Full opinion text
OPINION SUHRHE INRICH, Circuit Judge. I. OVERVIEW Months before the 2012 presidential election, based on a change in state law, Defendants State of Ohio and Secretary of State John Husted (collectively, “Defendants”) sought to undo a federal consent decree (“Decree”) that required Ohio to count provisional ballots cast by voters who appeared in the correct polling location but lacked certain identification and further required Ohio to count ballots cast in the right polling place but wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. In two related cases, NEOCH v. Husted (NEOCH) and SEIU Local 1 v. Husted (SEIU Local 1), Plaintiffs (NEOCH Plaintiffs; SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs; collectively, “Plaintiffs”) successfully defended the Decree and obtained an extension of it for one presidential cycle (NEOCH) and further obtained statewide preliminary and permanent in-junctive relief requiring Ohio to count these votes (SEIU Local 1). This appeal involves three attorneys’ fee motions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the two related cases. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs stemming from (1) their work in 2012 defending the Decree, (2) their work in 2013 obtaining an extension of the Decree, and (3) for the SEIU Plaintiffs, the work performed to obtain a preliminary injunction in 2012 and a permanent injunction in 2013. Using the lodestar method, the district court awarded fees to Plaintiffs in both cases. The district court, however, limited the fees to recover the costs of pursuing fees to 3% of the main case pursuant to the Coulter rule. See Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986) (setting a cap on fees for fees). On appeal Defendants argue that the district court abused its discretion because its award — $2 million in fees to twenty-five attorneys for over 6,000 hours in the two cases — -was not “reasonable” within the meaning of § 1988. Plaintiffs cross appeal the district court’s application of the Coulter rule, claiming that “unusual circumstances” warrants a higher percentage. Plaintiffs, joined by Amici, challenge the continued vitality of Coulter in light of Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990). For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the hours and rates awarded by the district court with the exception of the rates awarded to a contingent of attorneys from California. We also abrogate the Coulter 3% cap on fees for fees because the rule is inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court authority. II. BACKGROUND As the district court and this court recognized, “the consent decree arose from the 'turbulent saga of Ohio’s provisional voting regime’ that began in 2006 when Ohio enacted comprehensive election reforms.” Ne. Ohio Coal, for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter NEOCH] (per curiam) (quoting No. 2:12-CV-562, R. 67, Plenary Op & Order at 2). A detailed history of the Decree can be found in our opinion in Hunter v. Hamilton County Board of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 223-24 (6th Cir. 2011). This court has also recounted many of the events that underlie the fee award at issue. See NEOCH, 696 F.3d 580 (affirming the district court’s denial of motion to vacate Decree; affirming most of its grant -of a preliminary injunction). Because it is essential to determining whether the district court abused its discretion in making its three fee awards, we must give a rather detailed account of the motions and proceedings upon which the awards were based. A. NEOCH Lawsuit and 2010 Consent Decree In 2006, the Ohio General Assembly amended Ohio’s Election Code to require that voters provide one of several types of identification in order to cast a regular ballot in state and federal elections in Ohio. That same, year, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (NEOCH) and the Service Employees International Union Local 1199 brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Secretary of State challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the newly-enacted voter identification and provisional ballot laws. The State of Ohio intervened on behalf of the people of Ohio and the General Assembly (collectively, “Defendants”). See NEOCH v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1002-04 (6th Cir. 2006). On April 19, 2010, the district court entered a consent decree (“Decree”) between the parties. Although it stopped short of finding constitutional violations, the Decree mandated that the Board of Elections not reject provisional ballots cast by voters using only the last four digits of the voter’s social security number as identification that, due to poll-worker error, were cast (1) in the correct polling place but wrong precinct, or (2) with nonconforming or incomplete ballot affirmations (SSN-4 voters). The Decree was “final and binding,” but any of the parties could file a motion to modify, extend, or terminate the Decree for good cause shown. The Decree was valid through June 30, 2013. See NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 584, 601-02. Ohio followed the Decree in the 2010 and 2011 general elections and the 2012 primary. B. 2012 Proceedings Relating to the NEOCH 2010 Consent Decree 1. NEOCH Motion to Enjoin State Court Proceedings In 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct must be summarily disqualified if due to poll-worker error even if the voter was not at fault. Ohio ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 128 Ohio St.3d 17, 941 N.E.2d 782, 794 (2011) (per curiam). On April 16, 2012, the Ohio Senate President and House of Representatives Speaker Pro Tempore (jointly, “Relators”) filed a writ of mandamus in the Ohio Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the Decree was inconsistent with Ohio law. In response, on May 8, 2012, the NEOCH Plaintiffs moved in the district court for an injunction under the All Writs Act to prohibit the Relators from collaterally attacking the Decree and, in the alternative, an order to show cause why the Relators should not be held in contempt. The Relators did not oppose the motion, and Defendants took no position. On May 9, 2012, the district court held a telephone status conference with counsel for Plaintiffs, the Relators, the State of Ohio, and the Secretary of State. The court ordered an expedited response brief from the Relators. On May 10, 2012, the district court held an additional status conference with the same parties and announced its ruling. On May 11, 2012, the district court issued a 17-page opinion granting Plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the state court proceedings and ordering the Relators to dismiss their suit in state court. (May 11, 2012 Op.). First, the district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the nonparty Relators, who were acting on behalf of the State of Ohio, a named party to the Decree, and that it had the power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to enforce its judgment against nonparty interference in any event. The court also rejected the Relators’ argument that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibited the court from enjoining their mandamus action. The district court held that the requested relief was warranted given the Relators’ “extraordinary act of lodging a direct collateral attack on a Consent Decree of this Court.” The Relators subsequently dismissed their suit in the Ohio Supreme Court. 