Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Rules (762 So. 2d 392, 1999)

Citations

762 So. 2d 392

Full opinion text

CORRECTED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar has petitioned this Court to amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar relating to attorney advertising. Notice of the proposed amendments was published in The Florida Bar News, and this Court has received a number of comments in response. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

Based in large part upon recommendations from The Florida Bar’s Joint Presidential Advertising Task Force (Task Force), the Bar has proposed creating rules 3-1.3 (Lawyers Admitted in Jurisdictions Other Than Florida) and 15-1.2 (Applicability), both of which relate to this Court’s disciplinary authority over non-Florida attorneys who solicit or advertise for legal employment in Florida. The remainder of the Bar’s proposed amendments pertain to a comprehensive “overhaul” of subchapter 4-7 (Information About Legal Services). We have received comments and held oral argument on the Bar’s petition.

We here discuss some of the proposed changes. We follow this opinion with an appendix which includes changes to the rules which we hereby adopt.

Proposed Rule 3-1.3; Rule 15-1.2

In its petition, the Bar proposes rule 3-1.3 (Lawyers Admitted in Jurisdictions Other Than Florida), a new rule which provides in pertinent part that “lawyers, whether or not admitted to practice laiu in Florida, who solicit or advertise for legal employment in Florida or who target solicitations or advertisements for legal employment at Florida residents ... must do so only in accordance with the applicable provisions of these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.” (Emphasis added.) Proposed rule 15-1.2 (Applicability) concomitantly subjects such lawyers to this Court’s advertising rules and procedures if they “disseminate advertisements within Florida or target advertisements at Florida residents.” The Bar advises that these proposed rules stem directly from the offensive and improper practices of some non-Florida attorneys who converged on the survivors of those killed in the ValuJet airplane crash in the Everglades in May of 1996.

We deny the adoption of these proposed rules, as they essentially treat lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions like members of The Florida Bar for the limited purpose of subjecting them to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar regarding solicitation and advertising. We find the proposed rules unnecessary. Out-of-state lawyers are not lawyers who are subject to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar; rather, they are “nonlawyers” subject to chapter 10 unlicensed practice of law charges if they, among other things, engage in improper solicitation or advertising in Florida.

Specifically, chapter 10 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Rules Governing the Investigation and Prosecution of the Unlicensed Practice of Law), provides that “[pjursuant to the provisions of article V, section 15, of the Florida Constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida has inherent jurisdiction to prohibit the unlicensed practice of law” by nonlawyers. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-1.1 (Jurisdiction); see Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So.2d 979, 982 (Fla.1993) (rejecting nonlawyer’s argument that this Court’s jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law extends only to licensed attorneys); Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, 417 (Fla.1980) (“Inherent in our supervisory power is the authority to prohibit the unauthorized practice of law.”). Chapter 10 explicitly defines “nonlawyer or nonattorney” as “an individual who is not a member of The Florida Bar ... [including] lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-2.1(b) (Nonlawyer or Nonattorney) (emphasis added); cf. Preamble to ch. 4, R. Regulating Fla. Bar (A Lawyer’s Responsibilities) (“ ‘Lawyer’ denotes a person who is a member of The Florida Bar or otherwise authorized to practice in any court of the State of Florida.”). Chapter 10 further defines the “unlicensed practice of law” as “the practice of law, as prohibited by statute,[] court rule,[] and case law of the State of Florida.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-2.1(a) (Unlicensed Practice of Law).

Our case law is clear that improper solicitation or advertising in Florida by lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions is prohibited as the unlicensed practice of law. For example, in Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So.2d 1132, 1133 (Fla.1981), the referee found a New York attorney guilty of the unauthorized practice of law for implying in telephone-book, television, and newspaper advertising that he was authorized to practice law in Florida. In concluding that the referee’s findings of fact regarding the unauthorized practice of law were justified, this Court held:

The record supports the referee’s conclusion that [the New York attorney at issue] knew that his advertisements created the impression that he was authorized to practice in Florida on his own, and did not meet the requirements of our most recent pronouncement with respect to the interstate practice of law. See The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So.2d 559 (Fla.1978).[]

Accordingly [the New York attorney at issue] is hereby enjoined from any advertising by newspaper, television or otherwise that would tend to mislead the public into believing he is a member of The Florida Bar or authorized to practice in this state....

Kaiser, 397 So.2d at 1133-34; see also Florida Bar v. Tate, 552 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Fla.1989) (enjoining Pennsylvania attorney from representing that he was a member of The Florida Bar; from utilizing any cards, letterhead, or other written material identifying him as attorney at law without otherwise specifying that he was only admitted in Pennsylvania; and from otherwise engaging in the practice of law in Florida); Florida Bar v. Dale, 496 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.1986) (enjoining Mississippi lawyer from impliedly or expressly holding himself out as licensed to practice law in Florida or from describing himself as a lawyer or attorney, and directing him to remove all indicia of his status as a lawyer from public view in his title company offices). We also call attention to our decision in Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So.2d 180 (Fla.1995), which rendered void a contingency fee agreement entered into for pursuit of a claim in Florida by an out-of-state attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Additionally, of course, such lawyers remain subject to the disciplinary authority of the jurisdictions in which they have been admitted. As succinctly stated in the comment to Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 4-8.5 (Jurisdiction), “In modern practice lawyers frequently act outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice, either in another state or outside the United States. In doing so, they remain subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to ‘practice.” (Emphasis added.) We accordingly reject proposed rules 3-1.3 and 15-1.2, and suggest that the Bar instead develop and submit for approval by this Court proposed amendments amplifying chapter 10 and the rules concerning the unlicensed practice of law in regard to solicitation and advertising by lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions.

