Full opinion text
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge: Defendants-Appellants Mahender Murlidhar Sabhnani (“Mahender”) and Varsha Mahender Sabhnani (“Varsha”) (collectively “the Sabhnanis” or “appellants”) appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York following a jury trial before the Hon. Arthur D. Spatt, Senior Judge, convicting them of two counts each of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a), harboring aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii), holding a person in a condition of peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a), and document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a), as well as conspiracy to commit each of these substantive offenses. The district court sentenced Mahender Sabhnani to 40 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered him to pay a $12,500 fine and a special assessment of $1200. Varsha Sabhnani was sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $25,000 fine and a special assessment of $1200. The court also required both defendants to pay the sum of $936,546.22 in restitution to their victims, and ordered both defendants to forfeit their ownership interest in their home, where their victims had been held. The district court’s forfeiture order was stayed pending the disposition of this appeal. Varsha is currently serving her sentence, and Mahender was granted bail pending appeal by this Court. The Sabhnanis jointly and individually make numerous arguments on appeal, in-eluding: (1) improper refusal by the district court to change the venue of the trial in light of negative publicity regarding the defendants; (2) erroneous refusal to compel a prosecution witness to submit to an independent psychiatric examination; (3) incorrect instruction of the jury to the effect that it could convict Mahender Sabhnani of the charged crimes on a theory of omission as opposed to affirmative action; (4) insufficiency of the evidence as to Mahender Sabhnani’s convictions; (5) incorrect instruction of the jury prohibiting it from drawing an adverse inference from the refusal of prosecution witnesses to speak to defense counsel; (6) improper refusal to recall a prosecution witness following the completion of testimony and the beginning of jury deliberations; (7) insufficient investigation into purported juror misconduct; (8) procedural unreasonableness in Varsha and Mahender’s sentencing, consisting of multiple errors in the district court’s calculation of the applicable Guidelines range; (9) various errors in the calculation of the required amount of restitution; and (10) overbroad and unconstitutionally excessive property forfeiture. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that none of these challenges has merit, with the partial exception of the Sabhnanis’ challenge to the calculation of the restitution award. BACKGROUND Mahender Sabhnani, a naturalized citizen of the United States born in India, lived with his wife, Varsha Sabhnani, a naturalized United States citizen born in Indonesia, in a single-family home in Syosset, New York with their four children. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sabhnanis conspired to harbor in their Syosset home two aliens who were unlawfully in the United States — specifically, two domestic servants the couple brought from Indonesia. The jury further found that the Sabhnanis conspired to hold these two women in peonage, keeping their travel documents, and to have the aliens perform forced labor on the Sabhnanis’ behalf. The jury also convicted the Sabhnanis of substantive counts of harboring, peonage, forced labor, and document servitude based upon the evidence of them mistreatment of the two women, Samirah and Enung. The evidence at the Sabhnanis’ trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, demonstrated the following: In 2001 and 2002, Varsha’s mother, known as “Mrs. Joti,” arranged for Samirah, a 53-year old woman from Indonesia, to obtain an Indonesian passport and United States visa in order to travel to the United States to work in the Sabhnanis’ home. Samirah, a rice vender who spoke no English, did not know what a visa was. She did not know how to drive a ear or use an American telephone. Samirah agreed to work in the United States as a domestic servant for $200 per month. She traveled to the United States in February 2002 in the company of Mrs. Joti, who carried Samirah’s passport, and Varsha’s brother Naresh. Mahender and Varsha Sabhnani met them at John F. Kennedy International Airport and drove them to the couple’s home. Varsha Sabhnani took Samirah’s passport and other related documents and kept them until approximately April 2007, about one year after Samirah’s passport had expired. Mrs. Joti returned to her home in Indonesia shortly after delivering Samirah. Samirah worked as a domestic servant for Varsha and Mahender Sabhnani from February 2002 through May 2007, even though the visa that Mrs. Joti obtained for her authorized Samirah to enter the United States solely as Mrs. Joti’s employee and to work for her in this country only until May 2002. During her time with the Sabhnanis, Samirah was responsible for cooking, cleaning, laundry, and other chores at the couple’s large three-story residence, which included about seven bedrooms, seven baths, and separate offices from which Mahender Sabhnani operated PVM International and Eternal Love Par-fums, the two companies that together constituted his international perfume and toiletry business. Varsha told Samirah that her $200 per month salary was being paid to her daughter Lita in Indonesia. Lita was in fact paid only $100 per month. Samirah received no money herself. The circumstances of Samirah’s employment were more than severe. While at the Sabhnanis’ home, Samirah, who had slept in her own bed at home in Indonesia, was required to sleep first on the carpet outside the bedroom of one of the children and then on a mat on the floor of one of the residence’s kitchens. Samirah was not given adequate food to eat — to the point that she was often forced by hunger to eat from the garbage. She worked for extremely long hours per day and was often deprived of sleep. On one occasion in 2003, William Hespeler, an electrician performing work at the home, observed Samirah dressed in “raggedy clothes,” following Mahender Sabhnani as she carried a food and beverage tray. Tr. 3586. Her meager dress that day was not atypical. Indeed, beginning around March 2007, Varsha Sabhnani refused to provide Samirah with even the semblance of adequate clothing, requiring her to wear tattered sweat pants and a top made from old rags and the cut remnants of a dress. Various witnesses testified that Samirah wore “torn or tattered,” “messy” clothing, rags “used for cleaning the floor” and clothing that left her “private part ... visible.” Tr. 1786, 3834. Samirah was subjected to extremely harsh physical and psychological treatment in the Sabhnanis’ home. On one occasion sometime before 2005, for example, Samirah drank milk directly from a container, without using a glass; the incident was reported to Varsha Sabhnani by one of her daughters. Varsha responded by beating Samirah and pouring scalding hot water on her arm. At her mother’s instruction, one of Varsha’s daughters took a