2. Defendants’ Request to Vacate Decree Defendants asked the district court to invalidate the Decree, claiming it conflicted with state law. Defendants also argued that the Decree was void ad initio because the Secretary of State lacked the unilateral authority to abrogate state law absent a constitutional violation. On May 17, 2012, the district court ordered expedited briefing on the threshold issue of the legal validity of the Decree. The court held a merits hearing on June 27, 2012. On July 9, 2012, the district court issued a decision rejecting Defendants’ request to vacate the Decree. (July 9, 2012 Op.). Specifically, the court (1) rejected Defendants’ argument that the Decree irreconcilably conflicted with state law; (2) held that Rule 60(b) governed Defendants’ motion to vacate the decree; and (3) ruled that Defendants had not shown grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(5) because they had failed to show that the Decree was no longer necessary to prevent constitutional violations. 3. NEOCH Motion to Modify the Decree On June 20, 2012, while Defendants’ request to vacate the Decree was still pending, the NEOCH Plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the Decree to prevent further constitutional violations, including alleged equal protection problems caused by counties’ application of disparate standards in implementing the Decree. The NEOCH Plaintiffs asked the court to expand the Decree to protect all Ohio voters who cast “correct location, wrong precinct” ballots, not just SSN-4 voters. C. SEIU Local 1 Motion for Preliminary Injunction On June 22, 2012, a separate group of Plaintiffs, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs), represented by some overlapping counsel, filed a separate action alleging that Ohio’s strict application of the disqualification rules to ballot deficiencies caused by poll-worker error violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs also alleged that the Decree’s preferential treatment of SSN-4 wrong-precinct ballots violated equal protection. Finally, the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs sought relief for voters who failed to properly sign ballot affirmations (deficient-affirmation ballots). The SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that the Ohio election laws burdened the fundamental right to vote and did not serve sufficient state interests. The SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs proposed “remaking” wrong-precinct provisional ballots to cast only “upballot” votes, or votes in eligible races. Because the two cases were similar and sought parallel relief, the district court deemed them related, and on June 27, 2012, heard joint arguments on the NEOCH Plaintiffs’ motion to modify and the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. D. District Court Rulings on SEIU Local 1 Preliminary Injunction Motion and NEOCH Motion to Modify On August 27, 2012, the district court issued a preliminary injunction in SEIU Local 1 v. Husted, ordering Defendants to count all wrong-precinct provisional ballots unless there was affirmative evidence that the poll worker properly performed his or her duties, and to count all provisional ballots with technical errors in the ballot envelope. (Aug. 27, 2012 Op. or “Plenary Op. & Order”). The district court’s 58-page Plenary Opinion and Order premised in-junctive relief upon three likely equal protection violations and a likely due process violation. NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 585. First, the district court addressed the equal protection claim based on wrong-precinct ballots caused by poll-worker error. This court described the proceedings in the district court: Beginning with the SEIU plaintiffs’ wrong-precinct ballots claim, the court found reliable evidence that Ohio’s county election boards disqualified thousands of wrong-precinct ballots in each of Ohio’s three most recent elections. Specifically, the court found that Ohio rejected more than 14,000 wrong-precinct ballots in 2008 and 11,000 more in 2010, with wrong-precinct rejections occurring in the vast majority of Ohio counties. (Plenary Op. & Order at 26 & n.28, 27 (counting 14,335 wrong-precinct rejections in 2008 and 11,775 in 2010).) And in the mid-cycle election of 2011, which involved no federal races, Ohio kept specific data regarding right-place/wrong-precinct ballots revealing that Ohio disqualified more than 1,800 such ballots. But for the consent decree entered in the NEOCH litigation, Ohio would have disqualified another 1,500 such ballots. (Id. at 25-26 (finding that Ohio disqualified 1,826 of 3,380 right-place/wrong-precinct ballots in 2011).) This data led the court to conclude that “[wjhile the number and frequency of wrong-precinct ballot disqualifications vary county to county, the problem as a whole is systemic and statewide.” (Id. at 26.) The court noted that “[m]uch of the factual basis upon which the Court relies for its findings is uncontested, or has already been established by this Court or the courts in [the Hunter litigation].” (Id. at 25.) Though the Secretary did not dispute the accuracy of these statistics, it challenged their relevance in light of recent efforts to improve Ohio’s provisional ballot system. The Secretary also argued that reasons other than poll-worker error may have caused some of the wrong-precinct ballots. The district court rejected these arguments, citing the failure of previous state directives and the absence of evidence that voters disobeyed poll-worker instructions regarding voting precincts. “No party,” it stated, “has identified a single example, from the past four years’ elections, of a wrong-precinct provisional ballot being cast because the voter refused to vote in the correct precinct.” (Id. at 29.) Invoking poll workers’ statutory mandate to direct voters to the correct precinct and inform them that wrong-precinct votes will not count, see O.R.C. § 3505.181(C)(1), the district court reasoned, “It is common sense that no rational voter who arrives at the correct polling place would ever refuse to cast a provisional ballot in the correct precinct. ...” (Plenary Op. & Order at 29.) “Based on the record evidence provided thus far,” the court concluded that “Plaintiffs ha[d] established a strong likelihood that thousands of lawfully-registered voters will be completely deprived of their right to vote under Ohio Rev. Code § 3505.183(B)(4)(a)(ii) in the upcoming election because of poll-worker error.” (Id. at 30.) NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 586. The district court then weighed this burden against the state interests justifying the automatic disqualification of wrong-precinct provisional ballots under the balancing test established by Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). Defendants relied on the “significant and numerous” advantages of the precinct voting system articulated in Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam): (1) capping the number of voters at a polling place, (2) limiting the precinct ballot to applicable elections, (3) making the precinct ballot less confusing, (4) simplifying election administration, and (5) allowing the state to place polling locations closer to voter residences. NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 586-87. The district