Full opinion text
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Former San Juan Municipal Police Officers Raquel Delgado-Marrero (“Delgado”) and Ángel Rivera-Claudio (“Rivera”) were convicted by a jury on drug and gun charges arising from an FBI reverse sting operation called “Operation Guard Shack.” They each received a fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Delgado and Rivera raise multiple challenges, claiming both trial and sentencing errors by the district court. They each seek either a new trial or resen-tencing. Our discussion begins with Delgado’s contention that the district court committed reversible error by excluding the testimony of a defense witness. Because we agree with Delgado that the district court erred on this front, and that a new trial is needed to mend the error, we do not address any of her other appellate challenges. With respect to Rivera, we agree that his sentence cannot withstand the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Applying Alleyne retroactively, we find that the district court plainly erred in articulating the jury instructions imparted in connection with a post-verdict special jury form. We further find that Rivera’s other claims of error ultimately fail. The necessary details follow, with a recitation of “the facts in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir.1995). I. Background A. Operation Guard Shack The FBI launched “Operation Guard Shack” as part of its efforts to combat police corruption throughout Puerto Rico. As relevant here, the FBI hired a Puerto Rico Police officer (“Officer I”) to pose undercover as a corrupt policeman with close ties to a mid-to-high-level local drug dealer. Officer I’s main responsibility was to recruit fellow police officers willing to provide armed security during a staged “multi-kilo” drug transaction. The FBI also hired another undercover Puerto Rico Police officer, “Officer II,” to play the role of the dealer during the staged drug transaction. Delgado and Rivera were working partners stationed at the Antillas Police Precinct in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Delgado, a divorced mother of two, had no prior criminal record. She began her career as a municipal police officer in her late twenties. Before her arrest in 2010, Delgado had enjoyed five years of experience on the force, had never been the subject of an administrative complaint, and had received the award of “Municipal Police Woman of 2009.” For his part, Rivera, who was twenty-four years old at the time of his arrest, enjoyed four years of experience in the municipal police force and, like Delgado, had untarnished criminal and administrative records. Officer I reached out to Delgado sometime in the middle of 2009 as part of his undercover role as a corrupt policeman. Officer I knew Delgado from childhood. They grew up near each other, were middle-school classmates, and had once shared a close-knit circle of friends. After middle school, however, Officer I and Delgado went their separate ways and eventually lost touch with each other. More than a decade later, Officer I identified Delgado as a possible target of Operation Guard Shack during a conversation with her ex-husband, who had asked to meet with him for an unrelated personal matter. During the meeting, when Officer I asked about Delgado, her ex-husband told him that they were no longer together and that Delgado had several part-time jobs providing nighttime door security at veterinarian clinics as well as some pubs. Delgado’s ex-husband also shared with Officer I his distaste for Delgado’s part-time jobs, stating that he was concerned that the jobs were in unsafe locations. According to his testimony at trial, Officer I understood the ex-husband’s concerns to mean that Delgado was part-timing in places where drug-trafficking activities occurred. Officer I asked for Delgado’s phone number during a second meeting with her ex-husband. Soon thereafter, he called her to see whether she was in fact doing part-time jobs at questionable locations. Although the FBI had instructed that phone conversations with Operation Guard Shack targets be recorded, Officer I testified at trial that he was unable to record the first call with Delgado because he made it while on duty, with fellow officers nearby. Another unrecorded phone call took place shortly thereafter; Officer I testified that he could not record that conversation because some of his family members were nearby when he placed the call. Officer I recorded a phone conversation with Delgado for the first time on July 20, 2009. The transcript of that conversation reflects that Officer I had previously invited Delgado, and she had agreed, to participate in a drug transaction, in which Delgado and an unnamed fellow officer would provide security in exchange for $2,000 each. Officer I recorded a second call with Delgado on July 23, 2009. This time, as depicted in the call’s transcript, Officer I explained to Delgado that the transaction would take place inside a house; that Delgado and the fellow officer’s job was simply to frisk two people that would come to pick up the “kilos”; that the job would begin at 8:00 p.m. and would last thirty minutes to an hour; and that Officer I would personally direct Delgado on how to get to the house. B. The Sham, Transaction The sham drug transaction took place the next day. With the assistance of Officer I, who provided final minute-by-minute directions by phone, Delgado and Rivera arrived at the apartment in the municipality of Dorado, Puerto Rico, where the “transaction” was to take place. Officer I and Officer II waited in the apartment, where the FBI had placed hidden cameras and microphones in order to record the events. Also in the apartment was a duf-fle bag containing the purported drugs underlying the sham transaction — seven packages, or “bricks,” that the FBI had prepared to resemble one-kilogram blocks of actual cocaine. The video recording of the “transaction” begins when Delgado and Rivera step into the apartment. Officer I, Delgado, and Rivera enter in full view of a hidden camera that was recording the entry door and foyer area of the apartment. To the left of the entry door is a kitchen, and Officer I offers drinks to Delgado and Rivera. Delgado takes a soda and Rivera a beer. Officer I then ushers them into a living room, where Officer II, in his role as a drug dealer, sits in the middle of a large L-shaped sectional sofa. Another hidden camera captures the moment when Officer I, Delgado, and Rivera come into the living room. Officer I and Rivera sit on the sofa where Officer II awaits seated. Delgado asks where the bathroom is and steps out of the camera’s range. While Delgado is in the bathroom, Officer I and Officer II engage Rivera in friendly banter. Among other things, they ask Rivera about the type of gun given to the municipal police. Rivera states that he dislikes the old, secondhand gun he was provided, and, upon further probing from Officer I, retrieves the gun from underneath his jacket, waves it in the air so that the others can see it, and tucks it back in. Officer I and Officer II also show Rivera the gun each is carrying. When Delgado returns from the bathroom, the gun-related discussion continues, and she also shows her official gun, which she was carrying inside her