Full opinion text
OPINION KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. After a seven-week trial, a jury convicted Douglas C. Adams, Russell Cletus Maride, William E. Stivers, Charles Wayne Jones, Freddy W. Thompson, William B. Morris, Stanley Bowling, and Debra L. Morris on every charge levied against them by the government. Based on cumulative error from the district court’s evidentiary rulings identified in this opinion, we VACATE defendants’ convictions on all counts and REMAND for a new trial. I. BACKGROUND On July 9, 2009, defendants were named in a thirteen-count indictment that charged them with, among other things, conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The charges stem from defendants’ alleged participation in a vote-buying scheme in Clay County, Kentucky that lasted from 2002 to 2007, encompassing three election cycles (2002, 2004, and 2006). Defendants’ scheme allegedly operated as follows. Political candidates pooled money to buy votes and to pay “vote haulers” to deliver voters whose votes could be bought. In order to be paid, voters had to vote for a particular set of candidates, known as a “slate” or “ticket.” To ensure that these voters actually voted for the correct slate, co-conspiring election officers and poll workers reviewed voters’ ballots — a practice known in this case as “voting the voter.” Once the proper slate was confirmed, a token (such as a raffle ticket) or marking was given to the voters to confirm that they did in fact vote for the proper slate. Voters with the token or marking were then paid by members of the conspiracy in a location away from the polls. Conspirators retained lists of voters to avoid double payments and to keep track of whose votes could be bought in ensuing elections. In addition to hiring vote haulers, defendants allegedly utilized other methods of buying votes. Absentee voting and voter-assistance forms helped minimize the difficulty of checking paid voters’ ballots. In the latter case, co-conspiring poll workers were permitted to be in the voting booth under the pretext that they were assisting voters; in reality, co-conspiring poll workers were confirming that voters chose the proper slates. When electronic voting machines were introduced to Clay County in the 2006 election, the conspiracy both stole and bought votes. To steal votes, conspirators, typically poll workers, purposefully misinformed voters that they did not need to click “cast ballot” on a screen that appeared after voters had selected candidates for whom they wished to vote. Co-conspiring poll workers would enter the voting booth after the voter exited and change the electronic ballot to reflect the slate before finally casting the ballot. Election officers are appointed by the Clay County Board of Elections (the “Board”), which must also certify the results. The Board was alleged to be the racketeering enterprise in this conspiracy. It is comprised of the County Clerk, the Sheriff, the Republican Election Commissioner, and the Democratic Election Commissioner. The two Commissioners are responsible for appointing election judges and officers at the various precincts. Defendants held various positions within Clay County, played different roles within the conspiracy, and were charged with numerous offenses. Specifically, the Superseding Indictment, R. 272 (Page ID # 1074-98), alleged the following: Douglas C. Adams was the Clay County Superintendent of Schools from 1999 to 2007. The indictment alleged that Adams was considered a political boss in Clay County and an associate and director of the enterprise, the Clay County Board of Elections. As a leader of the conspiracy, Adams was alleged to have exerted influence over the selection of precinct workers and the appointment of corrupt members of the Board. The indictment also alleged that he recruited individuals to run for county offices on a slate that would benefit the conspiracy. Adams was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1) and conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2). The government also sought forfeiture against Adams under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). Russell Cletus Mancie was an elected circuit court judge for the 41st Judicial Circuit of the Commonwealth of Kentucky from 1991 through 2007. The indictment alleged that Maride was considered a political boss in Clay County and an associate and director of the enterprise. As a leader of the conspiracy, Maride — like Adams — was alleged to have exerted influence over the selection of precinct workers and the appointment of corrupt members of the Board. Also like Adams, the indictment alleged that Maride recruited candidates for the slate. Maride was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2), obstruction of justice and/or aiding and abetting its commission under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 2 (Count 8), conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count 10), and conspiracy to buy votes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (Count 11). The government also sought forfeiture against Maride under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). William E. “Al Man” Stivers was appointed as election officer by the Board in 2002 and 2004. He served on the Board as the Democratic judge for the Manchester precinct in 2002 and 2004. The indictment alleged that Stivers used his position as an election officer to commit extortion and bribery. As a conspiring election officer, he was also responsible for marking the hands of voters who had sold their votes and for stealing votes on the machines introduced in the 2006 election. Stivers was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2), attempted extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 4), obstruction of justice and/or aiding and abetting its commission under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 2 (Count 8), conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count 10), and conspiracy to buy votes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (Count 11). The government also sought forfeiture against Stivers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). Charles Wayne Jones was as an election officer during the period of the charged conspiracy. Jones was appointed as the Democratic Election Commissioner in 2000 and served until 2007. He was a member of the Clay County Board of Elections during the election cycles of 2002, 2004, and 2006. The indictment alleged that Jones appointed corrupt election officers and instructed those officers on how to purchase and steal votes. Jones was also responsible, as a Commissioner and a Board member, for certifying the accuracy of election results (which he knew to be false). Jones was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2), honest-services mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 (Counts 3, 5, 6, and 7), attempted extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 4), conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count 10), and conspiracy to buy votes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (Count 11). The government also sought forfeiture against Jones under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). Freddy W. Thompson was elected as Clay County Clerk in 2002 and served until 2007. By virtue of that position, Thompson