Full opinion text
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge: Prior to 1998, Compagnie Genérale des Earn was a French utilities company, best known for supplying water to households across France. By the close of 2000, that same company, now touting the name Vi-vendi Universal, S.A. (“Vivendi”)) was a global media conglomerate with extensive dealings in the film, music, telecommunications, publishing, and Internet industries, among related others. What followed on the heels of Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Vivendi’s seemingly overnight transformation gives rise to the securities-fraud allegations now at issue. To pull off its transformation and buttress its position as a mover-and-shaker in the global media-and-telecommunications market, Vivendi spent much of 2000 and 2001 acquiring a diverse array of media and communications businesses in the United States and abroad. Naturally, these acquisitions required money, and Vivendi did not have an unlimited supply. By 2001 and especially by 2002, Vivendi was running critically low. Indeed, Vivendi was in danger of not being able to meet all of its various payment obligations, including payments on loans-it had taken out for the very purpose of financing its buying spree. In the worst case scenario, which inquiries later revealed was not an altogether unlikely one, Vivendi was months away from bankruptcy or insolvency, Yet, up until approximately July 2002, Vivendi made numerous representations to the market suggesting that the course ahead for the company was smooth sailing. That all came to a halt when Vivendi’s stock price came tumbling down in the middle of 2002, after a series of credit downgrades and revelations that Vivendi was strapped, for cash. In a class-action suit they initiated against Vivendi in 2002, Plaintiffs-Appel-lees and Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Ap-pellants (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), investors in Vivendi’s stock during the relevant time period, alleged that Vivendi’s persistently optimistic representations during the period from October 30, 2000 to August 14, 2002, constituted securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), as well as the Securities Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 (“Rule, 10b-5”) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §■ 240.10b-5. Vivendi now appeals from a December 22, 2014 partial final judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.), following a three-month jury trial that' started in late 2009 and resulted in a jury verdict finding Vivendi liable for securities fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We affirm as to Vivendi’s claims on appeal, concluding as follows: (1) Plaintiffs relied on specifically identified false or misleading statements at trial and thus, contrary to Vivendi’s argument on appeal, did not fail to present an actionable claim of securities fraud by “elimi-nat[ing] the foundational element of ... a specific false or misleading statement,” Vi-vendi Br. 41; (2) Vivendi’s claim that certain' statements constituted non-actionable statements of opinion is not preserved for appellate review; (3) Vivendi’s claims that certain statements constituted non-actionable puffery and that others fall under the Private Securities Law Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) safe harbor provision for “forward-looking statements,” see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(e), is without merit; (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the fifty-six statements at issue here were materially false or misleading with respect to Vi-vendi’s liquidity risk; (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Blaine Nye (“Nye”); and (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding as to loss causation. As to the Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, we likewise affirm, concluding that the district court: (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding' certain foreign shareholders from the class at the class certification stage; and (2) did not err in dismissing claims by American purchasers of ordinary shares under Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). I. Background At the helm of Vivendi’s transition from a centuries-old French utilities conglomerate into a modern global, media powerhouse was a man named Jean-Marie Messier, who had been the chief executive and chairman of the executive committee since 1994, and chairman of the company since 1996. Messier was not, by trade, an expert in French utilities, but rather a former investment-banker at the firm La-zard Fréres & Co.' LLC. Soon after becoming chairman of "the' company’s executive committee, Messier formulated an ambitious plan to transform the company completely. In broad strokes, Messier’s plan was to merge the company with two other large companies that had significant media dealings; steadily supplement this new company’s core' media operations with various additional media acquisitions; and gradually divest the new company of its utilities and environment divisions. The plan largely got underway in May 1998, when the shareholders of Compagnie Générale des Eaux approved the company’s name change to Vivendi, S.A. Over the course of the following year, Vivendi, S.A., contributed or sold its interests in certain water-related holdings to a subsidiary, Vivendi Environnement, and acquired scattered interests in various media and telecommunications firms. The most aggressive foray in Messier’s plan came on June 20, 2000, when Vivendi, S.A., formally announced its intent to enter into a three-way merger with Canal Plus, S.A. (“Canal + ”), a french film and television production company; and The Seagram Company Ltd. . (“Seagram”), a Canadian entertainment and beverage company that .owned, among other things, Universal Studios and Universal Music Group. Shortly. after the announcement of the merger, credit-rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) undertook to reevaluate the creditworthiness of Vivendi, S.A. On July 4, 2000, Moody’s noted a “possible downgrade” of a particular senior class of Vivendi,. S.A.’s debt might be on the horizon, on account of, inter alia, concerns about the considerable amount of debt Vivendi, S.A., would carry after the merger (including extensive prior debts already incurred). S&P also expressed some concern, but tempered its forecast with the expectation that the company would be able to dispose of several assets and thereby alleviate its debt. Neither Moody’s nor S&P downgraded Vivendi, S.A., at the time. The three-way merger was complete on December 8, 2000, with the surviving entity being Vivendi, formerly a subsidiary of Vivendi, S.A. With the three-way merger, Vivendi became one of the world’s leading media and communications companies, second only to AOL-Time Warner. Among Vivendi’s assets were the world’s largest recorded music company, one of the world’s largest motion picture studios, and businesses in the global telecommunications, television, theme park, publishing, and Internet industries. Still, Vivendi pressed forth with additional acquisitions. Over the course of the next eighteen months, .Vivendi acquired significant stakes, or added to its existing interests, in a number of media and telecommunications companies across the world. To start, within just a