Full opinion text
The state courts rejected Langley's effort to extend Ashe . See State v. Langley (Langley IV ), 61 So. 3d 747, 756-58 (La. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied , 78 So. 3d 139 (La. 2012). The state appellate court first evaluated the record "to discern which facts were 'necessarily determined' " by the jury's guilty verdict in Langley II . 61 So. 3d at 757. The only way to determine what the jury actually and necessarily determined is to evaluate what the jury actually and necessarily did-namely, convict Langley of second-degree murder. Although the state court recognized it was "possible that the jury verdict was based on a jury finding under the felony-murder rule," the court noted it was equally likely the jury based its verdict on second-degree specific-intent murder as an alternative to first-degree murder. Ibid. It was also possible the jury convicted Langley of second-degree murder as a "compromise verdict"-that is, a verdict that did not reflect the jury's actual findings, but instead represented a compromise punishment of life in prison that was palatable to all jurors. Ibid . Because the jury could have reached its second-degree murder conviction without necessarily finding Langley lacked specific intent to kill, the Louisiana court held Langley "ha[d] not carried his burden of proving that the element of specific intent was actually decided [in his favor] in the previous trial" to preclude the relitigation of that issue in the third trial. Id. at 758. Langley filed a federal habeas petition. The district court denied it. See Langley v. Prince , No. 2:13-cv-2780, 2016 WL 1383466, at *1 (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2016). A panel of our Court, however, reversed and concluded not only that the state court's opinion was wrong, but that it was "objectively unreasonable." Langley v. Prince , 890 F.3d 504, 521-23 (5th Cir. 2018). That decision would've allowed Langley to walk free. But we vacated it upon granting rehearing en banc . II. This case implicates constitutional law, the equitable doctrine of estoppel, and statutory text. We address each in turn. We first explain the common-law and constitutional background of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Then we explain how Ashe and collateral estoppel fit into that background. Lastly, we explain how our application of Ashe is affected by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. A. The Double Jeopardy Clause originates in the common-law plea autrefois acquit , meaning "prior acquittal," and the related plea autrefois convict . As Sir Edward Coke described it, "the maxim of the common law is, that the life of a man shall not be twice ... put in jeopardy for one and the same offence, and that is the reason and cause that auterfoits acquitted or convicted of the same offence is a good plea." Vaux's Case (1591), 76 Eng. Rep. 992, 993; 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 45a (K.B.). But as far back as Vaux's Case , the plea of prior acquittal was not always a get-out-of-jail-free card. Only some verdicts of acquittal in the first trial would effectively bar a second. See ibid. (discussing some qualifications to the plea); EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 214 (1st ed. 1644) (same); 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ 393-95 (1st ed. 1736) (same). Our Double Jeopardy Clause was framed against this background. James Madison's first draft of that Clause stated: "No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence." 1 ANNALS OF CONG . 451-52 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Representative Egbert Benson objected because the draft varied from "the right heretofore established" by the common law. Id. at 781. To cure the defect, Benson suggested striking the phrase regarding "one trial." Id. at 782. Representative Roger Sherman agreed. He reasoned, "if [the defendant] was convicted on the first [trial], and any thing should appear to set the judgment aside, he was entitled to a second, which was certainly favorable to him." Ibid. The House revised it accordingly, and the Senate concurred in the revision. See S. JOURNAL , 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1789). As ratified, the Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Madison's initial phrasing ("more than one punishment or one trial") was thus replaced with a prohibition on putting a person in "jeopardy" more than once. Credit for that phrasing belongs to Blackstone. See United States v. Wilson , 420 U.S. 332, 341-42, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975) (noting the Fifth Amendment uses "language that tracked Blackstone's statement of the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict "); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335 ("[T]he plea of auterfoits acquit , or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same offence."). Thus, the historic core of the Double Jeopardy Clause generally bars re-trial of the "same offense" after a conviction or acquittal. See Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2150. The Framers adopted not only Blackstone's language but also some English common-law exceptions to the pleas of prior acquittal and prior conviction. Most relevant here, the plea did not bar all attempts to retry a criminal defendant. The defendant could be retried, for example: if the jury have been discharged without giving any verdict; or, if, having given a verdict, judgment has been arrested upon it,[ ] or a new trial has been granted in his favour; for, in such a case, his life or limb cannot judicially be said to have been put in jeopardy. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1781 (1st ed. 1833). Likewise, when an "attainder be reversed in a Court of Error," the defendant "may certainly be indicted again for the same offence, and the rule would be held to apply, that he had never been in jeopardy under the former indictment." Regina v. Drury (1849), 175 Eng. Rep. 516, 520; 2 Car. & K. 190, 199 (N.P.). That is why it has long been true that a defendant can be retried after he successfully appeals his first conviction. See, e.g. , Ball v. United States , 163 U.S. 662, 672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896) (citing Drury ). As the Supreme Court has explained: While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction. United States v. Tateo , 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964) ; accord Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon , 466 U.S. 294, 308, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) ("The general rule is that the [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction is overturned on appeal."). B. The Supreme Court recently reminded us the line from Vaux's Case to Ashe is a crooked one. See Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (noting Ashe "represented a significant innovation in our jurisprudence" that some say "sits uneasily with this Court's double jeopardy precedent and the Constitution's original meaning"). One reason why is, for the first 164 years of our Nation's history, the prohibition on double jeopardy could not be vindicated in habeas proceedings by state prisoners. From the Founding until after