Chavez v. State (832 So. 2d 730, 2002)

PER CURIAM.

The opinion issued in this case on May 30, 2002, is withdrawn, and the following revised opinion is substituted in its place. We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Juan Carlos Chavez. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgments and sentences under review.

MATERIAL FACTS

Jimmy Ryce’s Disappearance

On the afternoon of September 11, 1995, nine-year-old Samuel James (“Jimmy”) Ryce disappeared after having been dropped off from his school bus at approximately 3:07 p.m. at a bus stop near his home in the Redlands, a rural area of south Miami Dade County. An extensive and well-publicized search of the area followed, but faded to locate the child.

At that time, the defendant, Juan Carlos Chavez, was living in a trailer on property owned by Susan Scheinhaus. Chavez worked as a handyman for the Scheinhaus family, and was permitted to use their Ford pickup truck to run errands or do other work for the family. As part of his duties, Chavez frequently cared for horses owned by the Scheinhaus family, but housed on property owned by David Santana, which contained an avocado grove. There was also a trader on that property, referred to throughout Chavez’s trial as the “avocado grove trader” or the “horse-farm trader.”

In August or September of 1995, Mrs. Scheinhaus reported to the police several times that items (including a handgun and some jewelry) were missing from her residence. Although she suspected Chavez, she lacked evidence of his culpability. She testified at trial that, in November, she had decided to obtain the evidence required to pursue her claim. With the help of a locksmith, on December 5, 1995, while Chavez was away for the day, Mrs. Schein-haus and her son, Edward Scheinhaus (“Ed”), entered the trailer located on her property which Chavez occupied. She found the handgun — which she later identified in court as a gun she had purchased in April of 1989 — in plain view on a counter opposite the trailer door.

As Mrs. Scheinhaus continued to look inside the trailer, she discovered, in the closet area, a book bag which was partially open. Looking inside the bag, she saw papers and books. The work appeared to be in a child’s handwriting, and she noticed the name “Jimmy Ryce.” She also observed this name on one of the books. When Mrs. Scheinhaus asked her son to look at the items, he also recognized the child’s name.

As a result of this discovery, Mrs. Sche-inhaus notified the FBI. When Chavez returned to the Scheinhaus residence at about 7:15 on the evening of December 6, armed FBI agents quickly surrounded and secured him. After being patted down, he agreed to go with Metro Dade Police officers, who were also present, to the station for questioning.

Chavez’s Detention

Chavez was involved in a questioning process that was punctuated by regular refreshment, food, bathroom breaks and a rest period, and interspersed with two outings returning to the Scheinhaus and Santana properties in southern Miami Dade County. Although Chavez was first brought to the police station on the night of December 6, he did not sleep until shortly after midnight on December 7. Detective Luis Estopinan, who was bilingual, conducted most of the questioning, although other officers also participated. Various police detectives, an FBI agent, Mrs. Scheinhaus and an independent interpreter all had opportunities to observe Chavez at various times throughout this period. Chavez was consistently described as alert and articulate during this time, and no one observed police detectives mistreating Chavez in any way throughout the period of questioning.- He received repeated warnings and instructions in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and indicated that he fully understood them on four occasions during the period of interrogation.

Over the course of the interrogation, and after having been repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights and knowingly waiving them, Chavez provided several versions of his involvement in Jimmy’s disappearance. As law enforcement officers engaged in a contemporaneous investigation of Chavez’s changing narratives, he agreed to accompany officers on two occasions to visit the horse farm property and the Scheinhaus property, where he showed them the location of the events he had recounted had transpired. On those occasions, Chavez was asked to reveal where the boy’s remains were located, to permit Jimmy’s family to have closure.

After the physical evidence resulting from this contemporaneous investigation totally discredited each version of events which Chavez had initially proposed, Chavez agreed to tell the truth. However, Chavez explained that, before he would disclose the location of Jimmy’s remains, he wanted the officers to guarantee that he would receive the death penalty. Estopi-nan advised Chavez that he could not guarantee that the death penalty would be imposed. However, Chavez continued to talk, asserting that the events would not have happened had he not been sexually battered by a relative in Cuba. Estopinan told Chavez that he “felt that it was time for him to be truthful and tell us what really happened to Jimmy, and ... went back and began to ask him about Jimmy and where Jimmy was located. We wanted to find Jimmy.”

