Full opinion text
PRYOR, Circuit Judge: Anthony Ponticelli, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for the murder of two brothers, Nick and Ralph Grandinetti, raises two issues about the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. First, Ponticelli argues that the prosecution violated his right to due process when it allegedly suppressed evidence of and failed to correct false testimony about an agreement to provide immunity for a witness for the state and about Ponticelli’s use of cocaine shortly before the murders. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Ponticelli contends that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Florida — that the prosecution did not violate his due process rights and that, even if it did, he suffered no prejudice — is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Second, Ponticelli argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of Ponticelli’s incompetence to stand trial and by failing to present mitigating evidence of drug use and mental health problems during the penalty phase. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Ponticelli contends that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Florida — that trial counsel did not render deficient performance before and during the competency hearing, and that any deficiencies by counsel during the penalty phase did not prejudice Ponticelli — is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ponticelli’s arguments fail. The Supreme Court of Florida on the first issue, reasonably determined the underlying facts and, on both issues, neither contravened nor unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The denial of Ponticelli’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. I. BACKGROUND Anthony Ponticelli owed Nick and Ralph Grandinetti money for cocaine so he hatched a plan to lure the brothers into a car to drive to a back road, away from their home, where he murdered them with a gun he had borrowed from a friend. Ponticelli shot Ralph once in the head and Nick twice in the head and later abandoned them to die in the car. Ralph died from the gunshot wound within one or two minutes of being shot. Nick was found a day later, curled up on the floorboard in the front of the ear, covered in blood, gasping for air, and kicking his foot. Nick felt pain until he became comatose, and later died from cardiac arrest secondary to the gunshot wounds. In addition to his gunshot wounds, Nick- suffered bruises to the back and side of his head, which were consistent with blunt force trauma, and a burn of his right ear. The discussion of the procedural history of this appeal is divided into several parts. Part A discusses the pretrial determination of competency. Part B discusses the guilt phase of Ponticelli’s trial. Part C discusses the penalty phase of Ponticelli’s trial. Part D discusses the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida on direct appeal. Parts E and F discuss the state postconviction proceedings. Part G discusses the- proceedings in the district court. A. Pretrial Determination of Competency After Ponticelli was charged with two counts of first degree murder and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, Ponticelli’s counsel moved for an evaluation of his client’s competency. The trial court then appointed three mental health experts to evaluate Ponticelli’s competency to stand trial: Dr. Harry Krop, Dr. Rodney Poetter, and Dr. Robin Mills. At a pretrial hearing, both Dr. Krop and Dr. Poetter testified that Ponticelli was competent, but Dr. Mills testified that Ponticelli was incompetent because he suffered from a delusional thought process. The state trial court found Ponticelli to be competent. Ponticelli v. State (Ponticelli I), 593 So.2d 483, 487 (Fla.1991). B. Guilt Phase The prosecution built its case on both physical evidence and the testimony of several witnesses who testified that Ponticelli planned to kill the brothers, carried out that plan, and then bragged about it. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury convicted Ponticelli, so in our review of the evidence from the guilt phase, we are obliged to construe the record in the light most favorable to the government. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781-82, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3102-03, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990). On November 27, 1987, the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, Ponticelli drove to the Grandinetti brothers’ trailer in Silver Springs Shores, Florida, with a .22 caliber handgun that he had borrowed from his friend, Joseph Leonard. Ponticelli had bought large amounts of cocaine from the brothers on at least 15 occasions, and he owed the brothers between $200 and $300 for some of those drugs. Ponticelli planned to kill the brothers and rob them of cocaine and money. Ponticelli considered killing the brothers in their trailer, but decided against it, because too many other people were present, including the brothers’ roommate, Timothy Keesee. Ponticelli decided to lure the brothers away from their trailer by pretending to sell cocaine for them. Ponticelli asked the brothers if he could settle his debt by selling whatever cocaine they had. The brothers agreed and Ponticelli made fake telephone calls to make the brothers believe that he was finding purchasers for their cocaine. At trial, Keesee testified that he had seen cocaine at the trailer on the night of the murders, but denied that anyone present at the trailer — including Ponticelli — had used cocaine that night. Ponticelli directed the brothers to the purported customers’ residences, including the house of Keith Dotson. Ponticelli had visited Dotson earlier that day and had watched part of the movie “Scarface” with Dotson; Dotson’s cousins, Ed and Warren Brown; and their friend, Brian Burgess. When Ponticelli and the brothers arrived at Dotson’s home, Ponticelli left the brothers in the car. Inside Dotson’s house, Ponticelli showed Ed Brown and Burgess a gun and told them that there were two people in the car who he planned to kill for cocaine and money. Ponticelli asked Brown and Burgess if they would be willing to give him a ride home after he murdered the Grandinetti brothers. At trial, Ed Brown, Burgess, and Dotson testified that they had not met Ponticelli before that day. After he returned to the car, Ponticelli directed the brothers to drive to nearby back roads. From the back of the car, Ponticelli then shot Ralph once and Nick twice in the head with Leonard’s gun. Ponticelli threw Ralph into the back of the car. When Nick moaned, Ponticelli repeatedly hammered Nick’s head with the butt of the gun because he had no more bullets. Ponticelli then pushed Nick onto the floorboard of the car. Heat from the floorboard seared Nick’s ear. Ponticelli drove to Leonard’s house to return the gun and to seek his advice. Ponticelli approached a window and called Leonard outside. He gave Leonard the gun back and told Leonard that he “did Nick.” Leonard understood Ponticelli to mean that he had murdered Nick. Ponticelli returned to the car and began driving, but eventually abandoned the bodies and the car because of a flat tire. He called a taxi cab and returned to Dotson’s house around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. With his right knee covered in