Full opinion text
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge: Defendants-Appellants James Patrick Phillips, Wesley C. Walton, and James Brooks (collectively, the “Defendants-Appellants”) appeal their conviction of and sentencing for false reporting of natural gas trades in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act and the federal wire fraud statute. We AFFIRM. Factual and PROCEDURAL Background The Defendants-Appellants are former employees of El Paso Merchant Energy Corporation (“EPME”), a subsidiary of the El Paso Corporation (“El Paso”). The government alleges that the Defendants-Appellants violated the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”) and the wire fraud statute by sending false information about natural gas prices to trade magazines that report natural gas prices in indexes, in an effort to affect and manipulate those indexes, which, in turn, would affect the market for natural gas futures and benefit the compan/s financial positions. Some background on the natural gas industry is necessary for understanding this case. Natural gas is transported throughout North America via a network of pipelines. The gas transportation network is centered around “hubs,” which are geographical locations where major pipeline systems interlink. These hubs act as separate markets, at which supply and demand dictate prices that may differ between the hubs. Gas trades are divided into different types. Most basically, physical gas is traded, whereby one company agrees to purchase a quantity of gas to be physically delivered to a particular location. In addition to the sale of physical gas, financial trades are made based on gas prices. One particular financial trade, a gas contract for future delivery, is traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”). NYMEX contracts are based on the price of gas trading at Henry Hub, Louisiana. Other financial trades, termed “swaps,” are transactions where two traders agree to buy a volume of gas from each other at the same time, but at different prices. In one common format, called a “basis” trade, one party agrees to pay a first-of-the-month index price and the counterparty agrees to pay based on the last day NY-MEX settle. Another common financial transaction is an exchange for physical futures (“EFP”), which is a swap with one end priced off the NYMEX futures market and the other prices off an index plus or minus a differential. Financial trades generally do not result in the transfer of physical gas, but are resolved financially. The market index prices for physical gas are most prominently published in two privately owned newsletters: Inside FERC Gas Market Report (“Inside FERC”) and Natural Gas Intelligence (“NGI”). Both of these publications publish the natural gas price marketing indicators at the major pipeline hubs and market centers in the United States, and it is undisputed that both publications are highly influential to market price for physical gas. The indexes also are used to determine royalties and public gas contracts, among other things. The publications gather pricing information about the various markets and pipeline hubs by requesting data about physical gas transactions from natural gas traders. After receiving data from the gas traders, and taking a variety of other factors into account, the publications release indexes that purport to represent the price of natural gas at different delivery points. In requesting data, Inside FERC and NGI requested that traders report fixed-price, baseload deals negotiated during bidweek, and it also instructed that basis or EFP trades not be reported. The Defendants-Appellants were all employees at EPME. EPME traded in both physical and financial transactions of the sort previously mentioned. In 2000, Defendant-Appellant Brooks was EPME’s Senior Vice President for Risk Management, and he was responsible for overseeing physical traders. In 2001, Brooks became the Managing Director for Natural Gas, and he oversaw both physical and basis traders. At the time, EPME was divided into various trading “desks,” which were then split between physical gas trading and finance trading. The desks were based on pipeline network regions. During the time in question, Defendanh-Appel-lant Phillips was a senior physical trader and was manager of the Texas Desk at EPME. Defendant-Appellant Walton was a basis trader on the financial side for both the Texas Desk and the Gulf Coast Region of the Northeast Desk. As a market participant, Inside FERC and NGI would request physical trade information from EPME. EPME would report the information to the trade publications via spreadsheets sent by the physical traders responsible for each of EPME’s desks. From summer 2002 to fall 2002, El Paso received inquires from various federal agencies and a United States Attorney’s Office grand jury subpoena seeking information on the reports EPME sent to the trade publications. Around that time, El Paso hired Haynes & Boone, a law firm, to conduct an internal investigation into allegations that El Paso employees had submitted false trades to trade publications. Defendants-Appellants Brooks, Walton, and Phillips were interviewed as part of that investigation, and each employee was subsequently terminated. Nonetheless, at least at the beginning of this investigation, El Paso paid the legal fees for both Walton and Brooks. Starting in March 2003, an Assistant U.S. Attorney began a course of correspondence with El Paso’s legal counsel about El Paso’s payment of legal fees for former employees. El Paso informed the Assistant U.S. Attorney about the company by-laws, according to which EPME was required to indemnify any employee for legal fees if the employee was found not to have engaged in wrongdoing, but EPME was left with discretion about whether to advance payment of legal fees prior to such determination. El Paso stated that, based in part on “the limited results of the Haynes & Boone interviews,” it had decided not to advance legal fees for Brooks, but that it was inclined to advance Walton’s legal fees. El Paso stressed, however, that it would consider the employee’s cooperation with the federal investigation in deciding whether to continue advancing legal fees. After additional correspondence regarding Delaware law and its application to El Paso’s indemnification policy, the government, in response to El Paso’s request for the identities of any individual who was not cooperating, identified Walton, as well as four other employees, who are not defendants here, as non-cooperating employees. Sometime thereafter, El Paso terminated Walton’s legal fees, but it did not inform the government. Defendant-Appellant Phillips, who had not been discussed in the correspondence, subsequently requested indemnification. On August 12, 2004, El Paso declined Phillips’s request, noting that indemnification was made only after an ultimate determination of the legal proceedings, and that it would not advance his legal fees. El Paso also noted that it was not obliged to advance fees, and that EPME was cooperating with the government and so it would not advance legal fees to “potential subjects or targets of their investigations.” On September 25, 2006, the government filed a second