Full opinion text
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY. Opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: In this ease, appellants raise a number of challenges to a district court judgment ordering them to improve conditions at various District of Columbia (“District” or “D.C.”) facilities in which women are imprisoned. The district court found that the existing conditions violated the following statutory and constitutional provisions: (1) D.C.Code § 24-442, which creates a tort remedy for negligence by prison officials; (2) Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., which requires recipients of federal aid to provide men and women with equal access to educational programs and activities; (3) the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the District through the Fifth Amendment; and (4) the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. The court’s order contains provisions relating to sexual harassment; obstetrical and gynecological care; academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs; general living conditions; and fire safety. We hold that (1) the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under D.C.Code § 24-442, (2) Title IX and equal protection principles are not applicable here because the male and female prisoners whom the district court compared were not similarly situated, and (3) certain provisions of the district court’s order provide broader relief than is necessary to remedy the violations of the Eighth Amendment. In addition, we remand the ease to the district court to determine whether other portions of its order are inconsistent with the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act. I. BACKGROUND A. The Facilities Until recently, the District maintained no facility for women serving sentences of more than a year; all such offenders were sent to federal penitentiaries scattered throughout the country. The District has since assumed custody of such women, and it now houses them in three facilities: the Lorton Minimum Security Annex (“Annex”), the Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”), and the Central Detention Facility (“Jail”). The first of these facilities is located in Lorton, Virginia; the latter two in the District. The Annex, which is situated on the grounds of the men’s Minimum Security Facility (“Minimum”), consists largely of a few converted military barracks that serve as dormitories. The women in the Annex are escorted to Minimum at specified times to attend academic courses and use the gymnasium. As of January 1994, there were 936 men at Minimum and 167 women at the Annex. In this class action, the female inmates at the Annex raise challenges involving sexual misconduct, their general living conditions, and discrimination in access to academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs on the basis of their sex. The medical care provided to female inmates at the Annex is governed by a separate consent decree. CTF was designed as an 800-bed diagnostic and treatment center for offenders with special needs. In early 1992, however, the District converted part of CTF into a facility that, as of January 1994, housed 271 general population, medium-custody female inmates. In this class action, the female inmates at CTF present challenges involving sexual misconduct, their general living conditions, the quality of their obstetrical and gynecological care, and discrimination in access to academic, vocational, work, and recreational programs on the basis of their sex. The Jail is a medium to maximum security correctional facility. As of January 1994, it housed 168 female inmates who were either awaiting trial or sentencing or who were sentenced misdemeanants. In this action, the inmates at the Jail have limited then-challenges to allegations of sexual misconduct. Medical care at the Jail is regulated by a separate consent order. B. Procedural History The complaint in this class action was filed on October 1, 1993. The class (“appellees”), which is comprised of the female inmates at the Annex, CTF, and the Jail, was certified without objection. The defendants include the District, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“Department” or “DCDC”), the District of Columbia General Hospital Commission, and numerous District officials, all in their official capacities (collectively, “appellants”). Following a three-week trial, the district court issued an opinion on December 13, 1994, in which it found multiple violations of federal and local law. Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634 (D.D.C.1994) (“Women Prisoners V). On the same day, the court issued an order consisting of 138 paragraphs of instructions (“Order”) that were intended to correct the violations. Id. at 679-90. The defendants subsequently moved the district court to amend the Order or stay its enforcement. The court denied the motion to amend in its entirety, and denied the motion to stay except as to four paragraphs of the Order. On March 2, 1995, the District filed a motion for a stay pending appeal to this court. We ordered that the case be held in abeyance pending additional proceedings in the district court on appellants’ motion to stay. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections v. District of Columbia, No. 95-7041 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 4, 1995). On remand, the District filed a revised motion to stay and/or modify the judgment. After a review of the parties’ briefs and oral argument, the district court temporarily stayed thirty paragraphs and ordered the parties to attempt to negotiate an agreement concerning those paragraphs. The parties eventually reached agreement as to 26 of the paragraphs and jointly moved the court to amend the Order. On August 14, 1995, the district court issued a second opinion in which it supple-, mented the legal conclusions of the first opinion and denied appellants’ motion for a stay of the Order. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 899 F.Supp. 659 (D.D.C.1995) (‘Women Prisoners II”). The court also issued a second order that modified 23 paragraphs of the Order and vacated six others. Id. at 677-79. C. The District Court’s Opinions 1. Factual findings (a) Sexual Harassment at the Jail, CTF, and the Annex About a half dozen female inmates testified at trial that they had been sexually assaulted by prison guards. See, e.g., testimony of Jane Doe W, Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at Volume I, page 36 (“1-36”), Jane Doe Q (Tr. at 1-74), Jane Doe OOO (Tr. at 1-100), Jane Doe Five (Tr. at IV-66), Jane Doe RR (Tr. at VI-124) and Jane Doe Z (Tr. at VII-64). The district court concluded from this testimony that there had been “many incidents of sexual misconduct between prison employees and female prisoners in all three of the wom-ens’ [sic] facilities in this case.” Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 639. The court found that the level of misconduct ranged from inappropriate remarks to invasions of privacy to violent sexual assaults. Id. at 639-40. According to the court, one of the “most disturbing” aspects of this misconduct was “the inadequacy of the Defendants’ response to these attacks.” Id. at 639. The court found that while the DCDC had adopted policies and procedures designed to address sexual misconduct, “[t]hese various policies and procedures are of little value because the [Department] address[es] the problem of sexual harassment of female prisoners with no specific staff training, inconsistent reporting practices, cursory investigations and timid sanctions.” Id. at 640 (internal citation omitted). (b) Obstetrical and Gynecological Care at CTF The district court found that the District had provided inadequate women’s medical care, specifically concluding that the care provided them was deficient in the following areas: gynecological examination, testing for sexually transmitted diseases, follow-up care, health education, and prenatal care and education. Id. at 643-48. The court was also concerned about appellants’ use of physical restraints on pregnant inmates when they were transported to the hospital. Id. at 646-47. (c) Physical Conditions of Confinement The district court also found problems with the physical condition of the buildings at CTF. The court observed that the facility had originally been constructed as a treatment center for inmates with special needs. Id. at 648-49. Its buildings were connected by covered walkways that created a closed-in setting designed only for controlled movement. Id. The court concluded that CTF had several structural flaws, including insufficient heating, a malfunctioning ventilation system, and defective toilets. Id. at 649-60. The court found that the Annex inmates were housed in converted military barracks that were not initially designed for continued residency, that renovations and preventative maintenance have been either lax or nonexistent, and that the dormitories were inadequately ventilated. Id. at 651-52. The court also found that the dormitories were overcrowded, and that this overcrowding had created a shortage of sanitary facilities, increased the risk of spreading infectious diseases, produced high noise levels, and created filthy living conditions. Id. The court further found that fire hazards existed at both CTF and the Annex. The court identified the following difficulties at CTF: the sprinkler system was inadequately maintained; water leakage occurred in areas of the building where electrical equipment is exposed; and fire drills were seldom, if ever, conducted. Id. at 653-54. At the Annex, the court found that the level of fire safety was “grossly inadequate”: its fire alarm system was “antiquated,” little was done in the way of fire drills and staff training, the dormitories contained excessive quantities of combustible materials and inadequate eompart-mentalization to contain fire, and there were not enough exits to accommodate the number of people living at the facility. Id. at 654-55. (d) Programs The district court found that female inmates at CTF and the Annex did not have access to educational, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs equal to those made available by the District to similarly situated men. Id. at 656-62, 677-78. In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the programs offered to the women with those available to men in facilities that had “similar custody levels, sentence structures and purposes of incarceration” Id. at 675; Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 670-71. Specifically, the court compared the programs available to women at the Annex with those available to the men at Minimum; and it compared the programs available to women at CTF with those available to inmates at three men’s prisons: the Occoquan Facility (“Occoquan”), the Central Facility (“Central”), and the Medium Facility (“Medium”). Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 656, 659, 675. Because appellants agree that Title IX applies to the educational and vocational training programs offered inmates at District prisons, we will only summarize the court’s findings with respect to those programs that, in their view, he outside the scope of Title IX. Work Details. The district court described work details as “support duties needed for the running of the jail.” Id. at 657. At the Annex, women could participate in a variety of such details, including work as receptionists, housekeepers, and librarians. Id. At CTF, women could choose among thirteen work details, including clerical, housekeeping, and culinary assignments. Id. at 661. The court found, however, that similarly situated male inmates had access to better and more numerous programs than the “stereotypical” ones available to the women. Id. at 677 (men at Minimum could participate in details involving carpentry, electrical, and mechanical work); id. at 661, 678 (men at Central could participate in such work as bricklaying, mechanics, and welding). Prison Industries. “A prison industry is a business run out of a prison where goods are produced with inmate labor and then sold to government agencies.” Id. at 657. At the Annex, women could work in a garment shop and a print shop; at Minimum, men could engage in agriculture and landscape work. Id. The court found that these programs were comparable and held that the women at the Annex and men at Minimum had equal access to industrial programs. Id. at 677. At CTF, women could participate in only one program that was “remotely” akin to a prison industry. Id. at 661. Because the men enjoyed access to a greater number of industries, i.e., one at Occoquan, two at Medium, and ten at Central, id., the court found that the women at CTF had been denied an “equivalent opportunity in the area of industries” in violation of Title IX. Id. at 678. Recreation. At the Annex, women had access to “a recreation trailer which contains a pool table, a ping pong table, exercise bikes and a weight machine.” Id. at 658. Furthermore, the women were escorted twice a week to recreation areas at Minimum, where they could play volleyball, basketball, and handball. Id. The court found that the men at Minimum had greater recreational opportunities: they had access to a gymnasium and a ball field for approximately six hours a day, Monday through Friday, as well as for three hours on several nights each week; they could use a weight trailer seven days a week; and they could participate in a variety of organized intramural team sports, as well as in a “Renaissance Drama Class.” Id. at 658, 677. At CTF, women could participate in scheduled recreation for an hour a day, five days a week, and had access to a gymnasium for two hours, three days a week; they were able to play basketball and volleyball in a small outside area; and they could take part in “low-impact aerobics” two days a week for an horn-each day. Id. at 661-62. The district court found that the men had far greater opportunities for recreation. For example, the men at Central could play cards or engage in sports or other outdoor activities between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.; those at Medium could “have recreation all day long”; and at Occo-quan, they had between five and seven hours of recreation per day, depending on the season. Id. Religion. While women at the Annex had “Catholic and Protestant services on a weekly basis and a Bible Study Program,” id. at 659, the court concluded that they did not have access to the same