Full opinion text
ORDER These matters are before the court following our receipt of the United States Supreme Court’s order granting certiorari, vacating our August 27, 2013 decision, and remanding for reconsideration in light of CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014). See Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2818, — L.Ed.2d - (2014). The Supreme Court’s judgment issued on July 18, 2014. On July 11, 2014 the parties filed supplemental briefs. In addition, on July 11, 2014 the United States filed a brief amicus curiae. Upon consideration, we reinstate our original opinion, and also direct the clerk to issue our Opinion on Remand. Both our remand opinion and original decision shall be attached to this order. The mandate recalled on July 24, 2014 shall reissue forthwith. OPINION ON REMAND MATHESON, Circuit Judge. On August 27, 2013, we concluded the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”) established a universal time frame for the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) to bring any actions on behalf of credit unions placed into conservator-ship or receivership, notwithstanding any pre-existing time periods applicable to other plaintiffs. See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.2013) (“NCUA ”). Because NCUA filed its federal securities claims in this case during that time frame, we determined its claims could proceed. See id. at 1266-67. On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court decided CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014), which held that the federal commencement date established in an amended provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) for state personal injury or property damage actions preempted only state statutes of limitation, not statutes of repose. See id. at 2187-88. On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, vacated our August 27, 2013 decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of CTS. See Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2818, — L.Ed.2d - (2014). We have considered the impact of CTS on this case and conclude it does not alter our original decision. We therefore reinstate our previous opinion accompanied by this opinion. I. BACKGROUND A. NCUA, FIRREA, and the NCUA Extender Statute Established in 1934, NCUA is an independent agency charged with regulating federally chartered credit unions. If NCUA finds that a credit union is insolvent or (in some circumstances) undercapi-talized, it must place the credit union in conservatorship or liquidation and appoint itself as conservator or liquidating agent. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A). NCUA then steps into the shoes of the credit union and succeeds to “all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the credit union....” M § 1787(b)(2)(A)®. In the wake of the 1980s savings and loan crises, Congress enacted FIRREA to “prevent® the collapse of the industry, attack[ ] the root causes of the crisis, and restor[e] public confidence.” United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844, 856, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996). FIRREA includes a provision governing NCUA enforcement actions titled “Statute of limitations for actions brought by conservator or liquidating agent.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). Also known as the NCUA Extender Statute, this provision reads: (A) In general Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Board as conservator or liquidating agent shall be— (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of— (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of— (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of the Board as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. Id. Thus, for “any [federal] tort claim” on behalf of a credit union to be timely, NCUA must sue within three years from either the date it places that credit union into conservatorship (or receivership) or the date on which the cause of action accrues. See id. B. The Panel’s Opinion in NCUA v. Nomura In 2006 and 2007, two federally chartered corporate credit unions — U.S. Central and WesCorp-purchased residential mortgage — backed securities (“RMBS”) from the Appellants. See NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1252-53. In March 2009, NCUA placed the two credit unions into conservatorship based on “staggering losses” flowing from these investments. Id. at 1253. In June and November of 2011, within the three-year time frame required by the Extender Statute, NCUA sued several RMBS issuers on behalf of both credit unions, alleging federal securities torts involving “materially false and misleading statements” in registration and prospectus materials. Id. The Defendants (Appellants here) moved to dismiss, asserting NCUA’s claims were untimely under a different limitations period in the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. According to the Defendants, the Securities Act’s three-year statute of repose (Section 13), which starts running when the security is offered or sold (rather than when NCUA placed the credit unions into conservatorship or discovered the violation), barred NCUA’s federal securities claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m. The district court denied the motion, concluding FIRREA’s Extender Statute applies to Section 13’s three-year repose period. On interlocutory appeal, this panel affirmed. We first determined the “plain meaning of the statute,” which establishes “the applicable statute of limitations” for “any action brought by” NCUA. NCUA, 727 F.Sd at 1257. We said this language “indicates that it applies to NCUA’s Securities Act claim and that it supplants all other time limits, including Section 13’s repose period.” Id. We then analyzed how use of the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute affects the statute’s scope. We determined the surrounding language and context of FIR-REA demonstrates that “the statute is most reasonably interpreted to govern ‘any action’ NCUA may bring — and to displace all ‘statutes of limitations’ in the broad sense of the term, which encompasses both ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.” Id. at 1260. We gave Appellants “the benefit of the doubt and assume[d] there may be a modicum of ambiguity as to whether the Extender Statute covers statutes of repose.” Id. at 1262. But based on a review of FIR-REA’s statutory purpose, the use of “statute of limitations” in federal legislation, and the use of “statute of limitations” in case law, we concluded “any such ambiguity is easily resolved” and the Extender Statute displaces Section 13’s three-year statute of repose. M Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court granted Appellants’ petition, vacated this panel’s previous opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of its recently issued opinion in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014), which addressed whether an amended provision of CERCLA preempts state statutes of repose. C. CERCLA and Section 9658 “Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 ‘to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination.’ ” CTS, 134 S.Ct. at 2180 (quoting Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 173 L.Ed.2d 812 (2009)). “The Act provided a federal cause of action to recover costs of cleanup from culpable entities but not a federal cause of action for personal injury or property damage.” Id. “Instead, CERCLA directed preparation of an expert report to determine ‘the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment,’ including ‘barriers to recovery posed by existing statutes of limitations.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1), (3)(F)). Issued in 1982, the “Study Group Report” “noted the long latency periods involved in harm caused by toxic substances and ‘recommend[ed] that all states that have not already done so, clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its cause.’ ” Id. at 2181 (quoting Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes — Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 256 (Comm. Print 1982) (hereinafter Study Group Report or Report)). “The Report further stated: ‘The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes of repose which, in a number of states[,] have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiffs claim before he knows that he has one.” Id. (quoting and altering Study Group Report pt. 1, at 256). Although the Study Group Report called upon states to change their laws, in 1986 Congress amended CERCLA “to add the provision now codified in § 9658,” id., which provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases (1) Exception to State statutes In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the ápplica-ble limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute. (2) State law generally applicable Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. (b) Definitions (2) Applicable limitations period The term “applicable limitations period” means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought. (3) Commencement date The term “commencement date” means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period. (4) Federally required commencement date (A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “federally required commencement date” means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. (A) Special rules In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term “federally required commencement date” means the later of the date referred to in subparagraph (A) or the following: (i) In the case of a minor, the date on which the minor reaches the age of majority, as determined by State law, or has a legal representative appointed. (ii) In the case of an incompetent individual, the date on which such individual becomes competent or has had a legal representative appointed. 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Section 9658 generally provides that “the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law” for personal injury or property damage stemming from industrial pollution, id. § 9658(a)(2), except when “the applicable limitations period” under state law “provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date,” id. § 9658(a)(1). In such cases, instead of the state law commencement date, the “period shall commence at the federally required commencement date” — that is, “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)” that his personal injury or property damage stemmed from a “hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.” Id. § 9658(a)(1) & (b)(4)(A). Despite the Study Group Report’s distinction between “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose,” however, § 9658 did not employ the term “statute of repose.” D. The Supreme Court’s Decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger In CTS, property owners in North Carolina brought a state-law nuisance action based on well contamination against CTS Corporation, which ran an electronics plant on their land from 1959 to 1985. CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2181. Although CTS sold the property in 1987, the plaintiffs did not discover their well water was contaminated until 2009. Id. They filed suit in 2011. Id. CTS moved to dismiss the claim under North Carolina’s statute of repose, which bars any tort suit brought more than 10 years after the last culpable act of the defendant. N.C. GemStat. Ann. § 1-52(16); CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2181. The district court granted CTS’s motion to dismiss. CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2181. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that CERCLA’s federal commencement date preempted North Carolina's statute of repose. See id. at 2181-82. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Because “[i]t is undoubted that the discovery rule in § 9658 preempts state statutes of limitations that are in conflict with its terms,” the Court limited its focus to “whether § 9658 also preempts state statutes of repose,” id. at 2180 — that is, whether § 9658’s federal commencement date modifies the starting date under state law for both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose when it refers to “the ‘applicable limitations period,’ ” id. at 2185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658). The Court concluded (for the reasons discussed below) that the “applicable [state] limitations period” displaced by CERCLA’s federal commencement date does not include state statutes of repose, and thus the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose. II. DISCUSSION We conclude the Court’s decision in CTS does not alter our original conclusion that NCUA’s federal claims were timely. First, (A) the Extender Statute and § 9658 are fundamentally different. The Extender Statute plainly establishes a universal time frame for all actions brought by NCUA, notwithstanding any other limitations frameworks governing other plaintiffs’ claims. Section 9658 addresses only when the accrual date for state hazardous waste claims alleging personal injury or property damage begins to run. Second, (B) conventional tools of statutory construction confirm the Extender Statute replaces all pre-existing time limits that otherwise may have applied to NCUA claims. A. CTS does not change this panel’s principal conclusion that the Extender Statute sets a universal time frame for the NCUA to bring any claims. In CTS, the Supreme “Court note[d] first that § 9658, in the' caption of subsection (a), characterizes pre-emption as an ‘exception’ to the regular rule” that “ ‘State law [is] generally applicable.’ ” 134 5.Ct. at 2185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) & (a)(2)) (brackets omitted). “Under this structure,” the Court reasoned, “state law is not pre-empted unless it fits into the precise terms of the exception.” Id. The text and structure of the Extender Statute are fundamentally different from § 9658. The Extender Statute creates “the applicable statute of limitations” for “any action brought by” NCUA on behalf of a failed credit union. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). The Extender Statute on its face gives the NCUA its own time limits to file enforcement actions on behalf of credit unions in conservatorship or receivership. It specifies the time limits for “any action[s]” brought by NCUA, irrespective of whether the time limits in the statutes on which such “action[s]” are based (such as the Securities Act) might expire sooner for other plaintiffs, and irrespective of whether those time limits are statutes of limitations or repose. Put another way, by establishing all-purpose time limits for any actions NCUA may wish to pursue, the Extender Statute “displaces all preexisting limits on the time to bring suit, whatever they are called.” Aplee. Supp. Br. at 4. Section 9658 of CERCLA has a completely different structure. Rather than setting its own time limit to bring a personal injury or property damage claim based on hazardous waste, § 9658 recognizes that the time limits in state statutes apply. It further provides the applicable state limitations period starts to run no earlier than the “federally required commencement date,” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1), which is defined in terms of accrual— when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the hazardous waste injury. The “federally required commencement date” thus functions as an “ ‘exception’ to the regular rule,” CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2185, that “the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply....” 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Unlike § 9658’s federal commencement date, the limitations framework provided in the Extender Statute does not establish a narrow “ ‘exception’ to the regular rule.” CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2185 (brackets omitted). Instead, it creates the exclusive time framework for all NCUA enforcement actions and replaces all other time periods. Accordingly, unlike the applicable state limitations periods modified by § 9658’s federal commencement date, the time limits displaced by the Extender Statute need not “fit[ ] into [its] precise terms.Id. The contrast between the two statutes is stark. The time limits for the federal claims at issue under the Extender Statute are contained within the Extender Statute itself and apply only to NCUA actions. The time limits under § 9658 for personal injury and property damage actions, on the other hand, are largely contained in state statutes outside of § 9658 and apply to all plaintiffs. As the United States highlighted in its CTS amicus brief: Section 9658 contrasts markedly with other statutes [such as the Extender Statute, § 1787(b)(14),] in which Congress chose to override all otherwise applicable time limitations.... In one set of such statutes [including § 1787(b)(14) ], Congress created a new, exclusive time limitation applicable to claims brought by specified federal agencies as conservator, receiver, or liquidating agent for faded financial institutions .... [In § 9658], by contrast, Congress did not enact a new time limitation to supersede all others. Instead, Congress altered particular preexisting state statutes of limitations in only one limited respect — by changing the date on which the cause of action accrued. Congress otherwise left time limitations unchanged, explicitly stating that those time limitations continue to apply “[e]x-cept” to the extent that they are specifically superseded by federal law. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, No. 13-339 (U.S. filed Mar. 3, 2014) (“U.S. Waldburger Br.”), available at 2014 WL 828057 (quoting and altering 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(2)). In light of the fundamental differences between § 9658 and the Extender Statute, we reaffirm our original conclusion, which is sufficient to resolve the instant case: the Extender Statute plainly establishes its own exclusive time limits for NCUA enforcement actions and displaces all others, including statutes of limitations and repose. B. CTS does not change our conclusion regarding the scope of the Extender Statute 1. The panel’s opinion In our original opinion, after determining the plain meaning of the Extender Statute as establishing a universal time limit for all NCUA lawsuits, we employed tools of statutory construction — surrounding text, statutory context, and statutory purpose — to confirm that meaning. In doing so, we “assume[d] for the sake of discussion” the plausibility of Appellants’ contention that the breadth of the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute may affect the scope of its universal time frame. NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1258. We then “examine[d] the term ‘statute of limitations’ more closely.” Id. After acknowledging that “standing alone, the words ‘statute of limitations’ may be ambiguous” and may or may not include statutes of repose, we determined the Extender Statute’s surrounding language, statutory context, and statutory purpose compel a “broad” interpretation of the term that includes statutes of repose. Id. at 1258-60. We therefore concluded that even under Appellants’ aforementioned plausible contention, the Extender Statute’s universal time frame displaces statutes of repose. CTS does not change that analysis. 2. Use of the term “statute of limitations” This panel’s original opinion consulted dictionary definitions, case law, and treatises to determine the ordinary meaning of “statute of limitations” when Congress enacted FIRREA in 1989. See NCUA 727 F.3d at 1258-59. Although we believed our “discussion supported] the broader meaning of ‘statute of limitations,”’ we acknowledged “that, standing alone, the words ‘statute of limitations’ may be ambiguous.” Id. at 1259; see also id. n. 14 (“Courts have noted the historically ambiguous and overlapping use of these terms.” (citing cases)). We therefore considered other factors specific to FIRREA to determine whether the Extender Statute used the term “statute of limitations” in the broad or narrow sense. Similarly, in CTS, the Supreme Court analyzed § 9658’s use of the term “statute of limitations.” The Court found it “instructive, but ... not dispositive” that “ § 9658 uses the term ‘statute of limitations’ ” but “not the term ‘statute of repose’ ” because “ ‘statute of limitations’ has acquired a precise meaning, distinct from ‘statute of repose’.... ” CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2185. Like this panel’s original opinion, however, the Court recognized that “the term ‘statute of limitations’ is sometimes used in a less formal way” and “can refer to any provision restricting the time in which a plaintiff must bring suit.” Id. at 2185. The Court further acknowledged that “Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when enacting statutes of repose.” Id. Faced with this ambiguity, the Supreme Court looked to factors specific to CERC-LA to conclude § 9658 preempted only state statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. See id. (observing that “the Court must proceed to examine other evidence of the meaning of the term ‘statute of limitations’ as it is used in § 9658 ” (emphasis added)). As we discuss below, none of those factors changes our analysis of FIRREA’s Extender Statute, whose surrounding language, statutory context, and statutory purpose compel a broad reading of the term “statute of limitations.” See U.S. Waldburger Br. at 22-23 (“The text, context, and history of [several provisions creating a new limitations period for federal agencies, including the Extender Statute,] make clear that Congress intended an exclusive, uniform time limitation to apply to actions brought by the designated federal agencies.”). a. Surrounding language Our original opinion looked first to the Extender Statute’s surrounding language to shed light on the scope of the term “statute of limitations.” We recognized the Extender Statute’s new limitations framework includes the concept of accrual, which is “generally associated with the narrow meaning of ‘statute of limitations.’ ” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1260. But we further observed “the Extender Statute also includes the concept of repose.” Id. Specifically, the Extender statute provides that the limitations period begins to run either (i) on “the date of the appointment of [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent” or (ii) when “the cause of action accrues.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(B)(i) & (ii). Option (i) invokes the concept of repose because it is based on when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether the plaintiff is aware of the injury. The statute in CTS is completely different. Section 9658 exclusively adopts a discovery-based accrual framework and contains no such concept of repose, which suggests it can only be read to displace statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. The provision defines the “federally required commencement date” as “the date the plaintiff knew (or should reasonably have known) about his or her injury.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). Statutes of limitations in state actions therefore begin to run under CERCLA’s time limits only “when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm in question was caused by the contaminant.” CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2180. The Court’s discussion in CTS about § 9658’s surrounding language does not change our original conclusion regarding the Extender Statute. i. Use of the singular to describe the relevant “period” In CTS, the Court observed that Congress’s use of a singular term — “period”— to identify the object (as opposed to objects) of federal preemption suggests how far it intended § 9658’s federal commencement date to reach. Because “describing the covered [state] period ” modified by the federal commencement date “in the singular” “would be an awkward way to mandate the pre-emption of two different time periods with two different purposes,” the Court concluded Congress must have intended to leave state repose periods alone. Id. at 2186-87 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2186 (discussing “the applicable limitations 'period,” “such period shall commence,” and “the statute of limitations established under State law” (emphasis added)). In other words, if Congress had meant the federal commencement date to displace both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, it would have used the term “periods” as the object of federal preemption. The Extender Statute does not use the term “period” in a comparable way. Appellants nonetheless point to this passage: (A) In general [T]he applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent shall be— (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of— (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of- (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of the Board as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) (emphasis added). Unlike § 9658, however, which employs the word “period” in the singular to describe the “applicable limitations period,” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Extender Statute refers generally to the “period applicable under State law,” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A)(i)(II) & (ii)(II), without using the word “limitations” to modify “period.” Moreover, unlike § 9658, which employs the term “applicable limitations period” to identify the state law time frame modified by the federal commencement date (that is, the specific object of federal preemption), the Extender Statute uses “period applicable under State law” to help construct a new exclusive time framework for NCUA actions that replaces all pre-existing time limits (including repose periods). Whether the state period used to construct this framework is one of limitations or repose has no bearing on whether the new Extender Statute framework itself displaces statutes of repose. Finally, the Extender Statute’s remaining timing provisions, which do not appear in § 9658, should not be ignored. The “period applicable under State law” in the Extender Statute only applies if it is longer than three (or six, for contract claims) years from the later of (i) the date of the NCUA’s appointment as conservator or liquidating agent or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(B). Because the Extender Statute provides this framework — which, as discussed above, includes the concept of repose — independent of the “period applicable under State law,” the use of the word “period” does not exclude statutes of repose from the Extender Statute’s scope. ii. Use of the term “civil action” The CTS Court also pointed to § 9658’s definition for the preempted “applicable limitations period”: “the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2). Although the Court acknowledged that “in a literal sense a statute of repose limits the time during which a suit ‘may be brought’ because it provides a point after which a suit cannot be brought,” it found persuasive § 9658’s use of the term “civil action,” which is a “ ‘civil suit stating a legal cause of action.’ ” 134 S.Ct. at 2187 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 32-33, 222 (9th ed.2009)). A “statute of repose,” by contrast, “is not related to the accrual of any cause of action” and “can prohibit a cause of action from coming into existence.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Court therefore concluded the definition of the preempted “ ‘applicable limitations period’ ... is best read to encompass only statutes of limitations, which generally begin to run after a cause of action accrues and so always limit the time in which a civil action ‘may be brought.’ ” Id. Here, unlike § 9658, the Extender Statute does not use the term “civil action”; it refers more broadly to “any action.