the Civil War, there was no such thing as federal habeas for individuals in state custody (with one limited exception). See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (providing federal habeas only for federal prisoners); Ex Parte Bollman , 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 98-99, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (suggesting federal courts could issue only writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for state prisoners). And although a federal prisoner had greater federal habeas privileges than a state prisoner, even the former could not use habeas proceedings to collaterally attack a conviction. During that time, a judgment in a criminal case was just like a judgment in any other case: It was res judicata . As Chief Justice Marshall put it: The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would be. It is as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts. It puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it. Ex parte Watkins , 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830). In 1867, Congress extended the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction to state prisoners. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (empowering federal courts "to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States"). Even then, however, the Supreme Court continued to interpret the scope of its habeas authority in a very limited way. If a prisoner was in jail under a state court judgment of conviction, the Court asked only whether that state court had jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g. , Pettibone v. Nichols , 203 U.S. 192, 206, 215-16, 27 S.Ct. 111, 51 L.Ed. 148 (1906) ; Harkrader v. Wadley , 172 U.S. 148, 168-70, 19 S.Ct. 119, 43 L.Ed. 399 (1898) ; see also Wright v. West , 505 U.S. 277, 285, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (plurality opinion) (describing this practice). For almost a century following the 1867 Act, no prisoner (state or federal) could collaterally attack his conviction under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Take for example Ex parte Lange , 85 U.S. 163, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1873). In that case, a federal court sentenced the prisoner twice for one criminal offense of stealing mail bags. The government conceded the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. And the Court agreed: "For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?" Id. at 173. Still, the Court held, that did not justify habeas relief. That's because "[t]he judgment first rendered, though erroneous, was not absolutely void. It was rendered by a court which had jurisdiction of the party and of the offence." Id. at 174. And that was sufficient to deny relief. It was not until 1953 that state prisoners could use federal habeas proceedings to relitigate free-standing constitutional claims after pressing and losing them in state court. See Brown v. Allen , 344 U.S. 443, 460-65, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) ; id. at 506-08, 73 S.Ct. 397 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see also Fay v. Noia , 372 U.S. 391, 460, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing Brown v. Allen as a "landmark decision[ ]" that "substantially expanded the scope of inquiry on an application for federal habeas corpus"); BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 3 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2013) (referring to Brown v. Allen as the "big bang"). And it was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause against the States. See Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). On the same day it announced Benton , the Court held for the first time that state prisoners could raise Double Jeopardy claims in federal habeas. See North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 717-19, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). This is the backdrop for Ashe , which came the very next year. In Ashe , a group of masked men allegedly robbed six players at a poker game. 397 U.S. at 437, 90 S.Ct. 1189. Under the relevant state law, Ashe was guilty of robbery if he was one of the masked robbers, even if the State could not prove Ashe robbed any one particular poker player. Id. at 439, 90 S.Ct. 1189. The State tried Ashe for robbing the first player, but the jury acquitted him. Ibid. On their verdict form, the jury found Ashe "not guilty due to insufficient evidence." Ibid. Then the State attempted to try Ashe for robbing a second player. Ibid. The question was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the second trial. Id . at 440-41, 90 S.Ct. 1189. The Supreme Court held yes. Id . at 447, 90 S.Ct. 1189. The Court, however, did not base that holding on autrefois acquit , the common-law qualifications to that plea, or the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Instead, the Court identified a collateral estoppel "ingredient" in that Clause. Id. at 442-44, 90 S.Ct. 1189. The Court then held the State was collaterally estopped from alleging Ashe was one of the robbers because the first jury (1) returned an acquittal and (2) necessarily determined there was insufficient evidence to prove Ashe was one of the robbers. Id. at 445-47, 90 S.Ct. 1189. The Supreme Court therefore has made clear that Ashe has a different scope than the traditional protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. "While ... Ashe 's protections apply only to trials following acquittals, as a general rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction as well as against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal." Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2150 (quotation omitted). That's why the Court called Ashe "a significant innovation." Id. at 2149. Indeed, Ashe itself recognized the distinction between its collateral-estoppel rule and the rules that applied "at common law." 397 U.S. at 445 n.10, 90 S.Ct. 1189. C. In response to Brown v. Allen -along with its progeny such as Ashe -Congress enacted AEDPA. See Schriro v. Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (noting AEDPA "changed the standards for granting federal habeas relief" from those in Brown v. Allen ). As relevant here, AEDPA prohibits a prisoner from raising any claim in federal court unless it was first exhausted in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) ; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel , 526 U.S. 838, 839-40, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). After the state court adjudicates the claim, the prisoner must overcome "the relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA." Greene v. Fisher , 565 U.S. 34, 39, 132 S.Ct. 38, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ). The statute thereby restores the res judicata rule Chief Justice Marshall recited in Ex parte Watkins and then modifies it. See Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 663-64, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (comparing AEDPA's "modified res judicata rule" to Watkins ). To overcome AEDPA's relitigation bar, a state prisoner must shoehorn his claim into one of its narrow exceptions. As relevant here, he must show the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was [1] contrary to, or [2] involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The first exception to the relitigation bar-the "contrary to" prong-is generally regarded as the narrower of the two. A state-court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law only if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if" it resolves "a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Terry Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Langley identifies no Supreme Court precedent that is "opposite to" or "materially indistinguishable" from this case. So here, as in most AEDPA cases, the "contrary to" prong does not apply. The only other exception to § 2254(d)(1) 's relitigation bar-the "unreasonable application" prong-is almost equally unforgiving. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is not enough to show the state court was wrong. See, e.g. , Renico v. Lett , 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) ("[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." (quotation omitted)); Landrigan , 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933 ("The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold."). Rather, the relitigation bar forecloses relief unless the prisoner can show the state court was so wrong that the error was "well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Shoop v. Hill , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 504, 506, 202 L.Ed.2d 461 (2019) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). In other words, the unreasonable-application exception asks whether it is "beyond the realm of possibility that a fairminded jurist could" agree with the state court. Woods v. Etherton , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152, 194 L.Ed.2d 333 (2016) (per curiam); see also Sexton v. Beaudreaux , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2558, 201 L.Ed.2d 986 (2018) (per curiam) (asking "whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court" (quotation omitted)). Overcoming AEDPA's relitigation bar is necessary but not sufficient to win habeas relief. Even after overcoming the bar, the prisoner still must "show, on de novo review, that [he is] 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' " Salts v. Epps , 676 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 390, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ("[A] habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review [under] § 2254(a)."); Oral Argument at 13:30-13:59 (Langley's acknowledgement that overcoming AEDPA's relitigation bar is necessary but not sufficient to obtain habeas relief). III. Langley's claim fails under these demanding standards. We first explain that Langley cannot surmount AEDPA's relitigation bar. Then we explain that the most-on-point Supreme Court precedent supports the State, not Langley. Lastly, even if we set aside AEDPA's relitigation bar and review the claim de novo , Langley still cannot prove his second jury necessarily determined anything regarding his specific intent. A. 1. The first step in any case under AEDPA's relitigation bar is to determine the "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). It is not enough to say, as the panel did, that the " Ashe doctrine" forms the relevant clearly established law, or that Ashe established the "governing principles." Langley , 890 F.3d at 516-18. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed the courts of appeals for identifying the relevant clearly established law at that level of generality. Take for example Carey v. Musladin , 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held California deprived the defendant of a fair trial by allowing a murder victim's family members to sit in the front row of a jury trial wearing buttons with the victim's photo. Musladin v. Lamarque , 427 F.3d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit identified the clearly established law as "the Williams test." Id. at 658. "The Williams test" referred to Estelle v. Williams , 425 U.S. 501, 503-06, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held it would violate the defendant's fair trial rights to compel him to appear at trial in prison garb. In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held the clearly established law relevant under AEDPA's relitigation bar is only the Supreme Court's holdings, not its dicta. Musladin , 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S.Ct. 649. Therefore, Williams clearly established the law only as applied to prison garb-it could not be extended under AEDPA to vitiate state judgments for spectators' buttons. Id. at 75-77, 127 S.Ct. 649. As the Supreme Court put it in a different but related context: We have repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Mullenix v. Luna , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (quotations and emphasis omitted). In this case, our now-vacated panel opinion conflated the Supreme Court's holding with its dicta in much the same way the Ninth Circuit did in Musladin . The Ashe Court had much to say about how or why collateral estoppel should apply in the criminal context-just as the Williams Court had much to say about how or why the State should not allow jurors to see unduly prejudicial things in the courtroom. But the holding in Ashe , like the holding in Williams , was narrower. The Ashe Court held only that a general verdict of acquittal for insufficient evidence that "petitioner was ... one of the robbers" precluded the State from "hal[ing] him before a new jury to litigate that issue again." 397 U.S. at 446, 90 S.Ct. 1189 ; see Yeager v. United States , 557 U.S. 110, 119, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009) (stating Ashe "held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial"). The Supreme Court has found issue preclusion under Ashe only three other times. See Turner v. Arkansas , 407 U.S. 366, 369-70, 92 S.Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972) (per curiam); Harris v. Washington , 404 U.S. 55, 57, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971) (per curiam); Simpson v. Florida , 403 U.S. 384, 386, 91 S.Ct. 1801, 29 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971) (per curiam). Turner , Harris , Simpson , and Ashe all involved blanket acquittals. See Turner , 407 U.S. at 367, 92 S.Ct. 2096 (noting jury returned "a general verdict of acquittal"); Harris , 404 U.S. at 55, 92 S.Ct. 183 (noting defendant "was acquitted by a jury" on a single charge); Simpson , 403 U.S. at 384-85, 91 S.Ct. 1801 (noting jury returned a "general" verdict of acquittal); Ashe , 397 U.S. at 439, 90 S.Ct. 1189 (noting jury returned one general verdict of acquittal: "not guilty due to insufficient evidence"). None of the four juries convicted the defendant of the charged crime. Therefore, none of these cases held issue-preclusion principles apply to a conviction. We asked the parties to identify any case extending Ashe to cases involving a conviction. The parties could not find a single Supreme Court case even hinting at that result. That's unsurprising. As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged, " Ashe' s protections apply only to trials following acquittals ." Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2150 (emphases added). Thus, there is no "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," explaining whether and to what extent a state court should find issue preclusion following a conviction. 2. After identifying the clearly established law, we move to step two-determining whether the state court decision "involved an unreasonable application of" that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To make this determination, we must ask whether any fairminded jurist could believe the "clearly established rule" does not apply to the "set of facts" at hand. White v. Woodall , 572 U.S. 415, 427, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014). "If such disagreement is possible, then the petitioner's claim must be denied." Beaudreaux , 138 S. Ct. at 2558. Langley loses at this step. A fairminded jurist could conclude the rule clearly established in Ashe does not apply to a conviction rather than a general acquittal. When a jury issues a general acquittal, it necessarily determines at least something in the defendant's favor. It might be possible to identify that something and preclude the government from submitting it to a second jury. That task is obviously different-and more difficult-when the jury convicts the defendant on at least one count. In the face of a conviction on one count, it is not clear which issues if any the jury determined in the defendant's favor on that same count. We may or may not find this distinction persuasive. That's irrelevant. What matters is the last reasoned state court decision found it persuasive. See Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 757-58 (last reasoned state court decision); Wilson v. Sellers , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192, 200 L.Ed.2d 530 (2018) (requiring deference to that decision if reasonable). The state court recognized Ashe 's applicability to a "general acquittal." Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 757 (citing Ashe , 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189 ). By contrast, where the jury returns a conviction on "a lesser included offense," the state court found it's "not always possible to determine" which issues if any should be precluded under Ashe . Ibid. The state court found it "possible" the jury made one of three determinations: (1) Langley was guilty of specific-intent murder, (2) Langley was guilty of something less than specific-intent murder, or (3) the jury avoided the specific-intent issue by rendering a "compromise verdict." Ibid. In the state court's view, Langley's argument that the jury found (2) to the exclusion of (1) and (3) was "clearly ... unsupported." Id. at 758. Even if we thought the state court committed "clear error" by so holding, we still could not grant relief. Woodall , 572 U.S. at 419, 134 S.Ct. 1697. After all, neither Ashe nor any other Supreme Court precedent mandates that a lesser-included-offense conviction-or to use the dissent's preferred terminology, an "implicit acquittal"-be given issue-preclusive effect. And Supreme Court precedent does mandate caution in finding Ashe issue preclusion where the jury could have rendered a "compromise" or "lenity" verdict. See United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57, 65-66, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) ; Standefer v. United States , 447 U.S. 10, 22-23, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) ; accord Bravo-Fernandez v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 352, 363-64, 196 L.Ed.2d 242 (2016) (noting "the jurors in this case might not have acquitted on [certain] counts absent their belief that the ... convictions [on other counts] would stand"). Therefore, a fairminded jurist could find that Ashe 's rule regarding general acquittals does not require issue preclusion for Langley's conviction. Under AEDPA, that's the end of the matter. See Woodall , 572 U.S. at 419-20, 134 S.Ct. 1697. In the past, some federal courts mistakenly thought it was only the beginning. The Sixth Circuit, for example, faulted a state court for "unreasonably refus[ing] to extend" a Supreme Court precedent "to a new context where [the Sixth Circuit thought] it should apply." Woodall v. Simpson , 685 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry Williams , 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ). The Supreme Court emphatically reversed. The Court emphasized it "has never adopted the unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule .... It has not been so much as endorsed in a majority opinion, let alone relied on as a basis for granting habeas relief." Woodall , 572 U.S. at 426, 134 S.Ct. 1697 ; see also ibid. (holding "we reject it"). That result is compelled by the text of the relitigation bar itself: " Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies [the Supreme] Court's precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error." Ibid. To the contrary: "[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand," then by definition the rationale was not "clearly established at the time of the state-court decision." AEDPA's carefully constructed framework "would be undermined if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law." Ibid. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ). Because a fairminded jurist could decide the clearly established rule does not cover this case, we'd have to extend Ashe to grant relief here. That is something AEDPA says we cannot do. See, e.g. , Woods v. Donald , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (per curiam) ("Because none of our cases confront the specific question presented by this case, the state court's decision could not be 'contrary to' any holding from this Court," nor an "unreasonable application" thereof. (quotation omitted)); Woodall , 572 U.S. at 427, 134 S.Ct. 1697 ("Perhaps the logical next step from [three previous Supreme Court cases] would be to hold that the Fifth Amendment requires a penalty-phase no-adverse-inference instruction in a case like this one; perhaps not. Either way, we have not yet taken that step, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides-which is all Kentucky needs to prevail in this AEDPA case."); Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) ("[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not 'an unreasonable application of' 'clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court."); accord Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 299-310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding federal courts may not develop-and habeas petitioners may not seek-new legal rules on collateral review). As far as we can tell, the only other court of appeals to address this question agrees with us. See Owens v. Trammell , 792 F.3d 1234, 1246-50 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding AEDPA precluded awarding habeas relief based on Ashe following a conviction). B. 1. Extending Ashe in these circumstances would also conflict with other clearly established law. That's because the Supreme Court has confronted similar facts before and rejected the prisoner's Double Jeopardy claim. See Schiro v. Farley , 510 U.S. 222, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). If anything, Schiro was a harder case. The jury convicted Schiro of felony murder (count II) but did not return a verdict on intentional murder (count I). Id. at 225-26, 114 S.Ct. 783. "Thereafter, in a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury unanimously concluded that Schiro did not deserve the death penalty, presumably because he had not intended to kill." Id. at 239, 114 S.Ct. 