Full opinion text
OPINIÓN OF THE COURT AMBRO, Circuit Judge.- TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION............,.............:................../.......:. 420 II.BACKGROUND...............................................•........'..421 A Concussion Suits Are Brought Against the NFL........................421 B. The Parties Reaeh a Settlement ......................................422 C. The Proposed Settlement .....................-...............423 1. Monetary Award Fund........:..........■........................423 2. Baseline Assessment Program- —.................................424 3. Education Fund...........................'.......................425 4. The Proposed Class ..-......................................425 III.JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW............................425 IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION ................!......................Ó.420 A Numerosity............ — ....................'.....................426 B. Commonality...................'................;...................426 C. Typicality..........................................................427 D. Adequacy of Representation............■..............................428 1. Class Counsel.........-..........................................429 2. Class Representatives.................’...........................430 3. Conflicts of Interest...................'..........................431 E. Predominance..................-....................................434 F. Superiority..'...............................................'........434 V. CLASS NOTICE...............................................'.........435 VI. CLASS SETTLEMENT.................'.............v.................436 A • Presumption of Fairness................... 436 B. Girsh & Prudential Factors..........................................437 C. Settlement’s Treatment of CTE................. 441 VII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES ... -.......■................................■......\ . .444 A Deferral of Fee Petition ......................: .............■— 444 B. Clear Sailing Provision............................... 447 VIII. CONCLUSION ..............................................’..........447 I, INTRODUCTION The National Football League (“NFL’) has agreed to resolve lawsuits brought by former .players who alleged, that the NFL failed to inform them of and protect them from the risks of concussions in football, The District Court approved a class action settlement that covered over 20,000 retired players and released all concussion-related claims against the NFL. Objectors have appealed that-decision, arguing that class certification was' improper and that the settlement was unfair. But after thorough review, we conclude that the District Court was right to certify the class and approve the settlement. Thus we affirm -its decision in full. II. BACKGROUND A. Concussion Suits Are Brought Against the NFL In July 2011,, 73 former professional football players sued the NFL and Riddell, Inc. in the Superior Court of California. Compl., Maxwell v. Nat’l Football League, No. BC465842 (Cal.Super.Ct. July 19, 2011). The retired players alleged that the NFL failed to take reasonable actions to protect them from the chronic risks of head injuries in football. The players also claimed that Riddell, a manufacturer of sports equipment, should be liable for the defective design of helmets. The NFL removed the case to federal court on the ground that the players’ claims under state law were preempted by federal labor law. More lawsuits by retired players followed and the NFL moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to consolidate the pending suits before a single judge for pretrial proceedings. In January 2012, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these cases before Judge Anita B. Brody in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a rhultidistrict litigation (“MDL”). In re: Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F.Supp.2d 1378 (J.P.M.L.2012). Since consolidation, 5,000 players have filed over 300 similar lawsuits against the NFL and Riddell. Our appeal only concerns the claims against the NFL, To manage the litigation, the District Court appointed co-lead class counsel, a Steering Committee, and an Executive Committee. The Steering Committee was charged with performing or delegating all necessary pretrial tasks and the smaller Executive Committee was responsible for the overall coordination of the proceedings. The Court also ordered-plaintiffs to submit a Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint and a Master Administrative Class Action Complaint to supersede the numerous then-pending complaints. The Master Complaints tracked many of the allegations from the first lawsuits. Football puts players at risk of repetitive brain trauma and injury because they suffer concussive and sub-concussive hits "during the game and at practice (sub-concussive hits fall below the threshold ' for a concussion but are still associated with brain damage).‘ ’ Plaintiffs alleged that the NFL had a duty to 'provide players with rules and information to protect them fi’om the health risk's — both short and long-term — of brain injury, including Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, dépression, deficits in cognitive functioning, reduced processing speed,' loss of memory, sleeplessness, mood swings, personality changes, and a recently identified degenerative disease called chronic traumatic encephalopathy (commonly referred to as “CTE”). ■Because CTE figures prominently in this appeal,- some background on this condition is-in order. It was first identified in 2002 based on analysis of the brain tissue of deceased NFL players,- including Mike Webster, T)erry Long, Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk.. CTE, involves the build-up of “tau protein” in the brain, a result associated with repetitive head trauma. Medical.personnel have.examined approximately 200 brains with CTE as of 2015, in large part because it is only diagnosable post-mortem. That diagnosis requires examining sections of a person’s brain under a microscope to see if abnormal tau -proteins are present and, if so, whether they occur in the unique pattern associated with CTE. Plaintiffs alleged that CTE affects mood and behavior, causing headaches, aggression, depression, and an increased risk of suicide. They also stated that memory loss, dementia, loss of attention and concentration, and impairment of language are associated with CTE. The theme of the allegations was that, despite the NFL’s awareness of the risks of repetitive head trauma, the League ignored, minimized, or outright suppressed information concerning the link between that trauma and cognitive damage. For example, in 1994 the NFL created the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee to study the effects of head' injuries. Per the plaintiffs, the Committee was at the forefront of a disinformation campaign that disseminated “'junk science” denying the link between head injuries and cognitive disorders. Based on the allegations against the NFL, plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, medical monitoring, fraudulent concealment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent hiring, negligent retention,-wrongful death and survival,-civil conspiracy,- and loss of consortium. After plaintiffs filed the Master Complaints, the NFL moved to dismiss, argii-ing that federal labor law preempted the state law claims. Indeed', § 301 'of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts state law claims that - are’“súb-stantially dependent” on the terms of a labor agreement. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 852-53, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). The NFL claimed that resolution of plaintiffs’ claims depended upon the interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) in place ’ between the retired players and the NFL. If the CBAs do preempt plaintiffs’ claims, they must arbitrate those claims per mandatory arbitration provisions in'the CBAs. Plaintiffs responded that their negligence and fraud claims would not require federal courts to interpret the CBAs and in any event the CBAs did not cover all retired players. B. The Parties Reach a Settlement On July 8, 2013, while the' NFL’s motion to dismiss was pending, -the District Court ordered the parties to mediate and appointed a mediator. On August. 29, 2013, after two months of negotiations and more than twelve full days of formal-mediation, the parties agreed .to a settlement in principle-and signed a term sheet. It provided $765 million-to fund medical exams-and offer compensation for .player injuries. The proposed settlement would resolve the ciatos of all retired players- against the NFL related to head injuries. In January 2014, after more negotiations, class counsel filed in' the District Court a class action complaint and sought preliminary class certification and- preliminary approval of the settlement. The Court denied the motion because it had doubts that the capped fund for paying claims would be sufficient. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F.Supp.2d 708, 715 (E.D.Pa.2014). It appointed a Special Master to assist with making financial forecasts and, five months later, the parties reached a revised settlement that uncapped the fund for compensating retired players. Class counsel filed a second motion'for preliminary class certification and preliminary approval in June 2014. The District Court granted the motion, preliminarily approved the settlement, conditionally certified the class, approved classwide notice, and scheduled a final fairness hearing. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191 (E.D.Pa.2014). Seven players petitioned for interlocutory review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”). In September 2014, we denied the petition, later explaining over a dissent that we lacked jurisdiction because the District Court’s order preliminarily certifying the class was not an “order granting or denying class-action certification.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 571-72 (3d Cir.2014). Following preliminary certification, potential class members had 90 days to object or opt out of the settlement. Class counsel then moved for final class certification and settlement approval. On November 19, 2014, the District Court held a daylong fairness hearing and heard argument from class counsel, the NFL, and several objectors who voiced concerns against the settlement. After the hearing, the Court proposed several changes to benefit class members. The parties agreed to the proposed changes' arid submitted an amended settlement in February 2015. On April 22, 2015, the Court granted the motion for class certification and final approval of the amended settlement, that grant explained in a 123-page opinion. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D.Pa.2015). Objectors filed 12 separate appeals that were consolidated into this single appeal before us now. C. The Proposed Settlement , The settlement has three components: (1) an uncapped Monetary Award Fund that provides compensation for retired players who submit pro,of of certain, diagnoses; (2) a $75 million Baseline Assessment Program that provides eligible retired players with free baseline assessment examinations of their objective neurological functioning; and (3) a’ $10 million Education Fund to instruct football players about injury prevention. 1. Monetary Award Fund Under the settlement, retired players or their beneficiaries are compensated for developing one of several neurocognitive and neuromuscular impairments or “Qualifying Diagnoses.” By “retired players,” we mean players who retired from playing NFL football before the preliminary approval of the class settlement on July 7, 20Í4. The settlement recognizes six Qualifying Diagnoses: (1), Level 1.5 Neu-rocognitive Impairment; (2) Level 2 Neu-rocognitive Impairment; (3) Alzheimer’s Disease; (4) Parkinson’s ' Disease; (5) Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”); and (6) Death with GTE provided the player died before final approval of the settlement on April 22, 2015. A retired player does not need to show that his time in the NFL caused the onset of the Qualifying Diagnosis. A Qualifying Diagnosis entitles a retired player to a maximum monetary award: Qualifying Diagnosis . Maximum Award Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment $1.5 Million Level 2 Neurocognitive Impairment $3 Million Parkinson’s Disease $3.5 Million Alzheimer’s Disease $3.5 Million Death with CTE $4 Million ALS $5 Million This award is subject to several offsets, that is, awards decrease: (1) as the age at which a retired player is diagnosed increases; (2) if the retired player played fewer than five eligible seasons; (3) if the player did not have a baseline assessment examination; and (4) if the player suffered a severe traumatic brain injury or stroke unrelated to NFL play. To collect from the Fund, a class member must register with the claims administrator within 180 days of receiving notice that the settlement has been approved. This deadline can be excused for good cause. The class member then must submit a claims package to the administrator no later than two years after the date of the Qualifying Diagnosis or within' two years after the supplemental notice is posted on the settlement website, whichever is later. This deadline can be excused for substantial hardship. The claims package must include a certification by the diagnosing physician and supporting medical records. The claims administrator will notify the class member within 60 days if he is entitled to an award. The class member, class counsel, and the NFL have the right to appeal an award determination. To do so, a class member must submit a $1,000 fee, which is refunded if the appeal is successful and can be waived for financial hardship. A fee is not required for the NFL and class counsel to appeal, though the NFL must act in good faith when appealing award determinations. The Monetary Award Fund is uncapped and will remain in place for 65 years. Every retired player who timely registers and qualifies during the lifespan of the settlement will receive an award. If, after receiving an initial award, a retired player receives a more serious Qualifying Diagnosis, he may receive a supplemental award. 