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A). The term “any action” also appears in § 9658, but the Court did not address the phrase “any action” in CTS, and we otherwise do not understand the CTS disposition to turn on the “civil action” point alone. The Court relied on several points for its analysis, including the accrual character of § 9658. As discussed above, § 9658’s surrounding language, unlike the Extender Statute, is cast exclusively in terms of the discovery rule for accrual, which applies to the narrow understanding of “statute of limitations.” We therefore do not think the “civil action” reference in CTS overcomes the reasons we have identified to show that the time framework in the Extender Statute replaces other previously-applicable time periods, including repose limits. iii. Equitable tolling The CTS Court said “[ajnother and altogether unambiguous textual indication that § 9658 does not pre-empt statutes of repose is that § 9658 provides for equitable tolling for ‘minor or incompetent plaintiffs].’ ” 134 S.Ct. at 2187 (quoting and altering § 9658(b)(4)(B)). Because a “critical distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is that a repose period is fixed and its expiration will not be delayed by estoppel or tolling,” “the inclusion of a tolling rule in § 9658 suggests that the statute’s reach is limited to statutes of limitations, which traditionally have been subject to tolling.” Id. at 2187-88 (quotations omitted). Here, unlike § 9658, FIRREA’s Extender Statute does not mention, equitable tolling. In sum, the Extender Statute’s surrounding language differs considerably from § 9658’s in that it features the concept of repose, uses the word “period” differently, and lacks a tolling provision. The Court’s analysis of the terms “period” and “civil action,” as well as the tolling provision in § 9658, cannot be extended to the Extender Statute because its text and structure are fundamentally different from § 9658. The Court’s decision in CTS does not alter our original conclusion that the term “statute of limitations” should be construed broadly to include statutes of repose. b. Statutory context The panel’s original opinion also considered FIRREA’s statutory context in concluding the Extender Statute employs the broad meaning of “statute of limitations.” See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme — because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (citations omitted)). Section 1787 refers to “statute of limitations” or “statute of limitation” in six provisions, including the Extender Statute. The word “repose” does not appear. Three subsections set deadlines for appealing NCUA’s denial of a claim, without allowing for accrual or tolling — yet all are clearly labeled “statutes of limitations.” See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(6)(B), (b)(8)(D), (d)(4). Two references to statutes of limitations in § 1787 that provide for tolling of “any applicable statute of limitation” support the narrow interpretation adopted in CTS, but these tolling provisions apply only when an external claimant — not the NCUA itself — files a claim with NCUA against a failed credit union. See id. §§ 1787(b)(5)(F)(i), (b)(8)(E)(i). Moreover, “[tjhese provisions are consistent with the broad definition of ‘statute of limitations’ because the broad encompasses the narrow....” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1261. Taken together, Congress’s use of the term in the broad sense in other FIRREA provisions suggests it should be construed broadly in the Extender Statute. Nothing in CTS, which did not consider the meaning of “statute of limitations” within CERCLA’s broader statutory context, undermines that conclusion. c. Statutory purpose In our original opinion, we considered FIRREA’s legislative history and stated purpose to resolve “any lingering ambiguity” about the Extender Statute’s broad use of the term “statute of limitations.” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1262; see also Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-80, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (looking to statutory purpose to interpret an ambiguous statute). After reviewing the statements of FIRREA’s sponsor and the statute’s stated purpose, we concluded “the legislative purpose of FIRREA supports the conclusion that the Extender Statute applies to statutes of repose.” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1264. Nothing in CTS’s discussion of CERCLA’s legislative history and purpose alters that conclusion. i. Legislative history Our original opinion considered FIR-REA’s legislative history in confirming our conclusion that the Extender Statute employs the broad meaning of “statute of limitations” and displaces statutes of repose. In submitting FIRREA’s conference report to the Senate, the law’s sponsor said the extender provisions should “be construed to maximize potential recoveries ... by preserving to the greatest extent permissible by law claims [filed by the Government] that would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration of hitherto applicable limitations period.” 135 Cong. Rec. S10205 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr., then-Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and sponsor of FIRREA in the Senate, regarding the FDIC extender statute, which is identical to the NCUA Extender Statute) (emphasis added); see also UMLIC-Nine Corp. v. Lipan Springs Dev. Corp., 168 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.1999) (“In interpreting a statute, we accord substantial weight to statements by its sponsors concerning purpose and scope.”). As we noted in our original opinion, “[w]e have previously relied on this statement and similar statements in the legislative record when interpreting the purpose and scope of the FIRREA extender statutes.” NCUA 727 F.3d at 1263 (citing UMLIC-Nine Corp., 168 F.3d at 1178 (relying on same statement by Sen. Riegle)). So have other circuits. See SMS Fin., LLC v. ABCO Homes, Inc., 167 F.3d 235, 242 n. 21 (5th Cir.1999) (relying on similar comments concerning the purpose of the extender statutes); FDIC v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 486-87 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1991) (relying on the same statement by Sen. Riegle). In CTS, the Supreme Court noted the Study Group Report’s recommendation that states replace both their “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose” with more generous time periods. It concluded Congress would have used both terms when it amended CERCLA if it had wanted to preempt statutes of repose. See 134 S.Ct. at 2186. Commissioned by Congress in advance of CERCLA’s 1986 amendment, the 1982 Report “acknowledged that statutes of repose were not equivalent to statutes of limitations and that a recommendation to pre-empt the latter did not necessarily include the former.” Id. at 2186. The Supreme Court concluded that by “clearly urg[ing] the repeal of statutes of repose as well as statutes of limitations,” the “Report did what [§ 9658] does not: It referred to statutes of repose as a distinct category. And when Congress did not make the same distinction, it is proper to conclude that Congress did not exercise the full scope of its pre-emption power.” Id. Unlike CERCLA’s 1986 amendment, there is no evidence Congress distinguished