Full opinion text
OPINION KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendants Jon Husted, the Ohio Secretary of State, and Mike DeWine, the Ohio Attorney General, appeal from the district court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined the enforcement of Senate Bill 238 (“SB 238”) and Secretary of State Directive 2014-17, and ordered the restoration of additional early in-person (“EIP”) voting hours as set forth below on the basis that SB 238 and Directive 2014-17 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment granting the preliminary injunction. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History Plaintiffs, Ohio State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. (“NAACP”), filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on May 1, 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973 challenging the constitutionality and legality of SB 238 and Directive 2014-17. In their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs allege that SB 238 and Directive 2014-06 (now Directive 2014-17) (1) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the fundamental right to vote; and (2) violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by disproportionately burdening African American voters’ ability to participate effectively in the political process. On June 30, 2014, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to “enjoin the enforcement of ... Senate Bill 238 ... and require Defendant Husted to set uniform and suitable in-person early voting hours for all eligible voters that includes multiple Sundays and weekday evening hours.” R. 17 (Pis.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 61) (Page ID # 152). Following a hearing on August 11, 2014, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on September 4, 2014. R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 70) (Page ID # 5917). The district court’s order provided as follows: That the State of Ohio and the Secretary Husted are enjoined from enforcing and implementing SB 238’s amendments to § 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration; That, for purposes of the 2014 general election, the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election as was the case [prior] to SB 238’s enactment; That, for the 2014 general election, Defendant Secretary Husted shall require all Ohio county Boards of Election to set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours, in addition to those currently established by Directive 2014-17, for the following days: • Tuesday, September 30, 2014 through Friday, October 3, 2014; • Monday, October 6, 2014; • Evening voting hours between Monday, October 20, 2014 and Friday, October, 24, 2014, and between Monday, October 27, 2014 and Friday, October 31, 2014. Provided, that in setting such hours, Husted must, in good faith, take into consideration the Court’s findings and legal conclusions regarding the impact of a lack of evening voting hours on the protected classes of voters discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order; and • Sunday, October 26, 2014; and That Defendant Secretary Husted is enjoined from preventing individual county Boards of Election from adopting, by a majority vote of their members and in accordance with the procedures established by Ohio election law, EIP voting hours in addition to those specified above and in Directive 2014-17. Further, all issues regarding and pertaining to future elections are deferred and reserved for consideration on the motion for a permanent injunction. In the interim, the Ohio General [AJssembly is charged with the responsibility of passing legislation consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.... Id. at 70-71 (Page ID # 5917-18) (footnote omitted). Defendants timely appealed the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs and moved this court to expedite that appeal. After the district court denied Defendants’ motion for a stay of that order, Defendants moved this court to stay the order pending appeal. We granted Defendants’ motion to expedite the appeal on September 11, 2014, and denied their motion for a stay of the order granting a preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs on September 12, 2014. The Ohio General Assembly (“General Assembly”) filed a motion with the district court on July 11, 2014 to intervene in this case, which the district court denied on July 30. On August 1, the General Assembly filed a notice of appeal of that decision, which appeal is pending under case number 14-3756. After the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and after Defendants filed their notice of appeal in the instant case (appeal number 14-3877), the district court granted the General Assembly’s renewed motion to intervene, stating that the motion was granted “for the purpose of appeal only.” R. 75 (D. Ct. Order Granting General Assembly’s Intervention for Appeal) (Page ID # 5954). The General Assembly then filed a notice of appeal that is docketed as appeal number 14-3881. The General Assembly has filed a brief in appeal 14-3881. It has also filed a motion to file a brief instanter in 14-3877, which included an accompanying brief supporting Defendants’ appeal in this case. We do not address in this appeal whether the district court’s intervention decisions were proper, and we do not resolve appeals numbers 14-3756 and 14-3881. Nevertheless, we consider the arguments the General Assembly presented in the brief filed in 14-3881 as if it were filed as an amicus curiae brief in this case. Moreover, we also consider the arguments presented by amici curiae United States and Cuyahoga County in briefs filed in this case. B. Factual Background Ohio established early in-person voting largely in response to well-documented problems in administering the 2004 general election. As we explained in Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir.2012), “[djuring that election, Ohio voters faced long lines and wait-times that, at some polling places, stretched into the early morning of the following day.” Id. at 426. In League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir.2008), we summarized the problems the League of Women Voters of Ohio reported voters faced as follows: Voters were forced to wait from two to twelve hours to vote because of inadequate allocation of voting machines. Voting machines were not allocated proportionately to the voting population, causing more severe wait times in some counties than in others. At least one polling place, voting was not completed until 4:00 a.m. on the day following election day. Long wait times caused some voters to leave their polling places without voting in order to attend school, work, or to family responsibilities or because a physical disability prevented them from standing in line. Poll workers received inadequate training, causing them to provide incorrect instructions and leading to the discounting of votes. In some counties, poll workers misdirected voters to the wrong polling place, forcing them to attempt to vote multiple times and delaying them by up to six hours. Id. at 477-78. In sum, many voters in the 2004 general election were effectively disenfranchised and unable to vote. In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly passed Substitute House Bill 234 to remedy these problems. 