State v. Gleason (12 Fla. 190, 1868)

WESTCOTT, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

'Phis is an application for this court to exercise original jurisdiction in the case at bar, which is an information in the nature of a quo warranto instituted in behalf of the State of Florida by Almon R. Mock, its Attorney-General..

Under the first four points of the answer to the rule, the fol lowing questions arise:

Has filiis court original jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo war ranto ? Tf so, do proceedings under an information in the na ture of a quo warranto come within the constitutional grant of power to issue a writ of quo warranto, and is it necessary for the Legislature to prescribe the mode and manner of proceeding before the court can exercise the-power granted in the Const! tution ?

Upon an examination of the Constitutions of the several States (as well as that of the United States) it will be found, that in some constitutions the. powers granted to the Supreme Court are threefold:

First. Appellate powers.

Second. Original powers, embracing the -power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, and habeas corpus, ad dressed to persons, or to courts.

Third. The grant of power to exercise a superintending control over courts of inferior jurisdiction, by means of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and other writs applicable to this purpose.

In other Stales, it, will be found that. the. powers given are twofold :

First. Appellate powers strictly.

Second. Power to exorcise a. superintending control over inferior jurisdictions by appropriate writs, and power to issue writs of h/dxmx cor/ncx. '

A careful examination will show that (he Supremo. Courts of the States are, as a. general thing, clothed with powers in addition to those which are ts appellate jurisdiction andas an original power?

Two positions are taken in argument-,in inference to the grant of powers to the Supreme Court.

It is assumed, that that portion of the Constitution preceding the clause which we are here to construe, vests a jurisdiction which is strictly appellate in its character, and, excluding the exceptions enumerated, so .extensive in its scope that the <£ human mind can conceive, of no casein which the court, has not appellate jurisdiction.”

This is without doubt a correct construction, and it follows from it also, that the court would, without any additional or subsequent clause in the Constitution, possess all the powers necessary to its complete exercise, upon the admitted and ever active principle applicable to the construction of constitutional grants of power — that the incidental power follows the grant of the principal power. A grant of the principal power of apj>cllate jurisdiction embraces, e.v- necessitate, the powers appropriately adjunct thereto; without them the principal grant would be 'inoperative, and substance become but shadow.

The second position assumed in argument is, that the next grant of power contained in the words “ the court shall have power to issue write of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus,” is qualified by the words “ necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,”' in the subsequent portion of the sentence.

The precise extent to which it was qualified was not developed ; but looking to authority to determine it, the conclusion is irresistible, that with this construction this court has nothing granted in this entire sentence, purporting to grant additional-powers, which did not follow from the extensive grant contained in the preceding portion of the section.

If the words “ necessary or proper to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction” are held to qualify, to the extent claimed,, the power to issue the preceding enumerated writs, the result is twofold:

First. That this court has nothing except appellate jurisdiction, and it can issue no writs, whatever may be their character (except hateas corpus), that are not necessary or proper to a complete exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

Second. That power “ to issue -writs of mandamus, quo warranto, hateas corpus, and such other j-emedial and original writs as are necessary to give this court a general superintendence and control of all inferior courts,” is not vested in this court.

As to the second position stated, it is taken upon the assumption that Justice Thompson, one of the ablest judicial minds this State has produced, was correct in his view in the case of ex parte White, 4th Florida, 165, to the efiect “that power to. issue writs of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and such other remedial and original writs as may be necessary to give this court a general superintendence of all other courts, is a power not necessarily included in the grant of appellate jurisdiction.”

This conclusion of Justice Thompson is somewhat shaken, if not entirely overthrown, by the decisions in tlie Supreme Court of the United States.

The powers granted to the Supreme Court of the United States by the Constitution of the United States are original as to cases affecting ambassadors,