waistband, hidden underneath her shirt. Delgado then sits down on the sofa between Rivera and Officer II. The friendly banter continues for half an hour, including remarks about Delgado’s birthday party, which is happening later that night. The conversation is interrupted when the purported drug buyer knocks at the door. Immediately, Officer II instructs Rivera to open the door and to make sure that nobody enters the apartment armed. Rivera picks up a set of keys from the coffee table in front of the sofa and leaves to open the door. Officer I gets up and signals Delgado to follow him in order to assist Rivera. She gets up and follows Officer I out of the living room. The hidden camera recording the area of the entry door captures Rivera approaching. He opens the door and orders the purported drug buyer to stand still and proceeds to frisk him. Finding no weapons on the newcomer, Rivera walks him to the living room. There, the purported buyer greets Officer II and sits down on the sofa, and Officer I and Rivera return to their seats. Delgado remains standing and goes in and out of the camera’s frame, but her voice can sometimes be heard as she participates in the conversation. The friendly banter continues exactly where it left off. It is interrupted approximately fifteen minutes later, when the purported buyer tells Officer II to bring him the “stuff” because he is leaving. Officer II then casually tells Rivera to call an elevator that is apparently nearby, while at the same time signaling to him the direction of the elevator he is referring to. Rivera gets up from the sofa and walks away from the hidden camera’s view. Officer II then tells Rivera, who is still out of view but apparently in the living room, to wait for the elevator doors to open and to hand what is inside the elevator to the buyer. A few seconds later, Rivera comes back carrying a duffle bag. He hands it to the buyer, and sits down on the sofa next to him. Though the coffee table in front of the sofa blocks the camera’s view, it appears that the purported buyer places the bag on the floor, between his legs, and opens it. He takes two packages out of the bag and stacks them on top of the coffee table. He does the same with two additional packages. He next seems to fiddle with something in the bag. Rivera remains seated to the right of the buyer. Delgado is still standing and does not appear in the video at this moment. One of Delgado’s hands, which holds a cellular phone, comes into the camera’s frame briefly a few times. Her voice can also be heard ■ during the conversation, so it is safe to conclude that she remains somewhere in the living room. The jovial atmosphere continues. Approximately a minute after placing the four packages on the coffee table, the purported buyer places them back into the duffle bag, closes it, stands up, places the carrying strap of the bag on his left shoulder, shakes hands with everyone, and walks to the entry door escorted by Rivera. Delgado stays in the living room chatting with Officer I and Officer II. When Rivera returns, Delgado goes to the bathroom a second time. A new round of banter begins with Rivera, Officer I, and Officer II sitting around the sofa. Delgado joins in when she returns from the bathroom, though her attention often centers on her cellular phone, as she appears to be exchanging text messages with someone. A few minutes into the conversation, Officer II instructs Officer I to go get the “guys’ stuff.” Officer I walks out of the living room, away from the hidden camera’s view. He appears back in the video a minute later holding two beers in his left hand and a stack of money in his right. He places the two beers on the coffee table in front of Rivera and Delgado, then sits down on the sofa to the left of Officer II. Between jokés and laughter, Officer I counts the money, eventually handing $1,000 in $20 bills to Rivera. Rivera counts the money given to him. Officer I and Rivera follow the same routine until $4,000 in cash exchanges hands. Upon Officer II’s inquiry, Delgado and Rivera state that they are available to do a second job later on. They are still on the sofa, jovially chatting with Officer I and Officer II, when the video recording from the camera in the living room cuts off. The video recording from the hidden camera in the entry area cuts off around the same time. One hour and a few minutes have lapsed since Delgado and Rivera stepped into the apartment. C. The Arrest and Trial The FBI arrested Delgado and Rivera on October 6, 2010, pursuant to a four-count indictment. Count One alleged that Delgado and Rivera knowingly and intentionally conspired to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Count Two charged that Delgado and Rivera aided and abetted each other in an attempt to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of §§ 841 and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts Three and Four alleged that Delgado and Rivera, respectively, knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking crimes charged in Counts One and Two, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). At trial, the government presented three witnesses: Officer I, Officer II, and the FBI special agent (the “Special Agent”) who prepared the apartment and the duf-fle bag for the transaction. It also introduced into evidence (1) the two recorded phone calls between Officer I and Delgado; (2) the video recording of the transaction; and (3) five pictures of the duffle bag containing the “bricks” before the FBI placed it in the Dorado apartment. The government’s theory was that the video recording of the transaction spoke for itself and showed guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all counts. In her defense, Delgado argued entrapment. She presented her own testimony and the testimony of her ex-husband. In support of her entrapment defense, Delgado testified that for approximately one month, she rejected Officer I’s persistent invitations of part-time employment; that during this period, Officer I called her repeatedly and sometimes took her out on dates; that she had romantic, sexual affairs with Officer I in 2005 and 2009; that weeks after the transaction, Officer I took her out on a date during which they had sexual intercourse; and that Officer I preyed on their long-lasting friendship and trust to overcome her expressed and firm resistence to participate in the transaction. Despite this reluctance, Delgado testified that she finally gave into Officer I’s insistent pressure. She further explained that she contacted her partner, Rivera, and that they “decided to go to the place” where the part-time job organized by Officer I was to be held. She stated that, following directions from Officer I, she asked for $2, 000 each — for herself and Rivera — in exchange for their roles in the deal; that Rivera drove her to the apartment depicted in the video; and that the two partners entered the apartment together with Officer I. She admitted that she was. aware that the “bricks” involved in the transaction were narcotics and that she was doing something wrong, but she maintained that she only participated in the transaction because of Officer I’s insistence, because of the “sentimental or romantic relationship” she had with him, and because of her trust in him. In further support of her