2. Baseline Assessment Program Any retired player who has played at least half of an eligible season can receive a baseline assessment examination. It consists of a neurological examination performed by eredentialed and licensed physicians selected by a court-appointed administrator. Qualified providers may diagnose retired players with Level 1, 1.5, or 2 Neurocognitive Impairment. The results of the examinations can also be compared with any future tests to determine whether a retired player’s cognitive abilities have deteriorated. Baseline Assessment Program funds will also provide Baseline Assessment Program Supplemental Benefits. Retired players diagnosed with Level 1 Neurocognitive Impairment — evidencing some objective decline in cognitive function but not yet early dementia — are eligible to receive medical benefits, including further. testing, treatment, counseling, and, pharmaceutical coverage. The Baseline Assessment Program lasts ■for 10 years. All retired players who seek and are eligible for a baseline assessment examination receive one. nótwithstanding the $75 million cap. Every eligible retired player age 43 or over must take a baseline assessment examination within two years of the Program’s start-up. Every- eligible retired player younger than age 43 must do so before the end of the program or by his 45th birthday, whichever comes first. 3. Education Fund. The Education Fund is a $10 million fund to promote safety and injury prevention in football. The purpose is to promote safety-related initiatives in youth football and educate retired players about their medical and disability benefits under the CBA. Class counsel and the NFL, with input from the retired players,, will propose specific educational initiatives for the District Court’s approval. k. The Proposed Class All living NFL football players who retired from playing professional football before July 7, 2014, as well as their representative claimants and derivative claimants, comprise the proposed class. Representative claimants are those duly authorized by law to assert the claims of deceased, legally incapacitated, or incompetent retired players. Derivative claimants are those, such as parents, spouses, or dependent children, who have some legal right to the income of retired players. Even though the proposed class consists of more than just retired players, we use the terms “class members” and “retired players” interchangeably. The proposed class contains two subclasses based on a retired players’ injuries as of the preliminary approval date. Subclass 1 consists of retired players who were not diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, and their representative and dérivative claimants. Put another way, subclass 1 includes retired players who have no currently known injuries that would be compensated under the settlement. Subclass 2 consists of retired players who were diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, and their representative, claimants and derivative' claimants. Translated, subclass 2 includes retired players Who are currently injured and will receive an immediate monetary award under the settlement. The NFL estimátes that the total population of retired players is 21,070. Of this, 28% are expected to be diagnosed with a compensa-ble disease. The remaining 72% are not expected to develop a compensable disease during .their lifetime.- Class members-release all claims and actions against the NFL “arising out of, or relating to, head, brain and/or cognitive injury, as well as any injuries arising out of, or relating to, concussions and/or sub-concussive events,” including claims relating to GTE. The releases do not compromise the. benefits that retired players are entitled to receive under the CBAs, nor do they compromise their retirement benefits, disability benefits, and health insurance. Of the over 20,000 estimated class members (the NFL states that the number exceeds 21,000), 234 initially asked to opt out from the settlement and 205 class ■members joined .83 written objections submitted to the District Court. Before the fairness hearing, 26 of the 234 opt-outs sought readmission to.the class. After the District Court granted final approval, another 6 opt-outs sought readmission. This leaves 202 current opt-outs, of. which class counsel notes only 169 were timely filed. III. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW The District Court had jurisdiction over this class action settlement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). We have appellate jurisdiction to review its final order approving the settlement and certifying the class under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the decision to certify a class and approve a classwide settlement for abuse of discretion. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 185 n. 1 (3d Cir.2015); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir.2001); It exists “if the district court’s decision rests upon a cle.arly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotation omitted). This appeal principally presents two questions — whether the District Court abused its discretion .(1) in certifying the class of retired ■ NFL players and (2) in concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, reasonable, and adequate. Objectors (95 in all) have filed 11 separate briefs totaling some 500 pages addressing these questions. We address each of these arguments, but refer to objectors collectively throughout our opinion rather than cross-referencing particular objectors -with particular arguments. IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION Rule 23(a) lays out four threshold requirements for certification of a class action: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3)typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). “The parties seeking class certification bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 391 (3d Cir.2015). If that occurs, we consider whether the class meets the requirements of one of three categories of - class actions in Rule 23(b). This is a Rule 23(b)(3) class action under which we consider whether (1) common questions predominate over aiiy questions affecting - only individual class members (predominance) and (2) class resolution is superior to other available methods- to decide the controversy (superiority). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). A., Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1): There is no magic number of class members needed for a suit to proceed as a class action. We have set a rough guidepost in our precedents, however, and stated that numerosity is generally satisfied if there are more than 40 class members. Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 595 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir.2001)). The District Court found that a class of 20,000 retired players would be sufficient for numerosity. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371. No objector challenges this finding on appeal. B. Commonality “A putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s Commonality requirement if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Their claims must depend upon a common contention ... that it is capable of class-wide resolution — which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central -to the validity of each of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2545, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). Meeting this requirement is easy enough: “[W]e have acknowledged commonality to be present even when not all members of the plaintiff class suffered an actual injury, when class members did not have identical claims, and, most dramatically, when some members’ claims were arguably not even viable.” In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 397 (internal citations omitted). The District Court concluded that “critical factual questions” were common to all class members, including “whether the NFL Parties knew and suppressed information about the risks of concussive hits, as well as causation questions about whether concussive hits increase the likelihood that [rjetired [pjlayers will-develop conditions that lead to Qualifying Diagnoses.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371. It also found common legal questions, including the “nature and extent of any duty owed to [rjetired [pjlayers by the NFL Parties, and whether [labor] preemption, workers’ compensation, or some affirmative defense would bar their claims.” Id. Some objectors argue that commonality was lacking. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, they contend that the retired players do not share common issues of fact or law because they were injured in different ways and over different periods of time. For example, the claims of a lineman who played fifteen .seasons in the NFL, so goes the argument, will share little in common with those of. a back-up quarterback who played two seasons. These objections miss the mark. In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court 'held that commonality was lacking when a putative class of 1.5 million female employees alleged sex discrimination by their local supervisors. 131 S.Ct. at 2547. The local supervisors had discretion in making employment decisions and the class of female employees faced different managers making different employment decisions (some presumably nondiscriminatory). Id. The ■proposed class thus could not identify common questions capable of classwide resolution. Id. at 2553-55. The concerns in Wal-Mart do not apply héró because' the NFL Parties' allegedly injured retired players through the same course of conduct. See In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 399 (“Unlike the Wal-Mart plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs in this case have alleged that the class was subjected to the same kind of illegal conduct by the same entities,'- and 'that class members were harmed in the same way, albeit to potentially different extents.”). Even if players’ particular injuries are unique, their negligence and fraud claims still depend on the same common questions regarding the NFL’s conduct. -For example, when did the NFL know about the risks of concussion? What, did it do to protect players? Did the-League conceal the risks of head injuries? These questions are common to the class and capable of classwide resolution. C. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class representatives’ claims be “typical of the claims ... of the class.” Fed:R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). This “ensures the interests of. the class and the class representatives are aligned ‘so that the latter will work to ’benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals.’ ” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182-83 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir.1998)). We also have set a “low threshold” for typicality. Id...at 183. “‘Even relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories’ or where the claim 'arises from; the same practice or course of conduct.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir.1994)) (alteration omitted). The . class representatives, Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner, were named in the class action complaint and were selected by class counsel. Wooden is a retired player with no Qualifying Diagnosis. Like other retired players without , a current diagnosis, he sought a baseline assessment examination to determine whether he. had shown signs of cognitive decline and, in the unfortunate event that he developed one of the Qualifying Diagnoses, he would seek a monetary award. Turner was a -retired player living with ALS. Like other retired players with currently known injuries, he sought a monetary award. The District Court concluded that the claims of Wooden and Turner were “typical of those they represent.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig,, 307 F.R.D. at 372. We agree. Some objectors argue that the claims of the class representatives are not typical because of factual differences between the representatives and other class members’, including the number of seasons played and injuries caused by head trauma. But class members néed not “share identical claims,” and" “cases challenging the same unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56, 58. What matters is that Wooden and Turner seek re'covery under the same legal theories for the same wrongful conduct as the subclass-és they represent. Even if the class representatives’ injuries are unique to their time in football, the NFL’s alleged fraudulent concealment of the risks of head injuries is the same. D. Adequacy of Representation Rule 23(a)(4) requires class representatives to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the. class;” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). It tests the qualifications of class counsel and the cldss representatives. It also aims to- root out conflicts of interest within the class to ensure that all class members are fairly represented in the negotiations. ' Several objectors challenge the District Court’s adequacy-of-representation finding, but we conclude that- it was not an abuse of discretion. 1. Class Counsel When examining settlement classes, we “have emphasized the special need to assure that class counsel: (1) possessed adequate experience; (2) vigorously prosecuted the action; ■ and (8) acted at arm’s length from the defendant.” In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801 (3d Cir.1995) (“GM Trucks”). Rule-23(g) also sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider when appointing class counsel. They include counsel’s work in the pending class action, experience, in handling class action’s or other complex litigation, knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources available for representing the class. Fed .R.Civ.P. 23(g). When class counsel and the NFL began mediation, there was only one proposed class of all retired players. Class counsel, in consultation with members of the Steering Committee and the Executive Committee, decided early in the negotiations that creating' two separate subclasses “would best serve all [c]lass [m]embers’ interests and meet with Due Process.” To that end, class counsel designated lawyers from the Steering Committee to serve as sübclass counsel. in its final certification and approval order, the District Court found that class counsel and subclass counsel were experienced in litigating mass torts and personal injury actions,- vigorously prosecuted the action at arm’s length from the NFL, and were able to extract substantial concessions in the process. In re Nat'l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury. Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 373. The Court thus concluded that class, counsel adequately protected the interests of the class. Id. No objectors challenge the experience or qualifications of class and subclass counsel. They do make two related arguments regarding the adequacy of the subclass representation, though neither convinces us that the District Court abused its discretion. Objectors first assert that the procedure for selecting subclass counsel did nob ensure adequate representation because subclass counsel came from the team of lawyers already negotiating with the NFL. We agree that class counsel could have gone to' the District Court and asked it to appoint counsel from the outside. Yet objectors point us to no precedent requiring such a procedure. Moreover, the District Court assured itself that counsel were adequate representatives. They were selected early in the negotiations, had- already been approved by the District Court to serve on the Steering Committee, and were by all accounts active participants in the settlement negotiations. In-these circumstances,- the District Court did -not abuse its discretion in accepting subclass counsel as adequate representatives. Objectors next press that the subclass counsel for future claimants, Arnold Levin, was-not'an adequate representative, as he represented nine players who alleged current symptoms-in two lawsuits against the NFL. Levin disclosed to the District Court in an application for the1 Steering Committee-that he has agreed to fees in these cases on a one-third contingency basis. Objectors argue to- us that Levin’s representation of these players-created a conflict with his duties to represent the subclass of retired players with no Qualifying Diagnoses. Yet objectors, failed to. raise this contention in the District Court and did not meaningfully assert it on appeal until their reply brief. If they had raised concerns over Levin’s representation of other players, we have no doubt the District Court could ably have addressed this argument. -This-is part of the reason why we do not normally consider arguments not raised in the District Court— even in class actions — and deem them waived. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir.2009) (“.‘Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time .on appeal.’ ”). (quoting Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir.2006)). That said, some courts have relaxed the standards for waiver in class actions. See, e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th Cir.2015) (“Class members were not obliged, on penalty of waiver, to search on their own for- a conflict of interest on the part of a class representative.”); We agree that the . usual waiver rules should not be applied mechanically in class actions. We have an independent obligation to protect the interests of the class, and in many instances class members are far removed from the litigation and lack the information and incentive to objéct. See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he court plays the important role of protector of the absentees’ interests, in a sort of fiduciary capacity, by approving appropriate representative •■plaintiffs and class counsel.”). Accordingly, we retain discretion to consider arguments that go to the heart of the class- settlement’s adequacy and fairness. Out of .caution, we. decline - to apply' the penalty of waiver in this instance. Turning to the merits, we do not' See How representation by Levin created a Conflict of interest. He disclosed his representation of the players to the District Court, and it was still satisfied that he was an adequate representative. Beyond this, there is no evidence in the record before us that the players named in the complaints have a current Qualifying Diagnosis. Rather, they simply allege current symptoms that are not themselves Qualifying Diagnoses,. including memory loss, headaches-, mood'swings, and sensitivity to light. Many,'players without a current Qualifying Diagnosis presumably have similar symptoms. Accordingly, this is not a situation where ■ subclass counsel has dients in both subclasses and there is a risk of a conflict. 2. Class Representatives A class representative must represent a class capably and diligently. “[A] minimal .degree of knowledge” about the litigation is adequate. New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir.2007) (internal.quotation marks omitted). The District Court found that .the class representatives ably discharged their duties by closely, following the litigation, authorizing the filing of the Class Action Complaint, and approving the final settlement. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 375. Some objectors argue that the Court abused its discretion in approving Wooden as representative for the subclass of players with no Qualifying Diagnoses because he did not claim-'the risk of developing CTE.;This is- incorrect. In the Class Action Complaint Wooden alleged that he is “at increased risk of latent brain injuries caused by ... repeated traumatic "head impacts.” Id. (citing Master Administrative Class Action Complaint ¶ 7). This allegation covers the risk of CTE, which is associated with repeated head 'impacts. Moreover, what matters more than the words Wooden used to describe his current health are the interests he would have in representing the subclass. Given what we know about CTE, Wooden, and all retired NFL players for that matter, are at risk of developing the disease and would have an interest in compensation for CTE in the settlement; • 3. Conflicts of Interest “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and . the class they seek to .represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). The “linchpin of-the adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.” Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir.2012). But not all intra-class conflicts are created equal. If they concern “specific issues in controversy,” they are called “fundamental.” ’ Id. at 184 (quoting Newherg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed.2002)). This hits the heart of Rule 23(a)(4) and will defeat a finding'of adequacy. Id. - A recurring fundamental conflict is the divide between" present and future injury plaintiffs identified in Amchem. Counsel in that case sought to approve a class settlement and certify a nationwide class of persons — numbering between 250,000 and 2,000,000 — who shared an unfortunate fact in common: they were all exposed to asbestos-containing products . manufactured by 20 companies. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir.1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). The class settlement purported to resolve the claims of persons who had already sustained injuries as a result of asbestos exposure (those with present injuries) and those who had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet developed any injury (those with future injuries, if'any injury at all). The District Court approved the settlement and certified the class, but we-reversed because, among other things, conflicts of interest within the class precluded a finding of adequacy. Judge Beckér explained that the “most salient” conflict of interest was between those .with present and future injuries: As rational actors, those who are not yet injured would want, reduced current payouts (through cap? on compensation awards and limits on the number of claims that can be paid each year). The futures plaintiffs should also be interested in protection against inflation, in not having preset limits on how many cases can be handled, and in limiting the ability of defendant companies to exit the settlement. Moreover,, in terms of the structure of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism established by the settlement, they should desire causation provisions that can keep pace with changing science and medicine,, rather than freezing in place' the science of 1993. Finally, because of the difficulty in forecasting what their futures hold, they would probably desire a delayed opt out- In contrast, those who are currently injured would rationally want to maximize current payouts. Furthermore, currently injured plaintiffs would care little about inflation-protection. The delayed opt out desired by futures .plaintiffs would also be of little interest to the presently injured; indeed, their interests are against such an opt out as the more people locked into the settlement, the more likely it is to survive. In sum, presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the futures plaintiffs’ interests and vice versa. Id. at 630-31 (internal footnote omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed on this point and agreed that “the interests of those within the single class are not aligned.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626, 117 S.Ct. 2231. To overcome a conflict of interest within a proposed class, there must be “structural protections to assure that differently situáted ■ plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests.” Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631. A common structural protection is the creation of discrete subclasses, each with its own independent representation. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999) (“[A] class divided between holders of present and future claims ... requires division into homogenous subclasses ,.. with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”). The District Court found no fundamental conflict of interest in this class. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 376. It explained the incentives of class members were aligned because they “allegedly were injured by the same scheme: the NFL ... negligently and fraudulently de-emphasized the medical effects of concussions to keep [r]etired [p]layers in games.” Id. Moreover, the two subclasses of players guarded against any Amchem conflict of interest. Id. Turner, the representative for those with current injuries, “is interested in immediately obtaining the greatest possible compensation for his injuries and symptoms.” Id. Wooden, the representative for those who may develop injuries that manifest in the future, “is interested in monitoring his symptoms, guaranteeing that generous compensation will be available far into the future, and ensuring an agreement that keeps pace with scientific advances ... [while] compensating] as many conditions as possible.” Id. The District Court also cited other structural protections, including uncapped and inflation-adjusted monetary awards, the guarantee of a baseline assessment examination, and the presence of a mediator and special master. Id. at 376-77. The Court’s analysis was on point. Some objectors argue that this class action suffers from a conflict of interest between present and future injury plaintiffs. But simply put, this case is. not Amchem. The most important distinction is that class counsel here took Amchem into account by using the subclass structure to protect the sometimes divergent interests of the retired players. The subclasses were represented in the negotiations by separate class representatives with separate counsel, and, as discussed, each was an .adequate representative. This alone is a significant structural protection for the class that weighs in favor of finding adequacy. Moreover, the terms of the settlement reflect that the interests of current and future claimants were represented in the negotiations. -The Monetary Award Fund will start paying- out claims immediately, providing relief to those currently living with injuries. The Fund is uncapped and inflation-adjusted, protecting the interests of those who worry about developing injuries in the future. The NFL and class counsel must meet every ten years and confer in good faith about “prospective modifications to the definitions of Qualifying Diagnoses and/or the protocols for making Qualifying Diagnoses, in light of generally accepted advances in medical science.” This allows the settlement to keep pace with changing science regarding the existing Qualifying Diagnoses. As observed in Georgine, these are the sort's of settlement terms that rational actors from both subclasses would be interested in when negotiating the resolution of their ■claims. Finally, one of the principal concerns driving Amchem’s strict analysis of adequacy of representation was the worry that persons with a nebulous risk of developing injuries would have little or no reason to protect their rights and interests in the settlement. We have evidence that in this case the concern is misplaced because many retired players with no currently compensable.injuries have already taken significant steps to protect their rights and interests. Of the 5,000 players who sued the NFL in the MDL proceedings, class counsel estimated that 3,900 have no current Qualifying Diagnosis. These 3,900 players are represented, in turn, by approximately 300 lawyers. And with so many sets of eyes reviewing the terms of the settlement, the overwhelming majority of retired players elected to stay in the class and benefit from the settlement. We thus have little problem saying that their interests were adequately represented. Objectors further claim that the settlement’s treatment of -CTE demonstrates a fundamental conflict of interest between present and future injury class members. Under the settlement, retired players who died before final approval of the settlement and received a post-mortem CTE diagnosis are entitled to an' award. For any player who died after final approval, a post-mortem- CTE diagnosis is not com-pensable. Objectors cite this difference in recovery 'as evidence that the subclass of players with a Qualifying Diagnosis may have bargained away the CTE claims of other'players. GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 797 (“[A] settlement that offers considerably more value to one class of plaintiffs than to another may be trading the claims of the latter group 'away in order to enrich the former group.”). This argument misunderstands the role of the monetary award for CTE. As the District Court noted in discussing the fairness of the settlement, the monetary award “serves .as a proxy for Qualifying Diagnoses deceased [r]etired [p]layers could have received while living.