Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. Akhil Bansal and Frederick Mullinix appeal from their jury convictions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on a 42-count indictment alleging crimes arising from their multi-national, internet-based, controlled-substance-distribution scheme. They have, in our estimation, challenged every decision of the District Court, at almost every moment of the litigation before, during, and after their convictions. Yet in the more than 1,100 pages of briefing submitted to us by both defendants and the government, we have identified not a single instance of reversible error. That the prior rulings and findings in this case have emerged from such an onslaught wholly intact represents no small achievement by the District Court, whose decisions we will affirm in all respects. I. This case is about two defendants’ convictions for illegal drug sales via websites purporting to be online pharmacies. From 2003 to 2005, Appellants Bansal and Mullinix imported controlled and noncontrolled substances from India, which they then advertised on the internet and distributed to customers in the United States via the mail without prescriptions. In 2006 the Appellants were charged under a 42-count indictment, tried, and convicted by a jury on all counts. This is their direct appeal. Bansal, who lived in Philadelphia, supervised the domestic side of the multi-national controlled substance distribution conspiracy at issue in this case. He received bulk shipments of controlled substances from India, which he then stored, repackaged, and shipped directly to customers who ordered and paid for them online. He also oversaw the operation’s finances and payment system, which he managed by opening on- and off-shore bank accounts, accepting payments from and delivering controlled substances to participating website operators, and transferring money between coconspirators and various banks. Consumers were invited to purchase controlled substances through several of Mullinix’s internet websites, the most important of which was www.mymeds.com. Visitors to his websites simply chose the type, strength, and quantity of the drug they desired, paid with a credit card or online service such as PayPal, and awaited postal delivery to any address they provided. Between 2003 and 2005, approximately $1.3 million in proceeds from controlled substance sales flowed between Mullinix and Bansal. Bansal, Mullinix, and many other coconspirators were indicted in April of 2005. Both of the Appellants here were arrested quickly — Mullinix apparently without incident, and Bansal as he attempted to flee the country the morning after his bank accounts were frozen. Bansal waived his Miranda rights, confessed to running an internet drug selling business, and admitted that he knew the operation was illegal. At approximately the same time as Bansal’s arrest, federal agents executed search warrants upon at least two homes and a UPS store in New York, as well as two internet service providers in Mountain View, California. These searches produced approximately 450 gallons of contraband medication, as well as computer flies and other records detailing the inner workings of the distribution operation. Both Appellants hired and fired various attorneys throughout the course of their proceedings in the District Court. Ultimately, their cases proceeded to a jury trial and each was convicted on all counts alleged in their joint indictment. The convictions under that indictment, portions of which charged Bansal but not Mullinix, were: Count 1: Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2: Conspiracy to import controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. Count 3: Operation of a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Bansal only). Count 4: Conspiracy to distribute misbranded substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2). Count 5: Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count 6: International travel and money transfers in furtherance of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and 1957. Count 7-10: Money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (Bansal only). Count 11-13: Monetary transactions in property derived from criminal activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Count 14-19: Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)®. Counts 30-39: Monetary transactions in property derived from criminal activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Bansal only). Counts 40-41: Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Bansal only). Counts 42-44: Monetary transactions in property derived from criminal activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Bansal only). Forfeiture: Of all proceeds and property derived from the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 853 and 970. Upon their convictions, both Appellants filed this direct appeal, Mullinix through counsel and Bansal pro se. After briefing, Mullinix filed a motion seeking to proceed pro se as well, which we granted. II. The District Court had jurisdiction because the defendants were charged with offenses against the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over its final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The relevant standard of review is set forth in each subsection below. III. For simplicity’s sake, we rearrange and analyze Bansal’s and Mullinix’s most complex contentions in the following order. First, both Appellants contend that their money laundering convictions impermissibly merge with their underlying predicate felonies under United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008). Second, Bansal raises a host of issues related to his Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) conviction, concerning the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions on that charge. Third, Bansal challenges the District Court’s decision to suppress evidence obtained from untimely sealed surveillance records, on the ground that the government did not provide a satisfactory explanation for its seven- and ten-day delays in sealing the records. See United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir.1992). Fourth, both Appellants allege a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), during sentencing. For the reasons set forth infra Part IV and V, we reject each of these contentions. The remaining, more-frivolous contentions fall into two groups: shared arguments and those made by Bansal alone. Among the shared arguments, Appellants first challenge their conspiracy convictions under Counts One and Two of their indictment on the ground that the underlying conduct the government alleged, distribution of controlled substances via the internet, was not illegal at the time they were charged. Next, they challenge their money laundering convictions on the related ground that they obtained the money laundered by lawful means. Third, they contend their convictions under Count One were misdemeanors and not felonies. For these reasons set forth infra Part VI, we will affirm the District Court with respect to each of the above