Full opinion text
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. Separate opinion dissenting from Parts II.A.2 and II.G.4 filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. PER CURIAM: Table of Contents I. Background 875 II. Analysis ................................... 877 A. Statute of Limitations ................... 877 1. Relation Back Under the FCA........ 878 2. Claims Concerning Contracts 07 and 29 880 3. Claims Against BIE ................. 883 4. Remaining Claims................... 885 B. Preemption............................ 885 C. Personal Jurisdiction over HUK......... 886 D. Anderson’s Settlement..................888 E. BHIC Stipulation.......................888 F. Precluding BIE from Contesting Liability. 890 G. Evidentiary Issues..................... 891 1. BIE’s Guilty Plea.................... 891 2. Expert Testimony on Cartels ........ 893 3. Ruggieri’s Testimony...............................................896 4. Evidence of HII and HC’s Wealth....................................896 H. Sufficiency of the Evidence..............................................898 1. Overarching Conspiracy.............................................899 2. HUK’s Involvement in the Conspiracy ................................901 3. Damages..........................................................904 III. Conclusion................................................................907 In this False Claims Act case, the jury found five companies and one individual liable for rigging the bidding on three contracts in Egypt funded by the USAID. Trebling the jury’s award, the district court imposed over $90 million in damages. The defendants appeal, challenging several of the district court’s rulings, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence adduced against them. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude (1) that the plaintiffs’ claims on two of the contracts are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) that certain testimony and evidence introduced at trial unfairly prejudiced three defendants. In all other respects, we affirm. I. Background Following the 1978 Camp David Accords, the United States agreed to provide economic assistance to Egypt through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), including funding for improving sewer systems in Cairo and Alexandria. The sewer projects were divided into numerous construction contracts and put out for bidding by contractors prequalified by the USAID. In 1995, Richard Miller, then a Vice President of the J.A. Jones Construction Company (Jones), the 40% partner in a series of identical joint ventures that bid on three of the projects, filed a complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. Enacted during the Civil War, the FCA penalizes knowingly submitting or conspiring to submit false or fraudulent claims to the United States Government, § 3729(a)(1)(A), (C), and authorizes private enforcement through qui tarn actions, which give individuals knowing of fraud a monetary incentive to come forward, § 3730(b). In his complaint, Miller alleged that in the course of his employment, he discovered that the defendants, other contractors, and a variety of related corporate entities and individuals were all members of a conspiracy to rig the bidding on contracts in Egypt. This so-called Frankfurt Club would meet to discuss upcoming contract bids in Frankfurt, Germany, the home of the conspiracy’s leader, Jones’s parent corporation, Holzmann, A.G. Miller’s complaint focused on the bidding for one particular contract, Contract 20A, and named Holzmann, Jones, Harbert International, Inc. (HII)— Jones’s partner on the other side of the joint venture — and several related corporations as defendants. In accordance with the FCA, Miller filed his complaint in camera, and the district court placed it under seal. A qui tarn relator suing under the FCA brings his case “in the name of the Government,” § 3730(b)(1), and his initial complaint remains under seal for sixty days. Before the expiration of that period, the Government must (1) intervene and “proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by the Government,” § 3730(b)(4)(A); (2) “notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case [the relator has] the right to conduct the action,” § 3730(b)(4)(B); or (3) petition the court for an extension of the seal period by showing “good cause,” § 3730(b)(3). If the Government decides to intervene, it typically does so by filing an amended complaint. In this case, soon after Miller filed his complaint, the Government opened a criminal investigation into the alleged conspiracy and, fearing that active civil litigation would interfere with that investigation, filed successive motions to keep Miller’s complaint sealed. In the meantime, the Government prosecuted many of the participants in the Cairo and Alexandria bid-rigging arrangements, obtaining guilty pleas or convictions from at least five U.S. corporations or individuals. In February 2001, the Government allowed Miller’s complaint to be unsealed and filed its own Complaint in Intervention, taking over control of the case. The Government’s complaint adopted the claims that Miller had asserted on Contract 20A and added claims on two other contracts, Contracts 29 and 07, which it characterized as part of the same Frankfurt Club conspiracy. It charged all the defendants with substantive FCA violations for each of the three contracts and with participating in the overarching conspiracy. Miller later amended his complaint to do the same. In essence, Miller and the United States alleged that prior to each contract, some or all of the bidders prequalified by the USAID met in Frankfurt to discuss the bidding. At these meetings or thereafter, the bidders reached an agreement that all but one would either bid high or refrain from bidding, and the winning bidder would pay these cooperators a “loser’s fee.” Contract 20A, the first of the three contracts and the only one identified in Miller’s original complaint, covered installation of large-diameter, underground sewer pipe in densely populated Cairo neighborhoods. The plaintiffs alleged that the joint venture between HII and Jones (HarbertJones), one of three prequalified bidders, sought and received commitments from the other two companies to either overbid or not bid for the contract. Thanks to this agreement, Harbert-Jones ultimately won the contract for $115 million, subsequently paying the other two bidders $2.2 and $3 million for their cooperation. The plaintiffs further alleged that in order to hide $10 million in excess profits, the joint venture engaged in a sale/leaseback transaction with an affiliated corporation. Contract 29, the second contract, involved the construction of a wastewater treatment plant near Cairo. In this instance, Harbert-Jones allegedly met with the only other prequalified bidder and agreed to lose the bid in exchange for a $4 million loser’s fee. The third contract, Contract 07, covered the construction of sewers in Alexandria. Because this time Harberb-Jones was apparently unable to reach a bid-rigging agreement with all other qualified bidders, it entered into a bilateral agreement with one other bidder. Under that deal, the party that won the contract would compensate