Full opinion text
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. I. Introduction...242 II. Background...243 A. Statutory Background...243 B. Procedural History...244 III. Challenges to FERC's Orders...246 A. Interpreting the CWA...246 B. NEPA Challenges...248 1. Segmentation of PennEast...248 2. Consideration of the SRL...251 3. Potable Well Impacts...258 C. Need for the Project...261 D. Good Faith Notice...263 E. Green Acres Act...264 F. Cumulative Error...266 IV. Challenges to the NJDEP's Order...266 A. Jurisdiction Under the NGA...266 B. New Jersey Law...269 V. Conclusion...272 I. Introduction This consolidated appeal considers a bevy of challenges brought by the Township of Bordentown, Township of Chesterfield, and Pinelands Preservation Alliance's ("PPA") (collectively, the "petitioners"), seeking to prevent the expansion of interstate natural gas pipeline facilities operated by the Transcontinental Pipe Line Company, LLC ("Transco"). The petitioners contend that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") violated the federal statute governing the approval and construction of interstate pipelines, as well as other generally applicable federal environmental protection statutes, by arbitrarily and capriciously approving Transco's proposed project. The petitioners further maintain that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") violated New Jersey law by (1) improperly issuing to Transco various permits that Transco was required under federal law to obtain before it could commence construction activities on the pipeline project, and (2) denying the petitioners' request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the permits' issuance, based only on the NJDEP's allegedly incorrect belief that the New Jersey regulations establishing the availability of such hearings were preempted by federal law. As explained more fully below, although we conclude that the petitioners' challenges to FERC's orders lack merit, we agree that the NJDEP's interpretation of the relevant federal law was incorrect, thus rendering unreasonable the sole basis for its denial of the petitioners' request for a hearing. Given our disposition, we do not reach the petitioners' substantive challenges to the NJDEP's provision of the permits, which-assuming a hearing is granted-we leave for the NJDEP to address in the first instance. We accordingly will deny in part and grant in part the petitions for review, and we will remand to the NJDEP for proceedings consistent with this opinion. II. Background This case presents challenges to both the federal and state governments' treatment of Transco's application to construct its interstate pipeline project. Before detailing the agency proceedings that preceded this appeal, we first briefly set forth the various interlocking federal and state regulatory schemes at play, which this Court has already elucidated in some detail. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 870 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2017) (" Delaware II"); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 367-69 (3d Cir. 2016) (" Delaware I"). A. Statutory Background Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 ("NGA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 - 717z, FERC is tasked with regulating the construction and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines. Id. §§ 717f, 717n. If FERC determines that a given project should proceed, it will issue a "certificate of public convenience and necessity" (the "certificate"), which in turn is conditioned on the pipeline operator acquiring other necessary state and federal authorizations. See Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 367-68. Among the regulatory schemes related to the NGA are the federal environmental laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370h, and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1388. NEPA is primarily a procedural statute that requires FERC to assess "the potential environmental impact of a proposed pipeline project." Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368. Upon completing the analysis, FERC must issue either an Environmental Assessment ("EA," if the analysis indicates that the project will have no significant environmental impacts) or an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS," if the analysis indicates that the project will be a " 'major Federal action' that would 'significantly affect[ ] the quality of the human environment' "). Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 869 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) ). As to the CWA, although the NGA explicitly "preempts state environmental regulation of interstate natural gas facilities," it "allows states to participate in environmental regulation of these facilities under ... the Clean Water Act." Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368. The CWA permits states, subject to United States Environmental Protection Agency approval, to establish their own minimum water quality standards, including by regulating the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water in the state. Id. The NGA and CWA converge where, to construct an interstate pipeline, a company must discharge into-or displace water from-the navigable waters of the United States. Before a company is permitted to undertake this activity, it must obtain a permit pursuant to Section 404 of the CWA, which itself may issue only after the company secures a state-issued Water Quality Certification, pursuant to Section 401 of the CWA, "confirm[ing] that a given facility will comply with federal discharge limitations and state water quality standards." Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) ("Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate, ... that any such discharge will comply with the applicable [water quality] provisions ... of this Act"). Because New Jersey has assumed permitting authority under Section 404-implemented by the NJDEP under the framework of the New Jersey Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act ("FWPA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:9B-1 -the issuance of a Section 404 permit in New Jersey carries with it a Section 401 Water Quality Certification. N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-2.1(c)-(d); Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368-69. B. Procedural History The permits at issue in this case relate to Transco's Garden State Expansion Project (the "Project"), by which Transco planned to upgrade its existing interstate natural gas pipeline system so that it could support the transportation of another 180,000 dekatherms per day of capacity for natural gas from its Mainline to its Trenton-Woodbury Lateral. The Project proposed to construct a new meter and regulating station, compressor station, and electric substation along the Trenton-Woodbury Lateral in Chesterfield, New Jersey (Station 203), and to upgrade and modify the existing motor drives and compressor station located on the Mainline in Mercer County, New Jersey (Station 205). The New Jersey Natural Gas company ("NJNG") contracted with Transco to utilize all the capacity added by the Project, for distribution via NJNG's intrastate pipeline system. In anticipation of obtaining the excess capacity, NJNG has proposed to construct