Full opinion text
Affirmed in part, vacated in part by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judges Motz, King, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, and Harris joined in full. Judge Traxler wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Judge Keenan wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Judge Thacker joined except as to Part II.A.Í. Judge Wynn wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Thacker wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Shedd and Agee joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Niemeyer and Agee joined. Judge Agee wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Niemeyer and Shedd joined. GREGORY, Chief Judge The question for this Court, distilled to its essential form, is whether the Constitution, as the Supreme Court declared in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866), remains “a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace.” And if so, whether it protects Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination. Surely the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished founding principles—that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one religion over another. Congress granted the President broad power to deny entry to aliens, but that power is not absolute. It cannot go unchecked when, as here, the President wields it through an executive edict that stands to cause irreparable harm to individuals across this nation. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we affirm in substantial part the district court’s issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction as to Section 2(c) of the challenged Executive Order. I. A. In the early evening of January 27, 2017—seven days after taking the oath of office—President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation Prom Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” (“EO-1” or “First Executive Order”), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Referencing the past and present failings of the visa-issuance process, the First Executive Order had the stated purpose of “protect[ing] the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals.” EO-1, Preamble. To protect Americans, EO-1 explained, the United States must ensure that it does not admit foreign nationals who “bear hostile attitudes” toward our nation and our Constitution, who would “place violent ideologies over American law,” or who “engage in acts of bigotry or hatred” (such as “ ‘honor’ killings”). Id. § 1. To that end, the President invoked his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and immediately suspended for ninety days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. See EO-1, § 3(c). During the ninety-day period, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, and Director of National Intelligence were to “immediately conduct a review to determine the information needed from any country” to assess whether individuals seeking entry from those countries posed a national security threat. Those cabinet officers were to deliver a series of reports updating the President as to that review and the implementation of EO-1. See id. § 3(a)-(b), (h). The First Executive Order also placed several constraints on the admission of refugees into the country. It reduced the number of refugees to be admitted in fiscal year 2017 from 110,000 to 50,000 and barred indefinitely the admission of Syrian refugees. Id. § 5(c)—(d). It further ordered the Secretary of State to suspend for 120 days the United States Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”). Id. § 5(a). Upon resumption of USRAP, EO-1 directed the Secretary of State to “prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.” Id. § 5(b). Individuals, organizations, and states across the nation challenged the First Executive Order in federal court. A judge in the Western District of Washington granted a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), enjoining enforcement nationwide of Sections 3(c), 5(a)-(c), and 5(e). See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied the Government’s request to stay the TRO pending appeal and declined to “rewrite” EO-1 by narrowing the TRO’s scope, noting that the “political branches are far better equipped” for that task. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). At the Ninth Circuit’s invitation, and in an effort to avoid further litigation concerning the First Executive Order, the President enacted a second order (“EO-2” or “Second Executive Order”) on March 6, 2017. Exec. Order No. 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The Second Executive Order revoked and replaced the First Executive Order. Id. § l(i). Section 2(c) of EO-2—“Temporary Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern During Review Period”—is at the heart of the dispute in this case. This section reinstated the ninety-day suspension of entry for nationals from six countries, eliminating Iraq from the list, but retaining Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the “Designated Countries”). EO-2, § 2(c). The President, again invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and also citing 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), declared that the “unrestricted entry” of nationals from these countries “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Id. The Second Executive Order, unlike its predecessor, states that nationals from the Designated Countries warrant “additional scrutiny” because “the conditions in these countries present heightened threats.” Id. § 1(d). In justifying the selection of the Designated Countries, EO-2 explains, “Each of these countries is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict zones.” Id. The Second Executive Order states that “until the assessment of current screening and vetting procedures required by section 2 of this order is completed, the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the national security of the United States is unacceptably high.” Id. § 1(f). The Second Executive Order also provides brief descriptions of the conditions in each of the Designated Countries. It notes, for instance, that “Sudan has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1993 because of its support for international terrorist groups, including Hizballah and Hamas[, and] ... elements of core al-Qa’ida and ISIS-linked terrorist groups remain active in the country.” Id. § l(e)(iv). The Second Executive Order further states that “[s]inee 2001, hundreds of persons born abroad have been convicted of terrorism-related crimes in the United States.” Id. § 1(h). It provides the following examples: two Iraqi refugees who were convicted of terrorism-related offenses in January 2013, and a naturalized citizen who came to this country as a child refugee from Somalia and who was sentenced for terrorism-related offenses in October 2014. Id. The Second Executive Order does not include