superseding indictment, charging the Defendants-Appellants with forty-nine counts: specifically, twenty-four counts of false reporting in violation of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2), twenty-four counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of conspiracy to commit false reporting and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The government alleged that the Defendants-Appellants were involved in a conspiracy, lasting from about April 2000 through May 2002, whereby the Defendants-Appellants reported false information related to natural gas prices to Inside FERC and NGI to manipulate the index prices reported in those magazines. Specifically, the government alleged that DefendanWAppellant Brooks would direct the physical gas traders at EPME to report false data to the publications, such as trades that did not occur, false prices, or false gas volumes, in a manner that would benefit EPME’s financial positions. Defendant-Appellant Walton, a basis trader on the Texas and Northeast Desks, would allegedly tell the physical traders his financial positions for the upcoming month, such as whether he wanted the index price of gas to increase or decrease in certain areas, so the physical traders could report data manipulating the published indexes in his favor. The second superseding indictment also alleged that Defendant-Appellant Phillips and the other physical gas traders sent fictitious information and reports to Inside FERC and NGI. The government alleged that twenty-four misleading reports were transmitted to these publications, either personally by the Defendants-Appellants or based on their instructions. The trial lasted from December 4, 2007 to February 7, 2008. During the trial, the government submitted over 1,000 exhibits, including the bidweek surveys sent to Inside FERC and NGI, internal worksheet versions of those surveys, internal EPME emails, EPME trade tickets recording physical and basis deals, summaries of basis positions, and hundreds of taped telephone calls. During trial, the jury heard testimony from fourteen government witnesses, including Matthew O’Loughlin, an expert, and five defense witnesses, including Defendant-Appellant Brooks. The government’s two primary witnesses were physical traders Dallas Dean and Sharon O’Toole. Dean was a physical trader on the Northeast Desk and O’Toole was a physical trader on the Texas Desk. Both testified about the conspiracy and stated that Defendant-Appellant Brooks instructed them to submit false data to Inside FERC based on information given to them by Defendant-Appellant Walton. O’Toole also testified about Defendant-Appellant Phillips’s involvement in the conspiracy. The government also admitted a large number of incriminating emails between the various traders — often between Phillips and other physical traders — about the content of the reports sent to Inside FERC and NGI or requesting information from basis traders about their financial positions. Similarly, the government played recordings of telephone calls, many recorded on Walton’s line. In some of these conversations, Walton discussed price targets for certain trading regions, the submission of reports that would or had affected published indexes, and whether certain reported trades were too low to be credible. He also thanked the physical traders when the published index prices were favorable to his financial positions. In one particularly important email chain, various EPME employees, including Brooks, Phillips, and Walton, discussed the reports sent to the publications. Starting this chain, Brooks emailed the physical and financial traders on October 23, 2000, writing: There has [sic] been several discussions on how IP [Inside FERC ] price should be reported in the month of November. Most of you are aware that we reported only verifiable fixed price transactions to IF for October. It is the opinion of some, that the reason for doing so made no difference, and only eliminated us as an active price setting participant. In an effort to get everyone’s opinion on this, reply as to the following: 1. Report according to our book bias (as in the past). 2. Report verifiable fixed price trades only. In response, various traders, including Walton and Phillips, chose the first option. Several other traders discussed the options, emailing with Brooks and discussing how Inside FERC had a standardized format for reporting data, but that the “integrity of the data ... is not verified.” Another trader replied that they should “avoid discussing this is on e-mail” due to ongoing investigations, and O’Toole replied, “GOOD point!” Also testifying for the government was Ronald Clay Sanders, an employee at EPME, who worked as the manager of the risk operations group during the time of the alleged conspiracy. Sanders testified whether the trades reported to Inside FERC or NGI by the physical traders were real and whether they matched any trades in the EPME electronic database. Overall, Sanders testified that only 3.6% of the 6,213 trades reported to Inside FERC and NGI during the course of the conspiracy matched actual trades, and that if the trades reported by the West Desk are excluded — which allegedly stopped participating in the conspiracy in fall 2002 — -only 1.9% of the 5,687 trades match actual trades. Finally, the government presented O’Loughlin, an expert who testified about the effect of EPME’s false reports on the published indexes at Inside FERC and NGI. The primary defense witness was Defendant-Appellant Brooks. In part, Brooks testified about the incriminating October 2000 email chain where the traders discuss reporting based on “book bias.” Brooks testified that “book bias” did not mean that the physical traders would submit numbers favoring the basis traders’ positions; rather, Brooks stated that the term meant that EPME would report data to the publications based on their perception of where gas was actually trading. A potential defense witness, Don Guil-bault, invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the day he was scheduled to testify. Guilbault was a physical trader at EPME and he had admitted to submitting false reports to Inside FERC and NGI. According to the Defendants-Appellants, however, Guilbault would have testified that Walton did not provide him with basis positions to shape his reports. Although Guilbault pled guilty prior to the Defendant-Appellants’ trial, he was still awaiting sentencing at the time of the current trial to ensure cooperation. The Defendants-Appellants moved to compel testimony; after a hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding no government misconduct and a valid purpose for the invocation of privilege. After closing arguments, the jury deliberated for three days. The jury sent several notes during deliberations, one of which asked a question about the phrase “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Ultimately, the jury found: all Defendants-Appellants guilty of the conspiracy count; Phillips guilty of false reporting and wire fraud on counts 5, 9-10, 14, 19-21, 23-25, 29, 33-34, 38, 43-45, 47-49, and not guilty on all other charged counts; Walton guilty of false reporting and wire fraud on counts 3-5, 9-10, 19-24, 27-29, 33-34, 43-48, and