court found these factors inappo-site to the facts at hand or unsupported by the record evidence. The district court also determined that Ohio’s disqualification of right-place/wrong-precinct provisional ballots constituted invidious discrimination because “the restriction bore no relation to those voters’ qualifications.” Id. at 587. Second, the district court considered the equal protection argument based on deficient-affirmation ballots caused by poll-worker error. The court attributed these deficiencies, including missing or misplaced printed names or signatures, to poll-worker error “because it is the poll worker’s duty to ensure that provisional ballots are cast with a validly completed ballot envelope and affirmation.” Id. (citing Plenary Op. & Order at 43 (citing O.R.C. §§ 3505.181(B)(2)-(3), 3505.182)). The court found the State’s proposed interests in rejecting ballots with these áffirmation deficiencies — the same Sandusky interests discussed above — insufficient to support the burden on these voters. Id. at 587-88. Third, the district court evaluated the equal protection argument based on the Decree’s preferential treatment of SSN-4 ballots. We noted that the district court agreed with the SEIU plaintiffs that Ohio’s differential treatment of wrong-precinct ballots, depending on the form of identification used to cast the ballot, violated equal protection. Recognizing that the NEOCH consent . decree provided a different vote-counting standard for SSN-4 provisional ballots (allowing a chance to prove poll-worker error and have the vote counted) and all other provisional ballots (not), the court inquired whether state interests justified the preferential treatment. The State — by now seeking to vacate the consent decree — offered none, and the court agreed, finding “[tjhere is no reason for treating provisional ballots differently based on the type of identification used.” (Id. at 49.) Id. at 588. Fourth, the district court addressed the due process argument based on wrong-precinct ballots caused by poll-worker error. We observed that “the [district] court adopted dicta from the post-remand judgment in the Hunter litigation that Ohio’s strict disqualification of deficient ballots, regardless of poll-worker error, rendered the election system ‘fundamentally unfair,’ in violation of due process.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F.Supp.2d 795, 847 (S.D. Ohio 2012)). Thus, “[r]elying on the same evidence discussed in the equal protection claims,” the district court found a strong likelihood of success in the SEIU Local Plaintiffs’ due process claim. Id. The district court therefore concluded that the equitable factors warranted the grant of a preliminary injunction requiring the Secretary to count correct-location/wrong-precinct and deficient-affirmation provisional ballots unless the State could prove that the poll worker advised the voter to cast the ballot in the correct precinct and the voter refused. Id. Because the preliminary injunction in SEIU Local 1 v. Husted granted the same equitable relief requested by the NEOCH Plaintiffs’ motion to modify, the district court stayed the NEOCH Plaintiffs’ motion to modify the decree as moot, subject to renewal if warranted for good cause. E. This Court’s Expedited Appeals from Denial of Motion to Vacate the NEOCH Decree and the SEIU Local 1 Preliminary Injunction Defendants appealed the denial of the motion to vacate the NEOCH Decree and the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction. This court expedited briefing in both appeals — which were not consolidated — and ordered an expedited telephonic oral argument to be held on October 1, 2012. On October 11, 2012, another panel of this court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ request to vacate the NEOCH Decree and the grant of the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to count provisional ballots cast in the correct-location/wrong-precinct due to poll worker error. See id. at 584. This court reversed the- SEIU Local 1 ballot affirmation injunction. See id. 1. SEIU Local I Preliminary Injunction In SEIU Local 1, this court affirmed the wrong-precinct provision of the preliminary injunction, holding that automatic disqualification of wrong-precinct/right-location most likely violated equal protection and substantive due process. Id. at 591-99. We “agree[d] on all counts” with the district court’s identification of “three strands of likely constitutional violations related to the wrong-precinct ballots”: “the unreasonableness and fundamental unfairness of disqualifying wrong-precinct ballots caused by poll-worker error (equal protection and due process), and the disparate treatment of deficient provisional ballots under the consent decree (equal protection).” Id. at 591. First, we agreed that the Anderson--Burdick standard applied because the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs had demonstrated that their right to vote was burdened by Ohio’s automatic disqualification rule for all wrong-precinct voters in violation of equal protection. We explained: Here, the district court identified a substantial burden on provisional voters. The court’s factual findings detail Ohio’s “systemic” disqualification of thousands of wrong-precinct provisional ballots and a strong likelihood that the majority of these miscast votes result from poll-worker error.... Though the district court did not make specific factual findings regarding the incidence of poll-worker error, it found such error evident in poll workers’ statutory duty to direct voters to the correct polling place. See O.R.C. § 3505.181(C)(1).... The court also cited the proliferation of multi-precinct polling locations in Ohio’s counties as increasing the likelihood of poll-worker error causing right-place/wrong-precinct ballots. (See Plenary Op. & Order at 6 n.10 (finding, as of the 2012 primaries, shared-polling place rates for the following counties’ election precincts: Butler, 95%; Cuyahoga, 94%; Greene, 100%; Franklin County, 68%; Lorain, 90%; Montgomery, 88%; Stark County, 71%).) In addition to these findings, the SEIU plaintiffs presented voluminous evidence that poll workers give voters wrong-precinct ballots for a number of reasons, ranging from misunderstanding counties’ precinct location guides to failing to understand the vote-disqualifying ramifications of handing out wrong-precinct ballots. Id. at 593-94. By contrast, Defendants failed to present evidence to the district court or this court demonstrating that other factors besides poll-worker error caused wrong-precinct ballots. Id. at 594. “Given this record and the clear legal duty imposed on poll workers by Ohio law,” we found “no clear error with the district court’s factual conclusion that most right-place/wrong-precinct ballots result, and will continue to result, from poll-worker error.” Id. at 594-95. We also held that although the San-dusky factors reflected the state’s legitimate interests in maintaining a precinct-based system, the State failed to show how these interests supported the restriction at issue. Id. at 595-97. Next, we held that the voter burden identified by the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs also supported the district court’s finding of a probable due process violation. Id. at 597. We observed that “[t]he SEIU plaintiffs have shown, and the State does not deny, that poll-worker error causes