Full opinion text
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge HAMILTON wrote the opinion, in which Judges MOTZ, KING, GREGORY, SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN joined. Judge AGEE wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judges WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN joined. Chief Judge TRAXLER, Judge WILKINSON, Judge NIEMEYER, and Judge DUNCAN join in this opinion concurring in the judgment. OPINION HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge: Twenty-three former employees (the Retirees) of Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler) brought this action against the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the International), Local No. 1183 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Local 1183), and Local No. 1212 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (Local 1212), in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland. The UAW removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the claims asserted by the Retirees were completely preempted by federal labor law. After the UAW sought Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on a variety of grounds, the Retirees moved to remand the case back to Maryland state court, alleging that the notice of removal was untimely filed, and, alternatively, that their claims were not completely preempted. The district court denied the motion to remand, holding that the notice of removal was timely filed. The district court also granted the motion to dismiss, holding that, although the Retirees’ claims were completely preempted, the claims were barred by the six-month statute of limitation contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The Retirees challenge these rulings on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Retirees that the district court erred when it denied the motion to remand, because the UAW’s notice of removal was untimely filed. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to remand the case to Maryland state court. In light of our holding on the removal issue, we do not reach the Retirees’ arguments concerning the district court’s preemption and statute of limitation rulings. I Prior to their January 31, 2007 retirement from Chrysler, the Retirees were employed by Chrysler at its automobile assembly plant (the Plant) in Newark, Delaware. Each of the Retirees were members of the International, and were members of either Local 1183 or Local 1212. By the end of 2006, each of the Retirees had the requisite years of service with Chrysler to qualify for retirement with full benefits. However, each of the Retirees faced a difficult retirement decision. Through a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, statements from representatives and officers of the International, Local 1183, and Local 1212, the Retirees became aware that Chrysler was planning to reduce the size of its work force and that the Plant was “a prime candidate for a work force reduction.” (J.A. 27). Based on their previous experience with workforce reductions, the Retirees believed that it was in their best interests to continue to work and forego retirement in order to determine whether the work-force reduction would include financial incentives to retirement-eligible employees. Desiring to reap the benefit of any financial incentives to retirement-eligible employees, the Retirees sought the advice and counsel of the UAW to determine the “best course of action to preserve their eligibility to receive the financial benefits of a retirement package.” (J.A. 28). According to the Retirees, the UAW advised them to delay their retirement until January 31, 2007, because, “by retiring in the calendar year 2007, any retirement package offered in 2007 would include the [Retirees] and any other UAW member who retired during the year 2007.” (J.A. 28). Based on this advice, the Retirees submitted the required paperwork to effectuate a retirement date of January 31, 2007. Between the time they submitted their retirement paper-work and January 31, 2007, many of the Retirees received information that the offer of a retirement package to retirement-eligible employees was “imminent.” (J.A. 28). Consequently, some of the Retirees considered withdrawing their retirement paperwork and continuing to work until a firm announcement concerning financial incentives to retirement-eligible employees was made. In response, UAW representatives and officers informed the Retirees that it was unnecessary to withdraw their paperwork, because no retirement package was “ ‘coming down’” and that any retirement package offered in 2007 would be retroactive to January 31, 2007 and include all who retired on or after that date in 2007. (J.A. 29). Relying on these representations, each of the Retirees retired on January 31, 2007. Two weeks later, Chrysler announced that it would be offering retirement incentive packages, with the agreement and approval of the UAW, for eligible employees at the Plant. The retirement package offered had a value of approximately $70,000 for each retiring employee. However, the terms of the retirement package approved and agreed to by the UAW excluded the Retirees, because the retirement package applied prospectively, not retroactively. On February 11, 2008, the Retirees filed a two-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland. Count One asserted a claim under Maryland state law for negligent misrepresentation. The Retirees alleged that the UAW “owed [them] both legal and fiduciary duties ... to disclose all material facts with regard to the status of the UAW’s negotiations with Chrysler to the extent those negotiations impacted [the Retirees’] decision to retire.” (J.A. 52-53). Count One also alleged that the UAW “had a duty to refrain from misrepresenting and omitting material facts regarding” such negotiations. (J.A. 53). The Retirees alleged that the UAW “made at least one or more of the following material misrepresentations of fact”: (1) “No retirement package was ‘coming down’ or being currently negotiated by the UAW with Chrysler”; and (2) “Any retirement package negotiated between the UAW and Chrysler in 2007 would be retroactive and would apply to any employee who retired on or after January 31, 2007.” (J.A. 53). Count Two asserted a negligence claim under Maryland state law. This count alleged that the UAW breached “duties of care, fidelity and loyalty to ensure that all material facts regarding their relationship were fully disclosed and all actions taken on behalf of [the Retirees] were for their protection and in their best interests.” (J.A. 55). The UAW allegedly breached such duties by failing to: (1) “advise [the Retirees] of the true nature and extent of their negotiations with Chrysler”; (2) keep the officers and representatives of Locals 1183 and Local 1212 apprised of the true nature and extent of the International’s negotiations with Chrysler; and (3) “warn [the Retirees] that voluntary retirement of their employment before the official announcement of a retirement package would preclude them from being