Full opinion text
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case marks the latest appeal in the nearly eight-year-long litigation between the Brent family and the various entities involved in the State of Michigan's temporary removal of Nathaniel and Sherrie Brent's children from their home in 2010. After six years and 270 docket entries, the district court ultimately entered judgment in all the various defendants' favor. We now AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On January 17, 2010, fifteen-year-old Robert Brent ran away from home and arrived at a Detroit Police station wearing no shirt, no shoes, and a pair of shorts. R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 5) (Page ID #5174). This ultimately led employees of Wayne County Department of Health Services ("DHS")-including child-protective-services caseworker Mia Wenk, supervisor Monica Sampson, and intern Heather Decormier-McFarland-to open an investigation into Robert's parents, Nathaniel and Sherrie Brent, for potential child abuse and child neglect. Id. at 5-8 (Page ID #5174-77). During the course of their investigation, DHS employees visited the Brents' home on two occasions. Id. During the second visit, Sampson and Decormier-McFarland allegedly took photographs of the interior of Brents' home without the Brents' consent. Id. at 8 (Page ID #5177). On February 18, 2010, the DHS employees petitioned the Family Division of the Third Judicial Circuit Court for Wayne County ("Family Court") for an order authorizing the removal of the five Brent children from their home. Id. at 14-15 (Page ID #5183-84). Wenk drafted and submitted the petition, and Sampson and Sampson's supervisor, Joyce Lamar, co-signed the petition. Id. at 50 (Page ID #5220). In a page of "Allegations" accompanying the petition, Wenk detailed the poor conditions of the Brents' home, her concerns about lead-based paint on the walls, and her concerns about the Brents' youngest child, who was ten-years old and appeared to have a severe speech impediment . R. 231-1 (Petition at 2) (Page ID #5324). According to plaintiffs, Wenk knowingly included false information in the petition and withheld other relevant information. R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 12, 14) (Page ID #5181, 5183). Plaintiffs further allege that the Family Court judge whose signature appeared on the order, Judge Leslie Smith, never actually reviewed or approved the order. Id. at 12-13 (Page ID #5181-82). Instead, according to plaintiffs, Judge Smith instituted a policy allowing probation officers to use a rubber stamp bearing her name to approve child removal orders, and that policy was purportedly followed in this case. R. 115 (Pl. Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4) (Page ID #2376-77). The removal order was executed that same evening. R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 13, 53) (Page ID #5182, 5223). Wenk allegedly enlisted the assistance of Detroit Police Officers to execute the order by falsely claiming that previous attempts to remove the children had been unsuccessful. Id. at 13 (Page ID #5182). When the police arrived at the Brents' home, Officer Bridson knocked on the door and told Nathaniel Brent ("Brent") that the police had a warrant to remove the children. Id. at 53 (Page ID #5223). Brent asked to see the warrant, and Officer Michael Bridson refused and stated that the police were "going to secure the area first." Id. He then "pushed his way past" Brent and entered the home, and Officer Emina Biogradlija followed behind him. Id. Five minutes later, two additional officers entered the house and showed Brent the removal order. Id. Brent reviewed the order and told the officers that it was facially defective, but the police officers removed the children nonetheless. Id. at 54 (Page ID #5224). When the youngest child attempted to hold onto his mother, one of the officers "ripped him from his mother and pushed him out the front door." Id. According to Brent, the Detroit Police Department's internal policy bars Detroit Police Officers from serving civil orders. Id. On February 19, 2010, a preliminary hearing was held before Referee Bobak, and the court appointed guardians at litem and counsel for the parents. R. 163 (Order at 6) (Page ID #4117); R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 35) (Page ID #5205). On February 24, 2010, the Family Court held a probable-cause hearing and found probable cause to authorize the petition of removal. R. 113 (Order at 3) (Page ID #2262). Also on that date, Shevonne Trice, a foster-care caseworker with the Wayne County DHS Foster Care Department, was appointed as the caseworker for the Brent family. R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 3, 35) (Page ID #5172, 5205). On March 3, 2010, Trice placed Brent's male children in the home of Michael and Noel Chinavare. Id. at 36 (Page ID #5206). Trice allegedly drafted and gave the Chinavares a document claiming they were the temporary guardians of the children, even though neither the parents nor the court had authorized this guardianship. Id. Brent's male children were later placed with Methodist Children's Home Society ("Methodist"), a "residential care facility licensed and regulated by the State of Michigan for the care, treatment, and detainment of court and state wards." Id. at 56 (Page ID #5226). While Brent's male children were staying at the Methodist, Robert became ill. Id. at 57 (Page ID #5227). On April 14, 2010, Brent and his wife learned during a family visit with their children that the facility nurse at Methodist, Mary Ann Stokes, had given Robert medication for his cough that had expired in October 2008. Id. The Brents immediately informed Trice, who was also at the family visit, but Trice failed to report Methodist for its allegedly medically negligent treatment of Robert. Id. at 41 (Page ID #5211). The next day, Brent spoke with Stokes and told her that Robert needed to be seen by a doctor as soon as possible. Id. at 57 (Page ID #5227). On April 16, 2010, Robert's condition worsened and he repeatedly asked to see a doctor. Id. After his requests were denied for several hours, Robert left Methodist and went to a hospital. Id. By that point, Robert was coughing up blood and was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and acute pharyngitis. Id. After Robert returned to Methodist, his condition initially improved and then again worsened. Id. at 58 (Page ID #5228). Brent and Robert repeatedly asked for Robert to see a doctor, but these requests were denied "the entire time [Robert] remained at Methodist." Id. Meanwhile, Trice had transferred Brent's female children to the home of Renee Samples on April 28, 2010. Id. at 42 (Page ID #5212). Also on that date, Trice transferred supervision of their placement to the Children's Center. Id. On May 2, 2010, the Children's Center, Methodist, and Trice held a conference to set the family's visitation schedule, but neither the children nor the parents were allowed to participate in the conference. Id. at 42-43 (Page ID #5212-13). When Brent complained about the new visitation schedule, the Children's Center told him that this was the set schedule "whether he liked it or not." R. 114 (First Am. Compl. at 77) (Page ID #2359). A few days later, the Brents' sons were late in arriving to the family's first scheduled visit. Id. When the Brents complained to the Children's Center that their sons had not yet arrived, the Children's Center supervisor allegedly told the