the Southern Reliability Link Project ("SRL"), a 28-mile-long intrastate pipeline that would connect to Transco's Trenton-Woodbury Lateral pipeline and deliver gas south-eastward for connection into NJNG's existing system. Separately, PennEast has proposed to construct the interstate PennEast Pipeline Project, which would deliver natural gas from Pennsylvania's Marcellus Shale region and terminate at an interconnect with Transco's Mainline. NJNG has independently contracted with PennEast to purchase 180,000 dekatherms per day of the PennEast project's expected supply, for delivery to the SRL via Transco's pipeline network. As required by the NGA, Transco sought and obtained from FERC a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of the Project, subject-as is generally the case-to Transco "receiv[ing] all applicable authorizations required under federal law." Appendix ("App.") 67. Prior to issuing the certificate, FERC conducted an environmental analysis and issued an EA concluding that, with the appropriate mitigation measures, the Project would have "no significant impact" on the environment. App. 1479; see also App. 45. FERC issued the EA in November 2015 and, after receiving comments, issued Transco the certificate in April 2016. Bordentown and Chesterfield moved FERC for a rehearing, which FERC denied in November 2016. See App. 74-97. Because the Project would be situated in freshwater wetlands and transition areas, and the construction of the Project would require discharging fill or dredge material into navigable waters as well as the diversion of a significant volume of water, Transco applied to the NJDEP for a Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit and Water Quality Certificate ("FWW permit") and dewatering permit, as required by the CWA and New Jersey law. The NJDEP held two days of public hearings to consider the FWW permit, and received over 1,800 written comments, which included concerns raised by each of the petitioners. After obtaining Transco's responses to the public comments, as well as its responses to the NJDEP's requests for additional information concerning possible alternative sites for an electrical substation that would be built as part of the Project, the NJDEP issued the FWW permit on March 13, 2017. Shortly thereafter-and also following a public hearing-the NJDEP on March 16, 2017 issued the temporary dewatering permit. Pursuant to New Jersey law, the petitioners sought an adjudicatory hearing concerning each permit. Bordentown-later joined by Chesterfield and PPA-filed a request for a hearing on the FWW on March 22, 2017. On April 11, 2017, Bordentown alone also requested an adjudicatory hearing on the dewatering permit. Both requests were filed within the 30-day limitations period established under New Jersey law for seeking adjudicatory hearings. See N.J. Admin. Code §§ 7:7A-21.1(b) ; 7:14A-17.2(c). Bordentown asserted that it had standing under state law to challenge the permits as a third party because it had a particularized property interest affected by the Project, given that part of the project would be built on Bordentown-owned land, which Transco had acquired through eminent domain under the authority granted by the FERC certificate. See NJDEP App. 37 & n.4; 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). On August 22, 2017, the NJDEP denied the petitioners' requests for an adjudicatory hearing on either permit. The sole stated basis for the NJDEP's denial of the request was that this Court's decision in Delaware I established that we have "exclusive jurisdiction to review the issuance of permits regarding interstate natural gas pipeline projects" and accordingly that by operation of the NGA "the state administrative hearing process provided for in the [FWPA] is not applicable to permits for interstate natural gas projects." NJDEP App. 39. Concluding that the NGA "requires that final permits be appealed to the Third Circuit," the NJDEP denied the petitioners' hearing requests. The petitioners timely sought review in this Court, both of FERC's orders issuing the certificate and denying rehearing, and of the NJDEP's issuance of the permits and its order denying the requests for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge them. We have jurisdiction to review these petitions for review of the federal and state agencies' orders regarding the interstate Project under 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). III. Challenges to FERC's Orders We begin with the challenges directed at FERC's orders (docket No. 17-1047). As explained more fully below, we conclude that the petitioners' FERC-related claims are unavailing. A. Interpreting the CWA Before turning to the merits of the certificate's issuance, we must address the petitioners' challenge to its timing. As noted, Transco was required under the CWA to obtain a Section 401 permit from the NJDEP affirming that Transco's discharge activities would comply with federal and state water quality standards. Under Section 401, Transco had to obtain such a permit prior to the issuance of any "Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) ; see also id. ("No license or permit shall be granted until the certification required by this section has been obtained or has been waived...."). The petitioners argue that, despite this clear language, FERC issued the certificate to Transco before Transco obtained the Section 401 permit from New Jersey, thereby authorizing the pipeline project that "may result in ... discharge into the navigable waters" in contravention of § 1341(a) 's mandate. FERC does not dispute that Transco had yet to obtain the Section 401 permit, but argues instead that it only issued a conditional certificate, which required Transco first to obtain the required state permits and then to secure FERC's permission to proceed before it could begin any construction related to the project. See App. 67, 89-90. In FERC's view, because the certificate did not, in fact, permit Transco to "conduct any activity" that could "result in any discharge into the navigable waters" until Transco had received the necessary state permits, FERC's issuance of the conditional certificate prior to Transco's receipt of the state-issued Section 401 permit did not contravene the CWA. We agree with FERC's position and hold that FERC's practice of issuing certificates that condition the start of construction on the receipt of the necessary state permits complies with the plain language of the CWA. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained, "the 'logically antecedent' question under § 401 is whether the disputed federal permit or license 'is subject to the provisions of Section 401(a)(1)' in the first place." Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (" DRN II") (quoting North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ). Where the conduct that the certificate authorizes "would not result in a discharge," Section 401(a) is inapposite and no "license or permit" is needed to engage in that conduct. Id. The petitioners concede that the certificate did not permit Transco to engage in any construction-which implicitly acknowledges that it did not permit Transco to engage in any activity that could result in discharge-but argue that the certificate nevertheless "sanctions other conduct that Transco would not otherwise be permitted to undertake," such as initiating condemnation actions under the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). Pet. Br. 35. However, the activity that FERC's certificate allows to commence-bringing a condemnation action-cannot, without a series of additional steps (among them the prohibited construction activities), result in the discharge of water. Even accepting the petitioners' argument, FERC's conditional certification does not contravene the CWA's requirements. The petitioners' argument would expand the CWA from a statute meant to safeguard the nation's water sources to a statute regulating the initiation of an interstate pipeline's construction process. However, the latter statute already exists and, as the petitioners themselves note, it provides Transco the condemnation authority upon the issuance of the certificate, with no caveats. To the extent that the NGA recognizes the continued applicability of the CWA, it is only with respect to pipeline-related activities that impact the CWA's area of concern. The mere ability to initiate condemnation proceedings, proceedings regarding land from which discharge into the United States' navigable waters might not even occur, plainly is not an activity that the CWA prohibits prior to obtaining a Section 401 permit. Because, as was the case before the D.C. Circuit, the petitioners have "pointed to no activities authorized by the conditional certificate itself that may result in such discharge prior to the state approval and the Commission's issuance of a Notice to Proceed," DRN II, 857 F.3d at 399 (quoting Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Rogers, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) ), we conclude that FERC did not violate the CWA by issuing the certificate prior to the NJDEP's issuance of its Section 401 permit. B. NEPA Challenges Turning to the merits of FERC's issuance of the certificate, the petitioners first raise a number claims asserting that FERC violated NEPA by failing-in numerous ways-to consider the full scope of the Project's environmental impacts. The petitioners specifically challenge FERC's conclusion that the Project's impacts should be considered separately from the impacts of the PennEast and SRL projects, as well as FERC's determination that the Project would not significantly impact the potable wells in the project's vicinity. NEPA is "primarily [an] information-forcing" statute; it "directs agencies only to look hard at the environmental effects of their decisions, and not to take one type of action or another." Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ). In addition to that general directive, NEPA created the Council of Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to issue regulations to effectuate the statute. These regulations are " 'mandatory' for all federal agencies, carry the force of law, and are entitled to 'substantial deference.' " Del. Dep't of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 685 F.3d 259, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) ). A court reviewing an agency decision under NEPA and its implementing regulations may only overturn an agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ; see also Del. Dep't of Nat. Res., 685 F.3d at 271. So long as the agency takes a " 'hard look' at the environmental consequences" the agency has satisfied its responsibilities and a reviewing court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions." Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ). In other words, NEPA "requires informed decisionmaking 'but not necessarily the best decision.' " WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ). 1. Segmentation of PennEast Under NEPA and its implementing regulations, when evaluating a proposed project's environmental impacts, an agency must take account of "connected," "cumulative," and "similar actions" whose impacts should be "discussed in the same impact statement" as the project under review. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a). Where an agency instead attempts to consider such related actions separately by segmenting the mandated unified review into multiple independent analyses that insulate each project from the impacts created by its sister projects, it "fails to address the true scope and impact of the activities that should be under consideration" and therefore runs afoul of NEPA. Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (" DRN I"). The petitioners allege that FERC did just that, by refusing to consider the Project's impacts in conjunction with the anticipated impacts of the proposed PennEast pipeline that, when completed, will be the source of the gas that NJNG will transport using the capacity added by the Project. The petitioners insist that PennEast is a "connected action" that must be considered together with the Project because the two pipeline projects "lack independent functional utility." Pet. Br. 16 (citing Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2002) ). Given that the undisputed facts here clearly attest to the projects' separateness, we conclude that FERC correctly rejected this argument. Actions are deemed "connected" with one another if they "(i) [a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact statements," "(ii) [c]annot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously," or "(iii) [a]re interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). The petitioners' claim relies on the third basis for finding a connected action. In line with the prevailing view amongst the Courts of Appeals, both FERC and the petitioners agree that the essential question is whether the segmented projects have independent utility. See Pet. Br. 16; App. 45; see also, e.g., Coal. on W. Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 592 F.3d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The proper test to determine relatedness under 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(iii) is whether the project has independent utility." (quoting Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1142 (2d Cir. 1988) ) ); Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). Projects have independent utility where "each project would have taken place in the other's absence." Webster v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 426 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). The petitioners' theory of interdependence-or, stated in the inverse, the lack of independent utility-relies entirely on their unfounded contention that "Transco's sole stated purpose for the Project is to supply capacity to NJNG from the PennEast Line." Pet. Br. 16. But this is simply not so. The statements that the petitioners point to in support merely articulate the undisputed fact that the Project would supply capacity to NJNG; they are agnostic as to the source of the gas that would utilize the capacity. App. 887, 1419. Rather, as FERC concluded below, the agreement between NJNG and Transco concerning the Project makes clear both that NJNG contracted for Transco's capacity without regard to the source (or even availability) of the natural gas-which NJNG is alone responsible for sourcing-and, more importantly, that the actual source of the physical supply for the capacity added by the Project is the Station 210 Zone 6 pooling point, not the PennEast