the other with a loser’s fee. Although the record is unclear on this point, the fee would have been either 1.5 million U.S. Dollars or 1.5 million German Deutschmarks. As relevant here, the Government’s Complaint in Intervention and Miller’s amended complaint named the following defendants: • Holzmann, see supra at 4; • Jones, see supra at 3; • HII, see supra at 4; • Harbert Corporation (HC), HII’s parent corporation; • Bilhar International Establishment (BIE), to which HII assigned the contracts in question after bidding was complete. (We hold, infra at 883, that the reference in the original complaint to Harbert International Establishment, Inc., was intended to refer to BIE); • Harbert Construction Services (U.K.), Ltd. (HUK), a corporation owned 49% by BIE and 51% by a private individual that provided various financial services in connection with the bidding; • Bill Harbert International Construction, Inc. (BHIC), a corporation which, though inactive at the time of bidding, subsequently took partial ownership of BIE and allegedly provided support for fraudulent billing on inflated invoices as the ill-gotten contracts were completed. • Bill Harbert, President of HII and a senior executive at other corporate defendants; and • Roy Anderson, Vice President of HII and President of BIE. Five years of pleadings, motions, and discovery followed Miller’s amended complaint and the Government’s Complaint in Intervention. After declaring bankruptcy and settling with the plaintiffs, Holzmann and Jones were each dismissed from the case. Trial began in March 2007, and following seven weeks of testimony, the jury found for the plaintiffs on every count. This included conspiracy by all defendants, as well as substantive violations by most defendants with respect to most of the contracts. (For some defendants’ involvement in some contracts, the district court held that it lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction. In addition, at the conclusion of testimony, the court found all claims against Bill Harbert were barred by the FCA’s statute of limitations.) The jury found that the United States suffered approximately $34 million in damages from the defendants’ conduct. As required by the FCA, the district court trebled these damages and added statutory penalties. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). After subtracting amounts previously recovered by the United States, it awarded $90.4 million in damages. The defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict on a variety of issues and sought a new trial on others. Rejecting the defendants’ legal arguments and finding the jury’s verdict amply supported by the evidence, the district court denied all of the defendants’ motions in a 125-page opinion. Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C.2008). This appeal followed. II. Analysis The defendants raise a number of issues. We first address two threshold issues— whether the statute of limitations bars any claims against the defendants and whether the Foreign Assistance Act preempts the False Claims Act. We next address personal jurisdiction over HUK, the contradiction at trial of a stipulation regarding BHIC’s existence, and the district court’s decision to preclude BIE from contesting liability. Finally, we address the defendants’ arguments concerning four evidentiary issues and the sufficiency of the evidence. A. Statute of Limitations As relevant here, the FCA precludes a civil action filed “more than 6 years after the date on which the violation ... is committed.” 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). The violations at issue here occurred in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Miller filed his initial complaint in 1995 alleging the defendants violated the FCA in their dealings associated with Contract 20A. The Government filed its Complaint in Intervention in 2001, adopting Miller’s claims concerning Contract 20A and adding its own claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29. In his Third Amended Complaint, filed in 2006, Miller too added claims concerning the latter contracts. The defendants argue the statute of limitations bars all the Government’s claims and bars Miller’s claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29 because the events giving rise to those claims occurred more than six years before the claims were brought. The Government and Miller argue the claims relate back to Miller’s initial complaint and therefore have the benefit of the earlier filing date. BIE argues separately the claims against it do not relate back because it was added as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run. The district court held the Government’s claims concerning Contracts 07, 20A, and 29, as well as Miller’s claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29, relate back to Miller’s initial complaint. See 563 F.Supp.2d at 139-42. We review de novo whether “claims are barred by the statute of limitations,” Jung v. Mundy, Holt & Manee, PC, 372 F.3d 429, 432 (D.C.Cir.2004), and hold the statute of limitations does not bar the Government’s claims concerning Contract 20A because they relate back to Miller’s timely filed complaint but does bar all claims, both the Government’s and Miller’s, concerning Contracts 07 and 29. The district court also rejected BIE’s separate argument, as do we, because BIE should have known within the required time it was an intended defendant. 1. Relation Back Under the FCA At the time of trial the FCA did not by its terms address relation back, but the district court held the FCA nonetheless implicitly permitted an otherwise untimely claim to relate back under what is now Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B). See 563 F.Supp.2d at 139^0 n. 137 (interpreting what was then Rule 15(c)(2)). In 2009, after trial but before this appeal was briefed, the Congress amended the FCA expressly to provide for relation back. The statute now reads: For statute of limitations purposes, any such Government pleading shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of the person who originally brought the action, to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint of that person. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). The statute as thus amended applies to this case on appeal. Although most of the 2009 amendments to the FCA apply only “to conduct on or after the date of enactment,” the provision permitting relation back was made expressly “applicable] to cases pending on the date of enactment.” Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub.L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(2), 123 Stat. 1617,1625 (emphasis added). The defendants’ arguments that the amended statute cannot constitutionally be applied to this case are unpersuasive. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution applies only to penal legislation. See Colder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 390-91, 1 L.Ed. 648, (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (citing Colder). The FCA is not penal. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100-03, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (overruling Court’s prior decision that a civil FCA proceeding could be criminal under the Double Jeopardy Clause). We need not address the arguments concerning the Takings and the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution because they were raised in only two conclusory sentences. See Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“Federal courts should not ... decide [a] constitutional question unless it is presented with the clarity needed for effective adjudication.”) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“A litigant does not properly raise an issue by addressing it in a cursory fashion with only bare-bones arguments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants argue the Congress did not intend that the amendment reach cases in which the Government had already intervened because it referred to “cases pending” rather than to “all pending cases.” In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), upon which the defendants rely, the Supreme Court discussed in a footnote the use and omission of “all” and “any” in statutory provisions. See id. at 328-29 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 2059. There the Court interpreted a retroactivity provision that on its face applied only to one of several chapters in the statute. See id. at 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (“Chapter 154 ... shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act”)); see also Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 356, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (explicating Lindh). Unlike the statute interpreted in Lindh, the clause in the FERA specifying the effective date of the provision concerning relation back is not limited in scope to a particular type of case or subset of cases. The defendants, citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carr v. United States, 560 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2229, — L.Ed.2d - (2010), would also have us infer, from a temporal sequence or choice of verb tense, that Congress intended to limit the effect of the statute to cases in which the Government has not yet intervened. We have no need to draw inferences, however, when the statute is clear on its face. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (“Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”) (internal quotation marks deleted). The amendment “applies to cases pending on the date of enactment.” Pub.L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(2), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625. Because this case was pending on the date of enactment, the amendment applies. Q.E.D. The defendants urge us to adopt an “equitable doctrine of relation back” and so not to allow the Government’s claims to relate back in this case because it delayed filing its own complaint and unsealing Miller’s complaint until several years after the statute of limitations had run. We reject this argument because the statute, as amended, permits both relation back and — if good cause be shown — maintaining the relator’s complaint under seal indefinitely beyond the sixty days. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3). Although the Government may take advantage of the relator’s filing date, the FCA still does limit the claims it may add. Under the new provision, the Government’s complaint can relate back to the original complaint only “to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint.” 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). The defendants do not argue the scope of the Government’s claims concerning Contract 20A impermissibly expands beyond that of Miller’s. Accordingly we hold the Government’s claims concerning Contract 20A are not barred by the statute of limitations because they relate back to Miller’s original timely complaint. 2. Claims Concerning Contracts 07 and 29 In contrast, the Government’s claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29 do not meet that standard because they have little to do with Miller’s claims concerning Contract 20A. As we noted in Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857 (D.C.Cir.2008), ordinarily “[t]he underlying question [in analyzing relation back] is whether the original complaint adequately notified the defendants of the basis for liability the plaintiffs would later advance in the amended complaint.” Id. at 866 (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1497 (“if the alteration of the original statement is so substantial that it cannot be said that defendant was given adequate notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence that forms the basis of the claim ... then the amendment will not relate back”)). This focus upon notice is in tension with the requirement that a complaint alleging a violation of the FCA be filed under seal and not served “on the defendant until the court so orders.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). We have not had occasion to address this tension before because in no prior case in this circuit had the Government kept the complaint under seal and refrained from serving it on the defendant until after the statute of limitations had run. The Second Circuit, however, considered this tension when it held the FCA, before it was amended, did not implicitly permit relation back: “The secrecy required by § 3730(b) is incompatible with Rule 15(c)(2) [now 15(c)(1)(B) ], because (as is well-settled) the touchstone for relation back pursuant to [that] Rule[ ] is notice.” United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 270 (2006). Under the statute as amended to allow relation back, the inquiry cannot be whether the defendant had actual notice of the claim before the statute of limitations had run because the FCA specifically requires that the complaint be filed under seal. The timely filed private party’s complaint, however, still limits the permissible scope of the Government’s later-filed complaint because, as mentioned above, the statute requires that in order to relate back a new claim must arise from the same conduct, transactions, or occurrences as did the timely complaint. Cases concerning relation back under Rule 15, despite their focus upon notice to the defendant, are useful in analyzing relation back under the FCA because the standards in the FCA and in Rule 15 are substantively identical. As we have seen, the FCA allows relation back only “to the extent that the claim of the Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint,” 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c); Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows relation back only to the extent the new pleading “asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — -in the original pleading.” Relation back generally is improper when the new pleading “asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth,” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005); “attempts to introduce a new legal theory based on facts different from those underlying the timely claims,” United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C.Cir.2002); or, although it “shares ‘some elements and some facts in common’ with the original claim ... its effect is ‘to fault [the defendants] for conduct different from that identified in the original complaint,’ ” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 674 (2009) (quoting Meijer, 533 F.3d at 866). Courts have refused to relate back “amendments alleging the separate publication of a libelous statement, the breach of an independent contract, the infringement of a different patent, or even a separate violation of the same statute.” 