2005 Ohio Laws 40 (Sub.H.B.234). HB 234 instituted no-fault early voting, eliminating the requirement that Ohio voters had to provide an excuse for not being able to vote on Election Day in order to vote early. Early voting is done via an “absentee ballot,” which may be cast either early in-person (“EIP”) at the voter’s Board of Elections’ (“BOE”) designated voting location or by mailing the ballot to the BOE. Ohio Rev.Code § 3509.05(A). Each county has one BOE, which is permitted to operate only one location for EIP voting. Id. § 3501.10(C). Under the 2005 early-voting scheme, the BOEs were required to make absentee ballots available for voters — either for EIP voting or by mail voting — no later than 35 days before the election. Id. § 3509.01(B)(2) (2014) (as amended Feb. 25, 2014). Ohio law requires voters to be registered at least 30 days prior to an election. Ohio Const. § 5.01; Ohio Rev. Code § 3503.01(A). Therefore, Ohio voters could register and vote on the same day for a five-day period that Plaintiffs refer to as “Golden Week.” Until 2012, Ohio law gave each of the BOEs for Ohio’s eighty-eight counties the discretion to set their own EIP voting hours. R. 62 (Parties’ Statement Undisputed Facts ¶ 6) (Page ID # 3307). Thus, for the 2008 and 2010 elections each BOE set its own EIP voting hours. Id. Several counties, including six counties with the highest African American populations in Ohio, offered early voting during the evenings and on multiple Sundays. Id. ¶ 8 (Page ID #3307); R. 65-3 (2010 Early Voting Days & Times) (Page ID #4576-84); R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 9) (Page ID # 5856). On August 15, 2012, Secretary Husted issued Directive 2012-35, which established uniform EIP voting hours for all BOEs for the 2012 general election. R. 62 (Parties’ Statement Undisputed Facts ¶ 15) (Page ID # 3308). Directive 2012-35 eliminated all weekend EIP voting hours. R. 18-34 (Directive 2012-35) (Page ID #527-28). It did provide for some evening EIP voting hours on ten weekdays in the last two weeks before Election Day. Id. Directive 2012-35 was challenged in separate litigation as violating the Equal Protection Clause because it allowed only military voters to vote EIP during the last three days before the election. In Obama for America, we upheld the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Directive regarding the last three days of EIP voting before the election; under the preliminary injunction local BOEs had discretion to set EIP voting hours for those days so long as those hours applied to all voters, not just military voters. 697 F.3d at 437. In the 2008, 2010, and 2012 elections, many Ohio voters took advantage of early voting. As we noted in Obama for America, in 2008 “approximately 1.7 million Ohioans cast their ballots before election day, amounting to 20.7% of registered voters and 29.7% of the total votes cast.... In 2010, approximately 1 million Ohioans voted early, and 17.8% of them chose to cast their ballots in person.” 697 F.3d at 426. In the 2012 election, roughly 32% of Ohioans voted early. R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 6) (Page ID # 167). Thousands of voters also registered or updated their registration and voted during Golden Week. R. 62 (Parties’ Statement Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 10,14) (Page ID # 3308). The General Assembly passed SB 238 on February 19, 2014, and it went into effect on June 1, 2014. SB 238 amended the Ohio Code to make the first permitted day of early voting the day after the close of voter registration. Ohio Rev.Code § 3509.01(B)(2)-(3). Thus, SB 238 reduces the total number of EIP voting days by eliminating Golden Week. SB 238 largely mirrored the recommendations in a report by the Ohio Association of Election Officials (“OAEO”). R. 18-33 (OAEO Rep.) (Page ID # 521-26). On February 25, 2014, Secretary Husted issued Directive 2014-06, which set EIP voting hours for the 2014 primary and general elections. For the general elections, the Directive did not include EIP voting hours for the following times: (1) the Sunday and Monday immediately before Election Day; (2) Tuesday, September 30th through Monday, October 6th, the last day for voter registration (Golden Week); (3) Saturday, October 11th, Sunday, October 19th, or Sunday, October 26th; and (4) evening EIP voting hours after 5 p.m. on all weekdays or after 4 p.m. on Saturday, October 25th and Saturday, November 1st. R. 18-36 (Directive 2014-06 at 2) (Page ID # 531). On June 11, 2014, however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a permanent injunction in Obama for America v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-636, 2014 WL 2611316 (S.D.Ohio June 11, 2014). The district court “require[d] Secretary of State Husted to set uniform and suitable in-person early voting hours for all eligible voters for the three days preceding all future elections.” Id. at *5. No party appealed this final judgment. To comply with the permanent injunction, Secretary Husted issued Directive 2014-17 on June 17, 2014. R. 18-37 (Directive 2014-17) (Page ID # 532-33). Directive 2014-17 sets uniform EIP voting hours for all future elections in three categories: (1) Presidential General Elections; (2) Presidential Primary Elections and Gubernatorial General Elections; and (3) Regular Municipal Elections, Primary Elections, and Special Elections. Id. As required by the permanent injunction, Directive 2014-17 restores EIP voting hours for the Gubernatorial General Elections (the only election relevant to the 2014 general election) on the Sunday and Monday immediately prior to Election Day on November 4, 2014. Id. at 2 (Page ID # 533). In all other respects Directive 2014-17 sets the same EIP voting hours that Directive 2014-06 set for the Gubernatorial General Election. Id. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review “[F]our factors ... must [be] balanee[d] when considering a motion for preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.” City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.” Obama for America, 697F.3d at 428. However, we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions, and we review its factual findings for clear error. Id. Thus, “[t]he district court’s determination will be disturbed only if the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard.” McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “the ‘determination of whether the movant is likely to succeed on the merits is a question of law and is accordingly reviewed de novo.’ ” Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689 (6th Cir.2014) (quoting Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 819 (6th Cir.2012)). B. The District Court’s Factual Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous The district court analyzed the record evidence and made a number of factual findings in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In particular, the district court’s opinion carefully considered the conclusions of Plaintiffs’ four expert witnesses (Smith, Roscigno, Burden, and Gronke) and Defendants’ three expert witnesses (Trende, McCarty, and Brunell). See R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 26-45) (Page ID # 5873-92). After assessing each, the district court credited Smith’s conclusion that, based on his statistical analysis, African Americans will be disproportionately and negatively affected by the reductions in early voting in SB 238 and Directive 2014-17. Id. at 44-45 (Page ID # 5891-92). The district court also accepted Roscigno’s “undisputed” findings that disparities in employment and in residential, transportation, and childcare options between African American and white voters significantly increased the cost of casting a vote for African American voters. Id. at 45 (Page ID # 5892). The district court then relied on Smith’s statistical findings and conclusions in its Equal Protection analysis, and it relied on both Smith’s and Roscigno’s findings in its Voting Rights Act analysis. Defendants have not challenged the admissibility of any of Plaintiffs’ experts’ conclusions under Daubert, either at the district court or on appeal. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Indeed, Defendants’ brief makes little mention of the district court’s factual findings or its decision to credit the conclusions of Plaintiffs’ experts. Thus, whether or not the district court properly considered these expert findings is not before us. In any event, while they do not dispute Roscigno’s, Burden’s, or Gronke’s conclusions, to the extent Defendants and the General Assembly believe the district court improperly credited Smith’s findings over the conclusions offered by Defendants’ experts, they are mistaken. We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error. Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 731 F.3d 608, 627 (6th Cir.2013). “When reviewing for clear error, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the lower court but rather must uphold the lower court’s account of the evidence if it ‘is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.’ ” Pledger v. United States, 236 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). We will thus reverse the district court’s interpretation of the evidence “ ‘only where we are left with a definite and firm conviction that [the district court] committed a clear error of judgment.’ ” In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 528 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2002)). Consequently, “[i]f the district court interprets the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir.2003). Defendants and the General Assembly are unable to show that the district court clearly erred by crediting Smith’s statistical conclusions. First, contrary to the General Assembly’s claim, the record does not support a finding that the district court erred because Smith’s conclusions are based on faulty data. General Assembly Br. at 48-51. The district court recognized at the outset of its analysis “that some significant limitations exist regarding the available election data,” including different election management systems and policies for tabulating absentee votes among the counties, which made statewide comparisons difficult. R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 26-27) (Page ID # 5873-74). Indeed, Smith suggested as much in his expert reports. R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 12) (Page ID # 173); 53-11 (Smith Rebuttal Rep. at 1-2, 25) (Page ID # 1628-29, 1652). Recognizing these limitations, Smith utilized several techniques based on entirely different statistical methods and data sources to determine whether the propensity of African Americans to cast EIP ballots in Ohio is greater than whites. See 53-11 (Smith Supp. Rep. at 1-2, 25) (Page ID # 1628-29, 1652). In particular, Smith utilized a “triangulation” method, which relied on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Ohio, and county Boards of Elections, and included three different “standard ecological inference techniques” to analyze voting trends in the 2010 midterm and 2012 presidential elections. Id. at 1 (Page ID # 1628). Then, in a separate analysis, Smith examined data from the Current Population Voting and Registration Supplement to determine whether African American voters in Ohio were disproportionately more likely to cast EIP ballots in the 2012 and 2008 elections based on this data. Id. at 1-2 (Page ID # 1628-29). As the district court found, by varying degrees, each of these examinations supports Smith’s conclusion that African American voters in Ohio utilize EIP voting at higher rates than white voters in recent elections. Smith then supplemented his findings by citing additional studies indicating that African American and indigent voters utilized early voting more than white and affluent voters and would be negatively impacted by restrictions on early voting. See, e.g., R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 7, 17, 29-30) (Page ID # 168, 178, 190-91); R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 45-46) (Page ID # 5892-93). These findings are further supported by expert reports submitted by Gronke and Burden and studies attached to Plaintiffs’ briefing to the district court. See R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 45-46) (Page ID #5892-93); 53-5 (Gronke Rep. at 6-12) (Page ID # 1563-69) (noting research indicating that African Americans disproportionately use early voting in many states and shortening the early-vote period negatively impacted turnout among African Americans); R. 53-4 (Burden Rep. at 3) (Page ID # 1555) (citing research noting that “restrictions on early voting in Florida finds that it deterred participation of black voters”). Although, standing alone, any one analysis may not have proven dispositive, when reading them together and as properly supported by other record evidence, the district court did not clearly err by crediting Smith’s analysis despite the possibility of flaws in the data. Second, for the same reason, limitations in Smith’s analysis of the 2010 election do not demonstrate that the district court clearly erred by relying on Smith’s findings. General Assembly Br. at 51-52. Defendants cite the 2010 analysis to show that the early-voting days that were eliminated were among the days with the lowest African American voting rates. Appellants Br. at 56. And it is true that Smith’s 2010 analysis considered only data from five of eighty-eight Ohio counties. But, here, it is Defendants who attempt to cherry-pick the findings. Again, Smith’s analysis of the 2010 mid-term election was one of a number of studies cited by the district court in support of its conclusion that African Americans would be disproportionately impacted by restrictions in EIP voting. Moreover, the five counties analyzed by Smith in his findings based on the 2010 election make up one-third of Ohio’s population and nearly seventy-three percent of all African Americans living in Ohio, and the findings overall indicate that African Americans participated in EIP at a higher rate than white voters in these counties. R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 10) (Page ID # 171); R. 53-11 (Smith Rebuttal Rep. at 22) (Page ID # 1649). Thus, the 2010 analysis is certainly relevant to whether African American voters utilized early voting more than white voters, and the district court properly considered this finding along with the other evidence in the record in reaching its conclusion. Third, the General Assembly’s suggestion that Smith’s analyses relating to the 2012 and 2008 elections are not probative here because these were presidential elections and the 2014 election is an off-year election is not well-taken. General Assembly Br. at 52-53. