Full opinion text
HOLMES, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Thomas Bader appeals his convictions of distribution of human growth hormone (“HGH”), conspiracy to knowingly facilitate and knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH brought into the United States contrary to law, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (testosterone cypionate). He asks this court to reverse his convictions or, at a minimum, to grant him a new trial. Mr. Bader also challenges the district court’s forfeiture order requiring him to remit the $4.8 million in proceeds that he allegedly derived from his unlawful activity. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm Mr. Bader’s convictions for distribution of HGH and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute testosterone cypionate, but reverse based upon instructional error his convictions for knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH imported into the United States contrary to law, and conspiring to do so. Further, in light of our reversals, we conclude that the forfeiture judgment cannot rest on its current statutory basis, but we leave to the district court in the first instance the task of determining the precise amount (if any) of the forfeiture judgment authorized by the remaining, upheld convictions. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and sentence and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND Mr. Bader, a licensed pharmacist in the State of Colorado, owned and operated College Pharmacy, a compounding pharmacy located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In the context of this case, the precise definition of drug “compounding” remains in dispute. Nevertheless, the parties agree that College Pharmacy is involved in the process of purchasing, labeling, repackaging, and distributing drugs — including HGH — in finished dosages for patient consumption. In Spring 2004, Mr. Bader instructed Kevin Henry, a College Pharmacy sales representative, to locate an economical source of HGH for purchase and distribution. Mr. Henry located three manufacturers — all of them in China — and College Pharmacy began purchasing and importing HGH from these sources. Upon learning of potential contamination and potency issues with the HGH manufactured by these Chinese suppliers, Mr. Bader asked Mr. Henry to find a new HGH source. Pursuant to Mr. Bader’s instructions, Mr. Henry contacted Bradley Blum, a domestic representative for Chinese HGH manufacturer Genescience, and College Pharmacy began to order and import HGH in bulk quantities from the Genescience facility in China. Employees of College Pharmacy were then directed to repackage the imported HGH into smaller vials for distribution. Pursuant to College Pharmacy’s repackaging protocol, employees copied the relevant HGH drug-instruction guides from a Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)-approved version of HGH known as Saizen and included them with College Pharmacy’s own HGH drug, which they labeled and sold as Somatropin. If asked whether Somatropin was FDA-approved, College Pharmacy employees were instructed to explain that the FDA did not have jurisdiction in China, and to reassure customers that the imported HGH was manufactured in an FDA-approved Chinese facility. College Pharmacy also issued several promotional letters and advertisements which implied that Somatropin had been approved by the FDA. Between 2003 and 2007, Mr. Bader and his employees at College Pharmacy also distributed testosterone cypionate, an anabolic steroid, to individual body-builders and to body-building and “anti-aging” clinics. Among College Pharmacy’s top “clients” was Peak Physique, a large anti-aging clinic that purchased HGH and testosterone cypionate via purchase agreements that required no prescription from a licensed physician. College Pharmacy also promoted and sold the steroid, along with Somatropin, at American Academy of Anti-Aging Medicine (“A4M”) conferences and trade shows, despite the fact that neither “anti-aging” nor “body-building” is a medically necessary use for these drugs. On September 9, 2008, the government filed a Second Superseding Indictment in the District of Colorado charging Mr. Bad-er with a total of forty-three counts involving: (1) conspiracy to knowingly facilitate the sale of merchandise (HGH) brought into the United States contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (3) distribution of HGH, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e); (4) knowingly facilitating the sale of merchandise (HGH) brought into the United States contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545; and (5) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (testosterone cypionate), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. The indictment also indicated that the government would seek a forfeiture judgment in the amount of $4.8 million — the estimated amount of proceeds obtained by Mr. Bader due to his unlawful conduct — as well as forfeiture of the College Pharmacy building that allegedly had facilitated these crimes. The government subsequently dismissed Mr. Bader’s mail-fraud charges, and Mr. Bader was tried on the remaining thirty-three counts beginning on January 4, 2010. On February 2, 2010, a jury convicted Mr. Bader on thirty-two of the thirty-three counts of the indictment, acquitting him on one count of receiving illegally imported goods (Count Sixteen). The jury further found that Mr. Bader had obtained a sum of $4.8 million in proceeds from his illegal activities, and that the College Pharmacy building listed in the indictment had facilitated the crimes charged. The district court entered judgment on Mr. Bader’s convictions and the jury’s forfeiture verdict. Mr. Bader then filed an array of post-trial motions, pursuant to which the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on twenty-three of the HGH distribution counts; they involved prescriptions to minors, which had been validly issued by licensed physicians. Mr. Bader was subsequently sentenced to a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment of forty months and exempted from any payment of a criminal fine, the court having concluded that the forfeiture of $4.8 million and the pharmacy-building constituted an adequate financial penalty. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION Mr. Bader challenges on appeal each of his convictions and attacks the district court’s forfeiture order. More specifically, Mr. Bader raises an array of arguments contesting the legal propriety of the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence; alleges prosecutorial misconduct and entrapment by estoppel; and asserts violations of his Sixth Amendment rights and federal evidentiary rules. Mr. Bader asks us to reverse his convictions or, in the alternative, to grant him a new trial. We address below each of his challenges. A. Alleged Instructional Errors Mr. Bader alleges that the district court erroneously instructed the jury in three ways: (1) by including an “alternative prong on uncharged API [active pharmaceutical ingredient] importation” when it issued instructions regarding the charges of knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH imported contrary to law and conspiring to do so, Aplt. Opening Br. at 51; (2) “by telling the jury [that] all [of the] evidence about compounding was irrelevant,” id. at 47; and (3) by refusing to instruct the jury on applicable state pharmacy laws and his First Amendment right to advertise. The government contends that any error in the court’s “alternative prong” instruction was harmless, that the district court was correct to reject Mr. Bader’s compounding definition, and that the court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding state pharmacy dispensing regulations and Mr. Bader’s First Amendment rights. 