6A Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, § 1497 (footnotes deleted) (collecting cases). For example, in United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, 501 F.3d 493 (2007), the Sixth Circuit applied the relation back provisions of Rule 15 in a qui tarn case involving claims for reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid submitted under certain Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes used for billing medical services. The timely documents alleged improper billing under Code 94799 for services related to “emergency room” and “02 Equip./Daily” but the amended complaint also alleged “improperf] billing ... under that [same] code for a ‘call back’ charge for which no procedure is associated”; the court held the latter allegation did not relate back because the former allegation would not have “alert[ed]” the defendant that billing related to call backs was involved. Id. at 518-19. The timely documents also made “several allegations of improper billing under CPT code 99201,” including allegations concerning miscoding of supplies, but the amended complaint added allegations of improper billing “for cardiopulmonary resuscitation under [that] code”; again the court held the latter allegations did not relate back because the original documents would not have “alert[ed][the][d]efendants ... that cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedures were involved.” Id. at 513, 518-19. Although in each instance the allegations in the timely documents and in the amended complaint addressed improper billing under the same billing code, the court held the new allegations did not relate back because they did not “arise from the same conduct, transaction or occurrence” involved in the timely complaint. Id. at 519. In this case, all three contracts are similar only in that each was funded by the USAID and required work related to sewer systems in Egypt. The differences among them, however, are significant. Based upon the allegations in the complaint, the critical facts regarding each contract are the work to be performed, who was prequalified to participate in the bidding that was allegedly rigged, when the contract was awarded, who won the contract, and the amount of the winning bid. The following table summarizes these facts for each contract and thus shows the important differences. Winning Contract Awarded bid Project Prequalified Recipient 20A 1988 $114.9 million 19 km of underground sewer pipe in Cairo George A. Fuller Co., Fru-Con Construction Co., and Harbert-Jones 20A Joint Venture HarberWones 20A Joint Venture 29 1989 $114.9 million Wastewater treatment plant in Cairo At least Sadelmi U.S.A. and Harbert-Jones 29 Joint Venture Sadelmi U.S.A. 07 1990 $ 44.6 million Sewer in Alexandria Morrison-Knudsen, FruCo n, Maclean Grove, Tidewater, and Harbert-Jones 07 Joint Venture Harbert-Jones 07 Joint Venture As reflected in the table, each contract required work to be performed on a different project and was awarded in a different year to a different winning bidder drawn from a different pool of prequalified bidders. Allegations concerning Contract 20A do not fairly encompass Contracts 07 or 29 because each contract is unique and no two involved the same “conduct, transaction[ ], or occurrence[ ].” Miller and the Government argue the use of the plural in Miller’s complaint — • “conspired to rig the bidding for construction contracts paid for by the [USAID]” (emphasis added) — together with the allegation there was a “club [] organized to control prices” and the contention that “discovery in this case will reveal [ ] other AID contracts,” broadened the scope of the complaint beyond Contract 20A. As we held in Meijer, however, using the plural form does not cause new allegations to relate back when, as here, the new allegations do not involve “conduct, transactions, or occurrences” common to the timely pleading. See 533 F.3d at 866. As in Meijer, our decision here is impelled by more than the limited relevance of the plural form. Miller’s allegations concerning any contracts beyond 20A were nothing more than “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ ” viz., the existence of a price-fixing “club,” and that discovery would reveal other rigged contracts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)) (brackets in original). Allowing such broad and vague allegations to expand the range of permissible amendments after the limitation period has run would circumvent the statutory requirement in the FCA that the amendments “arise[ ] out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences” in the original complaint, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c); it would also, we note, circumvent the recent teachings of Iqbal and Twombly by allowing amendments to relate back to allegations that were themselves nothing more than “naked assertions.” That potential for abuse is avoided by the relation back provision in the FCA, the amendment of which postdates Twombly, cabining the scope of otherwise untimely amendments by imposing the same “conduct, transactions, or occurrences” requirement. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c). Turning to Miller’s claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29, we hold they are barred by the statute of limitations because he added them after the limitation period had run. Miller may not take advantage of the relation back provision in the FCA, which applies only to the Government’s pleadings. See id. If his claims are to relate back then they must do so under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), which permits relation back for claims “that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out ... in the original pleading.” We need not decide whether Rule 15(c)(1)(B) applies to claims made by a relator in litigation under the FCA because we have determined the claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29 do not meet that standard, which for our purposes is substantially the same as the standard in the amended FCA. 3. Claims Against BIE Prior to 2006 both Miller’s and the Government’s complaints named Harbert International Establishment, Inc. (HIE, Inc.) among the defendants; they did not name Bilhar International Establishment (BIE). In amended complaints filed in 2006, Miller and the Government replaced references to “Harbert International Establishment, Inc.” with references to “Bilhar International Establishment f/k/a Harbert International Establishment.” The statute of limitations bars all claims against BIE unless the amended complaints relate back to a timely complaint. The district court held the amended complaints relate back because BIE should have known it was the intended defendant. Miller v. Holzmann, 2007 WL 778599, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15598 (D.D.C. Mar.6, 2007). We agree with the district court. (a) History of the Companies A company called Harbert International Establishment was formed in Liechtenstein in 1975. At all relevant