Full opinion text
TINDER, Circuit Judge. We resolve three appeals in a single opinion because the appeals raise similar challenges to conditions of supervised release. Although supervised release has been a feature of the federal criminal justice system for nearly thirty years, with over a million federal defendants having been sentenced to supervised-release terms, during the past several years we have addressed certain aspects of supervised release for the first time. Some defendants, judges, lawyers, and probation officers might characterize our recent focus on these issues as better late than never, while others might grumble that we are trying to fix an unbroken system. In any event, we hope our recent jurisprudence results in the imposition of supervised-release conditions that are properly-noticed, supported by adequate findings, and well-tailored to serve the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public. The first section of this opinion provides an overview of the system of supervised release, including four general sentencing principles judges should consider. Next, we outline the history, crimes, and sentencings of the three defendants at issue. Then, we address the specific supervised-release challenges raised by each defendant, organized by the four general sentencing principles. Lastly, we consider* Defendant Crisp’s contention that the sentencing judge failed to consider one of his principal mitigation arguments. I. Supervised Release In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which replaced the federal parole system with the system of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583; see generally S.Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted, in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. The parole system allowed a convicted defendant to be released prior to the expiration of his prison term on conditions designed to reduce the likelihood of his committing further crimes. Parole was criticized for creating uncertainty as to how long a particular defendant would actually spend in prison — i.e., the judicially-imposed sentence was not considered the “real sentence” because it was “subject to constant adjustment by the parole commission”— which was viewed as undermining public respect for the law and defendants’ morale. S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 56. Under the replacement system of supervised release, judges impose conditions at sentencing which take effect after the completion of the defendant’s prison term, and, in contrast to parole, do not reduce the length of the custodial portion of a defendant’s sentence. The purposes of supervised release have been variously described as rehabilitation, deterrence, training and treatment, protection of the public, and reduction of recidivism. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000); United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir.2014); United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir.2013). Supervised release was not intended to be imposed for the purposes of punishment or incapacitation, “since those purposes will have been served to the extent necessary by the term of imprisonment.” S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 125; see also Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114 (“Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (directing a court contemplating the imposition of supervised release to consider most sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), except the need for the sentence to provide just punishment for the offense). The Supreme Court has described supervised release as “the decompression stage” between prison and full release. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 E.Ed.2d 727 (2000). “Prisoners may, of course, vary in the degree of help needed for successful reintegration. Supervised release departed from the parole system it replaced by giving district courts the freedom to provide postrelease supervision for those, and only those, who needed it. Congress aimed, then, to use the district courts’ discretionary judgment to allocate supervision to those releasees who needed it most.” Id. (citation omitted). In some felony cases, including certain cases involving drug-trafficking, sex offenses and domestic violence, supervised release is mandated by statute. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3588(a), (k); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 960(b). Between 2005 and 2009, approximately 41 percent of sentenced federal defendants were subject to statutes mandating supervised release. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release at 69 n. 275 (2010), available at http://www.ussc. gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2010/ 20100722SupervisedRelease.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015, as were all websites in this opinion). Although the sentencing guidelines call for supervised release in all remaining cases with a prison sentence of more than one year (with limited exceptions), see U.S.S.G. § 5Dl.l(a)(2), the Supreme Court made the relevant provisions of the guidelines discretionary in 2005. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 442 (7th Cir.2007). The change from supervised release being mandatory to discretionary has made little practical difference: between 2005 and 2009, district courts imposed a term of supervised release in 99.1 percent of cases with a prison sentence in excess of one year but not subject to statutorily-mandated supervised release. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release at 7, 52 n. 241. So while supervised release may have been intended “for those, and only those, who needed it,” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 709, 120 S.Ct. 1795, the reality is that virtually all federal defendants who spend at least a year in custody are subject to supervised release. The sentencing procedure generally is as follows. First the probation officer conducts a presentence investigation which culminates in the preparation of a presenfence report. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a), (b); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c), (d). The presentence report identifies the kinds of sentences available, including the terms of supervised release which may be appropriate. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d)(1)(C). The presentence report is disclosed to the parties at least 35 days before sentencing, and the parties state in writing any objections 14 days later. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e)(2), (f)(1). At least seven days before sentencing, the presentence report, including any addenda addressing objections, is submitted to the court and the parties. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(g). At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge hears from the lawyers, the defendant and any victims who are present, and may receive evidence related to objections. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i). Ultimately, the judge engages in a two-part analysis. First, the judge determines the defendant’s sentencing range under the guidelines. United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2864, 189 L.Ed.2d 823 (2014). Second, the judge makes “an individualized assessment of the appropriate sentence based on the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (quotation omitted). Any term of supervised release is considered part of the overall sentence. Id. at 192. In determining whether to include a term of supervised release, and, if so, in determining the length of the term and the conditions of supervised release, the judge is required to consider the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(c)-(d), which are discussed below. The sentencing judge’s difficult task is not undertaken on a completely blank slate, but rather is structured by statutes and the guidelines, which recommend a range of terms of supervised release depending upon the category of offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), and list certain mandatory and discretionary conditions, see id. §§ 3563(a)-(b), 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3. Some of the discretionary conditions are called “standard,” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e), while others are called “special,” id. § 5D1.3(d)-(e), and are recommended for particular offenses. Sentencing judges also are empowered to “impose conditions of their own devising.” Siegel, 753 F.3d at 707. After the sentencing judge exercises his or her “wide discretion in determining conditions of supervised release” at sentencing, Adkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (quotation omitted), the judge typically has no further occasion to consider the defendant’s supervised release until after the defendant has completed the custodial portion of his sentence, begun serving supervised release under supervision by a federal probation officer, and the district court is presented with a motion for modification, revocation, or termination of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Although not currently mandated by statute or the guidelines, we have suggested that sentencing judges “[rjequire that on the eve of his release from prison, the defendant attend a brief hearing before the sentencing judge (or his successor) in order to be reminded of the conditions of supervised release.” Siegel, 753 F.3d at 717. This “would also be a proper occasion for the judge to consider whether to modify one or more of the conditions in light of any changed circumstances brought about by the defendant’s experiences in prison.” Id. Adopting this suggestion would help mitigate the inherent difficulty in imposing conditions at sentencing which do not go into effect until the defendant is released from custody — often many years in the future. See id. at 708. A defendant may change substantially during a long prison sentence, and the world outside, the prison walls may change even more. A judgeship does not come equipped with a crystal ball. The sentencing judge may terminate supervised release at any time after one year of supervision, if the judge determines such action is warranted by the defendant’s conduct and serves the interests of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). For example, of the 42,984 active supervised release cases that closed during the 12-month period ending September 30, 2014, 13 percent were terminated early by the court. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Post-Conviction Supervision, Table E-7A, available at httpS/mm. uscourts. gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial Business/20U/appendices/E7ASepU.pdf. Approximately 68 percent of supervised release cases closed during the same period were closed “successfully”, i.e., terminated (whether early or not) without revocation. Id. Approximately 61.3 percent of the supervised release violations during this period were for “technical violations” (such as failure of a drug test, failure to report to a supervising probation officer, or non-payment of financial conditions), 32:3 percent were for “major” violations (i.e., criminal offenses with a sentence of more than 90 days imprisonment), and 6.4 percent were for “minor” violations (i.e., criminal offenses with a sentence of 90 days or less of imprisonment). Id. The three cases here concern legal issues arising at the original sentencing hearing, when the sentencing judge imposed a term of supervised release and selected the conditions and length of the term. We organize our discussion of the defendants’ challenges around four general principles sentencing judges should consider when imposing conditions of supervised release: (1) the importance of advance notice of conditions being considered; (2) the need to justify the conditions and the length of the term at sentencing by an adequate statement of reasons, reasonably related to the applicable § 3553(a) factors; (3) the goal of imposing only specific, appropriately-tailored conditions — -which is to say, avoiding the imposition of vague or overbroad conditions; and (4) the requirement to orally pronounce all conditions, with the written judgment only clarifying the oral pronouncement in a manner that is not inconsistent with an unambiguous oral provision. Prior to turning to the defendants’ challenges, we outline the history and offenses of the three defendants at issue. II. Defendants’ History and Offenses A. Jeffrey Jurgens Defendant Jeffrey Jurgens is the product of a deplorable childhood. He grew up in a rural Illinois house that was strewn with garbage due to his mother’s hoarding; based upon the photos admitted at sentencing, his childhood home more closely resembled a landfill than a house. Jurgens’ mother was a neglectful alcoholic who “always had a beer in her hand,” and his father, also an alcoholic, abused her until they divorced when Jurgens was nine. No one taught Jurgens proper hygiene, and he was teased and bullied at school because he was dirty and smelled. Despite his upbringing, Jurgens graduated from high school in 2003 and from DeVry University in 2005 with an associate’s degree. He continued to live with his mother until she died in 2007. At the time of his mother’s death, Jurgens was 23. He moved into his own apartment and got a job with a tech company as a help-desk technician. He held that job for nearly six years until his arrest and detention in this case in 2013. During that time, he suffered severe social anxiety, left his apartment only for work and groceries, and allowed garbage to accumulate in his apartment because he feared encountering other people when he took out the trash. He had occasional social contact with co-workers, but he has never dated or had an intimate relationship. Beginning in about 2007, Jurgens developed an interest in pre-pubescent and adolescent girls and in child pornography. For the next five years, he used file-sharing software to find child pornography and downloaded files to his computer hard drives. On February 17, 2012, a Moline, Illinois, police detective executed a search warrant at Jurgens’ apartment and seized three computer hard drives containing 69 videos of child pornography. After waiving his Miranda rights, Jurgens told the detective that he had been watching child pornography for about five years and knew it was illegal. Jurgens said he did not pursue or have any contact with minors. He said, “I can’t do anything when they are not here.” On September 25, 2013, a grand jury charged Jurgens with one count of receipt and distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). On October 24, 2013, Jurgens pleaded guilty to both counts without a written plea agreement. On January 15, 2014, a probation