not guilty on all other charged counts; and Brooks guilty on counts 2-5, 8-29, 32-49, and not guilty on all other charged counts. On December 17, 2009, the district court sentenced the Defendants-Appellants. The district court calculated, for Phillips and Walton, that the proper offense level was thirty-three (with criminal history category 1), with a recommended sentencing range of 135 to 168 months. For Brooks, the district court calculated that the offense level was thirty-five (with a criminal history category 1), with a recommended sentencing range of 168 to 210 months. The district court sentenced Phillips and Walton to 135 months of imprisonment and sentenced Brooks to 168 months of imprisonment. The Defendants-Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and they now assert ten separate grounds for error. They argue that the indictment must be dismissed, and that their convictions and sentences must also be reversed. Analysis A. Government Interference with Payment of Legal Fees The Defendants-Appellants first argue that the government pressured EPME to cut off its payment of legal fees for their attorneys, violating their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and consequently, requiring dismissal of the indictment against them, relying on 2003 correspondence between the Assistant U.S. Attorney and El Paso’s legal counsel. The district court found no such pressure by the government, and the Defendants-Appellants do not show clear error in that determination. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo. United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 868 (5th Cir.2010). We review the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Id. “Under the clear error standard, we defer to the findings of the district court unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The record creates no “firm conviction” that the district court erred in finding the government did not coerce El Paso into deciding not to advance the Defendants-Appellants’ legal fees. While the correspondence shows El Paso possessed an intense desire to be seen as cooperative by the government, the government never demanded or suggested to El Paso that it cease paying the legal fees of the Defendants-Appellants. Indeed, rather than create a “firm conviction” that El Paso was coerced into not paying the Defendants-Appellants’ attorney fees, the correspondence shows El Paso, through EPME, exercised its own discretion whether to pay the Defendants-Appellants’ legal fees. The correspondence shows that EPME had the discretion, under its by-laws, not to advance legal fees to its employees. Further, as to Brooks, the correspondence shows El Paso had exercised that discretion prior to the government’s correspondence due to the company’s conclusion that he was involved in wrongdoing. Nor do Defendants-Appellants fair better in relying on the 2003 Justice Department Memorandum, “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” also known as the “Thompson Memorandum.” That memorandum provided guidance on how the government should decide whether a corporate entity is cooperating with an investigation, and it suggested that investigators consider whether a corporation was advancing legal fees to culpable agents. Admittedly, that memorandum has been subject to criticism, and the Department of Justice has subsequently revised its policies. Nevertheless, the mere existence of the memorandum could not have compelled El Paso. This case is distinguishable from the facts that the Second Circuit confronted in United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2008). There, the district court found that the government had “forced” KPMG to cease paying legal fees on behalf of the defendants, the payment of which had been KPMG’s long-standing policy, based on threats from the government and the government’s involvement in crafting internal KPMG memos dissuading employees from obtaining counsel. Id. at 147-50. The district court’s factual findings bound the Second Circuit, and on such findings, the Second Circuit held KPMG’s actions were state actions that violated the defendants’ right to counsel of their choice. Id. Here, as noted above, no such factual findings were made, and reasonably so. Whereas in Stein, where the government specifically threatened to take into account KPMG’s payment of legal fees, referring to the Thompson Memorandum, the correspondence here does not refer to that memorandum and it includes no threat to indict El Paso if it continued to pay fees. Moreover, the governmeiit did not meddle in El Paso’s internal discussion with employees in an attempt to dissuade the retention of counsel. Lastly, whereas KPMG’s long-standing policy of paying legal fees demonstrated that the fees would have been paid but for the government’s actions, EPME’s policy was discretionary, and had been independently exercised to not advance legal fees to Brooks. Accordingly, the Defendants-Appellants fail to show clear error in the district court’s factual findings, and under those facts, we find that denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment was proper. B. Applicability and Constitutionality of CEA The Defendants-Appellants raise a number of challenges to the applicability and constitutionality of the CEA. First, they argue that 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)’s reference to “false ... reports” does not cover the false reports they sent to industry newsletters. Second, they argue that trades of physical natural gas are exempted from the CEA and/or do not meet the Act’s definition of “commodity.” Third, the Defendants-Appellants argue that various terms in § 13(a)(2) are vague, and thus the CEA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them. Fourth, they argue that the CEA is overbroad. While the Defendant-Appellants’ arguments are sweeping, they are, ultimately, unavailing. 1. “Report” The Defendants-Appellants first argue that their communications with Inside FERC and NGI do not qualify as “reports” under § 13(a)(2). They state that other portions of the CEA, as well as the CFTC’s regulations promulgated thereunder, distinguish between “statements” and “reports,” and generally use “report” to refer to “a formal record or document the Commission requires regulated futures professionals or traders to file, maintain or provide to the Commission or costumers.” The CEA states that it shall be unlawful for: [a]ny person ... knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning ... market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce .... 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). The term “reports” is not defined in the CEA or CFTC regulations. See 7 U.S.C. § la; 17 C.F.R. § 1.3. Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court has considered the definition. Consequently, the applicability of the term “reports” appears to be an issue of first impression. “In construing the United States Code our task must begin with the words provided by Congress and the plain meaning of those words.” United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir.2004). Thus, we begin with the plain meaning of “report[ ],” which the dictionary defines as any statement of fact, or at least a detailed statement of fact. See Merriam-Webster, report, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/report (defining report as “a usually detailed account or statement”); Oxford English Dictionary, report, available at http://www.oed.com/ search?searchType=dictionary&q=report (defining report as “[i]nformation provided or conveyed, and related senses,” “[a]n account of a situation, event, etc., brought by one person to another ..., a notification of something observed,” “[a] descriptive account or statement”); see also CBC, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys., 855 F.2d 688, 690-91 (10th Cir.1988) (applying dictionary definition of “report” to interpret word in Bank Holding Act). The Defendants-Appellants’ statements to Inside FERC and NGI would satisfy such a definition. They were not expressions of opinion, or casual communications, but were lengthy documents outlining detailed information about natural gas trades, sent to established industry publications with the intent to inform those publications about the state of the natural gas markets. The Defendants-Appellants argue that “reports,” when used in the CEA, refers only to formal reports required under the statute to be submitted by traders to the CFTC or to customers, and that other portions of the CEA differentiate between “reports” and mere “statements.” While it is true that various parts of the CEA specify reports that are to be kept and submitted, such fact cuts against the Defendants-Appellants. Where the CEA discusses reports to be sent to the CFTC or to customers, the CEA specifies the kind of report. See 7 U.S.C. § 6g (providing “[e]very person registered hereunder ... shall make such reports as are required by the Commission ...” (emphasis added)); 7 U.S.C. § 6i(2) (providing certain trades unlawful “unless such person files ... with ... the Commission such reports regarding any transaction ... as the Commission may by rule ... require” (emphasis added)); 17 C.F.R. § 16.00 (providing “[e]ach reporting market shall submit to the commission ... a report ... showing” specified information); 17 C.F.R. § 17.00 (providing “[e]ach futures commission merchant ... shall submit a report to the Commission ... ”; requiring report to provide specified information). Such specifics would be unnecessary if every use of “report” implied the same type of report. The fact that the CEA specifies the kind of report when discussing reports to be made to the CFTC or to customers implies that when the CEA uses “report,” without such limits, it does so in a more general fashion. Indeed, reading § 13(a)(2) in the manner suggested by Defendants-Appellants would render other sections of the CEA superfluous. The next two subsections of the CEA make it unlawful for “[a]ny person knowingly to make ... any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter ... which statement was false or misleading with respect to a material fact,” and for “[a]ny person willfully to falsify ... a material fact, make any false ... statements or representations ... to a registered entity, board of trade, of futures associations -” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(3), (4) (emphasis added). Similarly, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(2) renders it unlawful for “any person, in or in connection with any order to make ... any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery ..., (B) willfully to make or cause to be made to the other person any false report or statement or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for the other person any false record.” If § 13(a)(2) was intended to cover only false reports sent to the CFTC or to customers, these other sections would be superfluous. Moreover, if § 13(a)(2) concerned only false reports submitted to the CFTC, or false reports submitted from traders to customers, there would be no need to limit the provision to communications “in interstate commerce,” and that “affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity.” See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). These jurisdictional “hooks” would not be needed for Congress to regulate false communications to a government agency, or false communications by federally registered traders. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). The fact is apparent when one looks at the CEA’s provisions that specifically deal with false reports to the CEA or customers. Those sections are not limited to communications in interstate commerce or to those that affect commodity prices. Instead, they render all false statements to the CFTC or customers by registered traders unlawful. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(2)(B), 13(a)(3)(4). Further, the language in § 13(a)(2) indicates that covered “reports” include more than formal communications to the CFTC or customers. As the Northern District of Georgia pointed out, § 13(a)(2) covers reports communicated “through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless or other means of communication.” See CFTC v. Atha, 420 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1380-81 (N.D.Ga.2006). As the section clearly contemplates reports sent by telephone, it is unlikely it is intended to cover only the official reports. Finally, the CFTC has consistently interpreted § 13(a)(2) to apply to trade reports sent to Insider FERC and/or NGI, like those sent by the Defendants-Appellants. Although not promulgated in notice-and-comment rulemaking, the CFTC has sued various defendants for behavior identical or similar to that at issue here. See CFTC v. Dizona, 594 F.3d 408, 411-13 (5th Cir.2010) (alleging defendants sent false reports to Inside FERC and NGI; affirming district court’s refusal to overturn jury verdict on false reporting because no evidence that reports were false); CFTC v. Reed, 481 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1193 (D.Colo.2007) (alleging defendants sent false trade reports to “industry reporting firm”); Atha, 420 F.Supp.2d at 1377-78 (alleging defendants sent false reports to Insider FERC, NGI, and Gas Daily). The CFTC’s consistent interpretation is afforded at least some deference. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). Accordingly, we find that the Defendant-Appellants’ communications with Inside FERC and NGI qualified as “reports” under 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). 