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). And that presumption appeared well grounded because "[t]he principal issue at trial was Schiro's mental condition." Id. at 240, 114 S.Ct. 783 ; see also ibid. ("No one disputed that he had caused his victim's death, but intent remained at issue in other ways. Five expert witnesses-two employed by the State, one selected by the court, and two called by the defense-testified at length about Schiro's unusual personality, his drug and alcohol addiction, and his history of mental illness." (citations omitted)). Moreover, both the jury instructions and Indiana state law permitted the jurors to return a guilty verdict on every count on which they had unanimity-which could imply the jury intended to acquit the defendant on each count they failed to return (like count I, intentional murder). See id. at 233-34, 114 S.Ct. 783 (majority opinion); id. at 246-47, 114 S.Ct. 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing jury's failure to return a verdict on intentional murder implicitly acquitted on that count). Nonetheless, the State argued Schiro's intent was an aggravating factor that justified the court in sentencing him to death. The Supreme Court held the jurors' failure to return a verdict on intentional murder did not collaterally estop the State from so arguing. Id. at 232-36, 114 S.Ct. 783 (majority opinion); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania , 537 U.S. 101, 113-15, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar reprosecution for capital murder after prisoner successfully appeals judgment for life sentence). Louisiana law makes this case easier than Schiro . Under Louisiana law, "the jury must be given the option to convict the defendant of the lesser offense, even though the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly supported a conviction of the charged offense." State v. Porter , 639 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (La. 1994). And the jury was given that option. The Langley II jury was repeatedly told-orally and in writing-that "[t]he responsive lesser offenses to the charge of First Degree Murder are Second Degree Murder and Manslaughter." Neither the dissenters nor Langley's able appellate attorney has ever disputed that the evidence supported every element of the first-degree murder count against Langley, including specific intent. And a rational jury could have credited that overwhelming evidence and still -in accordance with the instructions and the law-returned a verdict for the lesser-included offense of second-degree specific-intent murder. As far as the Schiro opinion reveals, the jury in that case received no such option. To the contrary, Indiana law at least arguably required Schiro's jury to return a verdict on count I (intentional murder) if they agreed the State proved it. See 510 U.S. at 240-42, 114 S.Ct. 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And to the extent Schiro's jury instructions were ambiguous on that score, Langley's were even more so. See infra at 169-70. If the jury's failure to return a verdict on intentional murder did not trigger collateral estoppel in Schiro , it certainly does not do so here. Finally, it bears emphasis that Schiro was a pre-AEDPA death-penalty case. Even after Schiro's jury potentially acquitted him of intentional murder by returning only a verdict of felony murder, the trial judge rejected the jury's recommended sentence and held the State proved intent beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of sentencing the defendant to death. Id. at 226-27, 114 S.Ct. 783 (majority opinion). The Supreme Court upheld that result even without AEDPA's relitigation bar. In contrast, Langley's jury did not return a verdict of felony murder. It returned a verdict of "second-degree murder," which could mean Langley was convicted of specific-intent murder or felony murder. Langley also faces the additional burden of AEDPA. If Indiana could prevail in Schiro , then Louisiana must prevail on easier facts and a much more favorable legal standard. See Alvarado , 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140. 2. At the en banc argument, Langley suggested it matters whether the state court (or the state's lawyer at the panel stage) cited Schiro . It doesn't. Federal courts must apply § 2254(d) in light of controlling Supreme Court holdings regardless of whether the state court or the state's lawyer cites them. First, it doesn't matter whether the state court cited Schiro . The Ninth Circuit once refused to apply AEDPA's relitigation bar because "the state court 'failed to cite ... any federal law, much less the controlling Supreme Court precedents.' " Early v. Packer , 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Packer v. Hill , 291 F.3d 569, 578 (9th Cir. 2002) ). The Supreme Court unanimously and summarily reversed: "Avoiding [vitiation of a state judgment in federal court] does not require citation of our cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Ibid. ; see also Mitchell v. Esparza , 540 U.S. 12, 16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam). Second, it also doesn't matter whether the State's panel-stage appellate lawyer cited Schiro . The relitigation bar constrains our ability to award habeas relief regardless of what counsel cites or does not cite. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court [unless statutory exceptions are satisfied]." (emphasis added)). Every court of appeals to consider the question-including ours-has held a State's lawyers cannot waive or forfeit § 2254(d) 's standard. That likewise means a State's lawyers cannot waive or forfeit the applicable "clearly established law." See, e.g. , Thompson v. Runnels , 705 F.3d 1089, 1097-1100 (9th Cir. 2013) ; BRYAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 3:97 (2019). Schiro rejected a stronger Double Jeopardy claim under harder facts and without the added hurdle of § 2254(d) 's relitigation bar. Schiro thus provides an independent basis for denying Langley's claim. Wilson v. Sellers is not to the contrary. Wilson requires us to "look through" to the last reasoned state court decision and apply AEDPA's relitigation bar to it. 138 S. Ct. at 1192 ; see supra Part III.A.2 (doing so). But Wilson does not purport to overrule Packer or Esparza . Nor does Wilson say the state court must cite a Supreme Court decision to trigger AEDPA's strictures. See Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison , 911 F.3d 1335, 1350 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining Wilson "was not about the specificity or thoroughness with which state courts must spell out their reasoning to be entitled to AEDPA deference"); Hebert v. Rogers , 890 F.3d 213, 221 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining "the brevity of a state court's opinion is immaterial" and noting "a state court's decision does not