Full opinion text
OPINION HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge: Kenneth Jamal Lighty, James Everett Flood, III, and Lorenzo Anthony Wilson were charged in a five-count indictment by a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Maryland with kidnapping resulting in the death of Eric Hayes, and aiding and abetting the same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 2, conspiracy to kidnap, and aiding and abetting the same, id. §§ 1201(c) and 2, and three counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting the same, id. §§ 924(c) and 2. With respect to Lighty only, the government sought the death penalty on the kidnapping resulting in death count, pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), id. §§ 3591-3598. Because Wilson made statements implicating Lighty and Flood, Wilson’s case was severed and tried separately. Following a jury trial, the jury found Lighty and Flood guilty on all counts. In his separate jury trial, Wilson was found guilty of conspiracy to kidnap and not guilty on the remaining counts. Lighty’s case moved on to the sentencing phase, at the conclusion of which the jury imposed a death sentence on the kidnapping resulting in death count. Lighty received a concurrent life term on the conspiracy to kidnap count and a fifty-five year consecutive sentence on the remaining counts. Flood received a life sentence on the kidnapping resulting in death count and a sixty-five year consecutive sentence on the remaining counts. Wilson received a life sentence on his only count of conviction. Lighty, Flood, and Wilson filed timely notices of appeal, raising numerous assignments of error. While the appeals were pending, both Lighty and Wilson filed motions for new trial. Lighty also moved for a new sentencing hearing. As a result, we held all three appeals in abeyance pending a decision of the district court on the motions for new trial, and Lighty’s request for a new sentencing hearing. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motions for new trial and Lighty’s motion for a new sentencing hearing, and Lighty and Wilson filed timely notices of appeal concerning the denial of their respective motions. We heard argument in all three cases on May 13, 2010. On August 10, 2010, we consolidated Lighty’s and Flood’s cases for decision. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial not a perfect one. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (“[G]iven the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and ... the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.”). While the actions of the Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) handling Lighty and Flood’s joint trial unnecessarily introduced error into it, such error is not reversible, as both Lighty and Flood each received a fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm. I A Some time between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. on January 3, 2002, Eugene Scott (also known as ‘Yogi”) went to meet his girlfriend, Diamond Van, in front of Van’s grandmother’s apartment building, which was located near the intersection of Wheeler Road and Alabama Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. Scott parked his car across the street from the apartment building, but left the car running as he exited the car to meet Van. By the time he crossed the street, his car was stolen. At around the same time Scott’s car was stolen, Eric Hayes (also known as “Easy” or “E”) and his friend, Antoine Forrest, were about a block away from the scene of the theft, at Paul Hill’s apartment on Eighth Street, S.E., Washington D.C. According to Forrest, Hayes was wearing a green Eddie Bauer coat and Nike shoes with “swirls” on them, and Hayes also had a text pager. At about 6:45 p.m., Hill gave Hayes and Forrest ten dollars and asked them to purchase marijuana for him. As Hayes and Forrest were leaving, Washington, D.C. police officers arrived at the apartment “to serve a warrant or search something.” Hayes and Forrest were not detained and, once on Eighth Street, the pair approached “Fat Dog,” one of the many drug dealers that operated in the Eighth Street area. Fat Dog was not selling any marijuana at the time because of the presence of police officers on the street. As a result, the trio decided to enter a nearby apartment building (3210 Eighth Street) to observe the police officers from a third floor stairwell window. While sitting on the window sill, Forrest and Hayes observed a dark Lincoln Continental with tinted windows driving through and around an alley adjacent to the 3210 Eighth Street building. The car stopped in the alley, and the front passenger got out and approached the building. The front passenger yelled to the trio, asking them if they had any “water,” which Forrest understood to mean as a request for a cigarette soaked in PCP. After responding in the negative, the driver of the car got out, and the request for water was repeated. Hayes told the pair that they did not have any water, but had some “sacks,” ie., mint leaves soaked in PCP. The driver said he wanted a sack, so Hayes exited the building and walked with the front passenger and the driver towards the alley adjacent to the building. When Hayes did not return after a few minutes, Forrest left the 3210 Eighth Street building and approached the alley. Once there, Forrest observed the driver of the Lincoln Continental holding Hayes at gunpoint over the front hood of the car. At this point, the front passenger approached Forrest, brandishing a firearm. Forrest knocked the firearm out of the front passenger’s hand and fled to Hill’s apartment, where several of Hayes’ cousins were gathered. The group returned moments later, only to find that the Lincoln Continental and Hayes were gone. For about twenty to twenty-five minutes, Forrest drove “around Southeast” looking for the Lincoln Continental, but could not find it. Upon returning to Hall’s apartment, Forrest called the police. After reporting his car stolen, Scott went to the 2500 block of Keating Street, in the Hillcrest Heights area of Temple Hills, Maryland, to hang out on the street with some friends. Scott could not remember telling any of his friends on Keating Street that his car had been stolen. Scott observed an older model car speeding down the street. The car came to a “screechflng]” halt, and the doors of the car opened. At about the same time, Scott turned his back and started walking away from the car. Scott heard a voice (or voices) saying, “Yogi is this him?,” “[s]hut up,” and “[w]hat the F.” Scott did not respond, continued walking away, and entered Van’s car and drove off. At approximately 8:30 p.m. that evening, Michael Davis was at his house on the 12800 block of Hillcrest Parkway in Temple Hills, Maryland. A dog outside the house was barking uncontrollably, so Davis, who was upstairs packing for an upcoming vacation, looked out a second-story window to see what was going on. Davis saw an older model car stopped at the end of the street, next to undeveloped land owned by Prince George’s County. At the time, the presence of the car meant nothing to Davis, as it was not uncommon to see a car parked at the dead end. The dog continued to bark, however, which caused Davis to