blood, Ponticelli entered Dotson’s house “looking for an alibi.” Ponticelli announced to Ed Brown, Dotson, and Burgess, “I did it, dudes,” and asked the men to “give him an alibi ... that he had stayed there ... all night.” He explained that he “had killed two guys for $2,000 and some cocaine.” Ponticelli stated that he had shot each man in the back of the head and afterward “drove them out somewhere and left them” because he had a flat tire. Ponticelli showed the Brown brothers and Burgess some cocaine in small plastic packets and a large roll of money. At trial, Ed Brown denied that anyone used cocaine with Ponticelli after he returned to Dotson’s house. Ponticelli asked Ed Brown if he were “to shoot someone ... in the head with a gun” did he “think that they would live?” Ponticelli told Ed Brown, Dotson, and Burgess that he was worried because “one of the guys w[as] moaning or both of them.” Ponticelli then called his mother and told her that he was working out with some friends, but would be home in about 30 minutes. Dotson helped Ponticelli wash his clothes to remove the blood stains and Ponticelli folded the clean clothes and placed them in a brown bag. Afterward, Warren Brown and Burgess drove Ponticelli back to his house. Ponticelli instructed Brown and Burgess to “drive around the block a couple of times” because he “was afraid the police might spot him out ... and catch him.” The day after the murder, Ponticelli and his friend, John Turner, asked Turner’s friend, Ronald Halsey, if they could burn trash behind Halsey’s house. Halsey agreed. Halsey later inspected their progress and “noticed that there was a black looking coat on top of the fire.” When Halsey inquired about the clothes, Ponticelli “broke down and told [Halsey] ... that ... he shot the two boys, Nick and Ralph.” Ponticelli told Halsey that he owed Nick money for cocaine and that Nick and Ralph had “roughed him up.” Ponticelli stated that “they were driving somewhere” to “sell more coke” and, when they “came to a stop,” he took out a gun and “shot the driver twice in the back of the head and then he shot the passenger twice in the back of the head.” Ponticelli told Halsey that “he knew after he shot one of them that he had to kill both of them because of witnesses.” He said that he hoped to dispose of the brothers’ bodies “out of state,” but a flat tire foiled his plan. Ponticelli confessed that he took “eight or nine grams of crack” and “like $900 cash off the bodies,” and he admitted that he and Turner smoked all of the crack and spent most of the money on more crack. Ponticelli stated that he intended to leave Florida to escape the authorities. Ponticelli then returned to Leonard’s house, where he told Leonard that the Grandinettis had “harass[ed] him for some money,” and that “they weren’t going to let him leave because he owed them some money.” Ponticelli admitted that he directed the brothers around “back roads” where he shot and killed them. He stated that he took a few hundred dollars and cocaine from the car. Ponticelli also told Leonard, soon after Ponticelli returned Leonard’s gun, that he had noticed that the car had a flat tire so he had left the bodies and had taken a cab home. Ponticelli openly discussed his plans to cover up his crime. He told Leonard that he burned the clothes he had worn when he killed the brothers. He told Leonard and Leonard’s roommate, Bobby Meade, that he planned to escape to Canada or Mexico. He told Leonard and Meade that, if questioned by the police about the murder, he planned to either deny being with the Grandinettis after 9:00 p.m. or he would lie and say that “he was with them and some guy was with them, too, and that the guy had shot them and let [Ponticelli] go.” When Ponticelli returned to Dotson’s house, he showed Dotson his car and told Dotson that he planned to “fix this car up ... with the money that he got and use it as a getaway car.” After his arrest, Ponticelli confessed his crime to his jail cellmate, Dennis Freeman. Ponticelli admitted to Freeman that he made several telephone calls from the Grandinettis’ trailer to trick the brothers into believing that he planned to sell cocaine for them. Ponticelli told Freeman that the brothers drove him to Dotson’s house and that, after he left Dotson’s house, he shot the brothers in their car “to rob them of ... cocaine and ... money.” Ponticelli told Freeman that he returned the gun to Leonard and asked Leonard to “get rid of it.” Ponticelli told Freeman that he and Leonard discussed burning the bodies, but that he instead eventually abandoned the bodies in the car because of a flat tire. Ponticelli admitted that he took between $700 and $800 and cocaine from the bodies and then took a cab to Dotson’s house, where he washed his clothes and told everyone at the house about the murder. He stated that the next day he burned his clothes and buried the burnt remains in a backyard. When Freeman asked Ponticelli if he had “been doing any drugs or drinking, heavily or whatever” on the day that he killed the brothers, Ponticelli denied it. Ponticelli also asked Freeman if he would help dispose of some evidence and drew Freeman a map with the location of that evidence. The map had Dotson’s name and telephone number on it. At trial, the state introduced the map into evidence. Freeman testified that he had not received any benefit for his testimony against Ponticelli. He also testified that he had been convicted of 26 felonies, all of which involved dishonesty. On cross-examination, Freeman admitted that he was a “jailhouse snitch” who had provided information to law enforcement for the past ten years and that he had earned money through participation in a reverse sting operation. After the state rested, the trial court entered a judgement of acquittal on the robbery charge. The defense then presented evidence that Ponticelli was a cocaine addict who had suffered from cocaine psychosis. In his opening statement, defense counsel argued that Ponticelli’s cocaine addiction prohibited him from forming the requisite intent to kill the brothers and that there was reasonable doubt as to whether Ponticelli had even shot the brothers. Ponticelli’s father, Michael Ponticelli Sr., testified that the family had moved from Long Island, New York, to the Silver Springs Shores area of Florida a little more than two years before the trial. Michael told the jury that around Labor Day 1987, the family visited New York for about a month. When the family returned to Florida in early October, Ponticelli stayed behind in New York for another three weeks. When Ponticelli returned to Florida, Michael noticed that his son had changed. Michael described Ponticelli as argumentative, short tempered, and “very nervous, very thin, very agitated.” John Turner testified that he had known Ponticelli since he had moved to Florida from New York and that, after Ponticelli’s return from his recent trip to New York until the day before the murders, he and Ponticelli had used cocaine every day. Turner testified that neither he nor Ponticelli worked and instead smoked cocaine “all day long” from eight or nine in the morning to three or four the next morning. Turner admitted that, before Ponticelli had returned from his latest trip to New York, he had never seen Ponticelli use cocaine. On cross-examination, Turner testified that he could not recall whether he had seen Ponticelli