need to be thorough or directly address [the] Supreme Court's cases"). Here, as in Schiro , the last-reasoned state court decision held the prisoner failed to prove the jury necessarily determined the specific-intent issue in his favor. Compare Schiro , 510 U.S. at 232-36, 114 S.Ct. 783, with Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 757-58. Schiro thus illustrates that the last-reasoned state court decision was a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, including some holdings the state court did not cite. Nothing in AEDPA, Wilson , or any other relevant authority requires the state court to cite Schiro - or any other specific Supreme Court case-to insulate its decision from vitiation in federal court. Wilson likewise does not prohibit this Court from considering Supreme Court cases not cited when evaluating the reasonableness of the state court's reasoning. Indeed, we are often compelled to do so to determine "clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). C. The principal dissent takes issue with our application of AEDPA. Even if the dissent's arguments were well taken and AEDPA's relitigation bar did not apply, Langley would not automatically be entitled to habeas relief. Instead, he would still need to show-under a de novo review standard-"that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution ... of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ; see Thompkins , 560 U.S. at 390, 130 S.Ct. 2250 ; Salts , 676 F.3d at 480. Langley cannot do so because he cannot prove the Langley II judgment triggered collateral estoppel of the specific-intent issue. 1. Collateral estoppel-or, as we call it today, issue preclusion-originates in the law of civil judgments. See, e.g. , Cromwell v. County of Sac , 94 U.S. 351, 354, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876). As with other preclusion doctrines (like res judicata ), the idea is that an issue definitively settled once is "forever settled as between the parties." Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n , 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931) ; see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 48 (2001) ("[A]n issue once decided is settled, at least as between the parties."). In civil cases, the Supreme Court "regularly turns to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for a statement of the ordinary elements of issue preclusion." B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303, 191 L.Ed.2d 222 (2015). Under the Restatement, in turn, a civil judgment can generate issue preclusion if and only if it meets certain essential prerequisites. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982). Three of those prerequisites are relevant here: (a) The issue must be "actually ... determined" by the judgment, (b) the issue must be "essential to the judgment," and (c) the judgment must be "valid and final." Ibid. In civil cases, the availability of appellate review of the judgment in the first case is particularly important to its issue-preclusive effect in a second case. See id. § 28. That's because, as noted above, a civil judgment generates issue preclusion only when it's "valid and final." And the "valid[ity]" of a judgment is suspect if it cannot be reviewed. Therefore, the Restatement concludes, "the availability of review for the correction of errors has become critical to the application of preclusion doctrine." Id. § 28 cmt. a; see also Bravo-Fernandez , 137 S. Ct. at 358 ("In civil litigation, where issue preclusion and its ramifications first developed, the availability of appellate review is a key factor."). Correlatively, once a civil judgment is reversed on appeal, it's obviously no longer "valid" and retains zero preclusive effect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. o; 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER ] ("Reversal and remand for further proceedings on the entire case defeats preclusion entirely until a new final judgment is entered by the trial court or the initial judgment is restored by further appellate proceedings."). The principal reason issue preclusion is narrower in criminal cases than in civil ones is the limited availability of appellate review for the former. Criminal issue preclusion attaches to a general verdict of acquittal, and "the Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause." Powell , 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S.Ct. 471. This "absence of appellate review of acquittals ... calls for guarded application of preclusion doctrine in criminal cases." Bravo-Fernandez , 137 S. Ct. at 358 ; see also Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2152 (plurality opinion) ("We think that caution remains sound."). Take for example Standefer . In that case, the defendant was indicted for bribing an IRS official. 447 U.S. at 11, 100 S.Ct. 1999. While that indictment was pending, the IRS official was acquitted of accepting three bribes from Standefer. Id. at 12-13, 100 S.Ct. 1999. Standefer argued the IRS official's acquittal should trigger nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government's prosecution of Standefer. Id. at 13-14, 21-22, 100 S.Ct. 1999. The Supreme Court rejected that argument because the government did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the acquittal of the IRS agent. Id. at 22, 100 S.Ct. 1999. For example, the government could not seek a new trial because the acquittal is contrary to the evidence, nor could it appeal the acquittal. The Supreme Court explained: The absence of these remedial procedures in criminal cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity. It is of course true that verdicts induced by passion and prejudice are not unknown in civil suits. But in civil cases, post-trial motions and appellate review provide an aggrieved litigant a remedy; in a criminal case the Government has no similar avenue to correct errors. Under contemporary principles of collateral estoppel, this factor strongly militates against giving an acquittal preclusive effect. Id. at 22-23, 100 S.Ct. 1999 (quotations and citations omitted). Time and again-from Powell and Standefer to Currier and Bravo-Fernandez -the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished lower courts to carefully apply issue preclusion in criminal cases. 2. Our now-vacated panel opinion misapplied these principles. It ignored the Supreme Court's admonition regarding "guarded application of preclusion doctrine in criminal cases." Bravo-Fernandez , 137 S. Ct. at 358. In its place, the panel substituted a rigid logic game, complete with numbered "conditions" that could be "fulfilled" or negated according to "the rules of logic." 890 F.3d at 519-20. That not only contravenes the Supreme Court's warnings in cases like Currier , Bravo-Fernandez , Standefer , and Powell , but it also contravenes Ashe itself. Ashe emphasized "the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality." 