few days of the three-way merger’s completion in December 2000, Vivendi announced its acquisition of a 35% interest in Maroc Telecom, the Kingdom' of Morocco’s state-owned telecommunications company, for approximately €2.3 billion. In Summer 2001, Vi-vendi acquired publishing company Houghton Mifflin Company (“Houghton Mifflin”), along with its $500 million in net debt, for approximately $2.2 billion. Several months later, on December 17, 2001, Vivendi'announced that it would acquire full control of television company USA Networks Corporation (“USA Networks”) for $10.3 billion, approximately $1.6 billion of which Vivendi would finance in cash. That same day, Vivendi announced that it would invest $1.5 billion in satellite television company EchoStar Communications Corporation (“EchoStar”), which was expected to gain access to approximately 15 million homes in the United States when EchoStar acquired DirecTV. These multi-billion-dollar transactions merely scratched the surface of Vivendi’s buying frenzy. Vivendi also acquired, in whole or in part, MP3.com, GetMusic LLC, RMM Records & Video, MUSI-DISC, Koch Group Recorded Music, Uproar Inc. and EMusic.com Inc., among other media or telecommunications companies. In total, Vivendi reportedly spent approximately $77 billion on its acquisition spree, with Seagram alone costing roughly $34 billion. According to Plaintiffs, Viven-di’s debts associated with its media and communications operations ballooned from approximately €3 billion in early 2000 to over €21 billion in 2002. Meanwhile, Vivendi repeatedly expressed its aggressive growth prospects and its secure financial footing. Many of Vivendi’s public statements during its acquisition period focused on EBITDA (“Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization”), an earnings measure that is typically considered a “good example of [a company’s] cash income” and ability to service debt. J.A. 2833. On October 30, 2000, the company announced its “objective” to “grow proforma adjusted EBITDA at an approximate 35% compound annual growth rate through 2002.” Special App’x 315. Over the next year, Vivendi repeatedly underscored its “confidenc[e] that [it] w[ould] meet [its] very aggressive [EBITDA] growth targets,” id. at 316, and emphasized that its fiscal year 2001 quarterly results met or exceeded its EBITDA growth targets, e.g., id. at 320 (“With three quarters of the ‘aggressive’ incremental EBITDA target for the full year 2001 already achieved in the first half of the year, I can only re-emphasiz[e] our confidence. We will at least meet our stated targets.”); id. at 322 (“EBITDA organic growth is very strong, reaching 36% in the third quarter and 52% year-to-date. It represents the achievement in nine months of close to 100% of the full year 2001 incremental EBITDA growth target”). Vivendi supplemented these statements with representations that it had “very strong ... results with outstanding growth,” id. at 316, “the highest growth rates in the industry,” id. at 320, “strong operating results,” id. “free operational cash flow [that was] far above [its] objectives,” id. at 328, and “strong free cash flow,” id. at 330. But the tableau painted by Vivendi’s public statements did not match the tenor of the discussions inside the company. With each acquisition, Vivendi “had to borrow some money from the banks,” J.A. 2485, and it became “more and more difficult to raise the cash” Vivendi needed to pay for its acquisitions and its accumulating debts, J.A. 2487. Vivendi’s liquidity, or its ability to pay its fixed obligations, became increasingly strained. According to one member of Vivendi’s finance department, members of that department believed Vivendi’s liquidity situation was “tense” by the middle of 2001, “dangerous” by late 2001, and “more than dangerous [throughout 2002].” J.A. 2488. The USA Networks and EchoStar transactions at the close of 2001 were particularly alarming to one member of Vivendi’s finance department, who testified that the two deals “would create havoc with the debt level of Vivendi,” whose “cash situation” was already “extremely tense” at the time. Special App’x 366 n.21. Starting in June 2001, Vivendi’s Treasurer, Hubert Dupont-L’Hotelain, “clearly raised the issue of a cash problem inside Vivendi” at each one of Vivendi’s Finance Committee meetings. J.A. 2512. According to a Vivendi employee present at the meetings, Duponh-L’Hótelain repeatedly “expressed concerns over ... the liquidity situation” and discussed Vivendi’s “shortage in cash.” Id. These discussions prompted Vivendi’s Chief Financial Officer, Guillaume Hannezo, to comment on multiple occasions that Vivendi appeared to be “running out of cash” and “nearing bankruptcy.” Id. at 2513. Hannezo also warned Messier of these conditions. ’ For example, after credit-rating ágencies raised concerns with Hannezo in early December 2001 about Vivendi’s contemplated USA Networks and EchoS-tar transactions, Hannezo wrote Messier warning of the “danger” of a downgrade. J.A. 4072. He later penned a memorandum to Messier recounting the “painful and humiliating meetings with the ratings agencies.” Id. at 3794. In that note, he explained that he did “not want to put up with[] a downgrade, which [he believed] would [lead] to a liquidity crisis.” Id. Hannezo also told Messier that he had “the unpleasant feeling of being in a car whose driver is accelerating in a sharp turn while [he was] the one in the death seat.” Id. “The only thing that I am asking,” Hannezo continuéd, “is that it doesn’t all end in shame.” Id. at 3794-95. Four days after Hannezo alerted Messier to the “danger” of a downgrade, Vivendi publicly announced its $10.3 billion USA Networks transaction and $1.5 billion EchoStar transaction. In a press conference shortly after the announcement, Vivendi stated that the transactions were “not putting pressure on Vivendi Universal,” and that it anticipated maintaining “a very comfortable ... credit rating.” Id. at 4158, 4162. Around the same time, however, fissures began to appear in Vivendi’s public fagade. Despite Vivendi’s assurances about the financial soundness of the USA Networks and EchoStar deals, the two transactions prompted Moody’s to change its rating outlook on Vivendi to “negative.” J.A. 4164. The decision, Moody’s explained, came as a result of its concerns over the additional debt incurred by the transactions, in conjunction' with other debts previously incurred by Vivendi and uncertainty about Vivendi’s ability to take steps to reduce its debt. A few weeks later, on January 7, 2002, Vivendi announced the sale of 55 million treasury shares for a total of €3.3 billion. “The proceeds of the sale,” Vivendi explained in a press release, “w[ould] be used mostly to reduce the company’s debt.” J.A. 4117. Vivendi’s stock prices dipped following the announcement of the treasury-share sale. . Despite raising €3.3 billion for Vivendi, the substantial treasury-share sale in January 2002 did not prevent Vivendi’s problems from coming to a head several months later. On May 3, 2002, Moody’s downgraded Vivendi’s long-term senior debt rating from.Baa2 to Baa3, citing concerns about Vivendi’s ability to reduce debt and return its leverage to a point that would justify a Baa2 rating. In response to Moody’s decision, Vivendi stated that the downgrade “ha[d] no impact on Viven-di[’s] ... cash situation,” and that Vivendi “ha[d] every