1. “Finished” HGH versus API Mr. Bader’s first argument pertains to two of his convictions — specifically, his convictions for knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH imported into the United States contrary to law and conspiring to do so (Counts Seventeen and One of the Second Superseding Indictment, respectively). These convictions implicate 18 U.S.C. § 545, which prohibits the smuggling of illegal goods into the United States by providing, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives ... buys, [or] sells” such merchandise, “knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law” shall be fined or imprisoned for a maximum of twenty years. 18 U.S.C. § 545. In the present case, Mr. Bader was charged in Count One with conspiring to knowingly facilitate the sale of HGH after importation “knowing the same to have been imported into the United States” contrary to several identified federal statutes: 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of a misbranded drug; 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1), which relates to causing the introduction into interstate commerce of a misbranded drug that fails to bear adequate directions for use; 21 U.S.C. § 331(d), which prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of an article that is in violation of section 355 of Title 21; and 21 U.S.C. § 355, which prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of a “new drug” without prior application to or approval from the FDA. See Aplee. App., Vol. IV, at 1027-28 (Second Superseding Indictment, returned Sept. 9, 2008). At bottom, the charged conspiracy involved a scheme to import comparatively cheap HGH from China, to sell that cheap HGH in order to reap windfall proceeds, and to retain the proceeds. In Count Seventeen, Mr. Bader was charged with a specific instance of “knowingly facilitating] the sale” of HGH, “knowing the same to have been imported into the United States contrary to” the federal laws cited above. See id. at 1039. According to FDA documents, “finished drug products” must be approved through an “effective new drug application” (“NDA”) before they can be legally imported. Aplt.App., Vol. I, at 267 (Import Alert #66-71, dated Jan. 23, 2007). Active pharmaceutical ingredients (“API”), in contrast, may be legally imported on a case-by-case basis if they are intended for use in pharmacy compounding. Id. at 270-71. The government concedes that the district court significantly limited the basis upon which the jury could convict Mr. Bader under § 545, focusing upon the government’s primary theory that the HGH that Mr. Bader imported from China was a “finished” drug product subject to FDA oversight and, because Mr. Bader had failed to file an NDA, he had imported HGH “contrary to” 21 U.S.C. § 355’s ban on the importation of “new drugs” that lack FDA approval. As the court later explained in its order partially granting Mr. Bader’s motion for judgment of acquittal, its instruction on Count One — outlined in jury instruction number twenty (“Jury Instruction No. 20”) — “[djistilled to its essence, ... directed the jury to resolve the ‘imported contrary to law1 question by first determining whether the HGH being imported was a ‘finished drug’ or an ‘ingredient.’ ” Aplee. App., Vol. IV, at 1258 (Op. & Order Granting, in Part, Mot. for J. of Acquittal and Den. Remaining Mots., filed Apr. 29, 2010). The court further instructed that “[t]here is no definition under the law for the term ‘finished drug’ ” but that “in determining whether the [HGH] was a finished drug, [the jury could] consider whether it was in a finished dosage form; for example, a tablet, capsule, or solution.” Aplt. Trial Tr.App., Vol. VIII, at 2169 (Jury Instruction No. 20). In the event that the jury determined that the Chinese HGH was in finished form, “they were instructed that a ‘finished drug’ must have NDA approval in order to be legally imported, and because it was undisputed at trial that the HGH here did not have such approval, a finding that the HGH was a ‘finished drug’ compelled the conclusion that it was ‘imported contrary to law.’ ” Aplee. App., Vol. IV, at 1258-59; see ApltApp., Vol. VIII, Tr. at 2715-16. However, significantly, the district court further instructed the jury, in the alternative, that if the jury “f[ound] that the [HGH] was not a finished drug but instead an active pharmaceutical ingredient,” then it still was authorized to find that the HGH was “imported contrary to federal law if it was manufactured by a foreign entity that was not registered with the FDA.” Aplt. Trial Tr.App., Vol. VIII, at 2170 (emphases added). Importantly, the district court incorporated the legal standards concerning the contrary-to-law component of § 545, articulated in Count One’s Jury Instruction 20, into the instructions that would control the jury’s finding as to Count Seventeen. Specifically, the court stated: “For purposes of determining whether the human growth hormone was imported into the United States in a manner contrary to federal law, you should use the same standards and instructions I gave you with regard to that issue in Count 1.” Id. at 2176. Therefore, to the extent that a ground for reversal could be demonstrated regarding Count One relating to a defect in Jury Instruction 20’s contrary-to-law standard, that ground for reversal would also fatally undermine Mr. Bader’s conviction as to Count Seventeen because it employed the same standard. Mr. Bader contends that there is such a ground for reversal, focusing on the final sentence of Jury Instruction 20, relating to API importation. However, Mr. Bader did not specifically object to this portion of Jury Instruction No. 20 at trial — -despite the fact that the court afforded him ample opportunity to do so, see id. at 2145 (Jury Trial Tr., dated Jan. 28, 2010) (“Counsel, this is your second opportunity to lodge any objections to the concluding jury instructions reflected in the packet or to the verdict form.”). At most, Mr. Bader’s counsel made a general “objection] to the [c]ourt’s instruction” — -with no reference to which of the enumerated instructions was put at issue in his objection — and “re-urge[d]” the court to adopt the defense’s compounding instruction. Id. at 2148. This falls far short of Mr. Bader’s obligation to lodge a timely and specific objection. See, e.g., Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1172 (10th Cir.2003) (“No party may assign as error ... the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 51) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 553 (10th Cir.1999) (“Because the purpose of [an] objection is to give the court an opportunity to correct any mistake before the jury enters deliberations, an excessively vague or general objection to the propriety of a given