2. Covered Commodities The Defendants-Appellants next argue that the CEA does not apply to their conduct, making two arguments. First, they argue that natural gas is an exempt commodity under the CEA, and thus, the types of contracts they allegedly falsely reported — natural gas contracts — are exempt. Second, they argue that because the CEA only regulates natural gas futures contracts, which are traded on NY-MEX, any false reporting related to index prices at hubs other than Henry Hub are not covered by the CEA. These arguments will be considered in turn. a. Exemptions In 1993, the CFTC issued a final rule which “exempted] from all provisions of the [CEA], [except certain provisions to the extent they prohibit manipulation] ... [contracts for the purchase and sale of ... natural gas, [and] natural gas liquids.” See 58 Fed.Reg. 21,286, 21,294 (1993). Thereafter, 7 U.S.C. § 2(g)-(h) was amended in 2000, as part of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, to exclude all trades between individual qualified participants that are not “executed or traded on” or “entered into on” a “trading facility,” which, defendants argue, covers the physical natural gas trades. The Defendants-Appellants contend that because natural gas is exempted under both the 1993 CFTC rule and the 2000 amendment to the CEA, their false reporting practices are also exempted from the CEA’s coverage. The Defendants-Appellants’ argument, however, has been uniformly rejected by the courts that have considered it — this Court included. In United States v. Futch, an unpublished decision, this Court found that the various exemptions only cover actual contracts for natural gas, and do not cover false reports about non-existent contracts. See 278 Fed.Appx. 387, 392 (5th Cir.2008). In reaching this holding, this Court stated that “ § 13(a)(2)’s false reporting offense ... extends to ‘any commodity in interstate commerce’ and is not limited to futures contracts regulated by the CFTC ...[;] ‘false reporting of market information concerning natural gas and attempted manipulation of natural gas price indices does not implicate an agreement, contract or transaction’ and thus does not come under the exceptions in 7 U.S.C. § 2(g)-(h).” See id. (citations and quotations omitted). As in Futch, the charges against the Defendants-Appellants do not arise from their execution of contracts for purchase of natural gas, or contracts entered into outside of a trading facility, but rather, for filing false reports about contracts that they claimed to have executed. This reading has been uniformly adopted by courts, and the Defendants-Appellants do not cite any contrary case law to support their argument. See, e.g., Reed, 481 F.Supp.2d at 1197-98 (holding that false reporting not exempted); Atha, 420 F.Supp.2d at 1379-80 (same); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1218-19 (N.D.Okla.2005) (same); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ. A. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749, at *10 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 25, 2003) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 394 F.3d 352 (5th Cir.2004); see also CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F.Supp.2d 259, 266-67 (S.D.Tex.2005) (not expressly addressing issue but finding that CEA covers nearly identical false reporting practices). Moreover, other decisions by this Court have implicitly found that the CEA covers false reports about natural gas markets, even if it would not cover the falsely reported contracts (if they existed). See Dizona, 594 F.3d at 418 (dismissing false reporting count for lack of evidence, but assuming CEA covered similar false reporting of natural gas); Valencia, 394 F.3d at 353-57 (assuming but not expressly deciding that the CEA covers false reporting of natural gas); see also 58 Fed.Reg. at 21,291 (approving exemption of natural gas; noting conduct “otherwise subject to the Act would not be exempt for such activity, even if it were connected to their exempted ... (Energy Contract) activity”). In sum, given that we agree with the previously cited decisions that squarely rejected the Defendants-Appellants’ argument, we hold that the exemptions in the CEA and the CFTC do not cover their reporting activities. b. “Commodity” The Defendants-Appellants next contend that the false reports they submitted did not concern a “commodity” subject to the CEA. They argue that only natural gas traded at Henry Hub is a commodity under the CEA because only natural gas traded at Henry Hub underlies the natural gas futures contracts traded on NYMEX. Consequently, because the government proved only that their false reports affected or could have affected the price of natural gas generally, and not at Henry Hub, the Defendants-Appellants argue their convictions must be vacated. We do not agree. The CEA defines “commodity” as “wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye ..., and all other goods and articles, except onions ..., and all services, rights, and interests ... in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt with.” See 7 U.S.C. § la(4). Natural gas is plainly a “good” or “article.” The questions thus turns on whether it is a good “in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt with.” As mentioned above, futures contracts for natural gas are traded on NYMEX, and those futures are derivative of natural gas traded at Henry Hub. Nonetheless, the record shows that natural gas may be moved from any location to Henry Hub through the national pipeline system. Thus, it would be peculiar that natural gas at another hub is not a commodity, but suddenly becomes a commodity solely on the basis that it passes through Henry Hub, and ceases to be a commodity once it moves onto some other locale. While the price of that commodity may fluctuate with its location, and the forces of supply and demand at that location, the actual nature of the “good” does not change. Although, as discussed above, the Defendants-Appellants conduct did not fall within the regulatory exemption, the existence of that exemption bolsters our reading of the definition of “commodity.” The CFTC exempted from the CEA’s coverage “[c]on-tracts for the purchase or sale of ... natural gas.” See 58 Fed.Reg. at 21,294. Such an exemption would be unnecessary if natural gas was not a commodity under the act. Case law supports such a reading. Although no court has squarely confronted the question presented by the Defendants-Appellants, neither has any court suggested that natural gas at hubs other than Henry Hub is outside the purview of the CEA. See Futch, 278 Fed.Appx. at 390 (stating “natural gas is a commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act”); Valencia, 394 F.3d at 353 (considering allegations defendant manipulated natural gas market, by reporting false trades, in violation of § 13(a)(2)); United States v. Radley, 659 F.Supp.2d 803, 806 (S.D.Tex.2009) (stating “natural gas” was “the commodity at issue in the case”); Reed, 481 F.Supp.2d at 1196 (finding allegations “Defendant attempted to manipulate the price of natural gas, a commodity that travels in interstate commerce” covered by CEA); Atha, 420 F.Supp.2d at 1377-78 (stating “[njatural gas is a commodity”); Bradley, 408 F.Supp.2d at 1220 (“It is undisputed that natural gas constitutes a ‘commodity’ under the CEA.”); Johnson, 408 F.Supp.2d at 264-65 (finding allegations defendants falsely reported natural gas trades stated a claim under § 13(a)(2)). Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239 (5th Cir.2010), does not contradict this reading. In that case, the Court considered whether private plaintiffs had a cause of action based on allegations that the defendants were manipulating the price of natural gas at hubs other than Henry Hub. Id. at 243-49. The private plaintiffs’ standing to sue was premised on their holding NYMEX futures contracts. Id. at 240. The CEA, however, provides a right of action for holders of a futures contract for manipulation of that contract or “the price of the commodity underlying such contract.” See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D). Consequently, as the plaintiffs had not alleged manipulation of the Henry Hub natural gas price, which price underlay their security, they had no cause of action against manipulation of the price of natural gas which had no affect on their security. See Hershey, 610 F.3d at 241, 247 (stating “[t]he modifier ‘underlying’ has an important effect on ‘commodity— the ‘underlying commodity’ of a futures contract is a specific good, governed by the terms of the futures contract”; holding “the underlying commodity of a NYMEX natural gas futures contract is not natural gas wherever bought and sold, but the specific natural gas delivered at Henry Hub”). Hershey, however, never questioned whether natural gas was a commodity subject to § 13(a)(2). Accordingly, we find that natural gas, whether at Henry Hub or at some other location, is a “commodity” within the meaning of the CEA. 3. Vagueness The Defendants-Appellants next argue § 13(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give fair notice that the CEA, an act whose primary purpose is to regulate futures and options, covers false reporting of physical trades. In particular, they argue that terms “report,” “false or misleading,” “market information,” “conditions that tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce,” and “price” are all vague. “It is a basic principal of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Nonetheless, it is also “well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Here, the Defendants-Appellants do not argue that their speech is protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, this Circuit has held that “intentional or reckless falsehood, even political falsehood, enjoys no First Amendment protection[.]” Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir.1999) (finding first amendment did not protect defamation and libel made with knowledge of or reckless disregard to falsity). Consequently, the Defendants-Appellants’ vagueness challenge must be evaluated in light of the proven conduct. As discussed below, the evidence shows the Defendants-Appellants reported knowingly false trades to Inside FERC and NGI, that they did so with the intent that it affect those publications’ reported indexes, and with the intent that it would affect EPME’s financial positions, to their personal benefit. Simply put, it is incredulous to believe that a person of average intelligence could not understand the CEA as potentially applying to that type of conduct. See Futch, 278 Fed.Appx. at 393-95 (holding CEA was not vague in application to false trade reports submitted to Inside FERC). In particular, “report,” as discussed above, clearly covers the Defendants-Appellants’ emails and faxes to the publications. Similarly, “false and misleading” has a clear and well defined meaning. “[M]arket information” clearly covers reports of quantity and price of trades. See id. at 393 (holding the term “ ‘market information’ is not vague because [defendant’s] false statements about time, place, price, and volume of ... natural gas trades clearly qualified as ‘market information’ under almost any definition of the term”). Similarly, the term “price” is also clear. See Merriam-Webster, price, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/price (defining “price” as “the amount of money given or set as consideration for the sale of a specified thing”). Even if the Defendants-Appellants are correct that there are a number of prices in natural gas trading, each one of the referenced prices is a “price,” and thus manipulation of it would create a violation of § 13(a)(2). Finally, the term “affect or tend to affect” clearly covers a situation, such as the Defendants-Appellants’, where the false reports served as the basis for the industry publication’s price reports. See Futch, 278 Fed.Appx. at 394 (noting “even if the phrase ‘tends to affect’ were found to be vague in some factual contexts, it is sufficiently clear to have put [defendant] on notice that providing false sales data to Inside FERCs monthly reporting index survey violated the law”). Accordingly, the CEA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendants-Appellants’ conduct. 4. Overbreadth The Defendants-Appellants also challenge the CEA as being unconstitutionally overbroad. The Defendants-Appellants argue that the CEA, while directed at constitutionally unprotected speech, nevertheless covers constitutionally protected speech because it requires no mens rea proof with regard to the element that the speech “affect or tend to affect” commodity prices. A statute is overbroad if in “banning unprotected speech,” a “substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 237, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). Nevertheless, by its express language, the CEA only covers “knowingly ... false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate” speech. Such speech is not constitutionally protected. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir.1999). Accordingly, the CEA covers no constitutionally protected speech. C. Jury Instructions The Defendants-Appellants next argue that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous on several grounds. We review “preserved error in jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard and ask whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir.2007) (quotation and footnote omitted). Under this standard, district courts “enjoy substantial latitude in formulating a jury charge.” United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 689 (5th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Williams, 610 F.3d 271, 285 (5th Cir.2010). Similarly, the district court is afforded “great discretion in responding to jury questions.” United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740, 752 (5th Cir.2011) (quotation marks omitted). However, when a jury instruction “hinges on a question of statutory construction, [our] review is de novo.” United States v. Wright, 634 F.3d 770, 774 (5th Cir.2011). 1. Conspiracy Instructions First, the Defendants-Appellants argue that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the mens rea of conspiracy and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in a response to a jury note. In its jury instructions, based on the Fifth Circuit Pattern Criminal Instructions, the district court instructed that to convict for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the jury must find: First: That two or more persons made an agreement to commit the crime of false reporting or wire fraud as charged in the indictment; Second: That the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement and joined in it willfully, that is, with the intent to further the unlawful purpose; and Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts described in the indictment, in order to accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. The district court also explained that under the first element the jurors need to “agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants conspired to commit false reporting; or, all of you must agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants conspired to commit wire fraud.” The district court