between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose when enacting FIRREA in 1989. FIRREA’s legislative history lacks anything remotely similar to the Study Group Report prepared in advance of CERCLA’s amendment. And nothing else in FIRREA’s legislative history suggests Congress meant to use the term “statute of limitations” narrowly in the Extender Statute to exclude statutes of repose. Nor does Congress’s awareness of the distinction when it amended CERC-LA in 1986 mean that it had this distinction in mind when it enacted FIRREA in 1989. Despite the Study Group Report’s reference to “statutes of repose,” Congress has used the term “statute of limitations” or related terms in legislation several times after CERCLA and FIRREA to encompass repose periods. ii. Stated purpose In our original opinion, we also considered FIRREA’s stated purpose (as articulated by the Supreme Court and the statute itself) in concluding “the legislative purpose of FIRREA supports the conclusion that the Extender Statute applies to statutes of repose.” NCUA 727 F.3d at 1264. Congress enacted FIRREA to “prevent[] the collapse of the industry, attach!] the root causes of the crisis, and restor[e] public confidence.” Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 856, 116 S.Ct. 2432. The preamble to the bill described FIR-REA as “An Act to reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance system, to enhance the regulatory and enforcement powers of Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies, and for other purposes.” FIRREA, Pub.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). FIR-REA’s stated purpose also included “[t]o strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions,” id. § 101(9), and “[t]o strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their depositors,” id. § 101(10). In CTS, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “pre-emption of statutes of repose advances § 9658’s purpose, namely to help plaintiffs bring tort actions for harm caused by toxic contaminants.” 134 S.Ct. at 2188. The Court cautioned that “the level of generality at which the statute’s purpose is framed affects the judgment whether a specific reading will further or hinder that purpose. CERCLA, it must be remembered, does not provide a complete remedial framework.” Id. On the contrary, § 9658 “leaves untouched States’ judgments about causes of action, the scope of liability, the duration of the period provided by statutes of limitations, burdens of proof, rules of evidence, and other important rules governing civil actions.” Id. at 2188. “[I]n light of Congress’ decision to leave those many areas of state law untouched,” the Supreme Court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show that “statutes of repose pose an unacceptable obstacle to the attainment of CERCLA’s purposes.” Id. Here, unlike CERCLA’s incomplete “remedial framework,” id. at 2188, FIRREA’s statutory purpose (as explained by its sponsor, the Supreme Court, and in the statute itself), though generally stated, demonstrates Congress meant any ambiguity in the term “statute of limitations” to be construed broadly. When Congress enacted the Extender Statute, it not only gave the NCUA the time it needs to do its work, it also relieved the NCUA from the burden of complying with multiple federal and state statutes of limitations by giving it a statute of limitations of its own. It strains common sense to think Congress would have saddled the NCUA with having to comply with multiple federal and state statutes of repose. As this panel observed in its original opinion, “the legislative purpose of FIRREA supports the conclusion that the Extender Statute applies to statutes of repose.” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1264. In light of the foregoing, we conclude CTS, which dealt with a fundamentally different statute, does not change our original conclusion that the Extender Statute’s universal time frame for NCUA actions unambiguously displaces all pre-existing time periods, including Section 13’s three-year statute of repose. Because of this conclusion, we need not consider whether to apply the rule of “construing ambiguous statutes of limitations in Government action in the Government’s favor.” O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 92, 117 S.Ct. 452, 136 L.Ed.2d 454 (1996). Although “[w]e see no reason why this rule would not apply to Securities Act claims by the NCUA,” and we note that Appellants come nowhere close to showing their own strained interpretation of the Extender Statute is unambiguous, the rule is “not needed here.” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1267 n. 21. III. CONCLUSION We conclude CTS Corp. does not alter our original conclusion that NCUA’s federal securities claims were timely under the Extender Statute. We reissue our original opinion along with the foregoing opinion on remand. August 27, 2013 OPINION MATHESON, Circuit Judge. The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) placed two federally chartered corporate credit unions, U.S. Central Federal Credit Union (“U.S. Central”) and Western Corporate Federal Credit Union (“WesCorp”), into conservatorship. As liquidating agent, NCUA sued 11 defendants on behalf of U.S. Central, alleging federal and state securities violations. In a separate case, NCUA sued one defendant on behalf of U.S. Central and WesCorp, alleging similar federal and state securities violations. The cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. We refer to all defendants in these actions collectively as “Defendants.” Defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that NCUA’s claims were time-barred. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the so-called Extender Statute applied to NCUA’s claims. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). Defendants successfully moved for an interlocutory appeal for this court to determine whether the Extender Statute applies to NCUA’s claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we affirm. I. BACKGROUND We begin by describing several statutes relevant to this litigation. We then summarize the factual and procedural history of the case before turning to a discussion of the issues. A. Securities Laws and the Extender Statute This case involves residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”). RMBS are created through securitization by pooling residential mortgage loans and offering prospective investors the opportunity to invest in a particular loan pool through purchase of RMBS certificates granting ownership of a slice of the loan pool. Investors can buy, sell, or hold these RMBS certificates. When homebuyers pay back their loans, investors receive a positive return through payment of dividends and the increased value of the RMBS certificates. See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & Erisa Litig., 800 F.Supp.2d 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (describing mortgage secu-ritization process). Conversely, investors lose money when homebuyers fail to repay their mortgage loans. Several steps occur before an RMBS certificate