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not limit its challenge to the 2014 midterm elections. See R. 1 (Complaint) (Page ID # 1). Indeed, SB 238 is the law in Ohio and will apply to all elections moving forward, and nothing in the record suggests that the restrictions on early voting in Directive 2014-17 will be limited to the 2014 election. In fact, Directive 2014-17 expressly applies to “Presidential General Elections.” R. 18-37 (Directive 2014-17 at 1) (Page ID # 532). Thus, any attempt to diminish the probative value of Smith’s 2012 and 2008 election analyses for this reason has no merit. Similarly, attempts to disregard voter turnout among African Americans in the 2012 and 2008 elections because African American voters were targeted by an African American presidential candidate are equally merit-less. General Assembly Br. at 53. The suggestion is that African American voters in Ohio — a “battleground” state, central to any presidential candidate’s chance of winning an election — will not be as heavily targeted in future elections. Id. But this claim is both unsupported by record evidence and, given the continued importance of Ohio in national elections, contrary to common sense. See R. 41-3 (Trende Rep. at 31) (Page ID # 1041) (noting that African American voter turnout has risen in Ohio and the United States as a whole since 2004); see also Florida v. United States, 885 F.Supp.2d 299, 326 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[W]e cannot ignore elections in which minority candidates make breakthroughs in winning elected office on the assumption that future elections will revert to the status quo.”). Fourth, Defendants and the General Assembly suggest that the district court should not have credited Smith’s analysis because Defendants’ expert, Sean Trende, performed a statistical analysis that produced different results. See Appellants Br. at 56; General Assembly Br. at 52. While we acknowledge that a Daubert issue is not before us, it remains true that district courts play the role of “gatekeeper” and are charged “with evaluating the relevance and reliability of proffered expert testimony with heighted care.” Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 2007). For this reason, we generally defer to the district court’s decision to credit one expert over another. In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 528 (recognizing the deference afforded a district court’s assessment of expert testimony). Moreover, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Here, Trende analyzed EIP turnout from the 2010 elections and found that, contrary to Smith’s conclusion, “it is difficult to conclude that early voting enhances African-American turnout.” R. 41-3 (Trende Rep. at 42) (Page ID # 1052). He acknowledged, however, that the “strength of the relationship tested depends on the judgment call that is made about the different variables.” Id. Indeed, Trende asserted that much of his analysis — as was undoubtedly the case for Smith’s analysis — reflected judgment calls that could “reasonably be argued either way.” Id. at 34 (Page ID # 1044). The district court’s decision in assessing the evidence to then credit Smith’s findings — an academic in the area of electoral processes and election issues, R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 2-3) (Page ID # 163-64) — and the judgment calls inherent in the same, over Trende’s — an elections analyst for the political website RealClearPolitics, who apparently has not conducted a peer-reviewed analysis similar to the one at issue here, R. 41-3 (Trende Rep. at 3) (Page ID # 1013); R. 53-6 (7/30/14 Trende Dep. at 281) (Page ID # 1576) — is afforded deference. In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 528. Given this, along with the multiple methods and data sources used by Smith and other record evidence corroborating his findings, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by crediting Smith’s findings over Trende’s. Finally, the General Assembly’s claim that the district court erred because Smith’s methodology is flawed also fails. The General Assembly asserts that Smith’s findings are unreliable because factors other than race could explain the results of Smith’s census block analysis of the 2012 election, General Assembly Br. at 54-55; however, no evidence is offered supporting this. Moreover, the other record evidence suggesting that African American voters utilize EIP voting at higher rates than white voters indicates that race, rather than some other variable, helps explain Smith’s findings in his 2012 census block analysis. At the least, the district court did not clearly err in so finding. See Surles, 474 F.3d at 295 (noting the “broad discretion” district courts possess to assess the reliability of expert findings); see also McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir.2000) (“[M]ere ‘weaknesses in the factual basis of an expert witness’ opinion ... bear on the weight of the evidence rather than on its admissibility.’ ”) (quoting United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir.1993)). Similarly, Defendants’ expert, Dr. Nolan McCarty, and Smith quibble over whether Smith should have conducted his census block analysis at the county level rather than the precinct level — McCarty claims the results are more accurate at the county level while Smith asserts that “aggregat[ing] up ... dramatically worsens the problem of aggregation bias.” Compare R. 53-11 (Smith Rebuttal Rep. at 5-6) (Page ID # 1632-33), with General Assembly Br. at 55-56. And the General Assembly claims that the district court gave too much weight to the “direction of the relationship” between African American voters and EIP voting in the 2012 and 2010 analyses and ignored the “degree of the relationship,” which it claims is small. General Assembly Br. at 56-57. But neither argument supports reversal — again, given the other record evidence supporting Smith’s conclusion and the deference afforded the district court, the district court’s position is plausible based on the record as a whole, and so there is no clear error. King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir.2012), cert, denied, — U.S.—, 133 S.Ct. 985, 184 L.Ed.2d 773 (2013) (“If the district court’s account is ‘plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse.’ ”) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504). Consequently, Defendants and the General Assembly have failed to show that the district court clearly erred in crediting Smith’s statistical conclusions. C. Equal Protection Clause Claim The right to vote is a “fundamental” right. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059,119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.’ ”) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979)). “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). Moreover, “[t]he right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000); League of Women Voters of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 476 (quoting the same). Two aspects of “the manner of its exercise” warrant special attention: “[t]he Equal Protection Clause applies when a state either classifies voters in disparate ways or places restrictions on the right to vote.” Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 428 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Of course, “the Constitution provides that States may prescribe” “ ‘[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,’ Art. I § 4, cl. 1, and the Court therefore has recognized that States retain the power to regulate their own elections.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Ne. Ohio Coal, for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 592 (6th Cir.2012). And practically, “there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). “When equal protection challenges ask us to resolve these competing interests, we calibrate the equal protection standard to ‘[t]he precise character of the state’s action and the nature of the burden on voters.’ ” Ne. Ohio Coal, for the Homeless, 696 F.3d at 592 (quoting Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 428). State regulations that do not treat similarly situated voters differently and do not burden the fundamental right to vote are assessed through rational basis review. Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 429; Ne. Ohio Coal, for the Homeless, 696 F.3d at 592. On the other end of the spectrum, strict scrutiny applies to state regulations that impose “severe” burdens on the fundamental right to vote. Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 429 (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, and Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059). “For the majority of cases falling between these extremes, we apply the ‘flexible’ Anderson-Burdick balancing test.” Ne. Ohio Coal, for the Homeless, 696 F.3d at 592 (quoting Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 429). The Anderson-Burdick test provides as follows: A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs’ rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). “There is no ‘litmus test’ to separate valid from invalid voting regulations; courts must weigh the burden on voters against the state’s asserted justifications and ‘make the “hard judgment” that our adversary system demands.’ ” Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 429 (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)). Even a minimal burden “must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’ ” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). The district court “characterize[d] the overall degree of burden on voting imposed by SB 238 and Directive 2014-17 as significant although not severe.” R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 53) (Page ID # 5900). Focusing on SB 238, the district court found that its elimination of “Golden Week” burdened African American and low-income voters in two ways. Id. at 50 (Page ID # 5897). First, SB 238 in conjunction with Directive 2014-17 reduced the overall number of EIP voting days from 35 to 28 days. The district court noted evidence in the record that 67,408 Ohioans voted in 2008 during Golden Week; 26,230 did so in 2010; and 89,224 voters did so in 2012. Id. The district court also credited statistical and survey analysis by Plaintiffs’ expert Smith that African American voters in Ohio have higher EIP voting rates than white voters, and that African American voters in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 elections “disproportionately cast EIP absentee ballots on days that would have been eliminated by SB 238 and Directive 2014-06.” R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 32, 50) (Page ID # 5879, 5897); R. 18-1 (Smith Rep. at 31) (Page ID # 192). The district court cited four other statistical studies in the record on racial early-voting patterns in Ohio that it found supported Smith’s conclusions. Id. at 45-46 (Page ID # 5892-93). Second, the district court concluded that the elimination of Golden Week “burdens the voting rights of lower income and homeless individuals” because the record reflected that such individuals “move frequently” as well as “lack access to transportation,” which combine to make it harder for such individuals to maintain accurate registration. R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 51) (Page ID # 5898). Thus, the ability to register and vote on the same day “can make the difference between being able to exercise the fundamental right to vote and not being able to do so.” Id. The court pointed to evidence in the record that 12,842 voters used Golden Week to register or update their registration and vote in 2008; 1,651 voters did so in 2010; and 5,844 voters did so in 2012. Id. Turning to Directive 2014-17, the district court found that it burdened African American and lower-income voters by eliminating all evening voting hours for non-presidential elections and by providing only one Sunday of EIP voting, the Sunday before Election Day. Id. at 51-53 (Page ID # 5898-5900). The district court noted that the record reflected that lower-income voters are “more likely to rely on public transportation and work wage-based jobs wherein they are less likely” to be able to vote between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. at the one early-voting location permitted in each county, which might be a great distance away. Id. at 53 (Page ID # 5900). Regarding the elimination of all but one Sunday of EIP voting, the court pointed to evidence in the record that since the in-statement of EIP voting, African Americans have come to rely on Sunday voting through “Souls to the Polls initiatives,” in which churches have leveraged the transportation they already provide to and from church to bring voters to EIP voting locations. Id. at 52 (Page ID # 5899). Souls to the Polls organizers reported that, during the one permitted day of Sunday voting during the 2012 general election, there were long lines of mainly African American voters. Id. While the district court acknowledged that Souls to the Polls organizers could switch to the two Saturdays that are still designated EIP voting days under Directive 2014-17, the court concluded that this would still impose “some burden” because churches are already organized to provide transportation on Sundays. Id. at 53 (Page ID # 5900). Therefore, because the district court found that the burden imposed on Plaintiffs was “significant,” it proceeded to apply the Andersorir-Burdick test to SB 238 and Directive 2014-17. R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 55) (Page ID # 5902). Defendants argue that rational basis review, rather than the Anderson-Burdick test, is the proper standard of review for two reasons. First, they argue that “[t]he ‘right to vote’ has never included the ‘right to receive absentee ballots.’” Appellants Br. at 18 (quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Election Com’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969)). Second, Defendants argue that when a facially neutral voting law is at issue, as SB 238 and Directive 2014-17 are, the Supreme Court in Crawford held that Anderson-Burdick applies only if the law “severely burdens the right to vote of the general class of state voters.” Id. at 19. Otherwise, Defendants assert that traditional Equal Protection Clause principles govern — which require proof of discriminatory intent — and Plaintiffs have not established that either SB 238 or Directive 2014-17 was adopted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 19, 27. Finally, if Andersovr-Burdick review does apply, Defendants argue that the district court improperly determined that the burden imposed on voters represented by Plaintiffs is “significant.” Id. at 31. 