Proposed Subchapter Rule 4-7

The Bar has proposed substantial revisions to subchapter 4-7 in the form of both amendments to and a reorganization of the rules thereunder. We generally accept the proposed amendments and reorganization except where we specifically reject the proposed changes.

Our decision as to the rules pertaining to advertising must be within the' boundaries of multiple United States Supreme Court decisions on these issues. Our decision is our determination as to the limits of constitutional regulation absent a change in the analysis of the United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court as applied to this regulation.

Rule 4-7.1, in its existing form, is deleted. Existing rule 4-7.2(a) is essentially moved to rule 4-7.1. We accept this change, except we find no reason to delete “radio, television,” as those words are stated in the existing rule 4-7.2(a). Therefore, the words “radio, television” are included in the new rule 4-7.1(a). We also reject the addition to the end of new rule 4 — 7.1(b) the phrase “and does not concern the provision of legal services within Florida.” We conclude that this phrase was placed in this rule to be consistent with the Bar’s proposed rule 3-1.3 (Lawyers Admitted in Jurisdictions Other Than Florida), which we have rejected.

As to proposed rule 4-7.2(a)(2), the rule requires a “bona fide office,” defined as “a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm where the lawyer or law firm reasonably expects to furnish legal services in a substantial way on a regular and continuing basis.” Comments contend that this definition of “bona fide office” is too vague and uncertain. We agree with the Bar that this requirement is necessary for the protection of the public relying upon advertisements. We do not find the definition too facially vague or uncertain. This determination, of course, is without prejudice as to any contests of specific applications.

As to proposed rule 4-7.2(c)(7), concerning payment by a nonadvertisingi lawyer, we accept this provision but clarify that rule 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(D) (regarding division of contingency fees) is not affected by this provision even though the lawyer covered by rule 4 — 1.5(f)(4)(D)(ii) advertises.

As to rules 4-7.3 and 4-7.4, we accept the revisions proposed by the Bar.

Proposed Rule 4-7.5(b)

Proposed rule 4-7.5(b) (Appearance on Television or Radio) imposes restrictions on attorney advertising on television and radio. Before more specifically discussing these restrictions, we first address comments filed by the Task Force urging much more drastic action, to-wit, not just restrictions but a prophylactic prohibition on attorney advertising on television and radio.

Based upon several extensive studies and surveys, the Task Force concluded that “lawyer advertising, particularly television and radio advertising, is not providing the public with useful information ... and is lowering the public’s regard for the administration of justice in our state.” The Task Force accordingly urged the Bar, and now urges this Court, that a complete prohibition on advertising for legal services in the electronic media is “the only practical way to address the problems created by television and radio advertising.” The Bar rejected this recommendation in its proposal to this Court; however, it is still urged by the Task Force and in several comments submitted to this Court. We have considered a proposed complete ban and disagree with the Task Force’s suggestion that there is “good reason to believe that such a prohibition would withstand constitutional challenge.”

As recently stressed by the United States Supreme Court, “[i]t is now well established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is accorded a measure of First Amendment protection.” Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Specifically, restrictions on commercial speech are subject to “intermediate” scrutiny:

Under Central Hudson [Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980)], the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies a test consisting of three related prongs: First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be “ ‘narrowly drawn.’ ”

Id. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (citations omitted).

We do not find United States Supreme Court support for a holding that television and radio advertising is, in and of itself, inherently misleading commercial speech that the government can “freely regulate” under Central Hudson. We find that Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), holding in the context of newspaper advertising that “[w]e are not persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading,” indicates to the contrary. We further note that in its 1999 term the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its strong adherence to Central Hudson in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999).

“[S]tate rules [on attorney advertising and solicitation] may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil.” Florida Bar v. Herrick, 571 So.2d 1303, 1305 (Fla.1990) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 111 S.Ct. 2798, 115 L.Ed.2d 972 (1991). Prophylactic prohibitions are by definition broad in nature and have been generally disfavored in the context of attorney advertising and solicitation. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has held that states may not prophylac-tically prohibit attorneys from: (1) advertising the costs of certain routine legal services in the print media, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (“[Advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.”); (2) advertising an accurate listing of attorney’s areas of practice, either through general mailings, announce-merits to specific targeted groups, newspaper advertisements, or telephone listings, see R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. 929 (“[T]he States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.”); (3) advising through the print media target portions of the public of their rights to pursue particular types of cases, as well as the attorney’s willingness to handle such litigation, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (“[BJroad prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force.”); (4) directly soliciting through the mail clients with a particular legal problem, see Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 476, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988) (“[MJerely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech.”); (5) directly soliciting prospective clients where the attorney is motivated by the desire to promote political and ideological goals rather than for purely pecuniary gain, see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-33, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978) (“Because of the danger of censorship through selective enforcement of broad prohibitions, and ‘[b]e-cause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in [this] area only with narrow specificity.’ ”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)); and (6) indicating on letterhead certification as a trial specialist by a recognized national organization, see Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990) (“A State may not ... completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading, such as certification as a specialist by bona fide organizations ....”) (plurality opinion); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 129 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994). See generally Florida Bar Petition to Amend Rules Regulating Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d 451, 458-59 (Fla.1990) (quoting with approval from Robert D. Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening Pandora’s Box?, 19 Stetson L.Rev. 43, 44 (1989)).