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189. Under a proper understanding of collateral estoppel principles, Langley cannot demonstrate Langley II precluded the specific-intent issue. That's for three reasons. First, Langley cannot prove the jury "actually determined" the issue of specific intent even under the (broader) rules of civil judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (one prerequisite of preclusion is the issue was "actually ... determined" in the first civil action); SHAPIRO , supra , at 176 ("[T]he first precondition for the application of issue preclusion [is] that the issue have been 'actually litigated and determined' ... in the prior action."). Here is what the Langley II jury actually determined: 2 MAY 16, 2003 WE, THE JURY IN THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER, FIND THE DEFENDANT, RICKY JOSEPH LANGLEY, GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER ON OR ABOUT FEBRUARY 7, 1992. [REDACTED\] REPRESENTATIVE We presume the jury followed its instructions in rendering this verdict. See, e.g. , Turner , 407 U.S. at 369, 92 S.Ct. 2096. We turn then to the jury instructions. The judge orally instructed the jury it could premise its second-degree murder conviction on a finding of specific intent. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note asking for "the instruction sheet" on "specific intent" (among other things). The judge provided the jury with written instructions that again told the jury it could convict Langley of second-degree murder based on specific intent. Langley never objected to any of this at trial. To the contrary, counsel for the State and the defense had a colloquy with the trial judge over this exact instruction. And everyone agreed the jury should be instructed on second-degree specific-intent murder. Then at oral argument before our en banc Court, Langley's counsel conceded the jury was given the option of returning a legally valid conviction of second-degree specific-intent murder. See Oral Argument at 9:08-9:29. We are aware of no case from any court that would allow us to infer a jury "irrationally" chose a concededly valid option offered in the instructions. It was therefore wrong to hold, as the panel did, that no "rational jury could have convicted Langley of specific intent second degree murder." Langley , 890 F.3d at 521 (quotation and alteration omitted). Under de novo review, we hold the state court was objectively correct to find "[i]t is possible that the jury convicted the defendant of specific intent second degree murder." Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 757. Langley therefore cannot prove the jury "actually determined" the issue of specific intent in his favor. Second, and for similar reasons, Langley cannot prove the issue of specific intent was "necessary" or "essential to the judgment" even under the (broader) civil preclusion rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (one prerequisite of preclusion is the issue was "essential to the judgment"); SHAPIRO , supra , at 177 (same). Under Louisiana law, a jury can find a defendant overwhelmingly guilty of first-degree murder and still choose to convict of second-degree murder. See Porter , 639 So. 2d at 1140 ; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN . art. 814(A)(1) (responsive verdicts to "First Degree Murder" include "Guilty of second degree murder"). In accordance with this law, the jury was repeatedly instructed it could find every element of first-degree murder-including specific intent-and still choose to return a verdict of second-degree murder. The jury also was instructed it could convict of second-degree murder without finding specific intent. That means the jury could return its lawful second-degree murder conviction after (a) finding specific intent, (b) finding no specific intent, or (c) declining to consider the question of specific intent. To infer why the Langley II jury convicted him only on second-degree murder "would require speculation into what transpired in the jury room," and would require us to "scrutinize" the jury's "failures to decide" rather than its actual decision. Yeager , 557 U.S. at 122, 129 S.Ct. 2360. We cannot do that. The existence of three possibilities for the actual verdict means the issue of specific intent was not essential to the judgment. And since there could be no preclusion even under the broader civil preclusion rules, there certainly can be no issue preclusion under Ashe . Again, the state court's judgment would survive de novo review. See Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 758. Moreover, the instructions gave the jury a rational reason not to decide the issue. If the jury wanted to reconvene for a punishment hearing to sentence Langley to death, it would have to confront the specific-intent issue, find it, and convict him of first-degree murder. But if the jury chose second-degree murder, it could convict without deciding the specific-intent issue, avoid a separate sentencing hearing, and ensure Langley would spend the rest of his life behind bars. The jury instructions were explicit to that effect: "Whoever commits the crime of Second Degree Murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence." And Langley's lawyer used these instructions to plead for the jury's mercy. The record suggests the jury might've chosen second-degree murder for precisely this reason. See Langley II Sentencing Tr. at 15-16 (May 22, 2003). The state court therefore was objectively correct to conclude the jury could have avoided deciding the specific-intent issue by reaching a "compromise verdict" that sentenced Langley to life in prison. Langley IV , 61 So. 3d at 757. Third and finally, Langley cannot prove the issue of specific intent was decided in a "valid and final" judgment even under the (broader) civil preclusion rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (one prerequisite of preclusion is the issue was decided in a "valid and final" civil judgment); SHAPIRO , supra , at 176 ("In addition to the requirement of 'validity,' a judgment must be 'final' to be entitled to recognition."). When a judgment is partially reversed on appeal, "[t]here is no preclusion as to the matters vacated or reversed." 18A WRIGHT & MILLER , supra , § 4432 ; cf. Aguillard v. McGowen , 207 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) ("A conviction overturned on appeal cannot constitute a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel."). And the preclusive effect of the remainder of the judgment "is controlled by the actual appellate disposition." 18A WRIGHT & MILLER , supra , § 4432. Here, the Louisiana intermediate appellate court reversed the Langley II judgment and remanded for retrial on everything. See Langley II , 896 So. 2d at 212. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed the "trial error require[d] a reversal of Langley's conviction and sentence," but held, under Louisiana law, the jury's conviction for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder precluded retrying Langley for the greater offense of first-degree murder. See Langley III , 958 So. 2d at 1170 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN . art. 598(A) ). That was the entirety of its preclusion decision; it remanded everything else for retrial. See id. at 1171. This "actual appellate disposition" means, even under the ordinary rules applicable to civil judgments, the State would not be issue-precluded from retrying Langley for second-degree specific-intent murder. 