issues. Finally, Bansal alone raises a number of issues. First, he makes several contentions pertaining to the sufficiency of his indictment, the grand jury procedures in his case, and the voir dire procedures in empanelling his jury. Second, Bansal challenges the scope and sufficiency of the warrants by which evidence against him was obtained. Third, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict of guilty with respect to his controlled substance distribution and importation charges. Fourth, he contends various items of evidence were admitted against him in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fifth, he contends that various jury instructions misstated the law or directed a verdict for the prosecution. Finally, he alleges that prosecutorial misconduct and Brady violations mandate a new trial. We conclude, for the reasons infra Part VII, that all of these contentions are without merit. We therefore will affirm the District Court. IV. We must determine: (1) whether Appellants’ money laundering convictions violated United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008); (2) with what specificity must the government list predicate offenses in an indictment to support a CCE conviction after the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999); and (3) whether the government’s mistake of fact constitutes a “satisfactory explanation” for its delay in sealing intercepted communications, pursuant to our decision in United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir.1992). We ultimately side with the government and the District Court on each of these contentions, and will affirm the District Court’s judgment. A. Bansal and Mullinix challenge their convictions under various federal money-laundering statutes, all of which prohibit concealing the source of “proceeds” from a criminal activity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i). Appellants’ specific contention is that their convictions are invalid for the reasons set forth in the plurality opinion in Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded. Whether the elements of a money laundering charge merge with the elements of the crime that generated the money to be laundered, and whether the “proceeds” laundered must be “profits” or “gross receipts,” ordinarily are questions of law we review de novo. Cf. United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir.2008). When these issues are not raised in the District Court, however, we limit our review to plain error only. See United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir.2011). In Santos, the Supreme Court issued a 4-1-4 decision that appears to conclude that the word “proceeds,” as used by 18 U.S.C. § 1956, refers to “profits” but not “gross receipts.” Id. at 513-514, 128 S.Ct. 2020. Santos can also be read, however, to support the conclusion that proceeds means both “profits” and “gross receipts.” Id. at 525, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Stevens, J. concurring). Bansal and Mullinix contend, at bottom, that the government failed to demonstrate that the money they were convicted of laundering was “profit,” rather than “gross receipts,” and that, as a result, their money laundering crimes merged with the crimes that produced the money. We disagree and will affirm. A jury convicted Bansal and Mullinix under § 1956, which provides that a person is guilty of money laundering if he or she knowingly uses the proceeds of criminal activity to conduct a financial transaction designed in whole or part to conceal the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the funds: Whoever knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— (A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (emphases added). Although the District Court denied Bansal’s and Mullinix’s general motions for a new trial, it did not rule on the money laundering claims because they did not raise them in their motion. Bansal and Mullinix challenge their money laundering convictions on two grounds. First, they contend that because they were unaware that their behavior was criminal in 2006, they could not have been convicted of “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction representad] the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Second, they cite Santos to challenge both the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the “proceeds” they laundered were “net profits” and not gross receipts. They contend that much of the money they were accused of laundering was used to pay for inventory, shipping costs, and other operating expenses, and that those transactions were part of running a drug operation in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, not money laundering. The government responds in two ways. First, it reads the fractured decision in Santos to permit money laundering convictions for transactions involving “proceeds” that are used to pay operating expenses, and not just those proceeds that are net profit. In Santos, Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, invoked the rule of lenity to conclude that “proceeds,” as used in § 1956(a)(1), always means “profits.” 553 U.S. at 513-514, 128 S.Ct. 2020. Justice Alito, writing for a four-Justice dissent, would have held that “proceeds” means “gross receipts” and not merely net income or profits. Id. at 546, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, whose concurring opinion provided the fifth vote for Justice Scalia’s judgment, concluded that if “proceeds” meant only gross receipts, then the government could charge money laundering in cases where the alleged laundering transaction was actually an ordinary part of the underlying criminal activity. See id. at 526-527, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (Stevens, J., concurring). For example, in Santos, the defendant was convicted of illegal gambling and of laundering the profits by paying his employees and by paying the gambling winners. Id. at 509, 128 S.Ct. 2020. In Justice Stevens’ view, this created a merger problem because the elements of the laundering offense were also elements of the illegal gambling offense. See id. at 526-527, 128 S.Ct. 2020. Justice Stevens went on to suggest that in cases that presented a “merger issue,” the word “proceeds” should be construed to mean “profits” and not “gross receipts,” but left open the question of whether, in other cases, a defendant could be convicted of laundering gross receipts. Id. at 525, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (“[T]his Court need not pick a single definition of “proceeds” applicable to every unlawful activity....”). Here, the government contends that Justice Stevens’ opinion controls because it represents the narrowest ground for the plurality decision. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation omitted)). Relying upon Justice Stevens’ opinion, the government urges us to affirm the convictions in this case because (1) in certain circumstances, “proceeds” may be illegally laundered if they are gross receipts (and not just net profits), and (2) the Appellants’ case presents such circumstances because the “financial transaction” and “intent to conceal” elements do not merge with the elements of drug distribution. The government then cites cases from four other Courts of Appeals affirming money laundering convictions based upon financial transactions involving gross receipts of drug distribution. See Wilson v. Roy, 643 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir.2011) (addressing the issue in an innocence claim raised by habeas petition); United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 600 (2d Cir.2011); United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 880 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.2009). Finally, the government contends that under our plain error standard of review, which we must apply because the defendants failed to raise this issue in their motions for a new trial, the unsettled state of the law precludes us from holding for the Appellants. We agree with the government for the reasons that follow. As a threshold matter, we agree that, in the very narrow set of criminal cases arising from prescription-less sales of controlled substances via the internet, money laundering charges can apply to “gross receipts” of a criminal enterprise and not merely its profits. Cf. Quinones, 635 F.3d at 600 (2d Cir.2011) (“[W]e hold that ‘proceeds’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is not limited to ‘profits’ at least where, as here, the predicate offense involves the sale of contraband.”). We agree also that our standard of review for this issue is plain error, but we reject the government’s interpretation of that standard. The plain error standard of review asks whether “the District Court plainly erred in such a way as to affect the appellant’s substantial rights.” See Albertson, 645 F.3d at 196 (citing Rule 52(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). A ruling under the plain error standard thus turns upon an assessment of whether “the error ... [was] prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). It does not, as the government implies, turn on the correct answer to a question of law. Whether the jury’s verdict was plain error does not depend upon whether the current state of the law surrounding “proceeds” under § 1956 is confused and the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos is confusing. Rather, the question we must ask is whether the evidence in this case supported the jury’s findings pursuant to the essential elements of money laundering. For the following reasons, we conclude that it does. A person is guilty of money laundering under § 1956 if he, (1) knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, (2) conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction involving the proceeds of unlawful activity, (3) with either (a) the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or (b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law. See § 1956(a)(1). Here, the jury could have found evidence for element (1) in the Appellants’ intentional sale of morphine, ketamine, and steroids without prescriptions. Bansal and Mullinix contend that they could not have known that the proceeds from those sales were proceeds of illegal activity because they did not know that prescription-less internet drug sales were illegal. That contention misses the point. The elements of their crimes have nothing to do with the internet. They were convicted of prescription-less sales to customers within the United States — an activity that was clearly illegal at the time they were indicted. The jury could have inferred knowledge of that illegality from its findings that the defendants kept their bank accounts offshore, and that they conducted their sales only with the help of the internet and its relative anonymity. The jury’s finding under element (2) was amply supported by its findings that the Appellants channeled money from one offshore account to another in what were clearly “financial transactions” within the meaning of § 1956(a)(1). Finally, the jury’s finding under element (3) above was supported by its findings that the Appellants used their proceeds to purchase controlled substances (i.e., “to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity,” § 1956(a)(l)(A)(l)), and possibly, to hide the location or source of the money they received from customers (i.e., “to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds,” § 1956(a)(1)(B)©). The jury could also have inferred that the reason the Appellants kept their accounts offshore was “to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,” § 1956(a)(l)(B)(ii). Because there was evidence to support the jury’s findings on the money laundering Counts, we will affirm the Appellants’ convictions. B. Bansal next challenges his CCE conviction on two fronts, contending that (1) his indictment insufficiently stated the elements of a CCE offense, and (2) his subsequent conviction was flawed due to improper jury instructions and insufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment on all issues relating to Bansal’s CCE charge. 1. Bansal contends that his conviction under Count Three for conducting a Continuing Criminal Enterprise, see 21 U.S.C. § 848, should be vacated because the CCE count in his indictment (Count Four) did not state three separate felony offenses, and therefore did not properly state a CCE charge. The pertinent part of Bansal’s indictment provided that he committed a CCE offense when he: violated one or more provisions of sub-chapter I of Chapter 13 of Title 21, United States Code, which are felonies, and such violations were part of a continuing series of violations of subchapter I of Chapter 13 of title 21, United States Code, including but not limited to, the offenses contained in Counts One and Two of this indictment, and the Overt Acts listed in this Indictment at paragraphs 1 through 42 of Count One of this indictment.... Supp. App. 05011. In Bansal’s view, his indictment should be dismissed because the language above does not allege three distinct violations of federal drug laws. We disagree and conclude that the CCE count in the indictment was sound. “The ‘sufficiency of an indictment to charge an offense is a legal question subject to plenary review.’ ” Yusuf, 536 F.3d at 184 (quoting United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 975 n. 9 (3d Cir.1994)). To obtain a CCE conviction, the government must, in pertinent part, establish that the defendant’s felonious acts are “part of a continuing series of violations.” United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283-284 (3d Cir.1986) (construing § 848(a)). The Supreme Court has held that the government must show that the defendant committed three separate predicate offenses to establish a “continuing series of violations.” See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815, 119 S.Ct. 1707. With regard to the sufficiency of a CCE indictment, we noted in United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642 n. 4 (3d Cir.1988), that the government need not list in the indictment the three predicate offenses that would ultimately support a CCE conviction. Instead, we permitted the government “to rely upon all [criminal] activity, whether or not referred to in the indictment.” Id. In Richardson, however, the Supreme Court impliedly overruled the broadest reading of Echeverri. The Richardson Court held that a jury must find with specificity the predicate offenses to a CCE charge, and assumed without deciding that the necessary number of offenses was three. See 526 U.S. at 818-819, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The Court reasoned that each predicate act constitutes an element of the offense. It necessarily follows, then, that, as elements of the offense, each predicate act must appear in the indictment. Cf. id. at 826, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion means that indictments must specify predicate acts). Although neither we nor the Supreme Court has elucidated the contours of precisely what must appear in a post-Richardson indictment, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has, and we find its reasoning persuasive. In United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir.2002), the defendants contended that the indictment was deficient because it failed to specify which felonies within the indictment constituted the specific three felonies undergirding the CCE charge. Under the CCE count, the government had instead referred merely to vague “felony violations” of two criminal statutes, as well as to Counts One and Two, which charged a conspiracy to violate the same statutes. The Flaharty court construed Richardson to mean that although an indictment must contain three felonies that could support a CCE conviction, it need not specify which of those felonies will ultimately be used to maintain the CCE conviction. Id. at 197. This holding makes practical sense of Richardson’s dicta, comports with a narrower reading of Echeverri, and maintains the purposes of an indictment by apprising a defendant “of the nature of the accusation against him.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (citation omitted). Using the Flaharty court’s reasoning to guide our analysis, we conclude that an indictment must include the facts and circumstances comprising at least three felonies, but that the CCE count itself need not identify with exacting specificity which three will ultimately prove the CCE charge. Incorporation by reference is sufficient. The indictment here, therefore, passes muster under Echeverri and Richardson. The CCE count alleged that Bansal committed “a continuing series of violations of subchapter I of Chapter 13 of Title 21, United States Code, including but not limited to, the offenses contained in Counts One and Two of this indictment, and the Overt Acts listed in this indictment at paragraphs 1 through 42 of Count One of this indictment.” Supp. App. 05011. The notion that the three CCE offenses need not be “limited to” the indictment is incorrect; as discussed above, the offenses must appear within the indictment. An evaluation of the indictment, however, reveals that the acts comprising the CCE charge — and, more importantly, the acts undergirding the jury’s ultimate conviction — did indeed appear within it. Count One (conspiracy to distribute controlled substances) and Count Two (conspiracy to import controlled substances) are inarguably separate felony offenses. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963. For the third felony, although neither the indictment nor the jury’s verdict on the CCE count expressly states which act or acts made up the third CCE offense, the jury’s unanimous guilty verdicts on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Five removed any doubt that the jury found that Bansal committed (at least) one additional subchapter-I felony that appeared in the indictment. Because the overinclusive language in the indictment did not affect the grand jury’s decision nor the outcome of the trial, any such error was harmless. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (holding that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court or a petit jury of jurisdiction to ratify the indictment); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (holding that errors that “do[ ] not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence” are subject to harmless error review); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.”); United States v. Mechanic 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (holding that a petit jury’s guilty verdict made harmless a set of errors made in connection with the indictment); Russell, 369 U.S. at 763, 82 S.Ct. 1038 (“Convictions are no longer reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The overbroad language in the indictment did not affect the outcome because the jury unanimously found Bansal guilty on Counts Four and Five. Although those Counts were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States), Bansal’s guilt depended on the jury finding that he engaged in conspiracies in violation of sub-chapter I of Chapter 13 of Title 21. See Supp. App. 05012-05020. To reach its verdict, the jury was required to conclude that Bansal committed one or more Overt Acts listed in Count One in furtherance of these conspiracies. See Supp. App. 03394. Not only are the conspiracies alleged in Counts Four and Five themselves qualifying CCE felonies, but any of the many Overt Acts that the jury could have found to sustain those Counts — Overt Acts 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, and 42 — independently violate Subchapter I. Thus, by finding Bansal guilty of Counts Four and Five, the jury inexorably found that Bansal committed a third drug felony under subchapter I that necessarily appeared in the indictment. In short, Bansal had constitutionally sufficient notice of the “nature of the accusation[s] against him.” Russell, 369 U.S. at 766, 82 S.Ct. 1038. The indictment’s reference to Overt Acts listed elsewhere within it — and the petit jury’s subsequent conviction based on those Acts — satisfies Richardson and Flaharty’s requirement that three predicate felonies appear in the indictment. Any erroneous clause pointing beyond the indictment was, because of the jury’s findings, harmless. See, e.g., Mechanic 475 U.S. at 70, 106 S.Ct. 938 (“[T]he petit jury’s subsequent guilty verdiet means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (noting that the harmless-error doctrine “block[s] setting aside [the defendant’s conviction] for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial”). Here, the jury’s conclusions make apparent that neither the grand jury’s charging decision nor the petit jury’s conclusion would have changed whatsoever had the superfluous language in the indictment been omitted. We therefore will not disturb the District Court’s judgment with regard to Bansal’s indictment. 