Full opinion text
OPINION PER CURIAM: This appeal concerns whether the process of establishing management guidelines governing 11.5 million acres of federal land in the Sierra Nevada region complied with both the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the substantive restrictions of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). Sierra Forest Legacy, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society (collectively “Sierra Forest”) appeal a largely unfavorable summary judgment against them and a favorable but limited remedial order in their NEPA and NFMA suit challenging the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment (“the 2004 Framework”) and the Basin Project, a timber harvesting project approved under the 2004 Framework. The State of California also appeals a summary judgment against it and a limited remedial order in a related NEPA action. The district court found that the U.S. Forest Service and related federal defendants (collectively “the Forest Service”) violated NEPA by failing to consider alternative actions using the same modeling techniques and management priorities, but the court rejected several other NEPA and NFMA claims. The district court ordered the Forest Service to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to remedy the NEPA error and denied Sierra Forest and California’s requests to enjoin implementation of the 2004 Framework in the interim. Sierra Forest and California argue that the Forest Service violated NEPA both by failing to consider short-term impacts of the 2004 Framework and by failing to disclose and rebut expert opposition. Sierra Forest separately contends that the Forest Service violated NEPA when approving the Basin Project by failing to analyze cumulative impacts to sensitive species. Sierra Forest also argues that the 2004 Framework violates NFMA by failing to maintain viable populations of old forest wildlife. Sierra Forest further argues that the Basin Project specifically violates NFMA by failing to comply with the 2004 Framework’s management indicator species monitoring requirement, despite a 2007 Amendment to the 2004 Framework that purports retroactively to eliminate the monitoring requirement. Both Sierra Forest and California also contend that the district court abused its discretion when considering the equitable factors governing entry of a permanent injunction. The Forest Service and numerous intervenors contest these assertions and assert several procedural bars to relief. For the reasons that follow, a majority affirms the district court’s decision on the merits of Sierra Forest and California’s NEPA claim. Specifically, we hold that Sierra Forest and California have standing to assert a facial NEPA claim against the 2004 Framework but that the Framework SEIS adequately addressed short-term impacts to old forest wildlife and disclosed and rebutted public opposition. Similarly, we hold that the Forest Service did not violate NEPA when approving the Basin Project because the Forest Service adequately addressed cumulative impacts of the proposed management action. And we hold that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to update the alternatives from the 2001 Framework SEIS to reflect new modeling techniques used in the 2004 Framework SEIS. We vacate, however, the district court’s orders granting a limited remedy and remand for reconsideration of the equities of a “substantive” injunction without giving undue deference to government experts. Judge Noonan dissents for the reasons explained in his concurrence in Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1024-26 (9th Cir.2009) (Noonan, J., concurring). We remand also because we reverse the district court’s decision on Sierra Forest’s NFMA claim. A majority agrees to reverse, but for differing reasons. Judge Fisher would affirm. Judges Reinhardt and Noonan would reverse. Judge Noonan would reverse for the reasons stated in his previous concurrence in Rey. Judge Reinhardt’s holding is narrower, and therefore controls the disposition of this case. Judge Reinhardt holds that the Forest Service lacks power retroactively to amend forest plans, so the 2007 Amendment to the 2004 Framework did not change the population monitoring requirements for management indicator species applicable to the Basin Project. We therefore remand for the district court to determine in the first instance whether, when it approved the Project, the Forest Service had complied with the 2004 Framework’s population monitoring requirements. The district court should consider the 2004 Framework’s requirements as they were at the time the Project was approved, not as the Forest Service represented them to be following the 2007 Amendment. Sierra Forest’s challenge to the 2004 Framework itself is not presently ripe for judicial consideration because the district court has yet to consider whether the Basin Project complied with the 2004 Framework as it existed at the time of the Project’s approval. Until the district court decides whether the Project complies with the 2004 Framework without the 2007 Amendment, it should not consider Sierra Forest’s facial challenge to that Framework. Judge Fisher would affirm the district court on the NFMA claim. He would hold that the Forest Service had power retroactively to amend the 2004 Framework and thus that the species monitoring claim related to the Basin Project is moot. Having concluded that the Basin Project complied with the amended 2004 Framework, Judge Fisher would hold Sierra Forest’s NFMA challenge to the 2004 Framework is ripe, as applied in the Basin Project. He would further hold, however, that the adaptive management provisions of the 2004 Framework applied in the Basin Project do not violate NFMA. There are thus four separate opinions in this case. First, a NEPA opinion written by Judge Fisher and joined by Judge Reinhardt appears as Parts I-VI of the decision. Second, a NFMA opinion written by Judge Reinhardt appears as Part VII. Third, a dissent by Judge Fisher on the NFMA issue follows Part VII. Fourth, an opinion by Judge Noonan concurring in the result on the NFMA issue, and dissenting from the NEPA opinion, concludes the decision. FISHER, Circuit Judge: I. Background A. The 2004 Framework In January 2001, the U.S. Forest Service completed the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment and an accompanying Rule of Decision (collectively “the 2001 Framework”), the conclusion of a 10-year comprehensive review process. The 2001 Framework significantly altered guidelines for management of 10 national forests and one management unit, which collectively include 11.5 million acres in the Sierra Nevada region of California. The 2001 Framework restricted logging based on overlapping guidelines concerning tree size, canopy closure and the presence of sensitive species including the California spotted owl, the northern goshawk (a