officer filed an initial presentence report, which was later revised on March 13, 2014, to reflect Jurgens’ objections. The report stated that the statute required a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment and a supervised-release term of five years to life on each count. The report indicated that the advisory guidelines range was 151 to 188 months of imprisonment and the guidelines recommended a life term of supervised release. The report stated, “[i]n addition to standard conditions of supervised release ... found at U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3, the Court may impose the following special conditions,” and listed seven “special conditions.” An addendum to the report indicated that Jurgens objected to five of the proposed special conditions. At a hearing originally scheduled for sentencing, the district court ordered Jurgens to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and reset the date for sentencing. A licensed counselor later diagnosed Jurgens with pedophilic disorder and social anxiety disorder. The counselor recommended the same conditions of “community supervision” that the presentence report listed and recommend that Jurgens receive counseling to address his social anxiety in addition to sex offender treatment. At the sentencing hearing on June 26, 2014, Jurgens’ attorney objected to the proposed conditions of supervised release which use “these very broad and vague terms about ‘sexual arousal’ and ‘pornography and the like.” Jurgens’ attorney asked that the court fashion the conditions to “allow for Mr. Jurgens to have contact with minors who are relatives of his and allow him to have contact with minors that are incidental to employment.” Jurgens’ attorney then spoke of the “irrationality” of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, which produced a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment for Jurgens, and requested a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. The government attorney requested a sentence of 108 months of imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. After hearing from Jurgens himself, the district judge addressed Jurgens’ offense in relation to other offenders, the harm to the victims, aggravating factors, and Jurgens’ personal history and characteristics. The district judge then imposed a sentence of 72 months of imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. The judge imposed 13 standard conditions with no discussion, and six special conditions with discussion of each. The judge rewrote certain proposed special conditions to. accommodate the objections raised by Jurgens’ counsel, and did not impose the special condition proposed by probation that Jurgens refrain from using the Internet for the purpose of sexual arousal. ■Jurgens appeals, contending that the district judge procedurally erred when she imposed 20 years of supervised release without addressing his request for 10 years or making appropriate findings. On appeal, Jurgens also challenges each of the 19 standard and special conditions of supervised release on the basis that they were imposed without appropriate findings and are impermissibly vague and over-broad. B. Parrish Kappes The details of Defendant Parrish Kappes’ childhood are different from Jurgens’, but the themes are similar. Kappes’ parents separated when he was an infant, and his mother took him to live in Arizona. In 1972, when Kappes was six years old, he flew alone to Illinois, where his father and grandmother lived. He had been physically abused and neglected by his mother, and he “looked rough” when he arrived in Illinois. He was given the choice of living with his father or grandmother, and he chose the latter, feeling that his father had earlier abandoned him. He lived with his grandmother for most of the next 40 years until his arrest and detention in this case. Kappes had not seen his mother since he was a child, and he told the probation officer during a pre-sentence interview that he could not remember his mother’s name. Although Kappes graduated from high school, he finished near the bottom of his class, and he told the probation officer he was illiterate. Although he maintained steady employment from 2006 to 2012, he grew “accustomed to being alone” and had difficulty socializing. On October 15, 2012, law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at the Tuscola, Illinois, house that Kappes shared with his then-93-year-old grandmother. The agents found 2,319 images and 182 videos of child pornography on Kappes’ computer. Agents also found images taken by Kappes of a 17-year-old female in a bikini. After waiving his Miranda rights, Kappes admitted that he had been taking pictures of this female and others while they played in an outdoor pool adjacent to his home since the girl was approximately seven or eight years old. In a footlocker, the agents found over 30 pairs of children’s underwear which Kappes claimed to have stolen 20 years earlier when he worked as a furniture deliveryman. Kappes was charged with three counts of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. After hearing two days of evidence, a jury found Kappes guilty on all counts. The presentence report stated that the guidelines range was 210 to 240 months of imprisonment and five years to life of supervised release. The report stated, “[i]n addition to standard conditions of supervised release ... found at U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3, the Court may impose the following special conditions,” and listed seven special conditions which largely mirrored those recommended in Jurgens’ presentence report. An addendum to the report stated that Kappes’ attorney had no objections to the report. At sentencing, Kappes’ attorney reiterated that Kappes had no objections to the presentence report. Counsel for the government requested a sentence of 240 months of imprisonment and 25 years of supervised release. Government counsel said she was requesting the statutory maximum because of, among other reasons, the graphic and violent images in Kappes’ child pornography collection. Kappes’ counsel commented upon Kappes’ positive employment record and record of caring for his grandmother. Kappes declined to speak. The district judge then discussed the “horrendous” nature and circumstances of the offense, and the “disturbing” character and history evidence of “taking pictures of neighbors’ children and saving panties for 20 years.” The district judge imposed a sentence of 240 months of imprisonment and 25 years of supervised release. The judge imposed 13 standard conditions and the seven special conditions recommended in the presentence report. Kappes appeals, contending that the district court erred by imposing (1) four special conditions which were not adequately supported by specific findings and are impermissibly vague or overbroad, (2) two special conditions which required Kappes to pay for court-ordered treatment and testing, and (3) three special conditions which appeared in the written judgment but were not orally pronounced at sentencing. C. David Crisp, Jr. Defendant David Crisp, Jr. (“Crisp”) followed in the footsteps of his father, David Crisp, Sr. At the time Crisp was charged in this case with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, his father was serving a sentence in federal prison for similar crack cocaine trafficking offenses. Crisp later reported