2. Bansal raised a multitude of contentions with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, including three challenges of note relating to his CCE conviction. First, he contends that the jury did not sufficiently find three predicate felonies, which are essential to any CCE conviction. Second, he contends that the government failed to prove he managed five or more persons, as a CCE charge requires. Third, he challenges the jury instructions as incorrect. We disagree as to all three contentions and will affirm the CCE conviction. To obtain a CCE conviction, the government must establish five material elements: “(1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics law, (2) as part of a continuing series of violations, (3) in concert with five or more persons, (4) for whom the defendant is an organizer or supervisor, (5) from which he derives substantial income or resources.” Grayson, 795 F.2d at 283-284 (3d Cir.1986) (construing § 848(a)). As noted, the government must prove that the defendant committed three separate predicate offenses to establish the second element. See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818, 119 S.Ct. 1707. To prove the “organizer or supervisor” element, the government must prove that the defendant supervised or managed five or more people in furtherance of the CCE. Id. at 815-816, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (quoting § 848(a)). Bansal contends that the government did not produce evidence sufficient for the jury to find that he committed three predicate felonies in furtherance of a CCE, which the charge required. We disagree. As discussed above, Bansal’s indictment described a laundry list of felonious conduct including his participation in organized, serial violations of controlled substances laws. The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict supported by the evidence on every allegation in the indictment, including Counts Four and Five, and found that Bansal committed felonious Overt Acts listed in the indictment. The jury’s unanimous finding as to these felonies was a sufficient basis for its conclusion that Bansal committed three predicate felonies in furtherance of his CCE offense. Second, Bansal contends that the government failed to prove that he managed or supervised five or more persons, which a CCE charge requires. But the jury received testimony that Bansal: (1) hired coconspirator Richard Danby to be a “shipper” in furtherance of the CCE, see Supp. App. 00191-00193, 00411-00414, 00880-00890; (2) hired David and Elizabeth Armstrong to be “shippers” in furtherance of Bansal’s CCE, see Supp. App. 00193, 00891-00895, 02730, 02500-02004; (3) directed eodefendant Himanshu Kulshretha, who carried out Bansal’s instructions in India, see Supp. App. 00891-00895; and (4) appointed Sanjeev Shrivastav to take over operations at Bansal’s distribution business while Bansal traveled to India, see Supp. App. 00893, 00906, 00915-00920. The testimony about these five individuals—and we note that the jury heard testimony regarding many more— was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Bansal managed or supervised five or more people. Third, Bansal challenges the jury instructions in several discrete ways, none of which persuade us to disturb the District Court’s judgment. For instance, Bansal contends that the District Court failed to charge the jury with instructions that it must be unanimous in its findings on each of the three predicate felonies supporting Bansal’s CCE charge. But the District Court did instruct the jury that its finding must be unanimous. See Supp. App. 03387 (“You must unanimously agree on which three acts constitute the continuing series of violations.”). We therefore reject this contention. Bansal also appears to contend that the District Court erred by not instructing the jury to unanimously find and specify which individuals formed the basis of its conclusions on the CCE Count. We have rejected that argument and will not reconsider it here. See United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir.1989) (stating that unanimous agreement is not required as to the identity of the five or more persons supervised or managed pursuant to a CCE), vacated in part on other grounds by, 2000 WL 157172 (E.D.Pa.2000). Finally, Bansal challenges the District Court’s instruction to the jury that the third offense may come from acts within the indictment or “acts not mentioned in the indictment at all.” Supp. App. 03387. Bansal did not object to the jury instructions at his trial, and consequently, we review his claim for plain error only. Albertson, 645 F.3d at 196. Although we now hold that acts not mentioned in the indictment cannot sustain a CCE conviction, the District Court’s reliance on a broader reading of Echeverri was hardly plain error. Moreover, any error was harmless: the jury unanimously convicted Bansal on the CCE count for acts listed in the indictment. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-15, 119 S.Ct. 1827. We find no basis to reverse Bansal’s CCE conviction on any grounds, and will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment in this respect. C. Bansal next contends that various emails intercepted pursuant to two warrant-authorized wiretaps should have been suppressed because they were not immediately sealed upon the warrants’ expiration pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a), which requires that the recordings of “[t]he contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication” obtained pursuant to a search warrant be sealed “[i]mmediately upon the expiration of the period of the order.” § 2518(8)(a). Violation of this statute requires suppression if the sealing was not “immediate” and if the government fails to provide any “satisfactory explanation for the delay.” United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 264-268, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the government’s reasonable mistake of fact provided a satisfactory explanation for its delay, and we will affirm the District Court’s decision not to suppress the communications on that ground. The pertinent facts involve two delays. Bansal’s intercepted emails were downloaded and copied to a laptop computer in Philadelphia. Both involved the Assistant United States Attorney’s mistake of fact regarding when a CD containing the communications was available for sealing. In the first instance, this resulted in a seven-day delay before sealing. In the second, the initial delay was compounded by a great deal of confusion as to whether the computer containing the emails was functioning, as to who was to submit the CDs for sealing, and as to where the sealing order should be submitted (the supervising judge, who was also the emergency motions judge, was unavailable). This resulted in a ten-day delay before all copies of the CDs were sealed. The District Court took testimony and concluded that the government’s delay was excusable because the Assistant United States Attorney, who ultimately caused the delays, fully understood and intended to comply with the § 2518(8)(a) sealing requirement, and indeed believed that she had done so. See Supp. App. 04663-04664. It found that the delay was caused by her “mistaken understanding” and “a reasonable mistake.” Supp. App. 04664. We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings, and we exercise plenary review of its application of the law to those facts. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.2002). Because the District Court held, and the government concedes, that the sealing in this case was not immediate, the only issue before us on appeal is whether the government has offered a “satisfactory explanation” for its delay. In Carson, we held that a satisfactory explanation can be based on “objectively reasonable causes like understandable mistakes of law and interference from unexpected, extrinsic events beyond the government’s control.” 969 F.2d at 1488. We went on to hold that the explanation must be the actual reason for the delay, and must “substantially correspond” to the explanation the government gave at the suppression hearing. Id. at 1492 (quoting Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 264, 267, 110 S.Ct. 1845). We did not, however, give abundant guidance as to what can constitute a satisfactory explanation. Indeed, although Carson’s language expressly allows reasonable mistakes of law to provide a satisfactory explanation for a delay, it did not expressly state whether a reasonable mistake of fact — like the mistakes at issue here — can also provide a satisfactory explanation. Instead, we left the question open by stating that “satisfactory explanations for delays in sealing should relate directly to the practicalities of obtaining a sealing order,” id. at 1498, without defining “practicalities” more specifically than as unforeseen emergencies-certainly graver than reasonable mistakes of fact, see id. We must determine, therefore, whether a reasonable mistake of fact can constitute a satisfactory explanation, and if so, whether the government’s mistakes were reasonable. We answer both queries in the affirmative. After reading Carson closely, we conclude that a reasonable mistake of fact must necessarily be sufficient to constitute a satisfactory explanation for the purposes of § 2518. In other arenas of criminal law, constitutional rights, and government conduct, we have long espoused the proposition that a mistake of fact is less culpable than a mistake of law. When judging criminal behavior, it is axiomatic that, although “ignorance of the law will not excuse,” Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910), a reasonable mistake of fact is less culpable because of the absence of mens rea. With regard to government conduct vis-a-vis constitutional rights, we cannot find any support, in any setting, for the proposition that a government agent’s mistake of law might be excusable while a mistake of fact would not. For example, in Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir.2010), we recently noted that qualified immunity applies regardless of whether a government official’s conduct stemmed from a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. In Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 215 (3d Cir.2007), we held that a police officer’s reasonable mistake of fact in shooting the wrong person meant that no constitutional violation had occurred, and thus obviated the need for the court to continue to the question of whether the officer had committed a mistake of law for qualified immunity purposes. In the Fourth Amendment suppression context— logically analogous to the suppression remedy provided in § 2518(8)(a) — we have held that an officer’s “reasonable mistake of fact does not violate the Fourth Amendment,” whereas a mistake of law, even a reasonable one, might. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (noting that factual determinations made by government agents need not “always be correct,” but they always have to be “reasonable”). Finally, our sister Courts of Appeals have had little difficulty extending Ojeda Rios to cover reasonable mistakes of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Coney, 407 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir.2005) (permitting a misunderstanding between attorneys as to who was supposed to seal tapes to constitute a satisfactory explanation for a 10-day delay); see also United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 627 (2d Cir.1993). We therefore find no problem in recognizing that a reasonable mistake of fact can suffice to establish a satisfactory explanation pursuant to § 2518. Having concluded that a “mistake of fact” exception exists, we must next determine the contours of this exception and whether the government’s conduct here fits within it. We hold that the reasonable mistake of fact analysis should mirror the reasonable mistake of law inquiry in Carson. See 969 F.2d at 1494. In Carson, we held that a mistake of law “is objectively reasonable only when the attorney involved acted as a ‘reasonably prudent’ attorney would to investigate the legal question involved in a reasonably prudent manner.” Id. Thus, absent any indication of tampering, bad faith, or deliberate disregard for the requirements of Title III, we hold that an agent, acting as a reasonably prudent government agent would have, who has committed a reasonable mistake of fact may qualify for the “satisfactory explanation” exception. Applying the rule to the facts here, although the district court in Carson made inadequate findings to determine whether the attorneys in that case had acted reasonably, we face no such difficulty. The District Court here found that the attorney here had knowledge of and fully intended to comply with the sealing requirement, and in fact, believed that she had done so. See Supp. App. 04663-04664. Indeed, it found that the delay was caused by a “reasonable mistake made in good faith” regarding the mechanics of the sealing process. Supp. App. 04664. The Court also found that none of the data on the sealed CDs had been altered or corrupted. These findings are not clearly erroneous, and demonstrate that the attorney here acted as a reasonably prudent attorney in her situation would have. We therefore hold that the delays here were an excusable breach of the § 2518(8)(a) sealing requirement and do not warrant a retrial. V. We next must determine whether the District Court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), during sentencing. We conclude that no violation occurred, and we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Bansal and Mullinix contend that the District Court committed an Apprendi violation when calculating the sentences for their convictions under Count One. They contend that the violation occurred when the District Court sentenced them pursuant to the Guidelines that apply to Schedule IV controlled substances even though (1) they were charged with conspiring to distribute Schedule II, III, and IV substances, and (2) the jury made no finding of fact as to which substances the two actually conspired to distribute. We will affirm their sentences. Whether the District Court’s sentence in this case contravened Apprendi is “a pure question of law over which we exercise plenary review.” United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 452 (3d Cir.2001); cf. United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 (3d Cir.2000). A federal statute classifies controlled substances according to five Schedules: Schedule I describes the most serious substances, and Schedule V describes the least serious. The sentencing range for distribution of