look out the window again. This time, Davis saw the front passenger and a rear passenger exit the car and proceed to forcibly pull a man, later identified as Hayes, out of the back passenger area of the car. Davis saw Hayes on his knees and heard him saying “no” or “don’t.” Davis then heard what sounded like two gunshots, which resulted in Hayes falling over. The front passenger and the rear passenger reentered through the passenger side of the car, and the car left the scene. Davis left his house, entered his car, and drove to the end of the road, where he found Hayes lying on the ground. At that time, he called 911. At 8:51 p.m., after receiving a call from the dispatcher, Officer Arvester Horner of the Prince George’s County Police Department (PGPD) drove to the 12800 block of Hillcrest Parkway, arriving there at 8:53 p.m. Hayes was pronounced dead on the scene. At the scene, a PGPD evidence technician recovered two .380 caliber shell casings, the first was found in the woods, the other under Hayes’ head. Between 8:43 p.m. and 9:03 p.m., Lorenzo Wilson (also known as “Baby Ann”) used the cell phone of James Flood (also known as “June,” “Junebug,” or “Bug”) at least seven times to communicate with his girlfriend, Krystal Phauls. Wilson instructed Phauls to meet him on Iverson Street in Hill-crest Heights, which is less than two miles from the 12800 block of Hillcrest Parkway. At the time of their first conversation, Phauls was traveling back to her house with her friend, Melissa Coles, in Coles’ car. After a few minutes at her house, Phauls and Coles drove in Phauls’ car to the 1900 block of Iverson Street. They arrived in the vicinity of 1902 Iverson Street around the time the last call at 9:03 p.m. was ending. Phauls and Coles observed Lighty, Flood, and Wilson walking away from a single-family home with a garage. The men entered the back seat of the car, with Wilson seated behind Phauls, Flood behind Coles, and Lighty in the middle. Lighty held a pair of Nike “[foam] posit[ ]” shoes with “squiggly lines” and was observed with blood on his T-shirt. While in the car, Lighty, Flood, and Wilson talked about having done “something to some boy,” which Coles interpreted to mean that the trio had done “something bad” to some boy, “like killed him, hurt him, something like that.” At Wilson’s direction, Phauls drove the three men to the 2500 block of Keating Street where, earlier in the evening, Scott had seen an older model car pull up. When Phauls stopped the car, the three men got out and checked the street for blood. Thereafter, Phauls dropped Lighty off at an apartment building in Hill-crest Heights and then returned to her home with Wilson and Coles. Upon arriving at Phauls’ house, Coles left. After Coles departed, Phauls and Wilson went inside the house. While inside, a text pager Wilson was carrying started to ring, “with [the message] ‘Easy’ going across it.” Around 11:00 p.m. that evening, Lighty called Ebony Miller, a female friend and sexual partner. During their conversation, Lighty told Miller “he had just slumped somebody,” meaning that “he [had] just killed somebody, shot somebody.” Lighty explained that he shot the person because he “tried to steal his man’s car.” Lighty told Miller he “got him[,] ... put him in the trunk[,]” and “took him around the way.” Near the conclusion of the conversation, Miller agreed to meet Lighty in an area behind Iverson Mall in Temple Hills. Miller arrived at the area near Iverson Mall, and Lighty entered her car. Lighty again told Miller that “he had just slumped somebody.” Lighty indicated that he got the person “off of Alabama Avenue[,] ... put him in the trunk[,] and ... took him around his friends.” Lighty said, when he pulled the person out of the trunk, the person kept saying “on my mother,” meaning that he was not the person responsible for the car theft. Lighty then directed Miller to drive to Keating Street, and, once at the 2500 block, he showed her blood stains on the street. Thereafter, Lighty directed Miller to drive to the 12800 block of Hillcrest Parkway. There were no police officers at the murder scene, just police tape, which led Lighty to comment to Miller “that [the police] work fast[,] ... they got him already.” The next morning, Miller saw a news report about the murder of a police officer’s son. Coincidentally, Miller knew Hayes, by his nicknames Easy or E, and she knew that Hayes frequently used the phrase “on my mother.” Later that morning, Miller spoke with Lighty by telephone. Miller asked Lighty whether he killed Hayes, to which Lighty responded, “[h]e shouldn’t have tried to steal his man’s car.” Sometime in January 2002, Lighty went to visit his friend, CW, who was recuperating at his mother’s house in Temple Hills. CW received a gunshot wound in his stomach while he was being robbed on December 24, 2001. While talking with CW, Lighty said that “he went down 8th Street [in the Lincoln Continental], kidnapped a dude or whatever, threw him in the trunk of the car and took him back on the Maryland side and shot him in the head.” Lighty added that he initially approached Hayes and asked Hayes to sell him some PCP. Lighty said that he did not kill Hayes on Eighth Street because police officers were nearby. Lighty indicated that he shot Hayes “once or twice” and that he took Hayes’ Eddie Bauer coat and Nike “[fjoam [p]osit[ ]” shoes off to make it appear that robbery was the motive for the killing. At the time of Hayes’ kidnapping and murder, Flood was dating Tynika Marshall, who lived in Hillcrest Heights. On the evening of Hayes’ kidnapping and murder, Marshall was driving to a laundromat when she observed Flood pull his Lincoln Continental up behind her car at an intersection approximately one block from Keating Street. According to Marshall, there “could have been one other person” in Flood’s car, but she did not “know who it was.” After seeing Flood, Marshall called him on his cell phone, but she could not recall the substance of their two-minute conversation. The call was placed at 8:12 p.m. Marshall also called Flood at approximately 9:18 p.m. and 9:22 p.m. During these conversations, Flood made arrangements for Marshall to pick him up near Keating Street. After Marshall picked up Flood, he directed Marshall to drive down Hillcrest Parkway, where they observed police officers at the murder scene. According to Marshall, sometime in February 2002, Flood asked her to help him take his Lincoln Continental to North Carolina. Flood directed Marshall to a house on Iverson Street, the same house identified by Phauls as the location from which Lighty, Wilson, and “Junebug” were walking on the night of the Hayes kidnapping and murder just before she picked them up. Flood retrieved the Lincoln Continental from the garage, and Marshall followed Flood to North Carolina, where Flood gave the Lincoln Continental to his parents. On January 30, 2002, less the one month after the Hayes kidnapping and murder, Lighty was involved in a drive-by shooting (the Afton Street Shooting) on Afton Street in Temple Hills, Maryland, which resulted in the death of Antoine Newbill. According to the account Lighty provided to CW, two days before the Afton Street Shooting, Lighty and Wilson went to Afton Street and confronted a man