Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION......................................................255 II.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................257 III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................264 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW..............................................265 V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.....................................266 VI. SUMMARY OF THE LAW..............................................267 A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.........................267 B. Redress and the Statute of Limitations under the IDEA.................269 C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ................................271 D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...................................................273 E. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Relevant Regulations of the Department of Education..................•........................274 F. Americans with Disabilities Act.......................................275 G. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence...........................................275 H. Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Defenses .............276 1. Claim Preclusion................................................276 2. Application of Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) in Class Actions.....277 I. Standing ..........................................................278 VII. ANALYSIS............................................................280 A. The Effect of the Gaskin Settlement on the Claims Against the PDE.....281 B. Whether CBP Has Standing in this suit ...............................282 C. The Blunts and the 90-day Statute of Limitations under the IDEA, as Revised by the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004 ............................................................291 D. Whether Appellants Established a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination ...................................................293 1. Rejection of Certain Evidence by the District Court and Alleged Impermissible Reliance on Other Evidence Without a Daubert Hearing......................................................294 a. The MAP Presentation.......................................295 b. Daniel Reschley’s Report.....................................295 2. Whether the District Court Properly Viewed the Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Plaintiffs as Non-Movants and Whether Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination................................................296 3. Statistical Evidence .............................................299 VIII. CONCLUSION ................. .....................................301 I. INTRODUCTION In what may be an oversimplification, we introduce our opinion on this appeal by setting forth that the central controversy is a dispute over whether African American students in the Lower Merion School District (“LMSD”) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully brought this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and state law, claiming that African American students in the LMSD suffered from such discrimination. They now appeal from portions of the District Court’s orders on federal issues entered at various times during the course of the litigation. We, however, are not concerned with the substance of the state law claims on this appeal as the District Court did not exercise jurisdiction over those claims. This case encompasses a myriad of legal issues, including standing to bring suit, application of a statute of limitations, res judicata (claim preclusion), application of disability laws, appropriateness of education provided to students, anti-discrimination laws, and sections of the Code of Federal Regulations implementing the applicable laws. The case on appeal also includes a cross-appeal by the LMSD, but we will dismiss the cross-appeal without deciding it on the merits as it is moot. The District Court found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to survive LMSD’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination charges and the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ other claims for other reasons. Thus, the Court did not find that there had been any violations of federal law. Plaintiffs, now appellants, appeal from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order granting a final summary judgment to defendant LMSD and against all the plaintiffs in the case remaining at the time that the Court granted summary judgment, the Court already having dismissed several of the parties and claims from the case by previous orders. Appellants also appeal from rulings in two intermediate orders that became final at the time of the entry of the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, namely: the dismissal of all claims of plaintiffs, now appellants, Amber Blunt, a now former student at LMSD, and Crystal and Michael Blunt, her parents, in the District Court’s memorandum and order of February 15, 2008, the “February 15, 2008 Order”; the dismissal of all plaintiffs’ claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”) in the District Court’s order and memorandum of August 19, 2009, the “August 19, 2009 Order”; and the dismissal of plaintiff Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc. (“CBP”) as a party in the District Court’s August 19, 2009 Order for lack of standing. Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 1. Plaintiffs, with the exception of the CBP and the mainline branch of the NAACP (the “NAACP”), are present and past African American students of the Lower Mer-ion Township public schools, who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” under the IDEA and/or those students’ parents. The plaintiffs repeatedly used the term “disabled” to describe the student plaintiffs throughout the pleadings, a term consistent with the IDEA, a statute under which they were making claims, as the IDEA safeguards the rights of disabled students. Nevertheless, at this stage in the litigation some appellants argue that the LMSD incorrectly identified them as learning disabled, thereby causing them injury. Appellants claim that their placement in remedial classes had a negative impact on their opportunity for educational advancement, but by the time of the proceedings on the motion for summary judgment they were seeking relief in the District Court only pursuant to Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellants’ case is largely based on their contention that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias. Ultimately, the summary judgment question turns on whether there is enough record evidence to establish that LMSD intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs, whether through its own actions or by failing to correct a third party’s intentional discrimination. Looking at the whole record, which includes statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent. There is no evidence showing that the District intended to discriminate against plaintiffs, nor that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students as a form of intentional discrimination. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This suit has had many plaintiffs and defendants, though some have come and gone, and includes many related issues and claims. We now are dealing with what is left of this litigation by entertaining the present appeals which have been consolidated with the cross-appeal in this Court under No. 11-4200. The plaintiffs filed the original complaint on July 30, 2007. At that time the plaintiffs were current or former students in the LMSD, four parents, and the two organizations that we have identified. The original defendants were the LMSD and two of its officials in their official capacity. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. I. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on September 26, 2007, adding three plaintiffs (two current or former students in the LMSD and one parent) and several defendants, including the Lower Merion School Board, its President, Vice President, and various members of the Board (together, the “School Board”), the Pennsylvania Department of Education (the “PDE”), and two of its officials. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 10. Inasmuch as the LMSD and the School Board have the same interest in this case and are represented by the same attorneys, we sometimes refer to them together as the LMSD. The plaintiffs named the PDE as a defendant because they believed that it failed to meet the supervisory, monitoring and compliance procedural obligations that federal law imposed on it. The FAC concerned, inter alia, as appellants indicate in one of their briefs, “a decision of the Pennsylvania Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel (the ‘Appeals Panel’) pursuant to the IDEA.” Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 8-9; see also J.A. vol. 2, at 91-151. As stated above, the original complaint alleged that the defendants violated the IDEA, 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (regarding the monitoring requirements imposed on states receiving federal funds for education of students with disabilities), the ADA, § 504 of the RA, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all premised on the theory that plaintiffs had learning disabilities for which LMSD had not made adequate provisions. The FAC invoked the same legal theories/statutes as the original complaint. J.A. vol. 2, at 91-151. On October 8, 2007, LMSD and the School Board filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the CBP and NAACP did not have standing, and the FAC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They also contended that the IDEA action was untimely. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 11. On November 19, 2007, the PDE filed a motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 21-22; J.A. vol. 2, at 284. PDE argued that the Blunt plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the IDEA’S statute of limitations and that the other individual student plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA. Id. The PDE further argued that its sovereign immunity barred the state law claims asserted against it, and that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against it. Id. On February 15, 2008, the District Court entered an order dismissing various plaintiffs and claims from the FAC. The Court methodically eliminated each federal law claim that the Blunt plaintiffs made against each defendant. In particularly significant holdings that we address at length below, the Court held that a 90-day statute of limitations in the IDEA barred the Blunts’ claims under the IDEA, RA, and ADA and that a separate two-year statute of limitations barred their other claims. Consequently, the order dismissed the Blunts’ federal claims in their entirety, although their state law claims remained. See No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 9; see also J.A. vol. I, at 42.42-42.45. The Court also determined that the individual plaintiffs, other than the Blunts, had not sought an administrative remedy for their IDEA claims, and therefore it dismissed the IDEA claims of the remaining individual plaintiffs against the LMSD defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.16. However, the Court found that the individual plaintiffs did not need to exhaust administrative remedies with •respect to their claims against the PDE because Pennsylvania regulations provide for administrative resolution of disputes between students, their parents, and their representatives and school districts, but do not provide for administrative resolution of similar disputes with the Commonwealth. Id. at 42.17. The District Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims (other than the Blunts’ claims) against the LMSD and the School Board for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, reasoning that the claims were based on the same allegations as plaintiffs’ IDEA claims and that, if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, it would have been available through the IDEA administrative dispute process. Id. at 42.18-42. 19. The Court noted that “[t]he parties agree[d]” regarding the exhaustion requirement for those claims. Id. The Court found, however, that the IDEA exhaustion requirement did not bar plaintiffs’ claims under Title VI because, unlike the IDEA, Title VI does not “focus on ‘the rights of children with disabilities.’ ” Id. at 42. 19. The Court also did not find that the plaintiffs needed to exhaust their § 1983 claims administratively. In addition, as we indicated above, the District Court concluded that the NAACP and CBP lacked standing as plaintiffs. Id. at 42.33. The Court also found that the counts against individual defendants in their official capacity (as representatives of the other defendants, LMSD, the School Board and PDE) were duplicative, and therefore it dismissed the FAC against those individuals to “simplify!] the litigation in a way that does not cause any prejudice to plaintiffs.” Id. at 42.35-42.36. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) on July 8, 2008, adding two plaintiffs, one parent and one student. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 49. The SAC, in accord with the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order, removed as defendants the School Board members previously so-named in their official capacities. But the SAC continued to name the School Board in its caption though it did not make allegations against the School Board in its body. The SAC, however, included the PDE and two of its officials as defendants. The SAC continued to name the Blunts as plaintiffs, despite the circumstance that the Court had dismissed all of their federal claims in its February 15, 2008 Order. The SAC also added several paragraphs discussing the CBP’s alleged increase of expenditures that it attributed to “the inferior quality of LMSD’s dual system of education.” Moreover, the SAC named several persons who the CBP claimed were members of that organization in a clear attempt to demonstrate that the CBP had standing. SAC at 34-36. In addition, the SAC added six paragraphs regarding plaintiff NAACP’s expenditure of resources in addressing alleged issues with the LMSD. SAC at 37-38. The plaintiffs filed a third and final amended complaint (“TAC”) on August 5, 2008. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 55; J.A. vol. 9, 3847-97. The plaintiffs remained the same in the TAC as previously except that one parent was no longer a plaintiff. The TAC, however, no longer named two officials of the School Board as defendants, and it did not name the officials of the PDE that the plaintiffs previously had named as defendants. The TAC continued to list the School Board as a named defendant in the caption, and the PDE and LMSD remained named defendants in both the caption and the body of the TAC. Despite the District Court’s dismissal of all of the Blunts’ federal claims in the complaint in its February 15, 2008 Order, the TAC included them again in Count VI against the LMSD and the School Board pursuant to the Pennsylvania Public School Code, 22 Pa.Code § 14.102 et. seq. Plaintiffs sought widespread in-junctive relief and “compensatory damages each on their own behalf to offset the deprivations of an appropriate education to which they are entitled.” TAC at 3, para. 6; J.A. vol. 9, at 3849. The LMSD and the School Board filed an answer to the TAC and a separate motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 15, 2008. The PDE filed an answer to the TAC on August 19, 2008. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 58. On August 15, 2008, the LMSD and the School Board filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings addressed to the Blunts’ remaining state law claims, which the Blunts formally opposed on August 29, 2008. J.A. vol. 3, at 561-72, 575-89. The District Court issued a Memorandum and Order on November 18, 2008, (the “November 18, 2008 Order”), in which it noted that the motion incorrectly had been styled as a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, when it was really a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court granted the motion, finding that it did not have supplemental jurisdiction over the Blunts’ state law claims and that there was not a common nucleus of operative fact between her claims and those of the other students. J.A. vol. 3, at 597. On December 22, 2008, the remaining plaintiffs moved for class certification. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 64. After the parties briefed the issues, the District Court held a hearing on the motion on July 21. 2009. Id., Doc. No. 122. By an order of August 19, 2009, (the “August 19, 2009 Order”), the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Appellants’ No. 11-4200 br. at 39), again dismissed the claims brought by the CBP and the NAACP for lack of standing, and found that a prior court-entered settlement agreement reached in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F.Supp.2d 628 (E.D.Pa.2005), barred all claims against the PD E, which it therefore dismissed from the case. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.46-42.69. In concluding that CBP lacked standing, the District Court found that it did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, and did not suffer an injury giving it standing. Rather, “[i]ts injuries [we]re more akin to an abstract, ideological interest in the litigation as opposed to the necessary ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the controversy necessary to confer standing.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.52. In addition, the Court reasoned that CBP did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members because, according to CBP’s bylaws, it did not have any members. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.53-54; August 19, 2009 Order at 9 (“The corporation’s bylaws specifically state ‘the Corporation shall have no members.’ In light of this express statement in a formal document governing the conduct of the corporation, we find that it does not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members because it has none.”). J.A. vol. 1, at 42.54. The District Court also dismissed the claims against the PDE because the settlement agreement that the parties had reached in Gaskin barred this action against the PD E. The Court noted that Gaskin was similar to this action, as 12 students with disabilities and 11 disability advocacy groups brought that case against the PD E, among others, pursuant to the IDEA, § 504 of the RA, and Title II of the ADA. The Gaskin plaintiffs made similar (although not identical) allegations as those in this case, alleging that the defendants failed to provide disabled students the opportunity to participate in regular education classrooms, provided insufficient supplementary aids and services, and generally failed to provide them with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). J.A. vol. 1, at 42.63, 42.67. Though the Court acknowledged that the Gaskin complaint had not alleged racial discrimination as “the basis for the improper treatment of those with learning disabilities,” the Court nonetheless held that the causes of action in Gaskin and here arose from the same “common nucleus of operative facts.” The Court therefore concluded that the release included in the Gaskin settlement agreement, which by its terms was effective for five years from September 19, 2005, to September 19, 2010, barred the claims in this case because the plaintiffs brought this action and individual plaintiffs in this action were evaluated and identified as learning disabled during this period. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.67, 42.68; Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 19:9-22. Significantly, the class of plaintiffs in the Gaskin litigation was very broad and included “all present and future school age students with disabilities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” On April 5, 2011, the District Court denied a motion by LMSD to amend its answer to the plaintiffs’ TAC to include an additional defense based on releases that certain plaintiffs signed after the LMSD filed its answer in this case because the Court believed that the LMSD unreasonably had delayed making the motion. J.A. vol. 1, at 46-47. LMSD has filed a cross-appeal from the order but, as will be seen, this appeal is moot and thus we do not address it. The LMSD filed a motion for summary judgment on July 15, 2011, (No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 159), and it is that motion that has led to the order at the heart of this appeal. The parties filed numerous documents in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on the motion, at which time the Court afforded all parties the opportunity to present their arguments. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 174,183. On October 20, 2011, the District Court made three docket entries, two of which were orders and a third which is the memorandum explaining the basis for those orders (collectively, the “October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order”). No. 2:07-ev-3100, Doc. Nos. 180-82. In the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to partially exclude and/or limit the report and testimony of Daniel J. Reschly, Ph.D., a witness for the LMSD, as moot. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 181. The Court’s principal order granted summary judgment to the LMSD against all remaining plaintiffs in the action. J.A. vol. 1, at 1-39; also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 182. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to put forth any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the LMSD intentionally segregated the students on the basis of race into inferior educational programs in violation of Title VI. J.A. vol. 1, at 30-32. The Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they had not established that the LMSD had engaged in purposeful discrimination and had not been deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights. J.A. vol. 1, at 33-34. The District Court noted in particular that plaintiffs were required to “raise at least some reasonable inference that they were placed into classes and offered services by the [LMSD] due to intentional discrimination based on their race and not simply due to errors in evaluation.” The Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to support this inference with sufficient evidence, and had not put forth more than a scintilla of evidence that the LMSD had acted with a racially discriminatory purpose in identifying them as disabled and placing them in special education courses (regardless of whether this identification was correct or not). They also failed to identify an official policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights. J.A. vol. 1, at 32-36; also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 180. On November 18, 2011, the Blunt plaintiffs and the CBP filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order. J.A. vol. 1, at 40-42. In an attempt to preserve their right to appeal from all of the Court’s dispositive orders, their November 18, 2011 notice of appeal stated that “[w]ithout limiting their right to appeal any particular order rendered during District Court proceedings, Plaintiffs listed herein specifically appeal the following orders.” The notice of appeal then went on to challenge the February 15, 2008 Order dismissing the Blunts’ claims under the IDEA and the District Court’s orders of February 15, 2008, and August 19, 2009, as they pertained to CBP and its lack of standing. J.A. vol. 1, at 40-42; see also No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 186. Also on November 18, 2011, plaintiffs Linda Johnson, Lydia Johnson, Dur-rell/Hall, Dudley/Whiteman, Allston, Coleman, and Muse/Griffm filed an appeal generally from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order. Their notice of appeal specifically cited the District Court’s order of August 19, 2009, in which the Court dismissed the claims against defendant PD E, an order of October 20, 2011, entering the summary judgment in favor of LMSD, and an order of October 20, 2011, denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to preclude expert testimony. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 187. On December 1, 2011, LMSD filed a cross-appeal from the portion of the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order which denied LMSD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VI claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, as we have indicated, the District Court’s April 5, 2011 denial of its motion to amend its answer to the TAC. J.A. vol. 1, at 43-45; 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 123-24. III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal law claims pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the Court had supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We, however, do not determine whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the state law claims because no party contends that the Court erred in not exercising jurisdiction over those claims. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW It is well established that we employ a plenary standard in reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.2009)); Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d Cir.2001); see also Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir.2013); Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Beazer E., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir.1992)). Inasmuch as our review is plenary, “[w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record,” even if the court did not rely on those grounds. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir.2000). In considering an order entered on a motion for summary judgment, “we view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Babbitt, 63 F.3d at 236. As we also have explained, “[a] factual dispute is material if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiffs claim, and is genuine if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir.2002) (in turn quoting Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir.2002))). However, where a non-moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir.2007). Further, mere allegations are insufficient, and “[o]nly evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfin-der to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case merits consideration beyond the Rule 56 stage.” Id. (quoting and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We review a district court’s determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir.2001) (“Where a party makes known the substance of the evidence it desires to introduce, we review the District Court’s decision to exclude the evidence for an abuse of discretion.”) (citing Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 334 (3d Cir.2000)). There is an abuse of discretion if the district court’s decision “ ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’ ” Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Merritt Logan, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., Inc, 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir.1990)) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir.2000)). “An abuse of discretion can also occur ‘when no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.’ We will not interfere with the district court’s exercise of discretion ‘unless there is a definite and firm eonviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’ ” Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146 (internal citations omitted). It is also well established that we review de novo a district court’s determination of a party’s standing to bring suit, as a court makes a determination of whether a party has standing on a legal basis, at least where, as here, the determination does not depend on the court’s resolution of a factual dispute. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 218 (3d Cir.2013); Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir.2009). Judgments of a court applying the IDEA’S statute of limitations but not resolving disputes of fact are subject to plenary review as conclusions of law, but “whether [plaintiffs] proved an exception to the [IDEA] statute of limitations, and whether the [School] District fulfilled its FA PE obligations ... are subject to clear error review as questions of fact. Such [fjactual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct, and if [we] do[ ] not adhere to those findings, we must explain why.” D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting P.P. ex. rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir.2009); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir.2003)). When a district court reviews an administrative law judge’s decision, a court of appeals exercises plenary review over the court’s legal conclusions, and reviews its findings of fact with a “modified de novo” standard of review (giving the administrative factual findings “due weight” and considering them to be prima facie correct) for clear error. Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 266. However, we do not make such an analysis here, as the issue before us with respect to the Blunts, the only appellants who exhausted their administrative remedies, is whether the District Court correctly dismissed their case on the grounds that they brought it beyond the period allowed by the statute of limitations. The resolution of that issue would not be aided by administrative expertise. V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL Though the District Court made many rulings, the appellants have appealed only from some of them. Accordingly, we are able to summarize the issues on this appeal as follows: 1. Did the District Court correctly dismiss the action against the PDE on the basis of res judicata (claim preclusion)? 2. Did the District Court correctly conclude that CBP did not have standing as a plaintiff in this action? 3. Does the IDEA’S 90-day statute of limitations, in which a party adversely affected by an administrative determination of an IDEA claim may bring a state or federal suit, enacted on December 3, 2004, and effective July 1, 2005, apply to bar the Blunts’ federal action, given that they first began the administrative judicial process on April 8, 2005, when the IDEA’S statute of limitations for bringing a claim in state or federal court after receiving an adverse administrative determination was two years, and they received their final adverse administrative disposition on August 31, 2005, almost two months after the new 90-day statute of limitations came into effect, and almost nine months after Congress enacted it? 4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in how it treated certain evidence that plaintiffs offered by not giving it greater weight and not considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs when the Court considered and granted the motion for summary judgment made by the LMSD and, on the other hand, in how it treated certain evidence that LMSD offered for consideration on that motion? 5. Did plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VI and § 1983 such that summary judgment was inappropriate? VI. SUMMARY OF THE LAW A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Congress enacted the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., with the goal of “improving educational results for children with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). The congressional findings and purposes section of the IDEA is quite broad and sets forth in great detail Congress’ intention in adopting the IDEA. Each public school district in a state that accepts federal funds under IDEA has a continuing obligation, called the “child find” requirement, to identify and evaluate all students reasonably believed to have a disability, and each state receiving funds must establish procedures to effectuate this requirement. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M. R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir.2012). As we pointed out in Ridley, Pennsylvania has set forth child find procedures in 22 Pa.Code §§ 14.121 through 14.125. Id. States receiving federal funding for assistance in the education of children with disabilities under the IDEA are responsible for providing a FA PE to any students who are identified as learning disabled until they reach 21 years of age. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.2; Jonathan H. v. Souder-ton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 528 (3d Cir.2009); Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 272. As we explained in Ridley: A FAPE consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction. Although a state is not required to maximize the potential of every handicapped child, it must supply an education that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit to the child. [T]he provision of merely more than a trivial educational benefit is insufficient. 680 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir.2006)). In providing a FA PE to a disabled student, school districts must work with the student’s parents to create an individualized education plan (“IEP”), containing certain elements that the Code of Federal Regulations specifies must be made available to each disabled student. We have explained the balance between reasonable goals for the IEP and a parent’s fondest hopes for the parent’s child as follows: Under the IDEA, school districts must work with parents to design an IEP, which is a program of individualized instruction for each special education student. ‘Each IEP must include an assessment of the child’s current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide.’ Although the IEP must provide the student with a ‘basic floor of opportunity,’ it does not have to provide ‘the optimal level of services,’ or incorporate every program requested by the child’s parents .... [T]he IDEA guarantees to a disabled child ‘an education that is appropriate, not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents’.... ‘[A]t a minimum, the IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential,’ and ‘individual abilities.’ Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (internal citations omitted). Congress amended the IDEA through the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004 to require that an IEP include “a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child.” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (emphasis in original) (quoting and citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(IV))- Because neither the text of the IDEA nor the regulations promulgated under it provided guidance regarding the peer-review research provision, we looked to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations for guidance, and determined (1) that although schools should strive to base a student’s IEP on peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the student’s IEP team must be allowed to be flexible in devising an appropriate program for any particular student in light of the available research; and (2) courts must accord significant deference to the choices made by school officials as to what constitutes an appropriate program for each student. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 277 (citing 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,665 (2006); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556-57 (3d Cir.2010); Ridgwood, 172 F.3d at 247). B. Redress and the Statute of Limitations under the IDEA “If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their child with a FAPE, they may request an administrative ‘impartial due process hearing,’ ” as may a school district if it wants to change an existing IEP or seeks an evaluation without the parents’ consent. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 269-70 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53, 126 S.Ct. at 532). The burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing under the IDEA lies with the party seeking relief. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. at 537. Similarly, the party judicially challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the finding for each claim challenged. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 270. On December 3, 2004, Congress revised the IDEA with the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004, which included a two-year statute of limitations governing the time during which an aggrieved party may file a request for an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA. P.L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(c). The two-year period runs from the date that the parent knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for the complaint. The same two-year statute of limitations for bringing administrative claims also applies to other legal claims premised on the IDEA, such as claims under § 504 of the RA, or claims “invoking Child Find and FAPE duties.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (quoting P.P. ex. rel. Michael P., 585 F.3d at 734). In the same legislation, Congress shortened the statute of limitations to 90 days for a party dissatisfied with the result of the administrative proceedings to bring a federal or state judicial action to challenge that result. Though Congress mandated that these new statutes of limitations were to be retroactive, it delayed their effective dates until July 1, 2005. In 2010, we determined that the seven-month “grace period” between the enactment of the two-year statute of limitations and its effective date provided litigants with reasonable notice and opportunity to bring claims, so that it was not unfair to impose the new statute of limitations and thus the period that the limitations period allowed was not impermissibly short. Steven I. v. Cent. BucksSch. Dist., 618 F.Bd 411, 415-16 (3d Cir.2010). We further explained that “all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by them, [and] a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Id. at 416 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we noted that the Supreme Court has upheld retroactive adjustments to a limitations period only when the legislature has provided a grace period during which the potential plaintiff could reasonably be expected to learn of the change in the law and then initiate his action. In the context of a retrospective statute of limitations, a reasonable grace period provides an adequate guarantee of fairness. Having suffered the triggering event of an injury, a potential plaintiff is likely to possess a heightened alertness to the possibly changing requirements of the law bearing on his claim. Id. at 417 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 549, 102 S.Ct. 781, 802, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An IDEA claimant’s right to redress does not end with the administrative review process, for any aggrieved party who received an adverse administrative determination regarding his or her complaints with respect to IDEA compliance may bring an action in a “[s]tate court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), within 90 days of the final administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Prior to the amendment of the IDEA shortening the limitations period, the time for bringing suit in a state or federal court after receiving an adverse administrative determination had been two years. The amendment adopting the 90-day statute of limitations passed by Congress on December 3, 2004, became effective July 1, 2005, seven months after its enactment. This 90-day statute of limitations period begins running on “the date of the decision of the [administrative] hearing officer.