Full opinion text
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court OPINION OF THE COURT McKEE, Chief Judge. This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court. The City of Hazleton previously appealed the District Court’s judgment permanently enjoining enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the City. In a precedential Opinion and Judgment filed on September 9, 2010, we upheld the permanent injunction. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Hazleton’s petition for a writ of certiorari and remanded this case so that we could reconsider our analysis in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). See City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 563 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2958, 180 L.Ed.2d 243 (2011). Subsequently, the Court also decided Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Both Whiting and Arizona address the extent to which federal immigration law preempts various state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, we asked for supplemental briefing on whether either of those decisions alter our original analysis upholding the District Court’s injunction. Having thoroughly considered the additional submissions of the parties and the Court’s decisions in Whiting and Arizona, we again conclude that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are pre-empted by federal immigration law. Accordingly, we will again affirm the District Court’s order enjoining enforcement of these provisions. I. BACKGROUND The factual and procedural background underlying this case have been extensively described in the District Court’s decision, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477 (M.D.Pa.2007) (“Lozano I”), and our earlier decision, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.2010) (“Lozano II”), vacated and remanded, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2958, 180 L.Ed.2d 243 (2011). Accordingly, we need not reiterate that history as thoroughly as we otherwise would. However, context and clarity require that we first set forth those facts underlying our analysis on remand. This litigation involves a series of immigration ordinances enacted by the City of Hazleton between July 2006 and March 2007. The two ordinances at issue are: (1) the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (“IIRAO”), which consists of Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinance 2006-40, and Ordinance 2007-6; and (2) the Rental Registration Ordinance (“RO”), which consists of Ordinance 2006-13. These ordinances attempt to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens, and the provision of rental housing to aliens lacking lawful immigration- status, within Hazleton. The relevant employment provisions make it unlawful for any person “to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct” any person without work authorization “to perform work in whole or in part within the City.” IIRAO § 4A. The IIRAO also provides for public monitoring and prosecution, and sanctions violators by suspending their business permits. Id. § 4B. “Safe harbor” from the IIRAO’s sanctions is available for businesses that verify work authorization using the federal E-Verify program. Id. § 4B(5). The IIRAO also requires City agencies and certain businesses to enroll in the E-Verify program. Id. §§ 4B(6)(b), 4C, 4D. The disputed housing provisions are found in both the IIRAO and the RO. The IIRAO makes legal immigration status a condition precedent to entering into a valid lease. Id. § 7B. The IIRAO also provides that it is “unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien” is unauthorized. Id. § 5A. “Harboring” is broadly defined to include “let[ting], leasing], or renting] a dwelling unit to an -illegal alien.” Id. § 5A(1). The anti-harboring provisions in the IIRAO operate in conjunction with the rental registration scheme established in the RO. The RO requires that prospective occupants of rental housing over the age of eighteen obtain an occupancy permit. RO §§ lm, 6a, 7b. The application for an occupancy permit requires submission of “[p]roper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency.” Id. § 7b(l)(g). Landlords are prohibited from allowing anyone over the age of eighteen to rent or occupy a rental- unit without an occupancy permit. Id. § 6a. Violators are subject to fines and possible imprisonment. RO § 10. As explained in Lozano II, numerous plaintiffs sued alleging the ordinances were invalid and the District Court permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinances after a two-week bench trial. The court concluded that the ordinances are pre-empted by federal law and contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as a number of state laws limiting the authority of municipalities in Pennsylvania. See Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 181. . We thereafter affirmed the ultimate judgment of the District Court, although we differed in our reasoning. In short, we held that the employment provisions in the IIRAO, though not expressly preempted, are conflict pre-empted, because they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of federal law. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 210-19. We also held that the housing provisions in the IIRAO and RO are invalid because they impermissibly “regulate immigration” and are both field and conflict pre-empted by federal immigration law. Id. at 219-24, As we noted at the outset, after we issued our decision in Lozano II, the Supreme Court granted the City’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of that Court’s intervening decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). In Whiting, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.2009). There, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act against claims of express and implied preemption. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866, 867. After the decision in Whiting, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, — U.S.-, 132 5.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). There, the Court held that three of four challenged provisions of Arizona’s immigration law, known as “S.B. 1070,” were pre-empted. However, the Court overturned a preliminary injunction with respect to the fourth provision and remanded for additional fact finding. III. DISCUSSION The question before us on remand remains whether federal law pre-empts the employment and/or housing provisions of the Hazleton'ordinances. As we explained in Lozano II, “[t]he pre-emption doctrine is a necessary outgrowth of the Supremacy Clause,” which “provides that the laws of the United States ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ ” Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 203 (quoting U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2). Preemption may be either express or implied, and implied pre-emption includes both field preemption and conflict pre-emption. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). Field pre-emption occurs “[wjhen Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field.’ ” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). “The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’ ” Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2501, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine the boundaries that Congress sought to occupy within the field, “ ‘we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.’ ” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1974-75. Conflict pre-emption can occur in one of two ways: where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or “where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle' to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts must utilize their judgment to determine what constitutes an unconstitutional impediment to federal law, and that judgment is “informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288. Nothing the Court said in Whiting or Arizona altered this framework for preemption analysis. The Court, did, however provide important guidance for our application of the pre-emption doctrine to the Hazleton ordinances. The Court upheld Arizona’s efforts to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens through a business licensing law in Whiting, but largely rejected Arizona’s efforts to enact its own immigration policies, both within and outside of the employment context, in Arizona. With those cases as our compass, we now reconsider our prior ruling upholding the District Court’s permanent injunction. A. The Employment Provisions The relevant employment provisions of the IIRAO regulate and prohibit a broad range of economic interactions with unauthorized aliens. Section 4 of the IIRAO renders it “unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct” any person without work authorization “to perform work in whole or in part within the City.” IIRAO § 4A. “Work” is defined to include “any job, task, employment, labor, personal services, or any other activity for which compensation is provided, expected, or due, including but not limited to all activities conducted by business entities.” Id. § 3F. The IIRAO’s prohibitions also apply to any “agreement to perform any service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration.” Id. § 3C. “Every business entity that applies for a business permit” must “sign an affidavit ... affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the services of or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.” Id. § 4A. Any City resident may submit a complaint to Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office (“HCEO”) alleging a violation of the employment provisions. Id. § 4B(1). Upon receipt of such a complaint, the HCEO requests identifying information about the alleged unlawful worker from the employing or contracting business entity. That business entity must then provide the requested information within three business days, or Hazleton will suspend its business license. Id. § 4B(3). The HCEO then submits the identity information to the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, for verification of “the immigration status of such person(s).” Id. If the HCEO confirms that the worker lacks authorization to work in the United States, the business must terminate that worker within three business days or the City will suspend its business license. Id. § 4B(4). A business whose license has been suspended under the IIRAO regains its license one business day after it submits an affidavit affirming that it has terminated the unauthorized worker. Id. § 4B(6). After a second or subsequent violation of the IIRAO, Hazleton suspends the business’s license for a minimum of twenty days and reports the violation to the federal government. Id. § 4B(7). Safe harbor from the IIRAO’s sanctions is available for businesses that verify the work authorization of their workers using the federal E-Verify program. Id. § 4B(5). In addition, the IIRAO requires that City agencies and businesses that contract with the City for amounts greater than $10,000 must enroll in E-Verify. Id. §§ 4C, 4D. Those business entities found to have utilized the work of two or more unlawful workers at one time must enroll in E-Verify in order to recover their license. Id. § 4B(6)(b). We previously held that the IIRAO’s employment provisions, though not expressly pre-empted, are conflict preempted. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 210-19. However, in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011), the Supreme Court upheld an Arizona statute that allowed state courts to suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens and required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify. Accordingly, we will first consider whether our analysis in Lozano II, concluding that the IIRAO conflicts with federal law, survives Whiting. In Whiting, the Supreme Court considered whether the employer sanctions provisions of the Legal Arizona Workers Act (“LAWA”) were pre-empted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1324b). The Court held that those provisions were not expressly pre-empted because they fell “squarely” within the confínes of IRCA’s savings clause. That provision of IRCA “expressly preempts States from imposing ‘civil or criminal sanctions’ on those who employ unauthorized aliens, ‘other than through licensing and similar laws. ’ ” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1977 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)) (emphasis added). The Court also held that Arizona’s licensing law did not conflict with federal law, and therefore was not impliedly pre-empted. Whiting, 181 S.Ct. at 1981-85. The Court noted that the Arizona statute “simply implement[ed] the sanctions that Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through licensing laws,” and “Arizona went the extra mile in ensuring that its law closely tracks IRCA’s provisions in all material respects.” Id. at 1981. The Court in Whiting also held that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.), which established the optional program now known as E-Verify, did not pre-empt Arizona’s requirement that all employers use E-Verify. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1985-86. The Court reasoned that the IIRIRA provision setting up E-Verify “contains no language circumscribing state action,” id. at 1985, and Arizona’s use of E-Verify “in no way obstructs achieving [Congress’s] aims,” id. at 1986. The plurality opinion in Whiting rejected or otherwise undermined several aspects of our analysis in Lozano II insofar as we held that the IIRAO’s employment provisions were conflict pre-empted. First, Whiting contradicts our conclusion that the employment provisions' in Hazleton’s ordinance impede congressional objectives by creating a separate and independent process for determining whether an employer is guilty of employing unauthorized aliens. Compare Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1981 (rejecting the Chamber’s argument that Congress intended the federal system to be exclusive and therefore any state system necessarily conflicts with federal law) with Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 213 (“The crux of this conflict ... is rooted in the fact that Hazleton has established an alternate system,at all”). Since Congress expressly allowed states to pursue sanctions through licensing laws, the Whiting plurality reasoned that “Congress did not intend to prevent the States from using appropriate tools to exercise that authority.” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1981. Second, in Lozano II, we reasoned that, by imposing additional sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized aliens without including an express anti-discrimination provision, the IIRAO would create “the exact situation that Congress feared: a system under which employers might quite rationally choose to err on the side of discriminating against job applicants they perceive to be foreign.” Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 218. However, the Whiting plurality rejected a similar argument. Those Justices reasoned that LAWA did not displace IRCA’s anti-discrimination provisions, arid that other federal and state laws provide “further protection ... and strong incentive for employers not to discriminate.” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1984. Thus, the Court believed that, even without an express anti-discrimination provision in the state law, “[t]he most rational path for employers is to'obey the law — both the law barring the employment of unauthorized aliens and the law prohibiting discrimination.” Id. Finally, the Whiting plurality undermined our reasoning in Lozano II to the extent that we found preemption because the City’s employment provisions “coeree[] [the] use of E-Verify.” Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 214. That conclusion is now foreclosed by Whiting’s approval of Arizona’s requirement that all employers use E-Verify. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1985-86. There, the Court concluded that the requirement does not conflict with the federal scheme because the consequences for failure to use E-Verify under both the Arizona law and federal law were the same: the employer forfeits an otherwise available rebuttable presumption of compliance. Id. The Court further reasoned that the requirement does not obstruct federal objectives because “the Federal Government has consistently expanded and encouraged the use of E-Verify.” Id. at 1986. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs here argue that even after Whiting, Hazleton’s employment provisions remain impliedly preempted. Plaintiffs point first to the fact that the IIRAO’s restrictions apply to a much broader range of actors and activities than Congress intended under IRCA. According to Plaintiffs, this basis for our prior finding of conflict preemption was not disturbed by Whiting. We agree. Section 4 of the IIRAO makes it “unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work ... within the City.” IIRAO § 4A. The IIRAO defines “business entity” to include any person “engaging in any activity, enterprise, profession, or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood, whether for profit or not for profit.”. Id. § 3A. The term specifically includes “self-employed individuals, partnerships,- corporations, contractors, and subcontractors,” Id. § 3A(1), and any entity that “possesses a business permit, ... is exempt from obtaining such a business permit, ... [or] is operating unlawfully without such a business permit.” Id. § 3A(2). In sharp contrast to the IIRAO, the federal prohibition in IRCA reaches only “hirflng]” or “recruiting] or referring] for a fee, for employment in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(l)(A) (emphasis added). In striking the intricate balance that lead to the enactment of IRCA, Congress deliberately excluded independent contractors and other non-employees from the scope of the restrictions contained ■ in the statute. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2504. (“Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens.’ ”) (emphasis added) (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002)). As we explained previously: In drafting IRCA, Congress explicitly declined to sanction employers based on the work authorization status of “casual hires (i.e., those that do not involve the existence of an employer/employee relationship).” H.R.Rep. No. 99-682(1), [at 57], 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661. This was not an unreasoned choice, but part of the crafting of the statute to minimize the burden placed on employers. As the court explained in [Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.] Edmondson, “[e]mployers are not required [under federal law] to .verify the work eligibility of independent contractors” because it “would increase the burdens on business.” 594 F.3d [742] at 767 [(10th Cir.2010)]. Businesses utilize independent contractors, in part, to reduce the costs and liabilities associated with procuring labor when an enduring and structured relationship is not needed. Compelling businesses to concern themselves with the work authorization status of contractors alters this relationship, and also raises costs. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 216-17 (alterations in original). Under IRCA, employers are not required to verify contractors’ work eligibility, as they must with employees. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) (requiring employers to verify work eligibility of employees); § 274a. 1(f) (excluding “independent contractor” and “those engaged in casual domestic employment” from the definition of “employee”); id. § 274a. 1(g) (excluding those who use “contract labor” from the definition of “employer”). Given the intricate framework of IRCA, we cannot assume that the distinction is immaterial. Rather, it appears to be a deliberate distinetion that Congress included as part of the balance it struck in determining the scope and impact of IRCA’s employer sanctions. However, Hazleton’s ordinance does not distinguish between employees, on the one hand, and independent contractors or casual hires, on the other. The breadth of the reach of the IIRAO’s sanctions operates in tandem with the fact that the IIRAO provides a safe harbor only if “prior to the date of the violation, the business entity had verified the work authorization of the alleged unlawful workers)” using the E-Verify program. IIR-AO § 4B(4). Accordingly, the Hazleton scheme compels employers to verify the status of independent contractors and casual hires in order to obtain a safe harbor. In Lozano II, we determined that although the IIRAO only coerces, without directly requiring, verification of non-employees’ work authorization, the coercion is equally problematic for preemption purposes because the IIRAO subjects employers to sanctions if those non-employees lack work authorization. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 217. Moreover, we must assess the extraordinarily broad definition of the persons and entities covered by the IIRAO together with the equally broad definition of the activities covered by the IIRAO. The IIRAO defines “work” to include “any job, task, employment, labor, personal services, or any other activity for which compensation is provided, expected, or due, including but not limited to all activities conducted by business entities.” IIRAO § 3F. The IIRAO’s prohibitions also apply to any “agreement to perform any service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration.” Id. § 3C. Moreover, there is no requirement that the alleged unauthorized work be performed at the location associated with an entity’s business license, or even in connection with the activities for which an entity has a business license, for it to be considered a violation of the IIRAO. Thus, under a literal reading of the IIRAO, the HCEO may revoke the business license of any person or entity if, for example, s/he purchases used items at a yard sale from an unauthorized alien, buys a glass of lemonade from an undocumented child’s lemonade stand, or pays an undocumented neighbor to mow her lawn — even if such conduct is entirely unrelated to the actor’s licensed business activity. Indeed, it is difficult for us to conceive of any activity that is even remotely economic in nature, conducted by any person or entity in Hazleton, that would not be swept into the broad expanse of the IIRAO. We believe that prohibiting such a broad array of commercial interactions, based solely on immigration status, under the guise of a “business licensing” law is untenable in light of Congress’s deliberate decision to limit IRCA’s reach to the employer-employee relationship. Whiting is not to the contrary. The City argues that the Court in Whiting was not troubled by the fact that Arizona’s law applied to independent contractors. However, the provisions to which the City refers were added as part of a 2008 amendment to LAWA, and as the Supreme Court expressly noted, the 2008 amendments “were not part of the statute when [the] suit was brought, they are not before us and we do not address their interaction with federal law.” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1986 n. 10; see also Arizona Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1053 (D.Ariz.2008) (“[L]ike IRCA, [LAWA’s] restrictions apply only with respect to those persons who have an ‘employment relationship’ with an employer, so it does not include casual hires.”), aff'd sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.2009), aff'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). Thus, unlike the IIRAO, the Arizona law upheld by the Supreme Court “closely track[ed] IRCA’s provisions in all material respects,” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1981, including IRCA’s precisely tailored reach. Thus, Whiting alone does not support the proposition that an ordinance that diverges from federal law to the extent the IIRAO does is similarly sheltered from the reach of federalpre-emption. The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012), further undermines the contention that the IIRAO should be upheld as a protected business licensing law. The Court in Arizona affirmed that “the existence of an express pre-emption provisio[n] does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles or impose a special burden that would make it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2504-05 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). Moreover, the Court’s reasons for finding that § 5(C) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 law conflicted with IRCA apply with equal force to the IIRAO’s attempt to extend its regulations beyond the employer-employee relationship. Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 made it a state crime to seek or engage in work without federal authorization. In concluding that that provision was pre-empted, the Supreme Court stated, “Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens,’ ” and IRCA, by design, “does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee'side (ie., penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized work).” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2504. Thus, the Court concluded that “[although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law — the deterrence of unlawful employment — it involves a conflict in the method of enforeement” and is therefore pre-empted. Id. at 2505. Just as purposely as Congress limited the scope of IRCA’s coverage to exclude independent contractors, Hazleton purposely stretched the IIRAO to include them. The result is a local ordinance that conflicts with Congress’s intent to limit IRCA’s application to the employer/employee relationship. See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2505 (“[A] ‘[e]onflict in technique can. be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.’ ” (citing Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971))). Accordingly, like § 5(C) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the IIRAO employment provisions conflict with IRCA. In Lozano II, we also concluded that the IIRAO conflicts with IRCA because it does not provide an affirmative defense to employers who comply with the 1-9 process to verify immigration status. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 214-15. Plaintiffs argue that this conclusion was also not disturbed by Whiting because the Arizona law at issue there provided a safe harbor for 1-9 compliance. Once again, we agree. As we have explained: Congress paid considerable attention to the costs IRCA would impose on employers, see e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 99-682(1), at [90], 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5694 (“Considerable discussion was generated during the processing of [this bill] to the effect the employer sanctions provisions were placing an undue burden on employei’s in requiring them to do the paperwork and keep records on employees.”), and drafted the legislation in a manner that would minimize those burdens, see, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H1058301 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bryant) (IRCA has been “carefully designed for the minimum burden necessary ... to be effective”). Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 211. As part of this effort, Congress created the 1-9 process as a uniform federal system by which employers must verify the work authorization of néw hires. Under IRCA, good-faith compliance with the 1-9 process provides an employer with an affirmative defense if charged with a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3); H.R.Rep. No..99-682(1), at 57. However, Hazleton’s scheme does not provide any safe harbor for employers who use the 1-9 process. The IIRAO’s employment provi7 sions thus contravene congressional intent for the 1-9 process to serve as an acceptable way of protecting against sanctions and Congress’s desire to avoid placing an undue burden on employers. As we previously explained: By making the 1-9 system a uniform national requirement, Congress limited the compliance burden on interstate corporations while facilitating uniform enforcement. A uniform system reduces costs for employers with multiple locations throughout the country by ensuring that the same human resources procedures can be used in all locations. Hazleton’s scheme denies interstate employers who use the 1-9 process the benefits of uniformity. Interstate employers with locations in Hazleton (who wish to ensure safe harbor in all locations) would either have to adhere to different regulations in different locations, or use E-Verify in all locations. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 215 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Supreme Court in Whiting upheld Arizona’s requirement that all employers enroll in E-Verify, the Court’s holding did not negate the importance of the 1-9 process to the federal scheme. Rather, the Court’s holding was based upon its conclusion that “the consequences of not using E-Verify under the Arizona law are the same as ... under the federal law,” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1985, and “[t]he Arizona law provides employers with the same affirmative defense for good-faith compliance with the 1-9 process as does the federal law,” id. at 1982. Thus, although Arizona “required” employers to use E-Verify, that “requirement” was exactly the same as the federal law’s treatment of E-Verify, and similarly, Arizona treated 1-9 compliance the same way that federal law treated 1-9 compliance. The City argues that the lack of an affirmative defense for 1-9 compliance is irrelevant given the structure of the Hazleton scheme, which does not rely on a judicial process for proving that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien and assessing a penalty. In addition to highlighting procedural due process concerns, this assertion elevates form over function and misses the point. The significance of the 1-9 affirmative defense is the safe harbor it provides for employers. We .are therefore not impressed with a distinction between judicially imposed sanctions and administratively imposed sanctions. The resulting impact on a given business appears indistinguishable. Whether a judicial officer or an administrator is charged with imposing sanctions is irrelevant. The City insists that the drafters of Hazleton’s ordinances attempted to construct a parallel regulatory scheme that would comply with IRCA’s savings clause. However, the City’s decision to omit a safe harbor for I-9 compliance, while providing one for those who use E-Verify, see IIRAO § 4B(5), is not as inconsequential as the City would have us believe. A scheme providing a safe harbor for both verification procedures would have been much closer to the parallel regulatory scheme that the Court upheld in Whiting. Absent that, an important aspect of the federal scheme is undermined. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000), further illustrates how Hazleton’s disregard of the 1-9 process impedes federal objectives. There, Alexis Geier suffered serious injuries when the Honda she was driving crashed into a tree. She sued the auto company alleging that her injuries resulted from the absence of airbags, which she claimed was a design defect. Id. at 865,120 S.Ct. 1913. However, Geier’s car had automatic belts and thus complied with applicable federal safety standards, which, rather than requiring airbags, “allow[ed] manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies.” Id. at 878, 120 S.Ct. 1913. The applicable federal statute, however, also stated that “[cjompliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt any person from liability under common law.” Id. at 868, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (internal quotation marks omitted, bracket in original). Nonetheless, the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs claim for damages was pre-empted by federal law. The Court had to decide “whether the Act pre-empts a state common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the ... manufacturer, who was in compliance with the standard, should nonetheless have equipped [her] automobilé with airbags.” Id. at 865,120 S.Ct. 1913. ' The Supreme Court held that the tort action conflicted with federal law and was thus pre-empted. Id. at 874, 120 S.Ct. 1913. The Court reasoned that federal regulations sought “a variety and mixture of [safety] devices” and “deliberately imposed” a “gradual passive restraint phase in.” Id. at 881, 120 S.Ct. 1913. Notwithstanding the savings clause, allowing the action to proceed when plaintiffs car complied with -the applicable federal safety standard “would have stood ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of [those] important ... federal objectives.’ ” Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399). Similarly, permitting Hazleton to impose sanctions on employers who have complied with, and relied upon, the 1-9 process would obstruct important federal objectives. Congress wanted to make the 1-9 process available as a uniform means of protecting against such sanctions and minimizing the burden on employers. See also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (finding conflict preemption where state law limited the availability of due-on-sale provisions in loan instruments, which federal regulators deemed “essential to the economic soundness of the thrift industry”). The IIRAO’s lack of procedural protections presents yet another “‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’” of federal law. See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399). The IIRAO provides substantially fewer procedural protections than IRCA, which circumscribed sanctions with a detailed hearing and adjudication procedure. Under IRCA, only complaints with a “substantial probability of validity” are investigated. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(l)(B). In contrast, under the IIRAO, any superficially valid complaint is investigated. IIRAO §§ 4B(1), (3). In addition, when enacting IRCA, Congress mandated that an employer be provided with notice and an opportunity for a hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3)(A), and an administrative law judge must find the employer guilty of violating IRCA by a preponderance of the evidence before any sanctions can be imposed, id. § 1324a(e)(3)(C). That employer also has a right to an administrative appeal and judicial review. Id. § 1324a(e)(7)-(8). In marked contrast, the IIRAO requires the HCEO to immediately suspend the business license of any entity that fails to provide requested information about alleged unlawful workers within three business days. IIRAO § 4B(3). If a business entity does not terminate an unauthorized worker within three days of being notified that the worker is not authorized, the City immediately suspends that entity’s business license. Id. § 4B(4). Thus, the burdens imposed on businesses under the Hazleton scheme are greater than those Congress elected to impose under the similar, but distinct approach of IRCA. The procedures in LAWA (the Arizona statute upheld in Whiting), substantially track the procedures Congress established under IRCA. In contrast to the immediate suspension of business licenses authorized by the IIRAO, sanctions under LAWA, like under IRCA, could only be imposed after the attorney general or county attorney brings an enforcement action in state court. A.R.S. § 23-212(D) (effective Sept. 19, 2007 to Apr. 30, 2008). The state court was directed to provide a “hearing at the earliest practicable date,” id. § 22-212(E), and sanctions could only be imposed by the court after determining that there had been a violation, id. § 23-212(F). Conversely, the lack of procedural protections in the IIRAO’s employment provisions undermines the delicate balance Congress erected for enforcing, the prohibition on hiring unauthorized aliens. Congress was clearly concerned with avoiding undue burdens on employers. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 56, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757 (describing desire for employer sanctions to be implemented in a manner that “would be the least disruptive to the American businessman”); S.Rep. No. 99-132, at 35 (1985), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5857 (expressing concern regarding “harassment ... against innocent employers” and noting that “[sjpecific protections have been included to minimize the risk of these undesirable results”). As the Supreme Court noted, “Congress did indeed seek to strike a balance among a variety of interests when it enacted IRCA.” Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1984. It is therefore apparent that the lack of minimal procedural protections in Hazleton’s ordinance further undermines the express congressional objective of minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers. Accordingly, although the Court’s recent decisions in Whiting and Arizona alter some of our previous analysis, neither opinion alters the outcome of this dispute. For the reasons we have set forth above, we again hold that the employment provisions of the IIRAO" are pre-empted because they “stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution” of IRCA’s objectives, Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, and were properly enjoined by the District Court. B. The Housing Provisions The housing provisions at issue in this litigation are found in both the IIRAO and the RO. The RO sets up a rental registration scheme that operates in conjunction with anti-harboring provisions in the IIR-AO to prohibit unauthorized aliens from residing in any rental housing within the City. The RO requires any prospective occupant of rental housing over the age of eighteen to apply for and receive an occupancy permit. RO § lm, 6a, 7b. To receive the permit, the prospective occupant must pay a ten-dollar fee and submit certain basic information and “[p]roper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency” to the HCEO. Id. § 7b. Landlords must inform all prospective occupants of this requirement, and landlords are prohibited from allowing anyone over the age of eighteen to rent or occupy a rental unit without registering with the City and receiving a permit. Id. § 6a, 7b. A landlord found guilty of violating these requirements must pay an initial fine of $1000 per unauthorized occupant. Id. § 10b. That landlord is also subject to an additional fine of $100 per day, per unauthorized occupant, until the violation is corrected. Authorized occupants of rental housing who allow anyone without an occupancy permit to reside with them are subject to the same fines. Id. § 10c. As we mentioned earlier, the anti-harboring provisions in the IIRAO make legal immigration status a condition precedent to entering into a valid lease. IIRAO § 7B. A tenant lacking lawful status “who enters into such a contract shall be deemed to have breached a condition of the lease.” Id. The IIRAO makes it “unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law.” Id. § 5A. “Harboring” is broadly defined to include “let[ting], leasing], or renting] a dwelling unit to an illegal alien.” Id. § 5A(1). An “illegal alien” is defined as “an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States, according to the terms of United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq.” Id. § 3D. We previously found the housing provisions in the IIRAO and the RO pre-empted on three separate pre-emption grounds. No part of Whiting or Arizona considered provisions of a state or local ordinance that, like the housing provisions here, prohibit, and define “harboring” to include, allowing unauthorized aliens to reside in rental housing. Moreover, nothing in Whiting or Arizona undermines our analysis of the contested housing provisions here. On the contrary, the Court’s language reinforces our view that Hazleton’s attempt to prohibit unauthorized aliens from renting dwelling units in the City are pre-empted. 1. The Housing Provisions Constitute Impermissible Regulation of Immigration and Are Field Pre-empted. We begin this part of our analysis by noting that the Supreme Court was careful in Arizona to stress the important national interests that are implicated when local governments attempt to regulate immigration and the concomitant need to leave such regulation in the hands of the federal government. The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2498. In finding three of the four challenged provisions in Arizona pre-empted, the Court reiterated the primacy of the federal government’s concern for the treatment and regulation of aliens in this country. In Lozano II, we held that the housing provisions impermissibly “regulate immigration” in contravention of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that a state or locality may not determine “ “who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal éntrant may remain.’ ” Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 933). In concluding that the housing provisions constituted impermissible regulation of immigration, we recognized that “the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration.” De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 933. We did not hold that the housing provisions were a regulation of immigration simply because “aliens are the subject of’ those provisions. Rather, we determined that “[tjhrough its housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on immigration status.” Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220 (emphasis added). Thus, we concluded that enforcement of the housing provisions must be enjoined because “[d]eciding which aliens may live in the United States has always been the prerogative of the federal government.” Id. The . housing provisions of Hazleton’s ordinances are nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to regulate residency under the guise of a regulation of rental housing. By barring aliens lacking lawful immigration status from rental housing in Hazleton, the housing provisions go to the core of an alien’s residency. States and localities have no power to regulate residency based on immigration status. For these same reasons, we also concluded that the housing provisions are field pre-empted by the 'INA. That statute is centrally concerned with “ ‘the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully admitted.’ ” Id. (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. 