bird of prey), the Pacific fisher (a small carnivorous mammal), the pine marten (another small carnivorous mammal), the willow flycatcher (a small bird) and the Yosemite toad. Less than a year later, the Forest Service began a review of the 2001 Framework to address six new policy priorities: fuel treatments, compatibility with the National Fire Plan, implementation of pilot projects outlined in the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2104 note (HFQLG Act), impact on grazing permit holders, impact on recreational users and impact on local communities. In 2003, the Forest Service released a draft SEIS explaining proposed changes to the 2001 Framework. The Forest Service sought internal review from both its Watershed, Fish, Wildlife, Air and Rare Plants staff and a science consistency review team, as well as interagency review from the Environmental Protection Agency and Fish and Wildlife Service. The State of California also submitted comments on the draft SEIS. The Forest Service received over 50,000 public comments, including approximately 1,300 individual letters. Numerous experts presented vigorous critiques of the plan for its lack of emphasis on species preservation and purported assumptions concerning fire ecology. In 2004, the Forest Service released the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment and final SEIS. The 2004 Framework significantly liberalizes management restrictions, most notably by emphasizing mechanical thinning over controlled burns and increasing the maximum size of trees subject to logging from either six or 20 inches diameter at breast height to 30 inches, subject to minimum canopy retention levels and maintenance of specified percentages of existing tree volume. The 2004 Framework maintains specific protections for California spotted owls both in protected activity centers around nests and in home range core areas. On the other hand, the 2004 Framework permits broad implementation of the HFQLG Act, which loosens logging restrictions in specified areas in order to experiment with fire suppression techniques such as Community Defense Zones and Defensible Fuel Profile Zones. Finally, the 2004 Framework alters grazing limitations to permit pasture use outside of breeding periods in areas known to contain willow flycatchers — a small bird — and Yosemite toads and would allow for site-specific waivers of any limitation subject to development of local management plans. The SEIS included over 130 pages of responses to public comments. After the Regional Forester decided to select the 2004 Framework, members of the public submitted 6,241 administrative appeals. The Chief of the Forest Service denied the appeals, with instructions that the regional forester provide supplemental information concerning adaptive monitoring, a system under which the Forest Service will continuously assess the effects of management on sensitive species and adjust practices accordingly. The Under Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment affirmed the appeal decision a few months later. B. Basin Project Also in 2004, the Forest Service released an environmental assessment (EA) for the Basin Project, a timber harvesting project designed to implement the 2004 Framework. The Basin Project would harvest timber in a 40,000-acre area of the Plumas National Forest, including limited individual tree selection and group selection (removal of most trees in one-half- to two-acre clusters). The EA notes both direct and cumulative effects on the California spotted owl, northern goshawk, willow flycatcher and forest carnivores and concludes that “none of [the Basin Project’s] anticipated direct, indirect, or cumulative effects, considering both context and intensity, is expected to constitute a significant environmental effect, as that term is defined in the NEPA regulations.” (Emphasis in original.) C. Procedural History Sierra Forest Legacy, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society are membership organizations dedicated to the protection and restoration of the environment. Their individual members use and enjoy the Sierra Nevada mountains, including searching for and observing rare wildlife. The State of California contains numerous national forests and owns large tracts of land in the Sierra Nevada region. Sierra Forest and California filed separate actions in 2005, both challenging the adequacy of the 2004 Framework under NEPA. Sierra Forest additionally asserted violations of NFMA and attacked specific projects. The federal government moved to dismiss California’s complaint for lack of standing, and the district court granted the motion with leave to file an amended complaint. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211, 2005 WL 1719892 (E.D.Cal. July 18, 2005) (“California v. USDA I ”). California filed an amended complaint soon thereafter, and the Forest Service did not renew its motion to dismiss. The district court granted numerous entities defendant-intervenor status in both cases, including the Quincy Library Group, the American Forest and Paper Association and the California Cattlemen’s Association. The parties in both suits cross-moved for summary judgment. While the motions remained pending, Sierra Forest filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against implementation of the 2004 Framework in three specific projects, which the district court denied from the bench. See Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign v. Rey, No. 2:05-cv-0205, 2007 WL 3034931, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 16, 2007) (“Sierra Forest I ”), rev’d sub nom. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2009). In a subsequent written opinion, the district court found that Sierra Forest was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims, that the three specific projects Sierra Forest sought to enjoin were unlikely to harm forests or species irreparably and that the balance of hardships and public interest favored permitting the government to carry out logging. See id. at *7-*ll. On appeal, we reversed and remanded. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 526 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.2008) (“Sierra Forest II”), withdrawn and superseded, 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2009). Specifically, we held that the district court had abused its discretion by concluding that “[the Forest Service] complied with NEPA’s requirement to ‘[rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.’ ” Id. at 1233 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (2000)). We additionally concluded that at an interim stage the equities favored Sierra Forest and instructed the district court “to grant immediately a preliminary injunction on the three proposed projects to the extent that they are inconsistent with the 2001 [Framework].” Id. at 1233-34. In response to a petition for panel rehearing and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), we withdrew Sierra Forest II and issued a superseding opinion. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2009) (“Sierra Forest IV”). We reiterated that Sierra Forest was likely to succeed on the merits of its NEPA claim and specified that the Forest Service had introduced new management objectives and modeling techniques in the 2004 SEIS without applying them to the full range of alternatives. See id. at 1021-22. We then remanded for application of proper legal standards in the first instance and expressed “ ‘no opinion as to whether an injunction should issue.’ ” Id. at 1024 (quoting Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir.1987)). After we decided Sierra Forest II but before we granted the Forest Service’s petition for review and issued Sierra Forest IV, the district court resolved the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign v. Rey, 573 F.Supp.2d 1316 (E.D.Cal.2008) (“Sierra Forest III”); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-0211, 2008 WL 3863479 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (“California v. USDA II”). In both cases, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, with the exception of the NEPA alternatives claim, on which it granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. See Sierra Forest III, 573 F.Supp.2d at 1353; California v. USDA II, 2008 WL 3863479, at *28. In Sierra Forest III, the district court first found that the 1982 regulations implementing NFMA, rather than the 2005 regulations, applied to the 2004 Framework and that the NFMA claim was ripe for adjudication “to the extent its provisions are implicated within [Sierra Forest’s] challenge to the site-specific Basin Project.” 573 F.Supp.2d at 1327-29. However, on the merits the court found that the Forest Service “did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the [Basin] Project would maintain species viability concurrently with meeting other multiple-use objectives.” Id. at 1333. The district court also found no NFMA violation due to the lack of monitoring, concluding that monitoring requirements under NFMA regulations did not dictate the particular requirements contained in the 2004 Framework and that those requirements had been removed by the 2007 Amendment to the 2004 Framework. See id. at 1333-1337. The district court similarly denied Sierra Forest’s NEPA claims, finding that “the SEIS does recognize the importance of addressing short term impacts,” which were further mitigated by adaptive management strategies, id. at 1338-42, and that the SEIS considered opposing scientific viewpoints and acknowledged scientific uncertainty, see id. at 1342-45. The court also found that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in violation of NEPA by concentrating its 2004 Framework cumulative effects analysis on projected reductions in stand-replacing fires resulting from intensified management or by relying on the 2004 Framework cumulative effects analysis in the Basin EA. See id. at 1346-47,1352-53. The district court next found that the Forest Service permitted adequate public participation, as required by NEPA, when preparing the Basin EA. See id. at 1348-51. Finally, the district court found that the Forest Service did violate NEPA by failing to consider an adequate range of alternatives, because the Forest Service had not updated alternatives set out in the 2001 Framework SEIS to reflect new modeling techniques used in the 2004 Framework SEIS. See id. at 1347-48. In California v. USDA II, the district court first concluded that the State had standing to challenge the 2004 Framework based on its “ ‘responsibilities, powers, and assets’ ” concerning “wildlife, water, state-owned land, and public trust lands in and around the Sierra Nevada.” 2008 WL 3863479, at *5-*6 (quoting City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2004)). The court then rejected California’s broad Administrative Procedure Act challenge, finding that the Forest Service had adequately articulated “ ‘reasoned analysis’ in adopting the provisions of the 2004 Framework” concerning fuels management, California spotted owl impacts and grazing. Id. at *6-*13 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). The district court next found that the Forest Service had undertaken the analysis required by NEPA concerning old forest conditions and species including the California spotted owl, willow flycatcher and Yosemite toad. See id. at *14-*23. The court also found that the Forest Service had adequately considered opposing scientific viewpoints and uncertainty and had explained the concept and utility of adaptive management. See id. at *23-*27. Again, however, the district court found that the Forest Service did violate NEPA by failing to consider an adequate range of alternatives that all relied on the same modeling techniques. See id. at *27-*28. In a separate opinion addressing both cases, the district court granted a limited remedy for inadequacies in the NEPA alternatives analysis. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 670 F.Supp.2d 1106 (E.D.Cal.2009) (“Sierra Forest V”). Rejecting Sierra Forest’s and California’s requests to enjoin implementation of the 2004 Framework, the court first found that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a “substantive” injunction for a “procedural” NEPA violation. Id at 1110-11. The district court also found that traditional injunction standards — specifically the public interest and the balance of hardships — did not favor an injunction setting aside the 2004 Framework. See id at 1111-13. Rather, the court ordered the Forest Service “to prepare another supplemental EIS on the[2004] Framework, one that meets the range of alternatives and analytical consistency identified by the Ninth Circuit in its decision on the preliminary injunction portion of this case” by May 1, 2010. Id at 1113. The district court entered judgment, and Sierra Forest and California timely appealed. The Forest Service also entered a notice of appeal in Sierra Forest’s appeal, but we granted the Forest Service’s subsequent motion for voluntary dismissal. See Order, Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, No. 10-15376 (9th Cir. May 10, 2010). Sierra Forest moved for an injunction pending appeal, which the district court denied. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1207-14 (E.D.Cal.2010) (“Sierra Forest VI ”). However, the district court granted Sierra Forest’s unopposed request to delay completion of a SEIS integrating new alternatives analysis until after resolution of the merits appeal. See id at 1214. Sierra Forest then requested that we enjoin implementation of the 2004 Framework pending appeal. We denied the motion with leave to refile because Sierra Forest had presented no evidence that ground would be broken in projects named in its complaint — Empire, Basin and Slapjack — during the pendency of its appeal. See Order, Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, No. 09-17796 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2010). After argument Sierra Forest filed another motion for an injunction pending appeal, presenting evidence that logging was imminent in Empire, Basin and Slapjack. We granted the motion in part and enjoined logging in those three projects “that is inconsistent with the 2001 Framework, except such logging as may occur within the wildland urban intermix defense and threat zones, as defined in the” 2004 Framework SEIS. Order, Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, No. 09-17796 (9th Cir. July 23, 2010). That injunction remains in place. II. Jurisdiction The district court had jurisdiction over Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and entered judgment on December 18, 2009. Sierra Forest filed a notice of appeal two weeks before judgment, which we “treat[] as filed on the date of and after the entry” of judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2). The district court had jurisdiction over California v. U.S. Department of Agriculture under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and entered judgment on December 7, 2009. California filed a timely notice of appeal. The Forest Service contends that we nevertheless lack jurisdiction because the orders from which Sierra Forest and California appeal are not final. The district court ordered an agency remand for the Forest Service to prepare another SEIS to correct defects in the NEPA alternatives analysis, and an agency remand is ordinarily final only for purposes of a government appeal. See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004). Sierra Forest argues that the judgment is final for practical purposes, given that the draft SEIS already released by the Forest Service demonstrates that “the remand will not address even the NEPA violation identified by” Sierra Forest IV, “much less the additional violations of NEPA and NFMA” that Sierra Forest alleges on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides us with jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,” subject to exceptions inapplicable here. “[T]he requirement of finality is to be given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’ ” Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). We have held that a remand order is final where (1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable. Collord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 154 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir.1998). Because we apply a practical construction to the finality requirement, however, these are considerations, rather than strict prerequisites. See, e.g., Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that an agency remand that would not foreclose a later appeal was nevertheless “final and appealable”). In Alsea Valley Alliance, we addressed an appeal from a district court order invalidating the listing of a particular population of salmon as “threatened” under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and ordering the National Marine Fisheries Service to conduct further analysis consistent with the opinion. 358 F.3d at 1183. We dismissed an appeal by a group of intervenors for lack of jurisdiction, based on the absence of a final judgment, and held that “only agencies compelled to refashion then-own rules face the unique prospect of being deprived of review altogether.” Id. The decision depended on the possibility “that the action taken by the Service on remand will provide the [appellant] with all the relief it seeks,” in which case any decision by the court of appeals “could prove entirely unnecessary.” Id. at 1185. On other hand, in Skagit County we held that a remand order may be final when the broad relief sought could not be achieved through the action the district court directed the agency to undertake, in that case a “meaningless remand” for recalculation of a portion of the claim, in other words “a party with no cake.” 80 F.3d at 384. We similarly held in Pauly v. U.S. Department of Agriculture that a narrow partial remand for a “mechanical recalculation” does not preclude appellate review of the underlying claims because the district court’s opinion is “practically final.” 348 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2003); see also Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir.2010) (“Pit River II”) (“Alsea did not announce a hard-and-fast rule prohibiting a non-agency litigant from appealing a remand order.”). It is theoretically possible that on remand the Forest Service could reconsider alternatives from the 2001 Framework in light of modeling and policy changes reflected in the 2004 Framework SEIS and conclude that one of those alternatives is preferable to the 2004 Framework. However, the final judgment rule deals in practice, not theory. The narrow injunction both left the 2004 Framework in place and placed a judicial imprimatur on the vast majority of the challenged SEIS. Moreover, the Forest Service has already released a draft SEIS that updates the NEPA alternatives analysis, and that SEIS concludes without detailed analysis that the modified alternatives would not “fulfill the purpose and need for the proposed action.” As a practical matter, the work of both the district court and the agency is complete. Moreover, the three considerations we articulated in Collord illustrate the practical finality of the district court’s decision. There is no question that the district court decided numerous legal issues distinct from those to be addressed in the agency remand. Although the district court’s order would not “force[ ] the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule,” it permits adherence to rules that plaintiffs continue to challenge and the Forest Service continues to defend on appeal, “which may result in a wasted proceeding.” Collord, 154 F.3d at 935. The Forest Service recognized the inefficiency of such procedures by acquiescing to Sierra Forest’s request to stay the remedy pending appeal. Finally, although review would not be foreclosed after further administrative proceedings, we have ignored this requirement in the face of a “cakeless” remand. See Skagit County, 80 F.3d at 384. Our recent decision in Pit River II provides a useful counterpoint. There we held that an agency remand for an entirely new EIS, along with mandatory consultation with the plaintiff Indian tribe, did not constitute a final judgment subject to review. See 615 F.3d at 1073-78. Unlike the partially erroneous NEPA analysis found by the district court in this case, the agencies in Pit River II had failed entirely to engage in the required NEPA analysis prior to a disputed lease extension. See id. at 1072-73. We also noted that the Pit River Tribe would “have an opportunity to participate in the agencies’ processes on remand” and that it was “possible that the agencies may decide that no geothermal power production should occur on the land,” obviating the need for appellate review. Id. at 1076. This broad remand stands in stark contrast to the correction ordered in this case. For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgments are final and therefore subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We therefore have jurisdiction over Sierra Forest’s and California’s appeals. III. Standard of Review Standing, ripeness and mootness are questions of law that we review de novo. See Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir.2010) (standing); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir.2009) (ripeness); Siskiyou Regional Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 559 (9th Cir.2009) (mootness). We also “review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” California ex rel. Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1011. “Agency decisions that allegedly violate ... NEPA and[the] NFMA are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), and may be set aside only if they are'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’ ” Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and [federal courts do] not substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency. Rather, [courts] will reverse a decision as arbitrary and capricious only if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375. “Although we review the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion, we review the rulings of law relied upon by the district court in awarding injunctive relief de novo.” Biodiversity Legal Found, v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). IY. National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act is “our basic national charter for protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA requires that all agencies of the Federal Government shall include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Agencies must also “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.” Id. § 4332(2)(E). When an agency produces an environmental impact statement (EIS), it must “provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. “NEPA ... does not impose any substantive requirements on federal agencies — it ‘exists to ensure a process.’ ” Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir.1996)). So long as “the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that.other values outweigh the environmental costs.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). A. Standing As a preliminary matter, the Forest Service contends that the State of California lacks standing to challenge the 2004 Framework under NEPA. Several intervenors also argue that Sierra Forest lacks standing to challenge the 2004 Framework under NEPA, asserting that no person or entity may ever have standing for “a facial challenge to a first-level NEPA document.” Constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). [Deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation — -a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to create Article III standing. Only “a person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)) (emphasis in original). 1. California California, like all states, “does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). States are also not “normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497, 518, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). On the other hand, “well-founded desire to preserve [a state’s] sovereign territory” “support[s] federal jurisdiction,” which may be further reinforced by ownership of “a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’” by a challenged federal action. Id. at 519, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907)). A political body may also uniquely “sue to protect its own ‘proprietary interests’ that might be ‘congruent’ with those of its citizens,” including “responsibilities, powers, and assets.” City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir.1985)); see also id. at 1198 (including among such interests the “ability to enforce land-use and health regulations” and “protecting its natural resources from harm”). California has unquestionably asserted a well-founded desire to protect both its territory and its proprietary interests both from direct harm and from spill-over effects resulting from action on federal land, including ownership and trusteeship over “wildlife, water, State-owned land, and public trust lands in and around the Sierra Nevada.” Therefore, the State of California has concrete and particularized interests protected by the application of NEPA to the 2004 Framework. Because of California’s protected interests, this case is distinguishable from Summers v. Earth Island Institute. In Summers, the plaintiff environmental organizations had challenged a failure to apply particular regulations to a logging project, the Burnt Ridge Project, but they settled the site-specific dispute during litigation. See 129 S.Ct. at 1148. The environmental organizations had submitted only two affidavits to establish standing: one addressing the Burnt Ridge Project and one, the Bensman affidavit, that did not address the challenged regulation, a particular site or a future injury. See id. at 1150. The Court held that a “vague desire” to visit locations that might be harmed by the challenged regulations was insufficient to establish a particularized interest. Id. at 1150-51. The difference here is that California maintains concrete interests spanning its entire territory. Unlike the Bensman affidavit, California’s affidavit addresses the challenged regulation, the entirety of the Sierra Nevada and future injury that the State claims will result from any logging under the 2004 Framework. Thus, California’s unique proprietary interests will invariably be affected by the 2004 Framework because logging will occur soon somewhere in the State. The potential injury is neither vague nor speculative. California has also asserted actual harm to its procedural interest in federal management decisions made under the deliberation-forcing requirements of NEPA. The State’s standing is not defeated by its not having submitted affidavits establishing approval of specific logging projects under the 2004 Framework. A land resource and management plan (LRMP), such as the 2004 Framework, “sets logging goals, selects the areas of the forest that are suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate [but] does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 729, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Upon approval of a particular logging project, environmental “harm is more imminent and more certain.” Id. at 734, 118 S.Ct. 1665. However a procedural injury is complete