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see also Jonathan H., 562 F.3d at 530 (“Section 1415(i)(2)(B) limits a party’s right to ‘bring an action’ to within 90 days after the final administrative decision.”). As with ADA claims, a party seeking redress under the IDEA must exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action seeking redress in a state or federal court. See Komninos by Komninos v. Up per Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984)); see also I.M. ex rel. C.C. v. Northampton Pub. Schs., 869 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Mass.2012) (“Plaintiffs’ conceded failure to exhaust their administrative remedies with regard to the ADA-grounded claim and/or appeal such a decision within 90 days is fatal to its present viability.”). We have explained that the policy of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is strong but it has some very limited exceptions, namely: • where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate (see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S.Ct. 592, 606, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)); • where the issue presented is a purely legal question; • where the administrative agency cannot grant relief (for example, due to lack of authority); and • an emergency situation, such as where exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause ‘severe or irreparable harm’ to the litigant. Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778-79. Nonetheless, we have cautioned that “[t]he advantages of awaiting completions of the administrative hearings are particularly weighty in Disabilities Education Act cases. That process offers an opportunity for state and local agencies to exercise discretion and expertise in fields in which they have substantial experience.... [Therefore], courts should be wary of foregoing the benefits to be derived from a thorough development of the issues in the administrative proceeding.” Id. at 779-80. We have explained that “the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme” and “includes a judicial remedy for violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [a] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.’ ” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir.2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)). C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI further provides, in relevant part, that the guidelines and criteria established by Title VI “dealing with conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States ... whatever the origin or cause of such segregation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(a). The application of Title VI to recipients of federal assistance through the Department of Education, as explained in the Code of Federal Regulations is especially germane to this case: (a) General. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, col- or, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies. (b) Specific discriminatory actions prohibited. (1) A recipient under any program to which this part applies may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, on ground of race, col- or, or national origin: (i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided under the program; (ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to others under the program; (iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any matter related to his receipt of any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program; (iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program; (v)Treat an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies any admission, enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership or other requirement or condition which individuals must meet in order to be provided any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided under the program; 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a), (b)(l)(i)-(b)(l)(v). Private individuals who bring suits under Title VI may not recover compensatory relief unless they show that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597, 607, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3230, 3235, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1517-18, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (reaffirming that private individuals cannot recover compensatory damages under Title VI except in cases of intentional discrimination). Recently, we held that plaintiffs bringing claims under the ADA and RA may establish intentional discrimination with a showing of deliberate indifference. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir.2013). Given the parallels between Title VI and the statutes at issue in S.H., our rationale for adopting deliberate indifference as a form of intentional discrimination in S.H. applies with equal force in the Title VI context. We explained that the deliberate indifference standard was “better suited to the remedial goals of the RA and the ADA,” id. at 264, which is also true for Title VI given that the remedies available for violations of Title VI are coextensive with those available under the ADA and the RA, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 2100, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002). Other courts of appeals to have considered the issue agree that deliberate indifference may, in certain circumstances, establish intentional discrimination for the purposes of a Title VI claim. See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 664-65 (2d Cir.2012) (explaining that deliberate indifference to teacher or peer harassment of individual may create liability if a plaintiff establishes “(1) substantial control, (2) severe and discriminatory harassment, (3) actual knowledge, and (4) deliberate indifference”); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38 of Garvin Cnty., Ok., 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that “deliberate indifference to known instances of student-on-student racial harassment is a viable theory in a Title VI intentional discrimination suit”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir.1998) (finding that school district may violate Title VI if there is a racially hostile environment, the district had notice of the problem, and it failed to respond adequately). The Supreme Court, addressing claims under Title IX, explained that in order to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the school district had knowledge of the alleged misconduct and the power to correct it but nonetheless failed to do so. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645-49, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1672-74; S.H., 729 F.3d at 265. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient; “only actual knowledge is a predicate to liability.” Zeno, 702 F.3d at 666. D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s discriminatory action was purposeful: To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection, plaintiffs must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. They must demonstrate that they ‘received] different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated.’ Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). We further explained in Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 293 (3d Cir.2009): Our analysis yields the following conclusion: in order to establish municipal liability for selective enforcement of a facially viewpoint- and content-neutral regulation, a plaintiff whose evidence consists solely of the incidents of enforcement themselves must establish a pattern of enforcement activity evincing a governmental policy or custom of intentional discrimination on the basis of viewpoint or content. We also have explained that “[a]n essential element of a claim of selective treatment under the Equal Protection Clause is that the comparable parties were ‘similarly situated.’ Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike ‘in all relevant aspects.’ ” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir.2005)). E. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Relevant Regulations of the Department of Education Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., states, in relevant part:' No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, § 504 of the RA requires school districts receiving federal funding to provide a FAPE to each qualified handicapped person within the recipient’s jurisdiction. See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 274; see also Ridley, 680 F.3d at 280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W., 486 F.3d 791); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)-(b). We have explained that this means “a school district must reasonably accommodate the needs of the handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in educational activities and meaningful access to educational benefits.... However, § 504 does not mandate ‘substantial’ changes to the school’s programs, and courts ‘should be mindful of the need to strike a balance between the rights of the student and [his or her] parents and the legitimate financial and administrative concerns of the [s]chool [district.’ ” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 280-81 (internal citation omitted); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247; Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). On the other hand, mere administrative or fiscal convenience does not constitute a sufficient justification for providing separate or different services to a handicapped child. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 281 (citing Helen L. v. Di Dario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir.1995)). To establish that there has been a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the student was disabled; (2)(s)he was “otherwise qualified” to participate in school activities; (3) the school district received federal financial assistance; and (4) the student was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the educational program receiving the funds, or was subject to discrimination under the program. See id. at 280. F. Americans with Disabilities Act In a provision similar to the safeguards we have outlined above, Title II of the ADA provides, in relevant part: Subject to the provisions of this sub-chapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Code of Federal Regulations has effectuated the ADA by mandating that there be equal opportunity in benefits and services for disabled individuals. It provides, in relevant part, (b) (1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability— (ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others; (vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(h), (iii), (vii). We have explained that “the substantive standards for determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are the same.” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 282-83 (citing McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir.1995)). G. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence Inasmuch as we have recognized that individuals who violate the law based on discriminatory motives sometimes do not leave a trail of direct evidence, but instead “cover their tracks” by providing alternate explanations for their actions, we have found that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie factual foundation of discrimination by drawing reasonable inferences from certain objective facts that are generally not in dispute. See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162-63 (3d Cir.2001). In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, a Title VII employment discrimination case mentioned several times during oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court rejected defendants’ arguments that statistics never can establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Rather, the Court held that statistics, when bolstered by other evidence, may, depending on the circumstances, establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 431 U.S. 324, 338-40, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856-57, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). However, the Court cautioned that the “usefulness [of statistics] depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1856-57. Importantly, the Supreme Court has explained that neither the “courts or defendants [are] obliged to assume that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable,” and has cited, for example, the weaknesses inherent in small or incomplete data sets and/or inadequate statistical techniques. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. at 1857 n. 20 (“Considerations such as small sample size may, of course, detract from the value of such evidence.”). The Supreme Court also has rejected the use of particular standard deviations or “any alternative mathematical standard” in establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and has stressed that the significance or substantiality of numerical disparities must be judged on a case-by-case basis. “[S]uch a case-by-case approach properly reflects our recognition that statistics ‘come in infinite variety and ... their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.’ ” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. at 2789 n. 3 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Court has noted that its “formulations, which have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.” Id. at 995, 108 S.Ct. at 2789. H. Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Defenses 1. Claim Preclusion We have explained that [c]laim preclusion, formerly referred to as res judicata, gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities [sic]; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.—Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.1984)). In analyzing whether these three elements have been met, we “[do] not apply this conceptual test mechanically, but focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit. In so doing, we avoid piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir.1999) (inter