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 401-02 (emphasis in original). Retired players who were living with symptoms associated with one of the other Qualifying Diagnoses, but died before approval of the settlement, may not have had sufficient notice of the need to be diagnosed. To provide some compensation to. these players, the parties created an award for the post-mortem diagnosis of CTE. The NFL’s own estimate is that 46 players out of a class exceeding at least 20,000 will fall into this category- and will receive an average award, after offsets, of $1,910,000.- The monetary award for CTE is thus an attempt to compensate deceased players who would otherwise be unable to get the benefits available to the class going forward. It is- not evidence of a debilitating conflict of interest in the class settlement-. E. Predominance Turning to the additional requirements for certifying a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the class may be maintained if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” .Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231. “We have previously noted that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, which is far more demanding, incorporates the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir.2004) (citing In re LifeUSA Holding, Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir.200Íj). We are nonetheless “more inclined to find the predominance test ’met in the settlement context? Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 304 n. 29 (3d Cir.2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The District Court found that this class action presented predominate factual questions regarding the NFL’s knowledge and conduct as well as common scientific questions regarding causation. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at. 380-81. The negligence claims “depend on establishing that the NFL'... knew of the dangers of concussive hits, yet failed to modify. the rules of NFL Football to mitigate them, or even to warn1 [r]etired [p]layers that they were risking serious cognitive injury by continuing to play.” Id. at 380. The fraud claims “suggest a similarly1 far-reaching scheme, alleging that the ... MTBI Committee repeatedly obfuscated the link between football play and head trauma.” Id. We agree with the District Court that predominance is satisfied in this case. Objectors argue that damage claims in a mass-tort class action such as this are too individualized to satisfy the requirements of predominance. They cite to Amchem where, as we have discussed, a nationwide class of persons exposed to asbestos could not meet the predominance requirement. 521 U.S. at 624, 117 S.Ct. 2231. But Am-chem itself warned .that it does not mean that a mass,tort case will never clear the hurdle of .predominance. Id. at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (“Even mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending; upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement.”). Moreover, this class of retired NFL players does not present the same obstacles for predominance as the Amchem class of hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of persons exposed to asbestos. • ,F. .Superiority Rule 23(b)(3)’s "Superiority requirement “asks the court to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 533-34 (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider the class members’ interests in individually controlling litigation, the extent and nature of any litigation, the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation, and the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). The District. Court found superiority satisfied because “the [s]ettlement avoids thousands of duplicative lawsuits and enables fast processing of a multitude of claims.” In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 382. No objectors challenge. this conclusion, and we have no disagreements with the District Court’s analysis. At the time the settlement was reached, 5,000 players had filed over 300 lawsuits in the MDL. Assuming the retired players’ claims survived the NFL’s motions to dismiss, the resolution of so many individual lawsuits would have presented serious challenges for the District Court. Given our experience with similar MDLs, we expect the proceedings would result in years of costly litigation and multiple appeals, all the while delaying any potential recovery for retired players coping with serious health challenges. y. CLASS NOTICE When ,the District Court preliminarily certified the class and approved the settlement in July 2014, it directed that notice be given to all potential class members. Notice “is designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement and to apprise class, members of the right and opportunity to inspect the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the litigation.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally speaking, the notice should contain sufficient information to enable class members to make informed deci-siohs-on whether they should take steps to protect their rights, including objecting to the settlement or, when relevant, opting out of the class.” In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 180 (3d Cir.2013). In our case, the notice informed retired’ players that a settlement was reached and explained what relief the players might be eligible for. The notice also outlined the rights of players to object.to the settlement arid potentially opt out. If a retired player chose to opt out, he would not benefit from the settlement but would not release his claims against the NFL. Approximately 1% of retired players filed objections to the settlement, and another 1% elected to opt out. For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the' circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). In addition to the requirements of Rule 23, due process further requires that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The District Court found that the content of the class notice and its distribution to the class satisfied Rule 23 and due process. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 383. One objector argues that the notice materials were inadequate because they insufficiently disclosed that monetary awards for players are subject.to reduction on account of applicable Medicare and Medicaid liens against a player’s assets. But the Long-Form Notice did discuss possible reductions based on “[a]ny legally enforceable liens on the award.” Id. at 384 n. 