Full opinion text
HULL, Circuit Judge: It has been 34 years since Thomas Arthur brutally murdered Troy Wicker. During 1982 to 1992, Thomas Arthur was thrice tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for Wicker’s murder. After his third death sentence in 1992, Arthur for the next 24 years has pursued, unsuccessfully, dozens of direct and post-conviction appeals in both state and federal courts. In addition, starting nine years ago in 2007 and on three separate occasions, Arthur has filed civil lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the drug protocol to be used in his execution. This is Arthur’s third such § 1983 case, and this current § 1983 case was filed in 2011. For the last five years Arthur has pursued this § 1983 case with the benefit of lengthy discovery. The district court held a two-day trial and entered two comprehensive orders denying Arthur § 1983 relief. Those orders are the focus of the instant appeal. After thorough review, we conclude substantial evidence supported the district court’s fact findings and, thus, Arthur has shown no clear error in them. Further, Arthur has shown no error in the district court’s conclusions of law, inter alia, that: (1) Arthur failed to carry his burden to show compounded pentobarbital is a feasible, readily implemented, and available drug to the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) for use in executions; (2). Alabama’s consciousness assessment protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment or the-’ Equal Protection Clause; and (3) Arthur’s- belated firing-squad claim lacks merit. I. CONVICTION AND APPEALS The • Alabama Supreme Court summarized the facts underlying Arthur’s criminal conviction as follows: More than 20 years ago, Arthur’s relationship with his common-law wife ultimately led to his brutally murdering a relative of the woman. Arthur shot the victim in the right eye with a pistol, causing nearly instant death; He was convicted in a 1977 trial and was sentenced to life imprisonment. While on work release during the life sentence, Arthur had an affair with a woman that ultimately led to his brutally murdering that woman’s husband, Troy Wicker, in 1982. Arthur shot Wicker in the right eye with a pistol, causing nearly instant death. Ex parte Arthur, 711 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 1997). In 1982, Arthur was convicted and sentenced to death for Wicker’s murder, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed that conviction in 1985. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2007). In 1987, Arthur was again convicted and sentenced to death, but that conviction was overturned by Alabama’s Court of Criminal Appeals in 1990. Id. After his third trial in 1991, Arthur was again convicted of Wicker’s murder and sentenced to death in 1992. Id. This time, his conviction and sentence were affirmed. Id. He did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1337-38. At his third sentencing proceeding, Arthur asked for a death sentence, stating that a capital sentence would provide him better prison accommodations, more access to the law library, more time to devote to his appeal, and a more extensive appeals process. Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 614 (11th Cir. 2014). Arthur told the jury that he did not believe he-would be executed. Id. Arthur’s murder of Wicker was a capital offense under Alabama law because Arthur had been convicted of another murder in the 20 years preceding his second murder. See Ala. Code § 13A-5—40(a)(13) (1975); Arthur v. State, 71 So.3d 733, 735 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). In 2001, after exhausting his state court remedies, Arthur filed a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1238, 1240-43 (11th Cir.), modified on reh’g, 459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court dismissed the § 2254 petition as untimely, but granted a certificate of appealability as to Arthur’s claims of actual innocence, statutory tolling, and equitable tolling. Id. at 1243. In 2006, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Arthur’s § 2254 petition, concluding that Arthur had not shown actual innocence or entitlement to statutory or equitable tolling. Id. at 1253-54. The Supreme Court denied Arthur’s petition for writ of certiorari. Arthur v. Allen, 549 U.S. 1338, 127 S.Ct. 2033, 167 L.Ed.2d 763 (Mem.) (2007). With this background, we turn to Arthur’s current §¡1983 case, challenging Alabama’s use of midazolam in its lethal injection protocol. To place Arthur’s cur-i-ent § 1983 claim in context, we review the history of lethal injection in Alabama and how Alabama has had to change the drugs used due to unavailability. For years, Arthur challenged the use of sodium thiopen-tal and then pentobarbital. But now that the ADOC has not been able to procure sodium thiopental or pentobarbital and has had to switch to midazolam, Arthur is currently challenging midazolam and now asks to go back to sodium thiopental or pentobarbital as his preferred alternatives. We thus review in great detail how this case got here today. II. HISTORY OF LETHAL INJECTION IN ALABAMA When Arthur was sentenced to death, Alabama executed inmates by electrocution. See McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1171 (11th Cir. 2008). On July 1, 2002, the Alabama legislature adopted lethal injection as the state’s preferred form of execution. Id. The legislature allowed inmates already under a sentence of death a 30-day window to choose electrocution as their method of execution, after which time they would be deemed to have waived the right to request a method other than lethal injection. Ala. Code § 15—18—82.1(b). Alabama’s method-of-execution statute further provides that: If electrocution or lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional by the Alabama Supreme Court under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, or held to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court under the United States Constitution, or if the United States Supreme Court declines to review any judgment holding a method of execution to be unconstitutional under the United States Constitution made by the Alabama Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over Alabama, all persons sentenced to death for a capital crime shall be executed by any constitutional method of execution. Id. § 15-18-82.1(c). The' Alabama statute does not prescribe any particular method of lethal injection; the legislature left it to the ADOC to devise the policies and procedures governing lethal injection executions, and exempted the ADOC from the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act in exercising that authority. Id § 15-18-82.1(g). The ADOC has used a three-drug lethal injection protocol since it began performing executions by lethal injection in 2002. See Brooks v. Warden, 810 F.3d 812, 823 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks v. Dunn, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 979, 193 L.Ed.2d 813 (2016). Each drug in a three-drug protocol is intended to serve a specific purpose. The first drug should render the inmate unconscious to “ensure[] that the prisoner does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the second and third drugs”; the second drug is a paralytic agent that “inhibits all muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm, stops respiration”; and the third drug “interferes with the electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, inducing cardiac arrest.