entrapment defense, Delgado sought to present the testimony of Brenda Rosa-Valentin (“Rosa-Valentin”), the younger sister of a fellow policeman Officer I grew up with and considered a dear friend. But on an objection by the government, the court decided to hear her testimony outside the presence of the jury, and ultimately ruled it inadmissable extrinsic evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). Rivera neither took the stand nor presented any witnesses in his defense. During opening statements, Rivera’s counsel told the jury that he intended to show that Rivera “was not guilty of conspiracy as charged in the Indictment,” and that Rivera had no intention of participating in the transaction before Officer I lured Delgado into it. Although the record shows that counsel told the court that he intended to present a derivative entrapment defense, the court ultimately did not allow the defense. After a three-day trial, the jury found Delgado and Rivera guilty on all counts. They were each sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years on Counts One and Two, corresponding to the statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. On Counts Three and Four, respectively, Delgado and Rivera each received a five-year sentence for possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, to run consecutively with their ten-year sentences under Counts One and Two, for total terms of imprisonment of fifteen years each. This consolidated appeal timely ensued. II. Discussion A. Delgado’s Evidentiary Challenge As relevant here, Delgado argues that the district court committed reversible error in excluding Rosa-Valentin’s testimony, which “prevented [her] from presenting important evidence that [would have] aided ... in establishing her only defense, that she was entrapped by [Officer I] in participating in the offense conduct.” We agree. 1. Background, When the defense examined Officer I, the government objected, on relevancy grounds, to a question regarding his recollection of prior interactions with Rosa-Valentin. At sidebar, Delgado’s counsel proffered that Rosa-Valentin, who was one of Delgado’s witnesses, would testify that Officer I had offered her money in exchange for providing contact information of policemen to entrap. Rosa-Valentin would also testify that Officer I had confessed to her his desire to kill a man he thought had wronged her brother. Following the proffer, the court stated: “Well, I will not allow you to ask [about] that unless I first hear that from [Rosa-Valentin] .... Because I think this is too much of a stretch. If you give me ... some foundation evidence that he has done that, I will allow you to [recall Officer I].” When the interrogation resumed, Officer I admitted that he had offered money to Rosa-Valentin in exchange for police officers’ names. When asked about the timing of his proposal, Officer I said that he first mentioned it to Rosa-Valentin indirectly during a chance encounter with her while on duty patrolling his sector. In this regard, Officer I testified that, in responding to a late-night complaint about noise and loud music, he arrived at a commercial establishment where a birthday party appeared to be taking place. The party turned out to be Rosa-Valentin’s. As Officer I recounted: “[W]hen the person that came out to explain why the music was so loud turned out to be her, I greeted everybody and then I continued patrolling. I explained to her that they needed to lower the music down, and ... they told me that they were just about to close.” Officer I denied having any beers or allowing the party to continue after 2:00 a.m. in contravention of a municipal ordinance. He also denied going to Rosa-Valentin’s house looking for her more than fifteen times after the birthday party. As proffered, Delgado called Rosa-Valentin to the witness stand as part of her case-in-chief. The government immediately objected, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant. At sidebar, defense counsel repeated the proffer previously given about Rosa-Valentin’s testimony, and the court stated that it would have “to hear the evidence outside of the presence of the jury ... to see if it’s relevant.” Outside the presence of the jury, Rosa-Valentin stated that Officer I was her brother’s lifelong friend and that she had known him for approximately thirty-three to thirty-four years. She also stated that, during the funeral services for her sister-in-law, Officer I told her twice that he wanted to kill the man involved in the extramarital affair that allegedly caused the suicide. Rosa-Valentin further testified that Officer I “used to tell [her] when he came home all the things that he used to do.” Specifically, she testified that Officer I mentioned to her that he would go to a drag point in his patrolling sector, arrest a seller, “and [he] would tell the guy to call his boss.... [W]henever they got in touch with the drag dealer, [he] would tell him that in order to release his runner, he was going to have to give him something in return, either weapons, drags, or money.” Similarly, Rosa-Valentin testified that Officer I told her of other instances in which he would fabricate cases and arrest people to ask “for either drugs, weapons, or money, and he told [her] that he would always ask for weapons.” Rosa-Valentin next gave her version of the interactions she had with Officer I on the day of her birthday. According to her testimony, after greeting Officer I that night, he told her that “he was [on duty] in a [nearby] park so he could spend some time with us at the [party].” While at the party, she said that Officer I had around eight or nine beers. She stated that, at some point, a police sergeant drove by the party, but that the party was allowed to continue until 4:30 a.m. after Officer I spoke to the sergeant. Officer I left the party at around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., but came back later. After the establishment where the party was being held had closed, Rosa-Valentin’s guests (including Officer I) went to her house and continued the gathering until 6:00 a.m. Before the party was over, Officer I mentioned to Rosa-Valentin that he would come back the next day because he needed to talk to her. According to Rosa-Valentin’s testimony, Officer I came to her house the next day. Her account of that visit was as follows: He came in [driving] the patrol car, like he always did, wearing his uniform.... He asked me if I could get some police officers for him.... He asked me if I could get some for him to do some part-time work, and I told him I would check, because I have a friend who already had part-time jobs. They worked at gas stations, that kind of thing. Again, he emphasized whether I had the phone number, whether I had it in a safe place. I said I did. And he told me that if anything came up, that I should call him, that he was offering me $5,000 for every cop that I brought to him. Rosa-Valentin also stated that Officer I persistently followed up on his inquiry: “during the day he would come three, four, five, six, seven times ... then at night he would come in a patrol car.” Officer I kept this routine up for four months, beginning in February and ending in mid-June. Lastly, Rosa-Valentin testified that, when she refused to provide any information to Officer I, he invited her to do parttime work herself. She said that, when she asked what the parttime work would be, Officer I told her to go to an apartment in the municipality of Guayna-bo, “and [that] he would talk to [her] over there.” Officer I also told her that she could go to the apartment with her kids, that there was a pool and a tennis court in the complex, and that they would have a good time there. After a brief examination by the government, the district court found Rosa-Valentin’s testimony inadmissible under Fed. R.Evid. 608(b). In so ruling, it rejected defense counsel’s argument that Rosa-Valentin’s testimony directly contradicted portions of Officer I’s testimony. Counsel further argued that Rosa-Valentin’s testimony was relevant to Delgado’s entrapment defense. But the court ruled the entire testimony to be “nothing else but an attempt to circumvent Rule 608.” 