instructed that to convict someone of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the jury must find: First: That the defendant knowingly created a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain money, property or other things of value by means of material false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises as set out in the indictment; Second: That the defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud; Third: That the defendant used interstate wire communications facilities or caused another person to use interstate wire communications facilities for the purpose of carrying out the scheme; and Fourth: That the scheme to defraud employed false material representations. The district court explained that “ ‘specific intent to defraud’ means an intent to specifically deceive or cheat someone.” During its deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note asking: In the second part of Count 1 it states, “that the Defendant knew the unlawful purpose.” Doesn’t this contradict the idea that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” After a conference with the parties, the district court replied to the note, writing: There is no contradiction. The government is not required to prove that a defendant knew the purpose of the agreement was in fact unlawful, that is, in violation of a statute, but the government must prove the defendant knew the purpose of the agreement, and the government must prove that the purpose was in fact unlawful. The Defendants-Appellants argue that this answer misstates the mens rea required to prove conspiracy and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. A conviction for conspiracy under Section 371 requires that the government prove: “(1) an agreement between two or more persons to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful objective and voluntary agreement to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 719 n. 53 (5th Cir.2011). Conspiracy actually has two intent elements — intent to further the unlawful purpose and the level of intent required for proving the underlying substantive offense. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law' § 12.2(c)(1) (2003); United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir.1980) (“Conspiracy is, however, more complex because it involves two elements of intent that shade into each other: each party must have intended to enter into the agreement and the schemers must have had a common intent to commit an unlawful act.”). The Defendants-Appellants first seem to argue that proving conspiracy always requires proof the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, regardless of the mens rea of the underlying substantive offense. This argument is inconsistent, however, with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1959). In that decision, the Supreme Court stated that to convict for conspiracy, “[t]here need not, of course, be proof that the conspirators were aware of the criminality of their objective,” but rather, there must only be proof of knowledge of the unlawful conduct. Id. at 678. This holding was reaffirmed in United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). In Feola, the Supreme Court again stated that the government need not prove anything more than the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy. Id. at 686-87, 95 S.Ct. 1255. Thus, to the extent that the Defendants-Appellants argue that conspiracy always requires proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, we reject their argument. See United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642-43 (10th Cir.1995) (rejecting same argument and stating that since “ ‘one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the prohibited conduct’ ” (quoting Feola, 420 U.S. at 687, 95 S.Ct. 1255)). More specific to the wire fraud offense, the Defendants-Appellants argue that the answer to the jury’s question was erroneous because it improperly lowered the intent required to prove conspiracy to commit wire fraud. They argue that the response improperly led the jury to believe that the Defendants-Appellants could be convicted even if they lacked specific intent to defraud. This is closer, but again, we do not find the Defendants-Appellants’ argument persuasive. To prove wire fraud, the government must prove: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) material falsehoods; and (3) the use of interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. See Curtis, 635 F.3d at 718 n. 49; United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 447 n. 24 (5th Cir.2010). Violation of the wire-fraud statute requires the specific intent to defraud, i.e., a “conscious knowing intent to defraud.” United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th Cir.2001). Thus, proving conspiracy to commit wire fraud requires proof that the Defendants-Appellants joined the conspiracy with the specific intent to defraud. See Curtis, 635 F.3d at 719 n. 53. The district court’s response to the jury’s note accurately describes this intent requirement. The jury note states that as to the conspiracy statute itself, ignorance of the law is no excuse, because “[t]he government is not required to prove that a defendant knew the purpose of the agreement was in fact unlawful, that is, in violation of a statute, but the government must prove the defendant knew the purpose of the agreement.” See Ingram, 360 U.S. at 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314. The note also accurately states that the government must prove that the purpose was in fact unlawful, which requires proof that the Defendants-Appellants acted with the requisite mens rea to commit wire fraud. Coleman, 609 F.3d at 704-06 (analyzing whether elements of target offense also met when determining if conspiracy to commit that offense proven); United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148, 1155 (10th Cir.2008) (stating government must prove degree of criminal intent necessary to prove underlying crime). Although the district court’s response possibly could have spelled out the relationship between conspiracy and the underlying substantive offenses more clearly, it is not an incorrect statement of the law, particularly in light of the rest of the jury charge. See United States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100, 108 (5th Cir.1985) (“The jury charge must ... be considered as a whole, in the full context of the trial.”). Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s instructions and the note to the jury were an accurate statement of the mens rea required to convict for conspiracy to commit wire fraud. 2. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction Next, the Defendants-Appellants argue that the district court’s jury instruction on deliberate ignorance impermissibly lowered the mens rea of both offenses. The district used the Pattern Fifth Circuit instruction, and instructed: You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. While knowledge on the part of the defendant cannot be established merely by demonstrating that the defendant was negligent, careless, or foolish, knowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact. Fifth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, § 1.37. The Defendants-Appellants argue that these instructions were incorrect on two grounds: first, that the evidence did not support the instruction; and second, that the instruction was legally incorrect. On the first argument, a deliberate ignorance instruction is warranted “when a defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate indifference.” United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 476 (5th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). “The evidence at trial must raise two inferences: (1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.” United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir.1990). In assessing whether evidence sufficiently supports the instruction, we “view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the [government.” United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 132 (5th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir.1997). The first requirement for using the instruction — the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge — is not disputed by the parties. The second requirement— the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct — is satisfied if the evidence at trial raises an inference that: (1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 951. Here, taking all reasonable inference in the government’s favor, there is more than sufficient evidence to find that the Defendants-Appellants were subjectively aware of a high probably of the existence of illegal conduct and that they purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct. On this first prong, a review of the record shows that there was a great deal of evidence admitted at trial showing that the Defendants-Appellants believed that their conduct was illegal, or were aware of a high probability that it was illegal. For example, testimony at trial revealed that Brooks told co-workers that they would “be toast” if the government looked into their index reporting practices, and later, Brooks ordered traders to delete all copies of the reports that had been sent to the trade publications. Similarly, all of the Defendants-Appellants were involved in the email communication where the traders decided to continue reporting based on “book bias.” In that email exchange, the traders discussed how they should not discuss this topic over email' — ■ an obvious inference from these comments is that the traders were aware them “book bias” method of reporting was likely illegal. Finally, taking a step back, it is simply unbelievable to think that sophisticated gas traders, such as the Defendants-Appellants, did not realize that falsely reporting data to steal money from basis trading partners was, in all likelihood, criminalized under some statute. On the second prong, the Defendants-Appellants argue that there is no evidence that they “purposefully contrived to avoid learning of illegal conduct.” Specifically, the Defendants-Appellants claim that they did not know the actual instructions sent by the publications, and that they thought they were sending the correct information. There is evidence in the record, however, showing that the Defendants-Appellants purposely avoided learning of the illegal nature of the conduct. For example, both Brooks and Phillips repeatedly ignored the reporting instructions, and they both also had conversations with Kelley Doolan, an editor at Inside FERC, about the reporting requirements. Similarly, other evidence indicated that Walton had been forwarded a spreadsheet with fake trades, and that he was included in the “book bias” email, in which the traders made statements indicating that their reporting practices were not in line with Inside FERCs instructions. Based on this evidence, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to instruct the jury on deliberate ignorance. Second, the Defendants-Appellants argue that the instruction on deliberate ignorance was an improper statement of the law in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 179 L.Ed.2d 1167 (2011). In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court considered willful blindness in the civil context, stating that willful blindness requires proof that: “(1) the defendant [] subjectively believe[d] that there [was] a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant [took] deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 2070. The Court continued, stating that willful blindness “surpasses recklessness and negligence,” and that “a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” Id. at 2070-71. The Fifth Circuit Pattern Instruction meets the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Global-Tech. The instructions do not have the same failings as the Federal Circuit standard reversed in Global Tech, which allowed for a finding of willful blindness where there is only a “known risk,” and where the defendant did not make an active effort to avoid knowledge. Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2071. As to Global-Tech’s first prong — the defendant “must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists”— the jury instruction provided that the defendant needed to have “deliberately closed his eyes” to a fact that “would otherwise have been obvious to him.” As to the second prong — the defendant “must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact” — the instruction provided that the defendant needed to have “deliberately closed his eyes,” and “deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact.” The instruction also stated that merely finding the defendants were “negligent, careless, or foolish” was insufficient. Thus, although this instruction obviously does not use the same language as Global-Tech, the same meaning is conveyed. Accordingly, not only was the deliberate ignorance instruction justified, the instruction itself was legally correct. 3. False Reporting Instruction The Defendants-Appellants also argue that the jury instructions were in error because the district court incorrectly stated the elements of false reporting under the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). In relevant part, the CEA provides that “[i]t shall be a felony ... for ... [a]ny person ... knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or other means of communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce....” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). The district court instructed the jury that to convict it must find that the Defendants-Appellants: (1) “knowingly delivered, or caused to be delivered, for transmission through interstate commerce by telephone or other means of communication a material false or misleading or inaccurate report”; (2) “knew the report was false or misleading or inaccurate”; and (3) “[t]hat the report concerned market information or conditions that affected or tended to affected the price of a commodity in interstate commerce.” The Defendants-Appellants argue that the mens rea of false reporting — knowingly—requires that a defendant must “know” his reports would “affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.” In Valencia, the Court found that “knowingly” in this section of the CEA applies both to the transmission and falsity