Brents that if they "didn't stop complaining she would suspend all visitation." Id. Also during this visit, the Children's Center supervisor told the Brents in front of their children that "if they loved their children they would take the plea deal" that had been offered. Id. at 78 (Page ID #2360). When the parents refused to "admit to false allegations," the Children's Center supervisor announced that she was ending all phone contact between the parents and their female children. Id. Ultimately, a trial was held in Family Court from May 11, 2010 through May 13, 2010, and a jury found that "one or more statutory grounds existed for the Family Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Brent children." R. 113 (Order at 3) (Page ID #2262). The children were released to the Brents on June 2, 2010 but remained under DHS supervision. Id. After finding that the conditions in the family's home had improved and that the children's needs were being met, the Family Court ended its supervision on September 10, 2010. Id. at 3-4 (Page ID #2262-63). B. Procedural History Nathaniel Brent first filed suit in federal court on February 22, 2011, levying a variety of federal and state-law claims against seemingly every person or agency involved in the removal, custody, and care of his five children. R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID #1-29). On November 28, 2011, the district court dismissed Brent's claims against all the "Judicial Defendants"-i.e., the Wayne County Family Court judges and referees involved in Brent's case. R. 113 (Order at 22) (Page ID #2281). Among those defendants was Judge Leslie Smith, the Wayne County Family Court judge whose stamped signature appeared on the order authorizing the removal of Brent's children. At the same time, the district court granted Brent leave to file an amended complaint, but the district court instructed Brent not to reassert any claims against the Judicial Defendants (or any other defendants who had been dismissed from the case). Id. Brent filed his first amended complaint, R. 114 (First Am. Compl.) (Page ID #2283-2365), and moved for reconsideration of the district court's dismissal of his claims against the Judicial Defendants, including Judge Smith, R. 115 (Pl. Mot. for Reconsideration) (Page ID #2366-90). The district court denied Brent's motion for reconsideration on November 15, 2012. R. 163 (Order at 7-16) (Page ID #4118-27). Also on November 15, 2012, the district court denied in part and granted in part various dispositive motions filed in response to Brent's amended complaint. As is relevant for the purposes of this appeal, the district court dismissed all claims against Methodist and all but two state-law claims against Children's Center. Id. at 71-72 (Page ID #4182-83). The district court held that Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims brought under § 1983 against the Wayne County DHS in its official capacity could proceed, as could Brent's various § 1983 and state-law claims against Wenk, Sampson, Decormier-McFarland, Trice, McGehee, and Lamar. Id. at 72-73 (Page ID #4183-84). The individual State Defendants (Wenk, Sampson, Decormier-McFarland, Trice, McGehee, and Lamar) appealed the district court's order denying them immunity under federal and state law. R. 168 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #4219). We held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Brent's § 1983 claims alleging that the individual State Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they exceeded the scope of his consent when speaking with Robert during the first home visit on January 20, 2010 and photographed the interior of his home without consent during the second home visit on January 21, 2010. Brent v. Wenk , 555 F. App'x 519, 524-27 (6th Cir. 2014). We further granted qualified immunity to the individual State Defendants from Brent's § 1983 claims alleging procedural and substantive violations of Brent's Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights in parenting and raising his children. Id. at 529-34. We agreed, however, with the district court's denial of state-law governmental immunity on Brent's gross-negligence and intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claims. Id. at 535-37. Finally, we held that Brent lacked standing to pursue a claim against Trice under Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.633(1) for her alleged failure to report the medical neglect of Robert because Michigan law intended liability under the state statute to "be limited to claims for damages by the identified abused child about whom no report was made." Id. at 537 (quoting Murdock v. Higgins , 454 Mich. 46, 559 N.W.2d 639, 646 (1997) ). In the meantime, Wayne County DHS and the individual State Defendants had moved for reconsideration of the November 15, 2012 order. They argued that Wayne County DHS is an arm of the State, and therefore all claims against Wayne County DHS and the individual State Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed. R. 164 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2) (Page ID #4187). On February 4, 2013, the district court granted this motion and entered summary judgment in favor of Wayne County DHS and Wenk, Sampson, Lamar, McGehee, Trice, and Decormier-McFarland as to all claims brought against them in their official capacities. R. 171 (Order at 3-4) (Page ID #4225-26). Children's Center had also moved the district court to reconsider its November 15, 2012 order, arguing that the district court erred in allowing Brent's two-remaining claims against Children's Center-a state-law claim for gross negligence and a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress-to proceed. R. 165 (Mot. for Reconsideration 2) (Page ID #4195). Children's Center insisted that it was entitled to absolute immunity under state law from these two claims. Id. The district court ultimately agreed and entered summary judgment in Children's Center's favor on Brent's gross-negligence and IIED claims. R. 199 (Order at 17) (Page ID #4775). On July 11, 2013, Robert Brent-who had turned eighteen years old on July 11, 2012-moved to join his father as a plaintiff, arguing that he ought to able to assert his own claims given that Brent lacked standing to vindicate the injuries suffered by Robert. R. 182 (Mot. to Join at 1-2) (Page ID #4612-13). Because Robert failed to elucidate what claims he intended to raise, the district court denied Robert's motion "as presently written," but instructed Brent to file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint along with a proposed amended complaint that names Robert as a plaintiff and includes his additional claims. R. 199 (Order at 16-17) (Page ID #4774-75). Brent filed the motion for leave to amend the complaint along with a proposed second amended complaint, but the district court denied the motion because the proposed second amended complaint restated claims by Brent against parties who had already been dismissed from the suit. R. 210 (Order at 15) (Page ID #4983). As is relevant for this appeal, the district court instructed Brent to refile his motion for leave to file an amended complaint, but to exclude from the proposed amended complaint any claims-by either Robert or Brent-against the Judicial Defendants, Wayne County DHS or its employees in their official capacities, or Children's Center. Id. at 16-18 (Page ID #4984-86). The district court further denied leave for Brent to file any federal-law claims against Methodist Children's