A break followed this inquiry and then Chavez reiterated to Sergeant Jimenez the most recent account which he had given Estopinan. Chavez then went to the restroom for another break and, upon returning to the interview room, informed the officers that they were now going to hear the truth: “[Wjhat do you want to know? I’ll tell you what happened to Jimmy Ryce.”

Chavez proceeded to admit to Estopinan and Jimenez that he had abducted Jimmy at gunpoint, traveled to the horse ranch, and sexually assaulted Jimmy before finally shooting him. Estopinan explained that the officers would need details from Chavez, and requested permission to take a sworn statement. Chavez agreed to continue the questioning, and Estopinan and Jimenez “began to get details” about what had happened to Jimmy Ryce. At trial, Estopinan testified regarding the final version of Chavez’s statement.

Chavez said that he had observed young children playing in water on his way home from Home Depot at approximately 8 p.m. Some of the boys were wearing just their underwear, and “as he saw the young boys wearing just the[ir] underwear, he took an interest in them.” After observing the children, Chavez drove off, but returned a short while later, because he “still had a mental picture of what happened, meaning that he saw the young boys in their underwear by the canal bank, and decided that he wanted to take another look.” Estopi-nan testified:

And while this is occurring, he was driving on the avenue, he sees a young — he sees a figure of a person, and then he realizes it was a young boy that he saw. At the same time he sees the young boy who later turns out to be Jimmy Ryce, again he’s thinking about the young boys who are at the canal bank.

He said at this point he’s feeling something sexual and he wants to — he is — what he’s doing, he’s doing picture— what he explains to me is that he has a mental picture in his mind of the young boys in the canal with their underwear and he’s also picturing Jimmy Ryce the young boy, and what he does as he’s driving the pickup truck in the opposite direction of Jimmy Ryce, he said at the time he had with him the Scheinhaus revolver, the Taurus, .38 caliber. And he said at this time Jimmy is walking on the left side of the road, and what he did is driving on the opposite side, he begins to drive on the opposite side of the traffic and drives and stops right in front of Jimmy Ryce causing him to stop.

The minute that Jimmy stops, he stops the truck, he gets out of the truck with the gun in his hand and tells Jimmy at gunpoint, do you want to die. And Jimmy made a comment to him, no. And he told Jimmy in English to get inside the truck. And Jimmy responds by getting into the truck via the driver’s side door.

Once Jimmy is inside the pickup truck, he tells him to — Jimmy removes his backpack and puts it between his legs and he Chavez gets into the truck with Jimmy, still holding the handgun. It’s at that point he takes the revolver and he places it underneath his lap and tells Jimmy to put his head down so Jimmy wouldn’t be seen by anyone. And at that point he tells me that he drives back to the horse ranch where the trailer was located.

He told me that Jimmy left his backpack inside the pickup truck. Once they both exit the pickup truck, both him and Jimmy at his direction they go inside the trailer that’s located inside the horse ranch. He goes on to explain that once inside the trailer he tells Jimmy to sit down on the bed. Jimmy complies. And that he sits on a black office chair close to Jimmy by the entrance and he begins to talk to Jimmy, he notices that Jimmy is, he’s nervous and he’s scared and Jimmy begins sobbing. And while this is occurring, Jimmy began to ask him, why did you take me? And Chavez explains to him, what he does, he begins to ask, he wants Jimmy to answer his own questions, well, why do you think I took you, things to that effect. He wants Jimmy to answer his own questions. He goes on to explain that at this point he feels like doing something sexual and that he tells Jimmy to remove his clothing. He said Jimmy complied by removing his shirt, his shorts, his sneakers and he wasn’t sure if Jimmy was wearing socks or not. And then Jimmy remains in his underwear only, his white underwear he believes. He goes on to tell me that at this point he gets up and he tells Jimmy to also go ahead and remove his underwear. Jimmy complies and removed his underwear. And then he tells Jimmy to lay on the bed in the trailer and Jimmy complies. Jimmy lays on his stomach on the bed. Chavez tells me that he went into the bathroom area of the trailer looking for something. And I asked him, what are you looking for. He said, I’ll explain. And he told me I was looking for something like a lubricant. And then he goes into the bathroom and he finds a see through plastic container, he said, with some blue lettering on it. And then he took a sample of the contents of the container to see if it would burn, and when it didn’t, he came back to where Jimmy was and he placed this, the substance or the lubricant on to Jimmy’s rectum, he said, and as he was placing the lubricant on Jimmy’s rectum, Jimmy is asking what are you doing. And he mentioned to Jimmy that what do you think is going to happen, things to that effect. He unzipped his pants, he exposed his penis and he inserted his penis into Jimmy’s rectum.