to probation that his father was involved in his life when he was not incarcerated; however, “he was incarcerated frequently.” Crisp likewise was involved in his children’s lives when not incarcerated; he claimed to have committed the instant offense because he wanted to raise his one-year-old daughter and five-year-old step-son in “relative comfort” and “the minimum wage job of $8.25 an hour was just not cutting it.” Like his father before him, Crisp — 35 years old at the time ■ of his last arrest — had amassed a substantial criminal history consisting of 32 arrests and 24 convictions (including four drug felonies) during the previous 18 years. Crisp pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement. The presentence report stated that the guidelines range was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. The report stated, “[i]n addition to standard conditions of supervised release ... found at U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3, the Court may impose the following special conditions,” and listed four special conditions. An addendum to the report stated that Crisp’s attorney had no objections to the report. On May 15, 2014, Crisp was sentenced in the same courtroom where his father was sentenced in 2011. At the outset of sentencing, defense counsel reiterated that she had no objections to the presentence report. Government counsel then recommended a sentence of 286 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. Defense counsel argued that, despite Crisp’s failure to enter into a plea agreement, “the Court can still consider the timeliness of [Crisp’s] cooperation, the fact that he did render a proffer that was lengthy ... and he did accept responsibility in a very, very quick manner.” Defense counsel asked the district judge “to depart from the bottom of the guideline range to the maximum amount that the Court feels is appropriate.” After hearing from Crisp, the district judge discussed Crisp’s criminal history and said that his career offender status pursuant to the guidelines was appropriate. The judge said that Crisp had “rehabilitative potential” based upon Crisp’s allocution at sentencing and his “exceptional acceptance of responsibility.” The judge imposed a sentence of 240 months of imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. The judge imposed 13 standard conditions and the four special conditions recommended in the presentence report. Crisp appeals, contending that the district court erred by (1) imposing three conditions of supervised release which were not adequately supported by specific findings and are impermissibly vague or overbroad; and (2) failing to comment upon Crisp’s cooperation with law enforcement as a substantial mitigating factor. III. Advance Notice of the Conditions The first general principle sentencing judges should consider when imposing conditions of supervised release is that it is important to give advance notice of the conditions being considered. In most instances, this principle fits into the category of recommended “best practice” rather than mandatory requirement. Advance notice is only required of supervised release conditions that are not listed in a statute or the guidelines. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 377 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). This is because “[defendant and lawyer are charged with knowledge of the sentencing guidelines, which list the standard conditions along with a number of special ones.” United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir .2014). Despite this charged knowledge, we have suggested that sentencing judges require the probation office to include any recommended conditions of supervised release — and the reasons for the recommendations — in the presentence report that is disclosed to the parties prior to the sentencing healing. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 377; Siegel, 753 F.3d at 716-17. We also have suggested, as a matter of “best practices,” that sentencing judges: (a) send a list of the conditions that the judge is contemplating (including the reasons) to the parties prior to the sentencing hearing; and/or (b) explain at the sentencing hearing what conditions the judge is inclined to impose and why, then ask the parties whether they object to any of them or have a reasonable need for more time to decide whether to object, and adjourn the hearing if necessary. Thompson, 777 F.3d af 377. An exception to these “best practice” suggestions would be conditions of supervised release which are “administrative requirements applicable whenever a term of supervised release is imposed,” such as “requiring the defendant to report to his probation officer, answer the officer’s questions, follow his instructions, and not leave the judicial district without permission.” Thompson, 777 F.3d at 378. “Once the judge has explained why supervised release is necessary, he should be permitted to impose the necessary incidents of supervision without explanation.” Id. The goal of providing the parties with advance notice of the conditions at issue is to allow the parties to present an informed response. Cf. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008) (“Sound practice dictates that judges in all cases should make sure that the information provided to the parties in advance of the [sentencing] hearing, and in the hearing itself, has given them an adequate opportunity to confront and debate the relevant issues.”); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 735 (7th Cir.2003) (“Knowledge that a condition of this kind was in prospect would have enabled the parties to discuss such options intelligently.”). To the extent not required by rule or the sentencing judge, we recommend that defense counsel and government counsel make recommendations and/or objections regarding the proposed conditions of supervised release in advance of the sentencing hearing. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(1) (requiring parties to state in writing any objections to the presentence report within 14 days of receipt). Jurgens’ sentencing offers an example of the utility of advance notice by probation and timely objections by the defendant. Jurgens objected to four of the special conditions proposed in the presentence report, and the sentencing judge responded by changing the language in three of the objected-to conditions and declining to impose the fourth one entirely. It is our hope that the combination of advance notice, timely objections, and appropriate judicial response to the objections will result in conditions better tailored to fulfill the purposes of supervised release, less confusion and uncertainty, and perhaps — Jurgens’ case notwithstanding — fewer appeals. The issue of advance notice of the proposed conditions is potentially relevant to our standard of review. See United States v. Farmer, 755 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.2014) (“[I]t seems problematic to conclude that the defendant waives objections to special conditions if he does not properly confront conditions presented for the first time at the sentencing hearing.”). “We recently recognized some tension in our cases as to the proper standard of review” when a defendant fails to “object” (or, more accurately, take “exception”) after the sentencing judge imposes a condition to which the defendant had no notice, because, for example, the probation