eligible for the receipt of future retirement packages offered during the 2007 calendar year.” (J.A. 55-56). The International was served with a copy of the complaint on March 20, 2008. Local 1183 was served with process on March 29, 2008. On April 28, 2008, more than thirty days after service on the International, but within thirty days of service on Local 1183, but before Local 1212 was served, all three defendants filed a joint notice of removal in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. According to the notice of removal, “[a]l-though [the Retirees] characterize their claims as state law claims, the duty of care that [the Retirees] maintain[] it is owed from [the UAW] ... is the duty of fair representation, ... which arises from UAW’s status from its exclusive bargaining authority pursuant to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159.” (J.A. 13). The notice further averred that, “[b]ecause the NLRA is an ‘act regulating interstate commerce,’ this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337.” (J.A. 13). On May 5, 2008, the UAW filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the motion, the UAW argued, among other things, that the Retirees’ claims were barred by the six-month statute of limitation contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). On May 28, 2008, the Retirees filed a motion to remand the case to Maryland state court. According to the Retirees, the notice of removal was untimely, and, alternatively, there was no basis for federal jurisdiction. On June 12, 2008, the district court issued a memorandum and order denying the Retirees’ motion to remand and granting the UAW’s motion to dismiss. The district court did not specifically address the timeliness of the UAW’s removal. Rather, the district court noted that the Retirees had “artfully” attempted to “ ‘plead around’ the pre-emptive force of federal labor law” and that their state law claims were “completely pre-empted by the federal duty of fair representation” in § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, id. § 159(a). (J.A. 127). The district court found that “[t]he breach of that duty, if any, is a matter of federal, not state, law.” (J.A. 127). Concurrent with its denial of the Retirees’ motion to remand, the district court granted the UAW’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the claims were barred by the six-month statute of limitation contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). On June 13, 2008, the Retirees filed a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, the district court denied the motion. The district court held that the joint notice of removal was timely filed, noting that the “case ... [provides] an excellent opportunity for the Fourth Circuit to clarify whether the ‘first-filed’ ‘dictum’ ” in McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Community College, 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir.1992), “means what it actually seems to say.” (J.A. 132). The district court also reaffirmed its earlier ruling on the preemption issue, but, curiously, the district court did not address the Retirees’ request for reconsideration of the statute of limitation issue. The Retirees noted a timely appeal. On appeal, a divided panel of this court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the joint notice of removal had been timely filed, but reversed its holding that the Retirees’ claims were completely preempted by federal labor law. See Barbour v. Int’l Union, 594 F.3d 315 (4th Cir.2010). On May 6, 2010, the panel opinion was vacated, as a majority of active circuit judges voted to rehear this case en banc. See Fourth Circuit Local Rule 35(c) (“Granting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and opinion.”). II On appeal, the Retirees first challenge the district court’s ruling that the joint notice of removal was timely filed. Our review is de novo. See Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir.2006) (“For questions concerning removal to federal court, our standard of review is de novo.”). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, ... which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). We presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, ... and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. Removal statutes, in particular, must be strictly construed, inasmuch as the removal of cases from state to federal court raises significant federalism concerns. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941) (“The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.”); see also Healy v. Ratio, 292 U.S. 263, 270, 54 S.Ct. 700, 78 L.Ed. 1248 (1934) (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”); Maryland Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir.2005) (noting our duty to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the significant federalism concerns implicated by removal). Doubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir.2004)(en banc); Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999). Section 1441(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that “the defendant or the defendants” may seek to remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district. courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Section 1446 of Title 28 describes the appropriate removal procedure to invoke federal jurisdiction, and requires the defendant seeking removal to file a timely notice of removal stating the grounds for removal with the appropriate federal district court. Id. §§ 1446(a) & (b). In order to be timely, [t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.... Id. § 1446(b). The thirty-day window for removal is designed to prevent “undue delay in removal and the concomitant waste of state judicial resources.” Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir.1997). If a case involves a single defendant, the operation of § 1446(b) is straightforward. The defendant must file the notice of removal within thirty days of service. When a case involves multiple defendants, the operation of § 1446(b) gets precarious, because, unlike § 1446(a), § 1446(b) does not speak in terms of multiple defendants. Clearly, if all of the defendants are served on the same day, the notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the date of service, and all the defendants must consent to and join the notice of removal. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir.1985) (noting that “all of the defendants must agree to the removal of the state court action”); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.2006) (noting that all served defendants must join in the notice of removal); Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 489 (7th Cir.1997) (same). However, if the defendants are served on different days, two questions arise. First, must the notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant or can the notice be filed within thirty days of service on the last-served defendant? Second, if the notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant, do all of the defendants have to join the notice within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant or can each defendant join within thirty-days of the date they are served? The first circuit court to tackle the defendants-served-on-different-days dilemma was the Fifth Circuit in Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.1986). In that case, the plaintiff filed an action in Louisiana state court and promptly served the then-existing defendants. Id. at 480. After a lengthy period of discovery, the plaintiff added two additional defendants. Id. The additional defendants promptly sought removal, with the consent of the original-served defendants. Id. In response, the plaintiff and the intervenorinsurer moved to remand the case to state court on the ground that the removal was untimely. Id. The district court denied the motion, and the intervenor-insurer sought and obtained permission to appeal. Id. On appeal, the Brown court reversed. After finding that the intervenor-insurer had standing to challenge the denial of the motion to remand, the Brown court observed that “[t]he general rule ... is that ‘[i]f the first served defendant abstains from seeking removal or does not effect a timely removal, subsequently served defendants cannot remove ... due to the rule of unanimity among defendants which is required for removal.’ ” Id. at 481 (quoting Tri-Cities Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressmen & Assistants’ Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.1970)). In so observing, the Brown court rejected the notion that the “general rule” was unfair because it prevented later-served defendants from persuading earlier-served defendants to remove the case: [W]e do not perceive the suggested unfairness to the subsequently added defendant who is merely not granted an opportunity that might have been available to others. A defendant who is added to a case in which a co-defendant has failed to seek removal is in no worse position than it would have been in if the co-defendant had opposed removal or were domiciled in the same state as the plaintiff. Id. at 482. The Brown court only answered the first question — when must the notice of removal be filed — posed by the defendants-served-on-different days dilemma. Two years later, however, in Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit addressed the second question, that is, whether later-served defendants must join the notice of removal within the first-served defendant’s thirty-day window. The court answered the question in the affirmative, adopting what is commonly referred to as the “First-Served Defendant Rule.” Id. at 1262-63. Succinctly put, the First-Served Defendant Rule requires a notice of removal to be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant and requires all defendants to join the notice of removal within the first-served defendant’s thirty-day window. In Getty Oil, three defendants were served, the first on September 3, 1986, the second on September 5, 1986, and the third on September 24, 1986. Id. at 1256. The first and second defendants petitioned for removal on September 26, 1986, but the third defendant joined the petition on October 24, 1986, which was thirty days after it was served but fifty-one days after the first defendant was served. Id. The Getty Oil court held that: (1) a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the date of service on the first-served defendant and (2) a later-served defendant must join the notice of removal “no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served.” Id. at 1263. In so holding, the Getty Oil court reasoned that the First-Served Defendant Rule promotes unanimity among the defendants without placing undue hardships on subsequently served defendants. Indeed, if a removal petition is filed by a served defendant and another defendant is served after the case is thus removed, the latter defendant may still either accept the removal or exercise its right to choose the state forum by making a motion to remand. Id. (footnote omitted). The court also noted that, “by restricting removal to instances in which the statute clearly permits it, the [First-Served Defendant Rule] is consistent with the trend to limit removal jurisdiction and with the axiom that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal.” Id. n. 13. Almost four years after Getty Oil, we addressed the two questions raised by the defendants-served-on-different-days dilemma and adopted what is commonly referred to as the “McKinney Intermediate Rule.” Like the First-Served Defendant Rule, the McKinney Intermediate Rule requires a notice of removal to be filed within the first-served defendant’s thirty-day window, but gives later-served defendants thirty days from the date they were served to join the notice of removal. In McKinney, a group of dismissed employees of Mayland Community College sued the college’s board of trustees in their individual and official capacities in North Carolina state court, alleging unlawful discharge. 955 F.2d at 925. Three of the twelve defendants were served on April 25, 1988, while eight others were served on May 19, 1988. Id. The three members of the first group and seven of the eight from the second group filed for removal on May 25, 1998, thirty days after service on the first three. Id. The defendants could not find the eighth defendant in the second group to obtain her consent to the notice of removal. Id. The plaintiffs served the final, twelfth defendant after the filing of the notice of removal. Id. The eighth and twelfth defendants joined in the notice of removal on June 20, 1998, which was the thirtieth day from the time of service on the eighth defendant and well within the time limit for the twelfth defendant, but more than thirty days after the first three defendants had been served. Id. In moving to remand the case to state court, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were required to consent to the notice of removal within thirty days of service on the first group of defendants. Id. The district court rejected that contention, holding that individual defendants have thirty days from the time they are served with process or with a complaint to join in an otherwise valid notice of removal. Id. Our decision in McKinney addressed both of Getty Oil’s holdings concerning the timeliness of removal. With regard to Getty Oil’s first holding, we noted our explicit agreement with that holding, stating that the first-served defendant “clearly must petition for removal within thirty days.” Id. at 926. In Footnote 3 of our opinion, we agreed with the necessary corollaries to the principle that a timely notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant: In a different situation, where B is served more than 30 days after A is served, two timing issues can arise, and the law is settled as to each. First, if A petitions for removal within 30 days, the case may be removed, and B can either join in the petition or move for remand .... Second, if A does not petition for removal within 30 days, the case may not be removed. Id. at 926 n. 3. With