He told me right after he inserted his penis in Jimmy’s rectum, he again has a mental picture of the young boys in their underwear which he had seen at the canal and he said that he quickly ejaculated, and once he ejaculated inside Jimmy, he said he removed himself.

Chavez said that he and Jimmy then dressed and left in the truck, indicating that he had intended to leave Jimmy in the area where he had picked him up. However, upon nearing the area where he had abducted Jimmy, Chavez noticed that police cars were present. Believing “that someone had reported Jimmy missing and they were looking for Jimmy,” Chavez kept Jimmy’s head down in the truck and returned to the horse farm.

Estopinan testified regarding what transpired when Chavez and Jimmy returned to the horse farm:

He said once inside the trailer, Jimmy is trembling and crying. And Jimmy asked, what’s going to happen to me. Are you going to kill me. He noticed that Jimmy was very frightened. And what he does, he begins to speak to Jimmy in order to calm him down.

Chavez told Estopinan that he tried to calm Jimmy down by asking him questions. He then explained how he killed Jimmy:

Well, the next thing Chavez mentions happened is he heard a helicopter fly over the horse ranch. It was his opinion he believed the helicopter belonged to the police, that the police were searching for Jimmy. When he heard the helicopter flying over him, he went ahead and held Jimmy close by to him so Jimmy wouldn’t go anywhere, and eventually he heard the chopper several times flying over him, and at one point he said he got up and began looking out the window to see if he could see the chopper, the helicopter that is.

And while he was looking for the helicopter, Jimmy is still close to the front entrance of the trailer. He said that Jimmy made a dash for the door, Jimmy ran for the door trying to escape. He said that he tried to reach up to Jimmy, but he got tangled on the floor of the bathroom and at that point he said he took out the revolver belonging to Mrs. Scheinhaus, he pointed the handgun in the direction of Jimmy, fired one time hitting him.

He said that Jimmy collapsed right by the door and collapsed to the right by the door inside the trailer. He said after he shot Jimmy, he came up to Jimmy, he turned Jimmy around and held Jimmy in his arms and Jimmy took one last breath, he expressed it, and he said that was the last thing Jimmy did.

Chavez described that, to dispose of Jimmy’s body, he found a metal barrel inside the trailer at the horse farm, and placed Jimmy’s body inside the barrel. He transported the barrel containing the body from the horse farm to the Schein-haus residence, where he removed the barrel and placed it in Chavez’s disabled van, which was parked in the stable area. Chavez removed Jimmy’s book bag from the pickup and carried it with him to his own trailer. That night, Chavez looked at some of the note pads inside Jimmy’s book bag. Chavez noticed blood on his own clothing and eventually destroyed the clothes. During the night and into the next morning, “all he could think about was what he was going to do with Jimmy’s body.”

Two or three days later, Chavez attempted to use a backhoe on the Sehein-haus property to dig a hole in which to bury Jimmy, but the machine did not operate properly. Chavez remained concerned, particularly when he noticed that the lid of the barrel which contained Jimmy’s body had come off.