known as “Boo-Boo.” During the altercation, Lighty and Boo-Boo’s friends drew firearms. Wilson encouraged Lighty to leave the scene, and, as the pair did, Wilson told Lighty that they would “see them later on.” On the day of the shooting, Lighty drove Wilson and two other men to Afton Street in a Ford Taurus. Upon arriving, Wilson, who possessed a handgun given to him by Lighty, and the two other men, began shooting. The government introduced evidence from Thomas Hart, one of the victims of the Afton Street Shooting. Hart, New-bill, and “Boo-Boo” were standing outside on the street when a Ford Taurus drove by and shots were fired at them from the front passenger side and the rear of the ear. Boo-Boo was not injured. Hart was shot in the foot, the arm, and the chest, and Newbill died as a result of the gunshot wounds he received. The government also introduced evidence from Marlon Hines, who witnessed the aftermath of the Afton Street Shooting. Hines was in his home at the time of the shooting. After the gunshots were fired, Hart, Newbill, and Boo-Boo entered his home. Newbill told Hines that he could not catch his breath and that he thought he was shot. On the evening of January 31, 2002, Washington, D.C. police officers were conducting a vice operation on the 5900 block of East Capitol Street. During this operation, Officer Homer Littlejohn approached a car in which Lighty was a passenger. As Officer Littlejohn approached the car, he observed Lighty placing a .380 caliber handgun into his pants. Officer Littlejohn pulled Lighty from the car and then removed the handgun from Lighty’s pants. Brett Mills, an FBI firearms examiner, analyzed the two .380 caliber shell casings recovered from the Hayes murder scene, the .380 caliber shell casing recovered from the Afton Street Shooting scene, and the handgun seized from Lighty on January 31, 2002. Based on his analysis, Mills was able to conclude that the shell casing recovered from the Afton Street Shooting was fired by Lighty’s .380 caliber handgun (to the exclusion of all other firearms). Mills further concluded that the two .380 caliber shell casings recovered from the Hayes murder scene had numerous rifling characteristics in common with the shell casing recovered from the Afton Street Shooting scene and the test fire shell casing from Lighty’s .380 caliber handgun. The two .380 caliber shell casings from the Hayes murder scene, however, lacked sufficient microscopic markings to allow Mills to make a definitive identification or non-identification. Mills also examined the bullets that were recovered from Hayes during the autopsy. Mills concluded that the bullets recovered from Hayes had the same rifling characteristics as the test-fired bullets from Lighty’s handgun. However, as a result of mutilation and fragmentation, the bullets recovered from Hayes lacked sufficient microscopic marks to make a definitive identification (or non-identification) that they were fired from Lighty’s handgun. Dr. Laron Locke, a medical examiner, examined Lighty’s .380 caliber handgun and concluded that one of the abrasions found on Hayes matched the barrel portion of Lighty’s handgun and that another patterned abrasion matched the clip release of the handgun. Dr. Locke concluded these abrasions were consistent with Hayes being struck by Lighty’s .380 caliber handgun. B Under the FDPA, a death sentence may be sought for “any [federal] offense for which a sentence of death is provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). During the guilt phase of the defendant’s trial, the defendant must either be found guilty of, or plead guilty to, a federal crime punishable by death. Id. § 3593(b). At the sentencing phase of the trial, the sentencer must determine whether a death sentence should be imposed. The FDPA requires the government to notify the defendant of the intent to seek the death penalty within a reasonable time before trial or before the district court accepts a guilty plea. Id. § 3593(a)(1). This notice must include the aggravating factors that the government plans to offer at the sentencing hearing. Id. § 3593(a)(2). The sentencing hearing may be held before the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt or before a separate jury impaneled specifically for sentencing purposes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(b)(1) and (2). Alternatively, upon request by the defendant, and with approval of the government, the sentencing hearing may be held “before the [district] court alone.” Id. § 3593(b)(3). At the sentencing hearing, any information relevant to the sentencing may be presented to the jury, regardless of its admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except that information “may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” Id. § 3593(e). The government may present only information relevant to aggravating factors for which the defendant was given pre-trial notice, and the government must prove the existence of any aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. There are sixteen defined statutory aggravating factors for cases involving homicide, id. §§ 3592(c)(l)-(16), but the FDPA “allows the government to allege other aggravating factors (‘non-statutory aggravating factors’).” United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 612 (4th Cir.2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (noting that the sentencer “may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists”). In response, the defendant may present any evidence relevant to any mitigating factor, and bears only the burden of proving the existence of any such factor by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 3593(c). Section 3592(a) provides a list of mitigating factors, including a catch-all mitigating factor covering any relevant mitigating circumstance. Id. §§ 3592(a)(l)-(8). With regard to offenses involving homicides, the jury must initially find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted within one of four mental states of criminal intent: (1) intentionally killing the victim; (2) intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury that resulted in death; (3) intentionally participating in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a direct result of the act; and (4) intentionally engaging in an act of violence knowing such act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a result of the act. Id. §§ 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D). The jury must next find the existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating factors defined in § 3592(c) beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 3593(d). Upon a unanimous finding of both the required criminal intent and aggravating factor(s), the jury must then determine whether all the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors so as to justify a sentence of death. Id. C On October 8, 2003, a grand jury in the District of Maryland returned an indictment charging Lighty, Flood, and Wilson with kidnapping resulting in the death of Eric Hayes, and aiding and abetting the same, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 2 (Count One), conspiracy to kidnap, and aiding and abetting the same, id. §§ 1201(c) and 2 (Count Two), and three counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting the same, id. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Counts Three, Four, and Five). On December 28, 2004, pursuant to § 3593(a) of the FDPA, the government filed a notice of intent to seek the death sentence on Count One against Lighty only. The government’s notice listed all four of the mental states of criminal intent listed in § 3591(a)(2), the statutory aggravating factor of death during the commission of another crime, id. § 3592(c)(1), and four non-statutory aggravating factors: (1) victim impact evidence; (2) lack of remorse; (3) commission of other acts of violence, including the Afton Street Shooting; and (4) commission of a capital offense while on probation. Flood and Lighty’s joint trial commenced on September 6, 2005. During the trial, the government called twenty-five witnesses in its case-in-chief and one witness in rebuttal. As part of his defense at the guilt phase, Lighty called three witnesses. Latasha Massey, a girlfriend whom Mathis occasionally lived with, testified that Mathis received a phone call from Flood on the day of the Hayes kidnapping and murder. According to Massey, after the call, Mathis left the house wearing a camouflage “army fatigue sweat suit with a black hat” and entered Flood’s car. Massey testified that, when Mathis returned home, he had blood on the bottom of his pants and boots. Lighty also called Dr. John Adams, a pathologist. Dr. Adams agreed with Dr. Locke’s opinion that each of the gunshots to the head would have prevented Hayes from holding himself in a kneeling position and that each gunshot would have independently caused immediate unconsciousness. Lighty’s final witness was William Welch, a forensic firearms and tool marks examiner. Welch testified that, based upon his examination of the bullets found inside Hayes, one of the bullets was different than the other two found in Hayes. According to Welch, two of the bullets had a “lead core with a copper jacket,” while the third bullet just had a lead core; therefore, he opined that two guns were used in the shooting. Welch further testified that there were at least twenty-seven manufacturers who made .380 caliber handguns producing the same rifling characteristics as the .380 caliber handgun recovered from Lighty on January 31, 2002. On October 21, 2005, Lighty and Flood were convicted of all counts charged. The case moved on to the sentencing phase of the trial, where the same jury decided Lighty’s sentence on the kidnapping resulting in death count. D For its case in aggravation at the sentencing phase of Lighty’s trial, the government principally relied upon the evidence presented during the guilt phase of the trial. However, the government did introduce testimony from seven witnesses in its case-in-chief and two in rebuttal. A probation officer (Victoria Edwards) testified that, at the time of the Hayes kidnapping and murder, Lighty was on probation for a Maryland state drug offense. Debra Gates, the owner of Gates Bail Bonds, testified that, at the time of the Hayes kidnapping and murder, Lighty was on bond awaiting trial for a Maryland state robbery charge, to which he subsequently pleaded guilty. Sean Chaney, a detective with the PGPD, testified concerning the Afton Street Shooting. He testified that there were at least six people present during the shooting, including New-bill, Hart, and Hines, and three other people in a nearby car. Detective Chaney indicated that, in addition to Newbill and Hart, one of the individuals in the car was also shot. FBI Special Agent Joseph Bradley presented photographs of an individual in the trunk of the Lincoln Continental used in the kidnapping to demonstrate the conditions in which Hayes was likely held when he was alive in the trunk. Agent Bradley also testified about the absence of light inside the trunk and the ability of a person inside to hear voices outside of the trunk. Finally, the government called three witnesses to discuss the impact of Hayes’ death upon his family. Hayes’ girlfriend, Capricia Yarborough, testified about Hayes’ character and the effect of his death on their child, who was born after Hayes’ murder. Hayes’ parents, Rochelle Hayes and Eric Hayes Sr., also testified about Hayes’ life and the impact of his death on their lives and family. As part of his case in mitigation, Lighty called Dr. Mark Cunningham, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who testified concerning certain risk factors that make it more likely that a juvenile or young adult will commit a crime. A clinical social worker, Lori James-Monroe, provided a life history of Lighty based upon her interviews with him, his grandmother (who raised him), numerous other family members and friends, and a minister. She also examined Lighty’s school, medical, and jail records, as well as some of his family members’ records. During her testimony detailing Lighty’s life history, James-Monroe, among other things, described Lighty’s parents’ alleged involvement in criminal activity and drugs, the death of his father prior to his birth, drug abuse by his mother during pregnancy, the death of his mother, the criminal activity of his uncles, Lighty’s difficulties in school, his own use of drugs, and his good behavior while incarcerated. James-Monroe additionally testified about various “red flags” in Lighty’s history that corresponded directly to the risk factors described by Dr. Cunningham. Lighty presented evidence from family members and friends setting forth his troubled background and the obstacles he faced in life, but indicating an overall good character. In addition, Lighty presented evidence to support his theory that an equally culpable participant, Mathis, would not be sentenced to death. Lighty called Agent Bradley and Detective Chaney to testify about statements made by Wilson and Mathis. Detective Chaney read Wilson’s written statement to the jury verbatim: I, Lorenzo Anthony Wilson, am providing a statement about the murder of Eric Hayes. As far as I can remember, I recall it being in the evening time. I can’t recall the day, but it was evening time. And I saw Kenny walking down the street and I asked him where he was going, and he told me down on 26th, where June Bug be at. June Bug is James Flood. So I walked down there with him. And when he got down, they were down there drinking, so we started drinking with them. And when I say “them,” I’m referring to Tony, June Bug and about six or seven more dudes. So we’re all sitting up there laughing and joking and drinking. While all this is going on, June Bug, James Flood, was sitting away from everybody else by some dude th[ey] called Yoge or Yogi. So then June came back over there where we were standing and he was all stuttering and mumbling something I can’t recall what. And all shaking and shit. So I asked him what is wrong with him. Because I don’t trust him when he gets like that. When June Bug, James Flood, responded, he said, something is just on my mind, that’s all. So I walked over and started talking to Goat, better known as Kenneth Lighty. I was asking him, was the car still messed up? Because June had just brought it and then Kenny stated, Back with June Bug. Fixed it. So I said, Oh. Then he said, I could