photograph of Samirah with the milk container. Varsha Sabhnani told Samirah that the photo would be sent to Samirah’s family in Indonesia to prove that Samirah was a thief. The photo, which Varsha thereafter kept in a locked cabinet in a closet adjoining the Sabhnanis’ bedroom, was introduced into evidence at the trial. It depicts the discoloration on Samirah’s arm from the scalding. The milk incident was not an isolated one. Samirah was beaten by Varsha Sabhnani with various household objects, such as a broom, an umbrella, and a rolling pin. She was punished for sleeping late, for not receiving permission to throw out the garbage, for stealing food from the trash, and for failing to clean the garage. Varsha threw boiling water on Samirah on at least three separate occasions. She also mutilated Samirah, pulling on Samirah’s ears until they bled, causing scabs and scars, and cutting Samirah with a knife, leaving scars on her face and various parts of her body. Wearing plastic supermarket bags on her hands, Varsha Sabhnani on more than one occasion pulled on Samirah’s ears and dug her fingernails into the flesh behind them, causing blood to trickle down Samirah’s neck. She punished Samirah for various alleged misdeeds by forcing her to eat large quantities of hot chili peppers until Samirah vomited or moved her bowels uncontrollably. Varsha forced Samirah to walk up and down flights of stairs many times in succession. Samirah was required to bathe several times in a row, sometimes with her clothes on, and was not infrequently made to work while wearing wet clothing. Varsha Sabhnani also cut Samirah’s hair with scissors and shaved her pubic hair, threatening Samirah that if she resisted her children in Indonesia would be murdered by Mahender Sabhnani and by the couple’s teenage son. Samirah “never fought back,” according to her own testimony, “because [Varsha Sabhnani] always said, mind you, if you fight me off, then you [will] be killed by the mister,” referring to Mahender Sabhnani. Tr. 1774. The abuse suffered by Samirah caused her to become so fearful that she would sometimes urinate on herself. On at least three occasions, Varsha Sabhnani forced Samirah to write letters to Samirah’s family in Indonesia that Varsha dictated and then took from Samirah and kept. These letters contained statements to the effect that Samirah was a “crazy person,” that she walked around naked, urinated and defecated on herself, and wished to die. Tr. 2360. They also contained a statement that, when translated, was interpreted to mean that Samirah purported to curse or cast a spell on her son, Erwin, who was deceased. Varsha threatened to send these letters to Samirah’s family in Indonesia, but she actually kept them in the same locked cabinet in the closet adjoining the Sabhnanis’ bedroom that contained Samirah’s photograph with the milk container, as well as her passport and related documents. Subject to this recurrent abuse, Samirah often asked to return to Indonesia or to be “give[n] ... away” to another person. Tr. 1881. When she did so, Varsha Sabhnani told her that she would have to pay money to make up for the expenses the Sabhnanis had incurred in bringing her to the United States. Varsha told Samirah that Samirah’s children would be killed if she escaped. Varsha also threatened Samirah that if she ran away, Varsha would falsely report to the police that Samirah had stolen food and jewelry and by this means have Samirah sent to prison. Most of Samirah’s day-to-day supervision came from Varsha Sabhnani, who ran the Sabhnanis’ household and also spoke Indonesian, Samirah’s native language. However, Samirah served not only Varsha, but also Mahender Sabhnani, who often scolded her and who at least on occasion directly required Samirah to undertake various jobs, including cleaning the bathroom in his office. Samirah testified that one of the Sabhnanis’ daughters “maybe ... [felt] pity” for her and intervened on her behalf one day after Samirah was hit with a telephone, telling her mother that she would watch Samirah eat a raw chili pepper but then helping Samirah to throw it away. Tr. 1821. Mahender Sabhnani, in contrast, reported on Samirah’s supposed misdeeds to his wife: Q. Did you sometimes get punished for things that you did that the Missus didn’t see you do? A. Yes. Yes. The Mister would report to the Missus that I slept in the bathroom upstairs and the Missus would immediately hit me. 25 Tr. 1848. Mahender informed Varsha Sabhnani on one occasion that he had seen Samirah eating food from the garbage and on at least one other that he had found Samirah sleeping in a bathroom. These incidents resulted in Varsha’s physically abusing the maid. Insofar as the record reveals, Mahender Sabhnani was not present on the occasions of Varsha Sabhnani’s most violent physical abuse. He was present, however, when Samirah was forced to wear dripping wet or grossly inadequate clothing that left her body exposed. He saw his wife tear paper on which she had forced Samirah to write into small pieces and then throw it on the floor, only to require Samirah to pick the pieces up, one by one. Moreover, various marks on Samirah’s body resulting from Varsha’s maltreatment, as well as Samirah’s swollen and mutilated face, were clearly visible to Mahender Sabhnani during the time Samirah lived in his home and served him. In late 2004 and early 2005, the Sabhnanis acquired the services of Enung, another woman from Indonesia. Forty-seven years old, Enung, who had completed only the first grade and who, like Samirah, spoke no English, was also recruited by Mrs. Joti. A sister of Varsha’s, Kareena Deepak Kirpalani, trained Enung at Kirpalani’s residence in Indonesia and, along with Mrs. Joti and Kirpalani’s husband, helped Enung acquire the necessary travel documents to come to the United States. Enung’s 1-94 Departure Form authorized only a brief stay of no more than six months. Nevertheless, Enung began work for the Sabhnanis immediately upon her arrival in the United States. She was met by Varsha and Mahender Sabhnani at the airport in January 2005. Varsha took Enung’s passport and related travel documents and kept them in the same locked cupboard in the closet adjacent to the Sabhnanis’ bedroom in which she also kept Samirah’s passport and related documents, the photo of Samirah with the milk container, and the letters Samirah was required to write. Enung’s passport remained there until discovered by law enforcement agents in May 2007, nearly two years after Enung was required to depart the country and two-and-one-half years after she began work for the Sabhnanis. Enung, like Samirah, testified that she was made to work lengthy hours — from about 4:00 or 5:00 A.M. until late at night, seven days a week — and that she was generally denied food, sleep, and even medical care when sick or injured. Both Samirah and Enung testified to numerous occasions on which they were driven by hunger to eat food from the trash. Enung was also a witness to Samirah’s maltreatment at Varsha Sabhnani’s hands — maltreatment that appears to have worsened during the period after Enung’s arrival. Enung observed Varsha hit Samirah with various household implements, pull on Samirah’s ears, and throw hot water on her. She, like Samirah, testified that Samirah was