Full opinion text
BOGGS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SILER and GIBBONS, JJ., joined. GIBBONS, J. (pp. 344-45); delivered a separate concurring opinion. OPINION BOGGS, Circuit Judge. This case presents an important issue of first impression in the federal courts: whether a prohibition on the possession of firearms by a person “who has been committed to a mental institution,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), violates the Second Amendment. Twenty-eight years ago, Clifford Charles Tyler was involuntarily committed for less than one month after allegedly undergoing an emotionally devastating divorce. Consequently, he can never possess a firearm. Tyler filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court dismissed Tyler’s suit for failure to state a claim. Because Tyler’s complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment, we reverse and remand. I. Background A. Statutory and Regulatory Background Under federal law, an individual “who has been committed to a mental institution” may not possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Specifically, the statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Ibid. Section 922(g) imposes the same firearm restrictions on numerous other groups of individuals, including convicted felons, § 922(g)(1); fugitives, § 922(g)(2); and domestic-violence misdemeanants, § 922(g)(9). Federal law also provides a relief-from-disabilities program whereby individuals prohibited from possessing firearms may “appl[y] to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws.” § 925(c). The Attorney General may grant this relief if, after reviewing the circumstances regarding the disability and the applicant’s record and reputation, “it is established to his satisfaction ... that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” Ibid. Judicial review is available to “[a]ny person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Attorney General.” Ibid. A United States district court “may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Ibid. The Attorney General has delegated his authority to “[ijnvestigate, administer, and enforce the laws related to ... firearms,” including the relief-from-disabilities program of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), to the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1). ATF regulations prescribe the form and contents of an application for relief from disabilities. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.144. All applications from individuals, for instance, must contain written statements from three references and written authorization for ATF to obtain pertinent background records. § 478.144(e)(l)-(2). Applications from individuals prohibited from firearm possession because of prior commitment to a mental institution must provide: the court order mandating commitment; medical records reflecting diagnosis; and records from any authority showing the applicant’s discharge from commitment, restoration of medical competency, and restoration of rights. See § 478.144(c)(5). The ATF director may not grant relief to an applicant previously committed to a mental institution unless the applicant meets the requirements of 18 U.S..C. § 925(c) and unless “a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority” has subsequently determined the applicant “to have been restored to mental competency, to be no longer suffering from a mental disorder, and to have had all rights restored.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.144(e). In 1992, however, Congress defunded the relief-from-disabilities program. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub.L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732. Since that time, Congress has affirmatively retained the bar on funding the relief-from-disabilities program. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub.L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 57; United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 75 n. 3, 123 S.Ct. 584, 154 L.Ed.2d 483 (2002) (collecting appropriation riders from 1994-2002). In 2008, Congress authorized federal grants to states to assist them in determining which individuals are eligible to purchase and possess firearms and to aid them in supplying accurate information to federal databases. See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.L. No. 110-180, § 103, 122 Stat. 2559, 2567. To be eligible for such grants, a state must certify to the Attorney General that it has implemented a relief-from-disabilities program under which an individual who “pursuant to state law” has been adjudicated mentally defective or has been “committed to a mental institution” may apply “for relief from the disabilities imposed” by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). §§ 103 & 105, 122 Stat. at 2568-69. Similar to the federal relief-from-disabilities program, states “shall grant the relief’ if “the circumstances regarding the disabilities ... and the person’s record and reputation, are such that the person will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” Ibid. Such state relief satisfies the requirements of § 925(c) for restoration of gun rights. These state programs must permit an individual “whose application for the relief is denied to file a petition with the State court of appropriate jurisdiction for a de novo judicial review of the denial.” § 105(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 2570. Roughly half the states have created grant-eligible relief-from-disabilities programs. Michigan, Tyler’s state of residence, has not implemented a relief-from-disabilities program. B. Factual Background 1. Tyler’s Involuntary Commitment Tyler is a seventy-three-year-old resident of Hillsdale County, Michigan. On January 2, 1986, a state probate court committed Tyler to a mental institution. Tyler alleges that he underwent an emotionally devastating divorce in 1985 and that he was involuntarily committed because of a risk that he might be suicidal. Tyler submitted a 2012 substance-abuse evaluation containing additional information about his 1985 depression. In 1985, when Tyler was forty-five years old, Tyler’s wife of twenty-three years served him divorce papers. Prior to filing for divorce, Tyler’s ex-wife allegedly ran away with another man and depleted Tyler’s finances. Tyler felt “overwhelmed” and “sat in the middle of the floor at home pounding his head.” According to a mental-health evaluation submitted by Tyler, Tyler was crying non-stop, not sleeping, depressed, and suicidal at this time. Tyler’s daughters became scared and contacted the police. The police transported Tyler to the sheriffs department, where they contacted Tyler’s eighteen-year-old daughter to assist them with the necessary steps to have Tyler receive a psychological evaluation. Probate-court documents indicate that a Dr. Tamara