go and try it. So I walked over to the car so I can try it. I started up the car and then I played around with the radio for a while. And then I saw June Bug, James Flood, get in the car. Once he got in the car, Tony and Kenny got in the car, and Tony said, let’s go get some more liquor. So we went to Marlow Heights Liquor Store on Branch Avenue and got some more liquor. Then on the way back June Bug, James Flood, was like, let’s go up Eighth. So when he said that, I thought, like anyone would think, we going up Eighth to get some weed. So once we got up Eighth, it was not — no one up there, so we came back around Hillcrest to finish drinking. So we were all in the car drinking and driving around. I saw Katina, this female I used to date, and I was getting out to go over and talk to her. And Kenny was, like, we going back up Eighth. And I was like, no, I’m about to go with her. So me and Katina went to my house. We were about to have sex, but she didn’t want to. We were in there for about 25 minutes, then we came out. Katina went down 28th Avenue to Little Marlow, the apartments by St. Barnabas Road, and I went back on the street. And once I got down there, Tony, Kenny and June Bug, James Flood, was pulling back up and Tony jumped out of the car and began pulling Eric out of the car, and he was talking to June Bug saying he was a bitch. So while Tony had Eric on the trunk of the car, it was about 15 people outside and Tony called Yogi over to the car and [asked] him, was this one of the guys that carjacked him, and Yogi just said, let him go. And instead of letting him go, Tony shot one — shot him once or twice with a revolver, a 38 or 357. So June Bug and Kenny went and grabbed Eric and Kenny told me, pop the trunk. So I did and June told me to drive. So I did and June Bug gave me directions where to go. So I did exactly that and then we ended up down 28th Parkway in one of those side streets and June Bug and Kenny got out, pulled Eric out of the trunk and June Bug shot Eric five or six times. Then Kenny and June Bug got back in the car and told me, drive down to Iverson Street, and that where one of his folks lived and I parked it in his folks’ garage. And then I called Crystal to come and pick me up and she did. I did not tell her anything right then, only to pick me up. So she did and she dropped June Bug and Kenny off, and I went home with her. During the questions and answers which followed the written statement, Wilson admitted that he told Phauls about the incident. Detective Chaney also testified about an interview he and Agent Bradley had with Mathis. During the interview, Mathis stated that he was on Keating Street when he saw Lighty, Flood, Wilson, and an individual known as “Ty” get out of the Lincoln Continental. He then saw Ty pull a male out of the car. Mathis walked away and heard one shot, but did not look back. Mathis also identified other people who were at the scene and stated that the motive for the murder may have been related to a previous robbery of Scott. During the government’s rebuttal case, Michael Straughan, a detective with the PGPD, read verbatim from a written statement CW gave on May 2, 2002. Through this testimony, the jury was provided with CW’s prior statements, including a statement that Lighty, Flood, Wilson, and Mathis had been involved in the kidnapping. Detective Straughan also testified concerning a statement CW made to another PGPD detective. In that statement, CW implied that Wilson had told him that Lighty shot Hayes. E On November 10, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of death for Lighty on Count One. The jury unanimously found that all four of the mental states of criminal intent alleged in the government’s pretrial notice were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury also unanimously found that all of the aggravating factors alleged in the government’s pre-trial notice were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nine jurors found that the statutory mitigating factor of equally culpable defendants, id. § 3592(a)(4), was proven- by a preponderance of the evidence, and eleven of the jurors found that the catch-all mitigation factor was proven as well. Some of the jurors also found some non-statutory mitigating factors. Eleven of the jurors found that “[a]ll life has value,” and the same number found the “effect of the sentence” on Lighty’s grandmother as a mitigating factor. A “[pjoor defense” was found as a mitigating factor by three of the jurors. On February 28, 2006, the district court sentenced Lighty to death on Count One, a concurrent life sentence on Count Two, and a consecutive sentence totaling fifty-five years on the remaining counts. Flood was sentenced to life imprisonment on Count One. He also received a consecutive sentence totaling sixty-five years on the remaining counts. As noted earlier, Wilson was tried separately and found guilty of Count Two and not guilty of the remaining counts. Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment. Lighty, Flood, and Wilson filed timely notices of appeal, raising numerous assignments of error. While the appeals were pending, Lighty and Wilson sought new trials in the district court. Lighty also moved for a new sentencing hearing. Consequently, we held all three appeals in abeyance pending a decision in the district court. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, at the conclusion of which the district court denied the motions. Lighty and Wilson filed timely notices of appeal concerning this ruling. We heard argument in all three cases on May 13, 2010. Lighty’s and Flood’s cases were consolidated for decision on August 10, 2010. Our decision in Wilson’s appeal is being issued at the same time as our decision in this consolidated appeal. II A Prior to trial, Lighty moved to have his trial severed from Flood’s trial. The district court denied the motion, and now Lighty challenges this ruling on several grounds. First, he contends that severance was required because he and Flood presented antagonistic defenses. Second, he contends he was unfairly prejudiced by the district court’s ruling which prohibited CW from referring to Mathis as one of the participants in the Hayes kidnapping and murder. Finally, he contends that the refusal to grant severance violated his right to individualized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for severance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 490 (4th Cir.2006). Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment if they are alleged to have “participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 8(b). Generally, we adhere to the principle that defendants indicted together should be tried together, and a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the denial of a severance motion in order to establish that the district court abused its broad discretion in that regard. United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384 (4th Cir.2001); see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (noting that courts should grant severance “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence”); United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir.2007) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion “only where the trial court’s decision to deny a severance deprives the defendants of a fair trial and results in a miscarriage of justice”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a) (“If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.”). Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to severance merely because he might have had a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933. 1 The presence of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone does not require severance under Rule 14(a). Id. at 538, 113 S.Ct. 933. “The mere presence of hostility among defendants ... or the desire of one to exculpate himself by inculpating another [are] insufficient grounds to require separate trials.” United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir.1986) (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The antagonistic defenses must involve more than “finger pointing.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 474 (4th Cir.2002). Instead, “[t]here must be such a stark contrast presented by the defenses that the jury is presented with the proposition that to believe the core of one defense it must disbelieve the core of the other, ... or that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Flood’s defense at trial was that he did not participate in the Hayes kidnapping and murder. This defense was premised on the argument that there were only two individuals involved in the Hayes kidnapping and murder and that Lighty and Wilson were those two individuals. Although this defense largely ignored all of the circumstantial evidence linking Flood to the crimes, Flood’s counsel emphasized that no witness positively identified Flood as a participant, that Forrest only saw two people on Eighth Street, and that Davis only saw two people on the 12800 block of Hillcrest Parkway. Lighty’s defense also centered on a denial of participation in the Hayes kidnapping and murder. In closing argument, counsel for Lighty gave the jury twelve “reasonable doubts,” that is, twelve points that provided a reasonable doubt in the case. These twelve points largely attacked the credibility of the government’s witnesses, in particular, CW, Davis, Miller, Scott, Phauls, Coles, and Mills. One of these points involved Mathis, in which counsel argued to the jury that the “two kidnappers could just as easily [have been] Mr. Flood and Mr. Mathis.” Counsel emphasized that, according to Massey, Mathis met Flood on the day of the murder wearing camouflage clothing and returned home with blood on his pants and boots. In our view, Lighty’s and Flood’s defenses, while conflicting on certain points, were not mutually antagonistic to the point where the jury was required to believe the core of one defense and disbelieve the core of the other. In order to convict Lighty, the jury was not required to believe Flood’s defense that he was not a participant in the Hayes kidnapping and murder. Moreover, the jury was not required to believe Flood’s alternative defense that Lighty and Wilson were responsible in order to convict Lighty. Rather, to convict Lighty, the jury was required to find that he aided and abetted the kidnapping, murder, and the possession of the firearms. Such convictions did not rest on the jury’s acceptance of Flood’s defense(s). In other words, the jury was free to disbelieve both Lighty’s and Flood’s versions of the events and conclude they both participated in the Hayes kidnapping and murder. Such a conclusion did not rest on the belief of one defendant’s defense and the disbelief of the other defendant’s defense. See id. at 474 (noting that defenses were not mutually antagonistic where defendant’s guilt was not dictated by the asserted innocence of his co-defendants); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 898 (8th Cir.2002) (“Mr. Tello and Mr. Ortiz each claimed that the other shot Mr. Molina. While only one man committed that act, the government’s theory of the case did not require the jury to decide who shot Mr. Molina. The indictment charged defendants with crimes, including conspiracy and aiding and abetting, that did not require jurors to choose a particular defendant as the shooter.”); United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir.1991) (finding mutual antagonistic defenses where two defendants charged with assault both defended themselves by arguing the other committed the assault alone). Finally, there simply is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury, from the conflict in the defenses, unjustifiably inferred that both Lighty and Flood were guilty. The district court repeatedly instructed the jury that it was required to assess the evidence against each defendant separately, and the government, through the relevant evidence it introduced at trial (summarized in Part IIB1), overwhelmingly established each defendant’s guilt on each count beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 898-99 (“These instructions, combined with the ample evidence of guilt the government introduced at trial, persuade us that there is not an appreciable chance that [defendants] would not have been convicted had separate trials been granted.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The verdicts give every indication that the jury faithfully applied the district court’s instructions. In short, in this case, “it is not so much that the defenses were antagonistic to each other as it is that the evidence was antagonistic to those defenses.” United States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258, 261 (4th Cir.1968). 2 Lighty also contends that severance was required because he was unfairly prejudiced by the district court’s ruling which prohibited CW from referring to Mathis as one of the participants in the Hayes kidnapping. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court held that admission of a confession directly inculpating a co-defendant in a joint trial violated the co-defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. To protect Flood’s Confrontation Clause rights in this case, the district court refused to allow CW to refer to Flood, Wilson, and Mathis by name, but permitted CW to make reference to “three other people.” “Such redactions are permissible so long as the redaction does not distort the statements’ meaning, exclude substantially exculpatory information, or change the tenor of the utterance as a whole.” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district court’s ruling did not distort the meaning of Lighty’s original statement to CW, exclude exculpatory evidence, or change the tenor of the statement. The original statement’s meaning and tenor simply was that Flood, Wilson, and Mathis accompanied Lighty to Eighth Street and that Lighty was the one that shot Hayes. CW’s trial testimony conveys the same meaning—that three men accompanied Lighty during the kidnapping and that Lighty was the person that shot Hayes. Moreover, CW’s trial testimony did not exclude exculpatory evidence because Lighty’s original statement to CW does not suggest that Mathis shot Hayes, attribute any particular actions to Flood, Wilson, or Mathis, or otherwise lessen Lighty’s culpability in any way. 3 Lighty argues that he was entitled to severance because both he and Flood were charged with the same offenses. As the argument goes, “Lighty’s culpability was not determined individually as constitutionally required, but rather in comparison to Flood, whom the government already had decided was less culpable—and so informed the jury.” Lighty’s Br. at 59. We disagree. The Supreme Court has recognized a strong preference for trying defendants who are indicted together in joint trials. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 933 (“There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 418, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987) (“Underlying the Commonwealth’s interest in a joint trial is a related interest in promoting the reliability and consistency of its judicial process, an interest that may benefit the non-capital defendant as well. In joint trials, the jury obtains a more complete view of all the acts underlying the charges than would be possible in separate trials. From such a perspective, it may be able to arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and to assign fairly the respective responsibilities of each defendant in sentencing.”). A per se rule requiring severance each time a capital defendant and a non-capital defendant are charged with the same crimes certainly would undermine this stated preference. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a non-capital defendant cannot receive a fair trial when tried jointly with a capital defendant. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 418-19, 107 S.Ct. 2906. In Buchanan, a non-capital defendant and a capital defendant were tried by the same death-qualified jury. Id. at 408, 107 S.Ct. 2906. The Supreme Court concluded that the non-capital defendant could not demonstrate that being tried by a death-qualified jury violated either his right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community or his right to an impartial jury. Id. at 415-20, 107 S.Ct. 2906. Although Buchanan did not involve the claim of a capital defendant, the Court’s reasoning suggests that a joint trial of a capital defendant and a non-capital defendant does not run afoul of the Constitution. As the court in Stanford v. Parker noted in rejecting a similar claim, “[i]f anything, because of the exclusion of presumably more sympathetic jurors who could not be death-qualified, it would be far more plausible that the death-ineligible co-defendant would be prejudiced.” 266 F.3d 442, 459 (6th Cir.2001). Finally, the district court’s repeated instructions to the jury that it was required to assess the evidence against each defendant separately eliminated the risk that the jury would view Lighty more culpable than Flood, simply because Lighty was charged as a capital defendant. Moreover, the district court’s sentencing phase instructions reminded the jury that its sentencing decision was to be guided by the district court’s instructions and based on the evidence before the jury. In United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir.1996), three capital defendants sought severance at the capital phase of their joint trial, contending that the denial of severance violated their right to an individualized sentencing determination under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 892. We rejected the argument, relying in large part on the district court’s repeated instructions to the jury to consider the evidence against each capital defendant individually. Id. at 892-93. Here, the district court’s cautionary instructions at both phases of the trial similarly allowed the jury to compartmentalize the evidence against Lighty only and without regard to Flood, and we assume the jury followed these instructions. Id. at 893. B We review the district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir.2001). 1 Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission of evidence of other wrongs or acts solely to prove a defendant’s bad character. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir.1997). Although not admissible to prove the defendant’s character, evidence of other wrongs may be admitted to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts to be admitted, except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition. Queen, 132 F.3d at 994-95. For such evidence to be admissible, it must be “(1) relevant to an issue other than the general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to prove an element of the charged offense; and (3) reliable.” United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir.2004). The last requirement in our Rule 404(b) analysis involves a Rule 403 determination, that is, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. Rule 404(b) limits only the admission of evidence of acts extrinsic to the one charged, but does not limit the admission of evidence of intrinsic acts. United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir.1996). Other acts are intrinsic when they are “inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.” Id. at 88 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir.2007) (noting that evidence is intrinsic if it is necessary to “provide context relevant to the criminal charges”). “[E]vidence is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11 th Cir.2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to trial, the district court rejected Lighty’s challenge to the admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence, after one of the AUSAs mistakenly told the district court that CW would testify that Lighty said the same handgun was used in both the Hayes murder and the Afton Street Shooting. Lighty never made such a statement to CW and no such testimony was given at trial. According to the district court, if Lighty told CW that the same handgun was used in both shootings, CW’s testimony about the handgun would be admissible either as intrinsic evidence or Rule 404(b) evidence. At trial, before the admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence, the district court gave the following cautionary instruction: [T]he government is going to make certain inquiry into what will be called the Newbill murder, another case which is not the subject of this prosecution. So, you are going to hear evidence from this witness regarding the shooting of Antoine Newbill on Afton Street. Mr. Lighty is not charged with that offense and you may not consider that Mr. Lighty has a propensity to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad character. The evidence of the Newbill murder may only be considered by you in this case insofar as you may determine that evidence in the Newbill murder case is also evidence, something that connects the two, in the present case, for example, indicating Mr. Lighty’s presence and involvement in the present case. During his testimony, CW never testified that Lighty told him the same handgun was involved in both the Hayes murder and the Afton Street Shooting. After Mills testified that he could not conclude that the handgun used in the Afton Street Shooting was the same handgun used in the Hayes murder, Lighty sought to strike all of the Afton Street Shooting evidence, but the district court denied the motion. Lighty challenges the admission, at the guilt phase of his trial, of all of the Afton Street