times Bill Harbert owned at least part of that company and at various times BHIC and HII owned the remainder. In September 1993 Harbert International Establishment changed its name to Bilhar International Establishment. The next month a new company was formed in Liechtenstein, also called Harbert International Establishment. It acquired many of the assets of BIE (formerly HIE), including both the name Harbert International Establishment and that company’s interest in Contract 20A. After transferring its assets to the new HIE, the old HIE (by then BIE) ceased operating. In 1999 Bill Harbert’s son formed Harbert International Establishment, Inc. in Alabama. (a) Analysis Rule 15(c)(1)(C), which for present purposes is substantively the same as the version of then-Rule 15(c)(3) applied by the district court, provides an amendment relates back when: the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted ... if, within the [120 days] provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Relation back under this provision “is most obviously appropriate in cases [such as this] where the plaintiff has sued a corporation but misnamed it.” Roberts v. Michaels, 219 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir.2000). BIE does not claim the misnaming prejudiced it and the plaintiffs do not dispute BIE’s defense that it did not actually know it was the intended defendant; the dispute between the parties is whether BIE should have known it was the intended defendant. The same attorney represented BIE, HIE, and HIE, Inc. That attorney acknowledges she knew the plaintiffs had erred in naming HIE, Inc., but as between her two other clients with similar names she “felt that it was likely that the Government had intended to sue Harbert International Establishment!,] ... not Bilhar International Establishment.” In determining what BIE, in the person of its attorney, knew or should have known, we consider the allegations in Miller’s Second Amended Complaint as follows: Allegation Comment (1) BHIC “controls and operates” the defendant. BHIC owned 79% of BIE but none of HIE. (2) The defendant is “a Liechtenstein corporation which, upon information and belief, has as its principal place of business Bh'mingham, Alabama.” This allegation does not advance the inquiry because both HIE and BIE were organized in Liechtenstein and neither has its principal place of business in Alabama. (3) The defendant “holds a 49 percent share” of HUE. This allegation applied, at one time or another, to both BIE and HIE. By the time the complaint was filed BIE had sold its 49% interest in HUE to HIE. (4) Bill Harbert was Chairman and Roy Anderson was President of the defendant. This allegation applied equally to BIE and to HIE. (5) “In 1991, as a consequence of a reorganization of the Harbert entities, Contract 20A was assigned to Harbert International Establishment, which is owned and controlled by [BHIC], and these companies began participating directly in the conspiracy.” The same paragraph describes HII as managing the 20A Joint Venture, suggesting the referenced assignment of Contract 20A came from HII. The paragraph better describes BIE. As stated above, BHIC owned the majority of BIE, not of HIE. The assignment of Contract 20A did not change in 1991. In 1989 HII assigned it to BIE, which was then known as HIE. In 1993, after the new company was created and named HIE, BIE reassigned Contract 20A to the new HIE. Of these five allegations, Nos. 2 and 4 are of no help in identifying the correct defendant because they favor neither HIE nor BIE. Of the three allegations that better describe one company than they do the other, only one more accurately applies to HIE: At the time of the complaint, HIE owned 49% of HUE. Allegations 1 and 5 indicate BIE was the intended defendant: BHIC, not HIE, owned the majority of BIE, and HII assigned part of its interest in Contract 20A to the company that, at the time, was named HIE and was owned primarily by BHIC. Thereafter the assignee participated in the conspiracy. This latter datum, which unlike the others reaches the intended defendant’s substantive involvement in the bid rigging, should have led counsel to the conclusion that BIE was the intended defendant. This discussion undoubtedly seems obscure to anyone unfamiliar with the various companies in the Harbert group of companies. When an attorney for several of these companies, however, receives a complaint she knows mistakenly names as the defendant one company in the group, and she represents two other companies in the group with names similar to that of the named defendant, it should be obvious that she needs to consider the history and corporate structure of both companies and to determine which company is the intended defendant. BIE argues the Government and Miller could have determined the correct name because the relevant parts of the structure of the Harbert complex were disclosed in certain financial documents of which they had copies. The appropriate inquiry under Rule 15, however, is what the intended defendant “should have known.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c)(l)(C)(ii). After this case had been submitted the Supreme Court clarified the issue in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2485, — L.Ed.2d-(2010). In Krupski the plaintiff sued Costa Cruise Lines N.V. instead of the related company Costa Crociere S.p.A. Although the plaintiff could have determined the correct identity of the intended defendant, the Court explained, Rule 15(c)(l)(C)(ii) asks what the prospective defendants knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what the plaintiff knew or should have known.... That a plaintiff knows of a party’s existence does not preclude her from making a mistake with respect to that party’s identity. Id. at ——•, slip op. at 8-9. BIE argues for the first time in a footnote in its brief on appeal that the 120-day period in Rule 4(m), referred to in Rule 15(c)(1)(C), started to run when the suit was filed in 1995 rather than when the complaint was unsealed in 2001. We do not ordinarily consider an argument made for the first time on appeal. In any event, as we stated in Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1999) (en banc), “[w]e need not consider cursory arguments made only in a footnote.” 4. Remaining Claims To summarize, the only claims left standing are Miller’s claims concerning Contract 20A, as originally pleaded and subsequently amended, and the Government’s claims concerning the same contract, which relate back to Miller’s claims for purposes of the statute of limitations. All the Government’s and Miller’s claims concerning Contracts 07 and 29 are time barred. B. Preemption BIE, HUE, and BHIC alone argue this ease should have been dismissed because the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq., preempts the False Claims Act. The district court rejected this argument in Miller v. Holzmann, 2007 WL 710134 at *11, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16105 at *35-36 (D.D.C. Mar.6, 2007). We address the question of preemption de novo, Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C.Cir.2002), and affirm. The FAA, which governs how the United States provides aid to foreign countries, includes its own false claim provision. That provision authorizes the President to bring a suit on behalf of the United States, but does not authorize a private party to bring a qui tam action. See 22 U.S.C. § 2399b(b). In contrast, the FCA allows a private party, in addition to the Attorney General, to bring a civil suit. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b). The defendants argue the qui tarn provision of the FCA conflicts with the lack of such a provision in the FAA because “a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts more general remedies.” Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). They assert “[a]llowing a qui tarn relator the right to file an action against foreign aid contractors ... would effectively nullify the FAA’s more restrictive [remedial] provision.” With this argument they suggest that, for fraud involving foreign aid, the false claim provision in the FAA, enacted in 1968, implicitly displaced the qui tarn provision in the FCA, which has been around in some form since 1863. See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. at 698, Rev. Stat. § 3491. “[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). The FCA and the FAA are surely capable of co-existence. In a case involving foreign aid, such as this one, the Government could bring suit under either the FCA or the FAA. Indeed, the FCA expressly contemplates the possibility the Government will have a choice of remedy. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (“the Government may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available to the Government”). A choice does not create a conflict, let alone an “irreconcilable conflict.” See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 118, 122, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (“overlapping statutes” with “partial redundancy” “fully capable of coexisting”); cf. EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 435, 127 S.Ct. 1763, 167 L.Ed.2d 729 (2007) (nine-month limitations period for a claim under specific statute conflicts with four-year period provided by a more general statute). Finally, the Government need not face the prospect posed by the defendants of a private plaintiff in a qui tarn case somehow interfering in a case brought by the Government under the FAA. The FCA requires the private plaintiff to present his claim to the Government before it is served on the defendant. The Government may “proceed with the action, ... dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of [the relator], ... settle the action ... notwithstanding the objections of [the relator],” or keep the complaint under seal during an investigation. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b), (c). Indeed, the FCA specifically authorizes the Government to restrict the relator’s involvement, such as by limiting his discovery, if his involvement otherwise “would interfere with the Government’s investigation or [with] a prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts.” § 3730(c)(4). In sum, although the false claims provisions of the FAA and the FCA do overlap, the two statutes are fully capable of coexisting. Therefore, the FAA does not preempt the FCA. C. Personal Jurisdiction over HUK HUK challenges the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over it. Miller v. Holzmann, 2007 WL 778568, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15599 (D.D.C. Mar.6, 2007); United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 501 F.Supp.2d 51, 53 & n. 3 (D.D.C.2007). Reviewing the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction de novo, McAninch v. Wintermute, 491 F.3d 759, 765 (8th Cir.2007); see also FC Inv. Group LG v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C.Cir.2008) (reviewing dismissal), we hold HUK had sufficient contacts with the United States to subject the company to the jurisdiction of its courts. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant not present within the forum if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [that forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotation marks deleted). The exercise of personal jurisdiction “must have a basis in some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Personal jurisdiction is proper where the defendant has “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). HUK argues against personal jurisdiction based upon our decision in Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (1999). There we held the Government of “Qatar lacks the minimum contacts with the United States that would make it amenable to suit here” even though it had “entered into a contract with a company based in the United States.” Id. at 127-28. The contract had been “offered, accepted, and performed in Qatar.” Id. at 128. In addition, the “contract was made subject to the laws of Qatar, payment was made in Qatari riyals to Creighton’s bank account in Qatar, and the alleged breach occurred in Qatar.” Id. HUK’s contacts with the United States were a good deal more substantial than those of Qatar. At all relevant times HUK was, not surprisingly, based in the United Kingdom. It had no office, bank account, real property, or employees in the United States. It was not a party to Contract 20A, nor was it a member of the joint venture that bid for that contract. On the other hand, HUK was intimately involved with the Harbert-Jones Joint Venture bid for Contract 20A. From 1985 to 1988, fully 50% of HUK’s work was on the preparation of the bid for Contract 20A and one of its employees signed the tender. HUK knew that the United States Government was funding the contract and that all payments to HUK for work done in connection with the contract were funded by payments from the United States Government via bank accounts in the United States belonging to one of the other Harbert companies. In addition, the district court found, and HUK does not dispute, the following facts: HUK “was created by American citizens, acting as agents for ... American corporations, for the specific purpose of providing services to companies that were bidding on projects that were going to be funded by agencies of the United States.” Miller v. Holzmann, 2007 WL 39371 at *7-8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 501, *25-26 (D.D.C. Jan.8, 2007). Considering these facts, we conclude “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (personal jurisdiction over Texas company proper in California court “based on a contract which had substantial connection with” that state). Accordingly, we hold HUK’s contacts with the United States were sufficient to give the district court personal jurisdiction over it. D. Anderson’s Settlement For a time Anderson and the Government tried to settle the Government’s case against him. He argues they reached an agreement and have an enforceable settlement; the Government argues the settlement was never made final and should not be enforced. The district court dismissed “all of the relator’s claims on all contracts against defendant Anderson, and all of the Government’s claims but one claim on contract 29 against defendant Anderson ... as untimely under the FCA’s statute of limitations.” United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 505 F.Supp.2d 1, 19 (D.D.C.2007). At trial Anderson was found liable for $149,615.20 on that one claim. 