Marie Tyler filed a petition asserting that Tyler required treatment. Tyler was represented by counsel at his probate-court commitment hearing. The probate court found by “clear and convincing evidence” that Tyler was “a person requiring treatment because [he was] mentally ill.” The court further found that Tyler, as a result of his “mental illness,” could be “reasonably expected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure [himself] or others, and has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially supportive of the expectation.” Additionally, the probate court found no “treatment program other than hospitalization adequate to meet [Tyler’s] treatment needs.” The probate court ordered that Tyler undergo a treatment program “for a period not to exceed 90 days” and committed Tyler to Ypsilanti Regional Center “for a period not to exceed 30 days.” Tyler’s 2012 substance-abuse evaluation indicates that Tyler was transported to Ypsilanti Regional Center for a psychological evaluation. He purportedly had bruises on his head and face. He also purportedly had suicidal thoughts, was depressed, sobbing, shaking, and had not been sleeping. Tyler reported that he remained at the Center for two to four weeks. He declined prescribed medications for fear they would alter his “thinking.” Tyler subsequently returned home and remained in the workforce for another eighteen to nineteen years. Tyler’s 2012 substance-abuse evaluation determined that Tyler has no substance-abuse problem. It also indicates that Tyler did not report any “past legal involvement.” In 2012, Tyler underwent a psychological evaluation. Tyler informed the psychologist that he had never experienced a “depressive episode” other than his 1985 incident. The psychologist’s report indicated that Tyler has no criminal history. The psychologist contacted Tyler’s physician who also reported that she had not detected evidence of mental illness in Tyler. The psychologist determined that Tyler’s prior involuntary commitment “appeared to be a brief reactive depressive episode in response to his wife divorcing him.” The psychologist determined that there was no evidence of mental illness. In about 1999, Tyler remarried, and he maintains a close relationship with his two daughters from his first marriage. 2. Administrative Process Tyler has been unable to purchase a firearm because of his prior involuntary commitment. He alleges that on February 7, 2011, he attempted to purchase a firearm. The Hillsdale County Sheriffs Office informed Tyler that he was ineligible to purchase a firearm because the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) indicated that Tyler had previously been committed to a mental institution. In August 2011, Tyler appealed this denial to the FBI’s NICS section. On September 8, 2011, the NICS section informed Tyler that he was prohibited from purchasing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) but that his appeal was pending. On September 30, 2011, Tyler’s counsel wrote the NICS section to authorize release of private information and to provide additional information on Tyler’s circumstances. On January 6, 2012, the NICS section wrote Tyler’s counsel to inform him that Tyler’s appeal was denied. The NICS section’s letter explained that the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 “provides states with the ability to pursue an ATF-approved relief of disability for individuals adjudicated as a mental defective or who have been committed to a mental institution.” The letter further stated: “Until your state has an ATF approved relief from disabilities program in place your federal firearm rights may not be restored.” The letter did not mention that federal law allows Tyler to apply directly to ATF for relief but that Congress denied funding for a federal relief-from-disabilities program. 3. Federal Litigation On May 21, 2012, Tyler filed suit in federal court, alleging that the enforcement of § 922(g)(4), in light of the lack of any procedure in Michigan for relief from the disability, violates his rights protected by the Federal Constitution. In particular, Tyler alleged that the federal disability scheme constitutes an overbroad infringement on his right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment and also that the scheme violates equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, Tyler alleged that the government’s failure to afford Tyler notice and opportunity to be heard on the matter, even in a post-deprivation proceeding, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tyler named various county, state, and federal defendants. The state defendants moved to dismiss because Tyler did not allege that they interfered with his constitutional rights, and the district court granted the motion. The district court also granted the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Second Amendment, as historically understood, did not extend to persons in Tyler’s position. The court also determined that even if the Second Amendment did encompass individuals with Tyler’s status, § 922(g)(4) would survive intermediate scrutiny because Congress’s method of keeping firearms from those who have been previously institutionalized is “reasonably related to the government’s stated interest” in preventing firearm violence. Additionally, the district court found that Tyler’s Fifth Amendment claims failed because they were coextensive with Tyler’s Second Amendment claims.- Tyler and the county defendants agreed that the district court’s order as to the federal defendants was dispositive as to the remaining claims, and they stipulated to entry of a final order dismissing Tyler’s complaint as to the county defendants. Only the county and federal defendants are parties on appeal. II. Standard of Review We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Ass’n of Cleve land Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007). We accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir.2005). , III. Analysis -The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const, amend. II. The Supreme Court has determined that this text—with a structure “unique in our Constitution”—confers “an individual right to keep and bear arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). This right is “not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech [is] not.” Id. at 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783; accord id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50, 81 S.Ct. 997, 6 L.Ed.2d 105 (1961) (Harlan, J.). For instance, the Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to bear arms for “any sort of confrontation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Nor does it protect an individual’s right to possess all kinds of weapons, see id. at 621-22, 128 S.Ct. 2783; for example, “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.” Id. at 625, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Heller Court also condoned “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. In short, Heller did “not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment.” Ibid. Heller determined only that the Second Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Supreme Court has not fleshed out the extent of the right protected by the Second Amendment. Thus, although several courts of appeals have opined on whether the Second Amendment encompasses the right to carry a gun outside the home, the full breadth of the Second Amendment has not been determined. Compare Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir.2014) (recognizing the right beyond the home), and Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936-42 (7th Cir.2012) (same), with Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431-35 (3d Cir.2013) (declining to “definitively declare” that Heller extends beyond the home), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2134, 188 L.Ed.2d 1124 (2014), Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir.2013) (“merely” assuming, without deciding, that the “Heller right exists outside the home,” but upholding good-and-substantial-reason permit requirement), and Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89, 96 (2d Cir.2012) (assuming that the Second Amendment “must have some application” beyond the home, but upholding “proper cause” handgun-license requirement). In this case of first impression, we consider not the what, where, when, or why of the Second Amendment’s limitations—but the who. Specifically, does the Second Amendment forbid Congress from prohibiting firearm possession by all individuals previously committed to a mental institution? A. Appropriate Constitutional Test 1. Heller We begin with the Heller Court’s statements about whom the state may constitutionally restrict from possessing firearms. Most significant is the Court’s statement that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. These restrictions, the Court said, amount to “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id. at 627 n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Moreover, the right recognized in Heller concerns only “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Id. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added). Thus, the Heller Court presumed that certain individuals may be “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Ibid, (emphasis added). These statements strongly indicate that the Second Amendment right to possess firearms does not extend to all individuals'—or, at least, that the state may at times limit that right for certain groups of individuals consistent with the Constitution. Although these statements are dicta and not holding, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), reiterated its view that the Second Amendment has its limits. According to the Court, Heller “made it clear” that the decision “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. at 786, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (internal quotation marks omitted). The McDonald Court described that caveat as an “assuranc[e]” and “repealed]” it in its decision. Ibid. The Court’s “assurance” that Heller does not cast doubt on prohibitions on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill does not resolve this case. For § 922(g)(4) prohibits firearm possession not just by the mentally ill but by anyone “who has been committed to a mental institution.” That these two categories are not coextensive is made clear by the very fact that the language of § 922(g)(4) expressly refers to two separate groups. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (presumption against redundancy). Although it is plausible that the two groups overlap, the point is that we presume they are not identical. Heller’s assurance that the state may prohibit the “mentally ill” from possessing firearms may provide solid constitutional ground for § 922(g)(4)’s restriction as to an individual “adjudicated as a mental defective,” but it is insufficient—by itself—to support the restriction as to individuals who have been involuntarily committed at some time in the past. Therefore, we cannot resolve this case by relying solely on Heller’s “assurances,” as we did in rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a denial of an expungement motion in a case involving § 922(g)(l)’s bar on possession of firearms by felons. See United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 740-41 (6th Cir.2010). 2. Two-Step Approach To resolve Second Amendment challenges, we have adopted a two-step approach. United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.2012). The first step asks “whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood.” Ibid. If the government “demonstrates that the challenged statute regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood [in 1791, at the Bill of Rights’ ratification, or in 1868, at the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification], then the analysis can stop there.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, “the regulated activity is categorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.” Ibid. On the other hand, “[i]f the government cannot establish this—if the historical evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected—then there must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Ibid. The second step involves “applying] the appropriate level of scrutiny. If the law satisfies the applicable standard, it is constitutional. If it does not, it is invalid.” Ibid, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.2010) (Under the second step, a court will “evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.”). There may be a number of reasons to question the soundness of this two-step approach. It derives from the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Marzza-rella, which primarily rested on a view that because “Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second Amendment,” that fact “implies the structure of First Amendment doctrine should inform ... analysis of the Second Amendment.” 614 F.3d at 89 n. 4. There is significant language in Heller itself, however, that would indicate that lower courts should not conduct interest balancing or apply levels of scrutiny. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”). This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in McDonald. 