Full opinion text
Concurring in the result without opinion Circuit Judge HUGHES. Dissenting Opinion filed by Chief Judge PROST. Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. MOORE, Circuit Judge. I. Introduction The current appeal results from a patent infringement suit and countersuit between Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively, “Samsung”). Relevant to this en banc decision, the district court granted summary judgment that Samsung’s accused devices infringe the asserted claim of U.S. Patent No. 8,074,172 (“the '172 patent”). After a thirteen day trial, the jury found the asserted claim of U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 (“the '647 patent”) infringed, and the district court denied Samsung’s requested judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”). The jury also found the asserted claim of U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 (“the '721 patent”) infringed and not invalid and the asserted claim of the '172 patent not invalid. The district court later denied Samsung’s requested JMOL and entered judgment accordingly. Samsung appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of infringement as to the '172 patent, denial of JMOL of non-infringement as to the '647 patent, and denial of JMOL of obviousness as to the '721 and '172 patents. II. Procedural Progress A. The Decision to Grant En Banc Review On February 26, 2016, a panel of this court reversed the denial of JMOL with regard to the jury verdict of infringement as to the '647 patent and non-obviousness as to the '721 and '172 patents. Apple filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Apple’s petition argued that the panel reversed the jury’s finding of infringement of the '647 patent by relying on extra-record evidence “none of which was of record and that the panel appears to have located only through independent research.” Apple Pet. 2. Apple argued that this extra-record extrinsic evidence was used to modify the agreed to and unappealed claim construction. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“The panel looked to [this extra-record evidence] to create its own plain meaning of ‘server’ as requiring a ‘stand alone’ program.”). Apple also argued that this extra-record evidence was used in “considering the factual question whether Samsung’s phones met the ‘analyzer server’ limitation.” See id. at 6, 8 (“The panel also relied on dictionary and encyclopedia entries to inform its understanding of how'the shared library code in Samsung’s phones work.” (emphasis in original)). Apple also argued that the case should be taken en banc because “in an unprecedented decision,” the panel reversed nearly every fact finding by the jury which favored Apple. Id. at 1. We granted Apple’s en banc petition to affirm our understanding of the appellate function as limited to deciding the issues raised on appeal by the parties, deciding these issues only on the basis of the record made below, and as requiring appropriate deference be applied to the review of fact findings. There was no need to solicit additional briefing or argument on the question of whether an appellate panel can look to extra-record extrinsic evidence to construe a patent claim term. “The Supreme Court made clear that the factual components [of claim construction] include ‘the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.’” Teva Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Teva Pharths., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 831, 841, — L.Ed.2d-(2015)). After Teva, such fact findings are indisputably the province of the district court. We did not need to solicit additional briefing or argument to conclude that the appellate court cannot rely on extra-record extrinsic evidence in the first instance or make factual findings about what such extrinsic evidence suggests about the plain meaning of a claim term in the art at the relevant time or how such extra record evidence may inform our understanding of how the accused device operates. We likewise did not need additional briefing, or argument to determine that the appellate court is not permitted to reverse fact findings that were not appealed or that the appellate court is required to review jury fact findings when they are appealed for substantial evidence. The panel reversed nearly a dozen jury fact findings including infringement, motivation to combine, the teachings of prior art references, commercial success, industry praise, copying, and long-felt need across three different patents. It did so despite the fact that some of these findings were not appealed and without ever mentioning the applicable substantial evidence standard of review. And with regard to objective indicia, it did so in ways that departed from existing law. The dissents, and Judge Dyk’s dissent in particular, raise big questions about how aspects of the obviousness doctrine ought to operate. But no party—at the panel or the petition for rehearing en banc stage— invited this court to consider changing the existing law of obviousness. We did not take this case en banc to decide important legal questions about the inner workings of the law of obviousness. We have applied existing obviousness law to the facts of this ease. We took this case en banc to affirm our understanding of'our appellate function, to apply the governing law, and to maintain our fidelity to the Supreme Court’s Teva decision. B. The En Banc Decision We affirm and reinstate the district court’s judgment as to the '647, '721, and 172 patents. We conclude that the jury-verdict on each issue is supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the district court did -not err when denying Samsung’s respective JMOLs. Accordingly, we vacate the panel opinion and affirm the district court’s judgment with respect to these patents. We reinstate the panel opinion regarding U.S. Patent Nos. 6,847,-959, 7,761,414, 5,579,239, and 6,226,449. In all other respects, the panel decision is vacated. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). III. Discussion We review a district court’s order granting or denying JMOL under the standard applied by the regional circuit. In the Ninth Circuit, JMOL “is proper when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” See Monroe v. City of Phoenix, 248 F.3d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit explains that “[t]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of that party.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny JMOL de novo. Id. A. The '647 Patent Apple asserted infringement of claim 9 of the '647 patent. The jury found that Samsung infringed and awarded Apple $98,690,625. J.A. 40869-79. The district court denied JMOL of non-infringement. J.A. 40-48.. Samsung argues the district court erred in not granting its motion for JMOL of non-infringement. Because there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm. “Substantial evidence ,.. means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Infringement is a question of fact. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Our review on appeal is limited to whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict. Id. We presume the jury resolved all underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The '647 patent discloses a system and method for detecting structures such as phone, numbers, addresses, and dates in documents, and then linking actions or commands to those structures. When the system detects a structure in a document, an “analyzer server” links actions to that detected structure. Actions include things such as placing a phone call or adding an address to an electronic address book. See '647 patent at 2:21-41. Apple asserted claim 9, which depends from claim 1: 1. A computer-based system for detecting structures in data and performing actions on detected structures, comprise ing: an input device for receiving data; an output device for presenting the data; a memory storing information including program routines including an analyzer sener for detecting structures in the data, and for linking actions to the detected structures-, a user interface enabling the selection of a detected structure and a linked action; and an action processor for performing the selected action linked to the selected structure; and . a processing unit coupled to the input device, the output device, and the memory for controlling the execution of the program routines. 9. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the user interface enables selection of an action by causing the output device to display a pop-up menu of the linked actions. '647 patent at 7:9-55 (emphasis added). Samsung contends no reasonable jury could have found infringement based on our constructions of “analyzer server” and “linking actions to the detected structures.” We previously addressed the constructions of both terms in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc,, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Motorola”), a separate litigation involving the '647 patent. Our Motorola opinion issued on the parties’ final day for presenting evidence at trial in this case. J.A. 42. During the Markman hearing, neither Apple nor Samsung had sought a construction of “analyzer server” or “linking actions,” and instead sought to rely on the plain and ordinary meanings of those terms. After Motorola issued, the parties agreed to give the Motorola constructions to the jury and reopen evidence to give both sides an opportunity to present expert testimony about the impact of the Motorola constructions on '647 infringement. J.A. 43. The jury was instructed as follows: The term “analyzer server” means “a server routine separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.” The term “linking actions to the detected structures” means “creating a specified connection between each detected structure and at least one computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations on that detected structure.” Final Annotated Jury Instrs., No. 22, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK, 2015 WL 4967769 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014), ECF No. 1848. Neither side objected to the jury instruction and neither side has appealed the constructions given to the jury. We address Samsung’s arguments for each term separately. 1. Analyzer Server The only issue on appeal relating to the “analyzer server” limitation is whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s fact finding that Samsung’s accused devices satisfy this limitation under our Motorola construction. In Motorola, we construed “analyzer server” as “a server routine separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.” Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1304. In Motorola, the court explained: We agree with the district court’s construction of “analyzer server.” As the district court recognized, the plain meaning of “server,” when viewed from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, entails a client-server relationship. Consistent with this perspective, the specification discloses an analyzer server that is separate from the application it serves. The analyzer server is part of the “program 165 of the present invention.” '647 patent at col. 3, 11. 38-39. Fig. 1 shows the program 165 and the application 167 as separate parts of a random-access memory (RAM): Id. at Fig. 1. Further, the specification states that “the program 165 of the present invention is stored in RAM 170 and causes CPU 120 to identify structures in data presented by the application 167.” Id. at col. 3, 11. 37-41. Thus, the specification describes the analyzer server and the application, which it serves, as separate structures. Id. at 1304-05 (red box annotation to figure added). This court explained that the '647 patent’s separate requirement for the analyzer server is met when the “program 165” and “application 167” are stored in “separate parts of random access memory.” Id. As we explained, Figure 1 of the patent “shows the program 165 and the application 167 as separate parts of a random-access memory (RAM)” and they are thus “separate structures.” Id. Under the Motorola claim construction, the program and application satisfied the separate requirement because they were structurally separate, i.e., located in different parts of the RAM. In this case, the parties agreed that the Motorola construction be given to the jury, and neither party appealed that construction. The panel, however, used extra-record extrinsic evidence to modify the agreed upon and unappealed construction of “analyzer server.” Panel Op. at 8, 10 n.5. It held that Samsung’s accused systems did not infringe because “the Samsung software library programs are not ‘standalone’ programs that run separately.” Panel Op. at 13. Neither party asked for this changed construction. And there is no foundation in Motorola for it. The dissents claim that Apple agreed to a new construction during oral argument. The dissents take Apple’s statement out of context. When Apple’s counsel stated that the analyzer server runs separately, he was explaining that the analyzer server runs in its own location in memory; the shared library code is not copied into and run as part of the client application. See Oral Arg. at 29:15-30:25. “The big fight was this, this was the big fight, does the code from the analyzer server get copied and become part of the analyzer server where it is run, or is there one copy of the code, and it is run at the analyzer server separately at the analyzer server as a part of a separate routine.” Id. at 44:55. Apple’s counsel repeatedly and clearly rejected the panel’s suggestion that “separate” means a standalone program which runs separately. “There is no requirement in the claim interpretation that it run as a standalone program.” Oral Arg. at 34:55. Apple argued that the panel’s proposed interpretation of “separate” was “a new claim construction that’s actually more specific and different than the jury charge. No one has urged you to do that. There is no suggestion that the claim interpretation is wrong.” Id. at 45:45. Apple reiterated its objection to the panel’s modified construction in its Petition for Rehearing. Claim construction was not appealed and we do not agree that Apple agreed to the panel’s change to the construction of analyzer server. Even Samsung’s counsel agreed, “[Apple] is correct that we are not disputing the claim construction.” Oral Arg, at 1:12:40. We thus return to our Motorola construction which was agreed upon by the parties in this case, given to the jury, and not appealed: “analyzer server” is “a server routine separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.” We evaluate whether there is substantial evidence for the jury’s finding of infringement under that construction. On appeal, Samsung argues no reasonable jury could have found its accused devices meet the “analyzer server” limitation because the accused devices do not contain a server routine “separate” from the client application. Samsung Br. 16-25. It argues that “the uncontested evidence at trial showed that the Browser and Messenger applications each contain their own routines within the application for analyzing the data (ie., performing the detecting and linking functions) and do not rely on a separate server.” Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). It argues that in its accused devices, when a client application needs shared library code, “it will copy it from the library and it will run as part of the application.” Id. at 19. It cites the testimony of its expert, Dr. Jeffay, that “[y]ou go to the library, you take code out of the library, you integrate it in your application, and at that point the library code is no different than any other code in the application.” Id. at 21. There is no real dispute regarding whether the shared library code in the accused devices performs all the claimed functionality—the dispute is where'it performs those functions. Samsung contends the shared library code in its devices is copied and incorporated into the client application, so when the code is run, it runs as part of the client application. Therefore, its shared library code is not “separate” from the client application. Apple contends the shared library code in Samsung’s accused devices is never copied but rather remains at the library. It contends that, when a client application wishes to use Samsung’s shared library code, the application goes to the shared library and uses the code there. Therefore, Samsung’s shared library code is “separate” from the client. We limit our appellate review to the evidence of record before the district court. On this record, we hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Samsung’s accused devices contain “a server routine separate from a client that receives data having structures from the client.”' See Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1304. Apple’s expert, Dr. Mowry, testified that the “analyzer server” in the accused devices is shared library code,.and the client applications are the Browser and Messaging applications. J.A. 13030:4-22. He testified that Samsung’s shared library code and client applications are “separate” because they are located in separate parts of memory: “the shared libraries are developed independently of the application” and are “designed to be reused across different applications.” J.A. 13035:12-18, 13036:13-20. He explained that “there’s only one copy of the shared library code,” and when client applications in Samsung’s accused devices wish to use the library code, “those applications go to that code and use it where it is each time they want to, access that code.” J.A. 13035:22-25. He testified that, in the accused devices, one copy of shared library code may be shared by “20 or 100” different applications, J.A. 13036:13-20, and that, in order for an application to use the library code, the application must “go to the shared library code in the one place that exists in the- computer memory hardware to use it.” Id.; see also J.A. 13037:1-6 (“It has access to the code and it goes to the code where it is and uses it there, and it does that each time that it accesses the code.”). Dr. Mowry also testified that the client applications and shared library code in the accused devices are stored “in a different part of the address base.” J.A. 13036:1-2. He concluded that the shared library, code and client programs in the accused devices are “definitely separate.” J.A. 13036:20. On this record, this is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the accused devices meet the “analyzer server” limitation. Dr. Jeffay provided contrary testimony to Dr. Mowry, but the jury was in the best position to determine whether it found Dr. Mowry or Dr. Jeffay more persuasive. See, e.g., MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen there is conflicting testimony at trial, and the evidence overall does not make only one finding on the point reasonable, the jury is permitted to make credibility determinations and believe the witness it considers more trust worthy.”). We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the jury verdict with respect to this limitation. 2. Linking Actions Samsung also appealed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement based upon the “linking actions” limitation. We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the accused devices meet the “linking actions” limitation under our construction in Motorola. In Motorola, we construed “linking actions to the detected structures” as “creating a specified connection between ■ each detected structure and at least one computer subroutine that causes the CPU -to perform a sequence -of operations on that detected structure.” Motorola, 757 F.3d at 1307. On appeal, Samsung argues there is no “specified connection” in the accused devices between a user’s request to perform some action and the application that ultimately performs the requested action. More specifically, Samsung argues the “startActivity()” subroutine—the accused “computer subroutine” in Samsung’s products—does not satisfy the specified connection requirement. Samsung Br. 27. It argues startActivity() merely determines which application will perform the requested action rather than performing the task itself. Id. at 29. Thus, a “specified connection” to the startActivity() subroutine would not- infringe because there is no connection to the application that ultimately performs the task. Id. This argument can be illustrated through an example. Android (the operating system run on the accused phones) phones typically contain multiple applications capable of sending emails. When a user inputs a command to send an email, the phone prompts the user to select an available application to send the email. There may be two or three available applications; the user selects which application to use. Samsung contends this is not a “specified connection” because the user’s command is not tied to a particular application that performs the command. See Samsung Br. 28; J.A. 11586:1-11587:6 (trial testimony of Dianne Haekbom, Google engineer). It argues- there is “no evidence of any specified connection between detected structures and actions,” Samsung Br. 26 (emphasis added). Our claim construction, however, does not require a specified connection between detected structures and the applications that perform