regard to Getty Oil’s second holding, that a later-served defendant must join the notice of removal within thirty days of the date of service on the first-served defendant, we rejected that holding. In doing so, we made three observations. First, we observed that nothing in § 1446(b) implied “in any way that later served defendants have less than thirty days in which to act.” Id. Second, we observed that it would be “inequitable” to require a later-served defendant to join a timely filed notice of removal within thirty days of the date of service on the first-served defendant. Id. at 927. Third, we observed that to require a later-served defendant to join a timely filed notice of removal within thirty days of the date of service on the first-served defendant would necessitate adding the term “first” before “defendant” in § 1446(b). Id. We then turned to plaintiffs’ argument that they should be entitled to know within a prescribed period of time whether the case will proceed in state or federal court. In rejecting this argument, we first noted that, if the plaintiffs wanted to know in which court they will be at the earliest possible date, they need only to make sure that all defendants are served at about the same time. Id. Second, we noted that the plaintiffs’ entitlement was no greater than the defendant’s right to remove a case that could be heard in federal court. Id. Finally, we considered a policy concern in McKinney, which was not present when Getty Oil was decided. In 1988, Congress amended § 1446(a) to make notices of removal subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 928. We observed that, as amended, § 1446(a) is a further reason to allow all defendants a full thirty days to investigate the appropriateness of removal. Id. Otherwise, a later-served defendant faces a Hobson’s Choice: either to join hurriedly in a notice of removal and face possible Rule 11 sanctions or to forego removal. Id. In the McKinney court’s view, Congress did not intend to impose such a Hobson’s Choice on a later-served defendant. Id. Since our decision in McKinney, three other circuits have addressed the defendants-served-on-different days dilemma and have rejected the First-Served Defendant Rule and the McKinney Intermediate Rule in favor of what is commonly referred to as the “Last-Served Defendant Rule.” See Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1209 (11th Cir.2008); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir.2001); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.1999). In a nutshell, the Last-Served Defendant Rule “permits each defendant, upon formal service of process, thirty days to file a notice of removal pursuant to § 1446(b),” Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1209, and “[ejarlierserved defendants may choose to join in a later-served defendant’s motion or not.” Id. at 1207. In Brierly, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action in Kentucky state court on May 12, 1994, naming two defendants. 184 F.3d at 530. The first was promptly served in June 1994, but the second was not served until the fall of 1995. Id. at 530-31. Within thirty days of being served, the second defendant filed a notice of removal which was consented to by the first defendant. Id. at 531. Thereafter, the district court denied the plaintiffs motion to remand. Id. In adopting the Last-Served Defendant Rule, the Brierly court opined that adopting the First-Served Defendant Rule would require the court to insert the word “ ‘first’ ” into § 1446(b). Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533. The court also observed that, “[i]f Congress had intended the 30-day removal period to commence upon service of the first defendant, it could have easily so provided.” Id. Finally, the court was persuaded that the Last-Served Defendant Rule was necessary “as a matter of fairness to later-served defendants.” Id. In Maraño, the plaintiff filed a fraud and breach of contract action in Missouri state court. 254 F.3d at 754. Two of the defendants were served on February 1, 2000, and two were served on February 3, 2000. Id. On March 3, 2000, thirty-one days after the February 1 service, but twenty-nine days after the February 3 service, all the defendants (including the fifth and final defendant who had not yet been served) jointly filed a notice of removal. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the district court denied. Id. In its analysis, the Maraño court outlined the holdings of the Fifth Circuit in Brown and Getty Oil, our circuit in McKinney, and the Sixth Circuit in Brierly and, without discussion, found none of the positions “particularly compelling” because they are all “susceptible to abuse and have potential to create inequities.” Id. at 756. However, the Maraño court was persuaded to adopt the Last-Served Defendant Rule based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers. Id. at 756-57. In Murphy Brothers, the Court held that a defendant’s time to remove “is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service.” 526 U.S. at 348, 119 S.Ct. 1322. According to the Maraño court, [In Murphy Brothers,] [t]he Court held that formal process is required, noting the difference between mere notice to a defendant and official service of process: “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” ... Thus, a defendant is “required to take action” as a defendant — that is, bound by the thirty-day limit on removal — “only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” ... The Court essentially acknowledged the significance of formal service to the judicial process, most notably the importance of service in the context of the time limits on removal (notwithstanding an earlier admonition by the Court in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941), for strict construction of the removal statute). We conclude that, if faced with the issue before us today, the Court would allow each defendant thirty days after receiving service within which to file a notice of removal, regardless of when — or if— previously served defendants had filed such notices. 254 F.3d at 756. In Bailey, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in Florida state court on February 28, 2006. 536 F.3d at 1204. The first defendant was served on May 12, 2006, the second on May 15, 2006, the third on May 19, 2006, and the fourth on June 22, 2006. Id. On July 24, 2006 (July 22 was a Saturday), the fourth-served defendant filed a notice of removal of the action based on complete diversity pursuant to § 1446(b). Id. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the district court denied. Id. On appeal, the Bailey court put forth a variety of reasons supporting its decision to adopt the Last-Served Defendant Rule. Id. at 1205-09. First, the court recognized that the LasWServed Defendant Rule was the more recent trend in the case law. Id. at 1205-06. Second, the court was driven by equitable considerations, expressing concern that the First-Served Defendant Rule: (1) causes later-served defendants to lose their statutory right of removal through no fault of their own; and (2) eliminates the opportunity for later-served defendants to persuade earlier-served defendants to seek removal. Id. at 1206-07. Third, the Bailey court reasoned that the First-Served Defendant Rule requires reading “first-served” into § 1446(b), whereas § 1446(b), “as written, could reasonably be read to permit each defendant a right to remove within thirty days of service on the individual defendant.” Id. at 1207. Fourth, the Bailey court was not convinced that the First-Served Defendant Rule was more consistent with the rule of unanimity than the Last-Served Defendant Rule Id. Finally, the Bailey court agreed with the Maraño court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers supported the endorsement of the Last-Served Defendant Rule. Id. at 1207-09. In our view, the McKinney Intermediate Rule is the most logical and faithful interpretation of the operation of § 1446(b). When interpreting any statute, we must first and foremost strive to implement congressional intent by examining the plain language of the statute. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Section 1446(b) says that if you are a defendant in a cause of action you- are under an obligation to seek removal within thirty days of receipt of the plaintiffs complaint. If you do not seek removal within the thirty-day window, you have forfeited your right to remove. Here, because the International did not seek removal within its thirty-day window, the plain language of § 1446(b) dictates that it forfeited its right to removal. The question, then, is whether we should decline to follow the plain language of § 1446(b) simply because there is more than one defendant in the case who was served on a different day. In our view, it defies logic to read § 1446(b) any differently based on this circumstance, because the language of § 1446(b) unequivocally requires action by a defendant (seeking removal within thirty days of being served), not inaction. Equally illogical is the proposition that a first-served defendant in a multiple-defendant case should believe he or she does not have to act simply because there will be later-served defendants in the case who may or may not file a notice of removal. In such a scenario, the first-served defendant’s excuse for failing to file a timely notice of removal borders on preposterous — “I did not file a notice of removal because I was ‘a’ defendant instead of ‘the’ defendant.” To be sure, it seems eminently reasonable that, in drafting § 1446(b), Congress intended for the first-served defendant to decide within his thirty-day window whether to remove the case to federal court or allow the case to remain in state court. Such routine removal decisions are made day-in and day-out in courts all across the Nation. If the first-served defendant decides not to remove, later-served defendants are not deprived of any rights under § 1446(b), because § 1446(b) does not prevent them from removing the case; rather, it is the rule of unanimity that does. In other words, once the first-served defendant elects to proceed in state court, the issue concerning removal is decided under the rule of unanimity. Alternatively, if the first-served defendant does file a notice of removal, the later-served defendants dictate whether the case remains in federal court, either by joining the notice or declining to do so. There is a “ ‘strong presumption’ that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent,” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135, 112 S.Ct. 515, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991), and it is only in rare and exceptional cases where this presumption is rebutted. Id. In this case, we see no reason to depart from applying the plain language of § 1446(b) and letting each defendant, beginning with the first-served defendant, decide whether the case should be removed. If the first-served defendant files a notice of removal, later-served defendants have ample time — thirty days from the date that each such defendant is served — to decide whether to join the notice of removal, thus avoiding the Hobson’s Choice we identified in McKinney. While the operation of § 1446(b) may appear unfair to some, such operation is an inevitable feature of a court of limited jurisdiction. Cf. Russell Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir.2001) (“There are several such bright line limitations on federal removal jurisdiction (e.g. the removal bar for instate defendants and the one year time limit for diversity removals) that some might regard as arbitrary and unfair. Such limitations, however, are an inevitable feature of a court system of limited jurisdiction that strictly construes the right to remove.”). The McKinney Intermediate Rule obviously avoids the fatal flaw in the Last-Served Defendant Rule: The Last-Served Defendant Rule only applies § 1446(b) to one defendant — the last-served. Innumerable defendants can intentionally ignore § 1446(b) if the last-served defendant can convince the earlier-served defendants that their intentional decision was in error. It strains credulity to conclude that Congress intended to allow defendants to flagrantly ignore § 1446(b). In contrast to the Last-Served Defendant Rule, the McKinney Intermediate Rule seeks to apply § 1446(b)’s requirement to act within thirty days of service to all defendants, including the first-and last-served. As noted above, the first-served defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days of service; later-served defendants have to join the notice within thirty days of service upon them. Interpreting § 1446(b)’s within thirty days of service requirement as applying to all defendants instead of just one, in our opinion, carries out Congress’ intent in drafting the statute, and avoids reading the words “first-served” or “last-served” into § 1446(b). It is also worth noting that, under the McKinney Intermediate Rule, the later-served defendants are in no worse position than they would have been if the parties in the case were not completely diverse or the first-served defendant (or any other defendant) had opposed removal. See Brown, 792 F.2d at 482 (“A defendant who is added to a case in which a co-defendant has failed to seek removal is in no worse position than it would have been in if the co-defendant had opposed removal or were domiciled in the same state as the plaintiff.”). As Judge Shedd aptly noted in his district court opinion in Branch, “[t]he Court sees no reason why [the first-served defendant’s] failure to remove in a timely manner should be viewed differently simply because another defendant is in the case.” 83 F.Supp.2d at 636. Finally, it is evident that the McKinney Intermediate Rule is in line with admonitions from the Supreme Court and this court that we should construe removal statutes narrowly and that doubts concerning removal should be resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction. The McKinney Intermediate Rule requires the first-served defendant to act in a timely manner to achieve removal. If later-served defendants desire removal, they need only join a