The United States Supreme Court has upheld such a prophylactic prohibition, but only in the context of in-person attorney solicitation motivated by pecuniary gain due to the unique problems associated therewith:

Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decisionmaking; there is no opportunity for the intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual. The admonition that “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones” is of little value when the circumstances provide no opportunity for any remedy at all. In-person solicitation is as likely as not to discourage persons needing counsel from engaging in a critical comparison of the “availability, nature, and prices” of legal services; it actually may disserve the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates, in facilitating “informed and reliable decisionmaking.”

... Unlike the advertising in Bates, in-person solicitation is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny. Often there is no witness other than the lawyer and the lay person whom he has solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place. This would be especially true if the lay person were so distressed at the time of the solicitation that he could not recall specific details at a later date. [As such], in-person solicitation would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the State or by the legal profession, in contravention of the State’s strong interest in regulating members of the Bar in an effective, objective, and self-enforcing manner. It therefore is not unreasonable, or violative of the Constitution, for a State to respond with what in effect is a prophylactic rule.

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-67, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (citation and footnotes omitted); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (characterizing in-person solicitation at issue in Ohralik as “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud”); Florida Bar Petition, 571 So.2d at 459 (recognizing under Ohralik that “[s]tates may ... permissibly ... ban in-person solicitation when the attorney is motivated purely for pecuniary gain.”). However, none of the unique concerns at issue in Ohralik in the context of in-person solicitation apply in the context of general television and radio advertising directly at issue in the present case.

Nevertheless, “[i]n holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, ... we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691. “As with other varieties of speech, it follows as well that there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of [attorney] advertising.” Id. at 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691; accord Florida Bar Petition, 571 So.2d at 458. As specifically recognized' by the United States Supreme Court in Bates, “the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.” 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691. This Court has similarly recognized that electronic broadcast media may “require more restrictions than other[ ]” types of media. Florida Bar Petition, 571 So.2d at 458. With these general precepts in mind, we now address some of the restrictions on television and radio advertising advanced by the Bar in proposed rule 4-7.5(b).

The Bar’s proposed rule 4-7.5(b) does not completely ban such advertising but rather prohibits advertising on television and radio any information other than the somewhat generic information listed in proposed rule 4-7.2(e)(10). However, as stressed at length above, our primary concern and the evident concern of the United States Supreme Court is the “free flow of commercial information,” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646, 105 S.Ct. 2265, and, more specifically, the “disclosure of truthful, relevant information.” Peel, 496 U.S. at 108, 110 S.Ct. 2281. Indeed, in its comment on proposed rule 4-7.5, the Bar itself references its goal of “not interfering with the free flow of useful information to prospective users of legal services.” So severely restricting the information allowed in attorney advertising on television and radio as would be required by proposed rule 4-7.5(b), especially without reference to the touchstones of truth and relevance, we find does not further this goal.

We note that in referencing a strikingly similar “laundry list” of generic information in the print-media context, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 367, 97 S.Ct. 2691. We therefore reject rule 4-7.5(b) as proposed by the Bar and substitute in pertinent part: “Advertisements on electronic media such as television and radio may contain, but are not necessarily limited to containing, some or all of the information listed in rule 4-7.2(e)(10).” In so doing, however, we stress that attorneys will of course nevertheless still be prohibited from making false, misleading, or deceptive representations under proposed rule 4-7.2(b) (Prohibited Statements and Information).

Proposed rule 4-7.5(b) also restricts the visual images appearing in television advertisements to “the advertising lawyer in front of a background consisting of a single solid color, a set of law books in an unadorned bookcase, or the lawyer’s own office (with no other office personnel shown).” We approve this restriction as it does not significantly impede the flow of truthful and relevant information which, as we have stressed repeatedly in this opinion, serves as our polestar in the attorney advertising context. As we have previously recognized, “the electronic broadcast media, if manipulated, can produce unrealistic images and expectations.” Florida Bar Petition, 571 So.2d at 458. We agree with the portion of the Bar’s comment to proposed rule 4-7.5 that

the unique characteristics of electronic media, including the pervasiveness of television and radio, the ease with which these media are abused, and the passiveness of the viewer or listener, make the electronic media especially subject to regulation in the public interest. Therefore, greater restrictions on the manner of television and radio advertising are justified than might be appropriate for advertisements in the other media.

Proposed rule 4-7.5(b) also prohibits the voice or image of anyone but a lawyer of the firm whose services are being advertised, even in the context of lawyer referral service advertisements specifically authorized in proposed rule 4-7.11. As commented by the representative of one lawyer referral service that utilizes a spokesperson who is not a lawyer:

Perhaps there’s a concern that the public will be misled into thinking that a non-lawyer’s “voice” or actor’s “image” in a radio/T.V. ad will be that of the very lawyer that they will be engaging or at least one of the lawyers in the advertising firm. If that’s the concern, a simple disclosure would surely clarify the situation. Surely, if we permit any one “member” of a multi-person firm to be spokesperson, we leave ourselves open to the same claim: “Hey, you’re not the guy on T.V.! I was misled.”