any examples of individuals from Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen committing terrorism-related offenses in the United States. The Second Executive Order clarifies' that the suspension of entry applies to foreign nationals who (1) are outside the United States on its effective date of March 16, 2017, (2) do not have a valid visa on that date, and (3) did not have a valid visa on the effective date of EO-1—January 27, 2017. Id. § 3(a). Section 2(c) does not bar entry of lawful permanent residents, dual citizens traveling under a passport issued by a non-banned country, asy-lees, or refugees already admitted to the United States. Id. § 3(b). The Second Executive Order also includes a provision that permits consular officers, in their discretion, to issue waivers on a case-by-case basis to individuals barred from entering the United States. Id. § 3(c). The Second Executive Order retains some—but not all—of the First Executive Order’s refugee provisions. It again suspends USRAP for 120 days and decreases the number of refugee admissions for fiscal year 2017 by more than half, id. § 6(a), but it does not include the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. The Second Executive Order also eliminates the provision contained in EO-1 that mandated preferential treatment of religious minorities seeking refugee status. It explains that this provision “applied to refugees from every nation, including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a religion.” Id. § l(b)(iv). It further explains that EO-1 was “not motivated by animus toward any religion,” but rather was designed to protect religious minorities. Id. Shortly before the President signed E0-2, an unclassified, internal report from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Office of Intelligence and Analysis dated March 2017 was released to the public. See J.A. 425-31. The report found that most foreign-born, U.S-.-based violent extremists became radicalized many years after entering the United States, and concluded that increased screening and vetting was therefore unlikely to significantly reduce terrorism-related activity in the United States. J.A. 426. According to a news article, a separate DHS report indicated that citizenship in any country is likely an unreliable indicator of whether a particular individual poses a terrorist threat. J.A. 424. In a declaration considered by the district court, ten former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials who previously served in the White House, State Department, DHS, and Central Intelligence Agency—four of whom were aware of intelligence related to terrorist threats as of January 20, 2017— advised that “[t]here is no national security purpose for a total ban on entry for aliens from the [Designated Countries].” J.A. 91. B. The First and Second Executive Orders were issued against a backdrop of public statements by the President and his advis-ors and representatives at different points in time, both before and after the election and President Trump’s assumption of office. We now recount certain of those statements. On December 7, 2015, then-candidate Trump published a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website, which proposed “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” J.A. 346. That same day, he highlighted the statement on Twitter, “Just put out a very important policy statement on the extraordinary influx of hatred & danger coming into our country. We must be vigilant!” J.A. 470. And Trump read from the statement at a campaign rally in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, that evening, where he remarked, “I have friends that are Muslims. They are great people— but they know we have a problem.” J.A. 472. In an interview with CNN on March 9, 2016, Trump professed, “I think Islam hates us,” J.A. 516, and “[W]e can’t allow people coming into the country who have this hatred,” J.A. 517. Katrina Pierson, a Trump spokeswoman, told CNN that “[w]e’ve allowed this propaganda to spread all through the country that [Islam] is a religion of peace.” J.A. 518. In a March 22, 2016 interview with Fox Business television, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslim immigration, claiming that this proposed ban had received “tremendous support” and stating, “we’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” J.A. 522. “You need surveillance,” Trump explained, and “you have to deal with the mosques whether you like it or not.” J.A. 522. Candidate Trump later recharacterized his call to ban Muslims as a ban on nationals from certain countries or territories. On July 17, 2016, when asked about a tweet that said, “Calls to ban Muslims from entering the U.S. are offensive and unconstitutional,” then-candidate Trump responded, “So you call it territories. OK? We’re gonna do territories.” J.A. 798. He echoed this statement a week later in an interview with NBC’s Meet the Press. When asked whether he had “pulled back” on his “Muslim ban,” Trump replied, ‘We must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism until such time as proven vetting mechanisms have been put in place.” J.A. 480. Trump added, “I actually don’t think it’s a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an expansion. I’m looking now at territories. People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.” J.A. 481. Trump continued, “Our Constitution is great.... Now, we have a religious, you know, everybody wants to be protected. And that’s great. And that’s the wonderful part of our Constitution. I view it differently.” J.A. 481. On December 19, 2016, following a terrorist attack in Germany, President-Elect Trump lamented the attack on people who were “prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad.” J.A. 506. Two days later, when asked whether recent violence in Europe had affected his plans to bar Muslims from immigrating to the United States, President-Elect Trump commented, ‘You know my plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right. 100% correct. What’s happening is disgraceful.” J.A. 506. The President gave an interview to the Christian Broadcasting News on January 27, 2017, the same day he issued the First Executive Order. In that interview, the President explained that EO-1 would give preference to Christian refugees: “They’ve been horribly treated. Do you know if you were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, at least very tough to get into the United States? If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible....” J.A. 461. He found that situation “very, very unfair.” J.A. 461. Just before signing EO-1, President Trump stated, “This is the ‘Protection of the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.’ We all know what that means.” J.A. 403. The following day, former New York City Mayor and presidential advisor Rudolph Giuliani appeared on Fox News and was asked, “How did the President decide the seven countries?” J.A. 508. Giuliani answered, “I’ll tell you the whole history of it. So when [the President] first announced it, he said ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.’ ” J.A. 508. Giuliani said he assembled a group of “expert lawyers” that “focused on, instead of religion, danger—the areas of the world that create danger for us.... It’s based on places where there [is] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.” J.A. 508-09. In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to stay enforcement of the nationwide injunction, the President stated at a news conference on February 16, 2017, that he intended to issue a new executive order tailored to that court’s decision— despite his belief that the First Executive Order was lawful. See J.A. 334. In discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision and his “[e]xtreme vetting” proposal, the President stated, “I got elected on defense of our country. I keep my campaign promises, and our citizens will be very happy when they see the result.” J.A. 352. A few days later Stephen Miller, Senior Policy Advisor to the President, explained that the new order would reflect “mostly minor, technical differences,” emphasizing that it would produce the “same basic policy outcome for the country.” J.A. 339. White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated, “The principles of the executive order remain the same.” J.A. 379. And President Trump, in a speech at a rally in Nashville, Tennessee, described EO-2 as “a watered down version of the first order.” Appellees’ Br. 7 (citing Katie Reilly, Read President Trump’s Response to the Travel Ban Ruling: It ‘Makes Us Look Weak, ’ Time (Mar. 16, 2017), http://time.com/4703622/ president-trump-speech-transcript-travel-ban-ruling/ (saved as ECF opinion attachment)). At the March 6, 2017 press conference announcing the Second Executive Order, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, “This executive order is a vital measure for strengthening our national security.” J.A. 376. That same day, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions and Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly submitted a letter to the President detailing how weaknesses in our immigration system compromise our nation’s security and recommending a temporary pause on entry of nationals from the Designated Countries. Appellants’ Br. 8 n.3 (citing Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney Gen., and John Francis Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to President Donald J. Trump (Mar. 6, 2017)). In a CNN interview the next day, Secretary Kelly specified that there are probably “13 or 14 countries” that have “questionable vetting procedures,” not all of which are Muslim countries or in the Middle East. J.A. 411. He noted that there are “51 overwhelmingly Muslim countries” and rejected the characterization of EO-2 as a “Muslim ban.” J.A. 412. C. This action was brought by six individuals, all American citizens or lawful permanent residents who have at least one family member seeking entry into the United States from one of the Designated Countries, and three organizations that serve or represent Muslim clients or members. Four of the individual Plaintiffs—John Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, John Doe #3, and Paul Harrison—allege that EO-2 would impact their immediate family members’ ability to obtain visas. J.A. 213-14, 245-52, 305, 308-09, 318-19. Collectively, they claim that Section 2(c) of EO-2, the provision that suspends entry for certain foreign nationals for ninety days, will prolong their separation from their loved ones. See, e.g., J.A. 306. John Doe #1 has applied for a spousal immigration visa so that his wife, an Iranian national, can join him in the United States; the application was approved, and she is currently awaiting her visa interview. J.A. 305. Jane Doe #2, a college student in the United States, has a pending 1-130 visa application on behalf of her sister, a Syrian refugee living in Saudi Arabia. J.A. 316, 318-19. Since the filing of the operative Complaint on March 10, 2017, two of Plaintiffs’ family members have obtained immigrant visas. The Government informed the district court that Paul Harrison’s fiancé secured and collected a visa on March 15, 2017, the day before EO-2 was to take effect. Appellants’ Br. 19 n.6 (citing J.A. 711-12, 715). Doe #3’s wife secured an immigrant visa on May 1, 2017, and Plaintiffs anticipate that she will arrive in the United States within the next eight weeks. J.A. 819. The remaining two individual Plaintiffs—Mu-hammed Meteab and Ibrahim Ahmed Mo-homed—allege that EO-2 would delay or deny the admission of their family members as refugees. J.A. 214, 249-50, 252, 313-14, 321-22. Beyond claiming injury to their family relationships, several of the individual Plaintiffs allege that the anti-Muslim message animating EO-2 has caused them feelings of disparagement and exclusion. Doe #1, a scientist who obtained permanent resident status through the National Interest Waiver program for people with extraordinary abilities, references these “anti-Muslim views,” worries about his safety in this country, and contemplates whether he should return to Iran to be with his wife. J.A. 304, 306. Plaintiff Me-teab relays that the “anti-Muslim sentiment” motivating EO-2 had led him to feel “isolated and disparaged in [his] community.” J.A. 314. He explains that when he is in public with his wife, who wears a hijab, he “sense[s] a lot of hostility from people” and recounts that his nieces, who both wear a hijab, “say that people make mean comments and stare at them for being Muslim.” J.A. 314. A classmate “pulled the hijab off’ one of his nieces in class. J.A. 314. Two of the organizational Plaintiffs, the International Refugee Assistance Project and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, primarily assist refugees with the resettlement process. See J.A. 210-13, 235-43. These organizations claim that they have already diverted significant resources to dealing with EO-2’s fallout, and that they will suffer direct financial injury from the anticipated reduction in refugee cases. J.A. 238, 243, 276-77. They further claim that their clients, who are located in the United States and the Middle East, will be injured by the delayed reunification with their loved ones. J.A. 268, 282-83. The final Plaintiff, the Middle East Studies Association, an umbrella organization dedicated to fostering awareness of the Middle East, asserts that EO-2 will, among other injuries, reduce attendance at its annual conference and cause the organization to lose $18,000 in registration fees. J.A. 243-45, 300-03. D. Plaintiffs initiated this suit on February 7, 2017, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the First Executive Order. Plaintiffs claimed that EO-1 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012); the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521-24 (2012); and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2012). They named as Defendants the President, DHS, the Department of State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence. On March 10, 2017, four days after the President issued EO-2, Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint, along with a motion for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of EO-2 in its entirety, prior to its effective date. In quick succession, the Government responded to the motion, Plaintiffs filed a reply, and the parties appeared for a hearing. The district court construed the motion as a request for a preliminary injunction, and on March 16, 2017, it granted in part and denied in part that motion. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, — F.Supp.3d at —, 2017 WL 1018235, at *1. In its Memorandum Opinion, the district court first found that three individual Plaintiffs (Doe #1, Doe #2, and Doe #3) had standing to bring the claim that Section 2(c) violates the INA’s provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). Id. at —, at *6. The court also determined that at least three individual Plaintiffs (Meteab, Doe #1, and Doe #3) had standing to pursue the claim that EO-2 violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at —, at *7. After finding Plaintiffs’ claims justiciable, the district court turned to the merits of their claims. The court determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed only in part on the merits of their INA claim. Id. at —, at *10. It found that Section 2(c) likely violates § 1152(a)(1)(A), but only as to its effective bar on the issuance of immigrant visas, because § 1152(a)(1)(A) explicitly applies solely to immigrant visas. To the extent that Section 2(c) prohibits the issuance of nonimmigrant visas and bars entry on the basis of nationality, the court found that it was not likely to violate § 1152(a)(1)(A). Id. The court did not discuss this claim in addressing the remaining preliminary injunction factors. The district court next found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Id. at —, at *16. It then considered the remaining preliminary injunction requirements, but only as to the Establishment Clause claim: it found that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if EO-2 were to take effect, that the balance of the equities weighed in Plaintiffs’ favor, and that a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. Id. at —, at *17. The district court concluded that a preliminary injunction was therefore proper as to Section 2(c) of EO-2 because Plaintiffs’ claims centered primarily on that provision’s suspension of entry. The court accordingly issued a nationwide injunction barring enforcement of Section 2(c). Id. at —, at *18. Defendants timely noted this appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). II. Because the district court enjoined Section 2(c) in its entirety based solely on Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim, we need not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ statutory claim under the INA. In Section 2(c) of EO-2, the President suspended the entry of nationals from the six Designated Countries, pursuant to his power to exclude aliens under Section 212(f) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), and Section 215(a)(1) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). The Government contends that Section 2(c)’s suspension of entry falls squarely within the “expansive authority” granted to the President by § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1). Appellants’ Br. 28. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that Section 2(c) violates a separate provision of the INA, Section 202(a)(1)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality “in the issuance of immigrant visas.” The district court determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim under § 1152(a)(1)(A) only in limited part. Because Section 2(c) has the practical effect of halting the issuance of immigrant visas on the basis of nationality, the court reasoned, it is inconsistent with § 1152(a)(1)(A). To that extent—and contrary to the Government’s position—the court found that Presidential authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) is cabined by the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in visa issuance. But the district court’s ruling was limited in two important respects. First, because § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies only to the issuance of immigrant visas, the district court discerned no conflict between that provision and the application of Section 2(c) to persons seeking non-immigrant visas. And second, the district court found that because § 1152(a)(1)(A) governs the issuance of visas rather than actual entry into the United States, it poses no obstacle to enforcement of Section 2(c)’s nationality-based entry bar. The district court summarized as follows: Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Second Executive Order violates § 1152(a), but only as to the issuance of immigrant visas.... They have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that § 1152(a) prevents the President from barring entry to the United States pursuant to § 1182(f), or the issuance of non-immigrant visas, on the basis of nationality. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, — F.Supp.3d at —, 2017 WL 1018235, at *10. This narrow statutory ruling is not the basis for the district court’s broad preliminary injunction enjoining Section 2(c) of EO-2 in all of its applications. Rather, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, the district court determined, was what justified a nationwide preliminary injunction against any enforcement of Section 2(c). If we were to disagree with the district court that § 1152(a)(1)(A) partially restrains the President’s authority under § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1), then we would be obliged to consider Plaintiffs’ alternative Establishment Clause claim. And, importantly, even if we were to agree with the district court’s statutory analysis, we still would be faced with the question of whether the scope of the preliminary injunction, which goes beyond the issuance of immigrant visas governed by § 1152(a)(1)(A) to enjoin Section 2(c) in its entirety, can be sustained on the basis of Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. In light of this posture, we need not address the merits of the district court’s statutory ruling. We recognize, of course, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which counsels against the issuance of “unnecessary constitutional rulings.” Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161, 109 S.Ct. 1693, 104 L.Ed.2d, 139 (1989) (per curiam). But as we have explained, the district court’s constitutional ruling was necessary to its decision, and review of that ruling is necessary to ours. Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim under § 1152(a)(1)(A). The breadth of the preliminary injunction issued by the district court may be justified if and only if Plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction based on their Establishment Clause claim. We therefore turn to consider that claim. III. The Government first asks us to reverse the preliminary injunction on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim is non-justieiable. In its view, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the foundational Article III requirements of standing and ripeness, and in any event, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars judicial review of their claim. We consider these threshold challenges in ton. A. The district court found that at least three individual Plaintiffs—Mu-hammed Meteab, Doe #1, and Doe #3— have standing to assert the claim that EO-2 violates the Establishment Clause. We review this legal determination de novo. Peterson v. Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., 478 F.3d 626, 631 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007). The Constitution’s gatekeeping requirement that federal courts may only adjudicate “Cases” or “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, obligates courts to determine whether litigants have standing to bring suit, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013). To demonstrate standing and thus invoke federal jurisdiction, a party must establish that “(1) it has suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendants’ actions, and (3) it is likely, and not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States, 516 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The parties’ core dispute is whether Plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable injury. To establish a cognizable injury, “a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130); see also Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2017). In evaluating standing, “the court must be careful not to decide the question-on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff'd by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of his or her legal claim.”). This means, for purposes of standing, we must assume that Section 2(c) violates the First Amendment’s prohibition against governmental “establishment of religion.” “Standing in Establishment Clause cases may be shown in various ways,” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011), though as oft-repeated, “the concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive” in this context, Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and this Circuit have developed a set of rules that guide our review. To establish standing for an Establishment Clause claim, a plaintiff must have “personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion.” Id. at 1086 (emphasis added). A “mere abstract objection to unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to confer standing.” Id. The Supreme Court has reinforced this principle in recent years: “plaintiffs may demonstrate standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an establishment of religion.” Winn, 563 U.S. at 129, 131 S.Ct. 1436. This “direct harm” can resemble injuries in other contexts. Merchants who suffered economic injury, for instance, had standing to challenge Sunday closing laws as violative of the Establishment Clause. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 973, 983, 197 L.Ed.2d 398 (2017) (noting that, in McGowan, appellants who were “fined $5 plus costs had standing”). But because Establishment Clause violations seldom lead to “physical injury or pecuniary loss,” the standing inquiry has been adapted to also include “the kind of injuries Establishment Clause plaintiffs” are more “likely to suffer.” Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. As such, “noneco-nomic or intangible injury may suffice to make an Establishment Clause claim justi-ciable.” Id. “Feelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury,” we recently explained, “particularly in the Establishment Clause context, becaúse one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’ ” Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005)). Doe #1—who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, Muslim, and originally from Iran—filed a visa application on behalf of his wife, an Iranian national. Her application has been approved, and she is currently awaiting her consular interview. J.A. 305. If it took effect, EO-2 would bar the entry of Doe #l’s wife. Doe #1 explains that because EO-2 bars his wife’s entry, it “forces [him] to choose between [his] career and being with [his] wife,” and he is unsure “whether to keep working here” as a scientist or to return to Iran. J.A. 306. Doe #1 adds that EO-2 has “created significant fear, anxiety, and insecurity” for him and his wife. He highlights the “statements that have been made about banning Muslims from entering, and the broader context,” and states, “I worry that I may not be safe in this country.” J.A. 306; see also J.A. 314 (Plaintiff Meteab describing how the “anti-Muslim sentiment motivating” EO-2 has led him to feel “isolated and disparaged in [his] community”). Doe #1 has therefore asserted two distinct injuries stemming from his “personal contact” with the alleged establishment of religion—EO-2. Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. First, EO-2 will bar his wife’s entry into the United States and prolong their separation. And second, EO-2 sends á state-sanctioned message condemning his religion and causing him to feel excluded and marginalized in his community. We begin with Doe #l’s allegation that EO-2 will prolong his separation from his wife. This Court has found that standing can be premised on a “threatened rather than actual injury,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), as long as this “threat of injury [is] both real and immediate,” Beck, 848 F.3d at 277 (quoting Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 560 (4th Cir. 2012)). The purpose of the longstanding “imminence” requirement, which is admittedly “a somewhat elastic concept,” is “to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly impending.’