notice of removal that has been filed in compliance with the time requirements of § 1446(b) and within thirty days of the date they were served. Such interpretation of § 1446(b) is narrow because it requires compliance from the outset. Moreover, to the extent there is doubt as to which rule is the most appropriate, it stands to reason that the doubt should be resolved in favor of the interpretation that requires initial — rather than later — compliance with § 1446(b). In sum, we adhere to the McKinney Intermediate Rule, as this court has for close to nineteen years. Application of such rule mandates that we remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand the case to state court, because there was no notice of removal filed within thirty days of the date the International was served. Ill A The courts following the Lasi^Served Defendant Rule have put forth numerous rationales supporting their adoption of the rule. None of them survives close scrutiny. First, the court in Bailey observed “that the trend in recent case law” favored the Last-Served Defendant Rule. 536 F.3d at 1205. However, a recent interpretation of § 1446(b) that is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language and results in a broad construction of the statute simply cannot be endorsed, for obvious reasons. Second, the courts in Bailey and Maraño pointed to inequities that flow from the First-Served Defendant Rule and the McKinney Intermediate Rule, in particular, that the LasfrServed Defendant Rule is necessary to allow later-served defendants an opportunity to persuade earlier-served defendants to join a notice of removal. Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1206-07; Marano, 254 F.3d at 755; see also Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 (noting that “as a matter of fairness to later-served defendants,” it endorsed the Last-Served Defendant Rule). However, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to protect this power of persuasion when it enacted § 1446(b). In fact, this power of persuasion rationale creates such an inequity of its own that it is surprising that the Bailey and Maraño courts relied upon it at all. The power of persuasion rationale necessarily treats multiple defendants and single defendants differently. A single defendant who deliberately chooses not to remove a case cannot change his mind after the thirty-day window closes. However, if that single defendant is the first-served in a multiple-defendant case, that defendant gets another bite at the apple simply because he is part of a multiple-defendant case. There simply is no language in § 1446(b) that can be construed to suggest that Congress intended to treat single defendants and multiple-defendants differently in determining the timeliness of removal. Similarly, there is no language in § 1446(b) suggesting that Congress intended to treat multiple defendants served on the same day differently than multiple defendants served on different days. Equally flawed is the notion that the McKinney Intermediate Rule is inequitable to later-served defendants because, “through no fault of their own, [the later-served defendants] might ... lose their statutory right to seek removal.” Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1206. This inequity is illusory, because it assumes that later-served defendants can insist that a case be removed to federal court. However, if the first-served defendant (or any other defendant) opposes removal, the case cannot be removed “through no fault” of the later-served defendants. Third, the courts in Bailey and Brierly implied that the term “the defendant” in § 1446(b) is naturally read to be “each defendant,” and this natural reading means that “each defendant” has thirty-days to file a notice of removal. Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207; Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533. This statutory slight-of-hand allowed the Bailey and Brierly courts to get around the obvious import of their interpretation of § 1446(b) — that it inserts the term “last-served” between “the” and “defendant.” But this removal of the definite article “the” does nothing to help the Bailey and Brierly courts’ cause, because the statute read as such requires each defendant to file a timely notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (“The notice of removal ... shall be filed within thirty days.... ”). Under the interpretation of the Bailey and Brierly courts, each defendant is not filing a timely notice of removal, only the last-served defendant is so filing. Moreover, under this interpretation, each defendant is not acting within § 1446(b)’s thirty days of service requirement. In any event, even with the insertion of the word “each,” if the first-served defendant fails to file a timely notice of removal, then the rule of unanimity through the decision of the first-served defendant — not § 1446(b) — operates to defeat removal. In effect, the Bailey and Brierly courts change the word “shall” in § 1446(b) to “may.” For obvious reasons, we are constrained to reject such a drastic change to the statute. Fourth, the Bailey court observed that the Last-Served Defendant Rule is consistent with the rule of unanimity because it allows earlier-served defendants to join a later-served defendant’s notice of removal. Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207. This observation is really beside the point. All three of the rules before the court are consistent with the rule of unanimity, because each of them requires all of the defendants at some point in time to unanimously agree to removal. The more salient question concerns when the forum selection decision must be made. The Lash-Served Defendant Rule represents the broadest interpretation of § 1446(b), resulting in the possibility that the forum selection question may not be resolved for quite some time, especially if discovery reveals that additional defendants should be named or if some defendants are difficult to serve. Cf. Brown, 792 F.2d at 481-82 (holding that removal was not warranted where later-served defendants were added to a four-year old state court action because no notice of removal was filed within thirty days of service on the first-served defendant). One could envision other scenarios that reduce the Lasi^Served Defendant Rule to a tool to forum-shop. Put simply, embracing the broadest interpretation of § 1446(b) simply is inconsistent with the principle that we must narrowly construe removal statutes. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868. Such principle necessarily means that we penalize plaintiffs, as well as defendants, that sit on or waive their removal rights. Cf. Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir.1993) (“Unquestionably, a party may implicitly waive its right to remove a case by failing timely to file a notice of removal. Likewise, a party may implicitly waive its right to contest the removal of a case on procedural grounds by failing timely to move for remand.”) (footnotes omitted); DeLia v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 189, 190 n. 2 (D.Mass.2009) (denying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) motion in removed case alleging constructive discharge; noting that not all defendants consented to removal, but that the plaintiff, by failing to raise it within thirty days of the removal, waived the defect). Holding otherwise essentially engrafts an “interest of justice” standard into § 1446(b), allowing a court to relax the timeliness requirements of § 1446(b) when the interests of justice so require. Obviously, no such standard exists in the statute. Put simply, removal statutes must be construed narrowly, Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, and any doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court, Dixon, 369 F.3d at 816. Instead of construing the statute to encourage defendants to act in timely compliance with § 1446(b), the courts embracing the Last-Served Defendant Rule have done just the opposite. And to the extent there is doubt about the propriety of removal, such doubt must not be resolved in favor of an interpretation of § 1446(b) that requires only one defendant, among many defendants, to comply with the statute. Fifth, the Bailey and Maraño courts relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers. Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207-09; Marano, 254 F.3d at 756-57. However, it must be emphasized that Murphy Brothers did not involve multiple defendants. It involved a single defendant, and the issue to be decided was which service event triggered the running of the thirty-day window. 526 U.S. at 347, 119 S.Ct. 1322. The plaintiff argued that the January 29, 1996 service of a faxed courtesy copy of the complaint triggered the running of the thirty-day window; the defendant countered that February 12, 1996, the date of formal service in accordance with local law, triggered the running of the thirty-day window. Id. at 348, 119 S.Ct. 1322. The Court held that a defendant’s time to remove “is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service.” Id. The Court did not address, or even mention, the First-Served Defendant Rule, the McKinney Intermediate Rule, or the Last-Served Defendant Rule, or, for that matter, consider how to calculate the period for removal in a case involving multiple defendants served at different times. Indeed, Murphy Brothers was based on the principle that “[a]n individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Id. at 347, 119 S.Ct. 1322. That principle is neither threatened nor implicated in this case. The Marano and Bailey courts also seemed concerned that the First-Served Defendant Rule and/or the McKinney Intermediate Rule required or obligated later-served defendants to engage in litigation prior to service, thus running afoul of Murphy Brothers, because the Firsts Served Defendant Rule and/or the McKinney Intermediate Rule obligated the later-served defendants to seek removal prior to their receipt of formal process. Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1208; Marano, 254 F.3d at 756. This reliance on Murphy Brothers rests on a faulty premise — that the first-served defendant will always consent to the removal. Without the filing of a notice of removal within the initial thirty-day window, participation by later-served defendants at that juncture of the litigation is inconsequential, as a result of the rule of unanimity, a rule that understandably was not implicated in Murphy Brothers. B In its brief, the UAW argues that the Last-Served Defendant Rule is necessary to prevent unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys from manipulating the service of process system in order to defeat removal. Obviously missing from this argument is any empirical evidence even remotely suggesting that such manipulation has occurred or is currently occurring in the state and federal courts. In fact, the only empirical evidence before the court here are the facts of this case, which do not favor the UAW. Indeed, the International, Local 1183, and Local 1212 were all represented by the same attorneys and the most sophisticated of the three defendants, the International, was served first and deliberately chose not to remove the case. IV The separate opinion of our good colleague concurring in the judgment embraces the Last-Served Defendant Rule for essentially the same reasons espoused by the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. However, like the analysis in the cases from our sister circuits, we find the analysis of the separate opinion wanting. First, the separate opinion seems more concerned with what § 1446(b) does not say rather than what it does say. Post at 39-40. Quite clearly, § 1446(b) requires a single defendant to file a notice of removal. If a single defendant does not file a notice of removal, the case cannot be removed. The question before us, then, is whether, under the language of § 1446(b), removal can be achieved by that single defendant where he or she is part of a larger, multiple-defendant case and some later-served defendant (served out-side the single defendant’s thirty-day window) convinces the single defendant (and all other defendants) that removal is appropriate. The language of § 1446(b) simply does not allow for removal under such circumstances, because such language neither is permissive in nature, nor does it seek to protect the right of persuasion for later-served defendants. Second, and along a similar vein, the separate opinion goes on at length about how its interpretation of § 1446(b) adheres to the statute’s plain language and does not add words to the statute. But the separate opinion’s interpretation of § 1446(b) does just that — it adds the word “each” to the statute. Also, the separate opinion never recognizes the consequences of its textual change, that is, that such interpretation changes “shall” to “may” in § 1446(b). Moreover, the separate opinion’s interpretation of § 1446(b) is premised on the assumption that each defendant in a multiple-defendant case enjoys a procedural right to remove a case. Such assumption is incorrect. Rather, each defendant does not enjoy a procedural right to remove a case, because such right is conditioned on each and every defendant joining the notice of removal. In other words, any defendant can defeat removal. Thus, at the end of the day, the separate opinion’s interpretation of § 1446(b) seeks to protect a right that does not exist in the language of the statute, that is, the right of the last-served defendant to persuade the earlier-served defendants that removal is appropriate. Put another way, the majority’s gripe is not necessarily with the language of § 1446(b), but rather with the perceived unfairness in the rule of unanimity, which allows one defendant to thwart the wishes of his or her fellow defendants. Third, the separate opinion stresses that its construction of § 1446(b) is in line with the principle that we strictly construe removal statutes. Post at 41. Of course, such stress is premised on the same erroneous assumption described above — that each defendant in a multiple-defendant case enjoys a procedural right to