... As applied to the program we coordinate, [the proposed rule would mean] multiple ads for multiple areas, a proliferation of expense for participants and frequent editing. What if the participant in the ad moves, retires, dies, becomes judge or just drops out of the program? We would continually have to create yet another ad and this would become prohibitive. If this interpretation is accurate, the problem will seriously affect or kill off all similar lawyer referral service advertising.

(Emphasis omitted.) We find these comments to be persuasive and note that it would be inconsistent to allow lawyer referral service advertisements on the one hand under proposed rule 4-7.11 but to disallow the use of spokespersons on the other hand under proposed rule 4-7.5(b). Therefore, we decline to adopt proposed rule 4-7.5(b) in this regard and modify same as reflected in the appendix to this opinion to allow a spokesperson with an appropriate spoken disclosure to speak or appear in a lawyer referral service television or radio advertisement on behalf of the participating attorneys. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of [attorney advertising] ... so as to assure that the consumer is not misled.”).

Proposed Rule 4r-7.10(b)

Proposed rule 4-7.10(b) (Trade Names) prophylactically prohibits the use of trade names by lawyers and law firms. The Bar urges such a prophylactic prohibition because it claims “the use of trade names has proven to be actually and potentially misleading to the public.”

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he use of trade names ... is a form of commercial speech.” Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11, 99 S.Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979). As already discussed at length above, prophylactic prohibitions on commercial speech by attorneys have been generally disfavored. However, the United States Supreme Court in Friedman upheld a prophylactic prohibition on the use of trade names by optometrists due to specific concerns that were “not speculative or hypothetical” but were “well demonstrated” and “based on experience” establishing that “[t]he possibilities for deception [were] numerous.” 440 U.S. at 13-15, 99 S.Ct. 887. For example, The United States Supreme Court in Friedman elaborated that

[t]he trade ■ name of an optometrical practice can remain unchanged despite changes in the staff of optometrists upon whose skill and care the public depends when it patronizes the practice. Thus, the public may be attracted by a trade name that reflects the reputation of an optometrist no longer associated with the practice.

Id. at 13, 99 S.Ct. 887. Significantly, however, this “possibility] for deception” is not entirely alleviated by the prophylactic prohibition urged in the present case, due to an explicit exception thereto. Specifically, proposed rule 4-7.10(b)(4) exempts from this prophylactic prohibition “a law firm practicing as a partnership or authorized business entity that uses as its name or includes in its name the name or names of 1 or more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession.” As stated in one comment opposing the prophylactic prohibition on the use of trade names by attorneys:

Nonmisleading or nonfraudulent. trade names should be allowed. Keeping former prominent retired or deceased attorneys names in a law firm’s moniker has been traditional and allowed but [is] spurious and misleading. It is a fiction and a trade name. The modern appetite for legal specialization, which leads consumers to such specialties, should be encouraged, not discouraged, in order to be consumer friendly.

In further elaborating upon “[t]he [numerous] possibilities for deception,” the United States Supreme Court in Friedman continued:

A trade name frees an optometrist from dependence on his personal reputation to attract clients, and even allows him to assume a new trade name if negligence or misconduct casts a shadow over the old one. By using different trade names at shops under his common ownership, an optometrist can give the public the false impression of competition among the shops. The use of a trade name also facilitates the advertising essential to large-scale commercial practices with numerous branch offices, conduct the State rationally may wish to discourage while not prohibiting commercial opto-metrical practice altogether.

440 U.S. at 13, 99 S.Ct. 887. Significantly, however, none of these weighty “possibilities for deception” are advanced as a justification for the prophylactic prohibition on the use of attorney trade names urged in the present case. As discussed at length below, the concerns and examples cited in the present case are relatively slight in comparison to those at issue in Friedman.

As justification for the prophylactic prohibition urged in the present case, the Bar asserts that “in Florida the use of [trade] names in law practice has proven to be misleading to the public in various ways.” In support of this assertion, the Bar relies in significant part on the Task Force’s finding that “elements of commonly used trade names, such as ‘clinic,’ ‘legal services,’ and ‘group,’ confuse and mislead the public about the nature of the advertising entity, its level of resources, and the extent of its experience and expertise in the advertised areas of law.” In. making this finding, the Task Force in turn primarily relied upon the studies prepared on behalf of the Bar by Frank N. Magid Associates (the Magid studies).

We have examined the Magid studies and are not convinced that a prophylactic prohibition on attorney trade names is warranted. While focus group participants indicated that attorney trade names using the term “group” or “center” gave the impression of involving more than one person, “most reeognize[d] that the individuals or organizations advertising ‘could be just one person.’ ” Frank N. Magid Associates, Attitudes and Impressions of Attorney Advertising: A Summary of Focus Group Results 8 (1997).

Furthermore, to the extent that the Bar impliedly suggests that the use of attorney trade names tarnishes the profession or unreasonably influences potential clients, the Magid studies reveal:

Solid majorities (around 75% to 80%) do not believe any of the [sample attorney trade name] ads influence their respect for the legal system one way or another.... Clear majorities (around 50% to 60%) say they probably or certainly would not retain the entity on the basis of the ad.