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). The Government does not contest that, in some circumstances, the prolonged separation of family members can constitute an injury-in-fact. The Government instead argues that Doe #1’s claimed injury is speculative and non-imminent, Appellants’ Br. 19, such that it is not “legally and judicially cognizable.” Id. at 18 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)). According to the Government, Doe #1 has failed to show that his threatened injury— prolonged separation from his wife—is imminent. It asserts that Doe #1 has offered no reason to believe that Section 2(c)’s “short pause” on entry “will delay the issuance of [his wife’s] visa.” Appellants’ Br. 19. But this ignores that Section 2(c) appears to operate by design to delay the issuance of visas to foreign nationals. Section 2(c)’s “short pause” on entry effectively halts the issuance of visas for ninety days—as the Government acknowledges, it “would be pointless to issue a visa to an alien who the consular officer already knows is barred from entering the country.” Appellants’ Br. 32; see also Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees 25-28, ECF No. 185 (arguing that Section 2(c) operates as a ban on visa issuance). The Government also cites 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), which provides in relevant part that “[n]o visa or other documentation shall be issued to an alien if [ ] it appears to the consular officer ... that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation under section 1182 of this title.” See also U.S. Dep’t of State, 9 Foreign Affairs Manual 302.14-3(B) (2016). A ninety-day pause on issuing visas would seem to necessarily inject at least some delay into any pending application’s timeline. And in fact, the Government suggests that pending visa applications might not be delayed, but denied. See Appellants’ Br. 33 (explaining that “when an alien subject to the Order is denied an immigrant visa, ... he is being denied a visa because he has been validly barred from entering the country”). A denial on such grounds would mean that once the entry suspension period concludes, an alien would have to restart from the beginning the lengthy visa application process. What is 'more, Section 2(c) is designed to “reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies” to facilitate worldwide review of the current procedures for “screening and vetting of foreign nationals.” Logically, dedicating time and resources to a global review process will further slow the adjudication of pending applications. Here, Doe #1 has a pending visa application on behalf of his wife, seeking her admission to the United States from one of the Designated Countries. Prior to EO-2’s issuance, Doe #1 and his wife were nearing the end of the lengthy immigrant visa process, as they were waiting for her consular interview to be scheduled. J.A. 305. They had already submitted a petition, received approval of that petition, begun National Visa Center (“NVC”) Processing, submitted the visa application form, collected and submitted the requisite financial and supporting documentation to NVC, and paid the appropriate fees. J.A. 305; see U.S. Dep’t of State, The Immigrant Visa Process, https://travel.state.gov/content/ visas/en/immigrate/immigrant-process.html (last visited May 14, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment) (diagramming steps of the immigrant-visa application process). If Section 2(c) were in force—restricting the issuance of visas to nationals in the Desig-. nated Countries for ninety days and initiating the worldwide review of existing visa standards—we find a “real and immediate” threat that it would prolong Doe #l’s separation from his wife, either by delaying the issuance of her visa or denying her visa and forcing her to restart the application process. Beck, 848 F.3d at 277 (quoting Lebron, 670 F.3d at 560). This prolonged family separation is not, as the Government asserts, a remote or speculative possibility. Unlike threatened injuries that rest on hypothetical actions a plaintiff may take “some day,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, or on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1148, the threatened injury here is imminent, sufficiently “real” and concrete, Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549, and would harm Doe #1 in a personal and “particularized” way, id. at 1548. The progression of Doe #3’s wife’s visa application illustrates this. Doe #3’s wife received a visa on May 1, 2017, while Section 2(c) was enjoined. If Section 2(c) had been in effect, she would have been ineligible to receive a visa until after the expiration of the ninety-day period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). Put simply, Section 2(c) would have delayed the issuance of Doe #3’s wife’s visa. This' cuts directly against the Government’s assertion that it is uncertain whether or how Section 2(c) would affect visa applicants. Clearly Section 2(c) will delay and disrupt pending visa applications. Even more, flowing from EO-2 is the alleged state-sanctioned message that foreign-born Muslims, a group to which Doe #1 belongs, are “outsiders, not full members of the political community.” Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722). Doe #1 explains how the Second Executive Order has caused him to fear for his personal safety in this country and wonder whether he should give up his career in the United States and return to Iran to be with his wife. J.A. 306. This harm is consistent with the “[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion” injury we recognized in Moss. 683 F.3d at 607. In light of these two injuries, we find that Doe #1 has had “personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion.” Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. Regardless of whether EO-2 actually violates the Establishment Clause’s command not to disfavor a particular religion, a merits inquiry explored in Section IV.A, his injuries are on par with, if not greater than, injuries we previously deemed sufficient in this context. See Moss, 683 F.3d at 607 (finding Jewish daughter and father who received letter describing public school policy of awarding academic credit for private, Christian religious instruction suffered injury in part because they were made to feel like “ ‘outsiders’ in their own community”). The Government attempts to undercut these injuries in several ways. It first frames Plaintiffs’ injuries as “stress.” Appellants’ Br. 23. That minimizes the psychological harm that flows from confronting official action preferring or disfavoring a particular religion and, in any event, does not account for the impact on families. The Government next argues that because the Second Executive Order “directly applies only to aliens abroad from the specified countries,” it is “not directly targeted at plaintiffs,” who are based in the United States, “in the way that local- or state-government messages are.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 3. An executive order is of course different than a local Sunday closing law or a Ten Commandments display in a state courthouse, but that does not mean its impact is any less direct. Indeed, because it emanates from the highest elected office in the nation, its impact is arguably felt even more directly by the individuals it affects. From Doe #l’s perspective, the Second Executive Order does not apply to arbitrary or anonymous “aliens abroad.” It applies to his wife. More than abstractly disagreeing with the wisdom or legality of the President’s policy decision, Plaintiffs show how EO-2 impacted (and continues to impact) them personally. Doe #1 is not simply “roamfing] the country in search of governmental wrongdoing.