instruction is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.” (citation omitted)). We therefore review Mr. Bader’s objection to Jury Instruction No. 20 for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir.2007); see also Aplee. App., Vol. IV, at 1261 (“In the absence of a specific objection, the [cjourt need only review the instruction for plain error“Plain error occurs when there is (i) error, (ii) that is plain, which (iii) affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and which (iv) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 738 (10th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In undertaking the threshold error inquiry, we must “determine whether, as a whole, the instructions correctly state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and the applicable standards.” United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1273 (10th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding the second prong, we have recognized that error is plain if it is “clear or obvious under current law.” United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the third prong of the test, “[i]n the ordinary case,” to have the requisite affect on substantial rights, an error must be “prejudicial,” which means that “there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Marcus, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Thornburgh, 645 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir.2011); United States v. Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175, 1196 (10th Cir.2011). Lastly, as to the fourth prong, it is notable that there is a relationship between that prong and the third: “[I]n most circumstances, an error that does not affect the jury’s verdict [i.e., the third prong] does not significantly impugn the ‘fairness,’ ‘integrity,’ or ‘public reputation’ of the judicial process [i.e., the fourth prong].” Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2166 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). We are constrained to conclude that, in propounding Instruction No. 20 to the jury, the district court committed clear or obvious error; that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial; and that, under the circumstances presented here, this error significantly impugned the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the trial. In denying Mr. Bader’s post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court concluded that the final sentence of Instruction No. 20 was “unnecessary,” but that any potential error was harmless. Aplee. App., Vol. IV, at 1260-61. We conclude, however, that the final paragraph of the instruction was more than “unnecessary”; it effectively allowed the jury to convict Mr. Bader under a theory upon which he was never charged — viz., illegal importation of an API, as opposed to illegal importation of a finished drug product. See id. at 1024-50. Under Instruction No. 20, the jury was allowed to convict Mr. Bader of illegally importing HGH if either: (1) the imported HGH was a finished drug that did not receive “new drug approval” from the FDA; or (2) the imported product was an API that was “manufactured by a foreign entity that was not registered with the FDA.” Aplt. Trial Tr.App., Vol. VIII, at 2170. This effectively rendered the “finished drug” versus “API” distinction— upon which the government’s entire case was based — a nullity, allowing the jury to convict Mr. Bader regardless of the imported HGH’s form. In particular, the instruction permitted the jury to convict Mr. Bader of a charge for which he was never indicted. Therefore, in propounding Instruction No. 20 to the jury, the district court committed clear or obvious error. We also are convinced that there is a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome — i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Bader of the § 545-related counts but for this error. See United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.2010) (“[T]he overall effect of the due process [instruction-related] error must have been sufficiently great such that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted him absent the error.”). The probable prejudicial impact of Instruction No. 20 is evident when we examine it within the context of the entire trial. See Visinaiz, 428 F.3d at 1308. In his closing argument, the prosecutor invited the jury to consider several email exchanges between Mr. Bader, Mr. Henry, and Genescience representatives that “refleetfed] a concern about whether [the Genescience facilities] [were] even registered facilities.” ApltApp., Vol. IX, Tr. at 2760. In one of those email chains, Mr. Henry asked a Genescience representative whether Genescience was “FDA registered yet,” to which the representative responded that Genescience “ha[d]n’t got registered in FDA yet.” Id. at 2767 (Gov’t Ex. 34). In another, Mr. Henry informed Mr. Bader that a representative from Medisca — apparently an API supply company — would be “sending a letter with information on the FDA[-]registered facility that their HGH comes from,” explaining that the representative was “totally convinced that Medisca is the only place in the country that is bringing in [HGH] legally.” Id. at 2771 (Gov’t Ex. 44). In conclusion, Mr. Henry noted, College Pharmacy “need[ed] to ... find out if anybody [was] telling the truth or if they[ were] all doing it‘illegally.’” Id. Dr. Jason Woo, Associate Director for Medical and Scientific Affairs with the Center for Drug Evaluation Research, testified at trial. When questioned about the FDA approval of foreign-produced HGH, Dr. Woo explained that “[t]here are no approved Chinese facilities” — more specifically, there are not “any facilities in China that are approved to make any components of the approved human growth hormone products.” Aplee. App., Vol. I, Tr. at 18 (emphasis added). As Dr. Woo explained, those “components” — also known as API — are “basically the precursor to an approved drug. [They are] part of the mix that goes into making the drug.” Id. A reasonable jury presented with this evidence — the emails exchanged by Mr. Bader, Mr. Henry, and the Genescience representative; and the testimony of Dr. Woo — could have easily concluded that, even if the imported HGH was not a “finished drug” subject to NDA oversight, it was still an API that had been imported contrary to federal law by virtue of its having been manufactured at a foreign facility that lacked FDA approval. In particular, there is a reasonable probability that such a jury — considering this evidence, in conjunction with the district court’s erroneous jury instruction — convicted Mr. Bader when it would not otherwise have done so, on a theory upon which he was never indicted. Consequently, we conclude that the third prong of the plain-error test is satisfied. And we discern nothing in the circumstances of this case that would indicate that such a prejudicial effect would not significantly impugn the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of Mr. Bader’s trial. Thus, we conclude that the fourth prong of the plain-error test also is satisfied. See Marcus, 628 F.3d at 44 (concluding that there was “a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury charge affected the outcome of the trial and affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings”). This plain-error analysis indicates that because of Jury Instruction No. 20’s inclusion of an erroneous theory of liability— viz., a theory that permitted Mr. Bader’s conviction for having imported an API, as opposed to a finished drug, so long as that API was “manufactured by a foreign entity that was not registered with the FDA,” Aplt. Trial Tr.App., Vol. VIII, at 2170 (Jury Instruction No. 20) — we must reverse and remand. Specifically, we reverse Mr. Bader’s conviction on Count Seventeen, for knowingly facilitating the sale of HGH imported into the United States contrary to law, and on Count One, for conspiracy to do so. Both counts rely on the erroneous liability theory set forth in Jury Instruction 20. 