line. In addition, FERC found the PennEast project's proposed capacity of 1,107,000 dekatherms per day is 90 percent subscribed by 12 different shippers, such that NJNG's subscription makes up less than 15 percent of the pipeline's capacity. App. 47-50; 80. In other words, the Project would go forward even if PennEast were not built (such that NJNG could not obtain PennEast gas to consume Transco's capacity) and conversely the PennEast project would go forward even if the Project were not built (such that PennEast could not deliver its gas to NJNG). Indeed, in their reply, the petitioners all but concede that their segmentation claim fails. They acknowledge that PennEast has independent utility from the Project because it serves many shippers apart from NJNG. Reply Br. 7. They further concede that, even if PennEast is not built, NJNG could use the extra capacity provided by the Project to transport gas purchased from another supplier and moreover that NJNG's contract with Transco obligates it "to obtain the gas regardless of whether the Penn East project is built." Reply Br. 7. The petitioners' continued argument that FERC improperly segmented the Project and PennEast thus relies on the petitioners' bare assertion that this contractual setup-which establishes that NJNG must use the Project's increased capacity whether or not the gas comes from the PennEast line-is entirely irrelevant to determining whether the sole purpose of the Project is to connect PennEast and the SRL. But even to describe the petitioners' argument is to refute it. If just constructing the Project-and thus adding the capacity that NJNG requires-is sufficient to meet Transco's contractual obligation, such that NJNG must buy the capacity regardless of any other contingency (such as PennEast's status), then the Project's construction alone plainly serves an independent purpose separate and apart from whatever happens to the PennEast pipeline. See, e.g., NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 879 F.3d 1202, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting as insufficient to rebut a finding of economic viability a petitioner's claim that the developer had "envisioned" the project "as part of a larger" development plan). To conclude otherwise, the petitioners confuse the means of the Project for its ends. The Project exists to fulfill NJNG's need for gas in southern New Jersey, a need that will exist and require satisfaction whether or not PennEast is constructed. As we elaborate on below in discussing the need for the Project, NJNG required more supply to shore-up the southern parts of the state after Hurricane Sandy. App. 1419. To obtain that supply, NJNG contracted (1) with Transco to increase its pipeline's capacity and (2) with PennEast to get the gas to Transco. But while Transco's capacity increase is necessary to the plan, PennEast's participation is not. NJNG can (and by contract, must) simply buy gas from the Zone 6 pooling point that was delivered by a different supplier. Finally, even if the petitioners are correct that we are obligated to ignore the contractual terms and focus only on the functionality of the pipeline, such an analysis points conclusively in FERC's favor. Transco's Mainline can change the direction of gas flow depending on market conditions. See App. 49-501. The Station 210 Zone 6 Pooling point (connecting Transco's Leidy line to the Mainline) thus can either send gas from the Leidy line to the South or pull flow from the Gulf of Mexico northward, depending on market factors-such as where the cheaper gas is being produced. App. 49. The PennEast pipeline will connect to the Transco Mainline south of the Station 210 Zone 6 pool from which NJNG has contracted with Transco to obtain the supply created by the project. Accordingly, the Zone 6 pool will only be filled with gas physically brought in by the PennEast line during times when the Mainline is running South-to-North. The mechanics of the Transco Mainline's flow-determined without consideration of the NJNG contract-make it highly unlikely that the physical gas flowing from the Zone 6 pool, through the Transco lateral, to the SRL will only be gas piped in by PennEast. In a pipeline, gas is fungible, so "its 'transportation' does not always take the form of the physical carriage of a particular supply of gas from its starting point to its destination." Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990). NJNG's contract to purchase gas from PennEast and its simultaneous contract with Transco for capacity to transport that exact amount of gas was not, as the petitioners argue to this Court, a contract to purchase and transport PennEast's physical gas to the SRL. It was rather a contract to purchase an amount of gas from PennEast for inclusion in the Transco system, supported by a separate contract between NJNG and Transco to transport that same amount of gas from Transco's pooling station to the SRL. As FERC explained in its order denying rehearing, although "it is feasible, using backhaul and other methods, that natural gas from the PennEast Project could ultimately be delivered on Transco to reach the" SRL, that is not the way that the Mainline will necessarily operate. App. 81 n.36. The Project will thus often service the SRL with non-PennEast-derived natural gas, cementing our conclusion that the Project has a value independent of the PennEast line. Because we conclude that the Project's purpose is to supply the capacity that NJNG requested from their Zone 6 pool, and that the source of the pool's gas will be determined based on market conditions, we agree that FERC's refusal to consider PennEast a "connected action" in the Project's EA was not arbitrary and capricious. 2. Consideration of the SRL a. Direct Review As an intrastate pipeline, the SRL does not fall within FERC's jurisdiction under the NGA. Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that in some cases FERC "is required under NEPA to give some environmental consideration of nonjurisdictional facilities," FERC has developed a four-factor balancing test "to determine whether there is sufficient federal control over a project to warrant environmental analysis." Nat'l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1323, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Under the test, FERC considers (1) whether the regulated activity comprises "merely a link" in a corridor type project; (2) whether there are aspects of the nonjurisdictional facility in the immediate vicinity of the regulated activity that uniquely determine the location and configuration of the regulated activity; (3) the extent to which the entire project will be within the Commission's jurisdiction; and (4) the extent of cumulative federal control and responsibility. Id. at 1333-34 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(c)(2)(ii) ). As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained, the purpose of this test is to limit consideration of the environmental impacts of non-jurisdictional facilities to cases in which those facilities "are built in conjunction with jurisdictional facilities and are an essential part of a major federal action having a significant effect on the environment." Id. at 1334. Applying the test in its order denying the petitioners' request for rehearing, FERC concluded that "on balance" the factors