Home, though it held that Robert could potentially allege a plausible claim against Methodist for gross negligence. Id. at 17-18 (Page ID #4985-86). On December 9, 2015, Brent refiled a motion for leave to file a proposed second amended complaint and attached a new proposed amended complaint. R. 211 (Motion for Leave to File Second Am. Compl.) (Page ID #4988-5051). On March 4, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part Brent's motion. First, the district court held that Robert could join the case as a plaintiff, thereby rejecting Methodist's argument that the statute of limitations barred Robert's request for joinder. R. 221 (Order at 22-23) (Page ID #5149-50). Second, the district court reversed its earlier suggestion that Robert could assert a gross-negligence claim against Methodist, holding instead that "concerns for 'finality of judgments and expeditious termination of litigation' " counseled against allowing "amendments asserting anew claims against Methodist." Id. at 24 (Page ID #5151). Third, the district court noted that all claims against the City of Detroit and its police officers ("the City Defendants") had been stayed pending the City's bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 25 (Page ID #5152). Because the stay had been lifted in February 2016, the district court held that Brent's claims against the officers could now proceed via the second amended complaint. Id. Fourth, the district court rejected Brent's efforts to assert new claims under the Michigan Constitution against Wenk, Sampson, and Trice or to resurrect § 1983 claims against any of the individual State Defendants, even to the extent those claims were now being asserted on behalf of Robert rather than Brent. Id. at 27-34 (Page ID #5154-61). The district court allowed, however, plaintiffs to proceed with their preexisting IIED claims against various individual State Defendants, to proceed with Robert's failure-to-report-medical-neglect claim against Trice, and to add new state-law eavesdropping claims against Wenk, Sampson, and Decormier-McFarland. Id. at 35-36 (Page ID #5162-63). Fifth, the district court sua sponte struck all of plaintiffs' gross-negligence claims from the proposed second amended complaint, reasoning that Michigan law does not recognize "gross negligence" as an independent cause of action when "allegations of an intentional tort have been made." Id. at 26-27, 38-39 (Page ID #5153-54, 5166-67). Brent, with Robert now added as a plaintiff, then filed the second amended complaint. The City Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted on November 9, 2016. R. 250 (Order at 10) (Page ID #5531). The individual State Defendants also moved for judgment on the pleadings on the three state-law claims remaining against these defendants (IIED, eavesdropping, and failure to report medical neglect). R. 230 (Mot. for J. on the Pleadings) (Page ID #5302). The district court determined that the individual State Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under state law from plaintiffs' IIED and eavesdropping claims, but held that Trice is not entitled to immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act from Robert's failure-to-report-medical-neglect claim. R. 249 (Order at 3-10) (Page ID #5513-20). Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing all claims against the City Defendants and erred in granting state-law immunity on the IIED claims against the State Defendants. See R. 253 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 1) (Page ID #5543); 257 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 1-2) (Page ID #5589-90). As to their IIED claims against the State Defendants, plaintiffs insisted that the Sixth Circuit had already held in its 2014 decision that the individual State Defendants were not entitled to immunity from plaintiffs' IIED claims. R. 257 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 1-2) (Page ID #5589-90). The State Defendants, in turn, moved for reconsideration on the district court's decision not to grant statutory immunity to Trice from plaintiffs' claim of failure to report medical neglect. R. 255 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2-5) (Page ID #5577-80). On March 17, 2017, the district court affirmed its decision as to the City Defendants but reversed its earlier order as to the State Defendants, holding that (1) Trice was, in fact, entitled to statutory immunity from plaintiffs' claim of failure to report medical neglect, and (2) the Sixth Circuit had already denied the individual State Defendants "state-law immunity" as to plaintiffs' IIED claims. R. 261 (Order at 3-4, 6-8) (Page ID #5650-51, 5653-55). Although plaintiffs' eavesdropping claims were not before the Sixth Circuit when it denied the State Defendants qualified immunity on the IIED claims, the district court nevertheless reinstated plaintiffs' eavesdropping claims so that "all of plaintiffs' claims [would be] treated uniformly and fairly throughout this case." Id. at 5 (Page ID #5652). Plaintiffs then moved to alter or amend the district court's latest order to treat its ruling "as a final order as to all claims and Defendants previously dismissed or rejected by this Court or its predecessor." R. 262 (Mot. to Alter or Amend) (Page ID #5658-59). The State Defendants filed a statement explaining that they "have no objection to the Court directing that the March 17, 2017 order be a final order for the purpose of an immediate appeal." R. 263 (Statement at 2) (Page ID #5666). On April 11, 2017, the district court granted the motion and "certifie[d] for appeal the decision to grant qualified and statutory immunity to the City Defendants, and the decision to grant State Defendant Shevonne Trice statutory immunity." R. 264 (Order at 6) (Page ID #5673). The individual State Defendants quickly filed a notice of appeal from the March 17, 2017 order insofar as it denied them state-law immunity from plaintiffs' state-law claims. R. 265 (Notice of Appeal at 2) (Page ID #5676). A few days later, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the district court to amend its April 11, 2017 order to allow plaintiffs to appeal the district court's orders as to "all claims and defendants that have been dismissed from this suit," and not just plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims against the City Defendants and the granting of statutory immunity to Trice. R. 267 (Mot. to Alter or Amend at 2) (Page ID #5680). Plaintiffs argued that the district court's April 11, 2017 order, as it currently stood, would create a "piecemeal appeal that should be avoided." Id. In response, the State Defendants moved the district court to reconsider its denial of state-law immunity to the individual State Defendants, as set forth in the district court's March 17, 2017 order. R. 268 (Mot. for Reconsideration at 1-2) (Page ID #5696-97). Although they had already filed a notice of appeal from the district court's March 17, 2017 order, the individual State Defendants argued that, if the district court opted instead to reconsider that order, "all of the claims [would] be final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and may proceed to appeal." Id. at 2 (Page ID #5697). The district court determined that it had jurisdiction to reconsider its March 17, 2017 order, notwithstanding the State Defendants' pending appeal, and held that the individual State Defendants were in fact entitled to absolute immunity against plaintiffs' IIED and eavesdropping claims. R. 270 (Order at 6) (Page ID #5725). As that decision resolved all claims, the district court entered final judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. R. 271 (Judgment) (Page ID #5727). Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, R. 281 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #5844), and plaintiffs' appeal was subsequently consolidated with the individual State Defendants' appeal from the district court's earlier denial of state-law immunity as to plaintiffs' IIED and eavesdropping claims. II. DISCUSSION As the above background section makes abundantly clear, this case involves a wide variety of claims, defendants, and procedural postures. To the extent possible, we address plaintiffs' claims against defendants in the order in which they were dismissed by the district court. A. Judge Leslie Smith Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing the claims Brent levied against Judge Smith in his initial complaint. In particular, plaintiffs argue that Judge Smith violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures by "institut[ing] a policy that allowed probation officers to rubber stamp Judge Smith's 'signature' on orders to remove children." Appellant Br. at 18. Though this precise allegation did not appear in Brent's initial complaint, Brent asked the district court for leave to amend his complaint to raise this claim. See R. 115 (Pl. Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4) (Page ID #2376-77). The district court denied Brent's request, reasoning that any such amendment would be futile. See R. 163 (Order at 16) (Page ID #4127). We review de novo a district court's determination that proposed amendments to a complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss. Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, Inc. , 801 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir. 1986). Because the district court would have been required to dismiss Brent's amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, we now AFFIRM . The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district courts from hearing "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine occupies "narrow ground," id. , barring only claims where "the source of the injury is the state court decision," McCormick v. Braverman , 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). If there is instead "some other source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim." Id. In short, where a plaintiff does not seek "redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court decision itself," but instead "seeks redress for an injury allegedly caused by the defendant's actions ," Rooker-Feldman does not apply. Id. at 393 (quoting Davani v. Virginia Dep't of Transp. , 434 F.3d 712, 717 (4th Cir. 2006) ). Here, Brent claims that he is challenging Judge Smith's actions -i.e., her institution of the rubber-stamping policy-and not the child-removal order itself. Where, however, an allegedly unlawful policy is inextricably intertwined with a state-court order, we have previously differentiated between claims challenging the policy going forward and claims challenging the policy as applied in the past. Our decision in Shafizadeh v. Bowles , 476 F. App'x 71 (6th Cir. 2012), provides an apt analogy. There, a federal plaintiff alleged that the state court's practice of allowing law clerks to issue Emergency Protective Orders was unconstitutional. Id. at 72. In pursuing this claim, the Shafizadeh plaintiff asserted that a fresh-out-of-law-school law clerk had granted a request by the plaintiff's then-wife for an Emergency Protective Order that required the plaintiff to surrender his guns. Id. We held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the plaintiff's claim, notwithstanding his complaint's focus on "past injuries suffered as a result of ... the issuance of the Emergency Protective Order," because the complaint was not "focused solely on those past injuries." Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added). Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar "forward-looking, general challenges to state-court practices," we held that the doctrine "was not a basis for dismissing [the plaintiff's] entire complaint." Id. at 73. In other words, while the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a plaintiff from attempting to "clear away" an allegedly unconstitutional state-law policy going forward, it does prevent a plaintiff from seeking "relief against the discipline imposed upon him" by application of an allegedly unlawful policy in the past. Evans v. Cordray , 424 F. App'x 537, 540 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd. , 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993) ). We see plain parallels between Shafizadeh and this case. Like the plaintiff in Shafizadeh , Brent alleges that he was harmed by a policy that purportedly enabled unqualified persons to enter legal orders. Here, however, Brent does not wish merely to "clear away" Judge Smith's allegedly unlawful policy for future cases, but instead wants this court to hold that Judge Smith's application of her policy to the child-removal order entered against him was unconstitutional. This is precisely the sort of "specific grievance over specific decisions" that "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine intended to bar in the lower federal courts." Lawrence v. Welch , 531 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Loriz v. Connaughton , 233 F. App'x 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2007) ). Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Brent's claim that Judge Smith's policy violated the Fourth Amendment as applied to the removal order issued in this case. Based on his first amended complaint (in which Brent reasserted and expanded on his claims against Judge Smith, notwithstanding the district court's instructions to the contrary), Brent seemingly also desires a declaration that Judge Smith's policy is unconstitutional on a forward-going basis. See R. 114 (First Am. Compl. at 81) (Page ID #2363). Though the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not preclude such a claim, Shafizadeh , 476 F. App'x at 72-73, Brent has not adequately alleged standing to pursue such a facial challenge. "[A]llegations of past injury alone are not sufficient to confer standing" in declaratory-judgment actions. Fieger v. Ferry , 471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). Rather, a plaintiff must "demonstrate actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm" resulting from the state court's continued reliance on Judge Smith's policy. Id. (quoting Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus , 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 1998) ). Having failed to include allegations of likely future harm in his complaint or amended complaint, Brent has not established standing to bring a facial challenge against Judge Smith's alleged rubber-stamping rule. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the entirety of Brent's complaint against Judge Smith and properly dismissed those claims. B. Methodist Children's Home Society and the Children's Center 1. Claims Brought Against Methodist and Children's Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 The district court entered judgment in defendants' favor on all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Methodist and the Children's Center because Brent-the only plaintiff in the case at that time-had failed to establish that either entity was a "state actor." R. 163 (Order at 29) (Page ID #4140). The district court announced that it was entering summary judgment as to these claims, but it is clear from the district court's reasoning that it applied the motion-to-dismiss standard in reaching its decision. See R. 163 (Order at 21-27) (Page ID #4132-38). When ruling on the issue, the district court never once mentioned any of the materials that the parties had submitted in their motions or responses. Id. Rather, the district court examined Brent's "relevant arguments" and rejected each as a matter of law. Id. at 23 (Page ID #4134). In such circumstances, we feel compelled to accept the Children's Center's interpretation that "the District Court did not consider evidence beyond the pleadings" when assessing whether the Children's Center or Methodist were state actors. Children's Center Appellee Br. at 14 n.2. As "we are not bound to adhere to the label attached to the trial court's disposition of the case," United Bhd. of Carpenters, Dresden Local No. 267 v. Ohio Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund , 926 F.2d 550, 558 (6th Cir. 1991), we conclude that the district court dismissed Brent's claims under the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and review the decision accordingly. We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and we will affirm the district court only if the complaint lacks "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Marie v. Am. Red Cross , 771 F.3d 344, 361 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In reviewing the district court's judgment, we construe the complaint "in the light most favorable to [Brent]," accept all allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in Brent's favor. Gavitt v. Born , 835 F.3d 623, 639-40 (6th Cir. 2016). Additionally, we liberally construe pro se filings-like Brent's-and hold such complaints "to less stringent standards." Williams v. Curtin , 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Martin v. Overton , 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004) ). Viewing Brent's first amended complaint and plaintiffs' second amended complaint in this way, plaintiffs have alleged enough facts to plausibly state that Methodist and the Children's Center are state actors. We therefore REVERSE the district court's resolution of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against Methodist and Children's Center and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. To initiate claims against Methodist and the Children's Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that these entities are state actors. Reguli v. Guffee , 371 F. App'x 590, 600 (6th Cir. 2010). Though we have developed three separate tests for assessing whether a private entity is a state actor (the so-called "public functions test," the "state compulsion test," and the "nexus test," id. ), the Supreme Court has made clear that all of our various "criteria" boil down to a core question: whether "there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' " Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n , 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). (quoting Jackson v. Met. Edison Co. , 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) ). Through its cases, the Court has "identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution," id. at 296, 121 S.Ct. 924, including whether "a nominally private entity ... is controlled by an 'agency of the State,' " id. (quoting Com. of Pa. v. Bd. of Directors , 353 U.S. 230, 231, 77 S.Ct. 806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 (1957) ), whether the private entity "has been delegated a public function by the State," id. (citing West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ), and whether the "government is 'entwined in [the private organization's] management or control,' " id. (quoting Evans v. Newton , 382 U.S. 296, 301, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) ). In assessing whether a "close nexus" exists "between the State and the challenged action," Brentwood , 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, we are guided by the Supreme Court's analysis in West , in which the Court held that a physician employed by North Carolina to provide medical services to state prison inmates acted under the color of state law for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he treated a prisoner's injuries. 487 U.S. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250. As the Court explained, North Carolina has constitutional obligations to provide adequate medical care to inmates, and it contracted with private physicians "to fulfill this obligation." Id. at 54-55, 108 S.Ct. 2250. When the physician-defendant in West treated inmates pursuant to the state regulations and contractual agreements that "authorized and obliged" his care, he did so "clothed with the authority of state law." Id. (quoting United States v. Classic , 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941) ). The Court's reasoning in West governs our case. Michigan is constitutionally required to protect children who are wards of the state from "the infliction of unnecessary harm," Lintz v. Skipski , 25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources , 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) ), and to protect "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren]." Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ; see also Kottmyer v. Maas , 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he parent-child relation gives rise to a liberty interest that a parent may not be deprived of absent due process of law."). Here, Michigan assumed these constitutional obligations when it removed the Brent children from their home, and Michigan subsequently contracted with Children's Center and Methodist to fulfill its duties. Children's Home, in particular, was tasked with supervising foster placements and with making recommendations to the court regarding the children's care and custody, R. 114 (Am. Compl. at 49, 78-79) (Page ID #2331, 2360-61), and both Methodist and Children's Center played active roles in overseeing family visits, developing service plans, and providing counseling services to the children, id. at 50, 66 (Page ID #2332, 2348). Plaintiffs have therefore plausibly alleged that, "in fulfilling its affirmative obligation[s], DHS enlisted the service of [Methodist and Children's Home] and the [three] entities worked together" to manage the children's custody and care. Lethbridge v. Lula Belle Stewart Center , 2007 WL 2713733, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2007) ; see also Hall v. Smith , 497 F. App'x 366, 375 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) (leaving open whether "a private child placement agency could be considered a state actor with respect to the foster child placement decisions it makes pursuant to a contractual relationship with a state"). If anything, Children's Center and Methodist may be even more closely entangled with the state than the physician in West , given the extent to which Michigan regulates and dictates the organizations' behavior vis-à-vis the children in their care. See, e.g. , Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.14(q), id. §§ 722.111 et seq. Of course, "[s]tate regulation of a private entity, even if it is extensive and detailed, is not enough to support a finding of state action." Wolotsky v. Huhn , 960 