2. Relevancy of Compounding Law Next, Mr. Bader challenges Jury Instruction number twelve (“Jury Instruction No. 12”), pursuant to which the court informed the jury that “evidence concerning whether Mr. Bader’s actions constituted compounding under various legal authorities[ was] not relevant to the issues” that the jury was to “resolve under [the court’s instructions].” Id. at 2164 (Jury Instruction No. 12). Though Mr. Bader represents that he “objected” at trial to the court’s instruction, he did not do so on the grounds that he asserts here. See Aplt. App., Vol. VIII, Tr. at 2699. We therefore review his claim for plain error. See Willis, 476 F.3d at 1127. Mr. Bader argues that the court erroneously “told the jury that none of these meticulous and required pharmacy processing standards mattered when, in truth, they controlled the core questions: whether the [HGH] was already finished prior to College’s purchase, and whether [Mr.] Bader knew this.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 49; see also Aplt. Reply Br. at 12 (noting that “[Mr.] Bader’s defense that compounding absolutely had to occur before this [HGH] was in finished form safe and ready for patient dispensing was wholly negated by the court’s instruction that all evidence about compounding was' irrelevant”). His objection to Instruction No. 12, therefore, relates exclusively to his § 545-related charges. As discussed above, however, we must reverse and vacate Mr. Bader’s § 545-related convictions on account of the erroneous “alternative prong” in Instruction No. 20. Consequently, we need not (and do not) consider whether the district court’s characterization of compounding law as “irrelevant” obliges us to reverse Mr. Bader’s § 545-related convictions; we have already determined that those convictions cannot stand. 3. Rejection of State Pharmacy and First Amendment Instructions Finally, Mr. Bader argues that the district court erred with respect to the jury instructions that it did not give — i.e., in refusing to inform the jury of Colorado’s pharmacy-dispensing laws, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 52-54, and in failing to instruct the jury that Mr. Bader “had a Supreme Court-recognized right to advertise” under the First Amendment, id. at 55. We review the district court’s refusal to issue these instructions for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1314 (10th Cir.2006). However, in determining “whether the district court exercised its discretion properly, we review the jury instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with an accurate understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues in the case.” Id. Applying this standard to the present case, it is patent that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Mr. Bader’s proposed instructions. Mr. Bader first contends that the district court erred in refusing to issue several “relevant” state pharmacy instructions regarding: (1) “Colorado requirements that pharmacies maintain adequate drug inventories and provide adequate services,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 52; (2) “[s]tate laws governing ordering, dispensing[,] and requirements for valid prescriptions,” id. at 53; (3) “[s]tate laws clarifying that pharmacists who prepare, compound, package, repackage, or dispense drug[s] are not drug wholesalers or manufacturers,” id.; and (4) a “Colorado law providing that pharmacists may rely on a physician’s professional judgment in ordering a drug for a patient,” id. at 54. However, Mr. Bader fails to identify to which of the forty-three charged counts these state laws pertain, let alone explain how they are “relevant” to the charges upon which he was convicted. Indeed, it is clear from the record that the district court was more than generous in including “some language [from the proffered instructions] ... where it [was] relevant to [the] explanation of a particular element of a particular count,” despite its determination that Colorado’s pharmacy laws generally had no bearing upon Mr. Bader’s charges. See Aplee. App., Vol. Ill, Tr. at 634. As Mr. Bader offers no support for his bald allegation that this determination was somehow erroneous, we are constrained to conclude that his first argument is meritless. Mr. Bader’s undeveloped First Amendment claim, which he seeks to assert throughout his opening brief, is even less persuasive. As we discuss infra, the government introduced evidence of College Pharmacy advertisements in order to prove that Mr. Bader purposefully marketed HGH and testosterone cypionate for impermissible purposes. At no point, however, did the government contest, as a general matter, College Pharmacy’s right to advertise its products. In other words, Mr. Bader’s First Amendment right to advertise was in no way implicated, let alone compromised, by the charges against him. Consequently, an instruction regarding Mr. Bader’s First Amendment rights could not possibly have promoted an “accurate understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues in the case.” See Crockett, 435 F.3d at 1314. We therefore reject Mr. Bader’s unsubstantiated assertion that the district court somehow abused its discretion in refusing to issue an (irrelevant) instruction pertaining to his First Amendment right to advertise. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Mr. Bader avers that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, renewing many of the unsuccessful arguments that he asserted in his Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Alternative Motion for a New Trial that he filed post-trial. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence upon which Mr. Bader was convicted, “ask[ing] only whether taking the evidence — both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom — in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather than examining the evidence in ‘bits and pieces,’ we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by ‘considering] the collective inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole.’” United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th Cir.1986)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 651-52 & n. 5 (10th Cir.2011); accord United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 871 (10th Cir.2012). In so doing, “we may not assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh conflicting evidence, as these tasks are exclusively for the jury.” United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1076 (10th Cir.2008). 