Shooting evidence. The government counters that the Afton Street Shooting evidence was inextricably intertwined with the Hayes kidnapping and murder. Alternatively, the government argues that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b). With regard to the government’s inextricably intertwined argument, the Afton Street Shooting evidence certainly was not an integral part of any witness’s account of the circumstances surrounding the Hayes kidnapping and murder. CW’s testimony concerning the Afton Street Shooting was not an integral part of his account of the Hayes kidnapping and murder and, of course, the testimony of Hart, Hines, and the law enforcement personnel was even more tangential to that of CW. There simply was no connection between the Afton Street Shooting and the Hayes kidnapping and murder; the events occurred at different times, at different places, and involved completely different motives, so there were no gaps in the government’s case without the evidence. The events were not inextricably intertwined. Cf. Chin, 83 F.3d at 88 (holding that statements made concerning uncharged murder during exchange of heroin for cash was intrinsic part of drug trafficking charge). Having rejected the government’s inextricably intertwined argument, we turn to its extrinsic argument, that the Afton Street Shooting evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove Lighty’s identity at the Hayes kidnapping and murder. According to the government, the Afton Street Shooting evidence satisfies each of the four prongs of the test for admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence outlined in Queen. Assuming, without deciding, this evidence was relevant and reliable, it clearly fails under the necessity prong of our Rule 404(b) test for admissibility. Evidence is necessary where it is an “essential part of the crimes on trial, or where it furnishes part of the context of the crime.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 998 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hodge, 354 F.3d at 312 (noting that Rule 404(b) evidence must be necessary to prove an element of the crime charged). The necessity prong must be analyzed in “light of other evidence available to the government.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 998 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because district courts must analyze the evidence available to the government, if the Rule 404(b) evidence is entirely cumulative to other non-Rule 404(b) evidence available to the government, the Rule 404(b) evidence may not meet the necessity prong. Moreover, as the quantum of other non-Rule 404(b) evidence available to prove an issue unrelated to character increases, the need for the Rule 404(b) evidence decreases. When the non-Rule 404(b) evidence renders the Rule 404(b) evidence unnecessary is a determination left to the sound discretion of the district court. In this case, the necessity scales tip decidedly against admissibility. The government contends that it needed to introduce the Afton Street Shooting evidence to establish that Lighty “was found in possession of a gun that was consistent with the murder weapon.” Appellee’s Br. at 56-57. But this simply is not so. Other evidence established this link — more directly and more reliably. For the police recovered this very handgun directly from Lighty within four weeks of the Hayes murder. The introduction of the Afton Street Shooting evidence certainly did not make Lighty’s possession of the asserted murder weapon any more probable than did the seizure by the police of that weapon directly from Lighty. Even at oral argument, the government never adequately explained why the Afton Street Shooting evidence properly added anything to its case. Moreover, the government had Lighty’s confessions to CW and Miller admitting his participation in the Hayes kidnapping and murder and a host of other circumstantial evidence placing him at the scene of the kidnapping and murder. In light of the overwhelming admissible evidence connecting Lighty with the probable Hayes murder weapon and placing him at the scene of the Hayes kidnapping and murder, we are at a loss as to why the government viewed evidence as to an uncharged murder — the Afton Street Shooting evidence — as necessary. Compare United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir.2009) (finding other acts evidence unnecessary where government presented “extensive” physical and testimonial evidence on the same issue), with United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir.1974) (finding other acts evidence necessary where that evidence “furnished more dependable proof’ than “sparse” intrinsic evidence). The record suggests that the government pushed for the admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence under the misapprehension that CW would testify that Lighty told him the same handgun was used in both the Hayes kidnapping and murder and the Afton Street Shooting. Of course, such testimony would have been more probative of Lighty’s identity than other evidence available to the government and, thus, necessary when compared to such evidence. The admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence then would have turned on its reliability and the Rule 403 balancing. However, without such testimony from CW, the government’s necessity bell rings hollow. In short, we conclude, under the facts of this case, the Afton Street Shooting evidence simply does not come close to meeting Rule 404(b)’s necessity prong, and, therefore, the admission of such evidence was an abuse of discretion. In these circumstances, the protections of Rule 404(b)'— “against juries trying defendants for prior acts rather than charged acts, and ... against juries becoming confused by the purpose of the admitted acts and using the acts improperly in arriving at a verdict”— disappear, and we must find error. Queen, 132 F.3d at 996. The question becomes, then, whether the admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence is harmless error. ‘Where error is founded on a violation of Rule 404(b), the test for harmlessness is ‘whether we can say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ ” United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 753 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 211-12 (4th Cir.1980)). “This inquiry is not whether, absent the improperly admitted evidence, sufficient evidence existed to convict.” Madden, 38 F.3d at 753. Rather, the inquiry is “whether we can say that we believe it highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In our view, the admission of the Afton Street Shooting evidence did not affect the judgment in Lighty’s case. The evidence of guilt presented by the government was overwhelming. It is beyond dispute that the Lincoln Continental owned by Flood was involved in Hayes’ kidnapping and murder, as confirmed by the testimony of Forrest and Davis and the physical evidence. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that a kidnapping took place on Eighth Street on the evening of January 3, 2002, and that Hayes’ murder took place at approximately 8:30 p.m. on the same evening. The evidence in this case demonstrates, overwhelmingly, that Lighty participat