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1992). But where, as here, there exists a close nexus "between the challenged action[s] and the regulatory scheme alleged to be the impetus behind the private action[s]," the state action requirement has been satisfied. Id. Given that a number of plaintiffs' allegations concern conduct the child-care organizations and DHS employees undertook together, plaintiffs have pleaded sufficiently that Methodist and the Children's Center are state actors to survive a motion to dismiss. Because the district court declined to consider Methodist's and Children's Center's other arguments regarding plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, we leave it to the district court to resolve these issues in the first instance. See Stanek v. Greco , 323 F.3d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 2003). That said, we note that plaintiffs' ability to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to the state-actor question does not necessarily mean that they could survive summary judgment on their § 1983 claims. On remand, plaintiffs must point to record evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Methodist and the Children's Center are state actors. See Searcy v. City of Dayton , 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). In addition, the district court must determine whether plaintiffs have raised cognizable claims under § 1983. The district court did not address this argument below, Methodist only cursorily briefed the issue on appeal, and the Children's Center did not press the issue at all. See McPherson v. Kelsey , 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) ("It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.") (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n , 59 F.3d 284, 294 (1st Cir. 1995) ). So this is not the time to decide whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under § 1983. Nothing in our opinion today should be read to hold that they have. Accordingly, the district court can consider both the state actor and § 1983 issues at summary judgment. 2. Robert's State-Law Claims Against Methodist Because the district court had already dismissed Methodist from the case before considering whether to grant Robert's request to add claims as a new plaintiff, the district court prohibited Robert from bringing any new claims against Methodist. R. 221 (Order at 24) (Page ID #5151). The district court also determined that Robert's assertions of an IIED claim against Methodist would be "futil[e]," as his allegations did not "come close" to showing that Methodist's actions "would cause 'distress so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' " R. 210 (Order at 17) (Page ID #4985) (quoting R. 163 (Order at 64) (Page ID #4175) ). Plaintiffs now appeal the district court's denial with respect to Robert's IIED claim and negligence claim against Methodist. Appellant Br. at 41-42. We review de novo the district court's determination that Robert's proposed IIED claim could not survive a motion to dismiss, Associated Truck Lines , 801 F.2d at 248, and we now AFFIRM . To set forth a claim for IIED under Michigan law, a plaintiff must show extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or recklessness, causation, and severe emotional distress. Jones v. Muskegon Cty. , 625 F.3d 935, 948 (6th Cir. 2010). "Such conduct must be 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " Id. (quoting Graham v. Ford , 237 Mich.App. 670, 604 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1999) ). The allegations set forth in plaintiffs' first proposed second amended complaint, R. 201 (First Proposed Second Am. Compl. at 73-80) (Page ID #4861-68), second proposed amended complaint, R. 211 (Second Proposed Second Am. Compl. at 56-60) (Page ID #5045-49), and second amended complaint, R. 222 (Second Am. Compl. at 56-60) (Page ID #5226-5230), fail to set forth a plausible IIED claim against Methodist. To start, "the complaint is devoid of allegations that" Methodist gave Robert expired medication or denied him access to a physician "for the purposes of inflicting severe emotional distress." Cebulski v. City of Belleville , 156 Mich.App. 190, 401 N.W.2d 616, 618-19 (1986). Nor do Robert's allegations indicate that he actually suffered severe emotional distress. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Methodist's alleged conduct here simply does not amount to "extreme and outrageous conduct" under Michigan law. In Jones , we considered whether a deceased prison inmate (through his personal representative) could survive summary judgment on an IIED claim against nurses who had denied him access to a physician for months, even though the inmate was "visibly ill and not eating meals" and had lost forty-six pounds in a six-month period. Jones , 625 F.3d at 938-39. We concluded that even if the nurses' decision to ignore the decedent's request for medical assistance "for several months ... could reasonably be construed as deliberately indifferent to Jones's serious medical needs, it does not establish that they acted intentionally or in a manner that is sufficiently extreme or serious to satisfy [an IIED] claim" under Michigan law. Id. at 948. If the behavior at issue in Jones was insufficient to establish an IIED claim as a matter of law, then so too is the alleged misconduct here. The district court therefore properly barred Robert's IIED claim on the ground that allowing such an amendment would be futile. The district court barred Robert from asserting negligence and gross-negligence claims against Methodist on the ground that Methodist had already been fully dismissed from the litigation. R. 221 (Order at 24) (Page ID #5151). Because we now hold that the district court erred in dismissing Brent's federal-law claims against Methodist based on his purported failure to establish that Methodist was a state actor, we REMAND this case to the district court to decide in the first instance whether Robert's negligence and gross-negligence claims against Methodist should proceed. We agree, however, with the district court's rejection of Methodist's statute of limitations argument. Robert filed a motion to join as plaintiff on July 11, 2013, R. 182 (Mot. to Join as Pl.) (Page ID #4612-13)-the last day that he could bring tort claims against Methodist under Michigan law. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5805(2) ; 600.5851(1). Though the motion failed to satisfy the requirements for initiating a complaint, the Supreme Court has "allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period." Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in allowing equitable tolling in this case. See Truitt v. Cty. of Wayne , 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998). 3. Plaintiffs' State-Law Claims Against the Children's Center In his first amended complaint, Brent asserted two state-law claims against the Children's Center. First, Brent alleged that the Children's Center intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him (1) by telling him and his wife, in front of their children, that they would accept the plea deal they had been offered in Family Court if they loved their children, and (2) by cutting off phone contact between the Brents and their children in an effort to convince the parents to take the plea deal. R. 114 (Am. Compl. at 81) (Page ID #2363). Second, the Children's Center was allegedly "grossly negligent in their affirmative duty to help reunify the family." Id. The district court ultimately determined that the Children's Center was entitled to immunity under Martin v. Children's Aid Soc. , 215 Mich.App. 88, 544 N.W.2d 651 (1996). We AFFIRM . Martin shields social workers from liability for "initiating and monitoring child placement proceedings and placements." 