thousands of qualified voters to cast wrong-precinct ballots from the correct polling locations.” Id. Accepting Defendants’ argument that a due process violation requires intentional conduct, we nonetheless found sufficient indicia of purposeful conduct in the State’s intent to enforce its strict disqualification rules without exception, despite the systemic poll-worker error identified in this litigation and others. Hunter shed light on this problem last year, but the State persisted in its position. In light of the' well-documented problem of wrong-precinct provisional ballots caused by poll-worker error, resulting in the rejection of thousands of provisional ballots each year, we have no basis on which to disagree with the district court’s finding of a likely due process violation. Id. at 597-98. Third, we agreed with the parties and the district court that, by providing a remedy only for SSN-4 voters, the Decree “likely violate[d] 'the equal protection principle recognized in Bush v. Gore, [531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) ].” Id. at 598. We held that the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim “squarely raises the statewide disparity inherent in the terms of the consent decree: its preferential treatment of SSN-4 provisional ballots.” Id. Thus, consistent with Hunter, we affirmed the district court’s finding that the Decree’s different treatment of similarly situated provisional ballots likely violated equal protection. Id. We further held that the injunctive relief was narrowly tailored to the harm identified: denial of the fundamental right to vote based on the automatic disqualification of right-place/wrong-precinct votes based on poll-worker error. Id. at 599. On the other hand, this court rejected the district court’s finding of a likely equal protection violation based solely on the unreasonableness of disqualifying deficient-affirmation ballots caused by poll-worker error, “[bjecause the spotty record and Ohio law” did not support the district court’s presumption of poll-worker error. Id. Furthermore, the ballot affirmation deficiencies stemmed from “voters’ failure to follow the form’s rather simple instructions.” Id. Thus, because the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the deficient-affirmation claim, we reversed the preliminary injunction remedy on this point. Id. at 600. 2. NEOCH Decree In NEOCH, this court held that Rule 60(b) applied to Defendants’ request to vacate the Decree and that Defendants had not met their burden under that rule. Id. at 600-03. Defendants argued that Rule 60(b) did not apply because the Decree violated Ohio law and was therefore void under Rule 60(b). We rejected this argument because Defendants did not allege or show a “jurisdictional error” or “a violation of due process” that would justify relief under Rule 60(b)(4). Id. at 601. We also rejected .Defendants’ argument that the provision allowing the parties to modify the agreement “for good cause shown” waived the strictures of Rule 60(b). We noted that, although a consent decree is somewhat contractual in nature, it is still subject to Rule 60(b) because it is nonetheless a judicial decree. Id. The term “good cause shown” did not change that fact. Id. at 601-02. This court also rejected Defendants’ position that the Decree was not a final judgment given the Decree’s explicit statement that is “final and binding” as to the “matters resolved in this Decree.” Id. at 602. Having decided Rule 60(b) applied, we held that Defendants did not meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(5) because they failed to demonstrate a significant change in circumstances making the Decree unworkable or detrimental to the public interest. Id. at 603. Finally we noted that, because the court had set aside the portion of the preliminary injunction addressing deficient-affirmation provisional ballots, and the Decree continued to mandate that some deficient-affirmation provisional ballots be counted, a potential equal protection problem existed under Bush v. Gore. Id. at 603-04. Furthermore, the Decree “standing on its own” also raised Bush v. Gore issues in treating some provisional ballots differently than others. Id. at 604. This concern was “not purely academic,” because the Decree was “the only agreement governing these issues for Ohio’s 2013 primary elections.” Id. We therefore remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether the Decree should be modified to address the discrepancy created by the Decree between different sets of provisional ballots; Id. 3. Remand On remand, Plaintiffs obtained a separate preliminary injunction requiring Ohio to count wrong-location/wrong-precinct provisional ballots that resulted from poll-worker error, but this court issued an emergency stay pending appeal of the order. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter SEIU Local 1] (per curiam). The appeal was later dismissed as moot after the 2012 election. SEIU Local 1 v. Husted, 531 Fed.Appx. 755, 755 (6th Cir. 2013). The district court also granted Defendants’ motion to vacate the Decree’s affirmation provision. Plaintiffs did not appeal that decision. F. 2013 Proceedings On June 10, 2013, some of the NEOCH Plaintiffs moved to modify the Decree. The district court ordered expedited briefing. Initially Plaintiffs sought an indefinite extension, and later, in the alternative, sought an extension for two presidential cycles, or eight years. On August 5, 2013, the district court granted the motion, extending the Decree until December 31, 2016, one election cycle. (Aug. 5, 2013 Op.). First, it concluded that when they entered the Decree, the parties did not foresee that the voting rights of SSN-4 voters would still not be guaranteed after the Decree terminated in June 2013. Second, it found an extension until December 31, 2016, was . suitably tailored to ensure the counting of valid SSN-4 voters in the next election cycle. The court relied on new record evidence from the 2012 election that established the additional burden placed on boards of elections during presidential elections and the accompanying risk of disenfranchisement of SSN-4 voters. Defendants did not appeal that decision. On July 1, 2013, the SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs filed a motion for a permanent injunction that would require the counting of correct-location/ wrong-precinct ballots based on this court’s decision affirming the preliminary injunction, the evidence supporting that injunction, and supplemental evidence regarding the 2012 election. Defendants did not object to converting the preliminary injunction to a summary judgment. On July 9, 2013, the court granted summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction. (July 9, 2013 Op.) Defendants did not appeal. G. Attorneys’ Fees Motions and Awards This brings us to the district court decision at issue in the present appeal. As noted, the district court’s award and this appeal jointly address fees in the NEOCH and SEIU Local 1 cases. 