can be offered to an investor. First, the mortgages are separated into “tranches,” or classes, based on the estimated risk of default. Second, a ratings agency assigns a credit rating to each tranche before it is sold. This step signals to investors the risk associated with a given security. Broadly speaking, the ratings agency determines the credit risk of a loan pool based on information about each loan in a given tranche, each borrower’s creditworthiness, and the proposed capital structure of the loans. Third, RMBS sellers must file registration statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), along with a prospectus and other offering documents, which include disclosures about the RMBS being offered. Federal and state securities laws require RMBS sellers to provide investors with truthful and accurate information about the risks involved. See In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir.2010). Sellers are liable when offering documents include false and misleading statements. After the foregoing steps, the RMBS are sold to investors in the form of certificates. 1. Federal securities laws Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 impose liability on certain participants in a registered securities offering that involves material misstatements or omissions. Section 11 applies to registration statements, and Section 12(a)(2) applies to prospectus materials and oral communications. For private litigants bringing a claim under Sections 11 or 12(a)(2), two deadlines must be satisfied. Both appear in Section 13 of the Securities Act (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77m), under the heading “Limitation of actions.” First, a claim must be brought within one year from the date the violation is discovered or should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Second, a claim is subject to a three-year limit, which provides that “[i]n no event” shall a claim under Section 11 be filed “more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public,” and no “more than three years after the sale” in the case of a Section 12(a)(2) claim. Id. at § 77m. 2. State securities laws The Kansas Uniform Securities Act makes a securities seller liable to a purchaser if the seller sells a security “by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission.” K.S.A. § 17-12a509(b). Kansas also sets two deadlines on state securities claims: a two-year limitations period from the date the claim accrues and a five-year deadline from the date of the security’s issuance or sale. Id. § 17-12a509(j). The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968 similarly makes a securities seller “liable to the person who purchases a security,” Cal. Corp.Code § 25501, when the security has been sold or offered “by means of any written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact” or is “misleading,” id. § 25401. California’s deadlines for securities claims are similar to those in Kansas: two years from a plaintiffs discovery “of the facts constituting the violation,” or five years from “the act or transaction constituting the violation.” Id. § 25506(b). 3. Time limits specific to NCUA: the Extender Statute The Federal Credit Union Act (“FCUA”), enacted in 1934, governs the regulation of federally chartered credit unions. It established NCUA as an independent agency charged with regulating federally chartered credit unions and set the terms of federal insurance coverage for credit union accounts. If NCUA finds that a credit union is insolvent, or in some circumstances if it is undercapitalized, FCUA directs NCUA to place the credit union in conservatorship or liquidation and appoint itself as conservator or liquidating agent. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A). As conservator or liquidating agent, the Board steps into the shoes of the credit union and succeeds to “all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the credit union.” Id. § 1787(b)(2)(A)®. In the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIR-REA”). FIRREA’s purpose is to strengthen government regulation of federally chartered or insured financial organizations. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844, 856, 116 S.Ct. 2432,135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996). FIRREA contains provisions often referred to as “extender statutes,” which extend the time period for a government regulator to bring “any action” on behalf of a failed financial organization. FIRREA has two such provisions with identical language. One applies to NCUA, 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14), and the other to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), NCUA’s counterpart that regulates banks, id. § 1821(d)(14). See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86, 114 S.Ct. 2048,129 L.Ed.2d 67 (1994) (describing the FDIC extender statute). The NCUA Extender Statute is titled “Statute of limitations for actions brought by conservator or liquidating agent.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14). It reads: (A) In general Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Board as conservator or liquidating agent shall be— (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of— (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of— (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of the Board as conservator or liquidating agent; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. Before FIRREA, Securities Act claims brought by the federal government were subject to the limitations provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (“Section 2415”). See, e.g., FDIC v. Bachman, 894 F.2d 1238, 1237 (10th Cir.1990). Section 2415 is the default federal statute of limitations for all actions brought by the federal government when no other statute of limitations applies. Id. It reads, in relevant part: § 2415. Time for commencing actions brought by the United States (a) ... [Ejxcept as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues .... (b) ... [Ejxcept as otherwise provided by Congress, every action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon a tort shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within three years after the right of action first accrues .... Congress modeled the two FIRREA extender statutes after Section 2415. Early drafts of FIRREA legislation expressly incorporated “the [limitations] period provided for in sectionf j 2415.” S. 774, 101st Cong. § 212 (as passed by Senate, Apr. 19, 1989) (early version of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)), available at 1989 WL 1178231, at *44. Later drafts of FIRREA featured separate limitations provisions, which were eventually enacted in their current form, and we refer to them as the extender statutes. In the FIRREA extender statutes, Congress maintained the basic structure of Section 2415, with a three-year limitations period for tort claims and a six-year period for contract claims. But Congress omitted some portions of Section 2415 from the FIRREA extender statutes. In particular, the phrase “except as otherwise provided by Congress,” which appears in Section 2415, does not appear in the extender statutes. Compare 12 U.S.C.