Chavez pulled Jimmy’s body from the barrel onto a piece of plywood, and, from there, his remains fell to the ground. “And he said at that point he went ahead and began to dismember Jimmy’s body with the use of a tool.” Chavez described the tool he used to dismember Jimmy’s body, and even drew a picture of the implement. He explained that it took him a while to dismember Jimmy’s body, as he was becoming sick and vomiting. “[B]ut then he completes it and he places three of Jimmy’s parts [into] these three planters. And once he fills these planters with Jimmy’s remains, he goes ahead, goes into the stable area of the stable where the building is located and he locates some cement bags. With those cement bags he seals the tops of the planters with cement.”

The oral interview concluded at 10:50 p.m. on December 8. While an interpreter and a stenographer were being obtained to record a formal statement, Chavez remained in the interview room, and did not further converse with Estopinan until the interpreter arrived. Then, at 11:45 p.m., Chavez began to provide a formal statement. Estopinan, Sergeant Jimenez, and the court reporter were present as the statement was obtained. After somé preliminary questions, Chavez was again advised of his Miranda rights. At this time, Chavez confirmed that he had voluntarily agreed to waive his first court appearance and that he had given the officers consent to search his property.

When the statement was completed, each page of the statement was reviewed, and Chavez made any corrections he desired. He acknowledged in the statement that he was making the transcribed statement voluntarily; that no one had threatened or coerced him into making the statement; and that he had been treated well. Estopinan testified that, at the time he made his sworn statement, Chavez was “polite, cooperative and he was alert.”

Marilu Balbis testified that she was the professional interpreter providing services during Chavez’s sworn statement. Ms. Balbis was an independent contractor who had been an interpreter and translator for twelve years. The confession was unusually long, and Ms. Balbis had the opportunity to closely observe Chavez’s demeanor. Chavez did not appear sleepy, and was alert. At no point did the detectives give Chavez any answers.

Once the confession was finished, Ms. Balbis read each page, word by word, to Chavez to make sure that it was typed correctly. Chavez approved every page by initialing each page at the bottom. Ms. Balbis indicated that the police officers treated Chavez with courtesy, and that she did not observe them threaten or raise their voices toward Chavez.

Chavez’s Trial and Sentencing

Officer Michael Byrd recovered the loaded handgun from Chavez’s trailer. Byrd also found a poster in Chavez’s trailer bearing the likeness of Jimmy Ryce, which he processed as evidence. A box of bullets containing live ammunition, and one spent shell casing, were also found in the trailer.

Crime scene technician Elvey Melgarejo testified that, on December 8, 1995, he helped search and process a trailer on a horse/avocado farm. He searched the trailer and found “a tube of JR water-based lubricant” on a shelf inside the trailer. Melgarejo collected a sofa cushion and part of the wood floor of the trailer just inside the front door. These items were packaged for transmittal to serology for processing. Melgarejo also traveled to the Scheinhaus property, where he noticed the three concrete-filled planters and became suspicious that they might contain a cadaver.

Fingerprint technician William Miller identified Chavez’s fingerprint on the handgun recovered from his trailer. To determine whether fingerprints were present on the handgun, he placed it in a laboratory chamber in which super glue fumes were released, surrounding the handgun and adhering to the residue and oils left by any fingerprints. As a result, a fingerprint matching that of Chavez was found on the firearm. Miller testified that there were “ten points of identification throughout this fingerprint, which is only common to Chavez. It’s an absolute and positive identification that his left thumb print made on the weapon.”

On December 8, 1995, Miller also examined the books and notebooks found inside the book bag belonging to Jimmy Ryce. He found Chavez’s fingerprint on the front of one notebook found in the book bag. The fingerprint located on the interior of the notebook cover was found to “have sixteen points of identification, a positive identification, based on the left thumb print of Mr. Juan Carlos Chavez against the print which was developed on the inside cover.” Another print of value was located on the textbook entitled Journeys in Science. He found “this particular print of value from this area to be made by the right middle fingerprint of Chavez. I had nine points of identification.” When compared to the prints of Mrs. Scheinhaus and Edward Scheinhaus, the prints on the book bag contents did not match.