1. The Attorneys In the NEOCH case, Plaintiffs NEOCH and the Columbus Coalition for the Homeless (CCH) were represented by Dayton and Columbus, Ohio counsel of Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP, as well as The Chandra Law Firm LLC, of Cleveland, Ohio. Lead attorneys were Caroline Gentry of Porter Wright and Subodh Chandra of The Chandra Law Firm, along with Sandhya Gupta. The Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) was represented by McTigue, McGinnis & Colombo, LLC, of Columbus, Ohio. Donald McTigue acted as lead counsel and Mark McGinnis as junior counsel. Plaintiff SEIU Local 1199 was represented by Altshuler Berzon LLP, of San Francisco, California, and by Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub, Byard & Harshman, of Columbus, Ohio. Altshuler Berzon billed for nine attorneys. Stephen Berzon acted as lead counsel, while Danielle Leonard and Barbara Chisolm argued the cases. The NEOCH Plaintiffs billed 2,357.85 hours, with requested rates ranging from $215/ hour to $750/hour. They requested a total of $967,593.25 in fees. The NEOCH Plaintiffs also submitted a separate fee motion for the 2013 Decree extension. In the SEIU Local 1 case, SEIU Local 1 and the other union plaintiffs were also represented by Altshuler Berzon and Hunter Carnahan. Hunter Carnahan also represented the Ohio Organizing Collaborative (OOC). NEOCH, CCH, and ODP were parties only in the NEOCH case, not in SEIU Local 1. The SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs billed 3,641.13 hours at rates ranging from $300/hour to $750/hour. They requested a total of $1,383,436.75 in fees. 2. The Motions The NEOCH Plaintiffs who had moved to extend the Decree through 2016 moved for fees for that work on October 21, 2013. On December 12, 2013, all SEIU Local 1 and the NEOCH Plaintiffs moved for fees in both cases (1) for work performed in 2012 and 2013 defending the Decree, (2) obtaining preliminary and then permanent injunctive relief prohibiting disqualification of wrong-precinct/right-location ballots, and (3) the appeal of those decisions. Plaintiffs did not seek fees for work performed concerning the wrong-location or deficient-affirmation issues. 3. The District Court’s Award On September 29, 2014, the district court issued an order granting Plaintiffs’ motions for fees in both cases, but it eliminated some time and reduced some of the requested rates. (Sept. 29, 2014 Op.). The court limited “fees for fees” hours to 3% of the time on the main cases. a. Hours The court found that, with certain exceptions, all of the hours submitted were reasonably expended: Both NEOCH and SEIU Plaintiffs have provided the Court with extensive and detailed documentation of their hours, supported by affidavits of counsel related to billing entries, efforts to exclude excessive or redundant hours, and general exercise of billing judgment. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have submitted documentation containing sufficient detail and probative value to enable it to determine that the hours recorded were actually and reasonably expended in this action, with certain exceptions explained below. Id. at 6. The district court specifically stated that it had reviewed the time sheets and declarations of each of the attorneys. Id. at 6-7. Regarding the 2013 extension of the Decree, the court observed that the NEOCH Plaintiffs were required to review and analyze the lengthy record and docket of a seven-year-old case, numerous provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, parallel and related litigation, in addition to substantive legal research, analysis, and strategy. As the Court noted at the time, the legal issues around extending the Decree were complex and unsettled ... and the briefing scheduled was expedited and required intense engagement by all parties. Id. at 8. Regarding the 2012 work to defend and modify the Decree, the court initially noted that at least 23 attorneys, as well as paralegals and law clerks, worked on this stage of the litigation. The court found that Plaintiffs engaged in multiple avenues of defense in order to protect the Decree, including to enjoin the collateral attack on the decree and move for civil contempt; preparing on an expedited basis to intervene at the Ohio Supreme Court; defending the Decree against Defendants’ motion to vacate; and moving to modify the Decree. Id. Regarding the SEIU Plaintiffs’ work in obtaining preliminary and permanent in-junctive relief, the court recognized that Plaintiffs achieved court orders preventing the disenfranchisement of thousands of Ohio voters in 2012 and thereafter; the work required them to attack novel and complex issues of constitutional law, and required them to collect and analyze thousands of pages of evidence showing Ohio’s violations of voters’ rights. Id. The district court rejected Defendants’ allegations that the hours expended in “researching, drafting, editing, and consulting are too great,” stating “Defendants invoke a phantom specter” because their “conclu-sory allegations that the award was excessive and ... counsel employed poor billing judgment” did not establish that the fees were unwarranted. Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court added that “Defendants can hardly be heard to complain about the number of hours expended by Plaintiffs, when they themselves engaged in a vigorous opposition to the Decree at nearly every phase of this litigation.” Id. The court then addressed Defendants’ other objections, including attorneys’ fees for the NEOCH Plaintiffs’ mediation costs, travel, fees for fees, SEIU Plaintiffs’ certification motion, the NEOCH motion to modify the consent decree, and the NEOCH motion for contempt. In each instance the court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the hours billed were excessive. b. Rates In assessing rates, the district court considered the customary rates of Plaintiffs’ counsel, fee awards in analogous cases, and other evidence. The average rate awarded was $378/hour. Twenty-one rates were $300/hour or more, ten rates were $425/ hour or more, and one attorney was awarded $600/hour. Law clerks received between $125/hour and $150/hour. c. Costs and Expenses The court found that since nearly all of Plaintiffs’ hours of attorney work were reasonable, their requested costs were also reasonable and appropriate. In total, the district court allowed billing for 6,147 hours and awarded $2,227,179.90 in fees and costs. III. REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES Section 1988 gives a court discretion to award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A reasonable attorney fee is calculated by the lodestar method. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The lodestar is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonably hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The award-seeking party should submit evidence of the hours worked and the rates sought. Id. If “documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Id. In determining hours, a court must “exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended.’ ” Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)). That is, fee applicants must exercise “billing judgment.” Id.; see also id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Counsel are expected to “exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court reviews a district court’s award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the law improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (quoting Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Schs. Bd. Of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004)). Substantial deference “is appropriate in view of the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. But that discretion “is not unlimited.