Full opinion text
Judge LIVINGSTON dissents in part in a separate opinion. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge: Ronell Wilson murdered two undercover police detectives who were posing as gun buyers. Wilson appeals from a judgment of conviction and a sentence of death entered on March 29, 2007, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.). Wilson appeals on twelve grounds (some with sub-parts), among them that: the evidence was insufficient to support a finding under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (“VICAR”) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, that Wilson acted to maintain or increase his position in a racketeering enterprise; and the district court abused its discretion in cutting off recross-examination that had bearing on whether Wilson shot in perceived self-defense because he thought his victims were about to rob him. We affirm as to those claims and therefore affirm the convictions. We likewise affirm the district court’s rejection of Wilson’s arguments that: voir dire was unfairly biased and constitutionally inadequate; testimony in the penalty phase exceeded what is permissible under the Constitution and the Federal Death Penalty Act, and required an additional corrective charge; and a fellow inmate was acting as a government agent in eliciting admissions from Wilson. However, we vacate the death sentences, and remand, because two arguments made to the jury by the prosecution — both bearing on the critical issues of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and future dangerousness — impaired Wilson’s constitutional rights. The government argued: [i] that Wilson put the government to its proof of guilt rather than plead guilty; and [ii] that Wilson’s allocution of remorse should be discredited because he failed to testify notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he path for that witness stand has never been blocked for Mr. Wilson.” As to the first argument, although a guilty plea may properly be considered to support a sentence mitigation for acceptance of responsibility, the Sixth Amendment is violated when failure to plead guilty is treated as an aggravating circumstance. As to the second, it is a fair argument for the prosecution to say that an allocution of remorse is unsworn and uncrossed, but the Fifth Amendment is violated when the defendant is denied a charge that limits the Fifth Amendment waiver to that which is said in the allocution and the jury is invited to consider more generally that the defendant declined to testify. These constitutional violations were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we vacate the death sentences and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND Wilson was convicted on five capital counts: two counts of murder in aid of racketeering under VICAR (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)), two counts of causing a death through the use of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 924(j)), and one count of carjacking with death resulting (18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)). He was also convicted on five non-capital counts. At a separate penalty phase, the same jury unanimously voted to sentence Wilson to death on all five capital counts. Eight of the convictions (including all five capital counts) stem from a March 10, 2003 robbery and murder of New York Police Department detectives James Nemorin and Rodney Andrews. The other two counts (a robbery conspiracy and the use of a firearm) stem from a May 2, 2002 aborted robbery. Wilson was arrested on March 12, 2003, two days after the murders. At trial, the defense contended that the triggerman was Jesse Jacobus, a fellow gang member who was with Wilson during the murders and who testified against him at trial; but Wilson does not appeal the jury’s finding that he, Wilson (and not Jacobus), fired the shots. The district court had jurisdiction to hear the case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a final order of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A The Stapleton Crew was a violent gang that operated in Staten Island from approximately 1999 until it was disbanded by the arrest of the principals following the murders committed by Wilson. The gang was involved in robberies and the sale of drugs. The core members of this gang were Michael Whitten, Paris Bullock, Omar Green, Hason Taylor, and Rashun Cann; associated gang members included Mitchell Diaz, Jacobus, and the appellant, Wilson. The Stapleton Crew collectively owned several guns that were available for the members’ use. One week before the murders, on March 3, 2003, Whitten and Green sold one of these guns, a .357 caliber revolver, for $780. The buyer in that transaction was actually Detective Nemorin working undercover. He made no arrest at that time because he wanted to further infiltrate the gun-sale operation and make additional arrests later. Accordingly, he arranged to purchase another of the Stapleton Crew’s guns the following week. B Detective Andrews volunteered to accompany Detective Nemorin as backup at the second transaction. They were accompanied at a distance by officers on foot and in nearby cars; one of the putative gun buyers wore a fake beeper that would broadcast audio to officers conducting surveillance. In advance of the March 10 meeting, members of the Stapleton Crew decided to rob the buyer .of the $1,200 price rather than deliver the gun. The discussion among Wilson, Diaz, Bullock, Whitten, and Green in Green’s apartment was as follows: Jacobus would assist Wilson; Wilson would be armed with one of the communal guns, which (Wilson was told) he might have to use; Green or Whitten raised the possibility that Detective Nemorin might be a police officer or a thief attempting to rob the Stapleton Crew; Wilson committed to go through with the robbery anyway if Green and Whitten wanted him to do so; Green and Whitten then approved of the planned robbery. On the night of March 10, 2003, Wilson and Jacobus got into the back seat of the undercovers’ car (Wilson sat behind the driver, Detective Nemorin). Wilson directed the driver to another neighborhood in Staten Island, where Wilson got out, met Diaz, and picked up the .44 caliber pistol ultimately used in the murders. Wilson and Diaz discussed what both recognized to be an undercover police presence in the area, although Diaz stated that he told Wilson he did not believe the police were deployed on their account. Wilson, now armed, rejoined the others in the car, and directed the driver to another neighborhood (where the planned robbery would take place). When they arrived, Wilson briefly stepped out of the car. When he got back in, Wilson shot Detective Andrews in the head. Wilson then pointed the gun at Detective Nemorin and said, “Where’s the shit at? Where’s the shit at? Where’s the money? Where’s the shit at?” Jacobus testified that Detective Nemorin “was pleading for his life” before Wilson shot him in the head. Wilson and Jacobus left the car with the victims’ bodies inside, walked quickly to the nearby apartment of Wilson’s stepfather, entered with Wilson’s key, and stashed the murder weapon in a closet. Wilson and Jacobus then returned to the car and pulled the bodies out to search them for money. Leaving the bodies in the street, they drove off in the bloodstained