religious activities as the men at Minimum. Id. at 677-78 (observing that religious services at the Annex were not as frequent as those at Minimum). The court made no findings with respect to religious programs at CTF. 2. Conclusions of Law In Women Prisoners I, the district court found the following to be violations of federal or D.C. law: (1) sexual harassment at the Annex, CTF, and the Jail (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. at 665-67; (2) substandard medical care at CTF (D.C.Code § 24-442), id. at 667-68; (3) the shackling of pregnant women (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. at 668-69; (4) “unconstitutionally intolerable risk of injury by fire” at the Annex (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. at 669-70; (5) inadequate fire safety measures at CTF (D.C.Code § 24-442), id. at 671-72; (6) intolerable living conditions at the Annex and CTF (Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983), id. at 670-71, 672; (7) discrimination in access to programs (Title IX), id. at 672-78. In Women Prisoners II, the district court rejected appellants’ argument that it should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims based on D.C.Code § 24-442. 899 F.Supp. at 665-68. The court also concluded that the discrepancy in the programs available to male and female inmates violated not only Title IX, but also equal protection principles as applied to the District through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 669-72. D. The District Court’s Order The Order, which is reported at Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 679-90, as amended by Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 677-79, contains 132 paragraphs of detailed instructions and is to remain “in effect with all provisions for five years.” ¶ 137. (The Order originally contained 138 paragraphs, but six were vacated in Women Prisoners II. 899 F.Supp. at 677.) The Order and its amendments are reprinted as Appendices A and B to this opinion. The Order consists of six parts, of which the first five are relevant to this appeal: I. Sexual Harassment. ¶¶3-19. The provisions relating to sexual harassment are multi-faceted. First, they require the DCDC to adopt a regulation that prohibits sexual harassment and invasions of female inmates’ privacy. ¶¶ 3-4, 7. This regulation must provide that female inmates who allege sexual misconduct may not be subject to any disciplinary action “regardless of the merits or the disposition of the underlying complaint.” ¶ 7(c). Second, the Order authorizes the district court’s Special Officer to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to participate in the establishment of penalties for prohibited conduct. ¶¶ 5, 6, 13 (in their entirety) and ¶¶ 8, 14, 15 (in part). Third, it requires the Department to comply with its own Inmate Grievance Procedure, which establishes the mechanisms by which inmates may report misconduct by prison guards. ¶ 9. In addition, the Order directs appellants to employ “trainers” to instruct inmates and jailers about the Department’s policies and regulations regarding sexual harassment and to heighten their awareness of the problem. ¶¶ 17-18, as amended. II. Obstetrical and Gynecological Care. ¶¶ 20-62. Among many other things, these paragraphs require appellants to hire a half-time health educator with obstetrical and gynecological training to provide clinical and health services to the CTF population, ¶20, as amended; modify the intake screening of inmates and make special inquiry about then-use of contraceptives and history of sexually transmitted diseases, ¶ 24; adopt written “protocols” with regard to gynecological problems and the use of restraints on pregnant and postpartum women, ¶¶28, 35, as amended; and develop a written protocol governing prenatal care, ¶ 36. Other provisions concern such matters as the recording of pregnancy-related statistics, ¶ 23; Pap smears, ¶¶ 30, 32; medical staff coverage, ¶¶ 44-45; emergency care, If 46; and the scheduling of appointments and the transportation of inmates to the hospital, ¶¶ 49-50, as amended, ¶ 51. III. Program Evaluation. ¶¶ 63-101. Part III requires appellants to improve the quality of the academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs available to female inmates. Its purpose is to ensure that the women have access to the same opportunities and programs that are available to similarly situated men at other prisons. With regard to academic programs, appellants are ordered to provide the women with greater access to adult education and college-level programs. ¶¶ 68-69, 70-71, as amended, ¶ 72. They must also make a variety of vocational, pre-vocational, and work programs available to them. ¶¶ 76-93, as amended. The Order requires appellants to provide the women at CTF with 25 hours of recreation per week, ¶ 96, as amended, and those at the Annex with access to a recreation trailer “8 hours a day, 7 days a week.” ¶ 98. Appellants must also “improve the Annex grounds by adding a basketball court, volleyball pit, and outdoor tables.” ¶ 99. Finally, appellants must provide chaplaincy service to female inmates five days a week, including “evening hours during the week to accommodate those women working on details, industry, or in the community.” ¶ 101. IV. Environmental Health. ¶¶ 102-124. Appellants are required to improve environmental health at CTF and the Annex in a variety of ways. At the outset, they are ordered to limit the number of women imprisoned at the Annex to 135. ¶ 102, as amended. They are also directed to repair the Annex’s dormitory roofs, ¶ 103; provide each inmate with “at least one vertical locker and one footlocker,” ¶ 105; “replace all torn mattresses and pillows,” ¶ 106; “use cart liners or disposable or washable laundry bags to transport laundry,” ¶ 107; and provide each double-bunk with “a minimum of 20 footcandles of prisoner-controlled light.” ¶ 108. With respect to CTF, appellants are required to improve its heating and ventilation, ¶¶ 116-17, and to “monitor the food temperature and delivery times of all foods, including special diet meals.” ¶ 121. V. Fire Safety. ¶¶ 125-136. At the Annex, appellants are required to install and maintain fire alarm, fire detection, and sprinkler systems, ¶¶ 125-127; to ensure that bed linen and other dormitory materials are fire retardant, ¶ 128; and to “conduct fire drills 12 times per year, 4 times per shift, and [to] keep written documentation of all such drills.” ¶ 129. At CTF, appellants must, among other things, “maintain the storage in the culinary storage room in a manner that does not prevent the sprinkler heads from functioning adequately,” ¶ 134, and test the sprinkler system and fire pump and conduct fire drills on a periodic basis. ¶¶ 135, 136. E. Appellants’ Challenges Appellants characterize the relief ordered by the district court as far broader than necessary to correct the constitutional and statutory violations that were found to exist, and they ask that we vacate specific provisions in each of the first five parts of the Order, as follows: I. Sexual Harassment. ¶¶3-19. Although appellants concede that they have failed to protect women from sexual abuse, they challenge the paragraphs that (1) authorize the Special Officer’s staff to monitor sexual harassment complaints (¶¶ 5, 6, 13 (in their entirety) and 8, 12,14, 15 (in part)); (2) require the DCDC to comply with its Inmate Grievance Procedure (¶ 9); and (3) prohibit appellants from taking any retaliatory action against inmates who file complaints, even if it is determined that the inmate’s complaint was filed in bad faith (¶ 7(c)). II. Obstetrical and Gynecological Care. ¶¶ 20-62. Paragraphs 20-34 and 36-62, which require appellants to improve the quality of the obstetrical and gynecological care provided to inmates at CTF, are based on D.C.Code § 24-442. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 667-68. Appellants argue that these provisions must be set aside because the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these local law claims. They do not challenge paragraph 35 governing the use of physical restraints on pregnant women, which the court found to violate the Eighth Amendment. III. Program Evaluation. ¶¶ 63-101. These paragraphs are based on alternative grounds: (1) Title IX, which requires recipients of federal aid to provide men and women with equal access to educational programs and activities, see Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 676-78; and (2) constitutional equal protection principles, which require that men and women who are similarly situated be treated alike, see Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 669-72. Appellants ask that we vacate paragraphs 64-67 and 83-99 “to the extent that they affect work details, prison industries, work training, and recreation,” Brief for Appellants at 37, because, they contend, these activities are unrelated to academic and vocational education. They also object, as “having nothing to do with Title IX,” id., provisions governing law library hours, ¶ 64; transportation of prisoners to job interviews, ¶ 93; “large group events,” ¶ 97; and religious programs, ¶¶ 100-101. In addition, appellants argue that equal protection principles have no application to this case because the district court compared male and female inmates who were not similarly situated. Finally, they raise a general objection to the remedies as being far too expansive and burdensome, citing, as examples, paragraphs 71 (requiring the provision of college educations), 98 and 99 (mandating hours for the recreational trailer and the construction of basketball and volleyball facilities and picnic tables at the Annex), and 64 (requiring the coordination of the timing of activities “to maximize women prisoners’ participation in as many areas as possible”). IV. Environmental Health. ¶¶ 102-124. Appellants challenge paragraph 102, as amended, which imposes a population cap at the Annex. They argue that it is not warranted and encroaches on their ability to incarcerate convicts. They also make vague challenges to the other paragraphs in this section, contending that they are overbroad and unduly intrusive. V. Fire Safety. ¶¶ 125-136. These paragraphs address the court’s findings of violations of the Eighth Amendment at the Annex, .and of D.C.Code § 24-442 at CTF. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 669-70, 671-72. Appellants challenge those relating to CTF (¶¶ 133-136), contending that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under that section. F. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 On April 25, 1996, following oral argument in this appeal, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA” or “Act”) became effective. The reforms were enacted as Title VIII, sections 801 and 802 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, Stat. (Apr. 26, 1996). The Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626, which is now entitled “Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions.” It governs all civil litigation, whether in a federal or state court, with respect to conditions in a federal, state, or local prison that are alleged to violate a federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (d), and (g)(2) and (5). It apples to pending cases such as this one. Id. § 3626(b)(l)(A)(iii) & (b)(2). In supplemental briefs submitted by the parties, appellants argue that the Act has invalidated the great majority of the paragraphs in the Order. Specifically, they maintain that the PLRA (1) denies federal courts the authority to order prospective relief to correct violations of local law; (2) precludes the assigning of non-judicial functions to a court-appointed special officer; (3) prohibits the award of relief that is not “narrowly drawn”; and (4) strips federal courts of the power to impose population caps on prisons except under circumstances that are not satisfied here. In response, appellees question appellants’ construction of the PLRA and raise a number of constitutional and other challenges to the Act. They also note that they had originally alleged that the inadequate medical care and fire safety provided the female inmates at CTF violated both D.C.Code § 24-442 and the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, if we should find that the Act divested the district court of its supplemental jurisdiction over the section 24^442 claims, they ask that we remand those issues so that the court may consider the constitutional questions previously reserved. We will not address appellees’ objections to the Act for two reasons: First, we are able to dispose of the majority of appellants’ challenges on the basis of pre-PLRA law. Second, because the new statute may be disposi-tive of the remaining challenges and may provide the basis for new ones, we will remand the provisions we do not vacate so that the district court may review them in light of the PLRA. Appellees will be free, at that time, to bring their various challenges to the Act and to renew their Eighth Amendment claims with respect to medical care and fire safety at CTF. II. Discussion As a preliminary matter, we think it appropriate to emphasize that federal courts must move with caution when called upon to deal with even serious violations of the law by local prison officials. As the Supreme Court observed in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 1663, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990), “one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions.” This respect for local authorities is at its zenith in the context of prison reform litigation: “[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 n. 16, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1879, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (“the operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government, not the Judicial”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.”). Only weeks ago the Supreme Court reversed a district court order that had mandated detailed, system-wide changes in Arizona’s prison law libraries. Lewis v. Casey, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observed that, in Preiser, the Court had held that “considerations of comity ... require giving the States the first opportunity to correct errors made in the internal administration of their prisons,” and that the district court in Lewis had “totally failed to heed the admonition of Preiser.” — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2186 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A. Supplemental Jurisdiction The district court concluded that the DCDC had failed to provide adequate medical care and fire safety at CTF in violation of D.C. law, which provides that the Department shall have charge of the management and regulation of [D.C. prisons], and be responsible for the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons committed to such institutions. D.C.Code § 244142. Of the Order’s 132 paragraphs, roughly one-third are intended to remedy violations of this section. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 667-68, 671-72; Order at ¶¶ 20-34; 36-62; 131-32 (to the extent that they relate to CTF); 133-36. Appellants argue that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over these D.C.Code claims violated the supplemental jurisdiction provisions of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). When a federal court has an independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction, it may, in certain circumstances, also exercise pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction over related claims under state law. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Supreme Court crafted a two-part test to determine when the assertion of jurisdiction over a state law claim is appropriate. First, the district court must determine whether the state and the federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”; if they do, the court has the power, under Article III of the Constitution, to hear the state claim. Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Second, even if it concludes that it has that power, the district court must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over the state issue. Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. The Supreme Court cautioned that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims .... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Id. A district court’s decision to resolve state law claims is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C.Cir.1995). In 1990, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which provides in relevant part: (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) ..., in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution .... * * * * ❖ * (e) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. ‡ ‡ sj: Jjs (e) As used in this section, the term “State” includes the District of Columbia 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As we observed in Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union International and Local 689, 38 F.3d 598, 601 (D.C.Cir.1994), the extent to which section 1367(c) has modified the district’s court’s discretion to hear claims under local law is a matter of some dispute. In Diven, we rejected the argument that section 1367 had restricted the district court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, see id.; and we have since stated that section 1367(c) “essentially codifies [Gibbs]," Edmondson & Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1266. Here, the district court clearly had the power to consider appellees’ local claims under section 24-442. Their claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and Title IX were substantial enough to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, see Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138; and the local law claims, relating to the adequacy of the medical care and fire safety at CTF, arose from a “common nucleus of operative facts” as the federal claims; namely, the District’s decision to re-assume custody of its female prisoners and its alleged failure to provide for their needs. The question before us, then, is whether the court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the local claims. The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that district courts may decline jurisdiction over claims that “raise[] a novel or complex issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Appellants argued below, and renew their argument on appeal, that the novelty of appellees’ request for equitable relief based on section 24-442 precluded the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Specifically, they contend that the section merely extends the common law of torts to local prisons. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629, 639 (D.C.1987). See also Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988); Hughes v. District of Columbia, 425 A.2d 1299, 1302 (D.C.1981); Gaither v. District of Columbia, 333 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C.1975). Appellants point out that the statute has been relied upon by inmates suing for monetary damages and that D.C. courts have applied ordinary tort principles to those cases. See, e.g., Mitchell, 533 A.2d at 633; Matthews v. District of Columbia, 387 A.2d 731, 732 (D.C.1978). Furthermore, appellants observe that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has relied upon cases in other jurisdictions that have held that similar laws simply permit a common law tort action for inmate claims against prison officials. See Gaither, 333 A.2d at 60 (citing Justice v. Rose, 102 Ohio App. 482, 144 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1957) (Ohio statute is “simply declaratory of the common law”)). Finally, appellants note that the statute has never been interpreted to allow inmates to seek injunctive relief such as that granted here. The district court rejected appellants’ arguments and concluded that the award of injunctive relief under section 24-442 did not raise a novel issue of local law. It stated that “[t]he exercise of injunctive relief ... is an unexceptionable feature of the common law.” Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 668. We respectfully disagree with the district court’s analysis. While it is true, of course, that the common law recognized the propriety of injunctive relief in certain instances, it was never regarded as relief of first resort; indeed, in tort actions, the standard formulation of the common law on this point is that equitable relief, such as an injunction, will be granted only when plaintiffs legal remedies are inadequate. See John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 218, at 369 (5th ed.1941); William Q. de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity § 18, at 32 (2d ed.1956). Furthermore, courts have long stated that a variety of factors, including the public interest, may weigh against the award of an injunction. See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 53 S.Ct. 602, 77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933); Blair v. Freeman, 370 F.2d 229, 239 (D.C.Cir.1966). We think it significant that we can find no case in which a D.C. court has awarded injunctive relief under section 24-442; nor are we aware of any case in which injunctive relief was sought under this section of the D.C.Code, even though the inmates of D.C. prisons are no strangers to the judicial system and have frequently sought injunctive relief in both the D.C. and federal courts. In the last major prisoners’ class action to come before us involving allegations of, inter alia, inadequate medical care and fire safety, the claims were pled solely as Eighth Amendment violations. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 829 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“Occoquan”). No one seized upon the “unexceptionable” idea of seeking alternative injunc-tive relief under section 24-442. The Supreme Court has counseled that “the proper function of [a] federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be,” Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1022, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); and we have observed that “a federal court should be reluctant to retain pendent jurisdiction over a question for which state jurisprudence gives inadequate guidance.” Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 776 (D.C.Cir.1982). Thus, while we will generally defer to a district court’s decision to assert supplemental jurisdiction, that deference is not boundless. In Metzger and Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C.Cir.1983), we held that the district court had abused its discretion in deciding pendent claims when the local law was unsettled. We noted that “ ‘[although the District Court devoted considerable time, effort and care to these questions, in a completely unsettled area of local law a federal District Court opinion is no substitute for an authoritative decision by the courts of the District of Columbia.’ ” Doe, 717 F.2d at 1428-29 (quoting Metzger, 680 F.2d at 778). See also Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C.Cir.1984) (because, among other factors, the ease involved an unsettled issue of local law, “[ajppellees’ remedy, if any, lies in the courts of the District of Columbia”); Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th Cir.1995) (under section 1367(c), state “courts are the appropriate forum to decide [a] novel and complex issue of state law”); Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 760 n. 4 (3d Cir.1995) (section 1367(c) “counsels against the exercise of jurisdiction when ‘the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law’ ”). Our dissenting colleague contends that “[wjhatever other objections might be raised to the district court’s enforcement of local law in this case, ... it cannot be said that the court’s action was novel. See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 100, 105 (D.D.C.1975) (for constitutional violation, imposing mandatory injunction that in part required local agencies to remedy violations of local fire, building, housing, health, and food regulations at D.C. Jail) ...” Dissent at 948. In other words, the dissent contends that in Campbell the district court had awarded equitable relief to remedy a local law violation, and therefore the district court’s action in this ease has a precedent. With all respect, we think this distorts the holding in Campbell. There, the district court found that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment; to remedy these constitutional violations, the district court ordered the District to comply with local law provisions. See Campbell, 416 F.Supp. at 105. Here, the district court suggested that the medical care at CTF might rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, see Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 667; nevertheless, it expressly declined to decide the issue on constitutional grounds. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 667 n.42. Furthermore, the dissent mischaracterizes our holding when it states that “[t]he judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia would ... be ... surprised ... to hear it suggested that they lacked the authority to impose appropriate injunctive relief in the face of ongoing institutional failure to meet a legal duty of care.” Dissent at 948 n.5. Plainly, local courts are free to interpret section 24^442 as authorizing injunctive relief. We simply repeat our earlier point: they never have. The dissent is quite confident that the local courts would so interpret this statute; we confess to being impressed by the fact that they have never done so. The intrusiveness of the relief sought also weighs against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(4) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction”). The section of the Order relating to medical care at CTF is a case study in the judicial micromanagement of a local prison system. The Order requires appellants, inter alia, to hire a nurse midwife to provide additional services to the female inmates (¶20, as amended), establish a prenatal clinic (¶ 22), maintain statistics on the number of pregnancies and “birth outcomes” (¶ 23), develop and implement detailed protocols concerning the care for a variety of diseases (¶28), develop protocols providing guidelines for high-risk pregnancies involving women with histories of alcohol and drug abuse and venereal diseases (¶36), arrange for obstetrical examinations of pregnant women in accordance with a detailed schedule (¶ 37), implement “an obstetrical and gynecological health education program that satisfies a recognized national medical standard” (¶43, as amended), and ensure that female inmates are transported to the hospital, even for routine procedures, “no more than 2 hours before the scheduled time of their appointment” (¶ 60, as amended). These may all be highly desirable measures, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against such detailed marching orders. See, e.g., Lewis, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2186. In Grano, as in this case, the district court applied a D.C. statute in a novel way to assume control over local political processes. We dissolved the injunction, explaining: In general, principles of comity and the desirability of a surer-footed reading of applicable law support the determination of state claims in state court. Determination by the state court is especially important where the case involves novel and unsettled issues of state law. Here, the law in question is new, its meaning ambiguous and sharply disputed. Moreover, the district court should not retain jurisdiction because this case directly implicates the processes by which a locality governs itself. Appellees’ remedy, if any, lies in the courts of the District of Columbia. 733 F.2d at 169 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By its plain terms, section 24-442 simply requires the District’s jailers to exercise reasonable care in discharging their duties. The district court and dissent would read this bland codification of tort principles to empower federal courts to usurp control over fire safety and medical care at local prisons. There can, of course, be no limiting principle here. Issues relating to security, sanitation, food preparation, ventilation, etc., will all come within the court’s authority. We wonder whether the lawmakers who enacted section 24-442 intended to transfer control over the District’s prisons to the courts (or, more likely, a small cadre of court-appointed special officers). If this be the import of section 24-442, let the District’s courts proclaim it. Because it is not settled that section 24-442 authorizes injunctive relief, and because federal courts are obliged to exercise restraint in the extraordinary circumstances posed by prison litigation of this nature, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over these local claims .in violation of the supplemental jurisdiction statute and the well-established principles that it has codified. We therefore vacate ¶¶ 20-34, 36-62; 131-32 (to the extent that they relate to CTF); and 133-36. B. The Programs The district court found that female inmates at CTF and the Annex had not received the same access to academic, vocational, work, recreational, and religious programs that were available to similarly situated men at other prisons. In its original opinion, the court held that this violated Title IX. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 672-78. In Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 669-72, the court concluded that the unequal access to programs also violated the equal protection principles of the Constitution. Part III of the Order requires appellants to improve the quantity and quality of these programs at CTF and the Annex, see ¶¶ 63-101; it also requires appellants to increase the women’s access to a law library (¶ 64) and “group events” (¶ 97) and to transport them to job interviews (¶ 93). Appellants do not challenge the provisions that relate to educational (academic and vocational) programs. They ask us, however, to vacate those paragraphs of the Order (¶¶ 83-101, in their entirety, and ¶¶ 64-67, in part) that require them to upgrade the work, recreational, and religious programs available to female inmates, and that relate to law library hours, group events, and transportation to job interviews. They argue, first, that those prison activities are not “educational” and, as a consequence, are not subject to Title IX; second, they assert that the district court’s equal protection analysis is fundamentally flawed because the women at the Annex and CTF are not similarly situated to the men at the other facilities. We address the latter argument first because the district court’s Title IX and equal protection analyses are both predicated on its conclusion that the respective prison populations were similarly situated. See Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 675-76; Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 670-71. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires States to treat similarly situated persons alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). The District of Columbia is subject to that requirement by virtue of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Family Division Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 697 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1984). The Constitution, however, ‘“does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ ” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940)); accord Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1204, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981). Thus, the “[dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection.” Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.1994) (“Klinger F). The threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal protection claim is, therefore, “to determine whether a person is similarly situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treatment.” United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir.1995). We believe the same principle should apply in Title IX cases. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep’t of Correctional Services, 887 F.Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (D.Neb.1995) (“Klinger II”). In reviewing the district court’s conclusions, we begin, as indicated above, by addressing its assumption that the prisoners at the several facilities were similarly situated “by virtue of their similar custody levels, sentence structures and purposes of incarceration.” Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 675. Appellants argue that these are only three of a number of factors that must be considered when determining whether two groups of inmates are sufficiently similarly situated to render meaningful a comparison of the programs available to each. Two recent cases are instructive in this regard. In Klinger I, the Eighth Circuit observed that prison officials must balance many considerations, ranging from the characteristics of the inmates at that prison to the size of the institution, to determine the optimal mix of programs and services. See Turner [v. Safley], 482 U.S. [78] at 84-85 [107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259-60, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)]. Program priorities thus differ from prison to prison, depending on innumerable variables that officials must take into account. 31 F.3d at 732. A later case, Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F.Supp. 1243, 1254-62 (S.D.Iowa 1995), aff'd, 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir.1995), pet. for cert. filed (Apr. 8, 1996) (No. 95-8906), illustrates the variables that must be taken into consideration. In concluding that the female inmates were not similarly situated to the male inmates with whom they sought to be compared, the district court in Pargo placed particular stress on five factors: population size of the prison, security level, types of crimes, length of sentence, and special characteristics. 894 F.Supp. at 1259-61. See also testimony of Regina Gilmore, Acting Female Program Coordinator at DCDC, at Tr. IX-5-6, and of Dr. T.A. Ryan, expert witness, at Tr. XI-38-39 (programming needs of inmates are gauged by their classification, which takes the following factors into account: custody level; medical, educational, and employment histories; substance abuse information; impending factors relating to pre-release; results of psychological testing; social services reports; and security risks). Here, the district court acknowledged that 82 percent of women incarcerated in the facilities operated by the District were single-parent primary caretakers, and that only seven percent were serving sentences for violent crimes. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 656. It failed, however, to make any findings regarding the types of crimes for which male inmates had been convicted, or other “special characteristics” of male inmates. Compare with Pargo, 894 F.Supp. at 1254-57 (addressing the “types of crimes” and “special characteristics” of male inmates before drawing comparison to the female inmates). Nor did it take into account the striking disparities between the sizes of the prison populations that were being compared. The district court found that the female inmates at the Annex were similarly situated to the men at Minimum. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 656; Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 670. Yet Minimum had a population of 936 prisoners in contrast to the 167 at the Annex. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 656. It is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination, that the smaller correctional facility offered fewer programs than the larger one. We doubt, for example, that tuition-paying parents who entrust their daughters to the all-women Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, would raise an eyebrow (let alone accuse the college of sex discrimination) on learning that Smith offers its 2,800 students approximately 1,000 courses while Harvard University provides its 6,600 undergraduates with three times as many. Even if the women at the Annex had access to a third or half the number of work and religious programs as the men at Minimum, because of the six-to-one difference in their respective populations, on a per inmate basis, the women had access to two or three times the number of programs as did the men. Cf Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1233 (9th Cir.1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (while female inmates have access to fewer total number of programs, “[t]he women’s prison has almost 2^ times as many [programs] per prisoner as the most generous male prison”). We do not suggest that these mechanical ratios are a test of comparability; merely that, standing alone, the difference in the number of programs provided by prisons having vastly different numbers of inmates cannot be taken as evidence that those in small institutions that offer fewer programs have been denied equal protection. More than that is required. As regards the women at CTF, the district court found that they were similarly situated to male inmates at the Occoquan, Central, and Medium facilities. Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 659; Women Prisoners II, 899 F.Supp. at 671. While CTF is an 800-bed facility, and thus arguably comparable in size to Central (1,373 inmates), Miedium (1,016 inmates), and Occoquan (1,767 inmates), the female inmates at CTF number only 271. The district court specifically rejected a comparison of CTF men with its women because the “men reside at CTF for either short-term diagnostic attention or a voluntary 18-month intensive substance abuse program.” Women Prisoners I, 877 F.Supp. at 675. We note, however, that somewhere between 35 percent and 50 percent of the women at CTF are serving sentences of less than two years, and the vast majority of the remaining women are serving sentences of between two and four years. Id. at 675 n. 50. In other words, the women at CTF, like the men, are not being incarcerated there for an extended period of time. The district court failed to make any findings regarding the programs available to male inmates at CTF, and there is thus no evidence that they enjoy access to more fulfilling opportunities than the women. The female inmates at CTF are, therefore, foreclosed from making an equal protection challenge. The dissent contends that our analysis errs because we have ignored “how the prisoners came to be segregated,” with women typically assigned to smaller prisons than the men. Dissent at 952. As an initial matter, we note that the segregation of inmates by sex is unquestionably constitutional. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C.Cir.1989). The District’s decision to imprison women in smaller facilities than the typical male prison is the obvious result of an undisputed fact: there are far fewer female inmates. As of January 1994, the total number of female inmates incarcerated in all of the District’s jails was 606; this is considerably less than the total population at the smallest male facility (Minimum, pop. 936) discussed in this ease. It would be difficult for one facility to house all these female inmates because they range from minimum to maximum custody, from those awaiting immediate release to those serving long sentences. Furthermore, our decision here is altogether consistent with the Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of equal protection principles in United States v. Virginia, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (“VMI”). In VMI, the Supreme Court compared the programs available at the all-female Mary Baldwin College, where the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (“VMIL”) is located, with the programs available at the all-male Virginia Military Institute (‘VMI”). The enrollment at Mary Baldwin College is 1,327 students, of whom 650 actually live on the campus, United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.Supp. 471, 500, 501 (W.D.Va.1994); the enrollment at VMI is 1,124, United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 766 F.Supp. 1407, 1419 (W.D.Va.1991). Despite their comparable sizes, the two colleges offered vastly different educational and athletic programming. The Court noted: Mary Baldwin does not offer a VMIL student the range of curricular choices available to a VMI cadet. VMI awards baccalaureate degrees in liberal arts, biology, chemistry, civil engineering, electrical and computer engineering, and mechanical engineering. VMIL students attend a school “that does not have a math and science focus”; they cannot take at Mary Baldwin any courses in engineering or the advanced math and physics courses VMI offers. VMI, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2284 (citations omitted). In addition, the Court noted the extreme discrepancy in the financial resources available to Mary Baldwin and VMI. Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 2285. Here, while appellees have alleged that the District provides inferi- or programs, they have not alleged that the District allocates fewer resources per female inmate, nor was any evidence apparently introduced at trial to that effect. Appellees’ claim, therefore, would appear to be that appellants have mismanaged the resources allocated to female inmates by failing to provide them with the identical programs offered to the men. In effect, appellees are inviting this court to find that the District’s decision to provide male (but not female) inmates with access to any given program violates equal protection principles. We decline this invitation. While certain programs (such as a work detail in auto mechanics) may be available only to male inmates, other programs (such as a life skills class) may be available only to female inmates. Under the program-by-program method of comparison embraced by the dissent, any divergence from an identity of programs gives rise to equal protection liability. Thus, if male inmates have access to a work detail that is unavailable to women, that violates equal protection. If men can spend an extra hour a day in a gymnasium, that violates equal protection. Conversely, if women had access to a parenting class unavailable to men, that violates equal protection. Such an approach completely eviscerates the deference that federal courts are obliged to give prison administrators. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85, 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2259-60, 2261. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, as between any two prisons, there will always be stark differences in programming. Assuming that all prisons start with adequate yet limited funding — as we must here, because plaintiffs do not claim that [the correctional facility] is subject to discriminatory funding — officials will calibrate programming needs differently in each prison, emphasizing in one prison programs that they de-emphasize in others. Thus, female inmates always can point out ways in which male prisons are “bet