2. Applicable Law and Analysis We review the district court’s ev-identiary findings for abuse of discretion, United States v. Pelletier, 666 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2011), and reverse when, among other reasons, a decision rests on an erroneous conclusion of law. See, e.g., United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2011). Where, as here, a defendant challenges a conviction on account of an evi-dentiary error, the verdict will not be overturned if “it is highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict.” United States v. Pridgen, 518 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.2008). Put differently, “even if [an evidentiary] error occurred, it would not serve to overturn a conviction if it ultimately proved harmless.” United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir.2012). In this case, Delgado has demonstrated error, and the government has not met its burden of showing that the error was harmless. See United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 24 (1st Cir.2011). Our inquiry revolves around Rule 608(b), which in pertinent part prohibits the admission of extrinsic evidence “to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) (emphasis supplied). The phrase “character for truthfulness” was incorporated into the Rule by amendment in 2003. The amendment sought to conform the Rule’s language to the drafters’ original intent, which was to exclude extrinsic evidence of a witness’s general propensity for honesty and truth, rather than particular instances of honesty or dishonesty used for other non-propensity purposes. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) advisory committee’s note. Rule 608(b) was thus amended to do away with the mistaken notion that its reach extended to extrinsic evidence offered for general impeachment purposes, such as, for example, contradictions, prior inconsistent statements, bias, or mental capacity. Id. After the amendment, courts routinely find Rule 608(b) inapplicable to general impeachment evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 426 Fed.Appx. 702, 706 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that Rule 608(b) did not bar testimony that contradicted defendant’s story); United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 441-42 (5th Cir.2008) (stating that Rule 608(b) is inapplicable in determining the admissibility of evidence introduced to contradict a witness’s testimony as to a material issue); United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 680-81 (10th Cir.2005) (holding Rule 608(b) inapplicable because “the evidence was introduced not to ‘attack’ the witness’s ‘character’ ” but to demonstrate that a statement made during direct examination was false). We examine the excluded testimony against this backdrop. As previously stated, Delgado avers that Rosa-Valentin’s testimony contradicted Officer I’s in several respects, and it is clear from the record that this was the case. Officer I, among other things, disavowed constantly visiting Rosa-Valentin after her birthday, whereas in her proffer she stated that it was precisely thereafter that Officer I harassed her for approximately four months, insisting that he be provided with contact information of police officers to do part-time work, sometimes going to her house more than seven times per day. Rule 608(b) does not preclude the introduction of this type of impeachment evidence. See Taylor, 426 Fed.Appx. at 706; Skelton, 514 F.3d at 441-42; Magallanez, 408 F.3d at 680-81. More importantly, however, we agree with Delgado that Rosa-Valentin’s testimony would have shown how Officer I went about his participation in Operation Guard Shack and would thus support her entrapment defense. See United States v. Rizvanovic, 572 F.3d 1152, 1155 n. 1 (10th Cir.2009) (“Rule 608(b) does not bar extrinsic evidence to the extent it goes to substantive issues, and here the rebuttal evidence tended to disprove Defendant’s affirmative defense....”); see also United States v. Montelongo, 420 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir.2005) (finding that Rule 608(b) does not preclude evidence negating a defendant’s guilt). It is black-letter law that an entrapment defense has two elements: “ ‘(1) government inducement of the accused to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) the accused’s lack of predisposition to engage in such conduct.’ ” United States v. Sánchez-Berríos, 424 F.3d 65, 76 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir.1988)). In connection with the inducement prong, Rosa-Valentin and Delgado painted a similar picture of Officer I’s relentless pursuit of Operation Guard Shack part-time workers. Rosa-Valentin testified that Officer I offered her large amounts of money and pursued her for four months — sometimes going to her house more than seven times a day — trying to win her over so that she would provide contact information for part-time employees. In Delgado’s case, she testified that Officer I courted her almost daily for approximately one month before she capitulated. See United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir.1993) (finding that evidence of informant calling defendant on a daily basis for over a month requesting marijuana and threatening the defendant constituted a colorable entrapment defense). Delgado’s and Rosa-Valentin’s testimonies similarly reflected that Officer I tried to lure them into Operation Guard Shack activities by appealing to their long-lasting friendships. See United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir.1990) (explaining that improper inducement by law enforcement may take the form of pleas based on sympathy or friendship). But see United States v. Ford, 918 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (8th Cir.1990) (finding that friendship with a confidential informant is not evidence of entrapment). Delgado’s and Rosa-Valentin’s testimonies also reflected that Officer I attempted to manipulate his way around potential targets’ reluctance to participate in an Operation Guard Shack “part-time.” As to Rosa-Valentin, Officer I told her to bring her children to the “part-time” because there was a pool and a tennis court in the apartment where it would take place. Concerning Delgado, she said that Officer I romantically seduced her until she gave in to his invitations to engage in a “part-time.” Furthermore, Rosa-Valentin’s testimony supported