car. As they drove away from the crime scene, Jacobus asked Wilson why he shot the men; Wilson responded, “I don’t give a fuck about nobody.” Wilson and Jacobus parked the car near the Stapleton Projects and began to search it for money. Wilson found a gun under the front passenger seat and said, “[tjhey was going to get us before we got them.” Jacobus testified that Wilson had not previously suggested that the killings were preemptive. Wilson kept the gun he took from the car. As Wilson and Jacobus walked back to the projects, Wilson yelled something to a passing police car. The police car stopped and the officers got out; Wilson and Jacobus ran, and the officers pursued; Jacobus was arrested a short distance away. Wilson escaped into the Stapleton Projects, and went to Green’s apartment, where Green was with Diaz. Diaz testified that Wilson was asked what happened, and Wilson responded that he, Wilson, had “popped” the buyers. Diaz recalled that Wilson said other things as well, but in a ruling contested on this appeal, questioning of Diaz on that issue was terminated. Wilson left the apartment with Green and Diaz. Wilson was arrested two days later in Brooklyn. In his pocket the arresting officers found (among other things) rap lyrics he had written that arguably describe the murders. C In March 2003, Wilson was indicted in state court for first-degree murder, and the district attorney filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty. In June 2004, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the state’s death penalty statute violated the New York Constitution. The federal government then took up the prosecution. On November 17, 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Wilson, Bullock, Whitten, and two other members of the Stapleton Crew. Wilson’s four co-defendants each pled guilty to racketeering and narcotics charges, and have been imprisoned for a term of years. A notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed in federal court on August 2, 2005. In September 2006, the grand jury approved a superseding indictment that served as the trial indictment, charging Wilson on five capital counts (two charges of murder in aid of racketeering, two charges of firearm murders during a robbery, and one charge of carjacking murder) as well as five non-capital counts (three of which stem from the March 10, 2003 robbery and two from a previous aborted robbery). The government gave notice that it was seeking the death penalty on the basis of six aggravating factors. The two statutory aggravating factors were [i] that he committed the murders in the expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary value and [ii] that he intentionally killed more than one person in a single criminal episode. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8), (c)(16). The non-statutory aggravating factors were [iii] that the victims were law enforcement officers murdered during their official duties, [iv] that Wilson faced contemporaneous convictions for serious acts of violence, [v] that Wilson was a continuing danger to others, and [vi] that the victims’ deaths impacted survivors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). On appeal, Wilson argues that the victim impact evidence should have been limited to family, and that in any event he was prejudiced by the emotional content of the victim impact testimony. Approximately 600 potential jurors were assembled in September 2006 and filled out a questionnaire. Individual voir dire of approximately 260 potential jurors began in October 2006 and ended on November 16, 2006, during which time the parties submitted and objected to proposed written questions for the court to pose. After voir dire, the defense moved to discharge all twelve seated jurors; the motion was denied. On appeal, Wilson argues that the voir dire was biased to favor the prosecution and unconstitutionally omitted a critical inquiry — the willingness of the jury to consider childhood deprivation as a mitigator. At the guilt phase of trial, the government largely proved the case set out above in connection with the March 10, 2003 double homicide. Wilson argues on appeal that the trial evidence did not sufficiently prove that he killed for pecuniary gain or for position in the gang, an element of murder in aid of a racketeering activity. On December 20, 2006, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all ten counts against Wilson. D At the penalty phase of the trial the government relied on six aggravating factors to justify a sentence of death. The two factors expressly listed in the statute had been the subject of evidence in the guilt phase: killing for pecuniary gain and killing multiple people in a single incident. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8), (c)(16). Of the four non-statutory factors, two had been the subject of evidence in the guilt phase: killing law enforcement officers in the course of duty and contemporaneous convictions for serious acts of violence (the earlier aborted robbery). The government’s case at sentencing was therefore focused on two (non-statutory) aggravating factors: victim impact and future dangerousness. The government’s victim impact evidence consisted of: five witnesses who testified primarily about Detective Andrews (his widow, sister-in-law, son, cousin, and a friend in the police department); five witnesses who testified primarily about Detective Nemorin (his widow, mother-in-law, sister, former supervisor, and a friend in the police department); 41 photos of the detectives as they were in life; and an excerpt from a documentary film (sponsored by one of the police witnesses) in which Detective Nemorin discussed his job as an undercover police officer. Wilson objected to much of this evidence on a number of grounds. To show future dangerousness, the government adduced Wilson’s record of increasingly serious offenses, starting at age 11. The offenses included robberies and assaults. The victim of an assault committed when Wilson was 19 years old required 300 stitches. Between ages 15 and 17, Wilson was confined to a maximum security juvenile facility for robbery; at 17, he entered Rikers Island for one year. Wilson murdered Detective Andrews and Detective Nemorin when he was 20 years old. The prosecution also cited a long disciplinary record of prison offenses. Moreover, the prosecution established that Wilson was a member of the Bloods gang, stayed a member while in prison, and had (on at least two occasions) told fellow gang members to “pop off’ (i.e., attack the guards). To testify about the Bloods’ structure and organization, and how acts of violence move a member up within the gang hierarchy, the government put on a cooperating witness, Shabucalik Geralds, a former Bloods member who was still to some extent affiliated with the gang at the time he testified. Geralds, who encountered Wilson in prison while Wilson was detained following the murders, also testified to statements made by Wilson. The defense argues on appeal that Geralds’s testimony about the Bloods was unreliable opinion testimony lacking a foundation of personal knowledge and that Geralds was a government agent when he elicited information from Wilson. Wilson put on an expert witness to refute the idea that he would be a danger in prison. Donald Romine, a former Bureau of Prisons