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 44, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1527, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) (plurality opinion). The third drug in the ADOC protocol has always been potassium chloride, and the second drug has always been a paralytic agent—either pancuronium bromide or rocuronium bromide. Brooks, 810 F.3d at 823. However, the ADOC has changed the first drug in its protocol twice. Id. From 2002 until April 2011, it used sodium thiopental as the first drug in the three-drug sequence. Id. But a national shortage of sodium thiopental forced states, including Alabama, to seek a replacement for sodium thiopental as the first drug in the series. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. -, -, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2733, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) (explaining that the sole domestic manufacturer of sodium thiopental ceased production of the drug in 2009 and exited the market entirely in 2011). From April 2011 until September 10, 2014, Alabama used pentobarbital as the first drug. Brooks, 810 F.3d at 823. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[bjefore long, however, pentobarbital also became unavailable.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2733. Arthur has acknowledged that Alabama’s supply of commercially manufactured pen-tobarbital expired on or around November 2013. From September 11, 2014, until the present, Alabama has used midazolam as the first drug in the series. Brooks, 810 F.3d at 823. Currently, Alabama’s lethal injection protocol calls for the administration of: (1) a 500-mg dose of midazolam, (2) followed by a 600-mg dose of rocuronium bromide, and (3) finally, 240 milliequivalents of potassium chloride. This lethal injection protocol involves the same drugs, administered in the same sequence, as the protocol at issue in Glossip. 135 S.Ct. at 2734-35. III. 2011: COMPLAINT ABOUT PENTOBARBITAL Arthur’s execution date is currently set for November 3, 2016. This is the sixth time that Alabama has scheduled his execution, and this case is Arthur’s third § 1983 challenge to lethal injection as the method of his execution. In May 2007, shortly after the State filed a motion to set an execution date, Arthur filed a § 1983 action challenging Alabama’s lethal injection protocol which in 2007 included sodium thiopental as the first drug. (CM/ECF for the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. Ala., case no. 1:07-cv-342, doc. 1 at 1-2, 6; doc. 15 at 11). The district court dismissed that complaint based on laches, and this Court affirmed. (Id., docs. 19, 20, 27, 28). In October 2007, Arthur filed a second challenge to Alabama’s lethal injection protocol, which the district court again dismissed for unreasonable delay, and this Court affirmed. (CM/ECF for the S.D. Ala., case no. 1:07-cv-722, docs. 1, 22, 23, 28, 29). In April 2011, Alabama switched from using sodium thiopental to pentobarbital as the first drug in its lethal injection protocol. Brooks, 810 F.3d at 823. On June 8, 2011, Arthur filed another § 1983 complaint in federal district court, challenging Alabama’s new lethal injection protocol, especially its use of pentobarbital as the first drug. As amended, Arthur’s complaint raised three § 1983 claims: (1). the ADOC’s use of pentobarbital as the first drug in its three-drug lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; (2) the ADOC’s secrecy in adopting and revising its lethal injection protocol violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and (3) the ADOC had materially deviated from its lethal injection protocol by failing to conduct a “consciousness assessment” during an earlier execution, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Arthur also alleged that Alabama’s lethal injection statute violated the state constitution. The district court dismissed Arthur’s Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims on statute-of-limitations grounds and his Equal Protection claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012). Because Alabama began its lethal injection protocol in 2002, the district court determined that Arthur’s 2011 complaint challenging it was banned by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims. Id. Arthur appealed. Id. This Court reversed the district court’s dismissal as to only Arthur’s Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection claims. Id. at 1262, 1263. As to the Eighth Amendment claim, this Court concluded that Arthur’s allegations and his filed affidavits created factual issues as to whether Alabama’s new lethal injection drugs and procedures constituted such a significant change in the lethal injection protocol as to warrant a new limitations period and some factual development, including discovery. Id. at 1260-62. As to the Equal Protection claim, this Court held that Arthur had “alleged enough facts to constitute a plausible Equal Protection claim because he alleges that Alabama has substantially deviated from its execution protocol” by failing to perform the pinch test as part of the required consciousness assessment. Id. at 1263. Accepting Arthur’s particular allegations as true at the early Rule 12(b)(6) stage, this Court remanded for further factual development. Id. In the years after this Court’s 2012 remand, the parties conducted extensive discovery. Before the final hearing on Arthur’s § 1983 challenge to pentobarbital, the State was no longer able to procure pentobarbital. In September 2014, the State changed its lethal injection protocol to substitute midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital as the first drug, and rocuro-nium bromide for pancuronium bromide as the second drug in its three-drug cocktail. IV. 2015: SECOND AMENDED , COMPLAINT ABOUT MIDAZOLAM On January 7,2015, after receiving leave from the district court to amend his 2011 complaint, Arthur filed a complaint (the “Second Amended Complaint”), raising two claims. Arthur raised an ’Eighth Amendment claim, alleging that the ADOC’s use of midazolam as the first drug “creates a substantial risk of serious harm because ... there is a high likelihood that midazolam will fail to render [him] insensate from the excruciatingly painful and agonizing effects of the second and third drugs.” Despite challenging pentobarbital for more than three years, Arthur now suggested that he would prefer for the State to use a one-drug protocol of compounded pentobarbital in his execution instead of midazolam. Arthur’s Second Amended Complaint recycled his earlier argument about pentobarbital, which was that it would cause him to suffer a drop in blood pressure and then a heart attack. Arthur now made the same claim about midazo-lam, alleging that he had “clinically significant obstructive coronary disease” and that the State’s use of midazolam created a substantial risk that he would suffer a painful heart attack before losing consciousness. Arthur’s Second Amended Complaint also raised an Equal Protection claim, alleging that the ADOC had “materially deviated from their written execution protocol, impermissibly burdening Mr. Arthur’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Arthur claimed that Alabama employs a lethal injection protocol that requires a “consciousness assessment” after the first drug is injected. This consciousness assessment has three parts: (1) calling the inmate’s'name, (2) gently stroking