required to wear eyeglasses with tape and plastic obscuring the lenses. Enung was present on many occasions when Varsha Sabhnani forced Samirah to eat whole raw chili peppers or chili powder mixed with salt, often until Samirah became violently ill. On one occasion Samirah refused to eat chili peppers. Varsha Sabhnani first threatened to have her drink cleaning fluid and then required her to take off her clothes and stand naked while Enung put tape on Samirah’s body and ripped it off, causing Samirah to scream in pain. Enung herself was not immune from these more atrocious forms of abuse. Varsha Sabhnani forced Enung to walk up and down stairs repeatedly as punishment for supposed misconduct. She required Enung to cut up her own clothing. On one occasion, after Enung was accused of stealing two pieces of chocolate, she was forced to stand in one place for approximately ten hours — from early in the morning until about 4:00 in the afternoon. Varsha and Mahender Sabhnani, as well as their son, laughed at her while she was being punished in this manner. On another occasion when Varsha Sabhnani was cooking, Enung handed her the wrong spice. Varsha hit Enung in the face with a metal spoon, causing Enung’s face to bleed and leaving a scar. Varsha also struck Enung with her fist and with a glass Pyrex cooking dish. The Sabhnanis left the country for about two months each summer. So far as the record shows, the maids did not leave the residence or otherwise attempt to escape during these periods. Varsha told Enung that if she ran away, the police would shoot her. She also threatened that if Enung left, Enung’s husband in Indonesia, who had received advance payment for Enung’s services, would be arrested. During at least one of these summer absences, the Sabhnanis’ large refrigerator was chained shut. The Sabhnanis on more than one occasion failed either to leave adequate food for the maids or to arrange for its provision. Samirah and Enung begged for food in these instances from both Deborah Litras, who worked for Mahender Sabhnani as the export manager of his businesses, and Anthony Pascarella, the Sabhnani’s gardener, both of whom had brief contact with the maids on a few occasions and both of whom testified at trial. In addition to providing the maids with food, Litras also mailed several letters on their behalf. After receiving the first of these letters, posted in July 2006, from the maids, Litras obliterated the return address on the envelope, concerned that if the letter was returned to the Sabhnanis, “that it might present a problem” for the maids, and she “really didn’t want them to be in any kind of trouble if this was something that they weren’t supposed to be doing.” Tr. 3855. After posting this first letter on their behalf, Litras thereafter saw the maids only rarely: “Then I didn’t see them ever, outside, by a shed, or else anything. I started noticing that I was never seeing them at all.” Tr. 3858. The letter posted in July 2006 was received by Samirah’s children in Indonesia and was introduced at trial. In it, Samirah inquired after her children and pleaded for their help: “[Y]ou must do the midnight prayers if you want your mother to live and be together with you again.” Tr.2055. She informed them that she was being tortured, not allowed to eat or sleep, that she was forced to take repeated baths, and that she was not permitted to wear adequate clothing in the cold. She stated, “I don’t have the strength to work here anymore.” Tr.2052. Samirah asked her children to pray for her return and also to seek out a witch doctor to cast a spell “so that the Missus would send me home and pay for it.” Tr.2055. She advised her daughter, Lita, to seek her return by contacting Varsha Sabhnanis’ relations, but not to disclose the true reason: Lita, don’t say that your mother told you of being tortured, denied food, deprived of sleep, told to take a bath 30 times, clothes are torn to shreds, not allowed to wear double clothing in the winter. Lita, just say this, the children are grown, and working. So it’s my turn to rest. Tr.2056. Samirah testified that she gave these instructions “[bjecause if the Missus found out” she was complaining to her children, she would “get beat up some more.” Tr.2062. Samirah and Enung approached Litras again in April 2007, some nine months after this letter was posted, when Litras was alone in Mahender Sabhnani’s office and the Sabhnanis were not at home. The maids were “disturbed and rushed,” “[u]p-set.” Tr. 3861. They came in together and threw raw chili peppers on the ground. Using gestures, they appeared to communicate that they were forced to eat them. Samirah, whose hair Litras described as “chopped up,” showed Litras a large gash behind Samirah’s right ear and a bruise below her left shoulder. Tr. 3863. According to Litras, “[t]he language barrier was very difficult,” but the maids appeared to act out a scenario in which one maid was hit with an object and then was made to hit the other. Tr. 3874. Both maids were crying. Samirah and Enung provided Litras with another letter, which she also posted, resolving to herself that she “had to try to find out what was happening here.” Tr. 3874. A few weeks later, on a morning on which Mahender Sabhnani was present in the office, Litras saw Samirah crouching at the office door that led down to the basement with blood dripping from her hairline. Litras gestured Samirah away so that Mahender Sabhnani would not see her. Finally, on the evening of May 12, 2007, Samirah, who had been beaten about the face by Varsha in the preceding days and who testified that she was fearful she would soon be killed, ran away from the Sabhnanis’ house carrying the expired Indonesian passport that Varsha had returned to her the previous month. Samirah entered a Dunkin’ Donuts store in Syosset early the next morning. The people inside the Dunkin’ Donuts were unable to communicate with Samirah because she did not speak English, but Samirah attempted to tell them of her plight. Witnesses testified that Samirah showed them the marks, bruises, cuts, and scars on her face and arms and made gestures as if she were pinching or slapping herself. A security videotape introduced at trial captured Samirah motioning towards her ears and pointing out her other injuries. The mother of the store manager, a certified nursing assistant, saw the wounds behind Samirah’s ears and the marks on her forearms and told her son to call the police. Samirah was taken to the Nassau University Medical Center, where her treating physician diagnosed “[mjultiple physical abuse.” Tr. 2874. Doctors and nurses treated her ear wounds, which were infected, and Samirah, through an interpreter, told her treating physician about the abuse she had suffered. Police officers recovered from Samirah her passport, as well as a plastic bag Samirah had taken with her when she fled the Sabhnani’s house, containing a piece of paper with Varsha’s name and address on it, a number of other papers, and a single chili pepper. Police took a number of photographs of Samirah’s injuries, including pictures of her ears, face, forearms, chest, neck, and back, which were admitted into evidence during the trial. In the course of the resulting investigation, agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) executed