officer did not recommend it. United States v. Shannon, 743 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir.2014) (collecting cases). In general, our rule has been that the imposition of contested conditions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while uncontested conditions are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir.2007); cf United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir.2014) (allegations of procedural error, such as whether a judge adequately explained his chosen sentence, are reviewed de novo). Under either standard of review, we must be mindful of the fact that “[t]he sentencing judge is - in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,” and “district courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Edüd 445 (2007) (quotations and alterations omitted). The government contends that Jurgens, Kappes and Crisp received notice of the conditions they now challenge because all challenged conditions were recommended in the respective presentence reports. Accordingly, the government contends that plain error review is appropriate in each case because Kappes and Crisp did not object to the presentence report and each of Jurgens’ objections were accommodated by the conditions ultimately imposed by the sentencing judge. Kappes concedes that plain error review applies to his vagueness and overbreadth challenges. Jurgens argues that abuse of discretion review is appropriate to his challenges of the standard conditions because the presentence report merely incorporated the standard conditions by reference, rather than listing each standard condition in the report itself. Crisp offers no opinion on the standard of review, arguing that the errors are reversible regardless of the standard of review. We find that, with respect to the challenges we consider here, the outcome is the same regardless of the standard of review. See United States v. Hinds, 770 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir.2014) (same); Farmer, 755 F.3d at 854 (same); Shannon, 743 F.3d at 500 (same). Despite this finding, we caution future defendants against withholding objections under the belief that we will continue to treat the abuse-of-discretion and plain-error standards of review as functionally interchangeable in this context. Under plain-error review, unlike abuse-of-discretion review, we are permitted but not required to order correction of an error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Edüd 508 (1993) (“[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(b) [governing plain error] is permissive, not mandatory. If the forfeited error is plain and affects substantial rights, the court of appeals has authority to order correction, but is not required to do so.” (quotation omitted)). A sentencing hearing is not meant to be a dress rehearsal. IV. Statement of Reasons and Appropriate Tailoring The second principle — -justifying the conditions by an adequate statement of reasons — and the third — imposing appropriately-tailored conditions — are interrelated. Accordingly, after outlining the parameters of each principle, we discuss the defendants’ challenges to specific conditions in connection with both rules. A. Statement of Reasons The second general principle regarding the imposition of conditions of supervised release that we address is that a sentencing court must justify the conditions and the length of the term at sentencing by an adequate statement of reasons, reasonably related to the applicable § 3558(a) factors. See Bryant, 754 F.3d at 445. This “allow[s] for meaningful appellate review”; it “promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing”; and it is a vital element in maintaining the “uniform and constant” principle in the federal judicial tradition that “the sentencing judge ... considers] every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (quotation omitted). The applicable factors are set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(c)-(d). Section 3583(d) places the factors into three groups. First, the conditions of supervised release “must be reasonably related to (1) the defendant’s offense, history and characteristics; (2) the need for adequate deterrence;. (3) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the need to provide the defendant with treatment.” United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 360-61 (7th Cir. 2010); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Next, the conditions “cannot involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the goal of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 334, 187 L.Ed.2d 234 (2013); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Finally, the conditions must be consistent with any pertinent statement that the United States Sentencing Commission issues. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3); cf. Siegel, 753 F.3d at 708 (noting that, logically, this factor is not applicable to conditions already listed in the guidelines). Unfortunately, applying this “vague and general” list of unweighted factors to a specific case is unwieldy in practice, “and cannot yield an objective result.” Siegel, 753 F.3d at 707. The judge need not address every factor “in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusions regarding each one.” Shannon, 518 F.3d at 496; see United States v. Starko, 735 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.2013) (“Courts do not have to engage in a discourse of every single § 3553(a) factor; however, it is also the case that a rote statement that the judge considered all relevant factors will not always suffice.” (quotation omitted)). “[T]he court may simply give an adequate statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence it selects is appropriate.” Shannon, 518 F.3d at 496. “[T]he more onerous the term [of supervised release], the greater the justification required — and ... a term can become onerous because of its duration as well as its content.” United States v. Quinn, 698 F.Bd 651, 652 (7th Cir.2012); cf. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“We find it uncontroversial that a major departure [from the guidelines range] should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”). “Special” conditions often require more justification than “standard” conditions — but not always — and a condition’s label in the guidelines is ultimately irrelevant. All discretionary conditions, whether standard, special or of the judge’s own invention, require findings. See Bryant, 754 F.3d at 445. We emphasize that the judge need not give a speech about each condition, but conversely, we believe sentencing judges rarely, if ever, should list a multitude of conditions without discussion. This rule, however, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Siegel, 753 F.3d at 713. The fact that a sentencing judge may reduce or modify terms of supervised release at any time, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), may lead the judge to resolve uncertainties at the time of sentencing in favor of a long but reducible period. “[S]till this is a subject that requires an explicit decision by the judge after considering the defendant’s arguments.” Qyinn, 698 F.3d at 652. We also have advised sentencing judges to “consider the possibility of setting sunset dates for some of the more onerous terms, so that [the defendant] can regain more control of his own activities