his eyelash, and (3)-pinching his arm. Arthur’s Second Amended Complaint alleged that during “numerous executions,” including the 2011 execution of Eddie Powell, witnesses did not observe the pinch test being performed. Arthur also alleged that the" ADOC failed to adequately train its personnel in how to perform properly the consciousness assessment. He claimed that there existed a “significant risk that Defendants will deviate from their protocol in [his] execution,” thus burdening his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In March 2015, the district court elected to stay Arthur’s § 1983 case challenging midazolam until after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Glossip v. Gross. V. JUNE 2015: GLOSSIP IS DECIDED On June 29, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Glossip, holding that, in order to challenge successfully a method of execution, a plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) that the proposed execution method presents a risk that is “ ⅛ or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers,’ ” and (2) that there is “an alternative [method of execution] that is ‘feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.’ ” 135 S.Ct. at 2737 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50, 52, 128 S.Ct. at 1530-31, 1532) (alteration in original). After Glossip, the district court subsequently lifted its stay of proceedings in this case, and the parties conducted some additional discovery. On August 25, 2015, Arthur sought leave to file a third amended complaint, seeking (1) to switch back to compounded pento-barbital as an alternative method of execution, (2) to suggest sodium thiopental and a firing squad as additional alternative methods, and (3) to include additional allegations that midazolam was constitutionally inadequate. The district court granted Arthur leave to amend his complaint except as to the firing squad as an alternative method of execution. The district court concluded, inter alia, that “execution by firing squad is not permitted by [Alabama] statute and, therefore, is not a method of execution that could be considered either feasible or readily implemented by Alabama at this time.” The district court set trial to begin on January 12,2016. VI. OCT. 2015: THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT On October 13, 2015, Arthur filed his Third Amended Complaint, alleging substantially identical claims to those raised in his Second Amended Complaint and requesting single-drug protocols of compounded pentobarbital or sodium thiopen-tal as alleged feasible alternative methods of execution. The ADOC filed (1) a “Motion to Dismiss and, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment,” arguing that Arthur’s Eighth Amendment claim was untimely, that both claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether compounded pentobar-bital or sodium thiopental are known and available alternatives; and (2) a “Motion for Summary Judgment of Arthur’s Eighth Amendment Claim,” arguing again that compounded pentobarbital and sodium thi-opental are not known and available alternatives and, further, that Arthur failed to present any evidence showing how compounded pentobarbital could be administered to prevent a painful heart attack. The ADOC’s motions included arguments regarding its present inability to obtain either pentobarbital or sodium thiopental. On January 7, 2016, the district court issued an order limiting the issues at trial to: (1) Arthur’s Equal Protection claim, and (2) the availability of alternative methods of execution. The district court wrote that, if Arthur met his burden to prove an alternative method of execution that is feasible and readily available, the court would schedule a second phase of trial to address other issues, such as whether the use of midazolam “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminént dangers.” The district court held á two-day bench trial on January 12 and 13,2016. VII. TRIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT ALTERNATIVE DRUGS A. Arthur’s Evidence As noted above, although for four years Arthur, had challenged pentobarbital as the first drug, one of his requested alternatives is now a single drug of compounded pentobarbital. Arthur called Dr. Gaylen M. Zentner to testify about compounded pen-tobarbital. Dr. Zentner obtained a Ph.D. in pharmaceutics and was a licénsed pharmacist in Utah for 40 years. After obtaining his Ph.D., Dr. Zentner taught pharmacy at the University of Connecticut, including teaching in the compounding lab. He worked for 13 years for a large pharmaceutical company in their “advanced drug delivery dosage form design unit.” He was later in charge of “all formulation and dosage form design” at another large pharmaceutical company. He had held two adjunct professorships in pharmacy. Since 2012, Dr. Zentner had worked as an “independent consultant” to the pharmaceutical industry. He testified that he had-hands-on experience with manufacturing drugs and he had personally compounded drugs, although he had no experience preparing compounded pentobarbital sodium. The district court accepted Dr. Zentner as an expert witness in the fields of pharmaceutical chemistry, manufacturing, and compounding. Dr. Zentner testified that, in his opinion, “the talent, expertise, and facilities to perform sterile compounding” existed within Alabama and that “all ingredients required to formulate a compounded preparation of pentobarbital sodium” were “readily available.” Dr. Zentner explained that, in its pure form, pentobarbital sodium was a white powder, which could be compounded with other ingredients to form an injectable solution. He described pentobarbital as a “long-known and well-established drug product” that was “available to the medical sciences for decades.” He stated that Nembutal, the trade name for an industrially manufactured version of injectable pento-barbital sodium, was available for sale in the United States. He said that pentobar-bital sodium for injection was listed in the FDA’s Orange Book, which listed all “approved drugs” in the United States. The Orange Book stated that there were no active patents on this drug, meaning that anyone was permitted to make it. Dr. Zentner described the process of compounding a solution of pentobarbital sodium, calling it “a very- simple matter” and a “straightforward process,” During his testimony, Dr. Zentner relied on a 2015 article from the Journal of Pharmacological and Toxicological Methods that described the preparation of an injectable pentobarbital sodium solution by laboratory scientists that was essentially identical to the commercial product and was stable for one year. Dr. Zentner contended that there were “numerous sources” for both the active and inactive ingredients needed to-compound pentobarbital, including professional drug sourcing services. He said that these ingredients were available for sale in the United States and could be found through an Internet search. For example, Dr; Zent-ner found pentobarbital sodium listed on a drug manufacturer’s product listing, which listing indicated that the drug was produced in the United States. He stated that other manufacturers might offer it for sale or the drug could be synthesized in a lab. He said that he knew of one lab that would be willing to synthesize the drug and he suspected “all of them would be willing.” Dr. Zentner stated that he conducted an Internet search of sterile compounding pharmacies in Alabama from