two search warrants at the Sabhnanis’ home. During the first search, Varsha and one of her daughters told Enung to run away and hide, and agents discovered her in a small closet underneath the basement stairs. Enung provided agents with a knife stained with Samirah’s blood and tissues; both of these Enung had secreted away on Samirah’s departure. Enung also showed agents a broom and rolling pin with which Varsha had beaten Samirah, and gestured to the agents that this was their use. Agents also found a blood stain on the door leading from the basement to Mahender Sabhnani’s office — the location at which Litras testified that she had observed Samirah crouching, with blood dripping from her hairline. DNA testing confirmed that the blood found on the door was Samirah’s. Agents also discovered that the Sabhnanis had placed dead bolt locks on the outside of both doors to the basement bathroom. This bathroom was used solely by Samirah and Enung. Samirah testified that at the time the locks were installed, Varsha told her that she intended to lock Samirah up in the bathroom because she was expecting a guest from the Indies and was embarrassed about having someone in her home “who [didn’t] look good.” Tr. 2272. Enung testified that Varsha threatened to lock Samirah in the bathroom with no food and to give both maids an “injection” there that would “dry up the blood” or make them “go crazy.” Tr. 3245. Enung testified that she was rendered so fearful by virtue of this threat that she couldn’t eat. The Sabhnanis were arrested on May 14, 2007 on charges of committing forced labor. In a superseding indictment filed September 18, 2007, the Sabhnanis were charged with the following crimes: (1) two counts of forced labor or attempted forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a) and 1594(a); (2) one count of conspiracy to commit forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1589(a); (3) two counts of harboring aliens or attempting to harbor aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (v)(II); (4) one count of conspiracy to harbor aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii) and (v)(I); (5) two counts of peonage or attempted peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a) and 1594(a); (6) one count of conspiracy to commit peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1581(a); (7) two counts of document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592 and 1594(a); and (8) one count of conspiracy to commit document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1592. A seven-week trial followed; the evidence at trial consisted of testimony from many witnesses, including Samirah, Enung, Hespeler, Litras, Pascarella, Samirah’s relatives from Indonesia, Samirah’s treating physician, and law enforcement agents, as well as physical evidence recovered from the house and numerous photographs. The defense case consisted primarily of the testimony of visitors to the residence who observed the maids and noted nothing unusual. During summation, counsel for both Yarsha and Mahender Sabhnani contended that Samirah’s and Enung’s testimony could not be believed, and that, despite her denials, there was reason to believe that the marks on Samirah’s body were the product of kerokan, an Indonesian folk remedy practiced by Enung that involved rubbing a hard object on the skin. Defense counsel suggested that Samirah was consumed with hatred of Varsha Sabhnani because she believed Varsha had cast a spell on her adult son, Erwin, who died in 2006, while Samirah was working for the Sabhnanis. Seeking financial reward, Enung supposedly manipulated Samirah’s mental state to the point that Samirah was willing to testify about abuses that never occurred, while Enung falsely corroborated her story. Following the trial, both Varsha and Mahender Sabhnani were convicted on all counts. DISCUSSION I. Pretrial Motions A. The Venue Motion Appellants contend that the district court improperly denied their motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 21(a) for a change of venue. We review the district court’s disposition of such a motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 967 (2d Cir. 1990). Rule 21(a) provides in relevant part that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court must transfer the proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 21(a). The defendant must show “a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial.” Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 966-67 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In assessing the motion, the district court may take into account, inter alia, the extent to which the government is responsible for generating the publicity, the extent to which the publicity focuses on the crime rather than on the individual defendants charged with it, and other factors reflecting on the likely effect of the publicity on the ability of potential jurors in the district to hear the evidence impartially.” Id. at 967. The Sabhnanis contend that the prosecution generated prejudicial pretrial publicity during bail hearings on May 15 and 17, 2007. In the course of the bail proceedings, the government 0 described the charged crimes as involving “incomprehensible brutality and violence and inhumanity.” The local news media printed and broadcast stories about the matter, several of which repeated the prosecution’s statement that this was a case of “modern day slavery.” The tabloid newspapers dubbed Varsha “Cruella,” after the Disney villain Cruella de Vil, and printed details of the methods that the Sabhnanis allegedly used to torture their victims. During the weeks following the bail hearings, in which there was a significant amount of litigation over the bail conditions, see United States v. Sabhnani, No. 07-CR-429, 2007 WL 2769487, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007) (order denying transfer motion), the media reported on various developments in the case, continually referring to it as the “Slave Case.” The coverage also repeatedly referenced the Sabhnanis’ wealth and the value and size of their home. We conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the Sabhnanis’ motion to transfer venue. First, we agree with the district court that the prosecution’s statements regarding the character of the crimes were proper in the context in which they were made: bail hearings in which the prosecutors were arguing that the Sabhnanis were a danger to the victims and their families, justifying an order of pretrial detention. The prosecution’s mention of the Sabhnanis’ wealth was likewise proper in the context of arguing that the Sabhnanis were a risk of flight due to their substantial means. While a district court may consider the government’s role in generating adverse publicity in deciding a motion for change of venue, legitimate advocacy at a court proceeding — even advocacy resulting in adverse pretrial publicity — does not constitute conduct for which the government is properly held responsible in a Rule 21(a) inquiry. Nor do we find any error in the district court’s determination that, in any event, the press coverage appears to have been driven at least as much by comments of the Sabhnanis’ counsel as by any prosecutor’s statement. See Sabhnani, 2007 WL 2769487, at *3 & nn. 4-6. Second, we similarly conclude that the pretrial publicity here was not so pervasive and prejudicial as to have created a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial could not be conducted. The bail hearings took place in mid-May, and voir dire in the case began in late October, five months later. This is a shorter amount of time than has been present in some cases in which we have noted that the effects of publicity had dissipated by the time the trial began. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 155 (2d Cir.2003). However, in Maldonado-Rivera, we affirmed the denial of a motion to transfer venue even though the district judge there found that the press coverage was “continuing and prominent.” Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 967 (describing district court’s finding of “slightly more than one article per week over a three-year period”). Moreover, the record here indicates, as the district court found, that most of the press coverage tracked the frequent court proceedings in this case. See, e.g., Varsha App. 10-11 (first appearance), 14-15, 22 (second bail hearing), 28-30 (indictment), 33-65 (litigation over bail conditions). Coverage of actual developments in a criminal case generally will not rise to the level of prejudicial publicity that will warrant a venue change. Most importantly, the cases involving claims that pretrial publicity was so inherently prejudicial that a fair trial in the district could not be had draw a clear distinction between mere exposure to pretrial publicity and actual prejudgment by the venire of the issues to be decided in the case. “We must distinguish between mere familiarity with petitioner or his past and an actual predisposition against him.... To ignore the real differences in the potential for prejudice would not advance the cause of fundamental fairness, but only make impossible the timely prosecution of persons who are well known in the community....” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 n. 4, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). It is true that the Supreme Court has in the past stated that publicity can so saturate a community (and be so highly prejudicial to the defendants) that courts should in such cases presume a fair trial was impossible. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724-26, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963) (defendant was filmed, possibly without his knowledge, confessing to details of crime, and film was shown repeatedly on television in relatively small community); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (“[Ajdverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.”) (describing the holding of Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). Cases presenting this scenario are very rare, however, and have been characterized by our sister circuits as “extreme situation[s],” United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1143 (11th Cir.2006) (en banc) (upholding rejection of motion to transfer venue of accused Cuban spies from Miami despite alleged pervasive prejudice against the Cuban government in the district), in which the “publicity in essence displaced the judicial process.” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1181 (10th Cir.1998). The Sabhnanis argue that we need not employ a presumption of prejudice here because there is actual evidence that the venire was biased. The record, however, does not establish that the venire had prejudged the Sabhnanis’ case, and nothing-argued to the district court or to this court suggests anything to the contrary. The Sabhnanis point to the voir dire and, in particular, to the responses to questioning by some potential jurors as evidence that these jurors, who were excused, had been biased against them by the media coverage. They also point to an e-mail sent to the court by an excused potential juror, who claimed that other members of the venire were “lying” and pretending to “live in a cave” in order to serve on the jury in the case. Varsha App. 129-30. We have noted, in the context of the appeal from a conviction involving crimes far more notorious than the ones in this case, that “the key to determining the appropriateness of a change of venue is a searching voir dire.” Yousef, 327 F.3d at 155. Here, as in Yousef, the Sabhnanis did not renew their motion to change the trial’s venue directly after the jury’s voir dire, nor do they object here to the voir dire’s sufficiency. Moreover, in seeking a new trial before the district court post-verdict, although Varsha did point to adverse publicity, she never contended that the voir dire itself was deficient in any respect. See id. (taking such silence as an “indication that counsel was satisfied that the voir dire resulted in a jury that had not been tainted by publicity”). The evidence the Sabhnanis point to establishes no more than that some members of the venire had been exposed to publicity, and that some may have been reluctant to admit it. We have rejected claims that the venire was not sufficiently impartial in cases in which the evidence that excused potential jurors had formed an opinion of the defendant’s guilt or innocence based on pretrial publicity was far more substantial. See, e.g., Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir.1995) (finding no manifest error in state court’s determination that jury was impartial when defendant argued that 83% of veniremen were excused because they had prejudged the case); see also United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 308-09 (4th Cir.2003) (affirming denial of motion to transfer venue in which majority of potential jurors had heard about the case and several stated that they had formed an opinion based on publicity). Here, neither the character of the publicity nor the extent to which potential jurors were either exposed to it or affected by it warrants the conclusion that a presumption or inference of generalized prejudice was appropriate in this case. We conclude that the district court’s denial of the motion for a change of venue was not an abuse of discretion. B. The Motion for a Psychiatric Examination Appellants next assert that the district court erred in denying their motion for a psychiatric examination of Samirah. The motion was based on: (1) the affidavit of Dr. Barent Walsh, a clinical social worker providing therapy to “self-injuring persons,” which stated, based on Dr. Walsh’s examination of photographs of Samirah’s injuries, that although he could not be certain since he had never seen her, the photographs showed injuries that could “be consistent with self-injury,” Varsha App. 251; (2) Samirah’s discharge papers from the Nassau University Medical Center, which noted that she was being referred to an “outpatient psychiatry clinic”; and (3) the affidavit of one of the appellants’ daughters which stated that she had frequently observed Samirah behaving in a “strange fashion” (for instance by urinating uncontrollably), and that she had heard Samirah state after the death of her son, Erwin, that she “deserve[d] to be punished.” Varsha App. 246^47. The Sabhnanis also relied on letters written by Samirah that contained what they argued to be further evidence of Samirah’s possible mental