the propensity prong of Delgado’s entrapment defense. For example, Rosa-Valentin’s testimony showed that Officer I’s pursuit of potential Operation Guard Shack targets was not limited to corrupt officers. In this regard, she testified that Officer I persistently asked her for contact information of police officers, even though she told him she knew only officers seemingly involved in legitimate part-time work (her exact words on this were: “They worked at gas stations, that kind of thing”). Rosa-Valentin also testified that Officer I invited her to participate in a “parttime” herself, despite the fact that she had no criminal record, links to the drug-trafficking trade, or involvement with the police force. Delgado testified similarly, stating that her untarnished criminal record shows that she had no inclination to engage in illegal activities before Officer I’s month-long pursuit. See Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 815-16 (stating that the absence of a criminal record or known links to criminal activity could show the accused’s lack of predisposition to engage in illegal conduct); see also United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir.1998) (same). Notwithstanding the above, the government argues that “[t]he court correctly found [Rosa-Valentin’s] testimony inadmissible under Rule 608(b), which only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the conduct is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” But this argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the language just quoted from the government’s brief encompasses the entire extent of its argument before us on Rule 608(b). We have stated many times that such a lackadaisical effort is insufficient to carry the day. United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 126 n. 18 (1st Cir.2011); see also United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). Second, Rosa-Valentin’s testimony fell out of Rule 608(b)’s reach, inasmuch as it supported Delgado’s entrapment defense. See 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6113, at 47 (2d ed. 2012) (“Rule 608 does not grant discretion to admit or exclude evidence for any non-character purpose.”). While it may be true that Rosa-Valentin’s testimony incidentally called into question Officer I’s character for truthfulness, without more, such an effect does not render the testimony inadmissa-ble. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984) (“[Tjhere is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. It would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar.”). The government also argues that “the instances mentioned by Rosa-Valentin were improper collateral impeachment and inadmissible.” See United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir.2008) (“ ‘It is well established that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction on a collateral matter.’ ” (quoting United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993))). But the government’s brief contains no expía-nation whatsoever as to why or how Rosa-Valentin’s testimony constituted collateral evidence. Its argument in this regard was perfunctory at best. In fact, it was limited to the introductory remarks just quoted and a few parenthetical citations. See Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 126 n. 18 (stating that perfunctory, undeveloped arguments are deemed waived). All the same, we have already established that significant portions of Rosa-Valentin’s testimony showed how Officer I performed as an Operation Guard Shack agent and thus provided support to Delgado’s entrapment defense. Accordingly, Rosa-Valentin’s testimony was anything but collateral. See Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4 (stating that the term “collateral evidence” refers to a matter which in “itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Williamson, 202 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir.2000) (“A matter is collateral if it could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other than contradiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Lastly, the government attacks the admissibility of Rosa-Valentin’s proffer under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” According to the government, the Rule applies here because “Delgado ... wanted to [use Rosa-Valentin’s testimony] to show that because [Officer I] was bad in the past, he must have been bad in this case.” In so arguing, the government appears to refer to the confessions of corrupt acts Officer I allegedly made to Rosa-Valentin. But our prior discussion shows that the scope of Rosa-Valentin’s proffer went far beyond those admissions. To boot, we disagree with the view that Delgado’s stated purpose in seeking Rosa-Valentin’s testimony masked an effort to circumvent Rule 608(b). In so ruling, the district court abused its discretion by relying on an incorrect interpretation of both the relevant facts and the applicable law. Moreover, we agree with Delgado’s proposition that Rosa-Valentin’s proffered testimony would have corroborated pivotal elements of her entrapment defense. Because the government does not, and cannot, challenge such a proposition, we comfortably find that the government has not met its burden of showing that “it is highly probable that the [evidentiary] error did not affect the verdict.” See Pridgen, 518 F.3d at 91. This finding mandates that Delgado’s conviction be overturned. Of course, nothing in this decision should be interpreted as an intimation on our part as to the merits of Delgado’s entrapment defense. All that we decide today is that the district court erred when precluding Rosa-Valentin from testifying as part of Delgado’s defense. Delgado cannot properly be convicted without having the opportunity to present to the jury admissible, material, and favorable testimony bearing on her defense. B. Rivera’s Challenge to the Special Jury Verdict Instructions We now turn to the first of Rivera’s several claims on appeal. Among other things, Rivera argues that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury that in answering a postverdict “special” question regarding drug quantity, they needed to be sure of the quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 1. Background At sidebar, before the jury was sent to deliberate, Delgado’s counsel asked the court to inform the jury that “the amount and the type of drugs would be determined by the jury.” The court emphatically refused. It retorted: “No, no, no, no, no. Not this case. We know it’s seven kilos. I’m sorry.... It’s seven kilos. We counted them on the video. There’s nothing to be determined.” The initial jury instructions and verdict form thus left no role for the jury with respect to determining drug quantity. In fact, at that juncture, the court made no reference to quantity, explaining to the jury that the conspiracy count only had two elements: For you to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, you must be convinced that the Government has proven each of the following things beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the agreement specified in the indictment and not some other agreement existed at least between two people to commit that crime.... Second, that each of the defendants willfully joined in that