1. The District Court Properly Applied Anderson-Burdick Review We addressed Defendants’ first argument regarding McDonald in Obama for America, 697 F.3d 423. In McDonald, the Supreme Court did not apply rational basis review to the challenged Illinois statute allowing only certain categories of voters to receive absentee ballots solely because absentee ballots were at issue. Rather, [t]he McDonald plaintiffs failed to make out a claim for heightened scrutiny because they had presented no evidence to support their allegation that they were being prevented from voting. See O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529, 94 S.Ct. 740, 38 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) (“Essentially the Court’s disposition of the claims in McDonald rested on failure of proof.”); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 520-22, 93 S.Ct. 854, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 [(1973)] (finding that McDonald itself suggested a different result if plaintiffs had presented evidence that the state was effectively preventing them from voting). Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 431 (emphasis added). Thus, in Obama for America, we held that the district court properly applied the Andersom-Burdick balancing test, rather than rational basis review, to evaluate whether the challenged Directive’s elimination of early in-person voting for the three days immediately preceding Election Day violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in McDonald, we noted that “Plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence that a significant number of Ohio voters will in fact be precluded from voting without the additional three days of in-person early voting.” Id. This evidence included “statistical studies that estimated approximately 100,000 Ohio voters would choose to vote during the three-day period before Election Day, and that these voters are disproportionately ‘women, older, and of lower income and education attainment,’ ” groups which the plaintiffs represented. Id. (internal citation omitted). The defendants in that case also argued that the plaintiffs would not actually be precluded from voting as required by McDonald because they had “ample” other means of voting, including by mail, voting EIP at other times, or on Election Day. Id. However, we held not clearly erroneous the district court’s conclusion that early voters would not be able to exercise their right to vote in person because the challenged Directive also eliminated all evening and weekend hours of EIP voting, times during which early voters would likely have voted in the past because they tend to have lower incomes and less education than election day voters. Id. We did not read McDonald to require proof that there was no possibility that the plaintiffs would find a way to adjust and vote through the remaining options. We acknowledged that the challenged law “does not absolutely prohibit early voters from voting,” but focused on the evidence in the record that the plaintiffs’ “ability to cast a ballot is impeded by Ohio’s statutory scheme.” Id. at 433. To the extent that McDonald spoke in terms of “precluding” an individual from voting, which might imply the necessity of such proof, we note that McDonald was decided before the development of the AndersonBurdick test. Thus, the McDonald Court applied a two-tier test for evaluating restrictions on the right to vote, rational basis review for no burdens and strict scrutiny for “severe” burdens, a threshold that more clearly invites consideration of “preclusion.” However, as noted above, that two-tier test has evolved into the Andersorp-Burdick framework, under which burdens that fall between those two extremes can still be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has not required absolute certainty in predicting how many voters would be prevented from voting by laws that impose burdens on the right to vote. See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 221, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that “Petitioners, to be sure, failed to nail down precisely how great the cohort of discouraged and totally deterred voters will be, but empirical precision beyond the foregoing numbers has never been demanded for raising a voting-rights claim.” and citing Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 461-62, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (“Nothing in my analysis requires the parties to produce studies regarding voter perceptions on this score”); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 n. 5, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (“[I]t would be difficult to determine precisely how many would-be voters throughout the country cannot vote because of durational residence requirements.”); and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (taking account of “the obvious likelihood” that candidate filing fees would “fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs”)). Thus, in this case the district court properly held that whether voters might adjust to vote during a different time in EIP voting such that overall turnout might not be affected “is not determinative of the Equal Protection analysis.” R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 50) (Page ID # 5897). Like the plaintiffs in Obama for America, Plaintiffs in this case presented ample evidence that African American, lower-income, and homeless voters disproportionately have used in past elections the EIP voting times that Directive 2014-17 and SB 238 eliminated, and that the number of individuals who had previously voted during these periods was not insignificant. For example, the number of voters in Golden Week alone ranged from 26,230 in 2010 to 89,224 in 2012. R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 50) (Page ID # 5897). And the regulations at issue in the case reduce the overall time for EIP voting more than the three days that had been eliminated in Obama for America. Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in Obama for America, Plaintiffs also presented evidence to show that voting by mail is not actually a viable “alternative means of access to the ballot” for the groups they represent. Cf. Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 440 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the study in the record “did not consider the extent to which these voters would or could avail themselves of other voting options, either by mail ballot or in-person absentee ballot at other times, or in-person voting on election day.”) (emphasis added). The district court noted that “the record is undisputed that African Americans, lower-income individuals, and the homeless are distrustful of the mail and/or voting by mail.” R. 72 (D. Ct. Op. and Order at 54) (Page ID #5901). Additionally, the district court considered the fact that “[t]he associated costs and more complex mechanics of voting by mail, coupled with other information in the record concerning the enumerated groups including homelessness, lower educational attainment, more limited financial resources, reliance on public transportation, and transience” to bolster its conclusion that “voting by mail may not be a suitable alternative for many voters.” Id. The record also reflected that lower-income voters, because of their reliance on public transportation and higher likelihood of working in wage-based jobs, would face substantial difficulties in voting between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. Id. at 53 (Page ID # 5900). Under Obama for America, then, the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence that the groups they represent are in fact significantly burdened by Directive 2014-17 and SB 238 such that McDonald’s rational basis standard does not apply. 2. Crawford Does Not Foreclose Applying Anderson-Burdick Review In Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, we squarely addressed the applicability of Anderson-Burdick to facially neutral restrictions on voting. 696 F.3d 580. The State defendant in that case argued that the challenged practice— “Ohio’s automatic disqualification rule for ■wrong-precinct ballots” — “treats all voters equally and therefore does not involve any classification that could violate the equal protection standard.” Id. at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted). In responding to this argument, we explained that [T]he State overlooks the fact that a clear majority of the Supreme Court in Crawford applied some form of Bur-dick’s burden-measuring equal protection standard to Indiana’s facially neutral voter-identification requirement. See 553 U.S. at 189-91, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court), 204 (Scalia, J., joined by Alito and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote — whether it governs voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process — we use the approach set out in Burdick.... ”), 211 (Souter, J., dissenting). Id. Because the plaintiffs in that case had “ ‘demonstrated that their right to vote is ... burdened by Ohio’s law that rejects wrong-precinct ballots regardless of poll-worker error,” we held that “[t]he Anderson-Burdick standard ... applies.” Id. (quoting Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 430); see also Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 428-29 (stating that the “[t]he Equal Protection Clause applies when a state either classifies voters in disparate ways or places restrictions on the right to vote ”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). However, as the plaintiffs in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless asserted that the law at issue created a burden on provisional voters generally, rather than on a subclass of provisional voters, we did not address Defendants’ more specific argument here that Anderson-Burdick requires a showing of a burden on voters generally. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, a majority of the Court in Crawford did not expressly hold that a challenger must demonstrate that a voting restriction burdens voters generally in order to trigger scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick. The opinion authored by Justice Stevens announcing the judgment of the Court, which gained only two other votes, did not explicitly reject the petitioners’ argument that the middle level of scrutiny under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test could be triggered by evidence of burdens on a subgroup of voters, instead of all voters; rather, the Court held that “on the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200, 128 S.Ct. 1610; see also id. at 202, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (“In sum, on the basis of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes ‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, Justice Stevens weighed the evidence of minimal burdens of the law on voters generally, the vast majority of whom had IDs, and found that burden justified by the state’s interests. Id. at 202, 128 S.Ct. 1610. In contrast, Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which two other Justices joined, expressly would have required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that voters generally were burdened for the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to apply. Id. at 205-06, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cited decisions of the Court outside of the elections context holding that a generally applicable law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it merely disproportionately burdens a subgroup of people absent evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 207-OS, 128 S.Ct. 1610. Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, assumed that Anderson-Burdick balancing could be triggered by burdens on subgroups, and disagreed with Justice Stevens that the petitioners had not presented sufficient evidence of a more than minimal burden on the subgroup of voters they represented. Id. at 237, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, a majority of the justices in Crawford either did not expressly reject or in fact endorsed the idea that a burden on only a subgroup of voters could trigger balancing review under Anderson-Bur-dick. Alternatively, as the narrowest basis of the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens’s opinion may be viewed as “the holding of the Court” given the “fragmented” Crawford opinions. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia held that the Indiana law was constitutional, but Justice Scalia reached further and held that challengers to a voting restriction must show that it burdens voters generally. Thus, Justice Stevens’s opinion is narrower. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F.Supp.3d 837, 845-46, No. 11-CV-01128, 2014 WL 1775432, at *4 (E.D.Wis. Apr. 29, 2014) (holding that Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford is the narrower ground for the opinion under Marks). Finally, it is worth noting that in Anderson, the Supreme Court in fact assessed the burden imposed by the challenged law by looking to its impact on a subgroup of voters. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (holding that “[i]t is clear, then, that the March filing deadline places a particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio’s independent-minded voters,” specifically Anderson’s supporters, but not assessing whether the deadline burdens all voters). Therefore, that Plaintiffs presented evidence only of SB 238 and Directive 2014-17’s burdens on African American, lower-income, and homeless voters does not automatically mean that only rational basis review or standard Equal Protection Clause analysis applies. Crawford merely stands for the proposition that Plaintiffs must present more evidence than the petitioners did in that case to show that the subgroups of voters they represent are more than minimally burdened. As discussed previously, Plaintiffs presented extensive statistical, survey, and anecdotal evidence that SB 238 and Directive 2014-17 will disproportionately burden the ability of African American, lower-income, and homeless individuals to vote. The petitioners in Crawford had not presented any evidence in the record that even estimated the number of individuals who lacked identification cards. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200, 128 S.Ct. 1610. Nor did the affidavits or depositions in the record of lower-income individuals or elderly voters in Crawford substantiate that they in fact faced difficulties in obtaining identification cards. Id. at 201, 128 S.Ct. 1610. In contrast, Plaintiffs here presented statistical and survey evidence that indicated that thousands of individuals whom they represent had voted in past elections during the times that have been eliminated by SB 238 and Directive 2014-17, as well as numerous depositions, affidavits, and expert testimony documenting that the groups Plaintiffs represent have relied on the eliminated EIP voting times and would face difficulties in voting without them. In sum, we hold that the district court’s characterization of the overall burden imposed by SB 238 and Directive 2014-17 as significant, but not severe, was not clearly erroneous given the extensive evidence in the record of the burdens African American, lower-income, and homeless voters will face in voting, absent the times eliminated by SB 238 and Directive 2014-17. It therefore properly applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. We next turn to the district court’s evaluation of Defendants’ asserted justifications for SB 238 and Directive 2014-17. 3. The State’s Justifications Do Not Outweigh the Significant Burden on Voters Once a court has determined that a law burdens voters, under AndersonBurdick those burdens must be weighed against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (emphasis added). Put differently, the state must articulate specific, rather than abstract state interests, and explain why the particular restriction imposed is actually necessary, meaning it actually addresses, the interest put forth. See Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 433-34 (assessing under Anderson-Burdick whether the state had presented actual evidence to support the justifications it provided for the challenged law). Before even articulating these interests, Defendants appear to argue that we held in Obama for America that a law such as SB 238 or Directive 2014-17 would automatically survive this scrutiny of state interests. Appellants Br. at 21 (quoting our statement in Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 433-34, that “If the State had enacted a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation that limited in-person early voting for all Ohio voters, its ‘important regulatory interests’ would likely be sufficient to justify the restriction.’ ”). That statement, of course, was not central to our holding in that case and does not control the present case. Moreover, the quoted language in that sentence is in fact from Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (stating that “when [a regulation] imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon [voting rights], the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions”) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564). The key in that statement is the word generally; the Burdick Court was merely making clear that not all restrictions on voting will be struck down simply because they impose any kind of burden, as states do have the power to regulate elections generally. Burdick itself involved a nondiscriminatory restriction on write-in voting, and the Court still probed the state’s asserted justifications for the restriction in the manner required by Anderson. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059. Indeed, in a more recent case, the Supreme Court has tied this statement’s applicability to situations in which the burden imposed is modest. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 452, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (“If a statute imposes only modest burdens, however, then ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ on election procedures.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564). We also note that how Ohio’s early-voting system compares to that of other states is not relevant under the Andersom-Burdick balancing test. The test directs courts to weigh the burdens imposed on voters in a particular state against the justifications that that state has proffered for the challenged law or practice that imposes those burdens. Early voting does not necessarily play the same role in all jurisdictions in ensuring that certain groups of voters are actually able to vote. Thus, the same law may impose a significant burden in one state and only a minimal burden in another. Similarly, a particular state may have stronger justifications for a law that burdens voters than other states with the same law. Thus, we will examine in turn each of Defendants’ asserted justifications-preventing voter fraud and containing costs for SB 238, and uniformity for Directive 2014-17-under the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework. i. Fraud Regarding SB 238, Defendants argue that it is necessary as a measure to reduce fraud arising from same-day registration and voting during Golden Week. Appellants Br. at 26; General Assembly Br. at 38. Defendants point to the testimony by the OAEO Director that the “ ‘registration deadline’ exists so officials ‘can confirm that a voter is who they say they are before they cast a ballot.’ ” Id. at 26 (citing R. 54-4 (Keeran Decl. at 7) (Page ID # 1851)). Defendants assert that “[w]hen the deadline is later than the start of voting, votes might be counted even though cast ‘by people who fraudulently registered during this period, because the election officials could not confirm their registration status before Election Day.’” Id. The Ohio General Assembly points to declarations of individual county election officials that “historically voter fraud was most likely to occur during Golden Week,” R. 68-2 (Ward Decl. ¶ 4) (Page ID # 5123), or that it is difficult to verify an individual’s residence when someone registers and votes on the same day, R. 68-3 (Cuckler Decl. ¶ 9) (Page ID # 5511), or that some individuals were able to cast absentee ballots in one county and then register and cast an EIP Ballot during Golden Week in another county,