561 U.S. at 790-91, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (noting that the Heller Court “specifically rejected” “an interest-balancing test”). Although reams of analysis have been devoted to this question, Greeno clearly gives us the law to apply in this circuit at this time. B. Step One: Scope of the Second Amendment Greeno’s first step asks “whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood.” 679 F.3d at 518. We look at whether the challenged law “will survive Second Amendment challenge because [it]' regulate[s] activity falling outside the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified.” Ibid. Greeno appears to place the burden on the state to establish that the challenged statute regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment as it was understood in 1791. See ibid. (“If the [government demonstrates that the challenged statute ‘regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant historical moment ... then the analysis can stop there____If the government cannot establish this[,] ... then there must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.’ ”) (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702-03 (7th Cir.2011)). 1. Tyler’s Evidence Both Tyler and the government marshal historical sources and secondary historical scholarship to discuss whether the conduct proscribed by § 922(g)(4)—possession of a firearm by a person previously committed to a mental institution—-fell within the historical scope of the Second Amendment. Tyler relies on the English Bill of Rights, which provided: “That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.” 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 592-93, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Heller explains the purpose of this provision: “Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to suppress political dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 128 S.Ct. 2783. As a result of these experiences, Englishmen “obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the Declaration of Right (which was codified as the English Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never be disarmed.” Id. at 593, 128 S.Ct. 2783. It is unclear, however, whether the provision in the English Bill of Rights limiting the right to that “allowed by law” encompassed individuals previously committed to a mental institution. Tyler also relies heavily on legal commentary by William Blackstone, “whose works ... constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” Id. at 593-94, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Tyler quotes Blackstone as recognizing the right to arms as “a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *144. Blackstone recognized that restraints on this right, as well as other fundamental English rights, must be “so gentle and moderate ... that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened.” Ibid. Under this scheme, individuals were “restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow-citizens.” Ibid. Blackstone spoke approvingly on prohibitions on unlawful hunting or appearing armed in certain places “with the face blacked or with other disguise, and being armed with offensive weapons, to the breach of the public peace and the terror of his majesty’s subjects.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *144 (discussing the statute 1 Hen. VII., c. 7 and the statute 9 Geo. I., c. 22). Similarly, Blackstone described how the “offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land, and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III, c. 3.” Id. at *149. Blackstone does not resolve whether a mental-institution prohibition such as the one at issue here would have been considered a “due restriction.” Other historical sources cited by Tyler are no more helpful. Under the Militia Act of 1662, “any person or persons” who were judged “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdome” could be disarmed. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 1 (1662) (Eng.). But we already know from Heller that the right to bear arms, both now and as understood in 1791, did not extend to certain classes of people. Tyler also cites ratification history, but Heller explained that the ratification debate over the right to keep and bear arms was not over the nature of the right but “over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 598, 128 S.Ct. 2783. 2. The Government’s Evidence Greeno places the burden on the government to establish that regulated conduct falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment as understood in 1791. 679 F.3d at 518. The government relies on historical sources similar to those cited by Tyler, but they too are of limited helpfulness. The government, also invoking ratification history, relies on “a proposal offered by the Pennsylvania anti-federalist faction at the Pennsylvania Convention.” Appel-lee Br. 17. Heller described this proposal as “highly influential.” 554 U.S. at 604, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Under this proposal: The people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals[.] The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, 1787, reprinted in 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, A Documentary History 665 (1971) (emphasis added). This, too, simply raises the question of which individuals presented a “real danger of public injury.” The government also cites Samuel Adams’s proposal at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, which was also discussed in Heller. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 604-05, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Adams recommended “that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress ... to prevent the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms.” 2 Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, 675, 681 (emphasis added). But Heller already established that the Second Amendment applies, at the very least, to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The government’s brief discussion of historical scholarship is no more helpful. The government asserts that most “scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a’virtuous citizenry.” Appellee Br. 18 (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir.2010) (per curiam)). Whether we label the class of citizens entitled to Second Amendment protection as “responsible,” “peaceable,” or “virtuous,” we are no closer to determining whether individuals previously institutionalized were counted in that class. 3. Analysis Recourse to tradition is not much more helpful, for “legal limits on the possession of firearms by the mentally ill ... are of 20th Century vintage.” United States v. Skoien (Skoien II), 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.2010) (en banc). Section 922(g)(4) “was not enacted until 1968.” Ibid.; see Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220. This law does not appear to rest on much historical foundation. “One searches in vain through eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifically excluding the mentally ill from firearms ownership.” Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009). Professor Larson has concluded that “[s]pecific eighteenth-century laws disarming the mentally ill ... simply do not exist.” Id. at 1378. The only more modern precedent that Professor Larson uncovered was the Uniform Fire Arms Act of 1930, which “prohibited delivery of a pistol to any person of ‘unsound mind.’ ” Id. at 1376 (quoting Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Conference 565 (1930)). We are not aware of any other historical source that suggests that the right to possess a gun was denied to persons who had ever been committed to a mental institution, regardless of time, circumstance, or present condition. We need not reinvent the wheel and justify with historical reasoning § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on possession of firearms by the mentally ill. So much we may take for granted. Heller has already sanctioned the “longstanding prohibitio[n] on the possession of firearms by ... the mentally ill” as permissible. 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Court did not directly support this statement with citations. Justice Breyer suggested that the Court’s statement amounted to “judicial ipse dixit.” Id. at 722, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court, in turn, responded that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.” Id. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (majority opinion). The problem, as noted, is that the class of individuals constituting those ever previously mentally institutionalized is not identical to the class of individuals presently mentally- ill. Ultimately, the government cannot establish that § 922(g)(4) regulates conduct falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment as it was understood in 1791. We cannot conclude, then, that the regulated activity is “categorically unprotected.” Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518. History, text, and tradition, considered alone, are inconclusive. Because the government has not met its burden, we conclude that the Second Amendment as understood in 1791 extended to at least some individuals previously committed to mental institutions. We proceed, therefore, to Greeno’s second step. C. Step Two: Applying the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny Under Greeno, if the government cannot meet its burden of establishing that the regulated conduct fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood in 1791, then the court must proceed to a second step. 679 F.3d at 518. The second step analyzes “the strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Ibid. Courts must “appl[y] the appropriate level of scrutiny.” Ibid. 1. Intermediate Scrutiny or Strict Scrutiny? Whether courts should apply intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny is an open question in this circuit. Greeno itself concerned a Second Amendment challenge to the dangerous-weapon enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the ' U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 516-21. The Gree-no court concluded that the dangerous-weapon enhancement was consistent with the historical understanding of the Second Amendment because the right to bear arms did not extend to “individuals engaged in criminal activity,” id. at 519, or to “possession of weapons for unlawful purposes,” id. at 520. The court in Greeno decided only the question asked in the first step of its newly announced test. See id. at 520 n. 2. The Greeno court expressly reserved the question of what is “the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to post-Heller Second Amendment challenges under the second prong.” Ibid. a Although we might prefer to avoid a scrutiny-based approach altogether, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2783, Greeno now compels us to wade “into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.” Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 642. The traditional levels of scrutiny are rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Supreme Court in Heller ruled out the possibility that rational-basis review applies to Second Amendment challenges: “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. at 628 n. 27, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Our choice, then, is between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Both tests are “quintessential balancing inquiries that focus ultimately on whether a particular government interest is sufficiently compelling or important to justify an infringement on the individual right in question.” Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1281 (D.C.Cir.2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Under intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law “must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988). Strict scrutiny, in apparent contrast, requires the government to show that a challenged law “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (citation omitted). Before determining which standard is most appropriate, a few caveats are in order. First, we recognize that this decision— intermediate or strict?—is likely more important in theory than in practice. We are skeptical of ascribing too much significance to the difference between an “important” or “significant” interest and a “compelling” interest. Justice Blackmun, for example, was never “able fully to appreciate just what a ‘compelling state interest’ is.” Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). He felt that if “compelling interest” meant “ ‘incapable of being overcome’ upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all.” Ibid. Both intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny involve similar balancing tests. Second, intermediate and strict scrutiny are not binary poles in the area of heightened scrutiny. These familiar tests can take on many names and versions. “[I]t bears mention that strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny can take on different forms in different contexts that are sometimes colloquially referred to as, for example, strict-scrutiny-light or intermediate-scrutiny-plus or the like.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1277 n. 8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For example, in a campaign-finance case, the Court said a contribution limit would survive review if the government showed that the regulation was “closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). In another case, the Court reviewed a gender-based classification under “skeptical scrutiny” and “heightened review.