Frank N. Magid Associates, Attitudes and Impressions of Attorney Advertising: An Executive Summary of Phase II Results 9 (1997).

Finally and, to our view, most compellingly, the Magid studies reveal that focus group participants perceived that “the specific areas of law mentioned [in the sample attorney trade names] refer to an organization’s area of concentration.” Frank N. Magid Associates, Attitudes and Impressions of Attorney Advertising: A Sum mary of Focus Group Results 10 (1997). For example, the focus group participants typically perceived “The Ticket Center” as “specializ[ing] in DUIs and tickets,” “[t]hat’s all they do.” Id. at 8. As stated in one comment filed with this Court:

Contrary to the Bar’s assertions, rather than being misleading, this is in fact informative. Clearly a firm named “The Ticket Center” would in fact concentrate on tickets and DUI’s as indicated in their print ads. Would a prospective client think to call “The Ticket Center” for a divorce or a will? Obviously not. Clearly the name rather than being misleading as the Bar suggests is informative and indicative of the type of service that the prospective client will receive.

As succinctly stated in a similar comment, “the proposed prohibition would ... severely limit the public’s ability to quickly learn information which could narrow the search for a suitable law firm.” As more exhaustively phrased in another comment:

Prohibiting the use of trade names impairs the public’s understanding of the legal services provided by attorneys. The use of a simple trade name in my practice aids the public in accessing my legal services by helping potential clients understand the area of law I specialize in....

... The widespread advertising by numerous attorneys necessitates a simplified way for those seeking to access legal services to identify attorneys who can help them with their specific problems. A trade name is easy to remember and to refer on to others as opposed to a string of names that is difficult for anyone to recall....

... [Pjrohibiting the use of a simple trade name in advertising seems to be an unnecessary restriction on advertising content. While false, misleading, or deceptive trade names should clearly be prohibited, a trade name that assists clients in identifying and recalling the attorney who helps them should continue to be permitted in advertisements for legal services.

We also received comments to the effect that “[countless law firms] have relied for 15 years on this court’s approval of the use of trade names conditioned only upon the absence of deception. It is manifestly unfair to all who have so relied to shut them down precipitously.”

We agree with these and other similar comments filed in opposition to the urged prophylactic prohibition on the use of attorney trade names and reject same as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. Again, as in the television and radio advertising context discussed above, we do so with an eye toward the guiding commercial speech principle that “disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making than is concealment of such information.” Peel, 496 U.S. at 108, 110 S.Ct. 2281 (plurality opinion). To the extent that attorney trade names can be informative, “the right involved is that of the consumer to have all information necessary to make an intelligent economic decision.” Florida Bar Petition, 571 So.2d at 457 (emphasis removed).

Our decision to reject the urged prophylactic prohibition on attorney trade names is buttressed by the apparent efficacy of the existing restrictions thereon. As phrased in one comment filed in this Court, “ The Florida Bar already has at its disposal sufficient tools to deal with misleading trade names. The use of misleading trade names is already prohibited.”

More specifically, the existing rules already prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive firm names. See existing rule 4-7.7(a) (False, Misleading, or Deceptive); accord proposed rule 4-7.10(a). For example, under existing rule 4-7.7(a), the Standing Committee on Advertising (SCA) recently found several trade names to be misleading, including “Florida Lawyers Professional Association,” “Florida Employment Law Center,” “Legal Center for the Injured,” and “First American Law.” See Advertising Update, Florida Bar News, May 1, 1998, at 26; cf. Florida Bar v. Fetterman, 439 So.2d 835, 840 (Fla.1983) (finding the trade name “The Law Team, Fetterman and Associates” to be “neither inherently nor operatively misleading,” and accordingly rejecting the referee’s recommendation that the subject attorney be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and enjoined from using the trade name). We explicitly do not comment upon whether we agree, with the SCA that the listed trade names are misleading but reference same to underscore the fact that existing rule 4-7.7(a) can be and is already actively applied to regulate attorney trade names in Florida.

Existing rule 4 — 7.7(b) (Trade Names) similarly allows attorneys to use a trade name so long as it “is not deceptive and does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization, does not imply that the firm is something other than a private law firm, and is not otherwise [false, misleading, or deceptive].” As even more pertinent to the present case, existing rule 4-7.7(b) further provides that “[a] lawyer in private practice may use the term “legal clinic” or “legal services” in conjunction with the lawyer’s own name if the lawyer’s practice is devoted to providing routine legal services for fees that are lower than the prevailing rate in the community for those services.” See also comment to existing rule 4-7.7 (elaborating that terms such as “academy” and “institute” are precluded because they imply that the firm is something other than a private law firm); Bates, 433 U.S. at 381, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (“We suspect that the public would readily understand the term ‘legal clinic’ — if, indeed, it focused on the term at all-to refer to an operation ... that is geared to provide standardized and multiple services.”). Insofar as the Bar in the present case has expressed special concern over the use of terms “clinic,” “legal services,” and “group” in attorney trade names, it may wish to consider further conditions or restrictions on these and other similar terms instead of the urged prophylactic prohibition on all attorney trade names. See id. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (“In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, ... we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in any way.”)