controlled substances varies depending upon which Schedule describes the substance in question. In this case, Count One of Bansal and Mullinix’s indictment alleged that they conspired to distribute 17 controlled substances, all of which fell into Schedule II, III, or IV. At trial, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty under Count One, but did not identify which of the 17 substances it concluded were actually involved in the conspiracy. At sentencing, the District Court calculated Bansal and Mullinix’s sentences according to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(2), which applies to Schedule IV controlled substances, the least culpable of the 17 substances described in Count One. Bansal and Mullinix objected that the District Court could not have determined that § 841(b)(2) and Schedule IV applied without making a finding of fact as to what drugs they actually conspired to distribute, and they alleged that any such finding violated their right to a jury trial as set forth in Apprendi. The District Court overruled the objection, and they appealed. Bansal and Mullinix’s contention is that because the jury in this ease did not return a verdict specifying what drugs were involved, there was no way for the District Court to apply the provisions for Schedule IV drugs without engaging in fact-finding as to the drug or drugs involved. They contend that this fact-finding violated their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, because it increased the penalty for their crime beyond the statutory maximum for Schedule V controlled substances without a jury finding that Schedule IV controlled substances were actually involved. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. They rely primarily upon Barbosa, wherein we held that a district court violated Apprendi because it sentenced a defendant according to the Guidelines for cocaine trafficking, even though jury instructions resulted in a finding that the defendant had “trafficked in a controlled substance, without any finding as to a particular controlled substance or the amount at issue.” 271 F.3d at 454. The defendant in Barbosa had carried into the country on an international flight what a laboratory later proved was cocaine, believing — and maintaining at trial' — that it was heroin. Id. at 444, 450. Upon his charge for trafficking in heroin and cocaine, the jury returned a guilty verdict that did not specify the drug involved. The district court sentenced the defendant according to the relatively harsher provisions for cocaine. See id. at 449. Our Court concluded that the absence of a jury finding as to the drug’s type made it impossible for the trial judge to determine which Sentencing Guidelines applied to the defendant without fact-finding. See id. at 456-457, 459. Because the district court implicitly found a fact that had the effect of increasing the bottom end of the Barbosa’s statutory range, an Apprendi violation occurred. Id. at 457. But we then went on to examine what effect, if any, a jury’s finding would have had upon the sentence the district court actually imposed and we concluded that “irrespective of which of the two drugs the jury could have found, Barbosa’s twenty-year sentence falls [above the statutory minimum for both drugs and] well below the prescribed statutory maximum of life for either heroin or cocaine base.” Id. at 460. Because the jury could only have found one of two drugs — cocaine or heroin — and because the sentence Barbosa received was appropriate for either drug, we concluded that the Apprendi violation in his case was a harmless error and affirmed his sentence. Id. Bansal and Mullinix’s position is that— like in Barbosa — the jury did not specify the drug they were accused of distributing. They contend that as a result the District Court could not know which Schedule to apply unless it engaged in its own fact-finding, thereby committing an Apprendi violation. They urge us to vacate their sentences and remand for a new trial on the issue. The government responds that, like Barbosa, the jury’s choice in this case was limited to a finite set of controlled substances, any of which would support the Appellants’ sentences. It points out that Count One of the indictment charged the Appellants with conspiring to distribute Schedule II, III, and IV controlled substances, and went on to list 17 different substances the defendants had agreed to distribute. Because the District Court sentenced the Appellants pursuant to the provisions providing for Schedule IV substances (which carry the least culpability), the government contends that even if the jury had identified which of the 17 substances were actually involved, a more lenient provision of the Sentencing Guidelines still could not have applied. It therefore urges us to hold that any Apprendi violation in this case was harmless error. We agree with the government. An Apprendi violation occurs if a district court makes a finding of fact that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The 17 drugs Bansal and Mullinix were indicted with conspiring to distribute ranged from Schedule II to Schedule IV substances, but the sentences that the two received were based only upon the guidelines applicable to Schedule IV substances. The sentences, therefore, were based upon the lowest conceivable liability under the indictment. To the degree the District Court found any facts as to what substances were involved in the conspiracy, the finding did not increase the penalty for their crimes because it represented the lowest possible sentencing range compatible with the jury’s verdict. We therefore hold that any Apprendi violation was harmless. We will affirm the sentences Bansal and Mullinix received for their convictions under Count One. VI. Of the remaining joint contentions, Appellants challenge their conspiracy convictions under Counts One and Two of their indictment on the ground that the underlying conduct the government alleged, distribution of controlled substances via the internet, was not illegal at the time they were charged. They then challenge their money laundering convictions on the related ground that they obtained the money laundered by lawful means. Finally, they contend their convictions under Count One were misdemeanors and not felonies. We will affirm the District Court’s conclusion in all respects. A. Bansal and Mullinix challenge their convictions for (1) conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) conspiracy to import controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and (3) illicit money transfers and laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 1956 and 1957, on the ground that their conduct — distributing controlled substances via the internet — was not illegal when they were indicted. The cornerstone of their position is that controlled substance distribution via the internet could not have been illegal in 2006 because the relevant statute did not expressly address the internet until 2008. We disagree. We exercise plenary review over a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment. See United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.2002). The