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). Whether courts apply heightened scrutiny or a lighter version of that scrutiny, the underlying approach remains the same: it entails assessing means and ends and costs and benefits. With these cautions in mind, we proceed to determine the appropriate standard. b The government maintains that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. It offers two reasons. First, it argues that a “more demanding standard would be inconsistent with Heller’s recognition that ‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’ ” Appellee Br. 19 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783). Second, the government notes that other courts of appeals have generally applied intermediate scrutiny. i The government’s first argument is that Heller’s exceptions are inconsistent with strict scrutiny. Heller describes the prohibition on firearm possession by the mentally ill as “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The government at oral argument stated that this language must indicate that strict scrutiny is inappropriate because if a law is subject to strict scrutiny, the government reasons, then it is not presumptively lawful. There are several problems with this logic. First, the government reads Heller’s language to mean that courts, when analyzing the constitutionality of Heller’s exceptions, must begin their analysis by presuming that such exceptions are lawful. This cannot be correct because if that were the case, then courts would apply something akin to rational basis—an option that Heller forecloses. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n. 27, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The government argues in favor of intermediate scrutiny, but intermediate scrutiny does not involve applying a presumption of constitutionality. Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language does not suggest that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to the Heller exceptions. An equally valid, if not better, reading of the language is that the Court presumed that it would find the Heller exceptions constitutional after applying some analytic framework. We do not read Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language to suggest anything about the level of scrutiny, if any, that courts should apply when evaluating Second Amendment challenges. ii The strongest argument in favor of intermediate scrutiny is that other circuits have adopted it as their test of choice. The government correctly notes that circuits have generally applied intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges. A closer look, however, reveals that the circuits’ actual approaches are less neat— and far less consistent—than that. The First Circuit applied a form of intermediate scrutiny to a “categorical ban on gun ownership by a class of individuals,” which required a “strong showing, necessitating a substantial relationship between the restriction and an important governmental object.” United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit adopted “some form of heightened scrutiny ... less than strict scrutiny” to laws not burdening the “ ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home.” Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93-94. The Third Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny when the “burden imposed by the law does not severely limit the possession of firearms,” but recognized that the “Second Amendment can trigger more than one particular standard of scrutiny.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. The Fourth Circuit employs a hybrid approach, applying intermediate scrutiny to laws burdening the right to bear arms “outside of the home” but applying strict scrutiny to laws burdening the “core right of self-defense in the home.” United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470-71 (4th Cir.2011); accord Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; United States v. Chester (Chester II), 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir.2010) (“[W]e conclude that intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated persons.”). The Fifth Circuit has also adopted a multi-tiered approach in which “the appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.” NRA v. ATF (NRA I), 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit has followed a number of different approaches, depending on the panel. Recently, it applied “a more rigorous showing than [intermediate scrutiny], if not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’ ” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir.2011). In general, the court said that a “severe burden on the core Second Amendment right” requires “an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the government’s means and its end,” whereas “laws restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more easily justified.” Ibid. Previously, the full court, sitting en banc, accepted the government’s concession that the court should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than rational-basis review and asked whether the challenged law was “substantially related to an important governmental objective.” Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 641. But see id. at 647 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court “sends doctrinal signals that confuse rather than clarify”). Judge Pos-ner, taking a different approach still, analyzed a challenged law “not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 941. The Ninth Circuit has also followed various approaches. In a 2013 case, the court held that intermediate scrutiny applies to a Second Amendment challenge to a law burdening “conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir.2013). Three months later, the court clarified that intermediate scrutiny applied only because the conduct fell within the scope of the Second Amendment but “outside [its] core.” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168 n. 15. The court also clarified that “[i]ntermediate scrutiny is not appropriate, however, for cases involving the destruction of a right at the core of the Second Amendment.” Ibid. Several Ninth Circuit judges would adopt an approach that expressly considers “the extent of the regulation’s burden on Second Amendment rights.” Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Tallman, Callahan, & Ikuta, JJ.). In a 2014 opinion, the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny because the challenged law did “not impose a substantial burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment.” Jackson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 965 (9th Cir.2014). Judge Bea has forcibly argued that strict scrutiny is more appropriate because using “intermediate scrutiny as the correct level at which to review a categorical, status-based disqualification from the core right of the Second Amendment ... does not make sense.” Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1145 (Bea, J., concurring). The Tenth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal firearm restriction that applied “only to a narrow class of persons, rather than to the public at large.” United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir.2010). The District of Columbia Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to gun-registration laws, but held that “a regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257. This tour of the circuits confirms several points. The appropriate level of scrutiny that courts should apply in Second Amendment cases (assuming a scrutiny-based approach is appropriate at all) remains a difficult, highly contested question. “[0]ur sister circuits have grappled with varying sliding-scale and tiered-scrutiny approaches.” Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167. “Heller has left in its wake a morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged firearms regulations.” Chester II, 628 F.3d at 688-89 (Davis, J., concurring in the judgment). “Since ... Heller, courts have wrestled with its text to develop a sound approach to resolving Second Amendment challenges.” Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518. The general trend, however, has been in favor of some form of intermediate scrutiny. What this also reveals is that our circuit is one of the few that has not entered this debate. Although we must “applfy] the appropriate level of scrutiny,” ibid., we also must decide whether that is intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. “A choice must be made.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706. C There are strong reasons for preferring strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny. First, the Supreme Court has by now been clear and emphatic that the “right to keep and bear arms” is a “fundamental righ[t] necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778, 130 S.Ct. 3020. In our view, that strong language suggests that restrictions on that right trigger strict scrutiny. ' It is true that strict scrutiny is not always “called for whenever a fundamental right is at stake.” Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256 (majority opinion). The majority in Heller II forcibly argued this point. See id. at 1256-57. It is true, for instance, that in the First Amendment context, content-neutral regulations that restrict speech’s time, place, or manner are permissible if they survive a form of intermediate scrutiny—i.e., if the regulation promotes a significant interest unrelated to the suppression of a message and allows for ample alternative channels of communication. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); accord Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). For commercial speech, as well, courts apply a form of intermediate scrutiny. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). In those two contexts, courts “impose similarly demanding levels of intermediate scrutiny.” Hucul Adver. v. Charter Twp. of Gaines, 748 F.3d 273, 276 (6th Cir.2014). Those two tests are “close cousin[s], if not fraternal twin[s]” of one another. Id. at 276 n. 1 (citation omitted). Although it is true that strict scrutiny is not always implicated when a fundamental right is at stake, the Supreme Court has suggested that there is a presumption in favor of strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is involved. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (strict scrutiny applies to “fundamental” liberty interests); id. at 762, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing “fundamental” rights and “the corresponding standard of ‘strict scrutiny’ ”); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[E]nactment[s] involving] ... fundamental aspect[s] of ‘liberty’ ... [are] subjec[t] to ‘strict scrutiny.’ ”). Second, another way of thinking about the above point—and another reason for preferring strict scrutiny—is that the courts of appeals originally adapted the levels of scrutiny of Second Amendment jurisprudence by looking to First Amendment doctrine but that First Amendment doctrine reflects a preference for strict scrutiny more often than for intermediate scrutiny. In the First Amendment context, the Court has applied strict scrutiny when reviewing an infringement on “political speech,” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, on the freedom of association, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000), and on a content-based speech regulation, United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). Beyond the First Amendment context, the Court’s substantive due-process doctrine also employs a form of strict scrutiny. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, 728, 117 S.Ct. 2258. As explained above, although strict scrutiny is not ubiquitous in constitutional law, it predominates in numerous constitutional areas. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L.Rev. 1267 (2007). In those areas of constitutional law where the Supreme Court favors intermediate scrutiny, the Court has expressly indicated a reason for downgrading from strict scrutiny. With commercial speech, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny because it has decided that “[t]he Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63, 100 S.Ct. 2343; see also id. at 562, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (recognizing “the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech”) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Court has long indicated that content-neutral regulation receives a form of intermediate scrutiny because it imposes a lesser burden on First Amendment values. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459-62, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Cox v. State of N.H., 312 U.S. 569, 574-76, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). One strikingly clear First Amendment example of the Court expressly “downgrading” from strict scrutiny is FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984), concerning governmental regulation of broadcasts over the public airwaves. The Court recognized that “[a]t first glance,” strict scrutiny— “the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection”—should apply. Id. at 375-76, 104 S.Ct. 3106. But the Court’s express, reasoned determination that “broadcast regulation involves unique considerations” not present with “newspapers and magazines” is what “required some adjustment in First Amendment analysis.” Id. at 376-77, 104 S.Ct. 3106. Absent this kind of express indication from the Court that a lower version of scrutiny is sometimes applicable in Second Amendment eases, we prefer strict scrutiny. Third, strict scrutiny is preferable because this is a doctrinal area in which the Court has not simply refrained from suggesting that lesser review is called for but one in which it has strongly indicated that intermediate’ scrutiny should not be employed. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller explicitly advocated a form of interest-balancing intermediate scrutiny based in part on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 195-96, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997). See Heller, 554 U.S. at 690, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Heller majority, however, flatly rejected Justice Breyer’s Turner Broadcasting-based approach. See id. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (majority opinion). Even so, many of the courts now favoring intermediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny have relied expressly on Turner Broadcasting to develop Second Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97-98 (relying on Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994)); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257, 1259-60. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we reject intermediate scrutiny here because it has no basis in the Constitution. Both the Court and the academy have said as much. The Heller Court’s reasons for explicitly rejecting rational-basis scrutiny apply equally to intermediate scrutiny. The Court rejected rational-basis scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges because it “is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws,” citing Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008), an employment-discrimination case under the Equal Protection Clause. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n. 27, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added). “In those cases,” the Court said, “ ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee.” Ibid, (emphasis added). “Obviously, the same test”—i.e., a scrutiny test imported from Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence—“could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The Court continued: “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.... ” Ibid, (quoting United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938)) (bracketed material from Heller). Heller’s footnote 27— even aside from the Court’s flat rejection of Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing inquiry—strongly suggests that intermediate scrutiny “could not be used to evaluate” Second Amendment challenges. Ibid. Given the above, we prefer strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny. In choosing strict scrutiny, we join a significant,. increasingly emergent though, as yet, minority view that concludes that as between intermediate scrutiny and strict serutiny-the choice that Greeno requires— the latter is more appropriate for assessing a challenge to an enumerated constitutional right, especially in light of Heller’s rejection of judicial interest-balancing. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1146-46, 1149-52 (Bea, J., concurring) (“Categorical curtailment of constitutional rights based on an individual’s status requires more rigorous analysis than intermediate scrutiny.”); NRA v. ATF (NRA II), 714 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.2013) (Jones, J., dissental, joined by Jolly, Smith, Clement, Owen, & Elrod, JJ.) (“[T]he level of scrutiny required [for the case] must be higher than [intermediate scrutiny].”); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1284 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Even if it were appropriate to apply one of the levels of scrutiny after Heller, surely it would be strict scrutiny rather than ... intermediate scrutiny....”). d Because applying strict scrutiny puts us on a different course than that taken by other circuits, we offer one final precautionary note. The courts of appeals’ post-Heller jurisprudence does not suggest that the decision to apply intermediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny was generally the crucial keystone that won the government’s case. See, e.g., Reese, 627 F.3d at 804 n. 4 (reaching the same result “[e]ven if we were to apply a strict scrutiny test”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99-101 (reaching the same result “even if strict scrutiny were to apply”). We predict that the application of strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny will not generally affect how other circuits decide various challenges to federal firearm regulations. This is so for a few reasons. First, as discussed above, there is not just one model of strict scrutiny; there are different forms, such as strict-scrutiny-light. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1277 n. 8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). And it is not the case that a particular form necessarily corresponds to a particular doctrinal domain. The evidence bears out that jurists “tend to vary the version of strict scrutiny to reflect their personal views concerning the nature and significance of the rights involved in particular cases.” Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, supra, at 1312. Second, even when using the same form of strict scrutiny, “individual Justices”— and judges, it is fair to say-also “tend to vary their applications of strict scrutiny based on their personal assessments of the importance of the right in question.” Fallon, supra, at 1271 (emphasis added). Strict scrutiny is not a plaster mold that consistently produces identical results. For instance, the Court applied “the most rigid scrutiny”—using language later “cited to support the modern form of strict scrutiny review,” id. at 1277—in upholding a military order excluding all persons of Japanese descent from areas of the West Coast. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). That is not an outcome that most would expect from strict scrutiny today. Third, strict scrutiny, although having the benefit of greater fidelity to Heller and McDonald, is not so different a construct than intermediate scrutiny. Strict scrutiny demands government interests that are “compelling” and not “merely” “important.” “That’s unlikely to be relevant to gun controls, since virtually every gun control law is aimed at serving interests that would usually be seen as compelling—preventing violent crime, injury, and death.” Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1470 (2009). The other way in which strict scrutiny differs from intermediate scrutiny is that it demands that government regulations be “narrowly tailored” to the interests and not “merely” “substantially related” to those interests. But both “tailoring requirement[s] ... likely yield the same problems” and benefits. Ibid. We conclude our explanation of choosing strict scrutiny with a reminder of intermediate scrutiny’s shaky foundation in Second Amendment law. The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to apply intermediate scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge in United States v. Skoien (Skoien I), 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir.2009). That opinion was vacated, United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), and on rehearing, the en banc court expressly declined to wade “more d