Forensic serologist Theresa Merritt of the Metro Dade Police Department testified that she received items for examination on December 8, 1995. She was dispatched to the horse farm to assist crime scene personnel in attempting to determine whether blood was present. Merritt tested a twin-size mattress from the trailer, a cushion present on the bench in the trailer and a cut-out portion of the threshold area from the floor of the trailer. A scraping from the floor area produced a positive result for the presence of blood. Another sample, from a cushion in the trailer, yielded blood scrapings. (State’s Exhibit 135.)

Anita Mathews, assistant director of the forensic identity testing laboratory for “LabCorp” of North Carolina, testified that she was “responsible for doing interpretation on the results of the testing that the technologists conduct.” Mathews testified that they were not able to obtain a sufficient quantity or quality of genetic material from samples collected from the body of Jimmy Ryce for testing. However, DNA from the oral swab samples taken from his parents, Don and Claudine Ryce, was compared to the blood found on the floor of the trailer. This comparison produced the conclusion that the blood on the floor was extremely likely to have come from a child of Don and Claudine Ryce. Two other blood samples taken from the floor of the trailer carried the same genetic characteristics. Another blood sample, taken from the cushion found in the trailer, also was consistent with having come from the biological child of the Ryces.

Dr. Roger Mittleman, Chief Medical Examiner for the Dade Medical Examiner’s Department, testified that, on December 9, he conducted an examination of the contents of the three planters. The cement in each planter encased the remains of what appeared to be a young boy. The remnants of a cement bag were in at least one of the planters.

Dr. Mittleman described the clothing found on Jimmy’s body: “It was dressed in this T-shirt and had on jeans and underwear. There was one sneaker on; one sneaker was off. There were socks.” The doctor then corrected himself, and stated that only one sock was found on the body. The doctor testified that a body expands as it decomposes due to the breakdown of material and biological processes, causing gases to expand. This process could cause a body placed in a barrel to expand to the point that a lid would be forced off or open.

The remains were significantly' decomposed. Using dental records from Jimmy’s family dentist, a forensic dentist testified that the comparison with the jaw and teeth of the body was so strong that the “skeletal remains” were “positively identified as that of Jimmy Ryce.” An X-Ray of the body cavity revealed a flattened projectile jacket that lodged in the area of the heart and “great vessels.” The bullet entered at the point where the right sixth rib is located, went upward in the body, through the lung and the heart, and exited from the upper left chest. Based upon the trajectory of the bullet, the gun would have been' pointing slightly upward and below the individual who was shot. However, there was no evidence on the body which would demonstrate how far away the gun was when it was fired.

On December 20, 1995, Detective McCoIman had transported a tool known as a “bush hook,” which had previously been impounded, to the medical examiner’s office. Dr. Mittleman was asked to examine the bush hook to determine if its cutting characteristics were consistent with the injuries inflicted on Jimmy’s body. The medical examiner noted that a number of the injuries inflicted on the body during dismemberment were consistent with having been made by the bush hook. However, he also testified that it was possible that more than one instrument had been used.

Firearms examiner Thomas Quirk of the Metro-Dade Police Department Crime Laboratory testified that a .38 caliber Taurus model 85 revolver (State’s Exhibit 28) was submitted for his examination after it had been processed by the fingerprint section. He also received one aluminum jacket from a projectile recovered from the body of the victim, and two .38 caliber casings — a projectile identified as having come from a red bullet box (State’s Exhibit 36) and a casing that had been fired from a firearm (State’s Exhibit 35). The two empty .38 caliber shell casings found in Chavez’s trailer were fired from the .38 recovered from Chavez’s trailer.

Quirk testified that the manufacture of the barrel and the rifling process provide microscopic differences which are transferred to the bullet during firing and which repeat, similar to a fingerprint. Also, the projectile jacket recovered by the medical examiner and the lead core (the fatal bullet) were positively identified as having been fired by the gun recovered from Chavez’s trailer: “My conclusion is that this bullet was fired in this weapon to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. This is the gun that fired this bullet.”