501 F.Supp.2d 51, 58 (D.D.C.2007). Anderson joined the other defendants’ argument that the statute of limitations bars all claims concerning Contract 29. Having agreed with the defendants on that point, we have no need to reach Anderson’s alternative argument that the Government and he entered into a final and binding settlement agreement. E. BHIC Stipulation Prior to trial, the parties jointly stipulated that BHIC “did not exist at the time Contracts 20A, 29, [or] 07 were bid or entered into.” This stipulation simplified the more complex, but mostly irrelevant, circumstances surrounding the formation of BHIC. In 1986, an entity named BLH Enterprises, Inc. was formed but had no employees or operations for six years. In December 1991, BLH changed its name to Bill Harbert International Construction, Inc. Then, in 1992, more than a year after Harbert-Jones entered into the last contract, BHIC acquired employees and began operations. At that point, BHIC also became the majority owner of BIE and provided support services such as administrative accounting to that company. During trial, the Government introduced evidence that the defendants argue contradicted the joint stipulation of fact that BHIC did not exist at the time companies were bidding on and entering into the relevant contracts. The evidence introduced was a document submitted by BHIC in 1992 for prequalification to bid on another contract not at issue in this case. That document included the information about BLH’s formation and its subsequent name change, indicating that BHIC had, in fact, existed when Harbert-Jones and other companies bid on and entered into Contracts 20A, 29, and 07. The Government emphasized this contradiction with the joint stipulation, asking Alf Hill, the project manager for Contract 20A, to read aloud the part of the document explaining BHIC’s history. The Government then asked, “So according to this document which was submitted to the Government, BHIC existed since 1986, right?” The project manager replied, ‘Tes.” Over BHIC’s objection that the witness had not seen the document before and that the document had not been authenticated, the district court allowed the document to be submitted into evidence and refused to strike the testimony relating to BHIC’s date of incorporation. In closing arguments, the Government pointed back to that document, saying “Why are we suing BHIC? ... Take a look at that document.” The Government further clarified its point later in its closing argument, saying, “BHIC was in existence at the time Bill Harbert, Roy Anderson, and Tommy Kitchens were doing what they were doing rigging the bids, dealing with the profits on Contracts] 20A, 07 and 29.” After trial, BHIC argued in support of a new trial that this evidence was contrary to the stipulation, prejudicial, and undermined the credibility of BHIC counsel, who relied in opening statements on the joint stipulation. The district court denied BHIC’s motion for a new trial, and clarified its reasoning for allowing the Government to introduce the evidence that BHIC had incorporated in 1986: [PJlaintiffs did not stipulate that neither BHIC nor any predecessor company existed ‘at the time Contracts 20A, 29, 07 were bid or entered into.’ Plaintiffs did not seek to disprove the stipulated fact that BHIC did not exist prior to 1992. Rather, they sought to prove that BHIC, by its own admission, is a direct outgrowth of any entity that did exist when the bid-rigging occurred. Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F.Supp.2d 54, 104 n. 61 (D.D.C.2008). Even if the stipulation is read so narrowly, the Government violated it. The Government elicited testimony and claimed in closing argument that BHIC itself existed since 1986, not that a BHIC predecessor existed since then. Not only that, but the evidence establishes BLH was not in fact a predecessor to BHIC, but actually the same company. The only difference was a change in name. The document introduced by the Government included the articles of incorporation for BLH and the amendment to those articles that change its name to BHIC. The evidence did not seek to prove BHIC was an “outgrowth” of another entity. It established that BHIC existed at the time of the contract bidding. Stipulations of fact bind the court and parties. Gander v. Livoti, 250 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir.2001); see also Verkouteren v. District of Columbia, 346 F.2d 842, 844 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1965). This is then-very purpose, their “vital feature.” 9 Wig-more, Evidence § 2590 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Once a stipulation of fact is made, “the one party need offer no evidence to prove it and the other is not allowed to disprove it.” Id. § 2588. When the Government claimed that BHIC existed since 1986, it directly contradicted the joint stipulation that BHIC did not exist until after the bidding for the three contracts. The contradictory statements constitute substantial prejudice to BHIC. In his opening argument, BHIC’s counsel emphasized the stipulated fact, saying, “[I]f you remember those key events, the last of those was in May 1991, more than a year before BHIC begins its operations in July of 1992. The plaintiffs do not and will not contest that BHIC did not even come into existence, it didn’t even exist at the time that Contracts 20A, 29 and 07 were bid and entered into.” We agree with BHIC that allowing the Government to contradict the stipulation called into question the credibility of BHIC’s counsel, severely impeding counsel’s ability to effectively advocate for his client. The district court recognized this problem, but stated that it had “confidence that after hearing testimony concerning the complex corporate restructuring from which most of these defendants emerged, the jury was able to appreciate the distinction between plaintiffs’ argument [that BLH ultimately became BHIC] and the stipulated fact.” 563 F.Supp.2d at 104 n. 61. But we do not immediately see what distinction separates the Government’s assertion that “BHIC existed since 1986,” and the stipulated fact that “BHIC did not exist at the time Contracts 20A, 29, 07 were bid or entered into.” We therefore cannot conclude that the jury made such a distinction. The district court abused its discretion when it allowed the Government to contradict the stipulation and thereby undermine BHIC’s defense. We remand for a new trial for BHIC. F. Precluding BIE from Contesting Liability The district court held that BIE was estopped from contesting liability under the FCA as to Contracts 20A and 29 because of its guilty plea in a separate criminal proceeding. United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 2007 WL 851857, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17667 (D.D.C. Mar.14, 2007). In February 2002, BIE pleaded guilty to an indictment charging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by its involvement in the bid-rigging conspiracy from 1988 to 1996. BIE contends that it was error to preclude it, based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from contesting liability under the FCA because a Sherman Act conspiracy does not require an overt act, while an FCA conspiracy does. Therefore, BIE argues, it might have been able to show that although it was guilty of a Sherman Act violation, it was not liable under the FCA. As BIE sees it, because collateral estoppel affects only issues that were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first action, Jack Faucett Assocs. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 118, 125 (D.C.Cir.1984), issues relating to the overt acts necessary for the FCA conspiracy were not precluded by the guilty plea in the Sherman Act prosecution, which did not require the proof of such acts. The district court disagreed, reasoning that the overt acts BIE admitted in its guilty plea and accompanying memorandum were essential to its Sherman Act plea because they supplied the factual basis for the plea. Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F.Supp.2d 54, 80-81 (D.D.C.2008). The district court reasoned that the preclusive effects of a guilty plea in a prior criminal proceeding extend not only to the essential elements of the crime charged, but also to the facts admitted in the accompanying Rule 11 proceeding. As the court explained, Rule 11 “mandates that before entering judgment on a guilty plea, a court must ‘mak[e] such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.’” Id. at 79 (quoting Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(f) (brackets in the district court opinion)). Thus, because the facts admitted in the Rule 11 proceeding are essential to the entry of judgment, it is consistent with the underpinnings of the collateral estoppel doctrine that a defendant should be precluded from relitigating those facts as well as those related to the essential elements of the crime. Therefore, the court concluded that having admitted liability with respect to Contracts 20A and 29 in the previous proceeding, BIE was properly precluded from contesting its liability for conspiracy with respect to those contracts. Id. at 81. We need not ultimately decide this issue. The district court relied not only on collateral estoppel, but also on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, which states that if a party successfully assumes a certain legal position in one proceeding, “he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position.” Id. at 81 n. 14 (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 15 S.Ct. 555, 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895)). As applied to BIE’s circumstances, the court found that BIE was advancing a position contrary to the one the criminal court relied on when it accepted BIE’s guilty plea, and that judicial estoppel was therefore appropriate. Id. Before this court, BIE has not asserted any error in this alternative reason for estopping BIE. Because BIE has forfeited the argument that the judicial estoppel was erroneous, we need go no further in our analysis. Even if we were to reject the district court’s reasoning on the collateral estoppel theory, we would nonetheless affirm its ruling precluding BIE from contesting liability. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir.1998) (“in situations in which there is one or more alternative holdings on an issue, ... failure to address one of the holdings results in a waiver of any claim of error with respect to the court’s decision on that issue”). G. Evidentiary Issues The defendants argue the district court committed reversible error in four evidentiary rulings: (1) admitting into evidence against all defendants BIE’s prior guilty plea; (2) allowing the Government to present expert testimony on the economics of generic cartels; (3) allowing Luigi Ruggieri, an officer of the company that received Contract 29, to testify about his subordinate’s meeting with Peter Schmidt, a Holzmann executive in Frankfurt; and (4) permitting the Government to question a witness about the wealth of HII, HC, and a related management company that was not a defendant in this case. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decisions to admit evidence. United States v. Watson, 409 F.3d 458, 462 (D.C.Cir.2005). However, to the extent the defendants argue the district court misinterpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence, we review those interpretations de novo. United States v. Geioin, 471 F.3d 197, 200 (D.C.Cir.2006). Applying those standards, we hold that the district court did not err in the first two decisions. We also hold that Ruggieri’s testimony was irrelevant to the remaining Contract 20A claims, and therefore that claim is moot. We do, however, hold that allowing the Government to elicit evidence of HII and HC’s wealth constituted an abuse of discretion. Therefore, claims against HII and HC must be remanded for new trial. 1. BIE’s Guilty Plea As explained above, see supra at 33, BIE pleaded guilty to violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by engaging in the bid-rigging conspiracy. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, BIE also submitted a memorandum describing the conspiracy and BIE’s role. This guilty plea and accompanying memorandum explained that BIE and others rigged bids by “submitting bids on USAID-funded Contracts 20A, 29 and 07” and “making payments to co-conspirators who agreed to not compete for USAIDfunded contracts 20A and 08 pursuant to the bid-rigging conspiracy.” PLEx. 562A, at Joint App’x PL Exs. 568-69 (Joint Rule 11 Memorandum, United States v. Bill Harbert Int’l, No. 01-00302, 2002 WL 34377422 (N.D.Ala. Feb. 4, 2002), as redacted). When the Government sought to introduce evidence of BIE’s guilty plea in the district court, the defendants argued that admitting the guilty plea and accompanying Rule 11 memorandum into evidence would improperly impute BIE’s involvement to the remaining defendants. The district court disagreed, concluding that the plea and accompanying memorandum were evidence of the factual admissions therein, and were therefore “relevant pieces of evidence that are admissible against all defendants.” United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., Civ. No. 95-1231, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (Mem. Op. & Order Den. Mot. to Sever). Of course, the plaintiffs would “still bear the burden of establishing a link between the ‘others’ who BIE allegedly conspired with, and specific defendants in this case.” Id. at 4 n. 3. The court therefore allowed the Government to use the plea in its opening statement and again at the end of its case-in-chief, when counsel read the text of the memorandum to the jury. The defendants contend that this use of BIE’s guilty plea should have been excluded as hearsay. They dispute the plaintiffs’ contention that it is admissible under the hearsay exception set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22). They further argue that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We disagree. Rule 803(22) permits a judge to admit “[ejvidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty ... to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused.” First, we note that the exception to Rule 803(22) — the clause beginning “but not including” — does not apply. Because this case is not a criminal prosecution, the rule does not preclude introduction of the plea documents as evidence of the judgment “against persons other than the accused” {i.e., the other defend