the investment companies would benefit humanitarian projects and therefore be “in the interests of’ those projects. In sum, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Treadwell and Sluder’s appeal to their victims’ charitable motives constitutes “a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable ... organization” for purposes of USSG § 2B 1.1(b)(8)(A). Following Edelmann, we conclude that the facts are adequate to support the enhancement. IV We next consider Treadwell’s argument that the district court procedurally erred and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Under § 3553(a), a district court’s “overarching statutory charge” is to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide for just punishment; to afford adequate deterrence; to protect the public; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 991 (internal quotation marks deleted). In exercising its sentencing discretion, the district court must consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the kinds of sentences available,” the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines, “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” and “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)(3)-(7). On appeal, we review the ultimate sentence imposed under § 3553(a) for procedural error and “substantive reasonableness.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 993. It is procedural error for the district court to “fail to consider the 3553(a) factors” or “to choose a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” Id. “Substantive reasonableness” review is equivalent to review for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In determining substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the circumstances, and presume neither that a non-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable nor that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Carty, 520 F.3d at 993. Treadwell argues that the district court made five procedural or substantive errors in imposing his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): (1) ignoring or insufficiently explaining its reasons for rejecting Tread-well’s request for a variance on the basis of his personal history and characteristics; (2) creating an unwarranted sentencing disparity by imposing a sentence similar to or greater than the sentences of several high-profile white-collar criminals who were responsible for substantially greater financial losses; (3) failing adequately to account for the need to provide restitution under § 3553(a)(7); (4) failing to consider § 3553(a) factors other than § 3553(a)(2)(B) (deterrence) and § 3553(a)(2)(C) (protecting the public); and (5) rigidly applying the now-advisory Guidelines in violation of their advisory character as established in the Supreme Court’s opinions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We disagree on all counts. We hold that the district court’s imposition of Treadwell’s sentence under § 3533(a) was procedurally correct and substantively reasonable. We review each of Treadwell’s arguments in turn. A Treadwell argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply a downward variance for his personal history and characteristics because he “has no criminal record to speak of,” comes from “humble beginnings,” is a “naive man of low average intelligence who had no education or training in the area of finance,” has “several school-aged children,” and has “an ailing father suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and an elderly mother with coronary disease.” Treadwell also argues that the district court procedurally erred by “not even attempt[ing] to address these sympathetic and even mitigating circumstances or explain why the offense conduct or any other factor outweighs” them. The district court did not commit procedural error under § 3553(a) in evaluating and rejecting Treadwell’s variance request. A district court need not explain its reasons in detail where “context and the record make clear [what] reasoning underlies the judge’s conclusion.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). In Carty, we held that a district court did not procedurally err although it stated no reasons for the sentence imposed: Although the judge gave no explicit reasons for[the sentence imposed], the arguments were straightforward and uncomplicated .... [T]he district judge had presided over Carty’s trial. He reviewed the PSR and the parties’ submissions that discussed applicability of § 3553(a) factors; and he listened to testimony adduced at the sentencing hearing and to argument by both parties. The judge acknowledged Carty’s specially strong family support and the impact that prolonged incarceration would have. Based on all these factors, the judge imposed the sentence. The sentence was within, but at the low end of, the Guidelines range. “[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” 520 F.3d at 995. We see no material difference between Carty and Treadwell’s case. The district judge presided over Treadwell’s trial. He read the Presentence Report and the parties’ sentencing submissions. He listened to the arguments of Treadwell’s counsel describing Treadwell’s psychological evaluation and background, as well as a lengthy statement by Treadwell discussing his family and personal background. The district judge expressly ruled on Treadwell’s arguments for a variance on the basis of his mental condition and family circumstances, noting that a variance for Treadwell’s mental condition was not justified because the doctor’s report indicated only that he had “a personality disorder.” Nothing more is procedurally required. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359, 127 S.Ct. 2456 (“Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.”). Nor did district court abuse its discretion when it declined