the listing available on the Accreditation Commission for Health Care’s Web site, and found 19 such pharmacies, although two were essentially the same company. Dr. Zentner gave his list to the ADOC. Dr. Zentner contacted two of these pharmacies, and they said that they did perform sterile compounding. Dr. Zentner admitted that he did' not ask them whether they would be willing to compound pentobarbital for use in an execution by the ADOC. In his deposition, Dr. Zentner clarified that he did not ask these two pharmacies any questions whatsoever regarding compounded pentobarbital. Accordingly, Dr. Zentner could only give his opinion that (1) pentobarbital sodium is available for purchase in the United States* and (2) there are compounding pharmacies that “have the skills and licenses to perform sterile compounding of pentobarbital sodium.” On cross-examination, Dr. Zentner admitted that he had not contacted any drug companies at all about their willingness to sell pentobarbital to the ADOC for executions. He also admitted that he was unaware that the company that currently owned Nembutal had restrictions in place to keep that drug from being purchased for use in lethal injections. Dr. Zentner admitted that he had no knowledge of whether the pharmacies that he found would be able to procure pentobarbital, nor did he ever personally attempt to purchase the drug from a manufacturer. He stated that one drug synthesis company that he has a “long-term relationship” with was “willing to discuss” producing compounded pentobarbital. Dr. Zentner admitted that sodium thiopental is not listed in the FDA Orange Book, meaning it is not an approved product in the United States, although he stated that it is “available offshore and conceivably could be imported.” B. ADOC’s Evidence Anne Adams Hill, ADOC’s general counsel, testified on behalf of the agency. Hill explained that, as part of her job, she was “routinely” in contact with other states’ departments of corrections and that the subject of pentobarbital and lethal fil-jection came up in her conversations. Her job required her to constantly look for ways to procure new drugs and new sources for drugs. Hill was aware that, in 2015, Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia executed inmates using a single-drug protocol of compounded pentobarbital. Hill testified that she contacted representatives from the departments of corrections in these four states in the fall of 2015 in an effort to obtain compounded pentobarbital. With respect to these four states she recalled asking “specifically if they had compounded pentobarbital and, if they did, if they would be willing to provide it to the [ADOC] and, if not, if they would provide us their source.” All four refused. Hill stated that she was not aware of whether these four states had exclusive contracts with their drug sources, but that all four had refused to name those sources. Hill reiterated her deposition testimony that, in between September 2014 and November 2015, she had contacted 11 potential sources of pentobarbital, including those 4 states and 7 pharmacies within Alabama. She asked these pharmacies whether they would be willing to compound pentobarbital and provide it to the ADOC, and they all said no. Hill also testified that, in December 2015, she reached out to all of the 18 pharmacies on Dr. Zentner’s list regarding their willingness and/or capability to compound pentobarbital for the ADOC’s use. None of the pharmacies agreed to provide the drug to ADOC, with two saying they were incapable of obtaining the ingredients, another claiming that it no longer did compounding, yet another- saying it only produced one drug, and the remainder stating that “they’re not able to compound pentobarbital.” In total, Hill testified that she reached out to “at least 29” potential sources in an attempt to procure compounded pentobarbital for the ADOC. Hill admitted that she did not contact drug manufacturers, buying groups, or drug synthesis labs in an effort to find pentobarbital, nor did she conduct any Internet searches to obtain the drug. Hill also testified that she had made- no effort since September 2014 to obtain sodium thiopental and made no efforts to determine whether it could be imported. Hill said that she did not think sodium thiopen-tal was available in the United States, and she was not aware of any other state that had access to sodium thiopental. VIII. TRIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT ■ CONSCIOUSNESS -• ASSESSMENT Since October 2007, the ADOC’s written execution 'protocol has' included a three-step consciousness assessment, to be performed, after the administration of the first drug, but before administration of the second and third drugs. The purpose of this assessment is to ensure that the inmate has been rendered unconscious by the first drug. The assessment has three parts: (1) calling the inmate’s name; (2) fluttering the inmate’s eyelash; and (3) pinching the inmate’s arm. A. Arthur’s Evidence on the Consciousness Assessment Arthur presented four witnesses who attended prior executions at Holman Correctional Facility, where Arthur is housed. These witnesses included three attorneys who worked for the Federal Defenders Office for the Middle District of Alabama and the videotaped deposition of Don Blocker, a volunteer lay minister at Holman. To varying degrees, they all testified that they did not see prison staff perform the pinch test at these executions. All four witnessed the executions from the viewing room reserved for the inmate’s family, and they had a clear view of the inmate’s left side. Two of the attorneys, however, admitted that them view of the inmate was obstructed when a correctional officer stepped up to the gurney to perform the consciousness assessment. All three attorneys admitted that, at the time of the executions they saw, they were unaware that there was even a consciousness assessment that was supposed to be performed. Similarly, Blocker acknowledged three times on cross-examination that it was “possible” that he did not see parts of the consciousness assessment that were performed. At trial, Arthur also presented Dr. Alan David Kaye, who holds a medical degree and a Ph.D. in pharmacology. He completed a residency in anesthesia and was currently employed'as the chairman of the anesthesia department at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). He is the director of anesthesia services at LSU’s “flagship” hospital, has authored articles and books, and maintains an active anesthesiology practice. The court accepted Dr. Kaye as an expert witness in the field of anesthesiology. Dr. Kaye explained that “sedation” is understood by people in his field as a continuum. This can range from “mild sedation ‘in which- a person can easily respond to verbal cues,” to moderate sedation, deep sedation, and, finally, anesthesia, “the deepest level of the continuum.” In his opinion, 'Alabama’s consciousness assessment “is inadequate to measure deep sedation or anesthesia.’’ While Dr. Kaye has not witnessed any executions in Alabama, he opined that the ADOC had not “adequately administered” the assessment that was in place. Dr. Kaye gave four reasons for his opinion. First, from reviewing the testimony of certain ADOC personnel, Dr. Kaye opined that “it appears that the consciousness assessment may not have been performed at all in a number of prior executions.” Second, statements given by certain ADOC personnel gave the impression to Dr. Kaye that their training was inadequate because they did not know how to properly perform the pinch test and/or communicate the results of the assessment. Third, again based on the prior testimony of certain ADOC officials, it was Dr. Kaye’s opinion that members of Alabama’s execution team do not pinch inmates with sufficient force. Fourth, it appeared to Dr. Kaye that members of the execution team did not adequately communicate the results of the consciousness assessment. Dr. Kaye testified that, in anesthesiology medical practice, you have to perform “the hardest pinch that you can pinch,” hard enough to braise. Dr. Kaye explained, “As firm and as hard as you can. Not in a mild way; not in a moderate way. In a very significant way.” Dr. Kaye testified that the ADOC personnel’s testimony—that (1) “We don’t inflict pain on people”; (2) “I pinch hard enough that [a conscious person] would jerk their arm away from me”; and (3) “[I pinch] hard enough to wake [the inmate] if he’s asleep”—are all inadequate to meet the proper threshold and speaks to the lack of training and inadequacy of the safeguard. B. ADOC’s Evidence on the Consciousness Assessment The ADOC presented the testimony, either live or through deposition designations, of six current or former ADOC personnel, all of whom testified that all parts of the consciousness assessment were performed at every execution that they witnessed and/or participated in. At trial, Hill, the ADOC’s general counsel, testified that she had attended nine or ten executions since the implementation of the consciousness assessment and observed all parts of the assessment being performed in all of those executions. Hill stated that, in her role as the ADOC general counsel, she had never received any information that the assessment was not performed. Hill testified that she viewed the executions from the commissioner’s viewing room, which is positioned directly in front of each inmate’s feet as he lies on the gurney, and that her view was not obstructed. Hill was present at Powell’s execution, and she testified that all parts of the assessment were performed at Powell’s execution. She said that the correct and complete performance of the consciousness assessment is something she looks for in the executions that she attends. Hill stated that correctional officers are aware that the consciousness assessment is a mandatory part of the execution protocol, and they are trained on how to perform it. They are instructed to perform the pinch test on the back of the inmate’s left arm and to “pinch hard.” Hill stated that correctional officers practice performing the consciousness assessment before an execution. They are also trained to look for “any reaction” from the inmate and to report any reaction. The ADOC also presented the deposition testimony of: (1) G.C., Holman’s warden from 2002 until 2009; (2) A.P., the Holman warden who succeeded G.C.; (3) D.C., the former captain of Holman’s execution team; (4) W.H., the execution-team captain who succeeded D.C.; and (5) C.S., the chaplain at Holman. The wardens and captains testified that they were trained on the consciousness protocol, knew it was mandatory, and understood its purpose and importance. The wardens both testified that they were present at executions and all parts of the assessment, including the pinch test, were performed at every execution that they witnessed. Similarly, the captains of the execution team testified that they personally performed every aspect of the assessment, including the pinch test, at every execution. The Holman chaplain testified that he has witnessed approximately 40 executions at the prison since 1997. He witnessed the execution of Eddie Powell, and remembered seeing the consciousness assessment performed. G.C. testified that he was the warden when the consciousness assessment was implemented and that ADOC representatives explained the assessment to him and told him when it should be performed. He testified that a team consisting of himself, D.C., Hill, and former ADOC Commissioner Kim Thomas all agreed that inmates should be pinched on the back of the arm because it was “inconspicuous” but “fairly sensitive.” G.C. testified that he sat in the control room with another officer during executions and, on the warden’s command, that officer would “radio[ ] to the correctional personnel that’s in the execution chamber that it’s time to perform the consciousness test.” If there was any reaction from the inmate, the procedure was for the officer in the execution chamber to radio back to the officer in the control room, but if the officer performing the consciousness assessment stepped away from the inmate, “that was [his] cue to proceed” with administration of the second and third drugs. G.C. testified that, during his tenure as warden, no inmate ever reacted to administration of the first drug. A.P. succeeded G.C. as warden and also testified that, once the officer performing the consciousness assessment stepped away from the inmate, he knew he could proceed with the execution. D.C. was the captain of the execution team at Holman until his retirement in 2009 and was the captain when the consciousness assessment was introduced. It was his practice to do all three steps of the assessment simultaneously. He testified that, if the inmate showed any reaction to the consciousness assessment, he would turn and face the warden. In performing the pinch test, D.C. would pinch hard enough that, “if it was a conscious person, they would jerk their arm away from me.” He never received any reaction in the nine or ten executions in which he participated. W.H. succeeded D.C. as the execution-team captain at Holman in 2009. As captain, W.H. would pinch the inmate’s arm “hard enough to wake him if he’s asleep.” W.H. testified that he received oral, written, and physical training regarding the consciousness assessment from A.P., D.C., and another officer. W.H. testified that A.P. instructed him to stay at his place by the gurney if the inmate reacted. W.H. stated that no inmate ever reacted after he performed the consciousness assessment. IX. DISTRICT COURT’S APRIL 15, 2016 ORDER After setting out the factual background and procedural history of the case, the district court proceeded, first, to consideration of Arthur’s Eighth Amendment claim. The district court summarized the trial testimonies of Dr. Zentner and ADOC attorney Hill on the issue of alternatives to midazolam—namely, pentobarbital and sodium thiopental. The district court then made these findings of fact, among others: (1) The ADOC’s supply of commercially manufactured pentobarbital, Nembutal, expired around November 2013, and the commercial supplier of Nembutal is prohibited from providing it for use in executions. Thus, Nembutal is no longer available to the ADOC. (2) When a drug is no longer commercially available, but remains listed in the FDA Orange Book, a licensed pharmacist may legally create the drug through compounding or some other process. (3) Pentobarbital sodium is the active ingredient in compounded pentobarbital, and there is a formulation for compounding an injectable solution of pento-barbital sodium. (4) Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia have all performed executions using compounded pentobarbital after Nembutal became unavailable. (5) The ADOC has attempted to obtain compounded pentobarbital for use in executions from the departments of correction in all four of these states, but those efforts were unsuccessful. (6) The ADOC has contacted all