after an LRMP has been adopted, so long as is it is fairly traceable to some action that will affect the plaintiff’s interests. See id. at 737, 118 S.Ct. 1665 (acknowledging the possibility of “a person with standing” “at the time the [NEPA violation] takes place” in an LRMP and before anticipated implementation decisions in a site-specific project); see also Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 785 (9th Cir.2006) (“Pit River I ”) (“The purpose of an EIS is to apprise decisionmakers of the disruptive environmental effects that may flow from their decisions at a time when they retain a maximum range of options.” (emphasis added and internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The 2004 Framework permits the Forest Service to implement forest management projects in California, and there is no real possibility that the Forest Service will then decline to adopt any management projects under the framework governing over 10 million acres of federal land. Cf. Rapid Transit Advocates, Inc. v. Southern California Rapid Transit District, 752 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding, after an agency decision to fund design and engineering work, that harm was not imminent and that plaintiffs therefore lacked standing). Even if a specific application were required for standing, we would take judicial notice of the Basin EA, contained within Sierra Forest’s record on appeal, which approves intensive management within California. Therefore, we hold that California has standing to assert a facial NEPA claim against the 2004 Framework. 2. Sierra Forest Sierra Forest similarly has standing to bring a facial NEPA challenge to the 2004 Framework, independent from specific implementing projects. Sierra Forest has challenged the 2004 Framework as an imminent source of harm to its members’ interests in the area encompassed by the Basin, Slapjack and Empire projects within the Plumas National Forest, and there is no question that affidavits establish members’ interests in those areas. For the reasons discussed above, a procedural NEPA violation is complete even before an implementing project is approved. Nor could the Forest Service cure flaws in an LRMP in the EIS for a site-specific project. See Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 785 (“[Dilatory or ex post facto environmental review cannot cure an initial failure to undertake environmental review.”). We have never held that an LRMP is not subject to facial attack based on an alleged NEPA violation. B. 2004 Framework: Short-Term Harm Sierra Forest and California first argue that the Forest Service violated NEPA by focusing on uncertain long-term impacts in the 2004 Framework SEIS, at the expense of known near-term harm. “The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are ... realized through a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A ‘hard look’ includes considering all foreseeable direct and indirect impacts. Furthermore, a ‘hard look’ should involve a discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly minimize negative side effects.” N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (requiring analysis of “the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity”); Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir.2007) (“[G]eneral statements about possible effects and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent a justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Nevertheless, where agency experts have analyzed the immediate harm of a proposed action, the Forest Service may conclude that long-term benefits outweigh short-term costs. See Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1251 (9th Cir.2005). Proper analysis may also rely on long-term modeling, despite the inherent uncertainty of projections. See Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir.1993). The 2004 Framework final SEIS addresses short-term effects concerning the California spotted owl, fisher and marten — old forest species at the core of Sierra Forest’s NEPA claim. Concerning the California spotted owl, the SEIS acknowledges that implementing the HFQLG Act is likely to reduce owl habitat, widen gaps between habitat patches and create stand openings. Similarly, the SEIS indicates that implementation of the 2004 Framework will eliminate some canopy cover, which affects both California spotted owl habitat and habitat for owl prey. In sum, the SEIS states, “there is some risk of negatively affecting California spotted owls in the short term because of the uncertainty associated with the effects of using mechanical treatment,” potentially affecting five percent of protected activity centers. In order to mitigate potential harm and enhance understanding of the effects of forest management on the California spotted owl, the 2004 Framework adopts specific owl monitoring programs. The SEIS provides similar details with regard to the fisher and marten. It acknowledges that treatments “may increase fragmentation and create barriers to fisher movement” and yield “short-term trade offs in current habitat quality” through reductions in canopy closure and logging of large trees. The SEIS also notes that implementation of the 2004 Framework will harm marten habitat as compared to the 2001 Framework in the short term by eliminating one percent of canopy closure and five percent of old growth forests. Group selection logging in the HFQLG pilot project area will affect 0.57 percent of the project area per year for the first five years, reducing marten habitat, but would not render large areas “unsuitable for foraging or dispersal.” California also raises concerns about short-term effects on the willow flycatcher and the Yosemite toad. The SEIS explains that the 2004 Framework creates some short-term risk to the willow flycatcher by permitting grazing in nine sites where flycatchers have not been observed since 1982 or have been observed only after breeding season. Similarly, the SEIS explains that during the development of site-specific management plans, permitting cattle to graze increases the risk that Yosemite toads will be trampled. California does not specify what other types of short-term impacts it anticipates. California also points out that a particular chart found in the 2001 Framework SEIS was omitted from the 2004 Framework SEIS. This chart attached a degree of certainty to whether old forest habitats would be preserved by each alternative. Although NEPA requires us to determine “whether the EIS’s ‘form, content and preparation foster both informed decisionmaking and informal public participation,’ ” City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir.1992)), we may apply only “pragmatic judgment,” Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and may not impose “upon the agency [our] own notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). We cannot mandate that a SEIS