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court found this language sufficient' because the notice _ alerts class members to the possibility of lien reduction and refers them to the settlement where this topic is discussed in detail. Id. We agree. VI. CLASS SETTLEMENT A class action cannot be settled without court approval based on a determination that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(2). The inquiry into the settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) “protects unnamed class members from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The decision of whether to approve a proposed settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion of the district court.” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted). It “bear[s] the important responsibility of protecting absent class members, “which is executed by the court’s assuring that the settlement represents adequate compensation for the release of the class claims.’ ” In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805). In cases of settlement classes, where district courts are certifying a class and approving a settlement in tandem, they should be “even ‘more scrupulous than usual’ when examining the fairness of the proposed settlement.” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534 (quoting GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805). A. Presumption of Fairness We apply an initial presumption of fairness in reviewing a class settlement when: “(1) the negotiations’occurred at arms length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class objected.” Cendant, 264 F.3d at 232 n. 18. The District Court found each of these elements satisfied. and applied 'the presumption. In re Nat'l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 387-88. Objectors argue that the presumption-should not have applied at all because class counsel did not conduct formal discovery into the fraud and negligence claims against the NFL before reaching the settlement. We conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion in finding class counsel’s informal discovery to be sufficient. By the time of the settlement, class counsel had undertaken significant informal discovery. For instance, they had obtained a comprehensive database of the claims and ’symptoms of retired players and had enlisted the assistance of medical experts. They also had a grasp of the legal hurdles that the retired players would need to clear in order to succeed on their fraud and negligence claims, in particular the potentially dispositive issue of federal labor law preemption. Thus, in negotiations with the NFL class counsel “weré aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their case.” In re Nat'l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 387. To the extent objectors ask us to require formal discovery before presuming that a settlement is fair, we decline the invitation. In some cases, informal discovery will be enough for. class counsel to assess the value of the class’ claims and negotiate a settlement that provides fair compensation. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249, 267 (E.D.Pa.2012) (applying presumption in part because, “although no formal discovery was conducted ..., [class counsel] conducted informal discovery, including, inter alia, independently investigating the merits”). B. Girsh & Prudential Factors In Girsh v. Jepson, we noted nine factors to be considered when determining the fairness of a proposed settlement: (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the , stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class .action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1975) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). “The settling parties bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of the settlement.” In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d at 350. A district court’s findings under the Girsh test are those of fact. Unless clearly erroneous, they are upheld. Id. Later, in Prudential Insurance we held that, because of a “sea-change in the nature of class actions,” it might be useful to expand the Girsh factors to include several permissive and non-exhaustive factors: [1] the maturity , of the underlying substantive issues, as measured by experience in .adjudicating individual actions, the development of scientific knowledge, '. the extent of discovery on the merits, and other factors that bear on the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial . on the merits of liability and individual damages; [2] the existence and probable outcome of claims by other classes and - subclasses; [3] the comparison between the results achieved by the settlement " for individual class or subclass members . and the results achieved — or likely to be 1 achieved — for other ' claimants; [4] whether class or subclass members are accorded the right to opt out of the ■settlement; [5] whether any provisions for attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and -[6] whether the procedure for processing individual claims under the settlement is ■ fair and reasonable. 148 F.3d at 323. “Unlike the Girsh factors, each of which the district court must consider before approving a class settlement, the Prudential considerations are just that, prudential.” In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174. The District Court in our case went through the Girsh factors and the relevant Prudential factors in great detail before concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, reasonable, and adequate. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 388-96. Objectors try to challenge the District Court’s analysis in several ways, but none convinces us. 1. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation “The first factor ‘captures the probable costs, in both time and money, of continued litigation.’ ” Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 535-36 (quoting Cendant, 264 F.3d at 233). The District Court concluded that the probable costs of continued litigation in the MDL were significant and that this factor weighed in favor of approving the settlement. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 388-89. Some objectors assert that the District Court overestimated the costs of continued litigation because the negligence and fraud ■ claims were “straightforward.” This-is not the case. Over. 5,000 retired NFL players in the MDL alleged a multi-decade fraud by the NFL, • and litigating these claims would have been an enormous-undertaking. The discovery needed to prove the NFL’s fraudulent concealment of the risks of concussions . was • extensive. The District Court would then resolve many issues of causation and medical science. Finally, if the cases did not settle or were not dismissed, individual suits would be remanded to district courts throughout the country for trial. We agree with the District Court that the expense of this process weighs strongly in the settlement’s favor.' 2. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement “The second Girsh factor ‘attempts to gauge whether members of the class supp