After the State rested, Chavez moved for judgment, of acquittal, which was denied. Defense counsel specifically argued the State’s failure to establish a corpus delicti for the crime of sexual battery. The defense then began the presentation of its case. During the examination of Ed Scheinhaus, Ed explained that he had been under house arrest at the time the kidnap-ing occurred. He worked from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., and" was required to stay at home at all other times, unless he arranged in advance to be away from his house. He had an ankle device, and would be called each day at random times (as controlled by a computer) throughout the period he was confined to his home. When called, he would have to “report in” by placing the ankle bracelet next to a device installed in his home.

Chavez also testified in his own defense, stating that he had belonged to a counterrevolutionary group in Cuba. He gave details of his imprisonment (for attempting to escape and for stealing military property) in Cuba, and his eventual escape from the island. According to his trial testimony, Chavez encountered Ed Scheinhaus at the horse farm trailer after Jimmy had already been killed, and helped Ed to dispose of the boy’s body.

Chavez testified that, after he was brought to police headquarters in connection with Jimmy’s disappearance, he was mistreated. He stated that, when he was placed in the police ear, he was told, “Don’t do anything stupid or we’ll shoot you. We’re going to kill you.” He complained that his watch and beeper were taken away from him, and returned only after he gave his final confession. Chavez stated that, when they were interrogating him, he did not know what date or time it was. He said that he was not permitted to sleep, and no one ever offered him a pillow or a blanket. Chavez also claimed that the officers brought the book bag into the interrogation room, and asked Chavez to handle it and look through its contents, which he did. According to Chavez, the police goaded him into making up lies. He stated that the officers suggested details of his confession, and, to avoid deportation, he did whatever they wanted.

After the defense rested, the State presented rebuttal testimony. The officers refuted that they had ever threatened Chavez, coerced him, or suggested any part of the confession to him; they denied that they had taken Chavez’s watch away or that anyone had hit him; and they testified that he had never mentioned Ed as the perpetrator during the questioning process. Ed Scheinhaus’s parole officer testified that Ed (who is in the pest control business) had his permission to travel to take care of a client on the afternoon on which he had received a speeding ticket, and that Ed had shown the ticket to the parole officer himself, without being asked to do so. He testified that Ed had lost his ankle bracelet once (prior to September 11), and that he had come in that same day to have it replaced with a new one. He said that the file would only reflect times when calls were made to the house and Ed did not respond. He said that he had nothing in the file for the month of September 1995, which indicated that Ed had remained home as required, and that no violations had occurred.

At the close of rebuttal, Chavez renewed all motions, including the motion to suppress his statements, the motion for judgment of acquittal (particularly reiterating that the State had failed to prove the corpus delicti of the charge of sexual battery), and the motion for mistrial, based upon alleged cumulative errors. These motions were denied. The jury was instructed, and, following deliberation, entered verdicts of “guilty” on all of the counts charged.

Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended death by a vote of twelve to zero. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation, sentencing Chavez to death for the homicide and to consecutive terms of life imprisonment with three-year mandatory minimum sentences for the convictions of kidnapping and sexual battery.

On November 10, 1998, a hearing was conducted pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). Consistent with Chavez’s request, a prepared presentence investigation report was not considered. Sentencing memoranda were filed, and both the State and Chavez relied upon the evidence already presented. A death sentence was imposed on November 23, 1998, and this timely appeal followed.

APPEAL

Chavez raises multiple claims of error on appeal. We address each claim in turn. In so doing, we initially observe that, despite the egregious and inflammatory facts involved in a tragedy such as this case, we must conduct that dispassionate review which our system of law requires to arrive at a just and legally correct result so that there is no miscarriage of justice.

Probable Cause For Chavez’s Arrest

First, Chavez asserts that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him in connection with Jimmy Ryce’s disappearance. On this record, we conclude that such probable cause did exist. As we stated in Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 312 (Fla.1997):

Probable cause for arrest exists where an officer “has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a felony. The standard of conclusiveness and probability is less than that required to support a conviction.” Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). The question of probable cause is viewed from the perspective of a police officer with specialized training and takes into account the “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Schmitt v. State, 563 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

See also McCarter v. State, 463 So.2d 546, 548-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (“Probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has [been] or is being committed.”).