without needing a public official’s advance approval, while enough supervision remains to allow intervention should [the defendant] relapse.” Id. at 652-53. In Quinn, we vacated a term of supervised release and remanded for re-sentencing when the judge rejected the defendant’s request for a 10-year term of supervised release and instead imposed a lifetime term without discussion of the length of defendant’s supervision, the terms that he would be required to follow, or much of the defendant’s evidence that he presented a lower-than-normal risk of recidivism. See id. at 652. Jurgens contends that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 20-year term of supervised release without discussion of his request for a 10-year term. Jurgens points to the statement in Quinn that it is not sufficient to simply choose a supervised release term within the guidelines range; “a judge still must consider a defendant’s serious arguments for a sentence below the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations.” Id. Jurgens contends that we should vacate the 20-year term and “remand with instructions that the district court consider the § 3583(c) factors when addressing Mr. Jurgens’s requested 10 year term of supervised release.” The Sentencing Commission recommends the statutory maximum term of supervised release for every sex offense, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2), and any sentence within the guidelines range is “entitled to a presumption of substantive reasonableness.” Quinn, 698 F.3d at 652 (citing, inter alia, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). The 20-year supervised-release term Jurgens received is below the statutory maximum of life and thus below the term recommended by the Sentencing Commission. However, even in this situation, while the sentencing judge “need not discuss each section 3553(a) factor at sentencing and need not respond to every pithy argument that a defendant raises,” a defendant is entitled to a discussion of his “principal” arguments. United States v. Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.2009). Prior to sentencing, Jurgens submitted a 21-page “commentary on sentencing factors.” This document contains extensive discussion of factors favoring leniency in the term of imprisonment, culminating with a request for a custodial sentence of 60 months. The document contains a brief discussion of supervised release, focused exclusively on his objections to four terms of supervised release recommended in the presentence report. The document contains no recommendation as to — or even mention of — the length of the term of Jurgens’ supervised release. Jurgens’ objections in the addendum to the presentence report likewise contain nary a mention of the length of supervised release. In his remarks at the sentencing hearing, Jurgens’ counsel spoke expansively on Jurgens’ history and need for sex-offender treatment, the irrationality of the guidelines imprisonment-range, and the lack of evidence of “hands-on sex offenses.” At the conclusion of his remarks, after asking for 60 months in custody, Jurgens’ counsel devoted a single sentence to the length of the term of supervised release: “We ask for a ten-year period of supervised release with appropriate conditions therein.” In this context, we do not consider Jurgens’ request for a 10-year term to be one of his “principal” arguments, requiring discussion by the sentencing judge. Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.8d at 801. We find that the judge did not err in focusing her discussion on the topics focused upon by Jurgens’ counsel. Of course, a sentencing judge must always adequately explain his or her choice as to the length of custody and supervised release, consistent with the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See Farmer, 755 F.3d at 852. In this case, we find that was done, particularly given that the length of custody and supervised release were both significantly below the guidelines range. Cf. Quinn, 698 F.3d at 652 (more onerous terms require greater justification, and “a term can become onerous because of its duration as well as its content”). The judge chose to discuss her reasons for imposing the sentence as a whole, and we find this to be a reasonable choice in this case. The judge discussed Jurgens’ troubled personal history and characteristics and also discussed her “concern” that, after he was caught but prior to incarceration, he continued to watch “simulated depictions” of child pornography. Moreover, even if the judge erred by not adequately explaining her decision to follow the six-year custodial sentence (near the low end of the statutory range) with 20 years of supervised release (meaning Jurgens will complete his supervised release when he is approximately 54 years old), we find this error to be harmless in this case. “[A] district court may find it proper to impose a longer term of supervised release to follow a relatively shorter term of imprisonment,” United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 198 (3d Cir.2011), and that is what the sentencing judge did in this case. Jurgens also argues that the sentencing judge erred by failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons for each of the 19 standard and special conditions of supervised release the judge imposed. We address those arguments below in conjunction with our discussion of the individual conditions. B. Specific, Appropriately Tailored Conditions The third sentencing principle we address is that sentencing judges should impose conditions of supervised release which are (a) appropriately tailored to the defendant’s offense, personal history and characteristics; (b) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation; and (c) sufficiently specific to place the defendant on notice of what is expected. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at 196 (discussing “the importance of notice and reasonably narrow tailoring,” in crafting conditions of supervised release); Goodwin, 717 F.3d at 525 (“[E]ach special condition imposed must be tailored to Goodwin and his needs and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir.1999) (“A condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague if it would not afford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice as to the conduct prohibited.”). This rule functions as a limit to a sentencing judge’s “wide discretion in determining conditions of supervised release.” Adkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (quotation omitted). We have recognized “the difficulty of drafting special conditions.” Id. at 196. We have suggested that sentencing judges define the crucial terms in a condition in a way that “provides clear notice to [the defendant] (preferably through objective rather than subjective terms),” and/or “includes a mens rea requirement (such as intentional conduct).” Id. We have further suggested that the judge “[m]ake sure that each condition imposed is simply worded, bearing in mind that, with rare exceptions, neither the defendant nor the probation officer is a lawyer and that when released from prison the defendant will not have a lawyer to consult.” Siegel, 753 F.3d at 717. 1. Standard Conditions As we have said, the fact that certain non-administrative conditions are labeled “standard” does not render them immune from the requirements that they be adequately supported and not vague or overbroad. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 376-78. In Jurgens’ case, the sentencing judge imposed 13 standard conditions without giving reasons. Jurgens challenges each standard condition as having been improperly imposed without notice and without findings, and further challenges most of them as being vague, overbroad, and/or an excessive deprivation of his liberties. Jurgens first contends that the standard conditions were omitted from the presentence report, which deprived him of notice and an opportunity to object. Jurgens’ presentence report referred to the “standard conditions of supervised release ... found at U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3.” While it would be better practice for probation officers to detail each condition being proposed, along with reasons why they would be applicable in a particular defendant’s case, we cannot say that Jurgens was deprived of notice that each of the standard conditions listed in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3 would be considered by the sentencing judge. Jurgens finds more solid ground for his contention that the judge imposed 13 standard conditions without making findings consistent with the § 3553(a) factors. With respect to the substantive standard conditions, Jurgens is correct that the sentencing judge imposed them without explanation as to why they were appropriate in Jurgens’ case and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the permissible goals of supervised release. See Goodwin, 717 F.3d at 523-24. However, we nonetheless must look at the conditions to determine whether the failure to give reasons was harmless. See Siegel, 753 F.3d at 713. As we did in Thompson and Siegel, we highlight the ambiguities and/or overbreadth in many of the standard conditions, and suggest modifications for improving them. The condition forbidding the defendant from “associat[ing] with any persons engaged in criminal activity” and “assoeiat[ing] with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer,” is “fatally vague” because it appears to impose strict liability and does not define “associate.” Thompson, 777 F.3d at 376-77. A suggested modification would be to forbid the defendant “to meet, communicate, or otherwise interact with a person whom he knows to be engaged, or planning to be engaged, in criminal activity.” Id. at 377. The condition that the defendant “refrain from excessive use of alcohol,” is vague because “excessive use” is not defined. Id. at 376. A suggested definition for “excessive” alcohol use for men is “binge drinking or heavy drinking,” with “heavy drinking” being defined as “consuming 15 drinks or more per week.” Siegel, 753 F.3d at 715 (quotation omitted). While the government points to no evidence contradicting Jurgens’ claim he was a teetotaler, the government nonetheless contends the condition banning excessive alcohol use is appropriate because Jurgens is the child of alcoholics. The sentencing judge did not say this, and given the lack of any apparent connection between alcohol use and Jurgens’ offense, we think the imposition of this condition without findings was not harmless. The condition that “the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities” is inappropriate in Jurgens’ case because he has no dependents, see Thompson, 777 F.3d at 376, and it is not apparent what “other family responsibilities” means, given that it appears to mean something different than “support[ing]” Jurgens’ as-yet nonexistent dependents. To the extent the condition requires only financial support, as argued by the government, the condition should make that explicit and should include a limitation which takes into account the defendant’s ability to pay. Cf Siegel, 753 F.3d at 714 (“Revoking a defendant’s supervised release and recommitting him to prison for mere inability to pay would constitute imprisonment for debt.”). The condition that “the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics” contains numerous ambiguities. “There is no indication of what is meant by ‘personal history’ and ‘characteristics’ or what ‘risks’ must be disclosed to which ‘third parties.’” Thompson, 777 F.3d at 379. Presumably, the meaning of these terms would change from defendant to defendant, which makes definitions particularly important with this condition. The condition that the defendant is to notify his probation officer of any “change in ... employment” fails to indicate “whether change in employment just means changing employers or also includes changing from one position to another for the same employer at the same workplace.” Id. Likewise, the condition requiring the defendant to work “regularly at a lawful occupation” fails to define “regularly.” The condition prohibiting the defendant from “frequenting] places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered,” contains no “indication of how many trips constitute ‘frequenting]’ such places.” Id. More importantly, the condition, read literally, improperly imposes strict liability because “there is no requirement that [the defendant] know or have reason to know or even just suspect that such activities are taking place.” Id. Likewise, the condition that “the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without ... permission” would be improved by explicitly adding a scienter requirement, particularly in a case where it is foreseeable that a defendant will reside near the boundary of two judicial districts within the same state. The condition that “the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer” “essentially asks for a waiver of the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself, because the condition would require the defendant to answer ‘yes’ if he were asked whether he had committed another crime and he had.” Id. at 379-80. In the context of probation, the Supreme Court has held that a state probation requirement that the probationer “be truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters,’ ” was insufficient to require Miranda warnings because such a condition does not penalize the right to remain silent. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422, 434, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). The Court said that the “the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege,” but the “probation condition [at issue] proscribed only false statements; it said nothing about [the defendant’s] freedom to decline to answer particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution.” Id. at 437, 438, 104 S.Ct. 1136. We have interpreted Murphy as drawing a line between “a merely plausible fear that invoking one’s Fifth Amendment privilege will get one into trouble with the probation authorities,” and “the police tell[ing] the probationer that unless he talks his probation will be revoked.” United States v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir.2003). The former does not require Miranda warnings, while the latter does. Id. Because we are remanding for resentencing for other reasons, we decline to decide on which side of the Murphy line this condition falls. On remand, Jurgens may request that the standard condition that “the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer” should include language indicating that the condition does not prevent the defendant from invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We do not, however, hold here that such