was also a member of the Board of Elections during the election cycles of 2004 and 2006. The indictment alleged that Thompson provided money to be distributed by election officers to buy votes and instructed officers in the 2006 election on how to steal votes. Thompson was also responsible, as a Board member, for certifying the accuracy of election results (which he allegedly knew to be false). Thompson was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2), honest-services mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 (Counts 3, 5, 6, and 7), obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Count 9), conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Count 10), and conspiracy to buy votes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (Count 11). The government also sought forfeiture against Thompson under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). Stanley Bowling was elected as Magistrate in 2002 and served until 2007. He is also the owner and operator of B and B Excavating, an excavating company located in Clay County that obtained contracts from the city of Manchester and the County to provide excavation services. The indictment alleged that Bowling distributed money to bribe voters and exerted influence over the selection of precinct workers in local elections. Bowling was charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1) and conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2). The government also sought forfeiture against Bowling under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). William (“Bart”) Morris is the owner and operator of B and J Transport, Inc., a sanitation company located in Clay County that contracts with the city of Manchester and the County to provide sanitation services. Bart is married to Debra (“Debbie”) L. Morris. The indictment alleges that Bart and Debbie distributed funds that were pooled, by members of the conspiracy to buy votes. Both Bart and Debbie Morris were charged with: conspiracy to violate RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), conspiracy to money launder under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2), and conspiracy to buy votes under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i (Count 11). The government also sought forfeiture against both Bart and Debbie Morris under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 (Count 12) and 982 (Count 13). On March 25, 2010, after a seven-week trial, a jury found all defendants guilty of all charges and returned a special verdict against defendants on the two forfeiture counts. R. 818 (Verdict Form) (Page ID # 4965-78); R. 833 (Forfeiture Verdict Form) (Page ID # 5162-63). Subsequently, the district court granted post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal from Jones and Stivers, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions of attempted extortion (Count 4). R. 947 (06/11/2010 D. Ct. Op.XPage ID # 12563-83); R. 1080 (12/01/2010 D. Ct. Op.) (Page ID # 13278-87). After Skilling v. United States, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the district court granted post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal from Jones and Thompson because their convictions for honest-services mail fraud (Counts 3, 5, 6, and 7) did not involve a bribery or a kickback scheme. Defendants raise a host of issues on appeal, which we examine below in turn. However, we need not address defendants’ challenges to their convictions for conspiracy to money launder (Count 2) and the related forfeiture count (Count 13) because the government concedes that those convictions rest on an invalid theory. Gov’t Br. at 22, 59-66. We therefore vacate the convictions of all eight defendants on Count 2 and vacate the associated forfeiture under Count 13. II. RICO PREDICATE ACT Defendants contend that vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 does not constitute “bribery” and therefore is not “racketeering activity” under RICO. In other words, defendants claim that vote buying is not a valid predicate act for the purposes of RICO. Under RICO, “racketeering activity” is (A) any act or threat involving ... bribery ..., which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery).... 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Therefore, the question before this court is whether vote buying, chargeable under Kentucky law, is an act involving bribery. Legislative history informs us that § 1961(1)(A) lists predicate state offenses by reference to their “generic designation” and that § 1961(1)(B) lists predicate federal offenses by “specific reference.” H.R.Rep. No. 91-1549, at 56 (1970). As illustrated in the present case, this arrangement presents some difficulty because states classify offenses differently. Defendants note that Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 does not use the term “bribery.” Thus, according to defendants, vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 is not an act involving bribery. Although this argument has some superficial appeal, “[t]he labels placed on a state statute do not determine whether that statute proscribes bribery for purposes of the RICO statute.” United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418 (7th Cir.1987). Instead, “[t]he test for determining whether the charged acts fit into the generic category of the predicate offense is whether the indictment charges a type of activity generally known or characterized in the proscribed category, namely, any act or threat involving bribery.” United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir.1977); see Garner, 837 F.2d at 1418 (“Thus, any statute that proscribes conduct which could be generically defined as bribery can be the basis for a predicate act.”); see also Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409-10, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003) (discussing United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), in the context of RICO predicate offenses). Therefore, we must consider whether vote buying is the type of activity that is generally known or characterized as involving bribery. Although intuitively vote buying strikes us as an offense that involves bribery, we need not rest our decision on intuition. First, The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), which the Supreme Court has considered in construing RICO’s provisions, supports our determination that vote buying in violation of Kentucky law constitutes an act involving bribery under RICO. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 410, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (“[W]here as here the Model Penal Code and a majority of States recognize the crime of extortion as requiring a party to obtain or to seek to obtain property, as the Hobbs Act requires, the state extortion offense for purposes of RICO must have a similar requirement.”); see Perrin, 444 U.S. at 45 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 311 (looking to the MPC in construing the Travel Act). The MPC states that “[a] person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he offers ... (1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient’s ... vote or other exercise of discretion as a ... voter.” Model Penal Code § 240.1. Vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 is well within the prohibition of bribery under the MPC. Second, other states’ classification of vote buying as a bribery offense, which the Supreme Court has also considered in construing RICO’s provisions, shows that vote buying is generally understood as an act involving bribery. Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 410, 123 S.Ct. 1057. As noted by the district court, a majority of states considers vote buying to be a form .of bribery. R. 1081 (12/07/2010 D. Ct. Op. at 11-12 n. l)(Page ID # 13298-99) (listing twenty-six states that classify vote buying as a bribery offense or as involving bribery). Finally, the provisions of RICO must be construed liberally “to effectuate its remedial purpose[ ],” which is “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587, 589, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Reading 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) to encompass vote buying comports with this mandate. In conclusion, vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 is the type of activity that is generally known or characterized as involving bribery. Defendants do little to rebut the fact that vote buying is generally understood as an offense involving bribery; instead, defendants assert that vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 cannot serve as a predicate offense because of the structure of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). As noted earlier, subsection (A) lists state offenses that constitute “racketeering activity” by “generic designation,” and subsection (B) lists federal offenses that constitute “racketeering activity” by “specific reference.” H.R.Rep. No. 91-1549, at 56 (1970). Although two bribery statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 224, are listed among the specific federal offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), two federal vote-buying statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 597 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i, are not listed in subsection (B). Defendants note that Kentucky’s vote-buying statute, Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205, is virtually identical to one of the omitted federal vote-buying statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 597. According to defendants, the omission of vote buying in violation of § 597 as a predicate act for RICO means that the nearly identical Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 cannot serve as a predicate act for RICO. Defendants claim that Congress could not have intended to include vote buying when it occurs in a state election but not a federal election. Therefore, defendants argue that the absence of the federal vote-buying statutes from 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) makes the statute clear: defendants assert that vote buying is not “racketeering activity” under RICO. Although defendants’ structural argument has some appeal, it rests on the false notion that subsections (A) and (B) are coextensive in scope. We have never imposed such a limitation on the scope of predicate acts under § 1961(1)(A) and decline to do so now. In United States v. Licavoli, we held that both murder and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of Ohio law constitute “racketeering activity” because both involve murder under § 1961(1)(A). 725 F.2d 1040, 1044-47 (6th Cir.1984). In doing so, this court implicitly rejected a coextensive reading of § 1961(1)(A) and (B). Subsection (B) lists only one predicate federal offense involving murder: 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (“relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire”). If § 1961(1)(A) and (B) are coextensive in scope, murder and conspiracy to commit murder could not be state predicate offenses for the purpose of RICO because neither necessarily involves murder-for-hire. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.02; see also id. § 2923.01(A). We rejected this reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) in Licavoli and declined to limit the scope of RICO predicates because 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) contains “expansive” language — any act or threat involving— and “ ‘should be liberally construed to effectuate [RICO’s] remedial purposes.’ ” Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947). Given Licavoli’s holding and reasoning, we need not read § 1961(1)(A) and (B) as coextensive in the present case. We must, instead, construe § 1961(1) to effectuate RICO’s purpose. As noted earlier, vote buying in violation of Kentucky Revised Statute § 119.205 is an offense generally known or characterized as involving bribery. This reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) effectuates RICO’s remedial purpose. Finding no ambiguity in the 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), we hold that the district court did not err in determining that defendants’ RICO convictions rest on a valid predicate act. III. VARIANCE Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove a single conspiracy and that, at most, the evidence showed two separate conspiracies: Adams supporters and White supporters. Therefore, according to defendants, there was a fatal variance between what the government charged in Count 1 of the indictment and the proof offered at trial. Ordinarily, this court reviews de novo the question of whether a variance has occurred. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 235 (6th Cir.2006). That is, if a defendant alleges a variance at trial, we reverse the conviction if (1) a variance occurred and (2) that variance affected the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 841 (6th Cir.2008). However, when a defendant raises the variance issue for the first time on appeal, this court reviews for plain error. Id. Under this standard, the second part of our inquiry “requires the defendant to prove that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. In the present case, we need not decide which standard of review applies because under either standard, defendants have faded to show that a variance occurred. “A variance to the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 235. In conspiracy cases, “a variance constitutes reversible error only if ... the indictment alleged one conspiracy, but the evidence can reasonably be construed only as supporting a finding of multiple conspiracies.” Id. at 235-36 (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). In our review for whether the evidence can support only a finding of multiple conspiracies, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government because “whether single or multiple conspiracies have been shown is usually a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.” United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir.2003). Our “principal considerations in determining the number of conspiracies are the existence of a common goal, the nature of the scheme, and the overlapping of the participants in various dealings.” Id. The thrust of defendants’ argument is that the government proved multiple conspiracies, not one, because different members of the alleged conspiracy supported different candidates in the 2002 Clay County primary election. According to Adams: For years, the White family and its allies had “[p]retty much ruled” Clay County. In 2002, Jennings White — the family patriarch — held the office of County Clerk and ran for re-election. Kennon White (Jennings’ nephew) ran for jailer, and state representative Barbara White Colter (Jennings’ cousin) ran for reelection. Adams opposed the White faction in the 2002 primary election, in part because Jennings White was a notorious drug dealer (Adams’ daughter had a drug problem). Adams encouraged a slate of candidates to run against the White candidates. As one prosecution witness explained, “[i]t was a power struggle in the county.” Adams and Jennings White were known to “hate each other.” White was so furious that Adams opposed him in the 2002 election that he asked Kenny Day to plant drugs in Adams’ car. The appellants (and other alleged conspirators) split across the White-Adams divide during the 2002 election. Appellant Freddy Thompson ran for County Clerk on the slate Adams supported. Appellants Charles Wayne Jones and William Stivers supported the Adams slate. Appellants Stanley Bowling, William Morris, and Debra Morris supported the White faction. Appellant Maride did not take sides in the 2002 primary, although he usually supported the White family. Adams Br. at 7-8 (citations to the record omitted). Under this reading of the facts, defendants claim that there could not be an agreement among themselves — the essence of conspiracy — because they supported opposing candidates. Although defendants are correct that the evidence showed competing factions within the conspiracy, this does not undermine the government’s theory of the case. Looking to defendants’ common goal, the nature of their vote-buying scheme, and the overlap of participants in various elections, we cannot say that the evidence can reasonably be construed as supporting only a finding of multiple conspiracies. Defendants’ multiple-conspiracy theory overlooks the nature of the government’s conspiracy charge. The fact that there were competing slates of candidates within the conspiracy in the 2002 primary election does not change the possibility that defendants agreed to a common goal. Count 1 of the indictment charged defendants with conspiring to control the Clay County Board of Elections for their own benefit, not for the benefit of a political party or cause. The indictment states that defendants’ purposes were to obtain, solidify, preserve and expand for the Defendants and their associates, political power and' control within the county, and personal enrichment for themselves and their associates, through the use and misuse of the authority and power of the Board [of Elections], and the offices of circuit judge, superintendent of schools, and county clerk, and the positions of election officers. R. 272 (Super. Indict, at 4) (Page ID # 1077). Defendants contend that the present case is indistinguishable from United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.1982), because it involves ongoing antagonism between two rival factions within the alleged conspiracy. They argue that the government’s theory in the present case substitutes “common goal” for “agreement” in defining conspiracy. In support, Adams analogizes: “The Republican Party and the Democratic Party share the ‘common goal’ of controlling the outcome of the presidential election, but they do not have an agreement to control the outcome.” Adams Reply Br. at 5. Defendants’ analogy misses the mark. Although we agree with defendants that at times the members of the conspiracy were supporting candidates who ran against each other, “[t]he mere fact that a conspiracy can be subdivided ... does not mean that multiple conspiracies existed.” United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 924 (6th Cir.1999). Defendants did not, as they suggest in their analogy and reliance on Camiel, agree to control the Board for the benefit of a party or a particular faction thereof. Instead, the evidence showed defendants agreed to a common goal that remained the same throughout the period of the alleged conspiracy: “to obtain, solidify, preserve and expand ... political power and control within the county....” R. 272 (Super. Indict, at 4) (Page ID # 1077). In accord with their agreement to control the Clay County Board of Elections for their own personal benefit, conspiring election officers from both factions had to turn a blind eye to rampant vote buying. Furthermore, the record shows that defendants’ vote-buying scheme was not as simple as us-versus-them or Republicans-versus-Democrats. As is the case with politics, defendants’ allegiances to one another were not drawn on clear lines, and their own self-interest led to seemingly strange alliances. The nature of defendants’ vote-buying scheme highlights how individuals working for competing slates simultaneously could have agreed to a broader common goal of personal benefit. Veteran vote hauler, Bobby “Red” Sams, testified that it was common for vote buyers to trade off on which candidates they were supposed to tell paid voters to vote for based on “whoever had the most pull or the most money.” R. 933 (03/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 89) (Page ID # 12291). Kennon White’s testimony confirmed that slates were not consistent across all precincts: Well, what would happen is that when we — when you would go and meet with them, they would be certain precincts that they would be able to help you in and certain precincts that they wouldn’t. They would tie with whatever would be the best to benefit the candidate. In other words, someone you — might be for you in one precinct may be against you in another, it was just according to what they needed to do to get the votes that they wanted, you know. R. 840 (02/11/2010 Trial Tr. at 31-32) (Page ID # 5597-98); see R. 929 (02/18/2010 Trial Tr. at 13-15) (Page ID # 11943-45). Finally, the record confirms the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy because faction lines were not as clearly drawn as defendants contend and the overlap of participants in each election demonstrates a single conspiracy. Prior to the 2002 primary election, Doug Adams invited Kennon White to run for county clerk on his slate against Jennings White for the price of $60,000, and, if Kennon accepted, Adams “would get Freddy [Thompson] not to run and Freddy would do what [Adams] told him to do.” R. 929 (02/18/2010 Trial Tr. at 58-59) (Page ID # 11988-89); R. 840 (02/11/2010 Trial Tr. at 26-27) (Page ID # 5592-93). Ultimately, Kennon White decided to run against Freddy Thompson on Jennings White’s slate. R. 929 (02/18/2010 Trial Tr. at 58-59) (Page ID # 11988-89). Wanda White testified that Doug Adams attended White faction meetings during the 2002 primary election because “he was just playing both sides.” R. 844 (02/19/2010 Trial Tr. at 104) (Page ID # 5993). Bart Morris, Debbie Morris, Stivers, and Maride were also present at those meetings, though Maride remained in his car outside of the meeting and communicated with the others through a conspirator. Id. at 103-OS (Page ID #5992-94). Bobby “Red” Sams also testified that Maride “was down at [William Stivers’s] all the time, and I was there all the time. He would tell me to go get the voters and vote them.... ” R. 933 (03/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 49) (Page ID # 12251). These facts show that in the 2002 election, members of each faction attempted to and did in fact work with one another — evidence that the jury could find to