weighed against federalizing the SRL. App. 83. It reached this conclusion after giving careful attention to each factor. As to the first factor, for the same reasons that PennEast and the Project were not improperly segmented, FERC concluded that PennEast, the SRL, and the Project do not comprise a single corridor type project and that the Project would be a comparatively minor element compared to the 30-mile SRL. On the second factor, FERC concluded that the SRL did not "uniquely determine" the location of the project, because the SRL needed only to connect to the Transco lateral at some point at or downstream of the newly constructed Station 203, not to the compressor station itself. The location of Station 203, accordingly, was not uniquely dictated by the needs of the SRL. Regarding the third factor, FERC explained that (excluding PennEast which, as noted, is not part of the Project) the jurisdictional Project is dwarfed by the size of the SRL. FERC rejected the contention that its oversight of the PennEast's and the Project's costs-which the petitioners assert will be passed on to SRL ratepayers-means that FERC has decisional authority impacting the SRL. As FERC further explained, because each pipeline is owned by different companies, there will be no cost sharing between them; rather, shippers using each line will bear their own costs. Moreover, the tariffs of SRL, as an intrastate line, are governed by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and FERC has no role in funding, approving, or overseeing the SRL's construction or operation. Finally, concerning the fourth factor, FERC noted the almost total absence of federal control over the SRL and rejected the petitioners' argument that, by briefly traversing a federal military base and in light of some generally applicable federal permitting requirements, the SRL was subject to significant cumulative federal control. Although we recognize that one could quibble with its analysis of the second factor, we discern no abuse of discretion in FERC's final analysis or its weighing of the factors. The petitioners' argument that the first factor is satisfied is based solely on their view that the Project, when considered in conjunction with the 122-mile PennEast line, is significantly larger than the SRL. But this avenue of attack is foreclosed by our agreement with FERC's determination that the PennEast line was properly segmented from the Project. The petitioners' assertion that FERC has de facto jurisdiction over the SRL by virtue of its oversight over the Project's rates which in turn impacts the SRL's rates, even if accurate, articulates a logic that would extend FERC oversight over every nonjurisdictional project that attaches to an interstate pipeline. Such a rule would swallow the non-jurisdictional exception altogether. By its nature, a pipeline network consists of interstate and intrastate projects, and so the projects' connectedness alone-along with inherent cross-effects created by that connection-cannot weigh meaningfully in favor of federal control over purely intrastate projects. See New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (repudiating view that would require "the Commission to extend its jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional activities simply on the basis that they were connected to a jurisdictional pipeline"). Finally, that the SRL (1) would need to obtain an easement from the federal government, (2) traverses a federally designated National Reserve (managed by a state agency), and (3) must abide by generally applicable pipeline safety regulations are slim reeds upon which to assert cumulative federal control over the entire SRL. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 195 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the fact that a federal permit must be secured prior to commencing-and "is central to the success" of-a project, "does not itself give the [permitting agency] 'control and responsibility' over the entire" project); New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (deferring to FERC's determination of insufficient control despite petitioner's argument that the project at issue was subject to numerous federal licensing requirements). Because the above three factors weigh clearly against asserting federal jurisdiction over the SRL, the possibility that the location of Station 203-which links up to the SRL-was dictated in part by the location of the SRL does not render FERC's ultimate balancing arbitrary and capricious. The record evidence falls short of showing that the location was "uniquely determine[d]" by the SRL, but even if it did, this factor alone would not change the reasonableness of FERC's balancing, to which we accordingly defer. See New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (rejecting petitioner's claim that satisfying the second factor, alone, is sufficient "to tip the balance in the four-factor test"). b. Cumulative Impacts The petitioners alternatively argue that, even if FERC were not required to assert jurisdiction over the SRL, it was nevertheless required under NEPA to assess whether-in conjunction with the jurisdictional Project-the nonjurisdictional SRL would foreseeably have cumulative impacts on the environment. Under NEPA's implementing regulations, FERC is required to consider "the incremental [environmental] impact" of the jurisdictional action when added to the existing or "reasonably foreseeable" impacts of other actions, whether or not jurisdictional. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, .25 ; see also id. § 1508.7 ("Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time."). When conducting a cumulative-impacts analysis, FERC: [M]ust identify (i) the 'area in which the effects of the proposed project will be felt'; (ii) the impact expected 'in that area'; (iii) those 'other actions-past, present, and proposed, and reasonably foreseeable' that have had or will have impact 'in the same area'; (iv) the effects of those other impacts; and ( [v] ) the 'overall impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate.' Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ). In line with this test, FERC determined that the Project's "main region of influence" in which cumulative impacts might be felt was .25 miles from each of the Project's components, but nevertheless considered the cumulative impacts of the SRL, PennEast line, and other projects even though they largely fell outside of the Project's area of influence. FERC recognized that both the Project and the SRL would impact wetlands, but concluded based on the Project's limited geographic and durational impact, along with FERC's mandated mitigation measures, that any cumulative effects would be minor. It reached similar conclusions regarding impacts to vegetation and wildlife, explaining that cumulative effects are greatest when projects are built in the same geography, during the same time period, and where the impacts are expected to be long-term. FERC noted that the SRL, although largely occurring within existing rights of way, would be a significant pipeline project situated in a variety of habitats, including the protected Pinelands Area, and would be subject to extensive state-level regulation that would determine its ultimate environmental impacts. FERC accordingly outlined the potential area and