agreement. No one objected, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The court then stated in open court that it would dismiss the jury unless the parties had any other motions. The government took the opportunity to request “a special jury [verdict] on the amount of narcotics involved in this case.” The court initially refused, reasoning that photos of record showed the duffle bag containing the seven packages of purported cocaine. But the prosecution insisted that the quantity issue was for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt. Delgado’s counsel initially resisted, stating that “[t]he verdict ha[d] been rendered.” But, after a short colloquy with the government and the court, counsel agreed that the question was proper. The court acquiesced and immediately addressed the jury: “Members of the jury, the court has decided to ask you an additional question. Let me prepare a short question for you to answer. You have to go back and answer only this question. It’s like another deliberation under the same terms and conditions.” The court instructed the jury thereafter: “I want you to determine, answer an additional question that’s going to be typed out, how much narcotics were involved in this case. Two choices, less than five kilograms of purported cocaine or more than five kilograms of purported cocaine.” There were no trial objections to these jury instructions. After a nineteen-minute deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of “more than five kilograms of purported cocaine.” 2. Applicable Law and Analysis a. Alleyne Error Regarding the Jury Instructions Generally, we review challenges to the propriety of jury instructions de novo. United States v. Whitney, 524 F.3d 134, 138 (1st Cir.2008). However, where, as here, a defendant fails to properly preserve an objection at trial, we review the record under the plain-error standard. United States v. Medina-Martinez, 396 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2005); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-34, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (applying plain-error review to an unpreserved Apprendi error); United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir.2013) (“This court reviews unpreserved Apprendi errors for plain error and preserved Ap-prendi errors for harmless error. Since Alleyne is an extension of the Apprendi doctrine, the same standards should apply to Alleyne errors.” (internal citation omitted)). The plain-error standard requires an initial showing of three elements: (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was clear or obvious; and (3) that the error affected substantial rights or the outcome of the case. See United States v. Sánchez-Maldonado, 737 F.3d 826, 828 (1st Cir.2013); United States v. Rodriguez, 675 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir.2012); Whitney, 524 F.3d at 140 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Even if those requirements are satisfied, however, we have the discretion to affirm the ruling if “ ‘the error does not distort the fairness or integrity of the lower court proceedings in some extreme way.’” Rodriguez, 675 F.3d at 64 (quoting United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir.2010)). “This multi-factor analysis makes the road to success under the plain error standard rather steep; hence, reversal constitutes a remedy that is granted sparingly.” United States v. Gelin, 712 F.3d 612, 620 (1st Cir.2013). This appeal, however, falls within the realm of those infrequent cases in which reversal is warranted. As stated above, Rivera premises his challenge on the district court’s failure to instruct the jury that the government needed to prove drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. The reasonable-doubt standard, stemming from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is interwoven with the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a jury verdict. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (“It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine ... whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). It is therefore well settled that, in a criminal case, a vital part of a judge’s responsibilities is to provide the “reasonable doubt” charge to the jury. See Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Indeed, where a trial judge fails to instruct the jury that all the elements of the charged crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding of reversible plain error may be proper. See United States v. Hellman, 560 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (2d Cir.1974). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), this court did not consider “drug quantity” to be an element of the offense for purposes of the penalties prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir.2001). Rather, “drug quantity” was considered to be a “sentencing factor” that the sentencing judge could determine by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. (explaining that pm-Apprendi, the specific drug quantities in § 841(b)(l)’s penalty scheme did not have to be charged in the indictment or found by the jury). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Two years later, in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), the Supreme Court declined to extend the Apprendi rule to facts that increase only the mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at 565-69, 122 S.Ct. 2406. While this appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Harris in Alleyne, holding that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155, 2162-63. Here, Alleyne applies retroactively to Rivera’s claims on appeal. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases ... pending on direct review or not yet final.... ”); Pena, 742 F.3d at 514, 2014 WL 448439, at *6 (“The Alleyne rule applies to cases pending on direct appeal at the time it was decided.”); United States v. Doe, No. 12-2304, 741 F.3d 217, 233, 2013 WL 6697824, at *12 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 2013) (“As Alleyne was decided during the pendency of [the defendant’s] appeal, we apply it here.”); Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 94 n. 4 (same). On Counts One and Two, Rivera was convicted of conspiring and attempting to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Section 841 prohibits, among other things, possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Id. § 841(a)(1). In § 841, subsection (b) prescribes the penalties for violations of subsection (a). Id. § 841(a)-(b). For possession with intent to distribute cocaine, paragraph § 841(b)(1) sets out three different ranges of prison terms, depending on the quantity of cocaine involved. Id. § 841(b)(l)(A)-(C). For an indeterminate quantity of cocaine, there is no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and the maximum term is twenty years. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C). If the violation involves 500 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, the permissible prison terms range from a minimum of five years to a maximum of forty years. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B). If the violation of § 841(a) involves five kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine, as charged in the indictment here, then the highest statutory range of sentences applies: the mandatory minimum is ten years’ imprisonment, and the maximum term is life in prison. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). Under Alleyne, then, the “drug quantity” question in this case — whether the offense involved at least five kilograms of a substance containing cocaine — aggravated the statutory sentencing range, and was thus an element of the aggravated crime that was required to be determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2161 (“A fact that increases a sentencing floor, thus, forms an essential ingredient of the offense.... [T]he core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury”). In this case, the jury determined that more than five kilograms of cocaine were involved, triggering the aggravated sentencing range (ten years to life) under subparagraph (A). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Based on this finding, the district court sentenced Rivera to the mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment. See id. Although the jury returned a special verdict form indicating their finding that “more than 5 kilograms of purported cocaine” were involved in the case, however, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that they were required to make this special finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor can we assume that the jury likely made such an inference, given that they were never instructed that “drug quantity” was an element of any of the offenses of conviction. Nevertheless, the government argues that the special jury verdict and its accompanying instructions cured the instructional defect. Specifically, the government posits that the initial jury instructions unequivocally established the government’s duty to prove each element of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The government thus reasons that “the district court’s [post-verdict special] instruction that deliberation would be under the same ‘terms and conditions’ also called on the jury to accord drug quantity the same treatment as the other elements of the offense, ... which comported with AUeyne.” This argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it presumes that the jurors understood that the court posed the special question because “drug quantity” was an element of the underlying crime. Nothing in the record supports that presumption. The instructions accompanying the special question were tersely given, with the court only stating that the jury would be asked to answer another question. The court neither explained why the special question was being asked nor how the jury’s answer would bear in the case. Moreover, the special jury verdict form was submitted to the jurors after they had: (1) deliberated pursuant to the initial jury instruction; (2) rendered a guilty verdict; and (3) been told by the court that they were about to be dismissed. Having discharged their duties as initially explained by the court, and without the benefit of any guidance as to the reasons for or relevance of the new question being asked, the jurors had no cause to understand the special verdict question as involving another element of the offense. Indeed, given the timing and manner in which the question was presented, the jurors understandably may have failed to appreciate that the additional question represented something more than an inconsequential afterthought standing in the way of heading home. With nothing to discredit the reasonable inference that the jury placed little weight on the “special” question, we cannot find that they were sufficiently put on notice of its critical import to the case. Cf. United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1317 (1st Cir.1994) (framing the dispositive inquiry in a challenge to a district court’s “beyond reasonable doubt” charge as “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow [a] conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [beyond-a-reasonable-doubt] standard” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the government’s argument places undue weight on the phrase “under the same terms and conditions.” In the government’s view, this phrase properly conveyed to the jury that its post-verdict deliberation required a determination that the government had proven drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. The government, however, fails to articulate how such a broad phrase conveyed such a specific message. To be sure, the initial jury instructions properly conveyed to the jury that it needed to find all the elements of the underlying crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But, as stated above, and consistent with the Supreme Court precedent applicable at the time of trial, no one told the jury that “drug quantity” was an element of the crime. Indeed, even the government’s appellate attorneys insist in their brief that “[d]rug quantity was not an element of the offense here.” Yet the government argues, in the same breath, that the jury would have necessarily understood that the special verdict question was required to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the interplay of two instructions: (1) the initial instruction that the jury must find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for “any essential element of a crime charged,” and (2) the subsequent instruction that the special verdict question was “like another deliberation under the same terms and conditions.” To accept such an inconsistent argument would strain credulity. Similarly, the district court judge — after giving the instructions at issue, and immediately after the jury left the courtroom to consider the special verdict question — stated to counsel that: “I can understand the Apprendi concerns ... but in a case like this one ... I don’t think you need a special verdict. I’m doing it for the simple purpose of pleasing you, if you will. I don’t think you need that at all.” If the district judge himself — consistent with the then — governing case law — did not believe that “drug quantity” was an element required to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not explicitly instruct the jury otherwise, then we cannot presume that the jury made this inferential leap on its own initiative. The initial jury instructions involved many different “terms and conditions,” spanning twenty pages of the trial transcript. The government has failed to identify a single record entry that would allow us to properly link the phrase “under the same terms and conditions” back to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard explained to the jury in the initial instructions. Such imprecise language was insufficient to do the heavy lifting necessary to protect Rivera’s Sixth Amendment right. The government relies on United States v. Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2008), and United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2003), for the proposition that a verdict form need not explicitly state that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-standard governs the verdict, if the jury instructions sufficiently conveyed the same information. This reliance is misplaced. On the contrary, both cases weigh heavily against the government. In Avilés-Colón, we rejected the proposition that a verdict form needed to explicitly state that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would govern the jury’s deliberations, when the jury instructions at issue were “suitably focused” and properly “conveyed the need to make the finding with that level of certainty.” 