support a single conspiracy. Regarding later elections, Frank Roberts testified that he bought votes for Barbara Jo Colter, a member of the White slate, in the 2004 election. R. 875 (03/01/2010 Trial Tr. at 38-39) (Page ID # 8946-47). In the prior election, Roberts bought votes for Adams’s slate. Id. at 35 (Page ID # 8943). This shows that co-conspirators from different factions worked with one another after each election cycle, which supports the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy. The 2006 election cycle also involved a mix of members from both factions. Ken-non White testified: A. Okay. [Wanda and I] got involved [in the 2006 election] whenever Wayne Jones had come and brought a list to my wife to further up on the conversation with Cletus [Maride] about being appointed to election officer. He brought a list to my wife at City Hall and told us to put the names down of the people we wanted to serve to help us there. Q. All right. So let’s back up. You said that there was a discussion with Cletus about becoming — serving, I guess? A. Okay. We had talked with Cletus and he had talked about putting us in as election officers, one of us, and when it ended up coming time, hp had wanted help for his son-in-law who was running for the tax commissioner or whatever that office is and that we could help my father and help him, you know, by my wife being in there as election officer. Q. So what did you do after he made that offer? A. We took him up on it, my wife did. Q. So there were other positions, to be filled out besides Wanda’s? A. Uh-huh. Q. And did you-all make suggested names for Charles Wayne Jones to put on — for the Democrat list [of election officers]? A. Yes, we did. Q. Do you recall who it was you-all put on the list? A. We put Earl Pennington, I think was one, and Dobber [Weaver], Charles Weaver’s wife, Minnie Weaver. Q. Did you come up with those names yourself or did you seek input from others to suggest those names to Wayne Jones? A. I came up with them after talking with Cletus and talking with Darnell and Bart [Morris] and other people involved. Q. Did you ever — did you have any meetings with Doug Adams about this proposal? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Did he make any specific requests of Wanda through you? A. He wanted Wanda to be for Kevin Johnson. Q. And what office was he seeking? A. Sheriff. R. 840 (02/11/2010 Trial Tr. at 80-85) (Page ID # 5646-51). Wanda White’s testimony confirmed the involvement of Maride, Jones, Stivers, Bowling, and Thompson in the 2006 election. R. 931 (02/19/2010 Trial Tr. at 33-35) (Page ID # 12113-15). To this end, Stivers, Jones, and Thompson taught Wanda White how to steal votes on the new voting machines to be utilized in the 2006 election. Id. at 36-37 (Page ID # 12116-17). If the White and Adams factions were as divided as defendants contend on appeal, it seems odd that Adams supporters would instruct a White supporter on how to steal votes. The overlapping of participants from each faction in all three election cycles supports the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we cannot say that it reasonably can be construed as supporting only a finding of multiple conspiracies. Although there was antagonism among members of the conspiracy, the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy because defendants agreed to a common goal, the nature of vote buying does not allow for a clean division of sides, and there was evidence to support the overlapping of participants from both factions in each election cycle. Therefore, we conclude that there was no variance. IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Defendants raise a series of issues regarding the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We address each in turn. A. Background and Rule 404(b) Evidence Defendants challenge the district court’s admission of the government’s background and Rule 404(b) evidence. Because the two often serve as alternative grounds for admission, we will consider them together. See United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir.2000). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. Rule 404(b)(2). In determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), a district court uses a three-step process: First, the district court must decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the other act in question actually occurred. Second, if so, the district court must decide whether the evidence of the other act is probative of a material issue other than character. Third, if the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character, the district court must decide whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir.2003). With regard to the second step, “[e]vidence of other acts is probative of a material issue other than character if (1) the evidence is offered for an admissible purpose, (2) the purpose for which the evidence is offered is material or ‘in issue,’ and (3) the evidence is probative with regard to the purpose for which it is offered.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Background or res gestae evidence is an exception to Rule 404(b). United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 697 (6th Cir.2012). Background evidence “consists of those other acts that are inextricably intertwined with the charged offense.” Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748. “Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” Id. Concerned with the potential for abuse of background evidence as a means to circumvent Rule 404(b), we have recognized “severe limitations as to ‘temporal proximity, causal relationship, or spatial connections’ among the other acts and the charged offense.” Clay, 667 F.3d at 698 (quoting Hardy, 228 F.3d at 749). Typically, “we review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 693. However, our review of a district court’s admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) mirrors the district court’s three-step process: First, we review for clear error the factual determination that other acts occurred. Second, we review de novo the legal determination that the acts were admissible for a permissible 404(b) purpose. Third, we review for abuse of discretion the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudicial impact. Id. (emphasis added). 1. Kenny Day, Eugene Lewis, and J.C. Lawson Vote-Buying Testimony Prior to trial, the government filed a notice of admission of background evidence in the form of testimony from three convicted drug dealers: Kenny Day, Eugene Lewis, and J.C. Lawson. R. 581 (Gov’t Notice of Admis.) (Page ID # 3745-54). Defendants filed motions in opposition, and the district court conducted a hearing on the issue. See R. 671 (01/21/2010 D. Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #4257). Ultimately, the district court determined the following to be admissible background evidence: A. The testimony of Kenny Day and/or other evidence that Maride and Adams bought votes in the 1983 election and that Maride was involved in attempting to influence a juror in 1990; B. The testimony of Eugene Lewis and/or other evidence that, in the late 70’s-90’s, Lewis operated as a vote buyer at Maride, Jones and Thompson’s request! ]; C. The testimony of J.C. Lawson and/or other evidence that Lawson contributed to Maricle’s campaign in the 1980’s, that Lawson was approached by Jones and Bowling to buy votes and that Lawson was paid $500 by Bowling after an election; Id. at 26-27 (Page ID #4282-83). On appeal, defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Defendants’ first contention is that this evidence lacks temporal proximity to the charged conspiracy, given that most of the events about which Day, Lewis, and Lawson testified occurred in the 1980s. Therefore, according to defendants, the district court erred in admitting the testimony. Adams Br. at 23 (“As in Hardy, such temporally remote evidence cannot possibly be ‘necessary to explain the charged offense, complete the story [of a witness’] testimony, [or] tend to establish the charged conspiracy itself.’ 228 F.3d at 749-50.”). This argument fails for two reasons, both noted by the district court. First, vote buying and jury tampering by nature cannot be committed every day because elections and trials are not everyday occurrences. Therefore, in the context of this case, evidence of vote buying from the 1980s was not as remote as in other cases (although we agree with defendants that if the evidence was offered on temporal proximity alone it would have been an error). Second, and more importantly, Hardy acknowledges that background evidence requires a close “causal, temporal or spatial connection.” Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748 (emphasis added). The “or” is significant here because without a temporal connection, the evidence was admissible to show a causal connection. Defendants’ second contention is that the causal connection between vote buying in the 1980s and the charged conspiracy is too attenuated to be admissible under Clay. A review of Day’s, Lewis’s, and Lawson’s testimony is useful. Day testified that Adams and Maride served as corrupt election officers in the 1980s and bought votes for competing parties. Day explained that the Republican Adams and the Democrat Maride reached across party lines, however, to double-cross Corky McKeehan. R. 835 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 30-31) (Page ID # 5194-95). Day also testified that Adams gave him money to purchase votes and that Maride supplied Day with a list of who should serve as election officers in each precinct. Id. at 25, 35-36 (Page ID #5189, 5199-60). Lewis testified that he was given money to buy votes in Maricle’s presence. R. 869 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 58) (Page ID # 8308). Lewis also testified that he gave Maride $2,000 in cash to buy votes for Maricle’s first campaign for circuit judge. Id. at 59-60 (Page ID # 8309-10). Lawson testified that he gave money to be used to buy votes for Maride. R. 870 (02/05/2010 Trial Tr. at 53-54) (Page ID # 8402-03). As explained by the district court, this evidence is a prelude to and “completes the story” of the charged conspiracy by showing how Maride and Adams rose to become political bosses in Clay County, their knowledge of vote buying, and their personal relationship. Maricle’s and Adams’s rise to power and knowledge of vote buying was essential to the government’s case because the indictment alleged that they led and directed the operations of the conspiracy. Therefore, there is a causal connection between Maricle’s and Adams’s vote-buying activities in the 1980s and the charged conspiracy that they were alleged to have directed. Similarly, the fact that they had a relationship was essential because the indictment alleged a single conspiracy and defendants presented a multiple-conspiracy defense. United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 169 (1st Cir.1999) (collecting cases to support the proposition that “[i]n a conspiracy case, evidence of other bad acts ... can be admitted to explain the background, formation, and development of the illegal relationship, ... and, more specifically, to help the jury understand the basis for the co-conspirators’ relationship of mutual trust”). This is a missing and distinguishing feature from Clay. Defendants’ final contention is that the evidence should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.” The district court is afforded broad discretion in making this determination; therefore, we review for abuse of discretion and “must maximize the probative value of the challenged evidence and minimize its potential for unfair prejudice.” United States v. Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir.2006). Defendants argue that the probative value of the vote-buying testimony from Day, Lewis, and Lawson was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice—showing a propensity to commit vote buying. As discussed earlier, the vote-buying testimony was probative because it helped explain how Adams and Maride obtained the knowledge to direct and control the conspiracy and to show their relationship. With regard to prejudice, the picture painted by the government was not pretty, but it was not unfairly ugly either. Furthermore, the district court gave adequate instructions: (1) The United States introduced certain testimony and evidence which the Court has admitted as background evidence. This includes some testimony presented by Kenneth Day, Eugene Lewis, and J.C. Lawson. Background evidence includes an act or acts other than the specific acts charged in the indictment which are intertwined with the offense or offenses charged. The introduction of background evidence is offered to complete the story of the charged offense or offenses. Here, the United States offered the evidence to show the origins of the enterprise (i.e., the inception of the conspiracy) that has been alleged and the roles of some of the members of the alleged enterprise. (2) You are cautioned that the United States does not assert that the alleged conspiracy which is the subject of the indictment occurred in the 1980s with one or more of the Defendants participating in vote-buying. Instead, the United States offered this testimony as evidence of activity that allegedly was the origin of defendants joining the enterprise and their respective roles in the enterprise. R. 826 (Jury Instructions at 86) (Page ID # 5092); see United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1996) (“The magnitude of that risk might well have been reduced by a clear and concise instruction identifying for the jurors the specific purpose for which the evidence was admissible and limiting their consideration of the evidence to that purpose.”). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting background evidence regarding vote buying in the 1980s and 1990s. 2. Kenny Day, Eugene Lewis, and J.C. Lawson Drug-Dealing Testimony Defendants also challenge the admission of testimony from Day, Lewis, and Lawson that detailed their (and others’) involvement in illicit-drug activities. The government responds that such evidence was admissible as proper background evidence, Rule 404(b) evidence, or under United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir.2010). Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we recap just some of the abundant drug-dealing testimony given at trial. The government elicited the following testimony from Day: Q. What kind of drugs did you sell, Mr. Day? A. Cocaine and marijuana. Q. And how big of quantities did you sell at the height of your business over there in Clay County? A. I was selling tons of marijuana at the height of it. I would get a ton about every two to three weeks, I would get a ton of marijuana in. Q. Now, a ton, in my opinion — my recollection, is about 2,000 pounds? A. That is correct. Q. And is marijuana sold by the ton or by the pound when you sold it? A. I sold it by the pound. Q. And what was it bringing per pound? A. I sold mine for $1400 a pound. Q. And during the time period, Mr. Day, that you were operating there, did you also have some local customers? A. Well, I tried not to have none, but on the last, I did.' I got greedy and took on some local customers, and that was the downfall of me. Q. Did you ever know a fellow by the name of Oscar Hubbard? A. Yes, I do. Q. And how do you know Oscar Hubbard? A. I sold him marijuana. Q. And did he get prosecuted in your case? A. Yes, he did. Q. And was he convicted? A. Yes, he was. Q. And is he related to Doug Adams in any way? A. Yes, he is. Q. How is he related to Doug Adams? A. Doug married his sister. R. 835 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 9-10, 12-13) (Page ID # 5173-74, 5176-77). After this line of questioning, defendants moved for a mistrial because a prior order by the district court ruled that “[gjeneric statements or testimony that Adams formed relationships with a number of drug dealers in Clay County, Kentucky,” R. 671 (01/21/2010 D. Ct. Op. at 27) (Page ID # 4283), would not be admissible as background or Rule 404(b) evidence without further justification from the government. R. 835 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 13-14) (Page ID # 5177-78); see R. 671 (01/21/2010 D. Ct. Op. at 20-21) (Page ID # 4276-77). The government responded that “[Adams is] associated with people who are in [the drug-dealing] business, and that is not, in my understanding of the Court’s ruling, impermissible.” R. 835 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 14) (Page ID # 5178). The district court denied defendants’ motion for mistrial, noting that “to the extent that my previous ruling was ambiguous and gave the impression that the United States could not seek to introduce such connections with Mr. Adams, I’ll correct that, the United States may do so.” Id. at 15 (Page ID # 5179). Day’s drug-dealing testimony continued after making the “connection” with Adams: Q. During this '90s period, what was the quantities of cocaine that you were buying and selling there in your business at the pawnshop? A. I would get six, seven, eight kilos, just according to what kind of money I had when I went down there. Q. And what was cocaine, at that time, selling for? A. I sold mine for 1050. Q. Okay. Now, 1050, is that per ounce, per kilo, per pound? A. Ounce, $1,050 an ounce. Q. And approximately how many ounces is [sic] in a kilo of cocaine? A. 35.7. Q. So you got over 35 ounces out of a kilo of cocaine that you were selling for over a thousand dollars an ounce? A. That’s right. Q. And you were getting around how many kilos every other week? A. Five, six, seven.... Id. at 17-18 (Page ID # 5181-82). Lewis’s testimony included these exchanges: Q. So what was the understanding that you all — what was the goal, I guess, for you and Mr. Baker and Mr. Jones? What were you planning to do? A. To grow marijuana, sir. Q. And did you make any effort to actually follow through with that plan? A. Yes, we did. Q. And what did you do? A. We growed several hundred marijuana plants. Q. And where did you actually place this marijuana in the ground out, in the field somewhere? A. Yes, sir. We dug in several little pot patches that were a good place to grow. A lot of cedar thickets and pine thickets that accounted pretty well for camouflage. And we put small patches in, 40, 50 in a patch. We put in somewhere around 500 plants. Q. And this was put on the farm in Henry County? A. Most of it was. Some of it was on another people’s farm, sir. Q. And what were your plans to do ■with the marijuana once it had grown to maturity? A. To sell it, profit. Q. And did you follow through on those plans? A. Yes, sir. Q. And what did you do -with the marijuana you harvested? A. We sold it. Q. Okay. Did you divide it among yourselves, or did you divide the profits, or how did that work? A. Yes, we divided some of the marijuana in three different piles, and then sometimes I’d take it and hire some people to clean it for us and split the money. R. 869 (02/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 51-52) (Page ID # 8301-02). Finally, the government elicited the following testimony from Lawson: Q. Mr. Lawson, I believe we’re now publishing the copy of the [newspaper] article. There’s a picture there on the center of the screen. Could you describe for us who that person is in there? A. Yes, sir, that’s me. Q. And what’s your background? What have you got in your background? A. Marijuana. Q. And do you remember being interviewed for that article? A. Yes, I do. Q. Who did you give an interview to? A. Lexington Herald and Bill Estep. Q. And where did you all conduct that interview? ■ A. Sugar Creek and Red Bird. Q. And did the reporters actually go out in the mountains with you? A. Yes. Q. And Bill Estep take that picture of you there? A. Yeah. Q. Now, at that time, Mr. Lawson, you hadn’t had any convictions for marijuana growing, had you? A. No. Q. And what kind of a drug business did you have? About how much marijuana were you growing at the height of your business? A. The most, the highest was — I think I made about 350,000 one year. Q. $350,000? A. Yeah. Q. You made that in one year? A. Um-hmm. Q. Growing marijuana, selling it? A. Yes, sir. Yeah. Q. And did you grow all that marijuana in Clay County? A. Yes. Q. And did you sell that marijuana there in Clay County? A. No. I sold it to up north. Q. Did they come from up north to Clay County to get it? A. Yes, they did. Q. And that’s one of your marijuana patches there that you took the reporters to? A. Yeah. Q. What would you average in a year? Would you try to put out so many plants each year? A. Well, the one year I was talking about, I think I got about 300 pound. Q. How many plants do you have to grow to harvest 300 pounds? A. Probably about 2 or 3 thousand. Q. And you grew all these thousands of plants there in Clay County? A. Yes, sir. R. 870 (02/05/2010 Trial Tr. at 45-47, 59) (Page ID # 8394-96, 8408). The government contends that the drug-dealing testimony from Day, Lewis, and Lawson was admitted properly as background evidence because “defendants’ ties to drug dealing helped explain the possible origin of the large amounts of cash addressed at trial, even when the evidence showed ... that defendants turned down money offered by a known drug dealer.” Gov’t Br. at 75. We disagree. Evidence of drug dealing from Day, Lewis, and Lawson does not qualify as background evidence because it is not inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. The evidence does not serve as “a prelude to the charged offense” or “complete the story” because there was no allegation that drug money from Day, Lewis, and Lawson was used to buy votes in the charged conspiracy. Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748. Therefore, there was no causal connection. In Clay, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence relating to an uncharged theft of a handgun from the car of an uninvolved person, Moser. We found the admission was an error: Here, Clay was charged with carjacking and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to the carjacking. In order to convict on both counts, the government had to establish that Clay did in fact brandish a firearm. Eyewitness testimony established that the carjacker used a silver semi-automatic handgun during the incident. Another witness, Abernathy, testified that she saw Clay with a semi-automatic handgun either the day of or the day before the carjacking. The government argues that the evidence of the uncharged theft was necessary to complete the story of the offense and explain how Clay obtained the handgun. This argument is logically flawed. There is no evidence that firmly establishes a relationship between the carjacking and the theft. The gun stolen from Moser’s car was never recovered, and nothing confirms that stolen weapon was the gun Abernathy saw with Clay, or the gun used during the carjacking. Without confirmation that the gun is the same, the car theft is neither a prelude to the charged offense, nor probative of it. It does not arise from the same events as the carjacking; in fact, it is a completely separate and distinct offense that is not essential for providing a “coherent and intelligible description of the charged offense.” McCormick on Evidence § 190 (6th ed.2006). Clay, 667 F.3d. at 698. In the present case, the connection was even weaker. There was no evidence to establish — nor was there even an allegation of — any relationship between drug money from Day, Lewis, and Lawson and the charged conspiracy. Therefore, the evidence was neither a prelude to the charged offense nor was it probative of the charged offense. Furthermore, in Clay, we found an error where the government “had to establish that Clay did in fact brandish a firearm.” Id. Here, the government did not need to establish the source of the funds because it was neither an element of any charged offense nor alleged in the indictment. In contrast, the evidence of vote buying in the 1980s was proper background evidence because it showed how Maride and Adams rose to become political bosses in Clay County, their knowledge of vote buying, and their personal relationship. Such evidence was causally connected to the charged conspiracy because the government alleged that, from 2002 to 2007, Maride and Adams were political bosses, directed others to buy votes, and were involved in a single conspiracy. Unlike the use of evidence of vote buying in the 1980s and 1990s, there was no causal connection between the evidence of drug dealing and the charged conspiracy. The government did not charge defendants with purchasing votes with drug proceeds in the 2002, 2004, and 2006 election cycles. Thus, there was no link between the charged conspiracy and the admitted drug-dealing evidence. Additionally, the details surrounding their drug-dealing operations did not “form[ ] an integral part” of Day’s, Lewis’s, or Lawson’s testimony. Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748. The fact that witnesses Day, Lewis, and Lawson used drug money to buy votes in the 1980s and 1990s might have been an integral part of their testimony if there was an allegation that defendants used money from Day, Lewis, and Lawson to buy votes in the charged conspiracy. Furthermore, as highlighted above, the testimony from Day, Lewis, and Lawson focused on the details of their drug-dealing operations, not the details of using drug money to buy votes. The overwrought details of their marijuana operations were not integral to their testimony and appear to have served one function: to paint defendants in a bad light by “connecting” them to drug dealers. For these reasons, the evidence of drug dealing from Day, Lewis, and Lawson does not comport with this court’s strict limitations on the admission of background evidence. For similar reasons, the evidence is not admissible under Rule 404(b) because the evidence of drug dealing is not “ ‘material’ to matters ‘in issue’ in the case [or] ‘probative’ of them.” United States v. Tasis, 696 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir.2012); see United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir.2003). That is, the government did not need to prove that defendants used drug proceeds to purchase votes during the charged conspiracy because this was not an element of the offense and was not alleged in the indictment. Likewise, defendants did not present a defense that questioned where the vote-buying money came from, which would have put the matter “in issue.” See Tasis, 696 F.3d at 627. Therefore, the drug-dealing testimony was not admissible under Rule 404(b). The government’s other arguments for admissibility under the background-evidence exception or Rule 404(b) are equally unavailing: When Jones sought someone to commit illegal vote buying in Thompson’s race, he turned to Lewis, an individual Jones could trust because of their previous relationship violating the drug laws.... Likewise, the fact that Lawson was a drug dealer whose exploits and status as a nonvoting felon were widely known refuted any suggestion that Bowling was simply seeking legitimate support when he gave Lawson money through an intermediary. Gov’t Br. at 74-75. These explanations show that portions of the above evidence were relevant to an individual's testimony, but they do not explain how the details of Day’s, Lewis’s, and Lawson’s drug-dealing operations qualify as proper background or Rule 404(b) evidence. The government’s last-ditch argument is that the admission of the drug-dealing evidence from Day, Lewis, and Lawson was permissible “to ‘blunt’ forthcoming attacks on [its witnesses’] credibility.” Gov’t Br. at 74 n. 13 (citing United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir.2010)). In Thornton, the prosecution preempted the defense’s efforts to impeach by questioning its own witness about “the charge to which he pled guilty, the statutory penalties and sentencing guideline range he confronted, the reason for his agreement to testify at trial, and the charges which the Government had agreed to dismiss as a result of his cooperation.” 609 F.3d at 377. In the present case, the government went well beyond the line of questioning in Thornton by eliciting testimony from Day regarding the amount of drugs he was selling and the amount of money he was making from such sales. This unnecessary, unfairly prejudicial line of questioning was not admissible to blunt defendants’ forthcoming credibility attack. Even if the evidence was properly admissible as background evidence, under Rule 404(b), or under Thornton, it should have been excluded under Rule 403. The probative value of the relationship between Jones and Lewis is minimal, given that the government’s evidence showed that defendants approached many individuals to buy votes for their slate, and the government did not find it necessary to explain a relationship of trust with many of those individuals. With regard to the government’s explanation for Lawson’s testimony, the fact that money was given to Lawson to buy votes “refuted any suggestion that Bowling was simply seeking legitimate support”; the fact that Lawson was a former drug dealer does not change this. The government’s last argument is the least appealing because evidence of witnesses’ drug dealing in the 1980s and 1990s was not probative of an issue in the case at hand, given that there was no need for the government to explain the source of mone