supervisor, testified that prisons have many effective controls in place to prevent violence, that Wilson’s prison disciplinary record was unremarkable, and that the Bloods gang does not present a particularly high risk within the federal prison population. On cross-examination, the prosecution elicited testimony from Romine about the internal workings of the Bloods, including that acts of violence could lead to promotion within their ranks. Wilson’s affirmative case in the sentencing phase focused on mitigating factors relating to his Dickensian upbringing. His father was largely absent; his mother was a drug addict; and he lived in poverty either with them or with other relatives. State child services intervened on several occasions. Wilson lived for a time with his grandmother in a three-bedroom apartment in the Stapleton Projects, along with twelve other people. When Wilson was six years old, he was hospitalized three times for psychiatric difficulties, including suicidal tendencies. Prior to his hospitalizations, child services had taken him away from his mother, and given him over to his aunt. Wilson exhibited both sadness and aggression at school. His IQ has been tested in the high 70s. The defense also called members of Wilson’s family to testify about his loving relationship with them, and how they would suffer if he is executed. The defense received permission for Wilson to read aloud an allocution of remorse, both to support the mitigating factors of remorse and acceptance of responsibility and to counter the prosecution’s aggravating factor of future dangerousness. The defense argues on appeal that the district court improperly limited the scope of Wilson’s allocution of remorse and that the court’s rulings and the prosecution’s improper arguments on summation ultimately caused the jury to hold against him his allocution of remorse, his exercise of the right to trial, and the fact that he did not testify. The jury unanimously voted to sentence Wilson to death on each of the five capital counts. The special verdict form reports unanimous findings beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution established the two statutory aggravating factors and each of the four non-statutory aggravating factors. Further, the jury unanimously found that 14 mitigation factors were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. No juror found that Wilson was remorseful or that he took responsibility for his actions. The district court entered judgment on March 29, 2007. Wilson appeals from that judgment. DISCUSSION Two grounds of appeal would impact Wilson’s convictions: whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding under the VICAR statute that Wilson committed the murders to maintain or increase his position in the gang (see Point I); and whether the district court abused its discretion in curtailing recross-examination that had bearing on whether Wilson shot the detectives out of perceived self-preservation (see Point II). We affirm as to these claims and, therefore, affirm the convictions. The remaining grounds of appeal challenge the sentence of death. These include whether the judge’s voir dire inquiries were improperly biased (see Point III); whether testimony in the penalty phase exceeded what is permissible under the Constitution and the Federal Death Penalty Act, and required a corrective charge (see Point IV); and whether a fellow inmate was acting as a government agent in eliciting admissions from Wilson (see Point V). We reject those challenges. However, we vacate the death sentences, and remand, on the grounds that two arguments made by the prosecution, both bearing on the critical issue of Wilson’s claimed remorse and acceptance of responsibility, violated Wilson’s constitutional rights (see Points VI and VII). These constitutional violations were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Point VIII), and so we vacate and remand. Wilson further appeals his sentence of death on additional grounds that we can reject without making new law (see Point IX). I Wilson contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding that he had acted with any of the motives required for conviction under the VICAR statute, and that his convictions on Counts One and Two of the indictment must therefore be vacated. The VICAR statute provides, in pertinent part: Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders ... any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States ... shall be punished— (1) ... by death or life imprisonment, or a fine under this title, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). The government undertook to show that Wilson acted for pecuniary gain and “for the purpose of ... maintaining or increasing position” within the Stapleton Crew. Id. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Wilson acted for status and position we need not consider pecuniary gain. To show that Wilson acted “for the purpose of ... maintaining or increasing position,” the prosecution must show [i] “that [Wilson] had a position in the enterprise,” and [ii] “that his general purpose” in murdering Detectives Nemorin and Andrews “was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise.” United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir.1992). “Maintaining or increasing position in the [racketeering] enterprise [need not have been] defendant’s sole or principal motive.” Id. “[T]he motive [element is] satisfied if the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.” Id.) see also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir.2001) (“[S]ection 1959 encompasses violent crimes intended to preserve the defendant’s position in the enterprise or to enhance his reputation and wealth within that enterprise.” (emphasis omitted)). There is evidence that Wilson murdered the two detectives in order to improve his position within the Stapleton Crew. Jacobus made the connection between violence by Crew members and status within the Crew. He testified that he himself committed crimes “to raise [his] status” within the group, that Wilson enjoyed “a certain status” due to his reputation for violence, and that violent acts, especially the murder of police officers, would enhance one’s “status” within the Stapleton Crew. That such conduct would enhance Wilson’s status is confirmed by evidence of the Crew’s violent character. The gang’s members regularly committed violent acts on behalf of the Crew with fellow members. Members were expected to adopt each other’s grievances, and to react with violence toward offending outsiders, including any member of the rival 456 gang. The Crew possessed firearms for use by its members. Photographs show members of the Staple-ton Crew brandishing firearms and displaying gang signs. Rap lyrics written by a member celebrate the Crew’s rivalry with the 456. Finally, as Diaz testified, Wilson went from the murders to the apartment of one of the Crew’s leaders, reported to those present that he had “popped” (i.e., shot) his victims, and produced Detective Nemorin’s pistol. In reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of evidentiary support, “the trial evidence is viewed most favorably for the Government” and “Dali reasonable inferences a jury may have drawn favoring the Government must be credited.” United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 206-07 (2d Cir.2008). We affirm “ ‘if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [the] crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 207 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We conclude without difficulty that there is sufficient evidence of Wilson’s “position in the enterprise.” Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381. It is a closer question whether Wilson’s “general purpose” in murdering Detectives Nemorin and Andrews was “to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise,” id., but we find sufficiency. First, Jacobus testified that violent acts by members of the Stapleton Crew enhance status within the group. This testimony was reinforced by evidence that the Crew encouraged and even glorified violence: Members regularly organized and committed violent crimes and retaliatory acts of violence; the Crew made available firearms for such purposes; photographs and rap lyrics reflect group pride in its violent character. Second, there is evidence that the murders were contemplated and implicitly authorized by the group’s leaders. Green directed Wilson to commit the robbery, and it was decided that Wilson would carry the firearm, which was provided by the Crew. At the planning meeting in Green’s apartment, which included the group’s leaders, it was acknowledged that Wilson “might have to use” the gun with which they were going to commit the robbery— i.e., that Wilson might have to “shoot” one or more of the victims, and that one or another of the victims “might be a cop or he may be trying to rob” Wilson or Jacobus. When Wilson was then “asked whether he wanted to go ahead with” the robbery, he deferred to Green and Whit-ten — two of the group’s leaders — and it was decided that the robbery would proceed notwithstanding the risks. Third, Wilson’s actions after the murders suggest that he was proud of the crimes and wanted others to be made aware of them. When asked immediately after the murders why he had killed the officers, Wilson responded with bravado, “I don’t give a fuck about nobody”; and when Wilson was returning to his apartment after the murders, he called out to a police car, “[W]hat, are you looking for more trouble?” Furthermore, Wilson reported back to one of the Crew’s leaders— Green — following the murders. Finally, given the modest expected yield from the robbery (the gun transaction totaled $1,200 ), the jury may rationally have concluded that Wilson had an additional, non-pecuniary motive for committing such a crime. Wilson argues that, in any event, maintenance or increment in gang “status” is not a purpose that falls within the category of qualifying statutory motives. The argument is premised on a distinction between “status,” which Jacobus testified would be increased by violence, and “position,” the word used in the VICAR statute. That distinction is not so clear as Wilson makes it out to be; in ordinary usage the words are synonyms, and in the dictionary they reference each other. One definition of “status” is “position or rank in relation to others.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 2230 (Philip B. Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 3d ed.1986) (1961). And “position” in turn, means “social or official rank or status.” Id. at 1769. “Position” should not be construed so narrowly as to distinguish it from “status.” It does not matter, for example, that the Stapleton Crew did not promote by grade in a ramified hierarchy. Wilson contends that, on this record, status was at most a secondary or incidental motive for his crimes, and that the evidence therefore does not sustain a conviction under the VICAR statute. See, e.g., United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 817-19 (2d Cir.1994) (insufficient evidence to sustain VICAR conviction because the only evidence of motive suggested defendant had acted for pecuniary gain); Unit ed States v. Jones, 291 F.Supp.2d 78, 87-89 (D.Conn.2003) (insufficient evidence to sustain conviction where there was little evidence that act was motivated by anything other than personal animus). Wilson argues that in fact the primary motive was self-defense. However, the only evidence bearing upon a self-defense theory is testimony by Jacobus that, when he and Wilson returned to the detectives’ car following the murders, Wilson found a gun under the driver’s seat, and said “[t]hey was going to get us before we got them.” This statement says nothing about Wilson’s belief or motivation at any point prior to the moment he found the gun, after the deed was already done. In any event, the evidence discussed supports a jury finding that incremental status was one of Wilson’s primary motives; that is enough. See United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131, 143-44 (2d Cir.2009) (“The government was not required to prove that [defendant’s] sole or principal motive was maintaining or increasing his position, so long as it proved that enhancement of status was among his purposes.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Finally, Wilson argues that there is no evidence the murders increased Wilson’s status in fact. This argument is foreclosed by Farmer, 583 F.3d at 142 (“[T]he question is not whether [defendant’s] position ... was advanced in fact by the murder he committed, but whether his purpose in committing the murder was to benefit his position.”). Accordingly, we hold that sufficient evidence supported Wilson’s convictions for murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959, Counts One and Two of the indictment. II Soon after the murders, Wilson returned to the Stapleton apartment of Green. According to the testimony of Diaz — who was in the apartment with Green-Wilson announced that he had “popped” the two victims. Green did not testify; but he was the subject of a Brady letter, according to which Green “informed the government that Wilson actually said that he killed the victims because ‘they were going to rob us.’” See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Green’s § 3500 material indicated that Wilson also said the victims were pulling out their weapons. See United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3500 “codif[ies] the government’s disclosure obligations during criminal proceedings”). For the first time, on recross-examination, the defense asked Diaz if he had heard Wilson make the statements attributed to him in the Brady letter and other related statements. The court sustained the prosecution’s repeated objections that the questions were outside the scope of redirect. The relevant passage in the government’s direct-examination of Diaz is as follows: PROSECUTION: What did [Wilson] say? DIAZ: I don’t remember his exact words, but he said something to the [e]ffect that he popped him. PROSECUTION: The word “pop” you used, is that a word that the defendant used? DIAZ: Yes. Wilson concedes that “[d]efense counsel did not cross-examine Diaz about what Wilson said on his return to Green’s apartment.” On this topic, cross-examination touched only on whether Diaz had a clear memory of Wilson’s declaration that he had “popped” the victims. On redirect, the government therefore rehabilitated Diaz’s memory of Wilson’s admission: PROSECUTION: When the defendant said “I popped them,” what did you understand him to mean? DIAZ: That he shot them. PROSECUTION: Shot