confidence in its ability to meet its operating targets for 2002.” J.A. 4667. Nonetheless, S&P followed Moody’s suit on May 6, 2002, downgrading Vivendi’s short-term debt from A-2 to A-3. Shortly afterwards, Vivendi issued a press release stating that it “ha[d] no reason to fear any further deterioration [in its credit rating].” J.A. 4623. Vivendi’s “cash flow situation,” according to the press release, was “comfortable,” Id. “[Ejven assuming an extremely pessimistic market,” Vivendi would be able to “continue its debt reduction program in all serenity.” Id. Quietly, Vivendi attempted to slough off some of its less critical holdings for cash. On June 12, 2002, unbeknownst to the public, Vivendi and Deutsche Bank entered into a private sale-and-repurchase agreement, under which Vivendi sold- a 12.7% stake in its 63%-owned subsidiary Vivendi Environnement and agreed to repurchase those shares from Deutsche Bank at a later point. On June 17, 2002, while the public remained unaware of Vi-vendi’s deal with Deutsche Bank, Vivendi announced it was considering selling a significant stake.in Vivendi Environnement when market conditions were appropriate. Vivendi’s stock price took a hit on June 21, 2002, after the market learned that Viven-di had already entered a sale-and-repurchase agreement with respect to some of its shares in Vivendi Environnement. Press reports questioned why Vivendi could not wait until market conditions were appropriate to go through with the sale. Three days later, on June 24, 2002, Vi-vendi announced the immediate sale of a 15.6% stake in Vivendi Environnement shares, including the 12.7% stake that was the subject of its repurchasa-and-sale agreement with Deutsche Bank. That day alone, Vivendi’s stock price dropped 23%. Financial commentators remarked that-the quick succession of the two Vivendi Envi-ronnement transactions suggested that Vi-vendi “needed a quick cash injection” and “w[as] in a big rush to get that cash.” J.A. 2792. Vivendi parried back on June 26, 2002, stating in a press release that “[o]wing to its strong free cash flow,” combined with other factors, Vivendi was “confident of its capacity to meets its anticipated obligations over the next [year].” Special App’x 330. Two days later, however, Viven-di negotiated a new €275 million credit line from Société Générale. After the market closed on July 1, 2002, Moody’s downgraded Vivendi’s long-term senior debt rating again, this time from Baa3 to Bal, landing Vivendi’s long-term senior debt in junk territory. In a press releasé announcing the downgrade, Moody’s explained that its decision-primarily reflected growing doubts about Viven-di’s ability to achieve the level of debt reduction befitting of-a Baa3 rating and concerns over Vivendi’s ability to refinance liabilities that would become due over the course of the next 12 months. When the market opened the following day, on July 2, 2002, S&P downgraded Vivendi’s long-term debt from BBB to BBB-, just a notch above junk status, and warned that liquidity concerns could prompt further downgrades. Like Moody’s, S&P cited Viven-di’s lack of transparency about large debt obligations that were fast approaching repayment deadlines, among other things, as a reason for the downgrade. After news of both downgrades hit the market on July 2, 2002, Vivendi’s stock price slid approximately 26%. Financial analysts speculated that Vivendi could face a cash shortfall by the end of 2002 because it did not have the means to cover its debt repayments. Vivendi’s board of directors, meanwhile, hired Goldman Sachs to assess the severity of Vivendi’s financial difficulties. In late June 2002, Goldman Sachs presented its findings to the board and noted that one of four possible scenarios for Vivendi was bankruptcy, as early as September or October 2002. The- board of directors then zeroed in on Messier as the source of Vivendi’s troubles and sought to oust him from his position as CEO. On July 2, 2002, Messier announced his resignation, and the next day Vivendi’s stock prices tumbled 22%, Now under new management, Vivendi issued a press release acknowledging that the company faced a “short-term liquidity issue.” J.A.-2049. The press release also revealed that by the end of July, Vivendi would-have to repay creditors €1.8 billion, and €3.8 billion in credit lines would be up for renegotiation. The following week, French regulators began a probe into Vivendi’s financial affairs, while Moody’s and S&P warned of further downgrades. Additional damaging revelations surfaced on August 14, 2002, when Vivendi’s new management announced that-the company faced refinancing needs of €5.6 billion, had €10 billion more in debt than is typical of a company with a BBB credit rating by S&P, and planned to sell €5 billion worth of assets over the next nine months.- That day, S&P further downgraded Vivendi’s long-term debt, and Vivendi’s stock price dropped more than 25%. II. Procedural History On January 7, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint against- Vivendi, Messier, and Hannezo (collectively, “Defendants”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Baer, /.), principally alleging that between October 30, 2000 and August 14, 2002 (the “Class Period”), Defendants made material misstatements that artificially inflated Vivendi’s stock price, in violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, as well as § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), In February 2003, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing,- inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to specify with sufficient particularity the statements Plaintiffs alleged to be false or misleading. By opinion dated November 4, 2003, Judge Baer denied in part and granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and granted Plaintiffs leave to amend its Consolidated Class Action Complaint. On November 24, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint. ■ After several'years of discovery, during which time the case was transferred from Judge Baer to Judge Holwell, Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 15, 2008: Judge Holwell denied that motion on March 31, 2009. On June 2, 2009, Defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Blaine Nye. On August 18, 2009, Judge Holwell denied Defendants’ motion, with one narrow exception not at issue on appeal. Trial was scheduled, to begin in the fall of 2009. On October 5, 2009, a jury trial commenced on Plaintiffs’ § 10(b) claims against Vivendi, Messier, and Hannezo, as well as Plaintiffs’ § 20(a) control-person claims against Messier and Hannezo. At trial, Plaintiffs introduced into evidence the “Book of Warnings,” a compendium of internal communications and memoranda that Hannezo had written to Messier and other Vivendi employees during the period from 2000 to 2002, warning them of financial difficulties Vivendi was facing at the time. Special App’x 364. As Plaintiffs pointed out to the jury, Hannezo’s communications about Vivendi’s deteriorating financial health stood in sharp contrast to Vivendi’s rosy public statements. Plaintiffs also presented the testimony of former Vivendi employees, who generally corroborated the bleak internal view presented by the Book of Warnings. Defendants, meanwhile, called Messier and Hannezo to testify that Vivendi’s optimistic public statements regarding earnings and growth