of the accredited compounding pharmacies in Alabama to ascertain whether any of these pharmacies would be willing and able to provide compounded pentobarbi-tal to the ADOC, but those efforts have been unsuccessful. (7) Thus, pentobarbital is not feasible and readily implemented as an execution drug in Alabama, nor is it readily available to the ADOC, either compounded or commercially. (8) Per the FDA Orange Book, sodium thiopental is no longer legally available in the United States, and there is no evidence that the FDA has approved the import of sodium thiopental from other countries. (9) Thus, sodium thiopental is unavailable to the ADOC for use in lethal injections. The district court then made these conclusions of law: (1) Arthur has the burden to plead and prove a known and available alternative method of execution under Glossip. It is Arthur’s burden to identify an alternative method that is both feasible and readily implemented. (2) To meet his burden, Arthur proposed execution with a one-drug protocol of either compounded pentobarbital or sodium thiopental. (3)Dr. Zentner’s testimony that the active ingredient for pentobarbital is “available for purchase” and that there are compounding pharmacies that could “hypothetically” perform compounding did not meet Arthur’s burden “to prove that compounded pentobarbital is readily available to the ■ ADOC ■ for use in lethal injections. That it should, could, or may be falls far short' of-Arthur’s burden.” (4) Further, Arthur’s proof that (i) other states have procured compounded pento-barbital for use in their executions, (ii) “with effort it can be compounded,” and (iii) “indications on the internet” are that pentobarbital is available for sale all fail to meet Arthur’s burden to show that the drug was readily available to the ADOC. “At best, it proves a ‘maybe.’ ” (5) The fact that compounded pentobar-bital was available to other states “at some point over the past two years does not, without more, establish that it is available to Alabama.” (6) .Although the ADOC did not have the burden of proof on this .issue, Hill’s testimony lent “further support for. the finding that compounded pentobarbital is not presently available to the ADOC.” (7) Arthur also failed to carry his burden of showing that sodium. thiopental was an available alternative because sodium thiopental is not legally available in the United States and evidence of its possible availability overseas does not satisfy Glossip. (8) Therefore, “Arthur sufficiently pleaded an Eighth Amendment claim, but he failed to meet his burden of proof. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on Arthur’s Eighth Amendment claim.” . The district court then proceeded to evaluate Arthur’s Equal Protection claim, which is based .on the consciousness assessment. After summarizing- the evidence on this claim, the district court made these findings of fact, among others: (1) In October 2007, the ADOC adopted a consciousness assessment in order to provide an “additional safeguard to lethal injection executions' to ensure that an inmate is unconscious” before the second and third drugs are administered. (2) While there' was conflicting testimony as to whether the ADOC performed the pinch' test at all executions after October 2007, the district court credited the testimony of ADOC’s witnesses over that of Arthur’s witnesses. The district court gave two reasons for these findings. First, Hill and the other ADOC witnesses are all present or former ADOC employees who were knowledgeable about the consciousness assessment and were.trained “to understand how, why, and when it is performed.” Second, it found Arthur’s witnesses, while “truthful from their perspective,” to be “less direct and less probative” because (i) testimony that they “didn’t see” something' is less probative than testimony that it “didn’t happen”; and (ii) Arthur’s witnesses had obstructed views of the execution and/or did not know to look for the various steps of the consciousness assessment. (3) Based on the evidence and these findings, • the district court found that “the evidence establishes that the. pinch test was performed in all executions that the ADOC has conducted after the ADOC adopted the consciousness assessment and incorporated it as a mandatory part of the written execution protocol.” The district court found that any contradictory evidence did not “overcome” the direct testimony from current and former ADÓC wardens and other personnel who said “without equivocation that they performed the assessment.” (4)Further, because the consciousness assessment had been performed in every instance, the district court found that there was no deficiency in training, practice, or procedure. The district court then made these conclusions of law, among others: (1) The evidence that Arthur presented was “insufficient to prove that that [sic] the ADOC had inconsistently applied the protocol’s mandatory consciousness assessment by failing to' perform the pinch test during sortie executions, or has “otherwise ' deviated substantially from its execution protocol.” (2) Further, Arthur’s Equal Protection challenge “to the general adequacy of the ADOC’s consciousness assessment, claiming that it should meet certain training and medical standards but does not, also fails.” In support, the district court relied on language from Baze and Glossip to hold .that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require that such medical training and standards or procedures be employed,” noting that the Supreme, Court held in Baze that a consciousness assessment “much simpler than the one implemented by the ADOC” was not required under the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the district court wrote,' there is no constitutional requirement that a state perform a consciousness assessment at all. (3) Accordingly, “Arthur’s attempt to apply a medical standard of care to execution procedures and training for them, in this case, procedures that are not required by the" Eighth Amendment, does not state a plausible equal protection claim. This principle is applicable to Arthur’s Equal Protection claim challenging the ‘adequacy’ of the consciousness assessment and the training therefor, including the force used in the pinch test.” (4) For these reasons, the district court held that the ADOC was entitled to judgment on the Equal Protection claim. After entering judgment in the ADOC’s favor, the only issue remaining, concerned the interplay of the current protocol with Arthur’s alleged idiosyncratic health issues and medical condition, which the district court would address later. X. AS-APPLIED CLAIM On May 6, 201’6, as to Arthur’s as-applied claim based on his alleged health issues, the ADOC filed a motion for .judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for' summary judgment." ADOC’s motion argued that, to the extent that Arthur even adequately alleged an Eighth Amendment as-applied challenge based on his health concerns, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because (1) Arthur had failed to produce evidence of a genuine disputed "fact that the use of mi-dazolam is “sure or very likely to cause serious illness or needless suffering” by causing him to experience a painful heart attack; (2) Arthur had still failed to produce evidence of a genuine disputed fact that there are known and available alternatives that are feasible, readily implemented, and significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain; and (3) the