Conclusion

As we did in Florida Bar Petition, we again find that these rules, as we have modified them, are narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest since they propose to ensure the truthful dissemination of information by regulating, not prohibiting, legal advertising. 571 So.2d at 460. We commend the Bar, the Task Force, and all those who filed comments for their collective insight and inspiring dedication to the legal profession and the public’s perception thereof.

We approve as modified the proposed rules as discussed at length in this opinion and as reflected in the attached appendix. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions by strike-through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The amendments shall become effective upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

HARDING, C.J., SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., and OVERTON and KOGAN, Senior Justices, concur.

OVERTON, Senior Justice, concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

. Specifically, the Bar proposes amending or creating: rule 4-7.1 (General); rule 4-7.2 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services); rule 4-7.3 (Advertisements in the Public Print Media); rule 4-7.4 (Direct Contact with Prospective Clients); rule 4-7.5 (Advertisements in the Electronic Media, Other than Computer-Accessed Communications); rule 4-7.6 (Computer-Accessed Communications); rule 4-7.7 (Evaluation of Advertisements); rule 4-7.8 (Exemptions From the Filing and Review Requirement); rule 4-7.9 (Information About a Lawyer’s Services Provided Upon Request); rule 4-7.10 (Firm Names and Letterhead); and rule 4-7.11 (Lawyer Referral Services).

. Exceptions to this generalization may apply when, for example, attorneys admitted in other jurisdictions are granted permission to appear pro hac vice in particular cases or proceedings in Florida courts. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-3.2(a) (Members in Good Standing) ("A practicing attorney of another state, in good standing, who has professional business in a court of record of this state may, upon motion, be permitted to practice for the purpose of such business upon such conditions as the court deems appropriate under the circumstances of the case.”); see also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.060(b) (Foreign Attorneys) (providing that "[ajttorneys of other states shall not engage in a general practice in Florida unless they are members of The Florida Bar in good standing,” but allowing that, upon verified motion, "attorneys of other states may be permitted to appear in particular cases in a Florida court”); see generally Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1990) (discussing discretion of court in ruling on mo-lions to admit pro hac vice). Even then, however, our jurisdiction over such attorneys is limited, as set forth in Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-4.1 ("Notice and Knowledge of Rules”):

Every member of The Florida Bar and every attorney of another state who is admitted to practice for the purpose of a specific case before a court of record of this state is within the jurisdiction of this court and its agencies under this rule and is charged with notice and held to know the provisions of this rule and the standards of ethical and professional conduct prescribed by this court. Jurisdiction over an attorney of another state who is not a member of The Florida Bar shall be limited to conduct as an attorney in relation to the business for which the attorney was permitted to practice in this state and the privilege in the future to practice law in the state of Florida.

(Emphasis added.)

. For example, section 454.23, Florida Statutes (1997), provides:

Penalties. — Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court of Florida who shall practice law or assume or hold himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualified, or recognized by law as qualified, to act as a lawyer in this state ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree....

See State v. Foster, 674 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1st DCA) (upholding constitutionality of section 454.23), review dismissed, 677 So.2d 840 (Fla.1996); see also § 877.02, Fla. Slat. (1997) (lawyer anti-solicitation statute); Carricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla.1980) (upholding constitutionality of section 877.02).

. For example, Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-5.5 (Unlicensed Practice of Law) provides:

A lawyer shall not:

la) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or

(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of law.

.Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So.2d 559 (Fla.1978), involved unlicensed practice of law charges against an interstate law firm with its principal office in New York and a partner of that firm who, although not a member of The Florida Bar, supervised the Miami office of the firm. This Court adopted and approved the parties' joint motion and stipulation for settlement which, as pertinent to the present case, provided that "in any telephone directory published and used in Florida, the firm shall list only its lawyers who are admitted to practice in Florida,” and that "a professional card of a lawyer identifying him by name and as a lawyer, giving his address, may not contain a Florida address if he is not a member of The Florida Bar:” Id. at 561-62.

. Proposed rule 4 — 7.2(c)(10) (Permissible Content of Advertisements) does not differ significantly from its predecessor (existing rule 4-7.2(n)) and sets forth a list of somewhat generic information in advertisements and written communications that shall be presumed not to violate the rules regarding false, misleading, deceptive, or unfair communication about a lawyer or the lawyer’s services. The information listed includes: the name of the lawyer or law firm, office locations and parking arrangements, disability accommodations, telephone numbers, Web site and electronic mail addresses, office and telephone service hours, a designation such as "attorney” or "law firm,” date of admission to The Florida Bar and any other bars, years of experience practicing law, number of lawyers in the advertising firm, a listing of federal courts and jurisdictions other than Florida where the lawyer is licensed to practice, technical and professional licenses granted by the state or other recognized licensing authorities, and educational degrees received (including dates and institutions); foreign language ability, fields of law in which the lawyer practices, including certification logos, prepaid or group legal service plans in which the lawyer participates, acceptance of credit cards, fee for initial consultation and fee schedule, a listing of the name and geographic location of a lawyer or law firm as a sponsor of a public service announcement or charitable, civic, or community program or event, and common salutary language, such as "best wishes,” "good luck,” "happy holidays,” or "pleased to announce.” The proposed rule additionally provides that a lawyer referral service may advertise its name, location, telephone number, the referral fee charged, its hours of operation, the process by which referrals are made, the areas of law in which referrals are offered, the geographic area in which the lawyers practice and to whom those responding to the advertisement will be referred, and, if applicable, its nonprofit status, its status as a lawyer referral service approved by The Florida Bar, and the logo of its sponsoring bar association.

