City of Miami Beach v. Chisholm Properties South Beach, Inc. (830 So. 2d 842, 2002)

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The motion for rehearing is denied.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON, COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, SHEVIN, and RAMIREZ, JJ.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

The motion for rehearing en banc is denied.

JORGENSON, COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, SHEVIN and RAMIREZ, JJ., concur.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge

(specially concurring).

On July 1, 2002, a panel of this court unanimously and without opinion denied a petition for writ of certiorari seeking second-tier review of a decision of the Appellate Division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. City of Miami Beach v. Chisholm Properties South Beach, Inc., 830 So.2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). In that case, Chisholm Properties South Beach, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 689 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. August 9, 2001), the circuit court, in a comprehensive and insightful opinion by Judge Altonaga, rejected an attempt by a hotel owner and the City of Miami Beach to grant totally unjustified and illegal height variances through the device of a sweetheart “settlement” of a spurious action by the hotel owner against the City under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act, § 70.001, et seq., Fla. Stat. (1999). I of course totally agree with this opinion and thus with the panel’s determination to deny review. See Broward County v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838 (Fla.2001); Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla.1995).

Beyond that, however, I think that this case is so rife with suspicion that the proceedings in this court, especially the presumptuous motion for rehearing en banc now before us, are, in turn, so clearly— indeed, at best — frivolous that sanctions should be imposed against the petitioners under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2002) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410.