on the day of the murders. When asked whether he knew whether Ponticelli had used cocaine that day, Turner testified, “I don’t know, you know .... I mean, I’m saying maybe we did that morning. It’s been awhile. I can’t really remember exactly. I know it wasn’t that afternoon or that evening. I’m not — you know, I don’t think I seen him.” Joseph Leonard and Bobby Meade also testified for the defense. Leonard stated that before Ponticelli returned from his latest trip to New York he was “real reliable” and that, when he returned, he was “not like himself.” Meade agreed that before Ponticelli visited New York he had been a “good friend” who was “dependable” and “bubbly goofey.” Meade testified that, after Ponticelli returned from New York, “he was more quiet. He didn’t talk as much like he used to .... He kept everything inside of him, and he would get like upset about little things.” The defense attempted unsuccessfully to present the testimony of Dr. Mark Branch, an expert in behavioral pharmacology. The defense offered to have Dr. Branch present expert opinion testimony about the effects of cocaine on the mind and body and to explain cocaine psychosis, but Branch could offer no testimony on the elements of the insanity defense. The state objected to Dr. Branch’s testimony on the grounds that Branch had never interviewed Ponticelli, that Branch’s research had been limited to primates, and that Branch was not qualified to testify that Ponticelli had suffered from cocaine psychosis at the time of the murders. The trial court excluded Dr. Branch’s testimony. The jury convicted Ponticelli of both murders. C. Penalty Phase During the penalty phase, the state presented no new evidence, but the defense presented the testimony of Dr. Robin Mills, who had evaluated Ponticelli for fifteen minutes before the trial for legal competence and sanity. Based on a hypothetical question, which assumed that Ponticelli had no history of cocaine use before October 1987, Dr. Mills testified that Ponticelli’s changes in his personality were symptoms of someone who suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance induced by repeated exposure to illegal drugs. Defense counsel posed another hypothetical question, which assumed that Ponticelli had smoked cocaine “every day, all day, up until [the day before the murders]”; that a few hours before the murders, Ponticelli revealed his plan to four people who he had known for “only four hours” while acting “nervous,” “hyper,” and “paranoid”; and that after the murder, Ponticelli confessed the crime to these four people, washed his clothes, asked for an alibi, called his mother, and arranged a ride home. Dr. Mills testified, in response to that hypothetical question, that he believed that Ponticelli had suffered from a drug-induced extreme mental or emotional disorder or disturbance when Nick and Ralph were murdered and that Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to law had been substantially impaired. Dr. Mills testified that he believed that the statutory mental health mitigators should apply even if Ponticelli had not consumed any cocaine on the day of the murders: “The ... effect [of cocaine] on the ... intellectual capacities can persist, in some cases, for a year after the intoxication ... so one day later, to his brain, would not make that much difference.” On cross-examination, Dr. Mills admitted that Ponticelli “probably ... had the ability to know right from wrong” and that there “was some evidence” that he had the ability to understand the consequences of his actions. During closing argument of the penalty phase, the prosecutor told the jury that, although Ponticelli had used a lot of cocaine, “there was no evidence at all ... that he had used cocaine [the day of the murders]; none whatsoever.” The prosecutor also reminded the jury that Ponticelli “voluntarily chose to use cocaine ... day in and day out ... no one forced the defendant to use cocaine.” The jury recommended two sentences of death by a vote of nine to three for the murders of Nick and Ralph Grandinetti. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The trial court found two aggravating factors applicable to both murders: the murders were committed for pecuniary gain, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(f), and the murders were “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification,” id. § 921.141(5)(i). The trial court also found that the murder of Nick Grandinetti was “especially heinous, atrocious, [and] cruel.” Id. § 921.141(5)(h). The trial court found two statutory mitigators: Ponticelli had no significant history of previous criminal activity, id. § 921.141(6)(a), and Ponticelli was 20 years old at the time of the offense, id. § 921.141(6)(g). The trial court did not find the existence of any nonstatutory mitigator. The trial court rejected Dr. Mills’s hypothetical penalty phase testimony as speculative and declined to find the existence of either statutory mitigator about mental health. The court rejected the argument that Ponticelli had been “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” when he killed the brothers, id. § 921.141(6)(b). And the court rejected the argument that Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law had been substantially impaired, see id. § 921.141(6)05. D. Direct Appeal When the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Ponticelli’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal, Ponticelli I, 593 So.2d 483, the court rejected Ponticelli’s argument that the trial court erred when it rejected the two statutory mitigators about mental health. With regard to the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b), the state supreme court agreed with the trial court that Dr. Mills’s testimony was speculative because “Ponticelli had not discussed his mental processes or any of the details of the offense with Dr. Mills.” Ponticelli I, 593 So.2d at 491. Dr. Mills relied only on a description of “Ponticelli’s use of cocaine and ... hyperactivity on the evening of the murders, although there was no evidence of drug use on the evening of the murders.” Id. With regard to whether Ponticelli’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(f), the state supreme court determined that “there was no evidence that Ponticelli was using cocaine at the time of the murders” and that “Ponticelli’s actions on the night of the murder evinc[ed] that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was not impaired.” Ponticelli I, 593 So.2d at 491. The state supreme court concluded that “competent substantial evidence” supported the finding of the trial court that the mitigator did not apply. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Ponticelli’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida, and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1082, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2929, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992). Ponticelli v. Florida, 506 U.S. 802, 113 S.Ct. 32, 121 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992). On remand, the Supreme Court of Florida again affirmed Ponticelli’s sentences and concluded that any error under Espinosa was proeedurally barred. Ponticelli v. State (Ponticelli II), 618 So.2d 154, 154-55 (Fla.1993). E. First State Postconviction Motion and Evidentiary Hearing On April 11, 1995, Ponticelli filed a motion for postconviction relief in the state trial court. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851. Ponticelli amended his motion several times and included numerous claims, including the claims before us now. The trial court held two evidentiary hearings and Ponticelli presented testimony from 27 witnesses, including his trial counsel, the prosecutor, the lead detective, numerous lay witnesses, and four expert witnesses. The state called an expert witness, psychologist Dr. Wayne Conger, in rebuttal. The discussion of the evidence presented at the first evidentiary hearing is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the evidence related to Ponticelli’s due process claims and why the Florida courts rejected those claims. The second part discusses the evidence related to Ponticelli’s background and mental health and why the Florida courts rejected Ponticelli’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1. Brady and Giglio Evidence As to the evidence Ponticelli presented in support of his claims that the state had violated his right to due process of law, see Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194; Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, the Supreme Court of Florida divided Ponticelli’s claims into three categories. First, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the alleged suppression of and false evidence about an alleged agreement to provide immunity for Dennis Freeman, the jailhouse informant. Second, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the alleged suppression of Timothy Keesee’s statements to the lead detective, Investigator Bruce Munster, and the prosecutor, Sarah Williams, that he saw Ponticelli use cocaine at the Grandinettis’ trailer on the night of the murders, and Keesee’s false trial testimony about that matter. Third, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the alleged suppression of evidence and false testimony related to an alleged Thanksgiving Day cocaine party at Dotson’s house, which lasted until almost the dawn of the next day and during which the Brown brothers, Burgess, and Dotson smoked cocaine with Ponticelli, contrary to their trial testimony that the first time they met Ponticelli was on the evening of the murders. This discussion addresses these categories of evidence in the same order. a. Dennis Freeman’s Alleged Immunity Deal During the first postconviction evidentiary hearing, Ponticelli presented evidence to support his argument that the state had violated his right to due process by suppressing evidence, see Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and by presenting false testimony, see Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, about an alleged deal that the prosecution had made with Freeman in exchange for his testimony against Ponticelli. Ponticelli’s counsel asked Williams about a note that she had written to herself during the trial, which stated, “Spoke with Fred Landt [Freeman’s defense counsel] regarding Dennis Freeman. Told him I would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli’s] trial but assured him his cooperation would be remembered with favor before mitigating judge/Sturgis. Will make no formal deal on the record prior to trial.” Williams testified that Freeman “had been promised nothing for his testimony,” and that she did not know whether Freeman had later received any favorable treatment. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected Ponticelli’s arguments about the alleged deal with Freeman. With respect to Ponticelli’s Brady claim, the court stated that, “even if one accepts defense counsel’s testimony as sufficient to establish” that the evidence was favorable to Ponticelli and that the evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently, “Ponticelli’s claim still fails because Ponticelli has not established that the State’s failure to disclose this evidence resulted in prejudice.” Ponticelli v. State (Ponticelli III), 941 So.2d 1073, 1085 (Fla.2006). The court rejected Ponticelli’s argument that the note would have provided a basis for impeaching Freeman. The court reasoned that Freeman’s testimony “was merely cumulative to that presented at trial”; Freeman’s long criminal record and history of cooperation in exchange for benefits had “significantly impeached ... his motive for testifying and his capacity for truthfulness”; and the map that Ponticelli had given Freeman in addition to the testimonies of other witnesses corroborated Freeman’s testimony. Id. at 1085-86. With respect to Ponticelli’s Giglio claim, the court held that, “even if we accept Ponticelli’s allegation that the prosecutor’s note indicates that Freeman was not honest when he testified that he did not expect to receive a benefit from cooperating in Ponticelli’s case, we find no prejudice.” Id. at 1089. Again, the court reasoned that Freeman “was significantly impeached on his capacity for truthfulness and his incentive for testifying against Ponticelli.” Id. The court opined that “informing the jury that Freeman might be testifying falsely because of his hope for an unguaranteed, unspecified award would not have rendered him sufficiently less credible in the jury’s eyes to establish a reasonable possibility that this contributed to the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). b. Cocaine Use at the Trailer Ponticelli also presented evidence to support his argument that the state had violated his right to due process by suppressing evidence, see Brady, 873 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and by presenting false testimony, see Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, about whether Timothy Keesee had seen Ponticelli use cocaine at the Grandinetti’s trailer on the night of the murders. During the postconviction hearing, Keesee testified that he had lied at trial and had, in truth, seen Ponticelli snort “one line of [cocaine] that was about two matchsticks long” sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. at the Grandinettis’s trailer on the night of the murders. Keesee testified that, when Williams interviewed him about Ponticelli, he was “positive” that he told her that he, the Grandinettis, and Ponticelli had used cocaine that night. On cross-examination, he admitted that he didn’t “recall [Williams] asking specifically if Ponticelli did cocaine. She said: ‘Did you all do some cocaine.’ And I said, ‘Yes we did’; one line.” Keesee testified too that he told Investigator Munster that he left the trailer with his brother because “at the time my brother was in the Navy, and they had coke out, and we had done a line of coke, and I knew my brother was uncomfortable .... ” Keesee admitted that he told Ponticelli’s trial counsel that no one had used cocaine on the night of the murders because “[o]ne line wasn’t enough to influence me to say that we did coke.” Keesee testified that he had abused drugs at the time of trial and he lied to “get out of the spotlight ... it would bring more trouble on me if I didn’t cooperate. So I was trying to play ball and just get the past past me.” Keesee testified that Munster had searched his car and found drug paraphernalia. When Munster did not say anything, Keesee believed that Munster would “go light on [him]” in exchange for his cooperation. He also testified that Williams had asked him questions during trial preparation like “Did ya’ll do any coke,” and when he said, “no,” Williams would reply, “Okay, good.” Keesee testified that he “could tell by her response ... [that he] was helping her case.” Despite his cooperation, Keesee admitted that he was charged with possession of cocaine a month before the prosecution took his deposition in Ponticelli’s ease. Investigator Munster testified that Keesee told him he left the Grandinettis’s trailer on the night of the murder because of “cocaine usage” there. Munster included this information in a supplemental report dated December 1987 that stated that Keesee left the Grandinettis’s trailer on the night of the homicides because of cocaine usage taking place there and because of a cocaine deal occurring between Nick, Ralph, and a white male identified as Tony. Munster provided Ponticelli’s trial counsel this report. The prosecutor, Williams, denied that she knew that Ponticelli had smoked cocaine on the night of the murders. Williams acknowledged that she had written a note that stated, “Owed them $300. R and N wanted it. Not physical. No threats. He was making calls to sell coke, collect money, doing cocaine,” but she could not remember who “he” was. Williams also acknowledged that she had written a note on Keesee’s deposition testimony that Keesee “[d]idn’t see them do cocaine. Didn’t tell anyone,” and that she had underlined “Didn’t tell anyone,” and had written in the margin “Told BM. Taped.” She testified that she didn’t remember why she wrote the note, but that she did not believe that Keesee had made an inconsistent statement because “[oftentimes I’ll put a question mark next to [an inconsistent statement] and there’s not a question mark.” The trial court determined that Williams’s notes were neither exculpatory nor material. With respect to Williams’s first note about an unidentified individual who had used cocaine, the trial court held that “there is no way of knowing whether [defense counsel] would have gathered from the note[s] that [Ponticelli] was using cocaine at the trailer on the night of the murders,” and in the light of the “overwhelming evidence of Ponticelli’s guilt, no reasonable probability exists that the evidence regarding drug usage found in [Williams’s] interview notes would have changed the outcome of the guilt or penalty phase of Ponticelli’s trial.” Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1086 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). With respect to Williams’s second note about Keesee’s allegedly inconsistent statement, the trial court “found no evidence that the State either knowingly presented, or allowed to be presented, perjured testimony at trial.” id. at 1090 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court “recognized that Keesee testified adamantly at deposition and at trial that he did not see Ponticelli use cocaine on the day of the crimes, and that references to drug use found in the state investigator’s and [Williams’s] notes are vague.” id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The court concluded, “It is understandable that [Williams] and [Munster] could have overlooked vague statements in their notes when faced with this testimony.” id. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the ruling of the trial court that, even in the light of Keesee’s testimony, the prosecutor’s notes were neither exculpatory nor material. The court reasoned that Williams’s note about an unidentified individual who had used cocaine did “not clearly indicate that Ponticelli was the person Keesee witnessed using cocaine on the night of the murders,” and trial counsel could have confronted Keesee with Munster’s report, which “contained substantially the same information as the prosecutor’s note.” Id. at 1087. The court held that the findings of the trial court with respect to Williams’s second note were “supported by competent, substantial evidence. The prosecutor’s notation on Keesee’s deposition testimony does not clearly indicate that the prosecutor knew Keesee was testifying falsely.” Id. at 1090. c. Cocaine Party Ponticelli also presented evidence at the first evidentiary hearing that the state had violated his right to due process by suppressing evidence, see Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and by presenting false testimony, see Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, about an alleged cocaine party that took place at Dotson’s house the night before the murders. At the evidentiary hearing, Burgess and Ed Brown admitted that they had testified falsely at Ponticelli’s trial. Contrary to their trial testimony that they had first met Ponticelli on the evening of the murders, both admitted that they had met Ponticelli either late on Thanksgiving night or in the early morning hours of the next day. Both testified that there was a party at Dotson’s house on Thanksgiving Day and that they had smoked cocaine with Ponticelli at Dotson’s house until the party had ended at around 4:00 a.m. the next day. The two men admitted too that they had used cocaine with Ponticelli the next night, after Ponticelli had murdered the Grandinettis. Both men testified that they had not told the prosecution about the cocaine party. John Turner also testified about the cocaine party. He stated that he and Ponticelli had smoked cocaine with those present at Dotson’s house, including the Browns, Burgess, and Dotson. Turner testified that he had provided this information to Ponticelli’s trial counsel and to Munster. Munster testified about two notes that he had written, which Ponticelli argued proved that Munster knew that Ponticelli had attended the cocaine party. The first note stated, “Went to someone’s house to drop off girl. Both Tony and John are there. They are smoking coke out of an orange juice can.” But Munster could not remember to whom the pronoun “they” referred or on what night the incident allegedly took place. The second note stated, “At jail with Dennis Freeman. Thanks night. Tony says Tony and John and two guys from West Virginia, his cousin, went to Nick’s house .... Tony bought eight ball of coke that night .... Tony went back to Keith’s house after-wards.” Munster testified that he could not remember whether he disclosed the note to Ponticelli’s trial counsel and did not know if trial counsel would have thought that the note was material. The Supreme Court of Florida determined that the evidence did not prove that the prosecution knew about the cocaine party and that, “even if they did, Ponticelli has not established that the suppression resulted in prejudice.” Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1087. The court reasoned that the only “evidence tying the[ ] [first] note[] to Ponticelli’s cocaine use at the time of the crimes was Ed Brown’s testimony, and at the evidentiary hearing, Brown denied telling the State about the cocaine party.” Id. at 1087-88. With respect to the second note, which allegedly proved that Ponticelli had told Freeman about the cocaine party, the court concluded that its suppression was not material because “Ponticelli refused to answer defense counsel’s inquiries regarding Ponticelli’s cocaine use at the time of the crimes” and “at trial, [the Browns and Burgess] contradicted this statement in their sworn testimony.” Id. at 1088. With respect to Turner’s alleged statement to the state investigator, the court reasoned that, even if Turner had made the statement to Munster, defense counsel had that evidence. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected Ponticelli’s argument that “the State violated Giglio by allowing Brian Burgess and Edward Brown to testify falsely at trial about the date they first met Ponticelli and whether they had ever seen Ponticelli use cocaine.” Id. at 1091. The court held that the finding of the trial court that the state did not know that the witnesses had testified falsely was “supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Id. The court determined that “there was no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing that the State knew that Burgess or Brown testified falsely; in fact, Burgess and Brown testified at the evidentiary hearing that they never told the State they saw Ponticelli use cocaine the night before the crimes .... ” Id. at 1091-92. 2. Ponticelli’s Background and Mental Health Ponticelli also presented the testimony of his trial counsel, numerous lay witnesses, and various mental health experts about his trial counsel’s investigation of Ponticelli’s competency and potential evidence in mitigation. He argued that his right to effective assistance of counsel, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, had been violated, see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, because his trial counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation into his background and mental health, which Ponticelli argued prejudiced him. Defense counsel testified that Ponticelli’s trial was his first capital trial, that he did not know how to prepare for a penalty phase, that his only assistance came from a former deputy, and that the vast majority of his preparation was devoted to the guilt phase. To investigate evidence for mitigation, trial counsel talked with Ponticelli’s parents and asked them for names of persons who Ponticelli knew as a child. Although Ponticelli’s parents provided trial counsel with the names of some of Ponticelli’s former teachers, employers, and family members, counsel did not contact any of them. Trial counsel did not consider medical or school records and testified that he had only a partial view of Ponticelli’s drug use and background at the time of trial. Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1092. When asked about the lack of investigation into Ponticelli’s past, trial counsel agreed that there was mitigating evidence he could have discovered and would have used during the penalty phase. Trial counsel also testified that, had he known more, he would not have conceded in the penalty phase the aggravating circumstance that the killings were cold, calculated, and premeditated. At the first evidentiary hearing, several witnesses testified about Ponticelli’s childhood. Pontieelli’s sister testified that Ponticelli had been born a “blue baby,” which Dr. Conger explained “means there was insufficient oxygen during the birth process.” Ponticelli’s sister explained that Ponticelli was placed in foster-care months after his birth, and later adopted by the Ponticelli family. Many witnesses described Ponticelli as a typical, quiet child who grew up in New York. A few witnesses described Ponticelli as socially-awkward and acknowledged that Ponticelli had worn glasses and was overweight. Several witnesses described how Ponticelli started to abuse drugs as an adolescent. In junior high school, Ponticelli experimented with marijuana and beer. In high school, Ponticelli started to experiment with other drugs, including black beauties, mescaline, hash, Valium, and cocaine. The lay witnesses testified that, when Ponticelli was not using drugs, he was sweet and respectful. But when Ponticelli used drugs, he became paranoid and experienced mood swings. The evidence established that, soon after Ponticelli graduated high school, his family moved to Florida where he stopped using cocaine and held a job. Ponticelli returned to his former relaxed demeanor. But it did not last. When he returned to New York in 1987 to attend a cousin’s wedding, Ponticelli began using cocaine again. John Turner testified, as he did at trial, that he and Ponticelli started using cocaine nearly every day. And Turner was not the only witness to Ponticelli’s return to cocaine use. Ponticelli also presented the testimony of Frank Porcillo, who had not testified at the trial. After Porcillo befriended Ponticelli in Florida, they smoked marijuana and drank alcohol together. Porcillo did not know that Ponticelli used cocaine until after Ponticelli returned from a trip to New York several weeks before the murders. After the New York trip, Porrillo became aware that Ponticelli was smoking cocaine and noticed changes in his behavior. Porrillo witnessed Ponticelli use cocaine once after he returned from New York and observed that Ponticelli acted “paranoid, looking around all the time, just not easy to be around,” and “[hjiding in the corner.” Porcillo’s testimony suggested that Ponticelli used cocaine on the night of the murders. Porrillo testified that he encountered Ponticelli around 8:00 p.m. at a convenience store on the night of the murders. Ponticelli approached a car in which Porrillo was a passenger and spoke to him and other occupants of the car. Ponticelli kept his hands in his jacket and rubbed and scratched his stomach. Porrillo and his companions concluded that Ponticelli was “whacked out” based upon his behavior. Porrillo testified that, based on his familiarity with Ponticelli’s reaction to cocaine, he believed Ponticelli was under the influence of cocaine when he saw him at the convenience store. On cross-examination, Porrillo also recalled seeing a red car at the convenience store when he saw Ponticelli, which he later realized was the Grandinettis’s vehicle. Porrillo testified that he knew about how people could act under the influence of crack cocaine because he had a family member who was addicted to that drug. Ponticelli also presented witnesses to his behavior during his pretrial detention. Ponticelli’s former cellmates testified that “they often saw Ponticelli pacing in his cell, at times with a cloth over his head, and constantly reading his Bible and praying.” Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1101. Numerous friends and family members testified that “Ponticelli wrote them long letters from jail that were fragmented and uncharacteristically religious.” Id. Trial counsel testified that Ponticelli’s “bizarre behavior continued throughout the trial.” Id. Ponticelli’s sister testified that, although their father had been a religious fundamentalist, she had never known Ponticelli to be one too. Id. In addition to the lay witness testimony, four mental health experts, Dr. Harry Krop, Dr. Barry Crown, Dr. Michael Herkov, and Dr. Mark Branch, testified on behalf of Ponticelli at the evidentiary hearing. Krop, Herkov, and Branch testified that, in the light of Ponticelli’s reported cocaine abuse, both mental health statutory mitigators applied: that is, Ponticelli suffered from an extreme emotional or mental disturbance at time of the murders and Ponticelli’s ability to conform his behavior to the requirements of law had been substantially impaired. Krop and Herkov agreed that Ponticelli had not been competent to stand trial. Crown expressed no opinion about Ponticelli’s competency to stand trial nor about whether