predicate felonies alleged in the conspiracy charges under Counts One and Two were distribution and importation of controlled substances in violation of § 841(a). These also were the “specified unlawful activities]” that formed the basis for the money laundering charges under § 1956. Section 841(a), which is unchanged since 2006, provides: Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally— (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). An exception to this blanket prohibition permits physicians or other authorized health professionals to distribute controlled substances pursuant to a prescription. See 21 U.S.C. § 829. The Code of Federal Regulations further provides that every “prescription for a controlled substance ... must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04. Any distribution of a controlled substance pursuant to a prescription that does not meet this standard is a criminal violation of § 841. Bansal and Mullinix contend that their convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances are invalid because their conduct did not violate § 841. They rely primarily upon the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act (“the Ryan Haight Act”), which in 2008, imposed direct federal regulation upon online pharmacies. See Pub. L. No. 110-425, 122 Stat. 4820. The Ryan Haight Act sought to expand the Controlled Substances Act, the statute under which Bansal and Mullinix were convicted, by expressly regulating distribution of controlled substances over the internet. It does so by defining a valid doctor-patient relationship and providing “statutory clarification” to the law surrounding internet controlled-substance sales. See App. 59 (Senate Hearing Transcription). Relying upon statements by various senators and by then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Bansal and Mullinix contend that because the word “internet” was not added to the Controlled Substances Act until 2008, their internet-based conduct must have been legal when they were indicted in 2006. They contend that any application to this case of the Ryan Haight Act’s prohibition of internet drug sales is therefore ex post facto and unconstitutional. Their fallback position is that even if the 2006 version of § 841 could be read to apply to online pharmacies, such a reading would be open to interpretation and debate, thereby rendering it unconstitutionally vague — at least as applied to pre2008 online pharmacy operations. The government responds that § 841 clearly and unambiguously applied to Bansal and Mullinix’s online operations in 2006. In support of its contention that Bansal and Mullinix could be prosecuted under the pre-Ryan Haight Act version of the statute, it cites United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975) (holding that physicians may be prosecuted under § 841 if they distribute medication “outside the usual course of professional practice”), as well as cases from federal courts across the country holding that § 841 applied to controlled substance distributions by online pharmacies even before Congress enacted the Ryan Haight Act amendments, e.g., United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478, 484-490 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Quinones, 536 F.Supp.2d 267, 268-271 (E.D.N.Y.2008), aff'd 635 F.3d 590 (2d Cir.2011). The government’s position is that, because the pre-Ryan Haight Act version of § 841(a) applied to all distributions of controlled substances, Bansal’s and Mullinix’s convictions were not an ex post facto application of the Ryan Haight Act. We agree with the government. Strictly speaking, Bansal and Mullinix were not charged with distributing controlled substances via the internet; they were charged with distributing controlled substances, period. Their conduct—prescription-less sales of controlled substances—fell squarely within § 841(a)’s blanket statement that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,” and does not qualify for the exception that § 849 affords to sales in the usual course of medical business pursuant to valid prescriptions. We find this text abundantly clear: it was illegal in 2006 to sell controlled substances without a valid prescription. That the Ryan Haight Act later criminalized the precise machinery by which they effected their illegal transactions does not alter the basic fact that they were selling controlled substances without prescriptions. We therefore conclude that Bansal and Mullinix were properly indicted and convicted under § 841(a). B. Bansal and Mullinix contend that their money-laundering convictions are invalid because they laundered from lawful sources—i.e., because it was legal in 2006 to sell controlled substances over the internet without prescriptions. As explained above, prescription-less sales of controlled substances were illegal when the Appellants were indicted, regardless whether the sale took place online. Consequently, we will affirm the District Court. Whether the money a defendant has laundered represents the “proceeds” of “specified unlawful activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) is a question of law we review de novo. Cf. United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir.2008). A person is guilty of money laundering under 18 U.S.C §§ 1956 and 1957 if, with the intent to commit a crime, he conducts a financial transaction designed in whole or in part to conceal the source, ownership, or control of “the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” The statute then sets forth a list of “specified unlawful activities].” Id. § 1956(c)(7). Importantly, a person commits money laundering only if the laundered money is “proceeds” from at least one of the criminal activities specified in § 1956(c)(7). Appellants contend that their money laundering convictions are invalid because the government did not prove that the money involved was proceeds from a “specified unlawful activity.” They insist that their underlying conduct was the “sale of pharmacy medication,” which is not listed in § 1956(c)(7). The government responds that the “proceeds” were generated by felonies enumerated in § 1956(c)(7). It points out that § 1956(c)(7)(A) includes any “offense listed in section 1961(1) of Title 18.” Subsection D of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) includes “the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance ... (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act).” The government contends that the money laundering in this case involved the proceeds of Bansal and Mullinix’s distribution of prescription drugs without prescriptions. In the government’s view, the laundered money was therefore proceeds of felonious activity described in § 1961(1), which § 1956(c)(7) incorporates in full. We agree with the government. The evidence at trial established that Bansal and Mullinix committed felony violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Their conduct included “the distribution of, and conspiracy to distribute, controlled substances,” which — by way of § 1956(c)(7)’s incorporation of § 1961(1) — is an “enumerated felony” for th