Citations
- 519 So. 2d 728
Full opinion text
SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
Hillsborough County appeals the circuit court’s order awarding $16,500 in attorney’s fees to Anthony Márchese for his court appointed legal services provided in a criminal case. The proper procedure for challenging an order awarding attorney’s fees to court appointed counsel is by petition for certiorari, not appeal. Schommer v. Bentley, 489 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Therefore, we treat this appeal as a petition for certiorari. We grant the petition.
Following an order granting the public defender’s motion to withdraw and appoint private counsel, the trial court appointed Márchese to represent Curtis Von Woodard on the charge of first degree murder. At the conclusion of his representation, Márch-ese filed a motion based on Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986) cert, denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 908, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987), requesting attorney’s fees in excess of the $3,500 amount set by section 925.036, Florida Statutes, for the defense of one charged with a capital crime. In Makemson, the supreme court held that trial courts could depart from section 925.036, Florida Statutes, in extraordinary and unusual cases, when necessary to ensure that counsel is compensated in an amount which is not confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talents. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1115.
Marchese’s motion reflected that he rendered 200.85 hours of professional service to the defendant. At the hearing on the motion, Márchese presented expert testimony that the fair market value of his service was $20,000 to $25,000, and that a reasonable fee would be $15,000 to $16,000. The trial court found that the case involved extraordinary circumstances due to difficulties presented by the client, who was uncooperative and hostile to Márchese. Additionally, because the defendant would not agree to a continuance of the already scheduled trial, Márchese prepared and tried the case two weeks after his appointment. This caused him to virtually abandon his law practice during those weeks. The court found that Márchese provided “extremely effective” representation. After finding that the case was extraordinary and unusual, the trial judge awarded Márchese fees totaling $16,500.
On May 28, 1985, the chief judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit amended Administrative Order No. 79-3 to provide that special public defenders receive compensation at the rate of forty dollars an hour. The order was in effect at the time that Márchese accepted the appointment to represent the defendant. The fee awarded Márchese was not based on the rate established in the amended administrative order.
Subsequent to the trial judge’s order, we addressed a similar situation in Board of County Commissioners of Hills-borough County, Florida v. Lopez, 518 So.2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). There, we found that while the court could award attorney’s fees in excess of those statutorily established, the court must impose those fees based upon the hourly rate established by the chief judge in that circuit. See also Metropolitan Dade County v. Gold, 509 So.2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Our decision here is controlled by Lopez. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and remand this case to the circuit court with directions to recalculate Marchese’s fee based upon the hourly rate established by the chief judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.
HALL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.