18A WRIGHT & MILLER , supra , § 4432. And we know one thing with confidence: The Double Jeopardy Clause's issue-preclusion ingredient cannot sweep more broadly than the equitable doctrine that has governed civil cases for centuries. See Bravo-Fernandez , 137 S. Ct. at 357-58. 3. The dissenters offer four responses to our de novo rejection of Langley's claim. The first is confusing. The second is imaginary. The third is irrelevant. And the fourth is unfortunate. First, the confusion: The dissenters excoriate our reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as somehow constituting a "doctrinal innovation" in issue-preclusion law. See, e.g. , post at 174, 182-83 (Higginson, J., dissenting). But as noted above, the Supreme Court itself "regularly turns to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for a statement of the ordinary elements of issue preclusion." B&B Hardware , 135 S. Ct. at 1303 ; see also, e.g. , Herrera v. Wyoming , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1696-97, 203 L.Ed.2d 846, 2019 WL 2166394, at *7 (May 20, 2019) ; id. at *16-20 (Alito, J., dissenting); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr. , 547 U.S. 633, 646-47, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006) ; New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 748-49, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) ; Arizona v. California , 530 U.S. 392, 414, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) ; Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 522 U.S. 222, 233 n.5, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998) ; United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co. , 464 U.S. 165, 171, 104 S.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984) ; Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court also relies on the Restatement to determine the bounds of Ashe issue preclusion. See, e.g. , Bravo-Fernandez , 137 S. Ct. at 357-58 ; Bobby v. Bies , 556 U.S. 825, 834, 837, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009). There is nothing remotely "innovati[ve]" about our reliance on the Restatement here. Post at 182 (Higginson, J., dissenting). Equally baffling is the dissenters' concern over whether the state courts relied on the Restatement. E.g. , post at 174 (Higginson, J., dissenting). Under AEDPA's relitigation bar, the state court's reasoning can matter. See, e.g. , Wilson , 138 S. Ct. at 1191-92. But we're not discussing the Restatement to determine whether the relitigation bar protects the state court's judgment. We're discussing it to hold that-even without the bar-the state court was correct under de novo review to find no issue preclusion. Supreme Court precedents (and our own) specifically authorize us to deny a state prisoner's habeas claim under either the relitigation bar or de novo review. See Thompkins , 560 U.S. at 390, 130 S.Ct. 2250 ; Mirzayance , 556 U.S. at 123-24, 129 S.Ct. 1411 ; Salts , 676 F.3d at 480. We previously discussed the former; here we're discussing the latter. The dissenters appear confused over which standard applies where. Their second response is imaginary. The dissenters posit a hypothetical jury trial with instructions that were never actually given. It's simply not true the judge instructed the jurors "to begin with the single charge of first degree murder and ... work their way down through the list of responsive verdicts." Post at 182 (Higginson, J., dissenting). Nor did the court instruct the Langley II jury that it could consider second-degree murder "only if it were not ... convinced" of specific intent. Id. at 176. The actual jury instructions said the exact opposite: The court instructed the jury it could find Langley guilty of "SECOND DEGREE MURDER" based on a finding "THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL." The dissenters cannot find issue preclusion by ignoring the instructions given to the jury and imagining others that were not. Their third response is irrelevant. The dissenters make much of the jury instruction that said, "[i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that [Langley] is guilty of first degree murder, your verdict should be 'guilty.' " Post at 176 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original). The dissenters say this instruction prohibited the jury from returning a verdict for second-degree specific-intent murder. Of course, that ignores the other instructions that empowered the jury to return a "SECOND DEGREE MURDER" verdict based on a finding "THAT THE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH SPECIFIC INTENT TO KILL." It ignores Langley's agreement-at trial and here-that the jury could return a verdict for second-degree specific-intent murder. See supra at 165-66. And it would require holding the jury instructions violated Louisiana law. See supra at 166 (noting, under Porter and Article 814(A)(1), the jury could find specific intent and choose second-degree murder). "We do not think that a federal court can presume so lightly that a state court failed to apply its own law." Bell v. Cone , 543 U.S. 447, 455, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (per curiam). But even if Langley could misconstrue the instructions as violating state law, it would still be irrelevant. Schiro holds that issue preclusion does not attach where "[t]he jury instructions on the issue of intent to kill were ... ambiguous." 510 U.S. at 234, 114 S.Ct. 783. If we agree with the dissenters on anything, it's that one instruction very clearly told the Langley II jury it could convict of second-degree specific-intent murder. And if we spot the dissenters all of their points arguendo , the absolute most they can prove is that a second jury instruction told the jury it could not convict of second-degree specific-intent murder. That ambiguity would put the case on all fours with Schiro . And it would compel the denial of habeas relief-with AEDPA or without it. Fourth and finally, the unfortunate: The dissenters accuse us of "dangerously disregard[ing] Supreme Court precedent," "eras[ing] constitutional protections," and tearing "many pages ... from the United States and Federal Reporters." Post at 175, 183-84 (Higginson, J., dissenting). Worse, they question whether our real motivation is to underrule Ashe because we "disagree strongly with [its] foundations." Id. at 175 n.5. Worse still, they say we have bartered away our legal principles "wholesale" to reach a preferred policy result. Id. at 174-75. This sort of rhetoric is regrettable. We will not respond in kind. But we will make our motivation patently clear: It is the law. Ashe , Turner , and every other Supreme Court case finding issue-preclusion under the Double Jeopardy Clause involved a general acquittal. This one does not. If we were state judges, we'd obviously still disagree with the dissenters about whether issue preclusion attaches to Langley's conviction. That much is obvious from our de novo review of the issue-preclusion question and the dissenters' very different approach to it. But of course, we are not state judges. And we are bound by AEDPA. Under AEDPA's relitigation bar, the very existence of reasonable disagreement forecloses relief. See, e.g. , Musladin , 549 U.S. at 76-77, 127 S.Ct. 649. Yet the dissenters do not acknowledge this standard, let alone explain how