operations oh them. It requires a specified connection between detected structures and the computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform the operations. The district court made this observation in its JMOL order: “The Motorola construction of ‘linking actions,’ however, requires only that the detected structure be linked to a ‘computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform’ that function.” J.A. 45 (emphasis in original). The court quoted and rejected Samsung’s argument that “no specified connection exists because claim 9 requires that ‘you link the actual program that performs that function,’ such as dialing a phone number.” Id. (quoting Dr. Jeffay). We agree with the district court that Apple presented substantial evidence that the accused devices contain a specified connection between a detected structure and a computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations. In the accused devices, the detected structure is an object in the data, such as a phone number or email address. J.A. 10854:11-25,10858:3-12. And the computer subroutine is a method called “startActivity().” J.A. 13040:25-13041:4. Dr. Mowry testified that the phone numbers and email addresses form part of an Intent object. J.A. 10858:3-12. When a user wishes to perform some action in the accused devices (such as place a phone call or send an email), a method called setlntent() passes the Intent object to the startActivity() subroutine. J.A. 13040:6-23. Dr. Mowry explained that if a “program wants to open another program, it uses an Intent object.” J.A. 10861:4-6. He described startActivity() as the “launcher” that launches other programs to perform the requested action. J.A. 10858:13-20. For example, if a user wishes to make a phone call, the startAc-tivity() subroutine launches the user’s selected dialing application. See J.A. 10861:4-10. According to Dr. Mowry, startActivity() is “the computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations on that detected structure,” as our construction requires. J.A. 13040:25-13041:4. Dr. Mowry testified that startAc-tivity() is “necessarily” called when a user selects a particular action. J.A. 13040:6-23, 13041:7-16. He explained that “if the user picks a particular option, that information will'be passed to another procedure shown on the bottom, which is called Start Activity, and that is the launcher.” J.A. 10858:13-20. He testified that “you get different behaviors from Start Activity based on how you fill in the fields in the Intent object. So that causes the different actions to occur.” J.A. 13042:25-13043:2. A reasonable jury could have relied on this testimony to find that Samsung’s accused devices meet the linking actions limitation. See J.A; 45 (“[T]he jury could have determined that startActivity() satisfies this limitation because it is admittedly a linked subroutine that causes performance of an action.”). In the Ninth: Circuit, JMOL “is proper when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” Monroe, 248 F.3d at 861. Dr. Mowry’s testimony provided substantial evidence of infringement. In light of Dr. Mowry’s testimony, we cannot conclude that the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion which is contrary to the jury verdict. We see no error in the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement. The judgment of validity of the '647 patent was not appealed. We affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL as to this patent. B. The '721 Patent Apple asserted infringement of claim 8 of the '721 patent. The jury entered a verdict that claim' 8' was infringed and would not have been obvious. J.A. 40872, 40874. Samsung challenges the district court’s denial of JMOL that claim 8 would have been obvious. We agree with the district court that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s underlying fact findings and that these fact .findings supported the conclusion that Samsung failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying facts. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2012). When reviewing a denial of JMOL of obviousness, where there is a black box jury verdict, as is the case here, we presume the jury resolved underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave those presumed findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. We then examine the legal conclusion de novo in light of those facts. Id. at 1357. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007), the Supreme Court set out the framework for the obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103: Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobvi-ousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. A determination of whether a patent claim is invalid as obvious under § 103 requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is error to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those factors are considered. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co,, 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), Objective indicia of nonobviousness must be considered in every case where present. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[Evidence rising out oí the so-called ‘secondary considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.” (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The section 103 test of nonobviousness set forth in Graham is a four part inquiry comprising, not only the three familiar elements (scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art), but also evidence of secondary considerations when such evidence is, of course, present.”). This requirement is in recognition of the fact that each of the Graham factors helps inform the ultimate obviousness determination. Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1360; Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that evidence of secondary considerations must be examined to determine its impact on the first three Graham factors). The '721 patent discloses a portable device with a touch-sensitive display that can be “unlocked via gestures” performed on the screen. '721 patent at Abstract. The patent teaches that a “problem associated with using touch screens on portable devices is the unintentional activation or deactivation of functions due to unintentional contact with the touch screen.” Id. at 1:38-40. “Unintentional activation or deactivation of functions due to unintentional contact with the touch screen” is commonly referred to as “pocket dialing.” See, e.g., J.A. 10638:9-13 (Andrew Cockburn) (describing the “pocket dial problem”); Apple Br. 25 (“Apple’s '721 patent discloses a user-friendly solution to the problem of accidental activation of mobile touchscreen devices (e.g., ‘pocket dialing’).”). Greg Christie, an inventor of the '721 patent, described the problem he and his colleagues set out to solve: [W]e were worried about accidental use, pocket dialling [sic], the phone getting shut down accidentally, or since we were going to have all these features on the phone, like e-mail and messaging, we were worried that, you know, mail could be sent accidentally or deleted accidentally