language is required. Jurgens contends that his Fifth Amendment rights also are implicated by the separate standard condition requiring him to “notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer.” We do not see how the mere fact of an arrest or law enforcement contact is itself incriminating, and Jurgens points us to no authority so holding. And unlike the previous condition, which required “all inquiries” to be answered, there is nothing in this condition which requires the defendant to answer any follow-up questions by the probation officer which may tend to elicit incriminating answers. With respect to the lack of findings to support this condition, we think it is harmless in this instance. Clearly, this condition assists the probation officer in monitoring the defendant’s conduct and compliance with the other conditions of release, most notably, the mandatory condition that the defendant commit no other criminal offenses. Jurgens challenges the standard condition that “the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer” as infringing on his Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless nighttime searches. This condition is not as broad as the conditions we vacated in Farmer, 755 F.3d at 854-55, and Goodwin, 717 F.3d at 523, and thus does not implicate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to the same extent. However, the visitation standard condition is nonetheless broadly worded, and “would allow the probation officer to ‘visit’ the defendant at 3:00 a.m. every morning and look around for contraband, and also allow him to follow the defendant everywhere, looking for contraband.” Thompson, 777 F.3d at 380. The sentencing judge made no effort to explain why this condition — especially in its current, broadly worded form — is connected to Jurgens’s offense, history, and personal characteristics, or how it is reasonably necessary to furthering the deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation goals referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Given that Jurgens’ offense exclusively involved images on a computer — which presumably would not be left in plain view when Jurgens heard a knock on the door— and there is no indication Jurgens has ever possessed any other form of “contraband,” there is no readily apparent justification for this condition to be imposed upon Jurgens. Accordingly, we cannot find that the lack of explanation was harmless. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 380 (“Regardless of any possible constitutional concern, [this condition is] too broad in the absence of any effort by the district court to explain why [it is] needed.”); cf. Goodwin, 717 F.3d at 523 (“Although we stop short of stating that such [search] restrictions could never be appropriate in these circumstances, our skepticism leads us to conclude that the district court must provide some justification for these particular conditions.”). Jurgens contends that the condition prohibiting him from entering “into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court” prevents him “from pursuing, a key avenue for reducing his criminal exposure in the event he commits a new crime.” But this argument presumes the court unreasonably denies him permission, which seems to be an unlikely enough event that the imposition of this condition does not constitute an abuse of discretion, much less plain error. Moreover, the lack of findings to support this condition is harmless because, although there are occasions “when the law enforcement benefits to the community justify permitting the offender to engage in this high-risk activity,” “[a]cting as a confidential informant is generally inconsistent with the rehabilitative and re-integrative goals of supervision.” Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, pt. E, § 460.60.20 (2011), available at https://wvn.fd.org//pdf(Part_ E109.pdf. We have focused upon Jurgens’ challenges to the standard conditions imposed upon him because Jurgens challenges each of the standard conditions on appeal. The same 13 standard conditions imposed upon Jurgens were imposed upon Kappes and Crisp, with the exception that Crisp was prohibited from “any” use of alcohol instead of “excessive” use. The ban on “excessive” use of alcohol is the only standard condition challenged on appeal by Kappes, and it must be vacated for the same reasons this condition was v'acated as to Jurgens'. Because we are ordering a resentencing for Kappes, our comments above regarding the other 12 standard conditions should be considered by Kappes’ sentencing judge as well. On appeal, Crisp challenges the standard conditions banning “any” use of alcohol and requiring him to “support” his dependents and “meet other family responsibilities.” Unlike Jurgens and Kappes, there is evidence that Crisp consumed alcohol: he reported to the probation officer that he drank alcohol three to four times a week, but not to intoxication. The sentencing judge imposed the alcohol ban with no explanation for how it connected to Crisp’s offense or history. Perhaps a rationale could be offered adequate to support a total or — more likely — an “excessive” alcohol ban, but that rationale is not sufficiently apparent that we may declare harmless the failure to make any findings in support of the condition as written. See Baker, 755 F.3d at 524 (vacating a complete ban on alcohol despite defendant’s statement that he consumed a six-pack of beer or more twice per week, because “there is no evidence that Baker’s alcohol use has contributed to his repeated criminal conduct or that Baker is dependent on alcohol”). The failure to give reasons for imposing the condition requiring Crisp to “support” his dependents and “meet other family responsibilities” was harmless given the central role Crisp’s family played in the presentence report and the comments made by the defense and the judge at sentencing. However, our other comments made above regarding this condition apply with equal force to Crisp. The meaning of the phrasé, “other family responsibilities,” is not apparent, given that it appears to mean' something different than “supporting]” Crisp’s dependents. To the extent the condition requires only financial support, the condition should make that explicit and should include a limitation which takes into account the defendant’s ability to pay. As with Kappes, because we are ordering a resentencing for Crisp, our comments above regarding the other 11 standard conditions which were not challenged by Crisp should be considered by Crisp’s sentencing judge. We are not the first court to be presented with at least some of these objections to the standard conditions. “A number of decisions in other circuits brush aside objections to the breadth and ambiguity of the many conditions of supervised release imposed by district judges.” Thompson, 777 F.3d at 380 (collecting cases). Other courts have interpreted an overbroad or ambiguous condition narrowly, for example, by reading a scienter requirement into a condition that is silent on the issue. See United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 767-68 (9th Cir.2012) (construing the standard condition prohibiting the defendant from “frequenting] places where controlled substances are illegally sold” as “prohibiting] Phillips from knowingly going to a specific place where drugs are illegally used or sold, but ... not prohibiting] him from ... going to a giv