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). “It is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination.... ” Id. In other words, the court must provide “a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) (remarking that “[a] district court should state with some particularity which of the claimed hours the court is rejecting, which it is accepting, and why”), abrogated on other grounds by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). V. APPEAL A. Hours Awarded Defendants contend that the district court abused its discretion by awarding 6000+ hours in the two cases, highlighting eleven areas. We keep three things in mind as we address Defendants’ arguments. First, Hensley focuses on the bottom line: “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Second, in assessing fees, district courts are not required to act as “green-eyeshade accountants” and “achieve auditing perfection” but instead must simply to do “rough justice.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011). This means that the court can rely on estimates based on its “overall sense of a suit.” Id. Third, because the district court has a superior understanding of the litigation, we must afford “substantial deference” to its factual determinations. Id.; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. We now examine Defendants’ complaints. 1. Attendance and Travel Time Defendants claim that “[a] key feature of counsel’s excessive billing is duplicative attendance and travel for court proceedings.” Defendants’ OB at 23. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not demonstrate the need for so many attorneys, mostly senior attorneys with high rates, who were not arguing, and faults the district court for not explaining why it approved these hours. Defendants also complain that counsel billed excessive travel, particularly out-of-state travel. Defendants offer the following examples in support of their argument. First, they complain that too many attorneys billed for telephone conferences, highlighting numerous occasions when the number of attorneys who billed for a conference exceed the number of attorneys who actually spoke at the conference. Defendants also complain about the hours billed for attendance at oral arguments. They emphasize the sheer number of hours billed, the discrepancy between the number of attorneys appearing at oral argument and the number of attorneys who actually argued, and the number of attorneys who billed for travel. First, they assert that the hours billed for the June 27, 2012 oral argument, which addressed the Decree’s validity and SEIU Local 1 scheduling, were excessive. Counsel charged for eight attorneys to participate, but only three Plaintiffs’ attorneys handled the proceedings: Leonard and Gentry argued the merits, and Chisolm addressed SEIU Local 1 logistics. They collectively billed 90 hours for argument-related travel, preparation, and attendance for June 26 and 27 and 70 hours on the day of argument. At least four attorneys billed travel. Second, Defendants object to the 100 + hours billed for the July 30, 2012 oral argument concerning the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction motion and NEOCH motion to modify. Plaintiffs charged attendance for ten attorneys, even though only Chisolm and Leonard spoke. Between July 29 and 30, ten of these attorneys billed 100 + hours for hearing related activities. Third, Defendants contend that counsel billed excessive hours for the October 1, 2012 telephonic oral argument in this -court. Leonard argued. Six attorneys billed for participation, five from Altshuler Berzon. Leonard billed 60 hours of argument preparation from September 25 to 30. Berzon also billed 21 hours from September 24 to 30. Fourth, Defendants challenge the hours billed in connection with oral argument in the district court on July 12, 2013, regarding the extension of the Decree. Plaintiffs charged for four attorneys to attend (travel for three) and a total of 80 + argument-related hours. The district court did not conduct an atomized line-item analysis of the hours allocated to telephone conferences and oral arguments. However, the court found that Plaintiffs had presented “extensive and detailed documentation of their hours,” which contained “sufficient detail and probative value to enable” the court to make the factual determinations that “the hours recorded were actually and reasonably expended in this action.” Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 6. It reiterated that “although multiple attorneys worked on these cases,” that was “no[t] inherently unreasonable,” and that “[t]he time records submitted in these cases” were sufficiently detailed and established proper billing judgment. Id. at 8-9. In light of Plaintiffs’ extensive documentation, the court found that Defendants’ con-clusory allegations that fees were unwarranted did not establish that there was error. Id. at 9. Multiple-lawyer litigation is common and not inherently unreasonable. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2007); ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 432 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Coulter, 805 F.2d at 152 (remarking that “multiple representation can be productive,” but “there is also the danger of duplication, a waste of resources which is difficult to measure”). At the same time, Hensley made clear that in assessing hours “reasonably expended,” the district court should evaluate whether the case is “overstaffed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The district court did just that. Its “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award” is easily supported by the record. Id. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Given the extremely expedited pace in the few short months before the 2012 presidential election and complexity of the litigation, the need for multiple attorneys to handle the various legal and factual facets of the two cases is obvious. In early May 2012, the litigation was quickly taking shape, so multiple attorneys’ attendance at telephonic conferences ensured that members of the team were fully and efficiently informed. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were represented by different counsel, and those counsel were required by local rule to attend all such proceedings. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 83.4(a) (“[I]n all actions filed in ... this Court, all parties ... must be represented at all times by a ‘trial attorney'.... The trial attorney shall attend all hearings, conferences, and the trial itself unless excused by the Court from doing so.”). Moreover, in the face of Plaintiffs’ very detailed billing records “ ‘conclusory allegations that the award was excessive and that ... counsel employed poor billing judgment ... do not suffice to establish that there was error ..., particularly in light of the statements of the district court [explaining the award] and our standard of review.’ ” Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 553 (quoting Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 1991)). As the district court found, Plaintiffs presented detailed billing records as well as Declarations explaining the nature of the work performed. Like the records in 'Imwalle, the itemized billing records for each entry specify the date that the time was billed, the individual billing the time, and a brief explanation of the specific task completed. See id. at 553. Plaintiffs’ counsel was “not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended,” as long as the general subject matter was identified. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12, 103 S.Ct. 1933. When read in conjunction with the timeline of the litigation, the billing records support the district court’s determination that the hours charged were reasonably expended. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 554. The same is true for the hearings. Take, for example, the July 30, 2012 hearing on the SEIU Local 1 preliminary injunction motion and the NEOCH motion to modify the Decree. This was a critical hearing, as the district court’s Plenary Opinion and Order reflects. Counsel of record — Donita Judge for OOC, Donald McTigue for ODP, Michael Hunter for SEIU 1199 in NEOCH and the union plaintiffs in SEIU Local 1 as well as Subodh Chandra and Caroline Gentry for NEOCH — , were required to be present. In addition to client representation, other attorneys present at the hearing made specific contributions to the issues to be presented: Leonard conducted substantive legal work in both cases; Chi-solm conducted substantive work in SEIU Local 1; Berzon provided substantive and strategic guidance; Chandra, Géntry, and McTigue had knowledge of the NEOCH case'history and substantive work on the pending motions; and Miller and Harsh-man performed work on the evidence presented in both cases. Given the importance of this hearing, complexity of the issues, and the number of parties involved in the two cases, the number of counsel present does not seem unreasonable. In any event, the district court was there and in a far better spot to assess whether the number of counsel was necessary. The district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ requested fees for travel to and from the court for various oral arguments was therefore proper. See, e.g., Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that travel time is fully compensa-ble); Perotti, 935 F.2d at 764 (noting that “matters of this sort are within the discretion given the district court”). 2. Conferencing Defendants complain that counsel spent unreasonable time conferencing with one another. First, Defendants note that 1,190 entries — 659 in SEIU, 531 in NEOCH— include some form of internal conference. Defendants claim that routine block billing makes it impossible to tell how much time is billed just for conferencing, but even a conservative estimate suggest 650+ conferencing hours (300 in NEOCH, 370 in SEIU Local 1). This amounts to more than a tenth of the awarded hours. “There is no hard-and-fast rule as to how many lawyers can be at a meeting or how many hours lawyers can spend discussing a project.” Gautreaux, 491 F.3d at 661. As this court remarked in Coulter, “[h]ours spent in reviewing records, talking to other lawyers or experts, preparing legal documents and the like cannot be fully verified and require the court to trust the lawyer’s word that the hours claimed represent necessary work actually performed.” Coulter, 805 F.2d at 150. Here, counsel provided detailed billing records and submitted declarations stating that these discussions also permitted senior lawyers to provide important strategic guidance to more junior lawyers, without duplicating efforts, thereby increasing efficiency. The district court rejected Defendants’ argument that counsel spent too much time “consulting,” crediting the lawyers’ accounts of their time based on the court’s intimate understanding of the complexity of the proceedings before it. Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 9. “[I]t is not this court’s job to second-guess that judgment.” Gautreaux, 491 F.3d at 661. Again, given Plaintiffs’ detailed documentation, and the district court’s explanation of the award, Defendants’ conclusory “too many hours” allegations do not establish error. 3. Legal Research Next, Defendants argue that counsel billed unreasonable and duplicative research hours. In total, the NEOCH/SEIU Local 1 legal teams billed roughly 750 hours on research activities. This included: fifteen NEOCH attorneys who billed their own research; eight SEIU Local 1 attorneys who billed their own research; Altsh-uler Berzon Attorney Diana Reddy’s 20 + hours researching “expansion of consent decree”; Reddy’s 30+ hours researching civil contempt; and law clerk research on numerous subjects by the Altshuler Ber-zon firm (9.8 hours researching constitutional issues, 8 hours researching unlitigat-ed HAVA claims, 9.4 hours researching “1983 injunction,” 7.8 hours researching “deliberate indifference,” and 11.8 hours for an evidentiary standards memo). The district court disagreed, citing not only Plaintiffs’ detailed billing records and Defendants’ conclusory allegations that the award was excessive, but also that Defendants had mounted a vigorous opposition to the Decree and were therefore in no position to complain. Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 9. Further, the court expressly stated that the 2013 extension required Plaintiffs to engage in “significant substantive legal research, analysis, and strategy”; that the 2012 work involved “multiple avenues of defense in order to protect the Decree”; and that the preliminary and permanent injunction motions required Plaintiffs “to attack novel and complex issues of constitutional law.” Id. at 8. Defendants retort that generic allusions to “complexity” and “novel and complex issues of constitutional law” should not provide a free pass for scrutiny of the hours here. But the district court specifically held that this case involved “significant novel and complex constitutional and procedural issues, including the All Writs Act, the Anti-Injunction Act, the applicability of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and the constitutionality of state laws and practices under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.” Id. at 29. We do not read the district court’s “concise but clear explanation” in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of the comprehensive written opinions of the district court and this court, which fully establish the complexity of the numerous federal and procedural issues presented in these cases. Again, other than complaining about the numbers, Defendants offer no explanation why the hours are excessive. Such conclusory allegations do not provide us with any basis to discredit the district court’s factual findings. 4. Drafting and Editing Filings Defendants point out that the SEIU Local 1 team, which included six attorneys, charged 300 hours for drafting and editing the complaint and preliminary injunction motion, and an additional 130 hours, involving six attorneys, for drafting and editing their twenty-page reply. Similarly, the NEOCH Plaintiffs charged 150 hours, from eleven attorneys, to draft the motion to enjoin. Defendants note that the NEOCH team billed 190 hours, from thirteen different attorneys, drafting, editing, or reviewing the May 30 brief regarding the Decree’s validity. The NEOCH Plaintiffs also billed 215 hours between August 21 and September 4 for appellate brief work that included work from ten different attorneys. 