or the phone would answer itself simply because the touch surface—you know, if it was like, like, the touch surface against your leg in your pocket, we were worried that just, like, you know, jostling around, moving around would trigger things on the screen. J.A. 10601:4-13. The '721 patent also describes the importance of making phone activation as “user-friendly” and “efficient” as possible. It teaches: Accordingly, there is a need for more efficient, user-friendly procedures for unlocking such devices, touch screens, and/or applications. -More generally, there is a need for more efficient, user-friendly procedures for transitioning such devices, touch screens, and/or applications between user interface states (e.g.; from a user interface state for a first application to a user interface state for a second application, between user interface states in the same application, or between locked and unlocked states). In addition, there is a need for sensory feedback to the user regarding progress towards satisfaction of a user input condition that is required for the transition to occur. '721 patent at 1:56-67. Mr. Christie testified that the ease of the user interface was a central design consideration when developing the slide to unlock feature: [W]e thought to introduce some sort of definite gesture. We knew we wanted to have some instruction. We knew we wanted the interface to be obvious to the customer. It would be possibly the first experience even in a retail environment. They’re deciding whether they want to buy it. They pick up this iPhone, you know, it would be very bad if they looked at the phone that they had heard so much about and they look at it and •say “I can’t figure out how to use this. I don’t know how to unlock it. It’s locked.” At the same time, we knew that people would be unlocking their phone, you know, tens or hundreds of times a day, so we didn’t want the instruction to be, you know, insulting or talk down to the customer, We didn’t want it ,to be cumbersome, something that they would grow tired of after a while. J.A. 10602:6-20. Apple’s expert, Dr. Cock-burn, explained that there was a tension between preventing pocket dialing and ease of use: “... [I]t has to work. It has to succeed in preventing accidental activation by mistake. But yet it needs .to be something that’s easy to do,, but not so easy that it can occur by accident, and it succeeds in that.” JA.. 10639:19-23. Apple asserted claim 8, which depends from claim 7, against several Samsung devices. These claims recite: 7. A portable electronic device, comprising: a touch-sensitive display; memory; one or more processors; and one or more modules stored in the memory and configured for execution by the one or more processors, the one or more modules including instructions: to detect a contact vrith the touch-sensitive display at a first predefined location corresponding to an unlock image; to continuously move the unlock image on the touch-sensitive display in accordance with the movement of the detected contact while continuous contact with the touch-sensitive display is maintained, wherein the unlock image is a graphical, interactive user-interface object with which a user interacts in order to unlock the device; and to unlock the hand-held electronic device if the unlock image is moved from the first predefined location on the touch screen to a predefined unlock region on the touch-sensitive display. 8. The device of claim 7, further comprising instructions to display visual cues to communicate a direction of movement of the unlock image required to unlock the device. The jury found that Samsung’s accused devices infringed claim 8 of the '721 patent. J.A. 40872. Samsung does not appeal this aspect of the verdict. The jury also found that Samsung’s infringement was willful and that Samsung failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence claim 8 is invalid. J.A. 40874. Following the verdict, Samsung moved for JMOL that, inter alia, claim 8 would have been obvious and Samsung did not willfully infringe the claim. The district court denied Samsung’s motion as to obviousness but granted the motion as to willfulness. Samsung argues claim 8 would have been obvious in light of the combination of Neonode and Plaisant. “Neonode” refers to the Neonode N1 Quickstart Guide. J.A. 20713. Neonode discloses a mobile device with a touch-sensitive screen. It explains that a user may unlock the device by pressing the power button. After the user presses the power button, text appears instructing the user to “Right sweep to unlock.” Sweeping right then unlocks the unit. J.A. 20725. “Plaisant” refers to a video and corresponding two-page paper published in 1992 titled “Touchscreen Toggle Design” by Catherine Plaisant and Daniel Wallace. J.A. 20742. The authors of the paper conducted an experiment to determine which controls (“toggles”) users prefer on wall-mounted controllers for “entertainment, security, and climate control systems.” Id. These controllers were intended to be installed “flushmounted into the wall or the cabinetry.” Id. The authors presented six alternative unlocking mechanisms to a group of fifteen undergraduate students, including a “slider toggle” where a user could activate the controller by “grab[bing] the pointer and sliding] it to the other side.” J.A. 20743. The students preferred “toggles that are pushed” over “toggles that slide,” and generally ranked the slider fifth of the six alternatives. Id. The paper also notes that sliders “were not preferred,” “sliding is a more complex task than simply touching,” and that “sliders are more difficult to implement than buttons.” Id. On appeal, Apple does not contest that, together, Neonode and Plaisant disclose all the elements of claim 8. Rather, the parties dispute whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine one of the unlocking mechanisms disclosed in Plaisant with Neonode. Samsung argues “there was no evidence of any kind suggesting that Plais-ant’s application to a wall-mounted device would lead inventors not to combine Plais-ant with Neonode.” Samsung Resp. Br. 19-20. Its expert, Dr. Greenberg, testified that a person of ordinary skill “would be highly interested” in both references because “they both deal with touch base systems, they both deal with user interfaces.” J.A. 11982:13-17. Dr. Greenberg testified that “a person looking at this would just think it natural to combine these two, as well taking the ideas in Plaisant, the slider, and putting them on the Neonode is, is just a very routine thing to think about in terms of interaction design.” J.A. 11982:23-11983:2. Samsung points to the Plaisant reference which states that sliding movement “is less likely to be done inadvertently.” Samsung Br. 35-36 (quoting J.A. 20743). Apple counters that a skilled artisan designing a mobile phone would' not have been motivated to turn to a wall-mounted air conditioning controller to solve the pocket dialing problem. Apple Br. 26-27. Its expert, Dr. Cockburn, testified that a person of ordinary skill would not have been naturally motivated to combine Neo-node and Plaisant. J.A. 12877:17-21. Dr. Cockburn