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Rather, he is feeling the direct, painful effects of the Second Executive Order— both its alleged message of religious condemnation and the prolonged separation it causes between him and his wife—in his everyday life. This case thus bears little resemblance to Valley Forge. We likewise reject the Government’s suggestion that Plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate the legal rights of third parties. The prudential standing doctrine includes a “general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” CGM, LLC v. BellSouth Tele-comms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). This “general prohibition” is not implicated here, however, as Doe #1 has shown that he himself suffered injuries as a result of the challenged Order. For all of these reasons, we find that Doe #1 has met his burden to establish an Article III injury. We further find that Doe #1 has made the requisite showing that his claimed injuries are causally related to the challenged conduct—the Second Executive Order—as opposed to “the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 238 (quoting Frank Krasner Enters., Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 401 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2005)). Enjoining enforcement of Section 2(c) therefore will likely redress those injuries. Doe #1 has thus met the constitutional standing requirements with respect to the Establishment Clause claim. And because we find that at least one Plaintiff possesses standing, we need not decide whether the other individual Plaintiffs or the organizational Plaintiffs have standing with respect to this claim. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370 (4th Cir. 2014). Lastly, the Government asserts that Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim is unripe. It argues that under EO-2, Plaintiffs’ relatives can apply for a waiver, and unless and until those waiver requests are denied, Plaintiffs’ claims are dependent on future uncertainties. When evaluating ripeness, we consider “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003)). An action is fit for resolution “when the issues are purely legal and when the action in controversy is final and not dependent on future uncertainties.” Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). The “hardship prong is measured by the immediacy of the threat and the burden imposed on the [plaintiff].” Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC, 713 F.3d 187, 199 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Charter Fed. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 208-09 (4th Cir. 1992)). Our ripeness doctrine is clearly not implicated here. Plaintiffs have brought a facial challenge, alleging that EO-2 violates the Establishment Clause regardless of whether their relatives secure waivers. This legal question is squarely presented for our review and is not dependent on the factual uncertainties of the waiver process. What is more, Plaintiffs will suffer undue hardship, as explained above, were we to require their family members to attempt to secure a waiver before permitting Plaintiffs to challenge Section 2(c). We accordingly find the claim ripe for judicial decision. B. In one final justiciability challenge, the Government asserts that consular nonreviewability bars any review of Plaintiffs’ claim. This Court has scarcely discussed the doctrine, so the Government turns to the District of Columbia Circuit, which has stated that “a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But in the same opinion, the court explained that judicial review was proper in cases involving “claims by United States citizens rather than by aliens ... and statutory claims that are accompanied by constitutional ones.” Id. at 1163 (quoting Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1051 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). This is precisely such a case. More fundamentally, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar judicial review of constitutional claims. See, e.g., Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2132 (reviewing visa denial where plaintiff asserted due process claim). The Government’s reliance on the doctrine is therefore misplaced. Behind the casual assertion of consular nonreviewability lies a dangerous idea—that this Court lacks the authority to review high-level government policy of the sort here. Although the Supreme Court has certainly encouraged deference in our review of immigration matters that implicate national security interests, see infra Section IV.A, it has not countenanced judicial abdication, especially where constitutional rights, values, and principles are at stake. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has affirmed time and again that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). This “duty will sometimes involve the ‘resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches,’ but courts cannot avoid their responsibility.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 182 L.Ed.2d 423 (2012) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983)). In light of this duty, and having determined that the present ease is justiciable, we now proceed to consider whether the district court properly enjoined Section 2(c) of the Second Executive Order. IV. A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedfy] involving the exercise of very far-reaching power” and is “to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 816 (4th Cir. 1991)). For a district court to grant a preliminary injunction, “a plaintiff ‘must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.’ ” WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)). The district court found that Plaintiffs satisfied all four requirements as to their Establishment Clause claim, and it enjoined Section 2(c) of EO-2. We evaluate the court’s findings for abuse of discretion, Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2012), reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). A. The district court determined that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that EO-2 violates the Establishment Clause. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, — F.Supp.3d at —, 2017 WL 1018235, at *16. It found that because EO-2 is “facially neutral in terms of religion,” id. at —, at *13, the test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), governs the constitutional inquiry. And applying the Lemon test, the court found that EO-2 likely violates the Establishment Clause. The Government argues that the court erroneously applied the Lemon test instead of the more deferential test set forth in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). And under Mandel, the Government contends, Plaintiffs’ claim fails. I. We begin by addressing the Government’s argument that the district court applied the wrong test in evaluating Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim. The Government contends that Mandel sets forth the appropriate test because it recognizes the limited scope of judicial review of executive action in the immigration context. Appellants’ Br. 42. We agree that Mandel is the starting point for our analysis, but for the reasons that follow, we find that its test contemplates the application of settled Establishment Clause doctrine in this case. In Mandel, American university professors had invited Mandel, a Belgian citizen and revolutionary Marxist and professional journalist, to speak at a number of conferences in the United States. 