544 N.W.2d at 654. Unlike absolute immunity under federal law, absolute immunity under Martin is "not limited to 'quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial' actions." Braverman v. Hall , No. 253619, 2005 WL 1123889, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 12, 2005). The Michigan courts have justified Martin 's broad grant of immunity by reasoning that state courts "regularly review[ ] the placement recommendations" made by social workers, Martin , 544 N.W.2d at 656, and therefore parents distressed by social workers' actions "may avail themselves of the safeguards built into the adjudication process," McCarthy v. Scofield , No. 284129, 2009 WL 3235639, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009). Plaintiffs argue, first, that the district court erred in granting the Children's Center immunity under Martin because the Children's Center failed to plead this affirmative defense in its initial responsive pleading. Federal law governs whether a defense has been waived in federal court, but state law governs which defenses must be pleaded affirmatively to avoid waiver. See Roskam Baking Co. v. Lanham Mach. Co. , 288 F.3d 895, 901 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, both parties seem to agree that absolute immunity under Martin is an affirmative defense that can be waived if not properly pleaded, and we agree. As the Supreme Court of Michigan has reasoned that governmental immunity to individuals is an affirmative defense that individual officials bear the burden of raising and proving, we conclude that the same logic applies to absolute immunity under Martin . See Odom v. Wayne Cty. , 482 Mich. 459, 760 N.W.2d 217, 226-28 (2008). The question therefore becomes whether, under federal law, the Children's Center waived its state-law immunity defense. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires defendants to raise affirmative defenses in their first responsive pleadings; the failure to do so may result in waiver of the defense. Horton v. Potter , 369 F.3d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2004) ; Kennedy v. City of Cleveland , 797 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Since immunity must be affirmatively pleaded, it follows that failure to do so can work a waiver of the defense."). "It is well established, however, that failure to raise an affirmative defense by responsive pleading does not always result in waiver." Moore, Owen, Thomas & Co. v. Coffey , 992 F.2d 1439, 1445 (6th Cir. 1993), as amended on denial of reh'g (Aug. 31, 1993). "[T]he purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the opposing party notice of the affirmative defense and a chance to rebut it." Id. "Thus, if a plaintiff receives notice of an affirmative defense by some means other than pleadings, the defendant's failure to comply with Rule 8(c) does not cause the plaintiff any prejudice." Id. (quoting Grant v. Preferred Research, Inc. , 885 F.2d 795, 797 (11th Cir. 1989) ). Here, the Children's Center did not raise Martin immunity in its answer to Brent's initial complaint, see R. 41 (Answer at 21-22) (Page ID #265-66), but it did raise the defense in its first filing with the district court following Brent's filing of his amended complaint, see R. 118 (Mot. to Dismiss at 7-10) (Page ID #2567-70). Given that the Children's Center promptly raised the defense as soon as Brent filed a superseding complaint, we cannot conclude that plaintiffs were prejudiced in any way by the Children's Center's failure to raise the defense earlier. This is not a case where a defendant raised an immunity defense for the first time "days before the trial was scheduled to commence," Yates v. City of Cleveland , 941 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1991), or after the close of discovery, when a plaintiff's opportunity to gather relevant evidence in rebuttal would be harmed, Henricks v. Pickaway Corr. Inst. , 782 F.3d 744, 751 (6th Cir. 2015). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the Children's Center did not waive its defense under Martin . Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the Children's Center is not entitled to Martin immunity on the merits. Here, again, we disagree. Plaintiffs' argument, essentially, is that the Children's Center had no authority to attempt to coerce plaintiffs into taking a deal, and therefore they cannot be immunized for this conduct. Appellant Br. at 43-44. We are aware of no support in Michigan law for this claim. Indeed, the Martin court specifically granted immunity to defendants who had been accused of "bad faith," which would appear to cover plaintiffs' allegations in this case. See 544 N.W.2d at 654. At bottom, Martin immunity does not arise out of Michigan's governmental immunity statute, id. at 655 n.5, and thus, unlike that statute, its protections are not limited to behavior that an officer "reasonably believes ... [to be] within the scope of his or her authority," Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(2)(a). The district court therefore properly granted the Children's Center absolute immunity from plaintiffs' state-law claims. C. Wayne County DHS and the Individual State Defendants in Their Official Capacities The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state or its agencies in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress abrogated states' immunity with respect to certain claims. Timmer v. Mich. Dep't of Commerce , 104 F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997). Municipalities and municipal agencies "generally do not receive Eleventh Amendment immunity." Denton v. Bedinghaus , 40 F. App'x 974, 978 (6th Cir. 2002). "However, when acting on a particular issue or in a particular area, a local government official or entity may serve as an alter ego or arm of the state and, in that capacity, it may receive Eleventh Amendment protection." Id. Here, the district court initially determined that Wayne County DHS and its employees were not entitled to sovereign immunity. See R. 163 (Order at 31-32) (Page ID #4142-43). Upon reconsideration, however, the district court held that Wayne County DHS served as an "arm of the state" in its dealings with the Brent family, and therefore both the agency and its employees were entitled to immunity from claims brought against them in their official capacities. R. 171 (Order at 3-4) (Page ID #4225-26). We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor, and we make all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Timmer , 104 F.3d at 842. Summary judgment is appropriate if a movant shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). As the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on these claims, we AFFIRM . Wayne County DHS, as the entity asserting entitlement to sovereign immunity, bears the burden of showing that it is in fact an arm of the state. Lowe v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Job & Family Servs. , 610 F.3d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2010). Whether Wayne County DHS is an "arm of the state" turns on four factors: (1) the State of Michigan's "potential legal liability for a judgment against" Wayne County DHS; (2) "the