933). The INA’s comprehensive scheme “plainly precludes state efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate residence in this country based on immigration status.” Id. We noted that although Hazleton’s housing provisions do not control actual physical entry into, or expulsion from, Hazleton or the United States, “in essence, that is precisely what they attempt to do.” Id. at 220 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Again, we see nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Whiting or Arizona that undermines these conclusions. Since our decision in Lozano II, a number of courts have concluded that state or local laws proscribing the harboring of aliens lacking lawful status are also field preempted because they intrude on the field of alien harboring. See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263-65 (11th Cir.2012) (“GLAHR ”) (concluding that federal law occupies the field with respect to “the entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the United States” and state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring is field pre-empted); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2012) (same), cert. denied, 569 U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2022, 185 L.Ed.2d 905 (2013); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.Supp.2d 463, 468 (D.S.C.2012) (concluding that provisions of state law proscribing transporting or sheltering aliens lacking lawful status “infringe upon a comprehensive federal statutory scheme”), aff'd, 720 F.3d 518, 2013 WL 3803464 (4th Cir. July 23, 2013); Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, 2012 WL 8021265, at *5 (D.Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012) (concluding that state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring of aliens lacking lawful status is field pre-empted). As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained: The INA provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(i )(A)(ii)-(iv), it is a federal crime for any person to transport or move an unlawfully present alien within the United States; to conceal, harbor, or shield an unlawfully present alien from detection; or to encourage or induce an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” ... Section 1324(c) permits local law enforcement officers to arrest for these violations of federal law, but the federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute for these crimes and interpret the boundaries of the federal statute. See id. § 1329. Subsection (d) of § 1324 further dictates evidentiary rules governing prosecution of one of its enumerated offenses, and subsection (e) goes so far as to mandate a community outreach program to “educate the public in the United States and abroad about the penalties for bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section.” GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1263-64. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit and other courts that have held that “the federal government has clearly expressed more than a ‘peripheral concern’ with the entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the United States and the breadth of these laws illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field.” Id. at 1264 (citation omitted). The City argues that, by authorizing state and local officials to arrest individuals guilty of harboring, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c), Congress specifically invited state and local governments into this field. According to the City, this “invitation”— along with the requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1373 that federal agencies respond to inquiries from states and localities regarding any alien’s immigration status — forecloses any argument that the housing provisions are field pre-empted. However, while § 1324(c) allows state officials to arrest for violations of crimes enumerated in that section, the federal statute does not authorize states to prosecute those crimes. Instead, under federal law, the prosecution of such violations must take place in federal court and is at the sole discretion of federal officials. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329. “In the absence of a savings clause permitting state regulation in the field, the inference from these enactments is that the role of the state is limited to arrest for violations of federal [anti-harboring] law.” GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1264. For the reasons explained above, we-again hold that the housing provisions in the IIRAO and RO constitute an impermissible regulation of immigration and are field preempted because they intrude on the regulation of residency and presence of aliens in the United States and the occupied field of alien harboring. 2. The Housing Provisions Are Conflict Pre-empted. In Lozano II, we concluded that the housing provisions are also conflict pre-empted because they interfere with the federal government’s discretion in, and control over, the removal process. The exercise of that discretion implicates important foreign policy considerations. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. We also concluded that the housing provisions are inconsistent with federal anti-harboring law. Again, the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have not undermined our reasoning. In fact, as suggested above and explained below, the Court’s subsequent decisions reinforce our prior conflict pre-emption analysis with respect to the housing provisions. In Arizona, the Court emphasized that “[a] principle feature of the [INA’s] removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. “Federal officials ..,. must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all [and,] [i]f removal proceedings are commenced, [whether] aliens may seek —discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal.” Id. Yet, by prohibiting the only realistic housing option many aliens have, Hazleton is clearly trying to prohibit unauthorized aliens from living within -the City. As we explained in Lozano II, the housing provisions, in effect, constitute an attempt to remove persons from the City based entirely on a snapshot of their current immigration status. Accordingly, the housing provisions interfere with the federal government’s discretion in deciding whether and when to initiate removal proceedings. See Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 221-22. Indeed, interference with the federal removal process and the discretion entrusted to the Executive Branch are key reasons for the Supreme Court’s conclusions that § 6 and § 3 of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 law are conflict pre-empted. The Court reached that conclusion even though neither provision purports to physically remove any aliens from Arizona or the United States. In affirming an injunction against § 6, which would have given Arizona police authority to arrest an individual based on probable cause to believe the individual has committed a removable ■ offense, the Court' determined that' the provision “would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy,” which could result in “unnecessary harassment of some aliens ... whom federal officials determine should not be removed.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2506. The Court also found that “[b]y authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principles that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.” Id. Similarly, in invalidating § 3, which criminalized failure to carry an alien registration document in violation of federal law, the Court noted that, in addition to intruding on a field occupied by Congress, the provision also conflicts with federal law because it would give Arizona the power to act “even in circumstances where federal officials ... determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.” Id. at 2503. The same infirmities are evident here. Like the preempted provisions in Arizona, the housing provisions constitute an attempt to unilaterally attach additional consequences to a person’s immigration status with no regard for the federal scheme, federal enforcement priorities, or the discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General. Congress has not banned persons who lack lawful status or proper documentation from obtaining rental or any other type of housing in the United States. Hazleton’s decision to impose this “distinct, unusual and extraordinary burden[ ] ... upon aliens” impermissibly intrudes into the realm of federal authority. Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-66, 61 S.Ct. 399. Through the housing provisions, Hazleton is seeking to achieve “its own immigration policy,” one which will certainly result in “unnecessary harassment of some aliens ... whom federal' officials determine should not be removed.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2506. Hazleton may not unilaterally prohibit those lacking lawful status from living within its boundaries, without regard for the Executive Branch’s enforcement and policy priorities. “If every other state enacted similar legislation to overburden the lives of aliens, the immigration scheme would be turned on its head.” United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1295 n. 21. Accordingly, the housing provisions conflict with federal law. In addition to undermining the comprehensive procedures under which federal officials determine whether an alien may remain in this country, Hazleton’s housing provisions would create significant foreign policy and humanitarian concerns. As the Court in Arizona emphasized, federal decisions in this arena “touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice.” Id. at 2506-07. “ ‘One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships ... has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.’ ” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2498-99 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 64, 61 S.Ct. 399). “It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate states.” Id. at 2498. In addition, “[p]erceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.” Id. Accordingly, “[sjome discretionary decisions [in the enforcement of immigration law] involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations,” and the exercise of such discretion “embraces immediate human concerns.” Id. at 2499. “Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.” Id. The Supreme Court’s recognition of the primacy of the national interest in regulations directly affecting aliens in this country reinforces our holding in Lozano II that Hazleton’s attempt to regulate where aliens can live implicates strong national interests and must be done with a single voice. Other federal courts that have addressed this issue agree that attempts to proscribe harboring or restrict certain forms of housing for aliens lacking lawful immigration status are conflict preempted. Similarly, when the issue has been presented in the context of a preliminary injunction, courts have found a substantial likelihood of conflict pre-emption for reasons similar to those we have described. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, at 534-36, 537-38, 2013 WL 3791664, at *8, *10 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en banc) (concluding that local housing ordinance analogous to Hazleton’s housing provisions conflicts with federal anti-harboring law and federal removal procedures); GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1265-67 (concluding that state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring aliens lacking lawful status “presents an obstacle to the execution of the federal statutory scheme and challenges federal supremacy in the realm of immigration”); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1287-88 (same); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.Supp.2d at 468 (concluding that provisions' of state law proscribing transporting or sheltering aliens lacking lawful status would interfere with federal enforcement discretion), aff'd, 720 F.3d 518, 2013 WL 3803464 (4th Cir. July 23, 2013); Valle del Sol, 2012 WL 8021265, at *6 (concluding that state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring of aliens lacking lawful status conflicts with federal law because it interferes with federal enforcement discretion); Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F.Supp.2d 959, 972-73 (D.Neb.2012), rev’d, 719 F.3d 931, 2013 WL 3242111 (8th Cir. June 28, 2013) (concluding that city ordinance penalizing harboring or the lease or rental of dwelling Units to aliens lacking lawful status would impair “the structure Congress has established for classification, adjudication, and potential removal of aliens”). Despite the obvious trespass into matters that must be left to the national sovereign, the City continues to insist there is no conflict pre-emption because it is merely engaging in “concurrent enforcement” of federal immigration laws. Under that theory, virtually any local jurisdiction could prohibit activity that is also prohibited by federal law as long as the local prohibition is not expressly pre-empted and the locality is not acting in a field that is occupied by federal law. The City cites to a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of its contention: “Where state enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory interests concurrent enforcement activity is authorized.” Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir.1983), overruled, by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.1999). However, that argument collapses under its own weight. It requires that local enforcement activity not impair federal regulatory interests. It says nothing about the propriety of concurrent enforcement when the local enforcement does impair federal regulatory interests; yet, that is the situation here. Moreover, the City’s argument simply cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona. There, the Court reasoned that “[although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law — the deterrence of unlawful employment — it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2505. The Court went on to explain that it had previously “recognized that a ‘[conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.’” Id. (quoting Motor Coach Employees, 403 U.S. at 287, 91 S.Ct. 1909). Thus, the Court found § 5(C) pre-empted even though the provision imposed sanctions only on conduct already prohibited under federal law. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the housing provisions are not “concurrent” with federal law, despite Hazleton’s argument to the contrary. In addition to interfering with federal removal discretion, the housing provisions conflict with federal law because they define “harboring” to include simple landlord-tenant relationships. Although the Supreme Court has yet to define “harboring” as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii), we have found that culpability requires some act of concealment from authorities. See Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 223. “We ... define ‘harboring’ as conduct ‘tending to substantially facilitate an alien’s remaining in the Un