1. Unlawful Distribution or Possession with Intent to Distribute HGH In order to convict Mr. Bader of unlawful possession with intent to distribute HGH in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e), the government was obligated to prove each of three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Mr. Bader knowingly distributed HGH or possessed HGH with the intent to distribute it; (2) that Mr. Bader knew that the HGH that he possessed and intended to distribute was for use in humans; and (3) “[e]ither [that] Mr. Bader knew that the [HGH] was not being distributed for a[] use authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services[,] or that Mr. Bader knew that the [HGH] was not being distributed pursuant to the order of a physician^] or was not being prescribed for a valid medical purpose.” Aplt. Trial Tr. App., Vol. VIII, at 2180-81 (Jury Instruction No. 38). Mr. Bader challenges the third of these three elements on appeal. Mr. Bader principally argues that his conviction cannot stand because the government failed to present proof that he knowingly filled a prescription for an unauthorized use — “[i]llegal distribution,” he contends, “requires proof of a prescription sale for an unapproved use and that a pharmacist knowingly filled it.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 31. This is simply incorrect. Under 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1), whoever knowingly distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, human growth hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other recognized medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 355 of this title and pursuant to the order of a physician, is guilty of an offense punishable by not more than 5 years in prison, such fines as are authorized by Title 18, or both. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain terms of the statute belie Mr. Bader’s argument — specifically, his contention that there is only one means to violate the statute involving knowingly filling a prescription for an unauthorized use. Indeed, Jury Instruction No. 38 — the instruction that outlined the elements of the unlawful distribution charge and to which Mr. Bader has offered no objection — was phrased in the disjunctive. According to that instruction, proof of the filling of an improper physician prescription was but one of three ways that the government could satisfy its burden. The government could demonstrate either: (1) that “Mr. Bader knew that the [HGH] was not being distributed for a[ ] use authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services”; “or [ (2) ] that Mr. Bader knew that the [HGH] was not being distributed pursuant to the order of a physician”; “or [ (3) that Mr. Bader knew that the HGH that he possessed] was not being prescribed for a valid medical purpose.” Aplt. Trial Tr. App., Vol. VIII, at 2181 (emphases added). Throughout Mr. Bader’s trial, the government introduced a series of exhibits consisting of College Pharmacy advertisements that extolled the anti-aging and muscle-building benefits of HGH, as well as related statements from Mr. Blum and various College Pharmacy employees. Several of the witnesses who testified recalled that Mr. Bader had promoted HGH at A4M trade shows as an anti-aging and body-building drug. And their testimony was corroborated by photographs depicting Mr. Bader and his advertisements at one of these trade shows. Mr. Bader apparently argues that this evidence is insufficient because it merely demonstrates promotion, as opposed to actual distribution, of HGH. However, under the plain language of the statute — as well as Mr. Bader’s counts of conviction — proscribed is not only the actual distribution of HGH but also possession with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e). As it is undisputed that College Pharmacy “possessed” HGH at its Colorado Springs facility, any rational trier of fact could have concluded that these advertisements demonstrated Mr. Bader’s intent to market and distribute HGH as an anti-aging and body-building drug, which were not authorized uses of HGH. In that regard, the government introduced evidence demonstrating that the FDA had not approved the use of HGH for either anti-aging or body-building purposes through the testimony of Dr. Woo. After establishing that his position as medical director had familiarized him with the process that a pharmaceutical manufacturer must undergo in order to obtain FDA approval for a drug such as HGH, Dr. Woo informed the jury that HGH had yet to be approved for any off-label uses due to congressional safety concerns. Specifically, Dr. Woo also testified that bodybuilding and anti-aging were not FDA-approved “uses” for HGH. On the basis of this evidence, a reasonable jury could have logically deduced that the College Pharmacy anti-aging and body-building advertisements introduced at trial were aimed at distributing HGH for those uses — uses which had yet to be authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or recognized as valid medical conditions warranting HGH prescriptions. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have construed this evidence as satisfying the third element of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e). 2. Facilitating the Sale of Illegally Imported HGH and Conspiracy to Facilitate the Sale of Illegally Imported HGH While we must vacate Mr. Bader’s 18 U.S.C. § 545-related convictions of facilitating the sale of illegally imported HGH and conspiracy to facilitate that sale due to the aforementioned error in Jury Instruction No. .20, standing alone, this action would not preclude the government from re-prosecuting Mr. Bader on these charges. It is the law of this circuit that the reversal of a defendant’s conviction “bars retrial only where the government presents no evidence that could support [his] conviction.” United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1311 n. 11 (10th Cir.2007); accord United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.2003) (“Our conclusion that [defendant’s] convictions on counts 2 through 5 must be reversed does not, however, preclude retrial of [defendant] on these counts....”); cf. Level 3 Commc’ns v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir.2008) (vacating the jury’s verdict and remanding for a new trial where the court erroneously instructed the jury). This principle is grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause. In contrast to a second trial following an acquittal, which would “present an unacceptably high risk that the [government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that ‘even though innocent, he may be found guilty,’ ” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)), the Supreme Court has held that “the successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict ... poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge” because “to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked a statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect,” id. at 90-91, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Accordingly, this circuit has established a distinction between “trial error” deriving from an erroneous jury instruction and “pure insufficiency of evidence” such that, in the former case, a defendant “may be retried without violating double jeopardy.” Pearl, 324 F.3d at 1214; accord