language employed by state courts and state statutes to describe" Wayne County DHS, "as well as the degree of control and veto power which the state has over" Wayne County DHS; (3) "whether state or local entities appoint [Wayne County DHS] board members"; and (4) "whether [Wayne County DHS's] functions fall under the traditional purview of state or local government." Id. at 325. "The state's potential legal liability for a judgment against the defendant 'is the foremost factor' to consider in our sovereign immunity analysis." Id. (quoting Ernst v. Rising , 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005) ). Here, state law strongly suggests, although perhaps does not conclusively establish, that the State of Michigan would be responsible for judgments entered against Wayne County DHS. To start, the Michigan legislature abolished county departments of social services in 1975 and replaced them with a single statewide Department of Human Services (formerly called the Family Independence Agency). See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 401.1 et seq . Numerous district courts have thereby concluded that county-level "child protective services offices are therefore not county agencies, but are merely local offices of the state DHS." See, e.g. , Bradford v. Child Protective Servs. of Mich. Genesee Cty. , No. 12-CV-13718, 2013 WL 4084756, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2013). Given that county DHS offices are merely local subdivisions of the state DHS, and given that state agencies are required to pay for court judgments, it follows that the State of Michigan-and not Wayne County-is liable for judgments against Wayne County DHS. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 18.1396. The second and third factors also point strongly in favor of treating Wayne County DHS as an arm of the state. Once the "county department of social services ... [was] made structurally a part of the state department of social services," all employees of the county departments became employees of the state and became members of the state employees retirement system. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. 4973 (Apr. 16, 1976). The state allocates and distributes funding for county DHS offices, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 400.14, 400.18, and Michigan DHS appoints the director, employees, and assistants of each county DHS office, id. § 400.45. Moreover, the state director of social services appoints one of the three members of each county's board, id. § 400.46, and the state department director may organize up to three counties into a single administrative unit "for purposes of administrative efficiency." Id. § 400.48. Finally, although county DHS departments are responsible for investigating "matters pertaining to dependent, neglected, and delinquent children," id. § 400.55(h), the boards of the county DHS offices must "cooperate" with Michigan DHS "in handling the welfare and relief problems and needs of the people of its county." Id. § 400.53. As to the fourth factor, we conclude that Wayne County DHS's "functions cannot be characterized neatly as completely within the traditional purview of either local or state government." Lowe , 610 F.3d at 331-32. However, "because the other three relevant factors decidedly weigh" in favor of treating Wayne County DHS as an arm of the state, we hold that the district court's holding to this effect was proper. See id. at 332. Seeking to bypass this conclusion, plaintiffs argue that Wayne County DHS waived its immunity defense by failing to brief the issue sufficiently in its initial motion for summary judgment. Appellant Br. at 29-30. Although a state agency may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit by voluntarily appearing and defending against the merits of a case in federal court, we have not required an agency to make a full-throated assertion of its immunity in its initial dealings with the court to avoid waiver. See Boler v. Earley , 865 F.3d 391, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1281, 200 L.Ed.2d 469 (2018), and cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1285, 200 L.Ed.2d 469 (2018), and cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1294, 200 L.Ed.2d 469 (2018). In Boler , for instance, we held that the State of Michigan and various agencies had not waived their sovereign immunity when they argued against the merits of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and submitted a joint statement of resolved and unresolved issues without mentioning sovereign immunity, and they did not invoke their sovereign immunity until after the district court prompted them to submit a supplemental brief of their jurisdictional arguments. Id. Given that Wayne County DHS undeniably invoked its sovereign immunity in its initial motion for summary judgment, and failed only to support adequately this invocation with sufficient argument or evidence, see R. 50 (Mot. for Summary J. at 20-21) (Page ID #309-10), we do not believe that Wayne County DHS waived the defense or consented to suit. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought by a citizen against his own state for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment because (1) the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits by citizens of another state or a foreign county; and (2) plaintiffs could sue directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which "limits a state's sovereignty" with regard to due-process violations. Appellant Br. at 32. This argument is wrong on both fronts. First, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, the Eleventh Amendment protects states from suits by their own citizens. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 140-41, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Second, the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a private right of action; instead, " § 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by an abridgement of th[e] protections" set forth in "the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agr. , 553 U.S. 591, 611, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 119-20, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ). As "[§] 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity," Boler , 865 F.3d at 410, sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' claims against Wayne County DHS in this case. D. Mia Wenk, Shevonne Trice, Heather Decormier-McFarland, Monica Sampson, Charlotte McGehee, and Joyce Lamar ("State Defendants") Several issues remain on appeal with respect to the individual State Defendants in their personal capacities. We address first plaintiffs' federal-law claims and then address plaintiffs' state-law claims against the various State Defendants. 1. Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claims Against Wenk, Sampson, and Lamar Concerning the Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Removal Order In reviewing Brent's first amended complaint, the district court held that the individual State Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning "the preparation and submission of the removal petition to the Family Court ..., the execution of the resulting order, and the giving of recommendations and testimony." R. 163 (Order at 35) (Page ID #4146). "Whether a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo ." Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009). Social workers are entitled to absolute immunity,