the statutory mental health mitigators applied. He concluded that Ponticelli’s brain functioning was impaired and that “his deficits were particularly related to executive functions.” Doctors Crown and Branch conducted only limited research. Crown admitted that he had evaluated Ponticelli seven years after the murders and that' he had never been qualified as an expert' in neurology in any court of law. He testified that his opinion was based entirely on neuropsychological tests that he had conducted on Ponticelli and that he had not considered other materials or testimony, including testimony about how Ponticelli appeared to exercise executive type reasoning on the night of the murders. Branch, an animal researcher, did not test Ponticelli at all and testified that he was not qualified to testify that Ponticelli suffered from cocaine psychosis. Crown, Herkov, and Krop made several important concessions about Ponticelli’s culpability. Herkov and Krop testified that they could not express an opinion about Ponticelli’s sanity at the time of the murders. Crown conceded that Ponticelli had normal intelligence. Herkov and Krop conceded that Ponticelli understood that his acts were wrong. Krop admitted that he believed that Ponticelli “was sufficiently coherent and relatively well organized and knew that what had happened was a crime and wrong.” All three experts acknowledged that Ponticelli’s behavior on the night of the murder suggested that he was “goal orientated.” Herkov admitted that, even if Ponticelli suffered from an extreme and emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, he could still have formed the heightened premeditation necessary for both the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator and the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator to apply. Herkov conceded that Ponticelli’s behavior that night “sound[ed] like he ... [was] very much trying to avoid the consequences of his actions.” Herkov later was recalled as a witness and conceded that there were facts, some of which were unknown to him when he performed his initial evaluation, that cast doubt on his original opinions. These facts included that Ponticelli had assisted his counsel during the trial and that Ponticelli had attempted to dispose of the evidence by drawing Freeman an accurate map. Herkov also admitted that Ponticelli could have been rationally motivated by pecuniary gain. Dr. Wayne Conger testified, on behalf of the state, that, in his opinion, neither statutory mental health mitigator applied and that Ponticelli had been competent to stand trial. Conger also denied that Ponticelli’s brain functions were significantly impaired. Conger testified that Ponticelli was a “normal functioning individual,” both intellectually and cognitively. He testified that Ponticelli’s actions before, during, and after he killed the brothers “demonstrated significant, goal-oriented behavior that was inconsistent with significant cognitive dysfunction and with the allegation that Ponticelli’s cocaine use prevented him from reasoning effectively.” Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1094. Conger also testified that Ponticelli’s strong grades in school “rule[d] out significant organic problems.” Conger conducted many of the same tests as Crown, but reached different conclusions. Conger testified that Crown’s results were not valid and that the differences between his results and Crown’s results suggested that Ponticelli had malingered when taking Crown’s tests. Conger testified that, “even if he were to assume that Crown’s tests were accurate, ... he did not believe the results supported Crown’s hypothesis.” Ponticelli III, 941 So.2d at 1094. Dr. Conger also testified about the results of a personality test, which showed that Ponticelli had “the typical profile of an antisocial personality disorder: an individual who does not necessarily comply with the requirements of the law and adventure seeking without any particular concern for rules and regulations.” The trial court rejected Ponticelli’s claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. The trial court found that Ponticelli had failed to establish that he had been prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to offer the lay witness testimony because that evidence was either cumulative of the evidence presented at trial or “would have had a negative effect on Ponticelli’s case” because “[i]nstead of being a young man who naively experimented with drugs for a short period of time, the lay witnesses ... portray [Ponticelli] as a man who escaped the ill effects of drugs for a substantial period of time in Florida and then returned to a habit he knew was evil.” Id. at 1095. About the mental health evidence, the trial court found Dr. Conger’s testimony to be the most credible. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Although the court concluded that Ponticelli had established deficient performance, it ruled that Ponticelli was not prejudiced by his counsel’s deficiencies. Id. at 1095-99. The court based its decision on “the significant aggravators and the overwhelming amount of evidence convicting Ponticelli of these homicides”: A number of witnesses testified at trial that Ponticelli first announced his plan to kill the Grandinettis; then, after following through on this plan, confessed that he did it and asked for help in covering it up. Furthermore, two of the three aggravating factors found for Nick Grandinetti’s death, i.e., HAC and CCP, have been recognized as two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme. Id. at 1097 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court determined that the lay witness testimony was weak and cumulative of the evidence presented at trial: The lay witness testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing is certainly not sufficient to establish mitigators that outweigh these aggravators. As the trial court recognized, the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing was largely cumulative to that presented at trial and to which defense counsel referred in his closing statement during the penalty phase. During the guilt phase, the jury heard a number of witnesses testify to Ponticelli’s positive character and the effect of cocaine on his life. Ponticelli’s father testified that Ponticelli worked a part-time job during high school and was a “good kid.” John Turner, Ponticelli’s close friend, testified that he was with Ponticelli every day after Ponticelli returned from his visit to New York and that Ponticelli used cocaine almost constantly during this time. Turner and Ponticelli’s father also testified to Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior when he was under the effects of cocaine, and Brian Burgess testified at trial that Ponticelli was acting nervous on the night he appeared at Dotson’s. At the penalty phase, which occurred nine days after the guilt phase ended, defense counsel specifically connected the testimony regarding Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior to his cocaine use. Counsel led Dr. Mills to testify that this paranoia was indicative of the mental health mitigators. On numerous occasions, this Court has denied ineffectiveness claims when the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was merely cumulative to that presented at trial Id. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected, on three separate grounds, Ponticelli’s argument that his trial counsel’s failure to discover the mental health evidence had prejudiced him. First, the court reasoned that the mental health evidence was not sufficient to overcome the aggravators because no expert had testified that Ponticelli was retarded or suffered from a major mental illness. Id. at 1098. Second, because there was conflicting testimony about whether the mental health mitigators were established, the court deferred to the finding of the trial court that Dr. Conger was the most credible. Id. Third, the court concluded that the mental health testimony was cumulative of the testimony provided by Dr. Mills at the trial: Dr. Mills unequivocally testified at trial that both statutory mental health mitigators applied in Ponticelli’s case and that Ponticelli’s paranoid behavior was consistent with an extreme cocaine addiction. While Dr. Crown and Dr. Herkov may have presented more compelling testimony at the evidentiary hearing, this is not dispositive. There is no reasonable probability that these experts would have led the trial court to find the mitigating factors at the time of trial. The trial court did not find the mitigators from Dr. Mills’ testimony because there was no evidence Ponticelli had used cocaine on the day of the offenses, and none of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing to refute this finding was available to counsel at the time of trial, even after a reasonable investigation. Id. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected Ponticelli’s claim about his counsel’s performance during the pre-trial phase. The court concluded that Ponticelli’s argument that “counsel was ineffective for waiting until a month before trial to file his motion for psychiatric evaluation and for failing to obtain jail records and to interview cellmates who would have provided additional information regarding Ponticelli’s strange behavior” was “without merit.” Id. at 1102. The court reasoned that Ponticelli had failed to provide “evidence that it was unreasonable for defense counsel to file his motion for a psychiatric evaluation a month before trial; in fact, counsel testified that he filed this motion as soon as he noticed Ponticelli consistently refusing to speak with him about the case.” Id. The court determined that not one of the mental health experts who had testified at the evidentiary hearing had testified that they believed that the mental health evaluations during the competency hearing were inadequate. The court reasoned too that Ponticelli’s former cellmates did not reveal “anything significant that the experts did not know when they evaluated Ponticelli.” Id. F. Successive Postconviction Motion and Second Evidentiary Hearing At a second evidentiary hearing, Ponticelli presented more evidence of the alleged deal with Freeman and about the cocaine party. The evidence about the alleged deal included several letters that suggested Freeman sought gain time for his testimony in the Ponticelli trial and that Freeman’s wife “was told of promises made to Freeman by the [State Attorney’s Office] to reduce his sentence that had not been fulfilled.” Ponticelli also presented evidence that, on the day of Freeman’s deposition, Freeman received 33 days of meritorious gain time and that he was released from prison soon after he testified against Ponticelli. The evidence about the cocaine party included the testimony of Warren Brown, who confirmed that, contrary to his trial testimony, he had met Ponticelli on Thanksgiving night and had smoked cocaine with him that night. Again, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected Ponticelli’s Brady and Giglio claims. The court stated that, “for the same reasons explained in our previous opinion, Ponticelli has failed to meet the prejudice prong under Brady or the materiality prong under Giglio.” Ponticelli v. State, No. SC09-992, 49 So.3d 236, 2010 WL 4628968, at *1 (Fla. Nov. 10, 2010) (unpublished table opinion). That summary order concluded Ponticelli’s proceedings in the state courts. G. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings Ponticelli filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus while his successive postconviction motion was pending in the state trial court, and the district court later denied relief. The district court ruled that the Supreme of Court of Florida reasonably applied clearly established federal law when it rejected the claims presented in this appeal. With respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court ruled that “Porter v. McCollum, [558 U.S. 30,] 130 S.Ct. 447 [175 L.Ed.2d 398] (2009)[,] and Sears v. Upton, [— U.S. -,] 130 S.Ct. 3259 [177 L.Ed.2d 1025] (2010), are distinguishable and . do not announce any new rules of constitutional interpretation; ..they merely apply Strickland to different sets of facts.” The district court granted a certificate of appealability with respect to Ponticelli’s Brady and Giglio claims and his claim that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. A judge of this Court expanded the certificate to include Ponticelli’s claim that counsel had been ineffective in his preparation of evidence of Ponticelli’s competence to proceed to trial. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governs Ponticelli’s petition and our review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida that denied him postconviction relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We will not disturb the decision of the state court unless the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” “The Supreme Court of the United States has held that § 2254(d)(1) imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ a standard ‘which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’ ” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1306-07 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)) (internal citation omitted). “A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law when it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case,” Spencer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 609 F.3d 1170, 1178 (11th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), or when it “unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context,” Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2001). To. determine whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in adjudicating Ponticelli’s habeas petition, this Court must conduct the two-step analysis that the Supreme Court set forth in Harrington v. Richter, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). First, this court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or, [if none were stated], could have supported the state court’s decision.” Johnson v. Sec., Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, this Court “must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we may issue a writ of habeas corpus only when “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. “The question whether a state court errs in determining the facts is a different question from whether it errs in applying the law.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342, 126 S.Ct. 969, 976, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). “Our review of findings of fact by the state court is even more deferential than under a clearly e