United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir.1995). Thus, Mr. Bader may be retried following remand to the district court if his case falls within this “trial error” category — in other words, so long as the government presented legally sufficient evidence. See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th Cir.2008) (“Although we have concluded that Mr. Nacchio’s conviction must be reversed on account of trial error, we cannot leave it at that. He also claims that the government failed to introduce evidence sufficient for him to be convicted. If he is right, he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal and cannot be retried without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.”), vacated in part on other grounds, 555 F.3d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir.2009). Perhaps because he is aware of this fact, Mr. Bader devotes a substantial portion of his briefs to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his § 545-related convictions. Specifically, he avers that: (1) his convictions cannot stand because they were premised upon the importation of an API rather than a finished drug— i.e., that a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the imported HGH was a “finished drug” on the basis of the evidence that the government produced at trial; (2) the record contains no evidence that Mr. Bader possessed the requisite mens rea to be convicted of the importation of HGH contrary to law; and (3) the government failed to prove that Mr. Bader knowingly participated with a specific intent to further the conspiracy to sell contraband HGH. Aplt. Opening Br. at 21-30. None of these arguments has merit. (i) Importation of Illegally Manufactured API or Finished Drug Product Lacking NDA Approval Mr. Bader insists that a reasonable jury could not have convicted him of the § 545-related charges because the government failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the imported HGH was a “finished” drug product rather than an API. Though as noted we find error with the dual avenues that Jury Instruction No. 20 provided for conviction, there was ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have convicted Mr. Bader on the proper ground specified in this instruction: that is, the imported HGH was a finished drug that was illegally imported on account of Mr. Bader’s failure to garner NDA approval. Specifically, the government produced sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the HGH that Mr. Bader imported was a “finished drug” — primarily through detailed witness testimony explaining how the imported Genescience HGH remained essentially unaltered prior to distribution. Much of this testimony pertained to the specific, step-by-step protocol that College Pharmacy employees followed in preparing the imported Chinese HGH for distribution. Stacy Griffin, one of those employees, read portions of College Pharmacy’s “Somatropin prepackaged protocol” aloud from the stand as she testified. Aplee. App., Vol. I, Tr. at 131 (Test, of Stacy Griffin). That protocol was remarkably simple, requiring College Pharmacy employees to simply gather and sterilize “5 cc 20-millimeter vials,” clean the requisite measuring materials, calibrate the scales used to weigh out the appropriate doses, then “[p]lace [an] empty sterile vial on the balance and begin to weigh powder into it.” Id. at 132-34 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Griffin verified that this was “essentially the process that was followed when College Pharmacy took the Somatropin from the large bottles and put it into small vials,” id. at 134, and confirmed that College Pharmacy “got Somatropin from” Genescience, id. at 131. John Ruth, a College Pharmacy national sales representative, also told the jury that, at least initially, College Pharmacy did no more than simply “repackag[e]” the imported HGH. Id., Vol. II, Tr. at 296 (Test, of John Ruth). Mr. Ruth explained that College Pharmacy employees were “told via Mr. Bader” to repackage the imported HGH, and that the College Pharmacy sales team, in turn, “told all of [its] clients and prospective clients” the same thing: College Pharmacy was “bringing in a drug, importing it from another country, and ... repackaging [it] into [College Pharmacy’s] own package and selling it to them.” Id. Then, “in early 2005, after [College Pharmacy] had been selling the Somatropin for several months and had done well, [the sales team was] told ... that [it was] not repackaging [the HGH] because [it] could not get a license to repackage from the ... FDA.” Id. The College Pharmacy sales team then simply began to inform customers that the HGH “was compounded; that it was no longer repackaged.” Id. Any change in College Pharmacy’s Genescience processes — from “repackaging” to “compounding” — was therefore illusory, and was aimed at avoiding FDA oversight rather than actually “compounding” imported ingredients. The testimony of Ms. Griffin and Mr. Ruth was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Blum, who stated that he was not aware of “anything being added or taken out of the bottled version [of HGH] that [Genescience] provided [College Pharmacy] [as juxtaposed with] the vials that [College Pharmacy was] putting out.” Id., Vol. I, Tr. at 182 (Test, of Brad Blum). Mr. Blum consistently referred to the Genescience HGH product that he sold to Mr. Bader as “Somatropin,” and even testified that he “personally] use[d]” Somatropin after purchasing it directly from Genescience. Id. at 168-69. Upon receiving the Genescience shipment from China, Mr. Blum explained, he mixed the imported vial of HGH powder with a vial of water and injected himself with the hormone at his home, noting that HGH enables one to “recover faster from injury” and that he found it to improve his “general well being.” Id. at 170. On the basis of testimony from the man who actually imported and dealt directly with Genescience, it would have been entirely reasonable for a jury to conclude that Genescience’s HGH, to which nothing was “being added or taken out,” was essentially (in substance) identical to the smaller Somatropin doses that College Pharmacy later marketed— particularly in light of Mr. Blum’s testimony that he was able to personally use (as well as distribute to his friends) the “finished” HGH that he received directly from Genescience. See id. at 172, 182. Having learned (1) that the imported Genescience HGH was merely repackaged into smaller vials as “Somatropin,” (2) that College Pharmacy employees themselves told clients they were merely repackaging the imported HGH, and (3) that the imported Genescience HGH was — -at least in certain significant instances (e.g., the use of Mr. Blum) — patient-ready even prior to College Pharmacy’s processing, a reasonable jury could have easily inferred that the imported Genescience HGH was already in its “finished” form when it arrived at College Pharmacy for repackaging and distribution. In sum, Mr. Bader’s conviction was supported by a wealth of evidence. (ii) Mens Rea Mr. Bader also argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the necessary mens rea to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 545. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 28. Neither party does a good job of developing this issue. And, in particular, the government’s conclusory assertion that “[i]t was uncontroverted that [Mr. Bader] knew the [HGH] in question was not the subject of an approved NDA,” Aplee. Br. at 23 — with no citations to the record that support this statement — is unhelpful. Our independent review of the record, however, confirms that the government is correct: a reasonable jury could have easily concluded that Mr. Bader knew the illicit nature of his transactions on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial. Admittedly, our own circuit has offered little in the way of guidance regarding the mens-rea requirement of § 545. Our sister circuits, however, have observed that “the word ‘knowingly’ ” — as it appears in § 545 — “modifies ‘imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law.’ ” United States v. Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 545); accord United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1980) (“An essential element of a section 545 offense is ... a knowing importation of merchandise contrary to law.”); see also Roseman v. United States, 364 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir.1966) (noting that an appellant’s charge under 18 U.S.C. § 545 for the sale of LSD required proof “(1) that the appellants sold the LSD”; “(2) that [the] appellants had knowingly brought this LSD into the United States contrary to law”-, “and (3) that the LSD ... was a ‘new drug’ ... for which there was no effective new drug application” (emphasis added)). Under § 545, “[i]t is not a requirement of the offense that the defendant know the type of merchandise he is importing. He need only know that he is importing or bringing in ‘merchandise contrary to law.’ ” Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d at 1217 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 545). In the present case, therefore, the government could satisfy § 545’s mens-rea requirement so long as it could demonstrate that Mr. Bader “knew” that he was importing a drug from Genescience illegally. As proof that Mr. Bader possessed the requisite mens rea to be convicted of a § 545-related offense, the government first presented the testimony of Chris Strong, College Pharmacy’s managing pharmacist at the time that Mr. Bader began importing the Chinese HGH. Mr. Strong testified that he had expressed his concerns about the importation of Chinese HGH to Mr. Bader and other College Pharmacy pharmacists at a meeting in 2004. He explained that the meeting had centered upon whether or not College Pharmacy was “going to operate the pharmacy with the compliance policy guidelines of the FDA,” and he recalled that “Mr. Bader’s opinion [had been] that [the FDA’s policy] was a guideline” — not “a rule or a regulation” that College Pharmacy was obligated to follow. Aplee. App., Vol. I, Tr. at 113 (Test, of Chris Strong); see also id., Vol. II, Tr. at 293-94 (“[T]he FDA wanted in, and [Mr. Bader] wanted them out____ [T]hey were known as Big Pharma. They were the big enemy, and we were the good guys.”). Mr. Strong further testified that he and Mr. Bader had quarreled over appropriate College Pharmacy protocol, usually in relation to Mr. Bader’s continuous attempts to increase College Pharmacy’s profit. Not long after Mr. Strong attempted to institute a new policy at College Pharmacy — pursuant to which pharmacists would be asked to verify that any new physician who sought to fill a prescription with College Pharmacy was adequately certified — he was fired from his position at the pharmacy. Mr. Bader’s knowing disregard of the FDA’s regulatory scheme was directly confirmed by the testimony of Mr. Blum, who admitted that both he and Mr. Bader had known that the Genescience HGH was not an FDA-approved product and had also known that it was being imported from China. Mr. Ruth also told the jury that Mr. Bader had known that the imported HGH was subject to FDA approval, and recounted how Mr. Bader had directed his sales staff to inform College Pharmacy customers that the pharmacy was “compound[ing]” rather than merely “repackaging” the imported HGH in order to avoid FDA licensing requirements. Id., Vol. II, Tr. at 296. A reasonable jury certainly could have construed the testimony of Mr. Strong, Mr. Blum, and Mr. Ruth — particularly when viewed collectively — as constituting sufficient evidence that Mr. Bader “knowingly” imported HGH from Genescience and that he knew that he was doing so “contrary to law.” See 18 U.S.C. § 545; see Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d at 1217. As such, the government presented sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the mens rea element of § 545 was satisfied. 3. Conspiracy Finally, Mr. Bader contends that the government failed to prove that he conspired with Mr. Blum and others to illegally import HGH, alleging that (1) “the [gjovernment failed to prove anything other than an equipoise buyer-seller relationship between [Mr.] Blum and the purchasing pharmacies,” and (2) that the government failed to prove that he knowingly participated in the alleged conspiracy. Aplt. Opening Br. at 29. The district court here instructed the jury that, in order to convict Mr. Bader of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 545, the government was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “(1) Mr. Bader entered into an agreement or understanding with one or more others to import [HGH] into the United States contrary to federal law and thereafter to sell or distribute that [HGH] within the United States”; (2) “[t]here was an interdependence among Mr. Bader and the others involved in [the] agreement”; (3) “Mr. Bader knew that the purpose of the agreement was to import the [HGH] contrary to federal law[,]” to sell it thereafter, and that he “voluntarily entered into that agreement”; and (4) “[o]ne or more of the people who entered into the agreement performed one or more overt acts — that is, actions that constituted a substantial step towards achieving the purpose” of the illegal importation scheme. Aplt. Trial Tr. App., Vol. VIII, at 2168 (Jury Instruction No. 18); see also Molt, 615 F.2d at 146 (discussing elements of crime of conspiring to violate § 545). Mr. Bader arguments implicate only the first and third elements. The government, however, presented ample evidence to support the jury’s findings as to these elements. First, on redirect, Mr. Blum clearly and unequivocally testified that he illegally imported and distributed HGH, and that he did so with Mr. Bader’s knowledge and assistance. Mr. Blum acknowledged that he had “agree[d] to violate the law” when he “agreed to do business with Tom Bader,” and he further admitted that this agreement amounted to a conspiracy involving “importation of [HGH] and delivery to Mr. Bader,” that the “essential objective of the conspiracy” was to “distribute [HGH],” and that the “members of that conspiracy” were “[him]self and Tom [Bader].” Aplee. App., Vol. I, Tr. at 252. Mr. Blum also confirmed that Mr. Bader had “knowingly and voluntarily participated in that agreement.” Id.; see id. at 189 (agreeing that “Mr. Bader ... kn[e]w that this was not FDA[-]approved product”). Mr. Blum’s statements were corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Strong, who told the jury that Mr. Bader was aware of the fact that his importation of Genescience HGH violated FDA protocol, as well as the testimony of Mr. Ruth, who confirmed that College Pharmacy was purchasing HGH from Mr. Blum and from Genescience in China at the direction of Mr. Bader. On the basis of this testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Bader “knowingly” entered into an agreement with Mr. Blum to import and distribute HGH in a manner that Mr. Bader knew was “contrary to law” — i.e., in a way that he knew ran afoul of FDA rules and regulations. Accordingly, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence of Mr. Bader’s involvement in a conspiracy relating to the § 545 charge. 