536 F.3d at 27. Unlike this case, however, the instruction in Avilés-Colón adequately framed “drug quantity” as an essential element of the case and made the necessary linkage with the reasonable-doubt standard. The relevant portion of the instruction speaks for itself: For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the Government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: ... fourth, that the quantity of the substance was at least one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a detectable amount of marijuana. Id. at 26 n. 20. Pérez-Ruiz provides no better help for the government, as it also makes plain that jury instructions must provide a clear linkage between the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the proof that must be marshaled in connection with the elements of the crime. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 16, 19-20 (vacating the appellant’s sentence, in the context of an enhanced sentencing range for a particular quantity of drugs, when the jury instructions failed to “forge the necessary link” between the “drug types and quantities” alleged in the indictment and “the requirement that these facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt”). The instructional error in this case, moreover, is not mitigated by the fact that Rivera’s ten-year sentence happened to also fall within the statutory range (zero to twenty years of imprisonment) for an indeterminate quantity of cocaine. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162 (reasoning that when a fact “aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different range had been applicable”). The Alleyne Court emphasized that whether a defendant could have received the same sentence without the aggravating fact “is no answer” and “is beside the point.” See id. (“Indeed, if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range (ie., the range applicable without that aggravating fact).”). Under these circumstances, reversal is warranted even on plain-error review. Given Alleyne’s clear holding that facts which increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, see id. at 2163, it was an obvious error to fail to properly instruct the jury that they were required to determine the special verdict question beyond a reasonable doubt. And since the district court sentenced Rivera to the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of ten years — based on an aggravating fact (drug quantity) that was not found beyond a reasonable doubt, and for which scant evidence was presented — the error affected Rivera’s substantial rights and the outcome of his case. Likewise, we cannot say that the error did not “ ‘distort the fairness or integrity of the lower court proceedings in some extreme way.’ ” See Rodriguez, 675 F.3d at 64 (quoting Kinsella, 622 F.3d at 83). The evidence on the “drug quantity” question here was far from overwhelming and un-controverted. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631—33, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (applying the fourth prong of the plain-error test, and stating that where evidence of a statutory element — such as drug quantity — is “ ‘overwhelming’ ” and “ ‘essentially uncontro-verted,’ ” there is “ ‘no basis for concluding that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ ” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); cf. Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 95-97 (holding that an Alleyne error was harmless when “the evidence of the triggering drug quantity was overwhelming”); Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 17-20 (vacating the appellant’s sentence after concluding that the government failed to show “overwhelming evidence” of drug quantity at trial and thus failed to demonstrate that the Apprendi error was harmless). While the exhibits in this case include photographs of seven “bricks” and a duffel bag, the video of the transaction shows only the four “bricks” that the purported buyer placed on top of the coffee table. The video is not clear as to whether Rivera saw or handled more than four “bricks.” There was no discussion on the video or in the preceding phone calls as to the quantity of drugs to be transacted, and there was no testimony presented that Rivera or Delgado were told the quantity of purported drugs involved. The “bricks” involved in this case were fake drugs, and no evidence was presented as to their actual weight. For example; if the seven bricks actually weighed 0.7 kilograms each, their total weight would be 4.9 kilograms — just shy of the five kilograms necessary for conviction of the aggravated offense. Therefore, as in Pérez-Ruiz, this is not “a case in which the evidence tying the defendant to the charged conspiracy involved drugs that were indisputably in excess of the requisite amounts.” See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 19. Under these circumstances, we do not consider the evidence of the drug quantity-involved to be “overwhelming” or “essentially uncontroverted.” See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. 1781. Compare Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 95-97 (finding the drug-quantity evidence to be overwhelming when “[t]he delivery that the police intercepted, taken alone, was nearly four times the triggering amount,” and when the defendant himself “acknowledged responsibility for a quantity of drugs that far exceeded] the triggering amount”), with Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 17-20 (evidence that the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of cocaine was not overwhelming when “actual drug quantities” were mentioned “only three times during the trial” — including testimony from one witness that he supplied the drug ring with more than fifteen kilograms of cocaine, and testimony from a DEA agent that he estimated that the drug ring distributed “over 150 kilograms of cocaine”). In sum, the record supports Rivera’s contention that the district court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that the drug quantity question required a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of this instructional error, under Alleyne, Rivera’s sentence cannot stand. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163-64. b. Remedy To the extent that Rivera claims entitlement to a new trial altogether in light of this error, however, he is mistaken. The district court’s instructional error invalidates Rivera’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under the enhanced penalty set out in § 841(b)(1)(A), but it does not call into question the validity of his underlying conspiracy and attempt convictions under §§ 846 and 841(a). Neither conspiracy nor attempt includes “drug quantity” as an element of the core offense. Under § 846, any person who either attempts or conspires to commit a drug offense shall be subject to the same penalties as the target offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846. We have previously held that