. Proposed rule 4-7.11 (Lawyer Referral Services) does not differ significantly from its predecessor (existing rule 4-7.8), insofar as both authorize lawyer referral services and in pertinent part identically define a "lawyer referral service” as:

(1) any person, group of persons, association, organization, or entity that receives a fee or charge for referring or causing the direct or indirect referral of a potential client to a lawyer drawn from a specific group or panel of lawyers; or

(2) any group or pooled advertising program operated by any person, group of persons, association, organization, or entity wherein the legal services advertisements utilize a common telephone number and potential clients are then referred only to lawyers or law firms participating in the group or pooled advertising program.

OVERTON, Senior Justice,

concurring.

I concur. I write to emphasize that our decision in this case is controlled by seven decisions of the United States Supreme Court on lawyer advertising. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988); and Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). In our decision, Florida Bar Petition to Amend Rules Regulating Florida Bar—Advertising Issues, 571 So.2d 451 (Fla.1990), we discussed the legal principles of commercial free speech and lawyer advertising in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decisions. At the time, our advertising rules adopted in that case were considered to be among the most restrictive in the country. The rules we adopted in that case, and in particular the rule prohibiting attorneys from targeting direct mail advertising to victims of personal injury less than thirty days after the incident, were challenged before the United States Supreme Court. In its decision in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995), our rules were approved because they followed the underlying principle that they did not adversely affect the disclosure of truthful, relevant information and because the thirty-day ban targeting direct-mail solicitation of accident victims concerned sensitive privacy issues resulting from a “lawyer’s confrontation of victims or relatives with ... information, while wounds are still open, in order to solicit their business.” 515 U.S. at 630, 115 S.Ct. 2371. The Supreme Court emphasized that this restriction involved only “a brief period” amounting to a “short temporal ban” that was “narrow both in scope and in duration.” Id. at 633-35, 115 S.Ct. 2371.

I find the rules we adopt today are as far as we can go under the established commercial free speech principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. To go further as suggested by the dissent would, in my view, threaten the validity of the entire regulatory scheme.

At this point in time, it is not whether I would like to severely restrict or abolish lawyer advertising to enhance professionalism, it is what advertising restrictions are constitutionally permissible under the provisions and guidelines set out by the United States Supreme Court.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs.

WELLS, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which adopts the Bar's proposed amendments to the rules with the exception of the following two issues.

First, I dissent from the majority’s rejection (op. at 400) of the Bar’s proposed prohibition in rule 7.5(b) of the voice or image as it pertains to lawyer referral services. I would make an exception for lawyer referral services authorized under rule 7-4.11 but only so as to allow an employee of the service to be used in lieu of a lawyer. I would not allow a spokesperson. What is being addressed by the Bar’s proposal is the use of celebrity advertisements, which do not further the legitimate purposes of lawyer advertising.

Second, I would adopt the Bar’s proposal on trade names. However, I would provide a thirty-six-month compliance period rather than eighteen months because of the concerns raised about lawyers who have expended money developing a trade name. I would use this period of time to work out in more detail what trade names would be permitted. I have to conclude that the use of what can only be termed unprofessional trade names is inherently misleading and, more importantly, brings disrespect to the judicial system. There should simply be no place for the use of names designed to give the impression that the lawyer can “fix” a traffic ticket, as do some names presently, or which are used merely to obtain the first listing in the telephone yellow pages. I do not find offensive to the enforcement of this rule the exception in the- Bar’s proposed rule for law firm names which have historical roots in real past partners.

I reiterate my strongly held view that we must not have advertising regulations which are not enforced or are selectively enforced. Commercial free speech is a valuable right, but it should be limited so that the courts receive the public respect which the functioning of the court system requires, and such limitation must fairly and effectively limit all Florida lawyers-not just those who voluntarily comply.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority opinion except for the following:

I agree with Justice Wells’ concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion as to his comments on trade names. As discussed by Justice Wells, I would adopt the Bar’s proposal on trade names, but I would also extend the compliance period to thirty-six months, rather than eighteen months.

My greater concern with the majority’s opinion, however, has to do with its modifications of the Bar’s proposed amendments regarding television and radio advertising in rule 4 — 7.5(b), entitled “Advertisements in the Electronic Media, Other Than Computer-Accessed Communications.” The majority’s modification is a significant one in that it changes the Bar’s proposed amendment that states:

Advertisements on the electronic media such as television and radio shall contain no information other than some or all of that listed in rule 4-7.2(c)(10).

Rather, the majority substitutes this proposal with the following:

Advertisements on the electronic media such as television and radio may contain, but are not necessarily limited to containing, some or all of the information listed in rule 4-7.2(c)(10).