were in fact accurate at the time they were made. Defendants also emphasized that Vi-vendi never actually experienced a full-blown liquidity crisis or defaulted on a loan. According to Defendants, the events that occurred in the summer of 2002 merely reflected a transient hitch, from which the company ultimately rebounded. ■ The jury began its deliberations in early January 2010. The seventy-two-page final jury verdict form identified fifty-seven' alleged misstatements/ some of which were alleged against Vivéndi only, and others of which were alleged against Vivendi and Messier and/or Hannezo. Among other things, the final jury verdict form' asked the jury to determine whether Plaintiffs had proven the elements of their § 10(b) claim with respect to each of the fifty-seven statements for each Defendant against whom that false statement was alleged. It also asked the jury to determine whether Messier and Hannezo had violated § 20(a). After fourteen days of deliberation, the jury reached a verdict. The jury found that neither Messier nor Hannezo was liable under § 10(b) or § 20(a) for any of the alleged misstatements. However, it found Vivendi liable under § 10(b) for all fifty-seven alleged misstatements. The district court denied Vivendi’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial on February 17, 2011, with one exception: it awarded Vivendi judgment as a matter of law with respect to one statement. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F.Supp.2d 512, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). This appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs’ Theory of the Case Vivendi first challenges Plaintiffs’ theory of the case as well as the way that Plaintiffs presented that theory at trial. According to Vivendi, Plaintiffs were required to prove their case “statement-by-statement.” Vivendi Br. 2. Vivendi suggests that throughout the trial, Plaintiffs did not focus on specifically alleged fraudulent statements, but rather, argued generally that the company failed to disclose a liquidity risk (an approach Vivendi refers to as the theory of “unitary omission”). Id. at 35. Vivendi contends that Plaintiffs thus sought to prove that it committed securities fraud with respect to no particular statement at all. Only at the eleventh hour and after the close of evidence at trial, Vivendi continues, did Plaintiffs in fact identify the fifty-seven alleged misstatements for which they sought to hold Viven-di liable. The result, according to Vivendi, was that Plaintiffs presented no actionable claim of securities fraud. Vivendi thus argues that Plaintiffs’ supposed failure to define a specific set of alleged misstatements earlier in the trial had the effect of “eliminatfing] the foundational element of a claim for securities fraud” under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: “a specific false or misleading statement.” Vivendi Br. 41. Under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful to (1) “make any untrue statement of a material fact,” or (2) “omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. .§ 240.10b-5(b). Thus, to support a finding of liability, Rule 10b-5 expressly requires an actual statement, one that ⅛ either “untrue” outright or “misleading” by virtue of what it omits to state. Absent an actual statement, a complete failure to make a statement—in other words, a “pure omission,” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 719 (2d Cir. 2011)—“is actionable under the securities laws only when the corporation is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts,” Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Time Warner Inc. Secs. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988). And in and of themselves, “§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information.” Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 179 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011). No such duty arises “merely because a reasonable investor would very much like to know” that information. In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267. “Pure omissions,” of course, must be distinguished from “half-truths”—statements that are misleading under the second prong of Rule 10b-5 by virtue of what they omit to disclose. See S.E.C, v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Gabelli v. S.E.C., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1216, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013) (“The law is well settled ... that so-called half-truths—literally true statements that create a materially misleading impression—will support claims for securities fraud.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); See also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 2000 & n.3, 195 L.Ed.2d 348 (2016) (noting that the principle that “half-truths—representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information—can be actionable misrepresentations” applies in the “securities law” context (citing Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 44, 131 S.Ct. 1309)). The rule against half-truths, or statements that are misleading by omission, comports with the common-law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, according to which “a statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 529, cmt. a (1977). It is undisputed that Vivendi had no legal duty to disclose its liquidity risk, such that Plaintiffs could not hold Vivendi liable simply for its silence on the subject. Viven-di therefore contends that Plaintiffs’ presentation of the case effectively vitiated the requirement that the Plaintiffs prove Vi-vendi made a false or misleading statement. As a result, Vivendi argues, the jury necessarily held Vivendi liable for failing to disclose something that it had no legal duty to disclose. Simply put, we disagree. The record does not support Vivendi’s suggestion that Plaintiffs presented their case to the jury on the theory that Vivendi violated § 10(b) by remaining completely silent on the subject of its liquidity risk. To be sure, over the course of the litigation below, Plaintiffs were at times less than precise in articulating their theory of liability. In Plaintiffs’ opening statements, for example, counsel for Plaintiffs remarked at points that Plaintiffs were “going to prove ,.. that the defendant failed to tell the truth about the growing problems about its liquidity.” Trial Tr. 128 (emphasis added). In isolation, this statement could be taken to suggest that Plaintiffs would attempt to prove that Vivendi was liable merely for failing to disclose the company’s liquidity risk, although, even in isolation, it is at least as easy to understand the statement as an accusation that Viven-di had lied about the subject. In context, however, Plaintiffs’ opening statements made clear that the way in which they alleged that Vivendi “failed to tell the truth” was by making affirmative statements that. were either outright lies or misleading half-truths. See, e.g., id. at 128-29 (noting, two lines later, that Vivendi ‘.