remove a case. In any event, the separate opinion’s reliance on the principle of strict construction suffers from another flaw. The strict construction principle is designed to protect the interests of the state, as removal manifestly deprives a state from preserving the right of one of its citizens to proceed in state court. It follows, then, that strict construction requires us to limit the circumstances in which removal can be obtained, not expand them. Yet, this is exactly what the separate opinion seeks to achieve. Rather than limiting the time in which the rights of the parties are fixed, thus preserving state interests, the separate opinion seeks to broaden the time. Rather than requiring the first-served defendant to decide if he or she should proceed in state or federal court, the separate opinion would allow such defendant another bite at the apple. The list could go on, but suffice-it-to-say the separate opinion pays only lip service to the time-honored principle of strict construction. And it of course is silent on the principle that any doubts concerning the propriety of removal should be resolved against removal. Fourth, the separate opinion also observes that its embracement of the Last-Served Defendant Rule is “strengthened” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy Brothers. In doing so, the separate opinion recognizes that Murphy Brothers is not directly on point. Post at 45, 46. The separate opinion essentially adopts the reasoning of the Maraño and Bailey courts, so no extended discussion is necessary. Succinctly put, Murphy Brothers did not involve multiple defendants and any reliance here on Murphy Brothers rests on the faulty assumptions that each defendant enjoys a procedural right to remove a case and that each defendant will always consent to removal. Finally, the separate opinion relies on a perceived inequity in the McKinney Intermediate Rule, namely, that the McKinney Intermediate Rule prevents the last-served defendant from persuading earlier-served defendants to join a notice of removal. Post at 48-49. In Part III, we have adequately addressed this perceived inequity. Suffice-it-to-say that: (1) there is no language in § 1446(b) to suggest that Congress intended to protect this power of persuasion when it enacted § 1446(b); (2) this perceived inequity relies on the same faulty assumption mentioned above; and (3) the power of persuasion rationale is manifestly unfair, in the sense that it treats multiple defendants and single defendants differently. V In summary, Chief Judge Ervin writing for the McKinney court got it right back in February 1992. The McKinney Intermediate Rule adheres to the plain language of § 1446(b), but, more importantly, recognizes that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that we should construe removal statutes narrowly, and that any doubts should be resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decision holding that the joint notice of removal was timely filed and remand the case to the district court with instructions to remand the case to state court. Given that removal was not proper, we must refrain from addressing the Retirees’ other arguments, namely, that their claims are not preempted by federal labor law and that their claims are not barred by the six-month statute of limitation contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.... It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Columbia Venture, LLC v. Dewberry & Davis, LLC, 604 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir.) (“We have held that federal preemption of state law is a constitutional question because it is premised on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and when a party provides alternative independent state law grounds for disposing of a case, courts should not decide the constitutional question of preemption before considering the state law grounds.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 649, 178 L.Ed.2d 480, 2010 WL 3644597 (2010); Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 212 F.3d 863, 865 (4th Cir.2000) (discussing constitutional nature of preemption analysis); see also H & R Block E. Enter., Inc. v. Raskin, 591 F.3d 718, 723-24 (4th Cir.2010) (applying Bell Atlantic to remand the case for consideration of whether the statute applied to the plaintiff before deciding whether it was preempted). VACATED AND REMANDED. AGEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: While I concur in the judgment of the Court, I respectfully disagree with the basis upon which the majority opinion rests that judgment. As explained below, I believe the last-served defendant rule represents the more accurate and appropriate reading of the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Therefore, I do not join the majority’s adoption of the McKinney rule and would hold that the UAW’s notice of removal was timely. Nonetheless, because I do not find that complete preemption applies to the Retirees’ claims, I would remand the case to the state court because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, I concur only in the Court’s judgment remanding this case to the Maryland state court. I. The threshold issue to consider is whether the notice of removal was timely. See Fakouri v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 824 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir.1987) (“ ‘In reviewing a denial of a motion to remand a removed case, we look to whether the case was properly removed to federal court in the first place.’ ” (quoting Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir.1985))); see also Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 456-57 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that “[wjithout proper removal, a state-court action does not belong in federal court in the first place,” finding removal was improper, and declining to “express [an] opinion on the merits”). If the notice was untimely, we need not consider the UAW’s claim of complete preemption, as an invalid notice of removal would require a remand to the Maryland state court. On the other hand, if the UAW’s notice of removal was timely, we must then consider whether the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the Retirees’ claims through complete preemption. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides: The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.... (emphasis added.) As is self-evident, the statute speaks only in terms of a singular defendant and does not explicitly address the timeliness of removal in cases involving multiple defendants, as in the case at bar. “All pertinent sections of the removal statute contemplate cases with more than one defendant, except for § 1446(b). This conspicuous omission has created the most serious statutory construction problem when removal is sought in multidefendant actions.” Howard B. Stravitz, Recocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L.Rev. 185, 200 (2002) (footnote omitted). Application of § 1446(b) thus poses a conundrum when multiple defendants are served at different times, pa