district court should reject the “sham affidavits” offered by Arthur in support. The ADOC attached to its motion a November 16, 2015, declaration by Dr; J. Russell Strader, Jr., Arthur’s witness, and a transcript of Dr. Strader’s December 8, 2015, deposition. Notably, Dr. Strader’s November 2015 declaration about midazo-lam is his third declaration filed in this case. We first review Dr. Strader’s two prior declarations about pentobarbital before addressing his declaration about mi-dazolam. A. Dr. Strader’s 2013 and 2015 Declarations About Pentobarbital In his first declaration back in March 2013, Dr. Strader criticized the use of pen-tobarbital for Arthur’s execution. Athough Arthur wants pentobarbital used now, that Aabama cannot obtain it and must use midazolam, it is relevant to consider Arthur’s previous position about pentobarbi-tal. Back in 2013, Dr. Strader opined that (1) Arthur’s “likelihood of having clinically significant obstructive, coronary disease [“CAD”] is at least 70%”; (2) for people with CAD, the use of a 2,500-mg dose of pentobarbital was likely to induce a rapid and dangerous reduction in blood pressure, thereby triggering a heart attack; (3) the heart attack would occur more quickly than the appropriate sedation; and (4) “[g]iven the slower onset of the sedative effects of pentobarbital, it is likely that [Arthur] would experience the pain of said heart attack until such time as the sedative effects have onset to a sufficient degree to diminish the pain of the heart attack.” (Emphasis added). In short, Dr. Strader’s opinion about pentobarbital was that it would take a longer duration of time to induce appropriate sedation than that required for the onset of myocardial ische-mia/infarction. In his March 2013 declaration about pentobarbital, Dr. Strader stated that he was a board-certified cardiologist and the current Chief of Cardiovascular Services at a Texas hospital. As part of his routine clinical practice, he assessed the cardiovascular risk of patients scheduled to undergo surgery and anesthesia and, in particular, he assessed the likelihood that a patient would suffer a heart attack during or immediately after a cardiac procedure. Dr. Strader’s declaration included explanations of the “Hemodynamic and Anesthetic Actions of Pentobarbital and Thio-pental,” along with an overview of the relevant aspects of cardiovascular anatomy and physiology, coronary atherosclerosis, and myocardial ischemia/infarction. His declaration included an explanation that a coronary artery needs to be 70% obstructed before it is hemodynamically significant. It also stated that, “[i]n clinical practice, myocardial ischemia and infarction can occur due solely and exclusively to a drop in blood pressure” and that this drop in blood pressure may be due to anesthesia. Dr. Strader’s March 2013 declaration admitted that he had not examined Arthur but had reviewed his medical records only up until 2009. Although Dr. Strader’s declaration did not indicate precisely what records he reviewed, approximately 68 pages worth of Arthur’s medical history was included with the ADOC’s summary judgment motion. These medical records indicate that Arthur has repeatedly refused to be seen by a doctor since at least 2009. Arthur was seen in the prison infirmary on January 17, 2009, where he complained of chest pain and atrial fibrillation. Arthur, however, refused medical care on this occasion, including a refusal to submit to an electrocardiogram (“EKG”) on January 20, 2009. The medical records include dozens of similar waivers, signed by Arthur, refusing various medical treatments. These waivers extend from 2009 until 2015. There is no indication that Dr. Strader, as of his first declaration in 2013, had access to or reviewed any probative post-2009 medical records for Arthur. There is also no reference, much less a diagnosis, to Arthur’s ever having had a heart attack in his medical records. According to Dr. Strader’s review of Arthur’s medical records as of 2009, Arthur was then 71 years old, with a history of hypertension (high blood pressure) and atrial fibrillation (irregular heart rhythm). In June 1999, Arthur visited the prison clinic and he complained of being short of breath, sweaty, and dizzy. According to the prison report, an EKG was performed at that time, and it was “abnormal.” Dr. Strader opined that these symptoms are “identical to those experienced by persons with ongoing myocardial infarction.” In October 2004, Arthur was hospitalized for abdominal surgery, and he suffered from atrial fibrillation during that hospitalization. However, an echocardio-gram performed around that time came back “essentially normal.” According to Dr. Strader, an EKG dated January 15, 2009. showed “atrial fibrillation with a rapid ventricular response, along with Q waves in the inferior leads (leads II and aVF),” Dr. Strader opined that, “[t]he abnormalities on this [EKG]” indicated that Arthur had suffered a prior heart attack. A request for a cardiology consult, dated January 26, 2009, indicated that Arthur was experiencing chest pain and rapid heart rate, ' After reviewing these medical documents through January 2009, Dr, Strader opined that: Arthur’s abnormal [EKG] showing evidence of a prior myocardial infarction, history of recurrent atrial fibrillation, age, presence of hypertension, and symptoms of recurrent chest pain, all of which are independent risk factors for coronary heart disease, confer a risk of having clinically significant obstructive coronary artery disease of at least 70% at a minimum, and possibly greater. Dr. Strader opined that the use of pen-tobarbital would cause’ a drop in blood pressure and a heart attack in Arthur before the onset of the drug’s sedative effect. Dr. Strader admits the sedative effect from pentobarbital will occur but opines that Arthur will experience pairi from a heart attack “until such time” as the sedative effect reduces the pain. ■ After Alabama changed the first drug from pentobarbital to midazolam, Dr. Strader switched positions and wrote a second declaration. This time, in that second declaration, Dr. Strader now suggested pentobarbital should actually be used in Arthur’s execution but only as a one-drug protocol. Dr. Strader opined that if pento-barbital were used as a one-drug protocol and-“administered gradually and with due consideration for Mr. Arthur’s medical condition,” he did not believe that Arthur would suffer a heart attack before being properly anesthetized. Dr. Strader’s second declaration was conclusory and gave no specifics on what “administered gradually” would mean or what steps would be necessary as “due consideration for Mr. Arthur’s medical condition.” B. Dr. Strader’s Nov. 16, 2015 Declaration In his third declaration, Dr. Strader now criticizes the use of midazolam for use in executions, using precisely the same reasoning (and often the exact same wording) used in his earlier declaration condemning pentobarbital. Specifically, Dr. Strader now opines that (1) Arthur’s likelihood of having obstructive CAD is at least 70%; (2) for patients with obstructive CAD, a large bolus dose of midazolam is “highly likely” to rapidly reduce blood pressure in patients with' this disease, thereby triggering a heart attack; (3) the heart attack would occur before.the appropriate sedation from midazolam; and .