'The SEIU Local 1 Plaintiffs submitted 375 + hours from six attorneys for the SEIU Local 1 appellate brief. Defendants also point to “excessive” time on minor filings, such as at least 8 hours to provide notice to the district court that SEIU, Local 1 was related to NEOCH/Hunter litigation. Also SEIU Local 1 counsel billed 13 hours (four attorneys) for a case-related letter to this court. Defendants maintain that the foregoing litany establishes that counsel spent unreasonable hours on their motions and briefing, which often involved the same or similar issues. Defendants claim abuse’ of discretion by the district court because its analysis was minimal — namely, that it did not address the actual hours billed for drafting and editing, did not analyze any specific billing entries, and offered merely “a brief, oversimplified mention of the State’s positions.” However, other than aggregating the time spent on specific filings, Defendants offer no explanation why the hours were excessive. Thus, as the district court held, Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing error in light of Plaintiffs’ detailed records and the district court’s findings. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 553. Granted, numerous hours by more than several attorneys were billed for drafting and editing motions and briefs. But those submissions, prepared under extreme time pressure, helped the district court resolve the issues in this case in Plaintiffs’ favor. The district court’s overall assessment of hours reasonably expended was based on its unique understanding and reliance on Plaintiffs’ research and advocacy. As we observed in Coulter, “[w]hen the issue is a question of the lawyer’s judgment in billing for a particular number of hours on a piece of work, we must depend in larger measure on the fairness of the District Court in assessing the needs of the ease.” Coulter, 805 F.2d at 152. To put it bluntly, the district court assessed that Plaintiffs’ substantial success was due to the skill and substantial efforts of counsel, and its expressly said so. That decision deserves substantial deference. 5. Unfiled Proposal Defendants also assert that counsel unnecessarily increased hours by preparing a memo addressing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in advance of the hearing on Plaintiffs’ statewide preliminary injunction, which the district court did not request and did not use. At the hearing the district court praised “the extensive briefing” in the case, stating that it put the court “in an excellent position to decide this PI [preliminary injunction] based on the papers that have been filed and the arguments that have been made,” but it expressed concern that the Plaintiffs’ proposed filing would “prolong the process” because Defendants might want to file a response. NEOCH, 2:06-cv-896, ID# 12353-54. The district court did not isolate the hours spent on the unfiled proposal in its opinion awarding fees. Instead, it made an overall assessment. “[W]e look to see whether the District Court, based on experience and the record in the case, misapplied the reasonable billing practices of the profession.” Coulter, 805 F.2d at 151. Because work on the proposal was of a sort that “a reasonable attorney would have believed ... to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed,” Wooldridge, 898 F.2d at 1177, it cannot be said that counsel exercised poor billing judgment. We find no abuse of discretion in allowing compensation for such hours. 6. Discovery Defendants claim that Plaintiffs also billed excessive hours for gathering evidence and preparing evidentiary declarations and attachments. Initially they note that it is impossible to calculate an exact discovery total because of block billing, but the State estimates 1300+ hours for coordinating discovery, organizing evidence, and filing declarations/exhibits. Defendants also fault Plaintiffs for conducting. discovery on all 88 Boards of Elections rather than a sample of counties. Defendants isolate 30 hours charged by staff from May 24 to 25 for travel to counties to pick up and inspect documents. Attorney Jared Klaus of Porter Wright submitted numerous entries referencing clerical tasks such as cataloguing emails and compiling records. On June 13-14, 2012, he billed 15+ hours for “creating spreadsheet showing the status of public record requests to each county.” Defendants also point out that more senior attorneys billed for extensive discovery. Attorney Cathrine Harshman of Hunter Carnahan block billed 12 hours for “Preparation of subpoenas; request for production” on June 29. Attorney Michael Hunter of Hunter Carnahan “block billed” another six hours the same day with an identical billing description. Between July 2 and 11, Harshman reported 60 hours of document review and conferencing with Election Boards. The district court found that in securing the preliminary injunction, and ultimately the permanent injunction, Plaintiffs were required “to collect and analyze thousands of pages of evidence showing Ohio’s violations of voters’ rights.” Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 8. The record easily supports the district court’s findings. As Leonard explained in her Reply Declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ Motions for Attorneys Fees, the amount of material received from the Ohio County Boards and the Ohio ' Secretary of State was enormous, and not organized by subject matter or relevance to the provisional ballot issues raised by the litigation. Counsel reviewed and analyzed documents ranging from (1) minutes and transcripts from four years of County Board of Election meetings where provisional ballots were discussed; (2) the Secretary of State’s statistics on provisional ballots for four years of elections; (3) maps and diagrams of polling locations; (4) training materials and Directives from the state and county boards with respect to elections; (5) voter complaints and other incident logs from four years of elections; (6) county address and street guides used by poll workers in the 2012 elections; and (7) records showing the number and location of multi-precinct polling place locations. SEIU Local 1, No. 2:12-cv-562, ID # 7333. This information had to be gathered in a very short period of time for incorporation into the motion for a preliminary injunction. For this reason it is not surprising that several attorneys, including senior attorneys, participated in the process of gathering and analyzing these materials. Furthermore, as recited above, in its Plenary Opinion and Order, the district court relied heavily on the gathered evidence in finding that the problem of disqualifying wrong-precinct ballots due to poll-worker error was “systemic and statewide.” Aug. 27, 2012 Op. at 26. This court’s opinion affirming the district court cited extensively to the volume of evidence. See NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 586. Indeed, the discovery supported the requested relief in these cases. As the district court recognized, the SEIU Local 1 lawsuit presented “ ‘the hypothetical statewide challenge’ foreseen by the Hunter I Court.” Aug. 27, 2012 Op. at 18; see also NEOCH, 696 F.3d at 593 n.7 (“These findings regarding the statewide disqualification of wrong-precinct ballots amplify the countywide evidence established in Hunter.”). Offering a small sample of county boards might have allowed Defendants to argue that the evidence was insufficient to warrant statewide pre-election injunctive relief. Defendants’ complaint about Klaus’s hours is unwarranted. As the NEOCH