Citations

Full opinion text

STEVENSON, Judge.

Appellant, the wife’s former attorney in a dissolution proceeding, appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to enforce an attorney’s charging lien against the former husband. We reverse.

Appellant’s attorney’s charging lien was properly perfected by the timely filing of notice of such hen. Both the former husband and his attorney had notice of the Hen; yet, without notice to appellant, a settlement agreement was negotiated, which allowed for the entry of a final judgment that made no provision for the Hen and allowed all of the funds to be distributed directly to the wife. One of the advantages of a perfected charging Hen is that it may prevent the Henee from obtaining unfettered access to the funds to the possible detriment of the Henor’s rights. See Wishoff v. Wishoff, 497 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(GHckstein, J., concurring speciaUy)(noting that a charging Hen “protects counsel from the parties’ looking after themselves at his expense”); Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb, 452 So.2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)(stating “charging Hen ... is based upon equitable principles; the cHent should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment, award or decree if the attorney who secured it has not been compensated”).

Here, because appellant had no opportunity to participate in the settlement negotiations and was without notice that the particular negotiated judgment was going to be entered, appellant was unable to protect her Hen rights prior to the entry of that judgment. This case is directly eontroUed by Hutchins v. Hutchins, 522 So.2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Accordingly, appellant is entitled to enforce her attorney’s charging hen against the former husband.

REVERSED.

GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., concur.