(4) given the length of time between the onset of heart attack and the onset of sedation, “it is likely that Mr. Arthur would experience the . pain of the heart attack until the sedative effects take effect to a sufficient degree to diminish the pain of the heart attack, which could occur several minutes after the onset of the heart attack,” While the drug at issue was different; Dr. Strader’s opinion and reasoning remained the same—that Arthur was “likely” to experience the pain of a heart attack before being fully sedated. Dr. Strader’s November 2015 declaration is essentially a recycled version of his original March 2013 declaration, but with the following added information about mi-dazolam: • As part of his routine clinical practice, Dr. Strader administers “midazolam to patients for the purpose of achieving sedation for invasive cardiac procedures.” Dr. Strader has performed approximately 3,500 invasive cardiac procedures in cardiac patients using midazolam as a sedative. • As to Arthur’s likelihood of having CAD, Dr/ Strader updated Arthuris age to 73 years old-, deleted his earlier declaration’s reference to Arthur’s normal echo-cardiogram report in October 2004, and added a paragraph regarding Arthur’s family history of “heart trouble.” • In Dr. Strader’s clinical experience, “where midazolam in small doses (2-5 mg) is used to sedate patients undergoing invasive cardiac procedures, midazolam’s sedative effects generally take 5 minutes or more to take effect” and the hemodynamic effects of the drug can occur more quickly, within 1-2 minutes. (Emphasis added). He stated that, when used in clinical doses, midazolam typically produces a 10-20% drop in blood pressure. Dr. Strader opined that, when.midazolam is given in the large 500 mg bolus dose contemplated by the ADOC protocol, it is “highly likely that such drop in blood pressure would occur more quickly than it would occur in the administration of a clinical dose.” • Dr. Strader explained that the hemo-dynamic effects of midazolam occur more quickly than the sedative effects because the effect on vasculature is immediate, while the drug must travel to and affect the brain before sedation takes place. Dr. Strader, however, acknowledged that there is no “institutional experience” regarding a 500-mg dose of midazolam. C. Dr. Strader’s Dec. 8, 2015 Deposition In his 2015 deposition, Dr. Strader elaborated on this opinion: 1. Likelihood of Arthur having CAD ■ Dr. Strader reviewed Arthur’s medical records but admitted that he had never personally examined Arthur, had never spoken to Arthur, and had never spoken to any doctors who had treated Arthur. Based on the medical records provided to him, Dr. Strader noted that Arthur had high blood pressure, atrial fibrillation, and abnormalities on his EKGs that were “highly suggestive of coronary disease.” Dr. Strader testified regarding the incident in June 1999 (where Arthur visited the prison clinic with complaints of being short of breath, sweaty, and dizzy and then had an EKG come back with “abnormal” results), and he stated that Arthur’s symptoms and his abnormal EKG made it “possible” that Arthur had a heart attack back in 1999. Dr. Strader reiterated his opinion from his. declaration .that the abnormal EKG, taken on January 15, 2009, was “diagnostic” of Arthur having suffered a previous heart attack, although Dr. Strader could not say when this prior heart attack occurred. When' asked if he could diagnose a previous heart attack based just on an EKG, Dr. Strader replied, “Yes. Absolutely.” Dr. Strader also referenced the January 2009 request for a cardiology consult contained in Arthur’s medical records, but admitted that he did not know whether Arthur was ever actually evaluated by a cardiologist. 2. Midazolam Leads to a Drop in Blood Pressure In Dr. Strader’s opinion, if you administered even a 100-mg dose of midazolam to a patient, such large doses “are expected to have ... rapid, significant hemodynamic effects.” He explained that “hemodynamic effect” means a drop in blood pressure. To correct this issue, he suggested that doctors would give “pressors,” very large amounts of IV fluids and medication, to stabilize the blood pressure. Dr. Strader testified that, in his clinical practice, drops in blood pressure from 2-5 mg doses of midazolam can occur “within just a minute or two, sometimes sooner.” He went on to say that, “extrapolating off of that experience to this very large dose, you would expect to see an extremely rapid and very large drop in blood pressure.” He explained that, for people with obstructed arteries, this rapid blood-pressure drop could result in a heart attack, because “you have to maintain a certain amount of pressure in order to keep fluid going through a tube that’s got a fan-amount of blockage in it. This is ... applied physics.” He further explained that older people, starting at around age 70, tended to have bigger drops in blood pressure in response to the administration of midazolam. In his deposition, Dr. Strader reviewed the medical articles and other material that he cited in his November 2015 declaration, which he stated lent support to the idea that midazolam leads to a drop in blood pressure. Dr. Strader admitted that (1) none of the articles or materials dealt with such high doses, and (2) none of the articles or materials explicitly stated that midazolam should not be used on people with CAD. 3. The Heart Attack Would Occur Before Sedation Dr. Strader stated that, based on his clinical experience, the sedation effects of a clinical dose of 2-5 mg of midazolam typically take about five minutes to take effect. He testified that he would typically use this dosage of midazolam on patients before “invasive cardiac procedure[s].” (Emphasis added). When a patient is administered a clinical dose of midazolam (2 to 5 mg), the patient goes into a deep sleep. They can be aroused and spoken to, but they are “very comfortable.” (Emphasis added). He explained that in his clinic, he would titrate the midazolam, giving it in small doses until appropriate sedation was achieved. Dr. Strader admitted that he normally gave some sort of pain medication, such as fentanyl, along with the midazolam, but that this was not required. He could proceed with the procedure using midazolam alone, although it would require a higher dose. He stated that the largest dose of midazolam he ever administered to a patient was a 20-mg dose, used because the patient had no sedative response to the medication. While he opined that a 100-mg dose of midazolam would cause sedation within “three to five minutes,” he could not give an exact time because such a dose is “far outside of the realm of anybody’s clinical experience” and, indeed, the time to sedation “could be a very wide range.” When asked about a 250-mg or 500-mg dose of midazolam, Dr. Strader stated that, “I’m not sure anybody really knows to what degree [sedation] would onset.” Dr. Strader then indicated he would need to defer to an anesthesiologist about the onset time of sedation from a 500-mg dose of midazo-lam: Q. Now, in an execution, is it your opinion that it would take five minutes before a person becomes unconscious if they’re administered 500 milligrams of midazolam? [Objection] A. No, I don’t think I gave any opinion as to—as to the timing for ... consciousness to abate.... In a clinical setting, I would defer that to an anesthesiology colleague who is, you know, more familiar with the concept of consciousness. That’s outside my realm of practice. Again, I think you’d see a very rapid decrease, almost instantaneous decrease in blood pressure, and hemodynamic effects would be virtually instantaneous. Q. But regar