‘gave reports about how great the company was doing and, in doing so, ... completely disregarded alarms that Vivendi’s own employees ... were sounding inside Vivendi”). Indeed, counsel for Plaintiffs went on in that opening statement to ask the jury to “take a look at some examples” of alleged misstatements by Vivendi, Trial Tr; 141, and consider how those statements compared to the actual situation inside Vivendi at the time Vivendi made the statements, see Trial Tr, 142-79. Essentially all of the examples provided were ultimately submitted to the jury for consideration. Compare Trial Tr. 142, with- Special App’x 315 (Statement 3); compare Trial Tr. 152-53, with Special App’x 316 (Statement 5); compare Trial Tr. 154-55, with Special App’x 316 (Statement 6); compare Trial Tr. 162, with Special App’x 320 (Statement 18); compare Trial Tr. 167, with Special App’x 324 (Statement 32); compare Trial Tr. 167-68, with Special App’x 324 (Statement 33); compare Trial Tr. 169, mth Special App’x 324 (Statement 34); compare Trial Tr. 169-70, ivith Special App’x 324-25 (Statement 35); compare Trial Tr. 171, with Special App’x 326 (Statement 40); compare Trial Tr. 172, with Special App’x 327 (Statement 42); compare Trial Tr. 173, with Special App’x 329 (Statement 51); compare Trial Tr. 177, with Special App’x 330 (Statement 55). It is. true that Plaintiffs initially proposed to Judge Holwell a jury verdict form that did not include a list of specific alleged misstatements. In re .Vivendi, 765 F.Supp.2d at 577. It is also true that at oral argument on Vivendi’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, which took place after trial, Plaintiffs suggested that their initial proposed jury verdict form embodied the theory that Viven-di had made “a single unitary omission ... concerning Vivendi’s true liquidity risk” that the Plaintiffs believed “manifested in many different ways and with respect to many different statements,” and thus that might not easily boil down into a discrete set of specific alleged misstatements. J.A. 3693. At trial, however, Judge Holwell insisted on a more specific approach. After “reviewing] the verdict forms used in several [then-]recent securities class actions tried before a jury,” Judge Holwell concluded that Plaintiffs’ proposed jury verdict form was inadequate because “[u]nder the plain language of Rule 10b-5, an ‘omission’ is not a violation unless plaintiffs can point to statements that were made misleading by the omitted facts.” a In re Vivendi, 765 F.Supp.2d at 578. Because failing to identify a discrete set of statements in the verdict form might thus invite a verdict that would be inconsistent with this language", Judge Holwell “asked [Plaintiffs' to propose a[ ] ... verdict form that identified specific misstatements.”" Id. The final jury-verdict form thus asked, with respect to each statement and in regard to each Defendant, whether “plaintiffs [have] proven each element of their Section 10(b) claim.” E.g., Special App’x 243 (emphasis added). At closing argument after the district court finalized the jury verdict form, counsel for Plaintiffs walked through the fifty-seven alleged misstatements, highlighting with respect to each one the evidence that Plaintiffs believed supported a finding of securities fraud. Repeatedly, counsel for Plaintiffs asked the jury to consider the disparity between Vivendi’s “inside reality” and its “outside message.” See Trial Tr. 7294-365. From opening statements to closing arguments, then, Plaintiffs presented to the jury a theory of securities-fraud liability predicated on Vivendi’s statements, not its silence. In any event, “we review the proof at trial .only by reference to th[e] charged theory.” United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 663 (2d Cir. 2016). As in O’Donnell, the record here “shows that the jury was charged only as to a theory of fraud through an affirmative misstatement.” Id. In keeping with the final jury verdict form, Judge Holwell instructed the jury that Plaintiffs had to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that during the class period ... [Vivendi] made a false or misleading. statement or omitted to state a fact which made what was said under the circumstances misleading.” Trial Tr. 7512. Far from charging, the jury on what Viven-di terms a “ ‘pure-omission’ theory,” Viven-di Br. 2, Judge Holwell informed the jury that Vivendi was “not required to disclose every piece of material information” it possessed, Trial Tr. 7513. He further expressly distinguished between so-called “pure omissions” and statements that are misleading by virtue of what they omit to disclose. See id. It is simply incorrect, then, to say that Plaintiffs “secured a jury verdict based on ‘proof [of the six elements of a private 10b-5 action] as to no 'particular statement.” Vivendi Br. 41. In light of the Plaintiffs’ own presentation of their case, it does not appear that they in fact presented a “pure omission” theory, as Vivendi argues. And reviewing the proof at trial with reference to the charged theory, we discern no basis for concluding that the jury verdict was based on a theory other than the one on which the jury was, in fact, instructed. In short, Plaintiffs presented a case to the jury based on Vivendi’s alleged misstatements, and the jury entered a verdict against Vivendi based on fifty-seven of them. We thus reject Vivendi’s contention that the way in which Plaintiffs tried and proved their case had the effect of vitiating an essential element of their § 10(b) claim: proving that Vivendi made materially false or misleading statements. II. Materially False or Misleading Statements Having identified no reversible 'error stemming from the manner in which Plaintiffs presented and identified statements at trial, we turn to the statements themselves. Vivendi contests liability for certain statements on the ground that they were non-actionable opinion, puffery, or forward-looking statements. Separately, Vi-vendi also contests liability for all of-the statements on the ground that they all rested on an impermissible “liquidity risk theory” of liability. We address these arguments in turn. 1. Opinion Statements Vivendi first argues that certain statements (or sub-statements) are non-actionable statements of opinion. This argument is not preserved for appellate review, as Vivendi failed to contend that certain statements were non-actionable as opinions , in its motions for judgment as a matter of law, even after the parties agreed upon the set of statements the jury would consider. See Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.Sd 149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998). Recognizing this, Vivendi now tries to excuse its failure to raise this argument below in several ways. Vivendi first points out that it objected to statements as opinions in its motion to dismiss, which it filed in 2003. This argument can be rejected easily. Raising this argument in a motion to dismiss did not sufficiently alert the district court to the existence of the argument more than six years later, when Vi-vendi was required to raise it in its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motions at trial. See id. Second, Vivendi suggests that the late submission of the actual statements to the jury prevented Vivendi from challenging certain statements as opinion statements. Even assuming this argument to be otherwise colorable, Vivendi’s own submissions to the district court belie this claim. Specifically, Vivendi’s post-trial Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law clearly challenged specific statements on the ground that they were non-actionable fonvard-loohing statements; it also (in a footnote) challenged certain statements on the ground that they were inactionable puffery. Given these challenges, Vivendi cannot now argue that the timing of Plaintiffs’ identification of a specific set of statements prevented it from also challenging specific -statements on the ground that they were non-actionable opinion. Finally, Vivendi contends that intervening authority—by way of Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011), and Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, — U.S. -,135 S.Ct. 1318, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015)—excuses its failure to raise the argument below. This argument, too,' lacks merit. To excuse waiver on the grounds of intervening authority, it is not enough to argue that the intervening authority may have sharpened or otherwise elaborated upon an argument. Rather, the intervening authority ' must ’ have established an argument that was “not known to be available” to the party seeking to excuse waiver at the first opportunity that the party had to raise the argument. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1981). Not so with the decisions Vivendi claims constitute intervening authority. For purposes of the claim Vivendi makes on appeal, neither Fait nor Omni-care established an argument regarding the actionability of opinion statements that was previously unknown. As both Fait and Omnicare acknowledge, Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1088, 1090-98, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991), addressed the circumstances under which liability may extend to statements of opinion' or belief expressed in proxy solicitations. See Fait, 655 F.3d at 110; Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1326-27 & n.2. Fait and Om-nicare merely expanded upon an uncontroversial point already made clear by Virginia Bankshares: that although statements expressing opinions may not be grounds for liability when they are not false or misleading in context to a reasonable investor, such statements are “not beyond the purview” of the federal securities statutes. Fait, .655 F.3d at 110; see also Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1329 (“[I]f a registration statement omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself, then § U[] . creates liability. An opinion statement, however, is not necessarily misleading ydien an issuer knows, but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way.”). Indeed, we made similar observations even before Fait or Omnicare. See, e.g., In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. Secs. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Statements that are opinions ... are not per sé inactionable under the securities laws.”); In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 266 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “expressions of opinion” are “not beyond the reach of the securities laws” (citing, inter alia, Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1088-97, 111 S.Ct. 2749)). The argument that certain statements are not materially false or misleading because they contain only opinions was therefore known to be available prior to Fait and Omnicare. Cf. Gucci Am., Inc., 768 F.3d at 135-36 (concluding that a defendant did not “waive its personal jurisdiction objection” when, prior to an intervening decision, “controlling precedent in this Circuit made it clear that [the defendant] ... was properly subject to general personal jurisdiction” (emphasis in original)); Hawknet, 590 F.3d at 91-92 (concluding that a defendant could raise an argument on appeal that the defendant did not raise before the district court because intervening authority “provided [the] defendant with a new objection” that, prior to the intervening decision, “would have been directly contrary to controlling precedent in this Circuit” (emphasis added)). Although Fait and Omnicare may have provided a stronger basis for such an objection, having a better argument on appeal is not tantamount to having a previously unknown argument. As it required not “clairvoyance” but “conscientiousness” on Vivendi’s part to object to certain statements on the basis that they were non-actionable opinion statements, Vivendi’s reliance on Fait and Omnicare as intervening authority is unavailing. See id. at 92 (“[T]he doctrine of waiver- demands conscientiousness, not clairvoyance, from parties;”). Finding none of Vivendi’s reasons for excusing -its failure to raise the opinion argument below convincing, we decline to consider the argument on its merits. 2. Puffery Vivendi next contends that several statements are non-actionable puffery. Vivendi raised this argument only in a footnote in its Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, though the district court considered, and rejected, the argument on the merits. Cf. Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 216 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012). Assuming this footnote was sufficient to present the argument to the district court and thus preserve it for appellate review, the statements of which Vi-vendi complains are simply not puffery. Puffery encompasses “statements [that] are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them,” ECA, Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2009), and thus “cannot have misled a reasonable investor,” San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996). They are statements that “lack the sort of definite positive projections that might require later correction.” Id. (quoting In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993)). The jury reasonably concluded that the statements identified by Vivendi as puffery were actionable. Consider, for example, Vivendi’s June 26, 2001 statement that it “posted RECORD-HIGH NET INCOME, and ha[d] cash available for investing,” Special App’x 318, or its July 23, 2001 representation that “[t]he results produced by Vivendi Universal in the second quarter are well ahead of market consensus,” id. at 319. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that such statements were not so general that a reasonable investor could not have relied upon them in evaluating whether to purchase Vivendi’s stock. Cf. ECA, Local 134 553 F.3d at 205-06 (concluding that “statements such as the assertion^] that [the defendant company] had ‘risk management processes [that] are highly disciplined and designed to preserve the integrity of the risk management process’; that [the company] ‘set the standard for integrity’; and that [the company] would ‘continue to reposition and strengthen [its] franchises with a focus on financial discipline’ ” constituted puffery (citations omitted)); San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 806, 811 (concluding that “general announcements,” such as the defendant company’s statement that it “ ‘should deliver income growth consistent with [its] historically superior performance’ ” and was “ ‘optimistic about 1993’ ” constituted puffery). We thus reject Viven-di’s argument that certain statements found actionable by the jury are statements of puffery that are non-actionable as a matter of law. 3. Forward-Looking Statements Vivendi next argues, that certain statements fall under the safe-harbor provision for “forward-looking statements” under the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c). Under that provision a defendant is not liable if (1) “the forward-looking statement is identified and accompanied by meaningful cautionary language,” (2) the forward-looking statement “is immaterial,” or (3) “the plaintiff fails to prove that [the forward-looking statement] was made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.” Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2010). Because “[t]he safe harbor is written in the disjunctive,” a forward-looking statement is protected under the safe harbor if any of the three prongs applies. Id. As an initial matter, Vivendi disputes the district court’s conclusion that “[Plaintiffs challenge the non-forward looking elements of Vivendi’s statements regarding its EBITDA growth, rather than the [forward-looking] elements.” In re Vivendi, 765 F.Supp.2d at 569. “The PSLRA includes several definitions of a forward-looking statement, including ‘a statement containing a projection of ... income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, ... or other financial items’ and ‘a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management.’” Slayton, 604 F.3d at 766-67 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(l)(A) & (C)). However, “[a] statement may contain some elements that look forward and others that do not,” and “forward-looking elements” may be “severable” from “non-forward-looking” elements. Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MF Glob., Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) '(“[A] mixed present/future statement is not entitled to the safe harbor with respect to the part of the statement that refers to the present.”).- It is clear that at least some of the statements that Vivendi identifies as forward-looking contain present representations, and that it is these’ non-forward-looking elements of those statements that Plaintiffs alleged were false or misleading. Consider the February 14, 2001 alleged misstatement, which Vivendi labels as forward-looking: “Vivendi Universal enters its first full year of operations with strong growth prospects and a very strong balance sheet. This new company is off to a fast start and we are very confident that we will meet the very aggressive growth targets we have set for ourselves both at the revenues and EBITDA levels.” Special App’x 316. Although some aspects of this statement could conceivably be characterized as forward-looking, there is nothing prospective about the representation that Vivendi entered 2001 with a “very strong balance sheet,” which Plaintiffs argued at trial was part of what made Vivendi’s February 14, 2001 statement misleading. See Trial Tr. 7297. The safe-harbor provision does not protect this and other present representations—about “very strong 2000 results,” Special App’x 316, or achievement of “ ‘aggressive’ incremental EBITDA targets,” Special App’x 320—embedded within statements that Vivendi deems forward-looking. To the extent that other statements identified by Vivendi as forward-looking are arguably false or misleading with respect to their forward-looking elements, we need not decide whether those statements, or elements thereof, are indeed forward-looking. Even assuming, arguendo, that they are, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that none of the prongs of the PSLRA safe-harbor provision applies to them. Contrary to Vivendi’s argument, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury in concluding that any forward-looking statements were not accompanied by meaningful cautionary language. “To avail themselves of safe harbor protection under the meaningful cautionary language prong, defendants must demonstrate that their cautionary language was not boilerplate and conveyed substantive information.” Slayton, 604 F.3d at 772. “Vague” disclaimers are inadequate. Id. Although Vivendi points to a miscellany of disclaimers peppered throughout its required SEC filings in 2001 and 2002, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that none of them was meaningful. To start, several of the disclaimers highlighted by Vivendi are quite irrelevant to the alleged misstatements at issue. In one, for example, Vivendi warned that factors that “could cause actual results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements” included “inability to identify, develop and achieve success for new products, services and technologies; increased competition and its effect on pricing, spending, third-party relationships and revenue; [and] inability to establish and maintain relationships with commerce, advertising, marketing, technology, and content providers.” J.A. 4167. The considerations mentioned in this disclaimer—success with new products and services, relationships with competitors and third parties, and marketing and advertising efforts—do not bear even tangentially on Vivendi’s liquidity risk. The jury reasonably could have found that this kitchen-sink disclaimer, listing garden-variety business concerns that could affect any company’s financial well-being, was not meaningful cautionary language. Vivendi’s disclaimers with respect to the use of EBITDA were no less oblique. In Vivendi’s October 30, 2000 Form F-4 registration statement filing with the SEC, Vivendi stated that it “considers operating income to be the key indicator of the operational strength and performance of its business.” J.A. 4681. Vivendi continued to state, however, that while “[a]djusted EBITDA should not be considered an alternative to operating or net income as an indicator of Vivendi’s performance,” or “an alternative to cash flows from operating activities as a measure of liquidity,” adjusted EBITDA was nevertheless a “pertinent comparative measure” to “operating income.” Id. (emphasis added). Given the arguable endorsement of' the EBITDA measure inherent in this language, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that such language did not meaningfully caution against reliance on EBITDA figures as a measure of Vivendi’s performance. Túrning to the “actual knowledge” prong of the PSLRA safe-harbor provision, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Vivendi made the statements with actual knowledge that the statements were false or misleading. To take an example, Plaintiffs presented evidence that Vivendi actually knew that its October 30, 2000 announcement of a 35% EBITDA growth-rate objective was misleading to a reasonable investor. On September 15, 2000, Hannezo circulated an e-mail informing others at Vivendi that “the analysts will not have it easy to track the purchase accounting benefits” in EBITDA figures. J.A. 4169. Much less would a reasonable investor, who is not as well-versed at making sense of Vivendi’s disclosures as a financial analyst, be able to discern the impact of purchase accounting. To take another example, Vivendi highlights as forward-looking the December 19, 2000 statement that Vivendi would be “free of debt in its communications businesses” as of January 1, 2001 and have “free cash flow of more than 2 billion euros for the two coming years.” Special App’x 315. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence at trial, however, for a jury to find that Vivendi actually knew that this statement conflicted with internal forecasts of debt and free cash flow and thus was misleading. In December 2000, Vivendi was planning to restructure Seagram’s debt, a process that it knew would incur additional short-term debt and require it to pay substantial premiums on that debt. See Trial Tr. 1305-06, 7295. And just two weeks after Vivendi issued the statement, Hannezo stated in an internal communication that he “believefd] that it [was] wrong to reason in terms of ... free cash flow” because “there [wouldn’t] be any this year.” J.A. 4059. ■ Assuming, arguendo, that some of the statements Vivendi claims are purely forward-looking are indeed so, such evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Vivendi actually knew that its forward-looking statements were false or misleading. 4.' Liquidity Risk Theory . In addition to objecting that certain alleged misstatements are non-actionable opinion, puffery, or forward-looking statements, Vivendi lodges a broader attack against the entire set of alleged misstatements. To wit, Vivendi repeatedly protests what.it terms to be Plaintiffs’ impermissible “liquidity risk theory,” under which all of the fifty-seven statements were allegedly false or misleading with respect to Vi-vendi’s liquidity risk. The nub of Vivendi’s argument appears to be that “liquidity risk” is too “amorphous” and “ephemeral” a concept for any statement to be false or misleading with respect'to it, much less all fifty-seven statements at issue here. Viven-di Br. 51, 88. But, even assuming that this argument has separate purchase from the more specific arguments Vivendi makes as to the actionability of the statements, “liquidity risk” is not so “amorphous” or “ephemeral” a concept as Vivendi would lead us to believe. As Plaintiffs defined it at trial, liquidity is “the ease or difficulty with which’a company can timely meet its financial obligations and fund its operations.” Trial Tr. 128; see also Trial Tr. 3481 (Nye testifying that liquidity is “the ability to pay fixed obligations”). Liquidity risk, then, is simply a financial-accounting term for the concept of being “debt rich and cash poor.” Trial Tr. 141. Further, to the extent that liquidity risk is not a perfectly defined concept with rigid outer bounds, that does not necessarily preclude liability for securities fraud. The federal securities laws do not protect against only those false and misleading statements that are false or misleading with respect to very specific material facts. See, e.g., Suez Equity Inv’rs, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-99 (2d Cir. 2001) (conclud-tag that plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to state a claim that certain statements fraudulently concealed a company executive’s “financial and business problems,” “lack of skill,” and “inability to run the [company]”). The jury found that knowledge of Vivendi’s true liquidity risk at any given time would have been material to a reasonable investor and that the fifty-seven statements were individually false or misleading with respect to this risk. Without opining on whether there are indeed concepts so amorphous or broad that their concealment cannot support an actionable theory under § 10(b) as a matter of law, liquidity risk as defined in this case was not such a concept. The question, then, is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that all of the fifty-six statements (excluding the statement on which the district court granted Vivendi judgment as a matter of law) were materially false or misleading with respect to liquidity risk. “The test for whether a statement is materially misleading under Section 10(b)” is not whether the statement is misleading in and of itself, but “whether the defendants’ representations, taken together and in context, would have misled a reasonable investor.” Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 172 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Meyer v. Jinkosolar Holdings Co., Ltd., 761 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The literal, truth of an isolated statement is insufficient; the proper inquiry requires an examination of defendants’ representations, taken together and in context.” (quoting In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Secs. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 366 (2d Cir. 2010))). Whether a misrepresentation is material is “judged according to an objective standard” that turns on “the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, — U.S. ——, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 1195, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the fifty-six relevant statements materially false or misleading in regards to Vivendi’s true liquidity risk. To be sure, the statements do not each repeat the precise same refrain. Some speak directly to liquidity risk, while others concern components that contributed to Vivendi’s liquidity risk. That individual alleged misstatements may relate to different aspects of a larger problem does not necessarily subvert a finding of fraud, however. It would be perverse if companies could escape liability for securities fraud simply by disseminating a network of interrelated lies, each one slightly distinct from the other, but all collectively aimed at perpetuating a broader, material lie. Where a company seeks fraudulently to hide a particularly large problem with multiple. contributing factors, it is quite probable that the company will have to lie about a number of related topics in order successfully to conceal the larger issue. Just so here. -Vivendi’s alleged fraud (in the jury’s reasonable estimation) is remarkable in part because the problem that Vivendi sought to conceal from the public was so vast, and touched upon so, many aspects of its business, that a few scattered misstatements would not have sufficed to mask it. Vivendi needed both to systematically misrepresent its ability to satisfy its liquidity demands, and also to assiduously conceal any material facts (of which there were many) that would call into question its ability to meet its liquidity demands. Consider, for instance, Vivendi’s statements about its self-described “aggressive” EBITDA growth rates, which Vivendi consistently advertised as a point of strength. E.g., Special App’x 317 (Statement 9: “[F]or first quarter of 2001, the Company generated very strong • EBITDA ... growth with 900 million euros, an increase of 112% or an incremental 475 million euros over the first quarter of the prior year.” (first alteration in original)); id. at 320 (Statement 18: <cWith three quarters of the ‘aggressive’ incremental EBITDA target for the full year 2001 already achieved in the first half of the year, I can only re-emphasiz[e] our confidence”). As Plaintiffs’ expert testified, high EBITDA suggests high profitability—and by implication, ample cash flow available to service debt. But Vivendi’s high EBITDA targets derived in large part from purchase accounting effects (which are just one-time paper adjustments that cannot readily translate into free cash flow) rather than profits from a company’s business operations (which reflect actual earnings that may translate into free cash flow). And although purchase accounting was the required accounting technique at the time, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Vivendi emphasized EBITDA growth to the public because financial analysts, to say nothing of the average investor, “w[ould] not have it easy to track the purchase accounting benefits” and the degree to which they contributed to Vivendi’s EBITDA figures. J.A. 4169. Hannezo at one point referred to purch