testified that the way the Plais-ant controllers “were intended to be used was the touch screen would be mounted into a wall or into cabinetry and it would be used to control, for remote control, office or home appliances, like air conditioning units or heaters.” J.A. 12876:20-23. He also explained to the jury that Plaisant itself discloses that sliding toggles were less preferred than the other switches disclosed. J.A. 12877:7-16. Apple points to Plaisant’s teachings that “sliders were not preferred,” “sliding is a more complex task,” and “sliders are more difficult to implement.” Apple Br. 27-28. Apple argues there was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that there would not have been a motivation to combine Plaisant and Neonode to arrive at the claimed invention. What a prior art reference teaches and whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine references are questions of fact. See Par Pharm,, Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “Before KSR, we had also consistently treated the question of motivation to combine prior art references as a question of fact... KSR did not change this rule .... ” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2010); id. at 1237 (“[W]hether there was sufficient motivation to combine the references” is a • “factual issue[ ].”). The district court determined that a reasonable jury could have found that a person of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Plaisant and Neonode: A reasonable jury could infer from [Dr. Cockburn’s] testimony that an ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to combine elements from a wall-motmt-ed touchscreen for home appliances and a smartphone, particularly in view of the “pocket dialing” problem specific to mobile devices that Apple’s invention sought to address. Additionally, Dr. Cockburn explained that Plaisant “teach[es] away from the use of sliding,” because it “tells you not to use the sliding [toggle] mechanism.” J.A. 55 (citations omitted). After noting that what a reference teaches is a question of fact, the district court discussed the various statements in Plaisant about sliding toggles and concluded that substantial evidence supports the jury’s fact findings that Samsung failed to establish a motivation to combine. J.A. 55-56. We agree with the district court that on this record, the jury’s implicit fact findings that Plaisant would not have provided a skilled artisan with a motivation to combine its slider toggle switch with Neonode is supported by substantial evidence. In addition to the statements in Plaisant, the court explained: . Dr. Cockburn testified, contrary to Dr. Greenberg, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the Neonode and Plaisant in such a way as to invent claim 8. He provided two reasons. First, Plais-ant described “toggle designs” intended to be used with a “touch screen [that] would be mounted into a wall or into cabinetry” for controlling “office or home appliances, like air conditioning units or heaters.” A reasonable jury could infer from this testimony that an ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to combine elements from a wall-mounted touchscreen for home appliances and a smartphone, particularly in view of the “pocket dialing” problem specific to mobile devices that Apple’s invention sought to address. J.A. 54-55 (citations omitted). We agree with the district court’s analysis. Because the jury found the issue of validity in favor of Apple, we presume it resolved the conflicting expert testimony and found that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the slider toggle in Plaisant with the cell phone disclosed in Neonode. The question for our review is whether substantial evidence supports this implied fact finding. We conclude that it does. Neonode discloses a mobile phone. Plaisant discloses a wall-mounted air conditioning controller. The jury had both references before it- Although Samsung presents arguments for combining the two references, these ax-gu-ments were before the jury. Our job is not to review whether Samsung’s losing position was also supported by substantial evidence or to weigh the relative strength of Samsung’s evidence against Apple’s evidence. We are limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence for the jury’s findings, on the entirety of the record. And under the Ninth Circuit standard, we cannot conclude that the evidence affords only one reasonable conclusion and that it is contraxy to that of the jury. See Monroe, 248 F.3d at 801. We agree with the district court: “A reasonable jury could infer from this testimony that an ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to combine elements from a wall-mounted touchscreen for home appliances and a smartphone, particularly in view of the ‘pocket dialing’ problem specific to mobile devices that Apple’s invention sought to address.” J.A. 55. 1. The Objective Indicia of Non-Obviousness The Supreme Court explained that various factors “may also serve to ‘guard against slipping into use of hindsight,’ and to" resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36, 86 S.Ct. 684 (citation omitted). These factors are commonly known as secondary considerations or objective indicia of non-obviousness. These include: commercial success enjoyed by devices practicing the patented invention, industry praise for the patented invention, copying by others, and the existence of a long-felt but unsatisfied need for the invention. As this court held in Stratoflex: Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not. It is to be considered as part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in doubt after reviewing the art. 71S F.2d at 15B8-39. Apple introduced evidence of industry praise, copying, commercial success, and long-felt need. We presume the jury found that the evidence was sufficient to establish each by a preponderance of the evidence. We find substantial evidence, in the record to support each of those findings. a. Industry Praise Evidence that the industry praised a claimed invention or a product that embodies the patent claims weighs against an assertion that the same claimed invention would have been obvious. Industry participants, especially competitors, are not likely to praise an obvious advance over the known art. Thus, if there is evidence of industry praise of the claimed invention in the record, it weighs in favor of the non-obviousness of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (¶⅞-dustry praise ... provides probative and cogent evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have reasonably expected [the claimed invention].”); Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that industry praise, and specifically praise from a competitor, tends to indicate that the invention would not have been obvious). Samsung’s entire appeal regarding the jury’s fact finding that industry praise weighed in favor of nonobviousness is contained in one half of one sentence: “Indeed, the district court relied solely on generic praise not linked to the actual subject-matter of the claim .... ” Samsung Br. 37. The district court rejected Samsung’s argument on this issue, determining that substantial evidence supports the jury’s underlying findings in favor of “industry praise specifically for Apple’s slide to unlock invention.”