instability. Judge Platt denied the motion, which the defense renewed shortly prior to trial before Judge Spatt. At that time, the defense also relied on the deposition testimony of Samirah’s daughter Lita regarding information that Varsha Sabhnani had provided to her about Samirah’s behavior. Judge Spatt denied the renewed motion. “Ordering a witness to undergo a psychological examination is a drastic measure.” United States v. Russo, 442 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir.1971); see also United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 592 (8th Cir.2002). Given the “inherent problems in allowing psychiatric examination of a witness,” including “invasion of privacy, limiting availability of witnesses, [and] chilling testimony,” United States v. Gates, 10 F.3d 765, 766 (11th Cir.1993), a court should exercise its discretion to require such examinations only sparingly. Here, the Sabhnanis do not claim that Samirah was incompetent to testify, but only that the district court abused its discretion by failing to allow the defense to gather evidence of Samirah’s psychological state that could have been used to impeach her credibility. We conclude that this argument is without merit. In Russo, where we rejected the argument that a purported “pathological liar” should have been required to undergo an independent psychiatric exam, we noted that so long as “the jury from its observation has the opportunity to appraise the credibility of the witness in the light of the facts impugning his veracity, this constitutes the constitutional safeguard of a defendant’s rights.” 442 F.2d at 502. This precept is fully applicable here. The jury had a full opportunity in this case to assess Samirah’s credibility, and a psychiatric examination would not have added measurably to its ability to do so. Samirah testified for part or all of six days, and faced extensive cross-examination. The Sabhnanis argue that because Samirah’s testimony was given through an Indonesian interpreter the jury was unable to assess her tone of voice. Even assuming this to be case, however — a matter on which we express no opinion — the fact that Samirah’s testimony was conveyed to the jury through the medium of an interpreter did not measurably lessen the jury’s ability to assess other aspects of her testimony, such as the content of her statements, her body language, and her facial expressions. Cf Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1038 (9th Cir.2009) (testimony by deaf-mute through two separate sets of interpreters did not deprive defendant of opportunity to cross-examine witness; jury could assess credibility because witness testified under oath and jury could observe her demeanor). The Sabhnanis also point to Samirah’s testimony that Varsha Sabhnani put a spell on Samirah’s son Erwin as evidence of Samirah’s unstable mental condition. That the jury heard this testimony, however, only further undermines any claim that a psychiatric examination was needed to assist the jury in evaluating Samirah’s state of mind. We conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in determining that the evidence proffered by the appellants in support of their motion was insufficient to show the need for a psychiatric exam. Dr. Walsh’s affidavit, based only on a review of photographs, indicated merely that Samirah’s injuries might “be consistent with self-injury” — an assertion that fell well short of demonstrating any mental instability, much less mental instability warranting the conduct of a psychiatric examination. Cf. United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1984) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to hold a hearing to determine whether a witness with a history of mental illness was competent to testify). Similarly, Samirah’s letters, most of which Samirah testified Varsha dictated to her and forced her to write, did not demonstrate the need for investigation into Samirah’s mental state and, in any event, were themselves available for assessment by the jury. The hospital discharge papers noting Samirah’s referral to an outpatient psychiatric clinic do not explain the reason for the referral, but Dr. Attali testified that such a recommendation is routine for most recovering trauma victims. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to afford these notes much weight. Finally, neither the Sabhnani daughter’s affidavit attesting to Samirah’s “strange” behavior — much of it, according to Samirah’s later testimony, caused by the Sabhnanis’ mistreatment — nor the deposition testimony of Samirah’s daughter, which merely reported Varsha Sabhnani’s self-serving statements, established a compelling need for Samirah’s examination. The district court did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in determining that a psychiatric examination was not warranted. II. Mahender Sabhnani’s Jury Instruction and Sufficiency Challenges Mahender Sabhnani raises two claims of error with regard specifically to his convictions. First, he contends that the charge to the jury on aiding and abetting erroneously allowed the jury to convict him on an omissions theory of liability, rather than on any affirmative acts he might have taken to aid and abet his wife’s criminal conduct. This error, he contends, infected every count on which he was convicted and requires that all of his convictions be vacated. Second, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions on any of the twelve counts on which the jury convicted him. We disagree with both claims. A. Mahender Sabhnani’s Jury Instruction Challenge The government charged both defendants under the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, as well as under the specific substantive statutes at issue. Mahender Sabhnani asserts error in approximately forty words in Judge Spatt’s 792-word instruction on aiding and abetting. In particular, he contends that the district court’s instruction on willfulness permitted the jury to convict him for failing to act. Because none of the statutes pursuant to which he was charged predicates liability on a failure to act, he argues, and because no common law duty to act is at issue in this case, or was part of the jury charge, this instruction was erroneous, requiring his convictions to be vacated. For the following reasons, we disagree. A defendant challenging a jury instruction as erroneous must show “both error and ensuing prejudice,” United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 313-14 (2d Cir.2007), and we review the jury instructions “de novo ... viewing the charge as a whole,” United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 177 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2003)). “De novo review leads us to [find] error if we conclude that a charge either fails to adequately inform the jury of the law, or misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard.” Id. (quoting United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 535 (2d Cir.1997)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We emphatically do not review a jury charge “on the basis of excerpts taken out of context,” but in its entirety, see United States v. Mitchell, 328 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted), to determine whether considered as a whole, “the instructions adequately communicated the essential ideas to the jury.” United States v. Tran, 519 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 413-14 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (“[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.”). At the start, we find dubious the government’s claims that aiding and abetting liability may generally be predicated upon a failure to act unconnected to any legal duty to do so, that the statutes at issue created an affirmative duty to act, or that Mahender Sabhnani was properly found by the jury to have violated a common law duty that required him to act. It is a long-established principle that criminal law generally regulates action, rather than omission, and that “[f]or criminal liability to be based upon a failure to act it must first be found that there is a duty to act — a legal duty and not simply a moral duty.