kinds of resources that the SRL could impact but-in recognition of the ongoing state regulation-did not firmly conclude how the impacts would manifest. Nonetheless, it determined that the Project's largely short-term effects on vegetation and wildlife would not result in cumulative long-term impacts, even when added to the SRL's potentially greater impacts, which would in any event be controlled by state regulators. FERC similarly concluded that the Project's contribution to cumulative impacts on land use would minimal, given that only a small portion of the land permanently impacted by the Project would be forested, compared to the varied and more expansive terrain impacted by the miles-long SRL. Based on its finding that "each project would be designed to avoid or minimize impacts on water quality, forest, and wildlife resources," and given the Project's expected "temporary and minor effects," FERC concluded that the Project "would not result in cumulative impacts." App. 1465, 1474. The petitioners complaint is not that the .25 mile area was incorrect, but that FERC failed to take full account of all the environmental impacts across the entire span of pipelines other than the project under review-impacts far afield from the geographic area impacted by the Project-merely because those pipelines will ultimately be part of the same network as that served by the Project. To echo the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, such an expansive reading of the cumulative impacts requirement "draws the NEPA circle too wide for the Commission," which need only review impacts likely to occur in the area affected by the project under FERC review. Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 50. In this case, notwithstanding its determination-uncontested on appeal-that the area impacted by the Project was of an exceptionally small size, FERC considered the cumulative impact of the totality of the SRL (and PennEast) pipeline and determined that their cumulative impact was insignificant. In light of the gratuitousness of FERC's extended cumulative impacts review, the petitioners' complaint-which concedes the sufficiency of FERC's analysis as it relates to wetlands-that FERC gave short-shrift to its consideration of the SRL's impact on vegetation, wildlife, and aquatic species fails to persuade us. The core of the petitioners' argument, that the SRL "as a major linear project" that will span "approximately 30 miles in length" will result in "considerable" environmental impacts along its path, Pet. Br. 20, itself defeats their claim that FERC had to consider all those various and oblique impacts when determining whether the SRL would cumulatively impact "the same area" as the project before it-involving no new pipeline construction and disturbing only the immediately surrounding area. Accordingly, FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it "acknowledge[d] that these resources may be affected" by the SRL but properly determined that "a detailed analysis" of the impacts along the entirety of the SRL was "not within the scope of our environmental analysis" for the jurisdictional Project under review. App. 53. By detailing and recognizing even environmental impacts outside of the zone impacted by the jurisdictional Project, FERC gave the petitioners' concerns the "serious consideration and reasonable responses" that NEPA requires. Tinicum Twp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 685 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2012). NEPA does not mandate exhaustive treatment of effects not plausibly felt in the Project's impact area. But even taken head-on, the petitioners' argument is unavailing. Contrary to the petitioners' claim, FERC did consider the SRL's impact on vegetation and wildlife, and given the Project's "minor ... impacts" determined that the cumulative impacts would be insignificant. App. 1469. FERC explicitly acknowledged that the SRL may affect the Pinelands National Reserve and concluded reasonably that any impacts would be mitigated by the responsible state agency overseeing the permitting process for that project. App. 53. FERC was correct to rely upon New Jersey authorities to do so, as opposed-as the petitioners would have it-to assuming the worst and piggybacking that hypothetical impact onto the otherwise compliant jurisdictional Project. See, e.g., EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concluding that FERC reasonably relied upon the regulated parties' "future coordination with" other regulators in its NEPA assessment); Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 207-08 (upholding finding of no cumulative impact that was based partly on projected mitigation efforts because the mitigation was a condition of other permitting regimes to which the project was subject and thus was not speculative or conclusory); Friends of Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1549, 1555 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that regulated parties' responsibility to work with local authorities on mitigation proposal constituted a "rational basis" for FERC finding of no significant impact). Again, NEPA requires no more than the fair consideration and reasonable responses that FERC provided to the petitioners' concerns. Furthermore, had FERC failed to give the specific attention that it did to the various types of impacts that the SRL might potentially cause, we would still approve their cumulative impact conclusions. Aside from their challenge to FERC's determination of the Project's well impacts (discussed below), the petitioners do not contend that FERC improperly concluded that, taken alone, the Project would not "significantly affect[ ] the quality of the human environment." App. 64; see also App. 1424 (concluding in the EA that "the impacts associated with th[e] Project can be sufficiently mitigated to support a finding of no significant impact"). And-again, besides the wells challenge-nothing in the petitioners' briefing suggests that FERC's detailed consideration of the Project's impacts to the area's geology; water resources; vegetation; wildlife; endangered species; cultural resources; land use, recreation, and visual resources; or air quality and noise was erroneous or wanting. FERC thus reasonably concluded in the EA that the Project's "minimal impacts" in its service area-relegated largely to "geological and soil resources" impacts and other temporary impacts-meant that the Project necessarily "would not result in cumulative impacts." App. 1465, 1469. We conclude that FERC did not abuse its discretion in reaching this decision. This is especially true considering that the impacts from the SRL that the petitioners allege FERC ignored are different than the limited kind of impacts that FERC concluded were likely to result from the Project and so are less likely to result in cumulatively significant impacts when considered together. See Council of Envtl. Quality, Considering Cumulative Effects Under the National Environmental Policy Act 8 (Jan. 1997) ("Cumulative effects need to be analyzed in terms of the specific resource ... being affected."). Given that the petitioners failed to show anything more than minimal impacts from the Project itself, they have failed to show that FERC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that the Project would