By changing “shall” to “may ... but ... not necessarily limited to,” the majority has changed a critical element of the Bar’s proposed amendment. Instead of incorporating the specific list of guidelines that precisely limit what may be included in television or radio advertisements, the majority’s modification to rule 4-7.2(b) contains -no limitation on what may be included in an advertisement other than that the advertisement may not be “unsubstantiated,” “unfair or deceptive,” “false or misleading,” or “potentially false or misleading.” This standard is no different than the limitation already in existence. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4 — 7.3(f)(1)—(5) (superseded by the amendments in this opinion).

In my opinion, the information provided in the Bar’s proposed amendment is sufficiently inclusive to satisfy the public’s need for information and is sufficiently definite to be enforceable. In contrast, the Court’s substitution that prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive advértising is in reality so general as to run the risk of either selective enforcement or no enforcement whatsoever. Further, because no pre-screen-ing requirement is included or practical, once the electronic advertisement has been aired the damage to the public will have been done.

The Bar’s proposed amendment itself was a compromise from -the original Task Force recommendation. After a year and a half of careful study,, the Task Force concluded that a complete prohibition on advertisements for legal services in the electronic media was the only practical way to address the problems created by television advertising and that such a prohibition would withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Task Force commissioned a national research firm to determine to what extent lawyer advertising was adversely affecting the administration of justice. The resulting research showed that:

[LJawyer advertising simply does not provide the public with the useful, factual information that it wants and needs in order to make an informed choice about the hiring of a lawyer. Significantly, the data further shows that much lawyer advertising — especially television advertising — lowers the public’s respect for the fairness and integrity of the legal system.

This Court has acknowledged before and acknowledges again here that electronically broadcast advertising requires more restrictions than other forms of advertising. See Florida Bar Petition to Amend Rules Regulating Florida Bar, 571 So.2d 451, 458 (Fla.1990). In fact, our comment to our amended rule 4-7.5 recognizes that

Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court recognized, “the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

This Court cannot oversee how the electronic media portrays the judicial system and the legal profession, nor can we control the content of television programs such as Judge Judy and Ally McBeal. We do have the authority, however, to regulate lawyer advertising. If we are not prepared to ban television advertising completely, as the Task Force recommended, I find no valid reason for this Court’s rejection of the carefully crafted amendment proposed by the Bar. In my opinion, the Bar’s proposed amendment provides the proper structure for the rule — to limit electronic advertising to information that assists the consumer in making informed choices as to representation while ensuring that the advertising does not further contribute to the erosion of public trust and confidence in our judicial system.

APPENDIX

4-7. INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

RULE 4-7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER’S SERVICES GENERAL

A-lawyer shall-not make or-permit-to-be made a false, misleading, deceptive, or-unfair-communication about-fche lawyer or the lawyer’s services. — A communication violates-this rule-if-jfe

(a) contains a material misrepresentation -of fact or law or omits a fact necessary-to make the-statement coasidered-as a — whole not materially misleading; Permissible Forms of Advertising. Subject to all the requirements set forth in this subchapter 4-7, including the filing requirements of rule 4-7.7, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, including but not limited to: print media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical; outdoor advertising, such as billboards and other signs; radio, television, and computer-accessed communications; recorded messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number; and written communication in accordance with rule 4-7.4.

(b) is ■likely- to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve or states or implies that the lawyer can-aehieve -results by maeaas-that--violate the denies of Professional Conduct or other lawf Advertisements Not Disseminated in Florida. These rules shall not apply to any advertisement broadcast or disseminated in another .jurisdiction in which the advertising lawyer is admitted if such advertisement complies with the rules governing lawyer advertising in that jurisdiction and is not intended for broadcast or dissemination within the state of Florida.

(d-)-contains a testimonial.

Comment

This rule governs all communications about a lawyer’s -services — including advertising permitted by rule-4-7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer’s sendees, statements aboat-them must be truthful. This precludes-any-material misrepresentation — or—misleading—omission, such as where a lawyer states-or implies certification or recognition as a specialist other than in accordance with rule 4-7.5, where a — lawyer implies - that any court, tribunal, or other public-body or official can-be improperly influenced, or where a lawyer advertises a particular fee or a contingency fee without disclosing whether the-elient-will also be liable for costs. Another example of a misleading omission is an advertisement for a law firm that states that-all-the-firm’s lawyers-are juris doctors but -does-not-disclose that a- juris doctorate is a law-degree rather than a medical degree of some sort and- that virtually any law-firm-in the United States can make the same-claim* — Although -rule--4-7.2 permits lawyers to list the jurisdictions and courts to which-they-are-admittedr it also would be mísleadín-g-for a lawyer--who does not list other-;jurisdictions -or-courts to state that-the lawyer is a member-of-The- Florida-Bar-.-Standing-by itself, that otherwise truthful statement implies falsely that the lawyer-- possesses -⅛-qualifícation not common to virtually all-lawyers practicing in Florida*- — The latter-2- examples-of misleading omissions- also-are examples of unfair advertising.'

The prohibition in subdivision (b)---of statements that may create - “unjustified expectations” — precludes—advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer’s record in obtaining favorable verdicts, — and advertisements containing client endorsements or testimonials. — Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be-obtained for- others without reference to the specific factual and--legal ■ circumstances*

■The prohibition in subdivision -(c) of comparisons that cannot be factually substantiated-would preclude a lawyer from representing that the lawyer or the- lawyer’s-law firm is “the best,” “one of-the best,-’’- or-“one of the most experienced” in a field-ef

-Th