who? DIAZ: The victims. PROSECUTION: Human beings? People? DIAZ: Yes. The government concluded Diaz’s redirect with the following line of questioning: PROSECUTION: Do you have any doubt, any doubt at all, that when you got back to Omar Green’s house, that [Wilson] came into the house and said I popped them? Do you have any doubt about that? DEFENSE: Objection to the leading form of the question, Your Honor. COURT: You may answer. PROSECUTION: Do you have any doubt about that, sir? DIAZ: No. On recross, defense counsel turned to Wilson’s admission that he had “popped” the victims: DEFENSE: [Wilson] said more than popped him, isn’t that correct? DIAZ: Yes. DEFENSE: He said something like they pulled out, did you hear that? PROSECUTION: Outside the scope, Your Honor. Objection. COURT: Sustained. DEFENSE: He said something like, they were trying to rob us? PROSECUTION: Objection. COURT: Sustained. DEFENSE: Do you remember hearing anything like that? PROSECUTION: Objection, Judge. Outside the scope. COURT: Sustained. DEFENSE: There were more words than popped him, isn’t that correct, sir? PROSECUTION: Objection. The same objection. COURT: You may answer. DIAZ: Yes. DEFENSE: You don’t remember those other words, isn’t that correct, sir? PROSECUTION: Objection. That’s not what he said. COURT: Sustained. DEFENSE: While all this was going on, you were a nervous wreck, isn’t that correct, sir? DIAZ: Yes. DEFENSE: Thank you. Wilson contends that this curtailment of Diaz’s recross was error, that Diaz’s answers might have indicated that Wilson acted out of a perceived need for self-preservation, and that reasonable doubt thereby would have been raised regarding Wilson’s “pecuniary” and “position” motives for the murders. “Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.” Fed.R.Evid. 611(b). “The scope and extent of cross-examination are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision to restrict cross-examination will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir. 1993). In the exercise of discretion, a district court should consider the need to “ascertain!, the] truth,” “avoid needless consumption of time,” and “protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” Fed.R.Evid. 611(a); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (explaining that the district court has “wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on. cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, ... interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”). A good faith basis for proposed questions is relevant to these considerations. On the facts of this case, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district court’s control of Diaz’s recross-examination. The precluded questions were outside the scope of Diaz’s redirect-examination. As the transcript excerpts show, the defense effort on recross was to place Wilson’s admission in the context of other and additional statements, whereas the government had returned to the subject on redirect for the sole purpose of countering the defense’s attack on the clarity of Diaz’s memory concerning that one admission. Even though the precluded questions were outside the scope of redirect, the district court retained discretion to permit them. But Wilson failed to adduce his good faith basis for the precluded questions or explain the significance of Diaz’s potential answers, and did not request a sidebar conference to argue any basis upon which the district court should have permitted this line of questioning. See Jones v. Berry, 880 F.2d 670, 673 (2d Cir.1989) (“[A] party whose prospective questioning is threatened with curtailment should make all reasonable efforts to alert the court to the relevance and importance of the proposed questions.”). No doubt, there was a good faith basis for Wilson’s precluded questions; but the trial court was not made aware of it. The Brady disclosure (which, along with Green’s § 3500 material, furnished the good faith basis) was copied to and discussed with the district court on August 21, 2006. However, more than three months intervened before Diaz’s December 4, 2006 recross-examination. Green himself did not testify, and the district court had no occasion to review the Brady disclosure (or Green’s § 3500 material) in preparation for testimony by Diaz. There is no reason to believe that the good faith basis for the precluded questions would have been fresh in the district court’s mind, and there is no indication of any defense effort to refresh. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the district court would have understood the significance of Diaz’s potential answers. Defense counsel could have asked the precluded questions on Diaz’s cross-examination, and the judge could assume that the questions would have been asked then if they were of great import. Furthermore, the precluded questions represented a wholly new departure. Throughout the guilt phase, Wilson’s theory of the case was that Jacobus pulled the trigger, not Wilson, whereas the precluded questions were based on the idea that Wilson pulled the trigger, albeit out of a perceived need for self-preservation. Accordingly, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district court’s control of Diaz’s recross-examination, and we therefore find no error. As we find no error in the guilt phase, we affirm Wilson’s convictions. Ill The district court declined to include in its written jury questionnaire the following question, proposed by Wilson: If Ronell Wilson is found guilty of murder for the intentional killings of Detectives Nemorin and Andrews, without any legal excuse or justification, the defense might present evidence at a sentencing phase of the trial about Ronell Wilson’s childhood and background in support of a sentence other than the death penalty. How relevant is information like that to you when making a decision about punishment for murder? Wilson requested similar questions during oral voir dire, but the district court declined to pursue the subject uniformly, or at the level of particularity Wilson sought. (A counterpart to this issue is Wilson’s Eighth Amendment argument — rejected in the margin — that the prosecution’s penalty phase summations improperly urged the jury to give little or no weight to Wilson’s mitigation evidence.) Wilson assigns constitutional error to these refusals, argues in addition that the propounding of specific questions requested by the prosecution conferred unfair advantage in identifying prospective jurors, and requests that we vacate his death sentence and remand for resentencing. When a district court chooses to examine veniremen itself, it “may ask” questions submitted by counsel “if [the court] considers [the questions] proper.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(a)(2)(B). Refusal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d. 123, 128 (2d Cir.2002). That discretion, however, is subject to constitutional limits. United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1994). The trial court must ask a proposed voir dire question if refusal would “render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425-26, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 730 & n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Fundamental unfairness arises if voir dire is not “adequate ... to identify unqualified jurors.” Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222. In capital cases, a juror is constitutionally unqualified if he has “views on capital punishment” that would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Id. at 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (internal quotation marks omitted). That category includes “those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction.” Id. at 733-34, 112 S.Ct. 2222. Thus, in Morgan, sole reliance on general inquiries — as to willingness to “follow [the court’s] instructions on the law even though you may not agree” and ability to “be fair and impartial” — did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to identify and challenge for cause those jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty. Id. at 723-25, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Voir dire in this case proceeded in two stages. First, veniremen completed a 54-page questionnaire that included, inter alia, questions about background, relevant media exposure, opinions and biases, and ability to follow the law and discharge a juror’s duty. One question (proposed by the government) asked whether “the fact that the victims were killed while working undercover and posing as individuals engaging in illegal conduct [would] affect your ability to fairly and impartially evaluate the evidence in this case.” Another asked whether you hold any beliefs or opinions that would affect your ability to evaluate ... testimony [given pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the government] from ... witnesses [who have lengthy histories of narcotics trafficking and violent criminal conduct and have pled guilty to some of the most serious crimes in the indictment]. With respect to capital punishment, the questionnaire advised: Should a “penalty phase” be necessary, the question for the jury to decide is whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The jury makes this decision by weighing a variety of factors. The court proceeded to ask the following questions: Do you have any personal beliefs about what the law is or should be regarding the death penalty that would affect your ability to follow the Court’s legal instructions? Would knowing that the defendant faced the death penalty as a possible punishment make you reluctant to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of release even if you thought the circumstances of the case warranted a non-death sentence? Second, the district court orally examined prospective jurors in person. At the outset of oral voir dire, the district court read a statement to the venire: The indictment charges, among other things, that in March of 2003, the defendant murdered two undercover police officers, Detectives James Nemorin and Rodney Andrews, who were attempting to purchase firearms from Wilson and other members of the Stapleton Crew. The court emphasized, as it had in the jury questionnaire: Should a penalty phase be necessary, the question for the jury to decide is whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The jury makes this decision by weighing a variety of factors. Thereafter, the district court started questioning the individual veniremen, outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. Counsel was not permitted to ask questions, though both proffered inquiries for the court to make. With two exceptions, each member of the petit jury whose voir dire Wilson challenges was asked some variation of the following question concerning evidence of character and background: “[Wjould you be willing to consider evidence about the convicted individual’s character and background of this case and listen to argument from the defense that the death penalty should not be imposed in this case?” And each challenged member of the petit jury (with one exception) was asked some variation of the following life-qualifying question: “Would you be able to meaningfully consider life in prison instead of the death penalty as the correct punishment for someone who commits a murder?” What was done was constitutionally sufficient, and the district court’s refusal of Wilson’s proffered questions was not error. Each juror was informed that (in the event of conviction) the jury would determine the sentence based on various factors, and most of them were informed that those factors would include Wilson’s character and background. And each juror confirmed, by questionnaire and in person, that he could meaningfully consider life in prison as a possible sentence. Morgan requires nothing more. See 504 U.S. at 729-39, 112 S.Ct. 2222; see also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 878-79 (4th Cir.1996) (finding Morgan satisfied where district court asked questions sufficient to determine whether any venireman would automatically vote for death). “The district court was not required ... to allow inquiry into each juror’s views as to specific mitigating factors as long as the voir dire was adequate to detect those in the venire who would automatically vote for the death penalty.” United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1114 (10th Cir. 1996); see also id. at 1113-14. Wilson argues that there is a great disparity between the case-specific questioning allowed the prosecution and what Wilson was allowed. However, Morgan demands adequacy, not parity. It requires only that defendants be afforded an opportunity to identify constitutionally biased jurors. In any event, the record does not reflect the disparity Wilson alleges. He cites four alleged points of error: [i] the district court asked whether juror impartiality would be affected by the fact that the victims were undercover police officers posing as individuals engaged in illegal conduct; [ii] the court asked whether jurors held any beliefs or opinions affecting their ability to evaluate testimony from cooperating witnesses; [iii] the court informed the venire that the murders were multiple; and [iv] the court informed the venire that the victims were police officers. Wilson argues that the two questions afforded the prosecution more case-specific information than the defense was allowed, and that the reference to two victims, both police detectives, highlighted two of the expected aggravating factors, making each subsequent death-penalty question more particularized and thus more helpful to the government. Viewed in the context of a lengthy questionnaire and extensive oral examination, the two cited questions are hardly sufficient to render the voir dire meaningfully imbalanced, especially since the answers would have been helpful to the defense as well as the prosecution. As to disclosing that there were two victims, both of them police officers, those facts were also built into questions that the defense affirmatively sought, and cannot be deemed prejudicial. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Wilson’s proposed written and oral voir dire questions. IV During the penalty phase, one of the four aggravating factors that the prosecution undertook to prove was victim impact. The jury unanimously found that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “[djefendant Ronell Wilson caused loss, injury, and harm to the victims and the victims’ families.” To prove this aggravating factor, the prosecution called ten witnesses: seven family members of the murdered detectives (including in-laws); and three police officers who testified that the murders caused them anguish and had a profound influence on other officers who worked with Detectives Andrews and Nemorin, and who admired them personally and professionally. Wilson challenges the victim impact evidence on three grounds: [i] the testimony of non-family members (i.e., the three police officers) was outside the constitutional and statutory scope of admissible victim impact evidence in a capital case; [ii] the testimony in the aggregate was prejudicially emotional and the court failed to give proper jury instructions to counteract this; and [iii] the jury improperly inferred and took into account the witnesses’ views on sentencing. We hold that all of the testimony was correctly admitted and that the jury instructions were proper. A The Constitution. The Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence in a death penalty case. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Evidence concerning the personal characteristics of a victim and the effect of a murder on survivors “[i]s simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused” by the defendant’s crime in a capital case. Id. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (evidence of harm is “evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities”). At issue in Payne was testimony from a family member of the victims; but while the holding of Payne is therefore expressed in those terms, id. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, nothing in the Court’s reasoning suggests that the principle is so limited. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court states that a factfinder should be allowed to measure the “specific harm” the defendant caused by committing the murder, id. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, a phrase broad enough to embrace the loss felt by friends or co-workers who were close to the victim. The opinion refers repeatedly to the specific harm caused as encompassing loss felt by “community” or “society.” Id. at 822-28, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597; see also id. at 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We therefore hold that the Constitution allows evidence from non-family members about their own grief and about the loss felt by other non-family members. Other circuits are in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Bolden, 545 F.3d 609, 626 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 946 (10th Cir.2008); United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1098-99 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 712-14 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 478 (5th Cir.2002). The FDPA. Wilson also argues that the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq., limits victim impact evidence to impact on family members. The FDPA governs whether and under what circumstances a sentence of death may be imposed on a defendant, and includes the requirement that the government prove one or more specified aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). The government may also present additional, non-statutory aggravating factors in order to convince the jury that the defendant deserves a death sentence, so long as the government gives notice of which non-statutory factors are to be presented. Id. As the FDPA was enacted after Payne, Congress specifically indicated that victim impact evidence could be included as a non-statutory aggravating factor: The factors for which notice is provided under this subsection may include factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim’s family, and may include oral testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim’s family, and any other relevant information. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Wilson argues that this provision should be read to limit victim impact evidence to impact on the family alone. We read this passage as language of inclusion, not exclusion. It speaks to what “may [be] include[d].” Id.) see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (“The jury, or if there is no jury, the court, may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.”). The final phrase (“and any other relevant information”), though ambiguous, is read most naturally as a catch-all for what may be deemed “relevant” by the court. Wilson’s reading assumes that unless the victim has family, no one suffered loss other than the victim — so that a distant cousin may testify, but not a fiancé or a partner or a friend or a colleague. Other circuits allow testimony from friends (including friends who are co-workers) regarding the impact of a victim’s death, rejecting challenges similar to Wilson’s. Barrett, 496 F.3d at 1098 (allowing testimony from police colleagues of victim, and rejecting argument that Congress limited victim impact evidence in federal death penalty cases to evidence “concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim’s family” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Fields, 516 F.3d at 946 (allowing victim impact testimony from non-family members); Nelson, 347 F.3d at 712-13 (same); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 478 (same). Utilitarian Loss and Societal Harm. Wilson argues in the alternative that, even if non-family impacts are not excluded categorically, the Constitution and FDPA prohibit evidence of utilitarian losses to a workplace or evidence of the victims’ professional accomplishments. The police officers here testified for the most part that: [i] the victims had close relationships with their families; [ii] the victims continue to be mourned by members of the New York Police Department who worked with them, including the witnesses themselves; and [iii] the victims were exemplary, heroic policemen. Wilson argues only the first type of this testimony is admissible. We disagree. Wilson relies on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Fields, which distinguished between co-workers who were also friends with the victim (who could testify) and “coworkers per se” (who could not). 516 F.3d at 946-47. The court disapproved of coworker testimony focused on “impersonal utilitarian considerations” such as “the loss of [the victim’s] contribution to an office, unit, or team; the kind of loss that businesses insure with ‘key man’ policies.” Id. (holding nonetheless that the testimony at issue in the case came from a co-worker who was a friend and therefore was acceptable). Whether or not we are persuaded by Fields, the victims’ colleagues in this case testified to personal loss, even though it concerned in part loss experienced in a workplace that fosters intense loyalty and camaraderie. They did not adduce the “impersonal utilitarian considerations” that concerned the court in Fields and therefore the colleagues’ testimony was properly admitted. Wilson characterizes as utilitarian in character the testimony describing Detectives Andrews and Nemorin as heroic individuals who loved their work and inspired other policemen. Such testimony is permissible to show a “victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being.” See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Payne concurrence explains, the prosecution may, consistent with the Constitution, show “all that is special and unique about” the victim, including their “hopes, dreams, and fears.” Id. at 832, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O’Con-nor, J., concurring). To demonstrate that victims in capital cases were special and unique human beings, courts have allowed testimony concerning a victim’s professional life. See, e.g., Barrett, 496 F.3d at 1099 (allowing testimony about “the personal and professional characteristics of [the victim]”); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 479 (allowing testimony that the victims were religious youth ministers in part “[b]ecause religion played a vital role in [their] lives, [and so] it would be impossible to describe their uniqueness as individual human beings without reference to their faith” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Numerous witnesses ... testified about the professional and personal histories of victims who perished in the bombing, including reflections on the admirable qualities of the deceased.”). The police officers’ testimony that dealt with the victims’ outstanding careers, including the excerpted documentary videotape that showed Detective Nemorin discussing his job, was therefore properly admitted. Finally, Wilson contends that the testimony by the police officers went beyond evidence of the “specific harm” caused by the defendant, as allowed in Payne, and invoked a generalized community harm. See Fields, 516 F.3d at 947 (noting its concern with “replacing a close-in focus on persons closely or immediately connected to the victim with a wide view encompassing generalized notions- of social value and loss”). However, no prohibition on such evidence is generally recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir.1999) (allowing testimony about how much more difficult a prison was to administer after the murder of a guard); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 479 (allowing testimony related to the victim’s proselytizing due to its relevance to a “ ‘community’s loss at [the victims’] demise’ ” (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 821, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720)). In any event, once the testimony of the detectives’ heroism and professional accomplishments is properly characterized as evidence of their uniqueness as human beings, and therefore admissible, Wilson’s argument on generalized societal harm comes down to a single sentence: One police colleague testified that the murder of Detective Andrews “robbed the City of New York of another layer of security, and, more importantly, took away a father from his children.” In that sentence, harm to the City is expressly subordinated to the harm suffered by the victim’s children. Moreover, the reference to societal harm does not appear to go beyond the scope of what is deemed permissible; Payne references harm to society or community, but teaches that the Constitution allows only evidence that describes the “specific harm” caused by the crime. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, 823, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597; see also id. at 830, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The victim impact testimony given by the victims’ police colleagues was admitted without error. B Due process is violated when victim impact evidence is introduced that “is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Similarly, the FDPA requires remand if “the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2)(A). Wilson argues that his sentence was an arbitrary outcome resulting from unduly prejudicial victim impact testimony. Wilson concedes that he lodged no contemporaneous objection to the testimony. We thus review for plain error. See Puckett v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). We conclude there was no error in the admission of the testimony, or in the district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial. The family members of Detectives Andrews and Nemorin delivered emotionally charged testimony. The anguished testimony of Detective Nemorin’s widow described how her children visit the cemetery on Father’s Day and other occasions, write letters to their father, and embrace his headstone. Even such testimony does not appear to exceed (or approach) the margins of what has been allowed. It cannot be expected that victim impact testimony will be cool and dispassionate. Some deaths cause more suffering than others. The only way to ensure against victim impacts caused by one’s murder of a well-loved human being is to take care to murder no one at all. Courts are reluctant to conclude that the jury was unduly prejudiced by emotional testimony if the defendant presented mitigating factors that the jury found proven and if the trial court instructed the jury about not giving a verdict based on emotion. See McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1222; see also Nelson, 347 F.3d at 713 (discussing how the presentation of mitigators reduces risk of jury prejudice from victim impact evidence). We presume that juries follow instructions; and a jury diligent and dispassionate enough to find mitigating factors is unlikely to have been overmastered by emotion. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (juries are presumed to follow instructions). Wilson’s jury found 14 mitigating factors, one of them (peer pressure) a factor not even argued by the defense. We therefore go on to consider the instructions to the jury. Consistent with the statutory prohibition, the jury was charged not to rule on the basis of passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2). Before the final five victim impact witnesses testified, Wilson requested that the court instruct the jury not to be overpowered by emotion. The judge complied and told the jury that: You are about to hear more testimony about the impact of the murders on the victims’ family members and colleagues. The law permits you to hear this evidence. However, by its nature, it is highly emotional. I instruct you not to let this evidence overwhelm your ability to follow the law as I will instruct you before deliberations. You must decide the proper punishment without undue passion or prejudice. Before final deliberations, the court charged: In engaging in the weighing process, you must avoid any influence of passion, prejudice, or undue sympathy. Your deliberations should be based upon the evidence you have seen and heard and the law on which I have instructed you. Passion, prejudice, and arbitrary considerations have no role to play in your efforts to reach a just result in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2). These instructions were sound. We conclude that the testimony was not overly prejudicial and was admitted without error. C “[T]he admission of a victim’s family members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Wilson argues that the jurors were improperly influenced because they could infer that the victim impact witnesses wanted execution. However, no evidence as to the witnesses’ preferred sentence was actually admitted. Because there was no evidence to exclude, this claim necessarily fails. The victim impact evidence presented in this case was properly admitted, was not overly prejudicial, and was considered in the light of jury instructions that were properly framed. V Shabucalik Geralds, a gang associate of Wilson and a former member of the B