408 U.S. at 756, 92 S.Ct. 2576. But Mandel’s application for a nonimmigrant visa was denied under a then-existing INA provision that barred the entry of aliens “who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D) (1964). The Attorney General had discretion to waive § 1182(a)(28)(D)’s bar and grant Mandel an individual exception, but declined to do so on the grounds that Mandel had violated the terms of his visas during prior visits to the United States. 408 U.S. at 759, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The American professors sued, alleging, among other things, that the denial of Mandel’s visa violated their First Amendment rights to “hear his views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.” Id. at 760, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The Supreme Court, citing “Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden,’ ” id. at 766, 92 S.Ct. 2576 (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S.Ct. 1563, 18 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967)), found that the longstanding principle of deference to the political branches in the immigration context limited its review of plaintiffs’ challenge, id. at 767, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The Court held that “when the Executive exercises this power [to exclude an alien] on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the [plaintiffs’] First Amendment interests.” Id. at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The Court concluded that the Attorney General’s stated reason for denying Mandel’s visa—that he had violated the terms of prior visas—satisfied this test. It therefore did not review plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. Courts have continuously applied Mandel’s “facially legitimate and bona fide” test to challenges to individual visa denials. See Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying Mandel’s, test to challenge to visa denial); Cardenas v. United States, 826 F.3d 1164, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). Subsequently, in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977), the Supreme Court applied Mandel’s test to a facial challenge to an immigration law, finding “no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case.” Id. at 795, 97 S.Ct. 1473. And in a case where plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge to an immigration law, this Court has found that “we must apply the same standard as the Fiallo court and uphold the statute if a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ supports [it].” Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 127 (4th Cir. 2011). Mandel is therefore the starting point for our review. But in another more recent line of cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that despite the political branches’ plenary power over immigration, that power is still “subject to important constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), and that it is the judiciary’s responsibility to uphold those limitations. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (stating that Congress and the Executive must “chofose] a constitutionally permissible means of implementing” their authority over immigration). These cases instruct that the political branches’ power over immigration is not tantamount to a constitutional blank check, and that vigorous judicial review is required when an immigration action’s constitutionality is in question. We are bound to give effect to both lines of cases, meaning that we must enforce constitutional limitations on immigration actions while also applying Mandel's deferential test to those actions as the Supreme Court has instructed. For the reasons that follow, however, we find that these tasks are not mutually exclusive, and that Mandel's test still contemplates meaningful judicial review of constitutional challenges in certain, narrow circumstances, as we have here. To begin, Mandel's test undoubtedly imposes a heavy burden on plaintiffs, consistent with the significant deference we afford the political branches in the immigration context. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (describing the “narrow standard of [judicial] review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization”). The government need only show that the challenged action is “facially legitimate and bona fide” to defeat a constitutional challenge. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. These are separate and quite distinct requirements. To be “facially legitimate,” there must be a valid reason for the challenged action stated on the face of the action. Din, 135 S.Ct. at 2140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding visa denial “facially legitimate” where government cited a statutory provision in support of the denial). And as the name suggests, the “bona fide” requirement concerns whether the government issued the challenged action in good faith. In Kerry v. Din, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, elaborated on this requirement. Id. at 2141. Here, the burden is on the plaintiff. Justice Kennedy explained that where a plaintiff makes “an affirmative showing of bad faith” that is “plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,” courts may “look behind” the challenged action to assess its “facially legitimate” justification. Id. (suggesting that if plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that government denied visa in bad faith, court should inquire whether the government’s stated statutory basis for denying the visa was the actual reason for the denial). In the typical case, it will be difficult for a plaintiff to make an affirmative showing of bad faith with plausibility and particularity. See, e.g., Cardenas, 826 F.3d at 1173 (applying Din and finding that plaintiff who alleged that consular officer refused to consider relevant evidence and acted based on racial bias had failed to make an affirmative showing of bad faith). And absent this affirmative showing, courts must defer to the government’s “facially legitimate’’ reason for the action. Mandel therefore clearly sets a high bar for plaintiffs seeking judicial review of a constitutional challenge to an immigration action. But although Mandel’s “facially legitimate and bona fide” test affords signif