- §§ 1787(b)(14), 1821(d)(14), with 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)-(b); see also FDIC v. Thayer Ins. Agency, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 745, 748 (D.Kan:1991) (recognizing the connection between Section 2415 and the FIRREA extender statutes and describing the latter as “an amended version of the limitations period found in 28 U.S.C. § 2415[ ].”). In addition to FIRREA’s two extender statutes, several other extender statutes have been enacted. In 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), which contained an extender statute for any action brought by the Federal Housing Finance Administration (“FHFA”) on behalf of a failed government-sponsored entity, such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12). Another extender statute appears in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). 42 U.S.C. § 9658. This limitations provision, often referred to as “CERCLA § 309,” establishes a federally mandated commencement date for state-law limitations periods on certain claims and provides a minimum time frame for plaintiffs to bring claims regardless of State law. B. Factual History 1. Case No. 12-3295: RMBS purchased by U.S. Central The first of the two consolidated cases in this appeal involves 11 defendants, 29 RMBS certificates, and one of the two credit unions, U.S. Central. On behalf of U.S. Central Credit, NCUA alleged the defendants violated Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 772(a)(2). NCUA also alleged that one defendant violated the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. § 17-12a509. U.S. Central was the largest federally chartered corporate credit union in the country before it failed. In 2006 and 2007, U.S. Central invested in RMBS. It purchased 29 RMBS certificates issued by 10 of the defendants and underwritten and sold by Defendant RBS Securities Inc. When U.S. Central made these purchases, nearly all certificates were assigned the highest possible investment rating, indicating they were low-risk investments. But over the next four’ years, most of the certificates performed so poorly that their credit ratings were “downgraded to well below investment grade.” Appx. at 305. In other words, the certificates were reclassified to a credit rating commonly referred to as “junk” grade. See Cody v. SEC, 693 F.3d 251, 255 (1st Cir.2012). 2. Case No. 12-3298: RMBS purchased by U.S. Central and WesCorp The second of the two consolidated cases involves one defendant, five RMBS certificates, and two credit unions, U.S. Central and WesCorp. On behalf of the credit unions, NCUA alleged violations of Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Cal. Corp.Code §§ 25401, 25501, and the Kansas Uniform Securities Act, K.S.A. § 17-12a509. The credit unions purchased these RMBS certificates in 2006. NCUA alleged that U.S. Central and WesCorp relied on misleading statements in the offering documents that the five RMBS certificates were “extremely safe.” Aplee. Br. at 8. As with the first case, the RMBS were highly rated at the time of purchase but experienced a “surge in borrower delinquencies and defaults,” resulting in significant losses and a “collapse[]” of their credit ratings. Appx. at 375-76. 3.Both cases According to NCUA, by “May 2011, nearly half (45.73%) of the mortgage collateral across all of the [RMBS] ... was in delinquency, bankruptcy, foreclosure, or was ... [owned by a bank or lending institution] after a failed sale at a foreclosure auction.” Id. at 303. This resulted in staggering losses for the credit unions. Together, the credit unions paid $1.74 billion for the RMBS involved in both cases, and losses from these failed investments contributed to the demise of both organizations. NCUA placed both credit unions in conservatorship in March 2009, then in involuntary liquidation in October 2010. After taking over the credit unions, NCUA began investigating these RMBS. It reviewed the offering documents, which had represented that “[t]he mortgage loans [had] been originated generally in accordance with” industry underwriting standards, Appx. at 307, and that the mortgages in the RMBS pool had “zero or near zero delinquencies and defaults,” id. at 302. NCUA concluded that at the time the RMBS certificates were sold, they were “significantly riskier than represented in the [offering [documents” and that “a material percentage of the borrowers whose mortgages comprised the [RMBS] were all but certain to become delinquent or [in] default shortly after origination.” Id. at 301-02 (quotations omitted). NCUA further concluded that the offering documents contained materially false and misleading statements about the credit worthiness of the mortgage borrowers and the underwriting practices used by originators of the mortgages. NCUA claims these materially false and misleading statements concealed underwriters’ “shoddy” practices and “systematic disregard[ ]” of their own guidelines and industry standards. Id. at 305, 308-09 & n. 1. C. Procedural History In June 2011, NCUA filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on behalf of U.S. Central, naming 11 defendants. In November 2011, NCUA filed a separate complaint in the same court on behalf of both U.S. Central and WesCorp against a single defendant, Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC, alleging similar violations of federal and state securities laws concerning the five RMBS certificates purchased by both credit unions. The two cases were consolidated in the district court in June 2012. Most of the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss both cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting multiple grounds for dismissal, including timeliness. In July 2012, the district court granted the motion to dismiss as to some claims unrelated to this appeal and denied the motion as to other claims. The district court certified certain issues for interlocutory appeal in November 2012, and we granted a petition for interlocutory appeal over NCUA’s objection. The scope of this interlocutory appeal is limited to the meaning of the Extender Statute. II. DISCUSSION Defendants make two arguments that NCUA’s claims are untimely. First, they argue that the Extender Statute does not apply to repose periods and that Section 13’s three-year period is a repose period. Under this theory, the Securities Act claims would be untimely because NCUA brought them more than three years after the RMBS were offered and purchased. Second, Defendants argue that the Extender Statute covers only state common law claims. Under this theory, the Extender Statute would not apply to any of NCUA’s claims — all of which are statutory. We consider these questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United, States v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611, 614 (10th Cir.2008). A. Does the Extender Statute Apply to Section 13’s Three-Year Period? As discussed above, Section 13 sets forth two separate t