likewise not contribute to significant cumulative impacts, even taking into account the potential different impacts of the SRL on other areas within the Project's region. This conclusion is reinforced by the petitioners' own insistence that the SRL's construction is being held up by legal challenges, Pet. Br. 22-24, such that whatever impacts it causes will be temporally distinct from the Project's short-term impacts. See, e.g., Friends of Santa Clara River v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 887 F.3d 906, 926 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that where an EIS reasonably finds that a project is unlikely to have an impact on a given population, that it is "also not arbitrary or capricious to conclude that the Project would not result in significant cumulative ... impacts" to that population); Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding cumulative impact analysis finding "no significant cumulative impacts were expected" where the project under consideration "itself was expected to have minimal impacts" and-as is the case here-the two projects had distinct construction timelines). By addressing and expressly considering the specific concerns raised by the petitioners, FERC "fulfilled NEPA's goal of guiding informed decisionmaking" and ensured that FERC at least considered the wisdom of the agency action. Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1370-71 ; Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("Our job is simply 'to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.' " (quoting DRN I, 753 F.3d at 1312-13 ) ). The petitioners nevertheless argue that this low-impact project should be halted as a result of the possibly significant-but mostly different-in-kind-impacts of the nearby but later-in-time SRL. But this cannot be how the cumulative analysis inquiry operates. To hold otherwise would permit a jurisdictional project with little environmental impact to be torpedoed based only on a nearby non-jurisdictional project's significant impact, which FERC has no authority to control or mitigate. Such a rule would effectively condition the approval of pipelines operating under federal jurisdiction on the fastidiousness of pipeline companies operating in the same region under state authorities. Pipelines subject to lax state authorities or state environmental requirements that fall short of federal standards could, by mere proximity to a jurisdictional project, trump federal regulation and undermine FERC's careful balancing of environmental protection and public energy needs. Less pernicious, if a proposed state-governed project has potentially significant impacts but has not yet gone through the state's regulatory process (which could be expected to mitigate those impacts), such a project would essentially stay all federally regulated projects proposed in the area until the state agency either rejects the plan or approves a mitigation proposal. Congress surely did not intend for FERC's exclusive authority to control interstate pipeline construction to be so easily usurped by state regulators. Rather, the cumulative impacts analysis was meant to address instances where the jurisdictional project itself has minor environmental impacts that nevertheless fall short of stopping the project, but where-if added to the minor impacts from nearby non-jurisdictional projects-the cumulative impact of all the projects would be significant. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 ("Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time."); cf. id. § 1508.27 (setting out considerations for whether a project is "significant," including whether it "is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts" (emphasis added) ). The analysis was not intended to combine the effects of a nearly no-impact project with those of a project with potentially serious impacts and then to bar them both. The relevant question-as FERC correctly understood-is rather whether, taking the non-jurisdictional impacts as a given, the addition of the jurisdictional project's impacts on top of the other projects' existing or anticipated impacts renders significant those projects' otherwise insignificant impacts. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 ("Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions...." (emphasis added) ); Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 801 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015) ("An agency can take a 'hard look' at cumulative impacts ... by ... incorporating the expected impact of [a forthcoming] project into the environmental baseline against which the incremental impact of a proposed project is measured."); see also App. 1471 ("Only a small portion of forested land use would be impacted by the operation of the [Project]. These impacts would not contribute significantly to the cumulative impacts of the other projects in the region. Since the ... [SRL] include[s] a linear pipeline, [it] would result in greater temporary and permanent impacts in acreage and affect a variety of land uses."). In other words, the analysis looks at the marginal impact of the jurisdictional project when added to the non-jurisdictional projects' impacts, and asks whether the addition of the project under review affects a meaningful increase in the projected environmental impacts. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Landmark West! v. U.S. Postal Serv., 840 F.Supp. 994, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the cumulative impacts analysis requires "the consideration of the foreseeable actions of others as background factors, but does not require that the impacts of others' actions be weighed in assessing the significance of [the] action[ under review]. Rather, the [agency] need weigh only the marginal impacts of its own actions."). Where the other projects' impacts are themselves already significant or greatly outweigh the jurisdictional projects' impacts, such that the jurisdictional project will not meaningfully influence the extent of the already significant environmental impacts, the cumulative impacts test is inapposite. Were this not so, a single proposed project with a significant projected impact would preempt any other development-even no-impact or impact-reducing projects-regardless of whether the proposed project ultimately will come to fruition or have those expected impacts. Plainly, such an application of the cumulative impacts analysis is unreasonable and unwarranted, and we reject it. We conclude that FERC adequately addressed the Project's cumulative impacts. 