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2 (2d ed.2008). This general principle, that omissions may serve as the basis of criminal liability only if there is an affirmative duty to act, is equally applicable when the crime charged is aiding and abetting. See United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1990) (“To convict a defendant on a theory of aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the underlying crime was committed by a person other than the defendant and that the defendant acted, or failed to act in a way that the law required him to act, with the specific purpose of bringing about the underlying crime.”). Here, none of the statutes pursuant to which Mahender was convicted expressly impose an affirmative duty to take action, lest a crime be committed. And even assuming, arguendo, that Mahender Sabhnani owed a common law duty to the maids that was sufficiently well established in our legal tradition and practice that it constitutes part of the background common law against which these statutes should be interpreted, see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 135-36 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc), the jury here was not charged on the nature of this duty nor instructed as to the factors it should consider in determining whether the duty was discharged. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310-11 (D.C.Cir.1962) (reversing on plain error review where a jury was not instructed as to the nature of the common law duty that was the basis for omissions liability). We need not decide the question whether in the circumstances of this case Mahender Sabhnani could properly be convicted based upon an omission to act, however, because we reject his claim that the district court’s instruction on willfulness, considered in the context of the aiding and abetting instruction as a whole, rendered the instructions so confusing as to permit the jury to convict him on this basis. To be clear, the jury was instructed that participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally, or in the case of a failure to act, with specific intent to fail to do something the law requires. Drawn nearly verbatim from the model jury instruction in the leading treatise on the subject, see 1 Leonard Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions — Criminal, ¶ 11.01, at 11-4 (2008 ed.), this instruction was not inaccurate, however, but simply extraneous to this case — at least absent further instruction as to a legal theory that would support liability based on a failure to act. When a jury charge contains language that could potentially confuse the jury as to the applicable law, we look to see whether the charge as a whole adequately instructed the jury as to the applicable legal standard. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396. Here, the jury was never told that either Mahender or Varsha Sabhnani could be convicted of aiding and abetting based upon a failure to act. Indeed, immediately before the instruction on willfulness, the jury was informed that “[i]n order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate herself in some way with the crime and that she or he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed.” Tr. 5035 (emphasis added). Immediately after the challenged language, the jury was instructed that the “mere presence of a defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.” Tr. 5036. Cf. United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 134-35 (2d Cir.2008) (finding it “highly unlikely” that jury relied on erroneous sentence that was immediately preceded and followed by correct statements of the charge). An aider and abettor, the district court said, must “know that the crime is being committed and act in a way which is intended to bring about [its] success.” (emphasis added). The repeated emphasis in the instructions on the proposition that an aider and abettor must “seek by some act to make the crime succeed” was further stressed in the judge’s summary of the charge. The district court instructed the jury to ask itself three questions to determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of a crime: Did the defendant participate in the crime charged as something she or he wished to bring about? Did the defendant associate herself or himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully? Did the defendant seek by her or his actions to make the criminal venture succeed? Tr. 5036 (emphasis added). If the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did these things, the district court instructed, “then the defendant is an aider and abettor and therefore guilty of the offense.” But “if on the other hand your answers to any one of these series of questions ... is no,” Judge Spatt continued, “then the defendant is not an aider and abettor and you must find him or her not guilty as to aiding and abetting.” Tr. 5036-37. We conclude that the charge’s repeated, emphasis on the necessity of acting in order to aid and abet, coupled with the crystal clear summary, was sufficient to ameliorate any possible confusion that might conceivably have arisen from the willfulness instruction. See Brown v. Greene, 577 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir.2009) (collecting cases upholding jury charges containing language that might have created some confusion about the burden of proof, because the charges as a whole made clear that the cases were governed by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 941 (2d Cir.1993) (ambiguous summary of element did not warrant reversal where earlier discussion of element was clear). This was not a case in which the jury instructions were insufficiently detailed as to an essential element of the crime and were never clarified by other language, such that the jury could have convicted based on a legally erroneous theory. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 129-34 (2d Cir.2008) (instructions that failed to explain to jury that defendant needed to have intent to import particular controlled substance and that other substances referenced in the evidence were not controlled substances left open possibility for jury to convict on importation of other substances that were not illegal). Here, the instructions clarifled what was required to convict, and the judge’s three-question summary of the charge was perfectly clear, removing the possibility of any confusion on the jury’s part. Cf. United States v. Moran, 493 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2007) (while instructions might have had “minor ambiguity” after a “careful picking apart” of their wording, clear summarizing or overview paragraph that conveys basic point to jury can cure potential error). Mahender Sabhnani makes .two arguments in reply. First, he contends that Judge Spatt erroneously believed that he could be convicted for aiding and abetting based solely on his failures to act. To be sure, when counsel objected to the instruction on willfulness during the charging conference, Judge Spatt did overrule the objection, suggesting that the employer of a domestic servant does have an obligation to act when he allows “for five years ... beatings, deprivation, lack of food, sleeping on the floor, wearing tattered gowns, [and] hit[s] with a stick” to take place in his home. Tr. 4427. Notably, however, in denying Mahender’s Rule 29 motion, the judge noted that “there was sufficient evidence at the trial to prove that Mahender affirmatively acted with the specific intent to advance the crimes alleged in the indictment.” Even more importantly, the jury only heard the instructions, not Judge Spatt’s opinion at the charging conference, and our concern on appeal is the effect of jury instructions, not “the district court’s purpose in stating the jury instructions as it did.” Hassan, 578 F.3d at 132. Mahender points next to the government’s summation. In his sole reference to the necessary requirements for aiding and abetting, the government attorney stated without objection during the main summation that: You don’t have to have actually committed the crime to be an aider and abettor. All that needs to be established is that somebody else committed the crime, and that you knowingly and willfully associated yourself with that other person in some way to help with the crime. Help with the crime. And that can be done by actions, or it can be done by a failure to act. A failure to act with specific intent, to fail to do something the law requires. Tr. 4693. Mahender contends that these words created a “not insubstantial” risk that the willfulness instruction led the jurors to convict him on an invalid basis. Mahender’s Br. 29. Here, however, we have already determined that the jury instructions, read as a whole, clearly apprised the jury of what it was required to find in order to convict. We agree that a party’s summation can heighten the already present risk that an erroneous jury instruction may mislead the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 18-19 (2d Cir.2008). But that situation is not this case. The jury instructions, which we presume that jurors follow, see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 310 (2d Cir.2006), were clear that Mahender could not be convicted solely because he knew of Varsha’s crimes or acquiesced in her actions, without acting himself. And to the extent the prosecutor’s summation did misstate the applicable law, Mahender raised no objection below and does not press the issue here in those terms. Given our conclusion that the instructions as a whole adequately conveyed to the jury the law it was to apply, we need not and do not address Mahender’s argument that the error he alleges was sufficiently prejudicial to taint each of his convictions, including the four separate conspiracy convictions to which the challenged instructions did not apply. We conclude simply that the aiding and abetting instruction, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the necessary and applicable requirements for aiding and abetting, and that Mahender’s argument to the contrary is without merit. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Mahender also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for forced labor, peonage, document servitude, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir.2009). In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a defendant’s conviction, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 391 (2d Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will sustain the jury’s verdictfs] so long as any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mahender’s main contention on appeal is that the trial evidence was insufficient to show he had knowledge that Varsha was threatening or physically abusing the maids — and thus a fortiori that the evidence was inadequate to establish his intent to participate in the crimes of forced labor and peonage, whether as a principal, an aider and abettor, or a conspirator. Mahender does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude, but instead argues that because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his forced labor and peonage convictions, he cannot be guilty of these “derivative” offenses. For the following reasons, we disagree with these contentions. 1. Forced Labor and Peonage Convictions With regard to the forced labor charges, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 at the time of the Sabhnanis’ convictions prohibited “knowingly providing] or obtaining] the labor or services of a person by,” inter alia, “threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person,” “by means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor ... that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint,” or “by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(l)-(3) (2000). The jury convicted Mahender of obtaining the labor or services of Samirah and Enung both “through threats of serious harm or physical restraint against [them]” and “through a scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause [them] to believe that non-performance would result in serious harm.” Verdict Sheet 2-4. The peonage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a), prohibits “holding] or returning] any person to a condition of peonage....” To prove peonage, “the government must show that the defendant intentionally held a person against his or her will and coerced that person to work in order to satisfy a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal coercion, or (3) threats of legal coercion or physical force.” United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir.2009). At the start, the jury had a more than ample basis on which to conclude that Mahender knew of both the threatened and actual maltreatment of Samirah and Enung. “[Jjurors are entitled, and routinely encouraged, to rely on their common sense and experience in drawing inferences” of a defendant’s knowledge and his criminal intent. United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.2008). Here, Samirah and Enung lived and worked in Mahender’s home — a home from which he also operated his business — for five and two-and-a-half years, respectively. The jury was entitled to credit the maids’ testimony that during this time Mahender witnessed his wife humiliate them — when, for instance, Enung was required to stand in one place until she confessed to stealing chocolate and Samirah was forced to pick up one by one the tiny pieces of paper that Varsha Sabhnani had just thrown to the ground. There was substantial evidence, moreover, that Mahender observed Samirah eat from the trash an