. J.A. 56. It cited numerous internal Samsung documents that both praised Apple’s slide to. unlock feature and indicated that Samsung should modify its own phones to .incorporate Apple’s slide to unlock feature: • PTX 119 at 11: presentation prepared by Samsung’s European design team in June 2009 with a picture of the iPhone stating that Apple’s slide to unlock invention is a “[creative way[] of splving UI complexity” and that “swiping unlock on the screen allows to prevent erroneous unlock,” J.A. 50950; • PTX 121 at 100: Samsung software verification group document with a picture of the iPhone noting that unlike Samsung’s “Victory” phone, the iPhone’s “unlocking standard is precise as it is handled through sliding, and it allows prevention of any wrong motion,” and recommending a “direction' of improvement” to máke it the “same as iPhone, [and] clarify the unlocking standard by sliding,” J.A. 51289; • PTX 157 at 19-20: Samsung document with a picture of the iPhone recommending improving the Samsung phone by making it “easy to unlock, [given that] lock screen always shows guide text or arrow like the iPhone” and to make the lock icon’s movement “be smooth and continuous” like the iPhone, J.A. 57 (JMOL Order citing PTX 157); • PTX 219 at 14: Samsung document • with ¿ picture of the iPhone noting that the iPhone “intuitively indicate[s] the direction and length to move when unlocking on the lock screen,” J.A. 51603; • PTX 120 at 28, 84: Samsung document with a picture of an iPhone that describes the “Direction of Improvement” as using a defined bar to unlock the phone, as is done on the iPhone. The same document describes the “Direction of Improvement” as displaying the unlock instruction on the screen, as is done on the iPhone. J.A. 51028, 51084. See J.Ai 56-57 (JMOL Order citing several Samsung documents). Such internal documents from the patentee’s top competitor represent important admissions, acknowledging the merits of the patented advance over the then state of the art and can be used to establish ■ industry praise. Dr. Cockburn, Apple’s expert, testified “these various Samsung documents recognized the advantages of claim 8.” J.A. 57 (citing J.A. 10640-52). The court also explained that Apple presented a video at trial showing Steve Jobs unveiling the slide to unlock feature at an Apple event. When Mr. Jobs swiped to unlock the phone, “the audience burst into cheers.” J.A. . 12879-80 (Andrew Cock-bum). The video was shown to the jury, and Apple’s expert, an inventor, and Apple’s Vice President of Marketing all referenced the video in their testimony. See J.A. 57 (JMOL Order citing 4/4/14 Tr. at 603:6-11 (Greg Christie)); J.A. 12879:17-12880:2 (Andrew Cockburn); 4/1/14 Tr. at 428:12-17 (Phillip Schiller) (“There were many press in attendance at the event, and the reaction was enormous.”). Samsung does not discuss any of this evidence on appeal. In light of this evidence, we find its argument that the district court cited only generic praise of the iPhone, and not praise tied to the claimed slide to unlock feature, is without merit. The jury was presented with substantial evidence of praise in the industry that specifically related to features of the claimed invention, thereby' linking that industry praise with the patented invention. b. Copying Samsung does not dispute in its briefing that the jury heard substantial evidence that it copied the iPhone’s claimed features. In other words, Samsung does not challenge on appeal that substantial evidence exists in the record that Samsung copied Apple’s slide to unlock feature, nor does it challenge on appeal that this evidence of copying supports a conclusion that claim 8 would not have been obvious. Apple cites the same Samsung internal documents for both industry praise and copying, as they show evidence of both. The record contains multiple internal Samsung presentations given by different Samsung groups at different times stating that the iPhone’s slide to unlock feature is better than the various Samsung alternatives. See supra J.A. 50950 (PTX 119); J.A. 51028, 51084 (PTX 120); J.A. 51289 (PTX 121); J.A. 57 (JMOL Order citing PTX 157); J.A. 51603 (PTX 219). And many of these same presentations conclude that the direction for improvement is for Samsung to modify its unlocking mechanism to be like the iPhone. See id. This is substantial evidence of copying by Samsung, and it supports the jury’s verdict that the claimed invention would not have been obvious. c. Commercial Success In its opening appellate brief, Samsung also glosses over commercial success, giving it one sentence: “Apple made no effort to establish a nexus between commercial success and the subject matter of claim 8.” Samsung Br. 37. Commercial success requires a nexus to the claimed invention. Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1350. We look to the record to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence for the jury’s fact finding that Apple established a nexus between commercial success and the invention in claim 8. At trial, Apple’s expert, Dr. Cock-bum, testified that the iPhone practiced the asserted claim of the '721 patent, and “clearly there’s been commercial success of the iPhones that use this invention.” J.A. 12879:20-22; see also J.A. 11984:24-25 (“[Tjhere’s no question that the Apple iPhone was a commercial success.”) (Saul Greenberg, Samsung’s expert). Critically, Apple presented survey evidence that customers would be less likely to purchase a portable device without the slide to unlock feature and would pay less for products without it, thus permitting the jury to conclude that this feature was a key driver in the ultimate commercial success of the products. J.A. 21066, 21108. Apple’s Senior Vice President of Worldwide Marketing testified that slide to unlock was the very first feature shown in Apple’s original iPhone TV commercial, 4/1/14 Tr. at 433:16-434:18 (Phillip Schiller) (citing PTX 180), and the jury saw that commercial during the trial. Id. A reasonable jury could have found evidence that Apple’s marketing experts elected to emphasize the claimed feature as evidence of its importance. It is likewise reasonable to conclude that advertising that highlights or focuses on a feature of the invention could influence customer purchasing decisions. And an inventor of the '721 patent—an Apple Vice President—confirmed that slide to unlock was important because it “would possibly be [a customer’s] first experience even in a retail environment” when the customer was “deciding whether they want to buy it.” J.A. 10601:25-10602:22 (Greg Christie). Mr. Schiller explained the importance of the slide to unlock feature in great detail: When this ad ran, people hadn’t had the opportunity yet to actually use an iPhone for themselves, and so they’ve never used at this point in time a device anything like it. The challenge is how do you show people, in a simple, 30-second ad, something that gives them a feel for what it’s like to use this new generation of Apple’s smartphone. And we started the ad with something you’re going to be doing every day, many, many times a day, which is to unlock the screen, and to do that, you use a simple gesture, slide to unlock. And that one gesture, having seen that one thing first, you get an instant idea of how multitouch works so that you’re doing a gesture on the screen, and it does something simple and useful to you, and that it’s easy to use. You don’t need a manual to figure it out. And that one starting point was. a great beginning to your understanding of what an iPhone is and what this kind of device can do. 4/1/14 Tr. at 433:1-18. Finally, the video of the crowd “bursting] into cheers” when Steve Jobs demonstrated the slide to unlock feature supports a conclusion that consumers valued this particular feature. J.A. 12879:20-12880:2 (Andrew Cockburn). It is the fact finders’ job to assess the probative value of the evidence presented. Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“If is within the province of the fact-finder to resolve these factual disputes regarding whether a nexus exists between the commercial success of the product and its patented features, and to determine the probative value of Pro-Mold’s evidence of secondary considerations —”). This record overall contains substantial evidence of a nexus between the slide to unlock feature and the iPhone’s commercial success, and we are required to give this jury fact finding deference. It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or consider what the record might have supported. This commercial success evidence supports the jury’s verdict that the claimed invention would not have been obvious. d. Long-Felt Need Evidence of a long-felt but unresolved need can weigh in favor of -the non-obviousness of an invention because it is reasonable to infer the need would not have persisted had the solution been obvious. There is substantial evidence for the jury to have found that there was a long-felt but unresolved need for a solution to the pocket dialing problem until Apple’s claimed invention, with its slide to unlock feature, solved that problem. Samsung’s appeal of the jury’s fact finding of long-felt need was limited to a single sentence, which was itself simply a quote from George M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2010): “[w]here the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are as minimal as they are here, ... it cannot be said that any long felt need was unsolved.” Samsung Br. 37 (alteration in original). In its brief, there was no application to this case, no analysis of the issue of long-felt need, and no citation to any record evidence. To the extent that Samsung’s quote should be interpreted as precluding a jury finding of long-felt need favoring non-obviousness when the difference between the prior art and the claimed invention is small, we reject such a categorical rule. This type of hard and fast rule is not appropriate for the factual issues that are left to the province of the jury. There could be a long-felt need for what might be considered a relatively small improvement over the prior art—it all depends upon the evidence, and it is up to the fact finder to assess that evidence. Moreover, we do not understand the quote from George M. Martin to be a proclamation of law but instead simply an application to the particular facts of that case. The quoted language makes clear that the court was evaluating the facts in that particular case regarding the claimed advances over the prior art, “as minimal as they are here.” George M. Martin, 618 F.3d at 1304. And importantly, the George M. Martin court explains that the “need” had already been met by the prior art devices that already solved the problem at issue. Id. at 1305. Thus, in George M. Martin, not only was the difference between the prior art and the claimed invention minimal, but the prior art had already solved the problem for which the patentee claimed there was a long-felt need. Id. Samsung’s sole argument on long-felt need is thus based, on a misreading of George M. Martin. In this case, there is substantial evidence for the jury’s finding that long-felt need supported the nonobviousness of the claimed invention. Denying JMOL on this issue, the district court cited testimony from Apple’s expert: “Dr. Coekburn’s testimony that phone designers had been trying to solve the problem of accidental activation and the ‘pocket dial problem’ before the iPhone existed, but had only come up with ‘frustrat[ing]’ solutions.” J.A. 57 (quoting J.A. 10638-39). While the expert discusses particular examples in the first person: “I have been very frustrated with [the prior art options],” the jury could still reasonably find that this testimony was probative of a long-felt need. See J.A. 10638:17-19. . The district court also cited the testimony of one of the inventors, where he discussed concerns over pocket dialing. In addition to the portion of Dr. Cockburn’s testimony cited by the district court, there are other portions of his testimony upon which the jury fact finding could be predicated. The record contained á document (PTX 55) in which Samsung listed all the alternatives to the iPhone slide to unlock. See 4/4/14 Tr. at 680:10-687:15 (Andrew Cockburn). Apple’s expert went through several of the alternatives, including the Ripple unlock, the glass unlock, and the circle unlock, and explained how each of these failed to solve the accidental activation problem. Id. The jury could have reasonably found that this testimony established long-felt unresolved need. In addition, the jury could have found that the same internal Samsung documents Apple relied upon for industry praise and copying demonstrate that Samsung compared four of its own rejected alternative unlock mechanisms (Kepler, Victory, Behold, & Amythest) to the iPhone slide to unlock mechanism, and that Samsung concluded the iPhone slide to unlock was better. See, e.g., J.A. 51028 (PTX 120 at 28 (“Behold3: Unintentional unlock occurs ,.. iPhone Lock undone only when sliding action is applied to a specific button”)); J.A. 51289 (PTX 121 at 100 (“Victory: The Screen Lock gets unlocked with a slight flick motion”; “iPhone Unlocking standard is precise as it is handled through sliding, and it allows prevention of any wrong motion”)). The jury could have found that these Samsung documents show that Samsung, Apple’s fiercest competitor, was unsuccessfully trying to solve the same problem. All of this evidence was presented to the jury during the trial in this case. This evidence constitutes substantial evidence for the jury fact finding that there was a long-felt but unresolved need, which Apple’s '721 patented invention solved. This evidence weighs in favor of non-obviousness. 2. Conclusion on Obviousness of the '721 Patent Acknowledging that “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does,” the Supreme Court cautioned that “[h]elpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19, 127 S.Ct. 1727. The Supreme Court explained: The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against limiting the analy