4. Conspiracy to Distribute or Possess with Intent to Distribute Testosterone Cypionate Finally, Mr. Bader challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that the government presented to prove Count Nineteen of the Superseding Indictment — conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute testosterone cypionate (an anabolic steroid), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. Mr. Bader argues that, of the nearly four thousand doctors that College Pharmacy serviced, only two admitted that they had “secretly” prescribed testosterone through College Pharmacy for unlawful uses. Aplt. Opening Br. at 56. He also avers that he was unaware of these unlawful prescriptions. As the jury was instructed at trial, the government bore the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that: “(1) Mr. Bader entered into an agreement or understanding with one or more others to unlawfully distribute or to possess ... with the intention of unlawfully distributíng a controlled substance; namely, testosterone cypionate, an anabolic steroid”; “(2) Mr. Bader knew that the purpose of the agreement” was to unlawfully distribute or to possess with intent to distribute that testosterone cypionate; and “(3) [tjhere was an interdependence among Mr. Bader and the others involved in this agreement or understanding.” Aplt. Trial Tr.App., Vol. VIII, at 2178 (Jury Instruction No. 34). Mr. Bader contests the government’s proof of the first two of these three elements. (i) Agreement to Unlawfully Distribute Although Mr. Bader primarily attempts to discredit the government’s evidence regarding the two doctors who prescribed testosterone cypionate for unlawful uses through prescriptions filled by College Pharmacy, this was merely one aspect of the abundant evidence that the government presented to demonstrate that Mr. Bader knowingly agreed with other College Pharmacy sales and advertising staff to illegally distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute testosterone cypionate. First, to prove that an agreement existed, the government presented testimony from one of Mr. Bader’s co-conspirators. Specifically, Mr. Ruth testified that he “always got instruction from Thomas Bader” regarding how he and fellow College Pharmacy employee, Kevin Henry, should prepare for and present information at the A4M anti-aging conferences at which College Pharmacy marketed testosterone cypionate, Aplee. App., Vol. II, Tr. at 298 — despite the fact that anti-aging is not a lawful, approved use for this drug. Sometimes Mr. Bader even attended these conferences ■ himself and, when he did, Mr. Bader was the one “running the show.” Id., Vol. I, Tr. at 191. Mr. Ruth also explained that College Pharmacy had enjoyed a lucrative relationship with Peak Physique, a large anti-aging clinic that purchased large volumes of prescriptions from College Pharmacy, and that Mr. Bader had supervised the Peak Physique account. Additionally, the government introduced a series of College Pharmacy’s advertisements promoting testosterone for anti-aging and body-building purposes. Among these was a printout of College Pharmacy’s web page, which depicted a bulging bicep and the word “TESTOSTERONE” in large, block print, accompanied, at the top of the page, by these words: “Recent headlines question the benefits of testosterone for aging men ... To learn more, click here.” Id., Vol. Ill, at 657 (Gov’t Ex. 23) (some capitalization altered). Mr. Ruth testified that this advertisement was geared toward promoting “[b]ig muscles,” and that Mr. Bader himself had approved it. Id., Vol. II, Tr. at 318. Government Exhibit Thirteen — a College Pharmacy print advertisement encouraging consumers to “[l]ive [l]ife to the [fjullest” — also billed “[tjestosterone for [m]en & Women” as one of College Pharmacy’s featured anti-aging products, and boasted that “[a]nti-[a]ging clinics all over the United States [were] coming to College Pharmacy for solutions to their age[-]management questions.” Id., Vol. III, at 645 (Gov’t Ex. 13). Mr. Ruth explained that Tracy Crawford, College Pharmacy’s managing director of sales, had affixed a post-it note to this advertisement asking Mr. Bader whether he would like to include it as an insert in the registration bags that College Pharmacy distributed to anti-aging trade show attendees. Indeed, Mr. Ruth confirmed that all of College Pharmacy marketing materials and major decisions were subject to Mr. Bader’s approval. His testimony, combined with these College Pharmacy advertisements, provided more than sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Bader “entered into an agreement” with Mr. Ruth and other members of the sales department to unlawfully distribute testosterone cypionate — in other words, the govern- meat met its burden of proof concerning element one of Count Nineteen under Jury-Instruction No. 34. See Aplt. Trial Tr. App., Vol. VIII, at 2178; see id. at 2168-69 (Jury Instruction No. 19) (“In determining whether the [g]overnment has shown that Mr. Bader entered into an agreement or understanding with others, you are instructed that the [g]overnment need not show that the people involved had any formal or written agreement nor that they specifically discussed among themselves what the purpose or details of the agreement would be or the means by which it would be accomplished.”). (ii) Knowingly Unlawful Distribution The government also established that “Mr. Bader knew that the purpose of the agreement was to unlawfully distribute” testosterone cypionate. Id. at 2178 (emphasis added). At trial, the jury was instructed that “[w]ith regard to whether any distribution or possession with intent to distribute testosterone cypionate by Mr. Bader was unlawful,” it was to consider whether the government had shown “that Mr. Bader either knew that he was distributing or possessing with intent to distribute the testosterone cypionate without a valid prescription by a medical practitioner or knew that the prescription he was filling was issued without a valid medical purpose.” Id. at 2178-79. As Mr. Ruth and others testified, Mr. Bader knew that he was distributing testosterone to Peak Physique and other clinics for anti-aging and body-building purposes. Furthermore, particularly in light of Mr. Ruth’s concession that he knew that anti-aging was not a “valid medical purpose,” id. at 2179, a reasonable jury could have easily inferred that “a reasonable pharmacist acting in good faith,” id. at 2173, would have known that these were unlawful uses. Thus, the government also satisfied its burden of proof regarding element two of the testosterone-conspiracy charge. Accordingly, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have convicted Mr. Bader of conspiracy to distribute