include a particular graph, no matter how helpful. Moreover, the SEIS states in text that the 2001 and 2004 Frameworks “are indistinguishable in their short-run outcomes” and presents in graphical form short-term acreage of old growth forest projected to exist during implementation of the alternatives under serious consideration. Collectively, the substantial discussion of potential harm to old forest species and projections of the size of old growth forests adequately addresses the relative short-term effects of these two alternatives. There is no question that implementation of the 2004 Framework will destroy some owl habitat, a consequence the SEIS plainly acknowledges. Annualizing anticipated effects would not have furthered the deliberation-forcing goals of NEPA. Moreover, the projected loss of habitat is small compared to both the scale of the Sierra Nevada and earlier management practices insensitive to the needs of old forest species. For example, the 2004 Framework SEIS states, “Within the HFQLG project area ... [the 2004 Framework] is projected to result in roughly 65,000 fewer acres of suitable owl habitat in year 20 than [the 2001 Framework].” Less than 20 years ago, the federal courts reviewed practices that raised the question “whether the owl can survive the near-term loss of another half-million acres of its habitat.” Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1473, 1478 (W.D.Wash.1992). It is the prerogative of the Forest Service to determine that long-term effects — even long-term effects subject to uncertainty — remain desirable despite short-term harm. The Forest Service, when promulgating the 2004 Framework, disclosed and focused adequately on short-term effects of intensified management and therefore complied with NEPA. C. 2004 Framework: Dissenting Views Sierra Forest and California also both argue that the Forest Service violated NEPA when approving the 2004 Framework by failing to disclose and to respond to the views of experts opposed to intensified management. “In preparing the final EIS, the agency must ‘discuss at appropriate points ... any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and [must] indicate the agency’s response to the issue raised.’ ” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 n. 13, 109 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b)) (alterations in original); see also Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1001 (“[T]he Forest Service must acknowledge and respond to comments by outside parties that raise significant scientific uncertainties and reasonably support that such uncertainties exist.”); 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (“An agency preparing a final environmental impact statement shall assess and consider comments both individually and collectively, and shall respond ... in the final statement.”). The mere presence of expert disagreement does not violate NEPA because “experts in every scientific field routinely disagree.” Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 1001. NEPA also does not require an agency to publish “every comment ... in the final EIS. Nor must an agency set forth at full length the views with which it disagrees.” California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 773 (9th Cir.1982) (internal citations omitted). Sierra Forest and California present an array of experts who submitted comments to the 2004 Framework draft SEIS. As a general matter, the final SEIS incorporates a science consistency review that raises conflicting perspectives. It also acknowledges and responds to general critiques concerning the use of science. Plaintiffs’ experts’ more specific criticisms can be broken down into five categories. Most critiques concerned the California spotted owl. The final SEIS, however, expressed uncertainty concerning California spotted owl analysis, noted submission of concerns “about the reliability of habitat projections” for the California spotted owl and disclosed “conflicting science about the effects of canopy cover reductions from fuel treatments.” Most importantly, the SEIS dedicates nearly 12 pages to airing concerns about California spotted owl management and providing agency responses. Second, the experts expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty inherent in long-term modeling. The final SEIS acknowledges that “[e]oncerns have been expressed about the reliability of habitat projections used in this analysis and the deterministic nature of the models underlying those projections,” but explains the importance and inherent flaws of modeling. The SEIS also includes modeling appendices, which describe modeling assumptions and “sensitivity analysis to address questions about uncertainty in modeling outcomes.” Moreover, the Regional Forester acknowledged the validity of some critiques and chose not to rely on 120-year projections when deciding to adopt the 2004 Framework. Third, the experts argued that the 2004 Framework will lead to further decline of fisher and marten populations. The final SEIS acknowledges uncertainty concerning marten and fisher habitat use and the effect of management on persistence in the Sierra Nevada. It also recognizes that concerns have been expressed “that treatments ... may increase fragmentation and create barriers to fisher movement,” that reductions to canopy that will harm fisher habitat and about “effects of the [HFQLG] pilot project, particularly on marten in eastside pine habitats.” The SEIS also airs and responds to three pages of additional concerns regarding fisher and marten management. Fourth, the experts raised concerns regarding meadow species, such as the willow flycatcher and Yosemite toad. The final SEIS acknowledges uncertainty concerning the effects of grazing on these species and accepts one of the willow flycatcher working group’s suggestions concerning development of a conservation strategy. More importantly, the SEIS raises and addresses a host of public concerns regarding both meadow species in the volume dedicated to responding to public comments. Fifth, the experts critique the fire ecology underpinning the core management analysis. The final SEIS notes uncertainty “whether unaltered wildfires would have a greater or lesser impact ... on ecosystem integrity and habitat” compared to fires in treated areas. Again, the SEIS acknowledges and responds to a substantial number of critics addressing fire and fuels management, including critiques of the scope and methods of treatment. California specifically argues that “the agency did not bring attention to ... critical expert comments but rather mixed them into the stack of all public comments .... ” Similarly, Sierra Forest contends that the “SEIS does not disclose that these ‘other’ viewpoints were expressed by the country’s leading spotted owl experts, including the retired Forest Service owl expert ... and the agency’s own wildlife