3. Potable Well Impacts The petitioners' final NEPA-based claim regards FERC's conclusion that the Project's construction would not significantly impact the water quality of wells or cisterns in the service area. In its EA, FERC determined that "[m]inor, temporary impacts on groundwater infiltration could occur as a result of tree, herbaceous vegetation, or scrub-shrub vegetation clearing" around Station 203 during its construction, but that Transco would thereafter "restore and revegetate cleared areas to pre-construction conditions to the maximum extent practicable." App. 17-18. The EA continued that, in the event that groundwater is "encountered during construction," Transco would adhere to a series of mitigation measures, which would ensure that "impacts on groundwater would be adequately minimized." App. 18. Although reaching this general conclusion about the risk of groundwater impacts as a result of the Project, FERC made no specific finding about the impacts to any particular wells or cisterns "within 150 feet and up to one mile" from the Project, because at the time of the EA, neither FERC nor Transco had identified any such resources. App. 17. Accordingly, the particular finding that FERC did not "anticipate any significant impacts on cisterns, wells, or septic systems in the Project areas" was based most directly on FERC's understanding that those resources simply did not exist. Transco and several commenters subsequently notified FERC that there were numerous private wells in the project area. Nevertheless, based on additional assurances from Transco that it would remedy any damage or disruption to the water supply-and without revising the EA or identifying the specific number of potentially impacted wells-FERC issued Transco the certificate, subject to additional monitoring and mitigation conditions. These included the requirement that Transco identify and file the locations of all private wells in the Station 203 project area prior to beginning construction; conduct "pre- and post-construction monitoring of well yield and water quality"; and report to FERC any complaints it receives from well owners and how the complaints were resolved. App. 56. Some of the petitioners challenged the propriety of the certificate, arguing that the underlying assessment of the impact on wells was necessarily insufficient given that it was made without regard to the number of impacted wells. In denying the motion for rehearing, FERC rejected this claim, asserting that the certificate's requirements that Transco identify and monitor the wells, and Transco's promise to "minimize and remediate impacts" and "to repair, replace, or provide alternative sources of potable water" in the event of more permanent impacts, "appropriately identify and mitigate any potential impacts to groundwater resources." App. 87. On appeal, the petitioners in large part renew the challenge levied before FERC. They add that even if FERC were not absolutely required to identify the number of affected wells, its proposed mitigation plan is inadequate because: (1) it cannot effectively be enforced, and (2) because without knowing how many wells are potentially impacted, it is impossible to determine whether the proposed mitigation plan will suffice. The petitioners contend that FERC's "no significant impacts" conclusion was therefore arbitrary and capricious because it was not based on sufficient evidence. Because we conclude that FERC sufficiently established the efficacy of the proposed mitigation plan, we will not disturb its conclusion that the Project's groundwater impacts-if any-will not be significant. When an agency's "proposed mitigation measures [are] supported by substantial evidence, the agency may use those measures as a mechanism to reduce environmental impacts below the level of significance." Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 17 (2d Cir. 1997). Mitigation measures will be deemed "sufficiently supported" where "they are likely to be adequately policed," such as where the mitigation measures are included as mandatory conditions in a permit. Id.; Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 524 F.3d 938, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that an " 'agency is not required to develop a complete mitigation plan detailing the precise nature ... of the mitigation measures[,]' so long as the measures are 'developed to a reasonable degree.' " (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 734 (9th Cir. 2001) ) ). Nor must the proposed mitigation be included in the original EA in order to pass muster under NEPA. If FERC in its certificate order addresses the commenters' concerns about the adequacy of the EA's analysis and clearly articulates its mitigation plan therein, it takes "the requisite 'hard look' at the impact of the ... Project on the environment." DRN II, 857 F.3d at 401 (quoting NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ). This is because NEPA's "purpose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent action" and to "[e]nsure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 ; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 2718 ("By requiring an impact statement Congress intended to assure [consideration of the environmental impact] during the development of a proposal...."). The command to conduct an EA is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve informed decision-making, and reviewing courts should not elevate the form of the analysis over its substance by requiring that the totality of the relevant information be included in the EA in the first instance. "The role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious," Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983), not to police precisely how-or in what form-the agency engages in the requisite analysis. See, e.g., DRN II, 857 F.3d at 396 (explaining that courts should not "flyspeck" FERC's NEPA analysis and should defer to its expertise "so 'long as the agency's decision is fully informed and well-considered' " (quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2015), then quoting Hodel, 865 F.2d at 294 ) ). Where the EA fails to address fully a specific issue but the record makes clear that the agency and public were apprised of the deficiency and that the agency sufficiently considered the matter before making a final decision or permitting actions to be taken, it has fulfilled NEPA's procedural mandate. FERC determined in the EA that groundwater effects were expected to be temporary, limited, and controlled by Transco's adoption of prophylactic measures to limit sediment discharge. After it learned of the wells' existence, FERC imposed supplementary measures to mitigate and remedy any damage to private wells in the project area, along with a reporting framework to ensure Transco's compliance. We conclude therefore that the record establishes that FERC adequately considered the potential impact to the wells, responded appropriately to the concern, and reasonably concluded that in light of its intervention, any impact would be insignificant. Given that FERC in the EA had already reached a reasoned conclusion regarding the intensity of the expected effects of the construction-which it deemed to be minor and transient-its failure to detail fully the number of wells potentially impacted by this limited impact is insufficient to render its findings arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners do not contend that FERC underestimated how the construction would impact a well in the project area, but only that it has not confirmed how many wells this uncontested calibration would disturb. FERC could reasonably conclude that a consequence whose intensity was unlikely to significantly impact any one resource was likewise unlikely to significantly impact additional-but distinct-instances of that same resource. This case is therefore unlike the Babbitt case cited by the petitioners, in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the agency's EA that made a no significant impact finding without articulating the expected intensity or expected consequences of the projec