office.” However, NEPA does not require that a final SEIS prioritize the concern of scientific experts or disclose their identities amongst public critiques. The practical concerns of individual landholders or hikers may be just as important — and just as trenchant — as the formal submissions of academic experts. So long as an EIS addresses the substance of public comments, it need not single out the authors. In sum, the SEIS dedicates over 120 pages to raising and meaningfully responding to public critiques. That is all NEPA requires. Sierra Forest and California do not argue that the Forest Service’s decision not to adopt critiques was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Therefore, the Forest Service did not violate NEPA by failing to disclose conflicting scientific opinion. D. Basin Project: Cumulative Impacts Sierra Forest separately challenges approval of the Basin Project under NEPA, arguing that the Basin EA failed to assess the cumulative impact of the Project. To comply with a NEPA alternatives analysis, the Forest Service must consider, among other things, the “cumulative impacts” of the proposed action, which NEPA’s implementing regulations define as the “impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.... ” League of Wilderness Defenders v. US. Forest Serv., 549 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7). A cumulative impact analysis must describe related projects, “enumerate the environmental effects of those projects” and “consider the interaction of multiple activities.” Or. Natural Res. Council, 492 F.3d at 1133. The Basin EA provides detailed cumulative analysis of soil and watershed effects and incorporates a substantial cumulative analysis concerning fish and wildlife in the area. A section of the EA is titled “Potential Cumulative Impacts” and summarizes cumulative effects of the Basin Project alongside both prior management and other planned projects in the vicinity. Sierra Forest’s argument that the EA fails “to disclose the cumulative impact that these projects have had and will have on old forest wildlife” or to provide “any explanation” of “cumulative effects” is largely conclusory and is belied by the record. The EA cumulative impact analysis covers a variety of factors that could contribute to an overall decline in old forest wildlife, including group logging, HFQLG pilot projects and barred owl range expansion. The EA is supplemented by the extensive discussions of cumulative impact in the 2004 Framework SEIS, which is the cumulative assessment of planned management throughout the Sierra Nevada. Sierra Forest argues that it would be improper for the Basin Project to rely on the 2004 Framework SEIS. Although the 2004 Framework commits to “[djetailed cumulative effects analysis at the ... project level” concerning soil and watershed effects, this does not preclude reliance on “cumulative effects ... addressed pro-grammatically in the [2004 Framework] SEIS.” Between the EA and SEIS analysis, the Forest Service has conducted and disclosed a substantial assessment of cumulative impacts. Therefore, the Forest Service did not violate NEPA when approving the Basin Project. V. Injunctive Relief on the NEPA Claim Although we agree with the district court’s conclusions concerning the substantive application of NEPA to the 2004 Framework and the Basin Project, we part ways concerning the appropriate remedy for the NEPA violation that occurred when the Forest Service established the 2004 Framework. Before an award of permanent injunctive relief, a plaintiff must meet four well-established requirements: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Even in NEPA cases, “[a]n injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor test is satisfied”; no “thumb on the scales is warranted.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2757, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010). A. Jurisdiction The first issue we face is the district court’s conclusion that it lacked “jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ substantive claims against the programmatic 2004 Framework,” based on the legal premise that “[o]n a programmatic Framework basis ... [courts] are limited to providing procedural relief.” Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1110. This is plainly erroneous. As noted above, Sierra Forest and California have standing to assert a facial NEPA challenge to the 2004 Framework, and their claim is ripe. The APA requires that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)0» (emphasis added). We have directed or upheld setting aside agency action pending NEPA compliance on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 562 (9th Cir.2006) (enjoining timber sales premised on a policy change that violated NEPA). If courts could not stop the federal government from applying a substantive rule promulgated without adherence to required procedures, regardless of the equities, both NEPA and the APA would be toothless. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by finding that it lacked jurisdiction to bar implementation of the 2004 Framework during a remand for analysis required by NEPA. B. Equitable Analysis: Reliance on Government Experts As an alternative ground for its limited remedial order, the district court engaged in a traditional equitable analysis and concluded that the appropriate remedy was to leave the 2004 Framework in place and to order the Forest Service “to prepare another supplemental EIS on the Framework, one that meets the range of alternatives and analytical consistency identified by the Ninth Circuit in its decision on the preliminary injunction portion of this case.” Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1113. Sierra Forest challenges this decision on numerous grounds. When assessing the four prerequisites for a permanent injunction, the district court correctly noted that “the Forest Service is entitled to rely on the reasoned opinions of its experts.” Sierra Forest V, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1111. However, the court then deferred to those experts in its own equitable analysis. In so doing, the district court improperly conflated deference in the context of judicial review of an agency decision, see Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993, with deference in consideration of the equities after a violation of law has been found. Although the federal government is undoubtedly permitted to follow its own experts when making a decision, see Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), federal experts are not always entitled to deference outside of administrative action. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D.Wash.), aff'd 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.1991) (“This is not the usual situation in which the court reviews an administrative decision and, in doing so, gives deference to age