Here, the officer’s tip came from a reliable, identified citizen informant who was unconnected to the crime which was being investigated. That informant, being Chavez’s employer and the owner of the property where Chavez lived, had reason to know that Chavez was not a friend of the Ryce child. Ed Scheinhaus, the informant’s son, who was also present when the book bag was found in Chavez’s trailer, had indicated his shock to his mother when he realized that the book bag contained items which belonged to Jimmy Ryce. He knew that Chavez had seen the televised requests for assistance related to Jimmy’s disappearance, and had expressed an interest in them.

The little boy had disappeared months earlier, when he had been expected to return home directly from school, suggesting that he was taken by force. A handgun stolen from Mrs. Scheinhaus was found in the trailer by the informant at the same time the book bag was discovered. Further, the Scheinhaus property where Chavez lived was in the same general vicinity from which the little boy had disappeared. That neighborhood had been saturated with flyers depicting Jimmy, and asking for help. Under these circumstances, it is illogical to suggest that a reasonable person (aware of the massive effort to locate Jimmy) who merely happened to find the book bag would take it to his living quarters without ever reporting the matter to authorities.

This cumulative information, known at the time Chavez was apprehended, constituted probable cause to arrest Chavez in connection with the Ryce kidnapping. Cf. Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358, 363 (Fla.1983) (upholding an arrest without a valid warrant based upon “cumulative information” which provided probable cause in a murder/kidnapping case). The fact that the police maintained that Chavez submitted to them voluntarily, or that the State also argued that there was probable cause to arrest Chavez for stealing property of Mrs. Scheinhaus, does not invalidate Chavez’s arrest based upon probable cause in connection with Jimmy Ryce’s kidnapping. Cf. State v. Carmody, 553 So.2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (observing that the validity of Carmody’s arrest was not affected where, despite two valid reasons providing probable cause for the arrest, he was arrested on an unsupportable one); McCarter v. State, 463 So.2d at 549 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (observing that the “fact that McCarter was arrested for attempted first degree murder rather than attempted kidnapping does not invalidate the search incident to the arrest since the label placed upon an arrest by the arresting officer is not determinative of the question of whether the arrest was legal”).

Chavez’s Confession

Chavez argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession, for a variety of reasons. The trial court’s denial of Chavez’s motion to suppress is presumed to be correct and must be upheld where, as here, that decision is supported by the record. See Rhodes v. State, 638 So.2d 920, 925 (Fla.1994); Owen v. State, 560 So.2d 207, 211 (Fla.1990).

Length of Interrogation

Chavez claims that his confession must be suppressed as involuntary, because he was subjected to a period of continuous police custody for more than fifty-four hours. The length of interrogation is a significant factor to consider in determining whether Chavez’s statements were coerced. In reviewing the denial of his motion to suppress, this Court defers to the trial court on questions of historical fact, but conducts a de novo review of the constitutional issue. See Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598 (Fla.2001). To establish that a statement is involuntary, there must be a finding of coercive police conduct. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (recognizing that the defendant’s own perception of coercion is not the determinative factor).

Under the unique circumstances of this case, the police interrogation conducted here was not so coercive as to render Chavez’s confession involuntary. His version of the facts regarding the circumstances of his questioning — which was refuted by testimony both from an independent witness (the translator) and from the officers involved — was apparently disbelieved by the trier of fact.

Although Chavez was questioned over the course of several days, he was provided with food, drink, and cigarettes (as requested) at appropriate times, and permitted to have frequent breaks. His interrogation was also interspersed with time away from the police facilities for visits to various properties, a six-hour rest period (where Chavez was offered a blanket and a pillow), and times when he was left alone for quiet reflection. He was repeatedly given Miranda warnings, in Spanish, and indicated each time that he fully understood them. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Chavez’s motion to suppress on this ground. Compare Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 311 (Fla.1997) (upholding voluntariness of confession where the defendant was questioned for six hours during the morning and early part of day, was provided with drinks and allowed to use the bathroom when he wished, and was never threatened with capital punishment, or promised anything other than that the officer would inform the prosecutor that the defendant had cooperated), with Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232 (Fla.1980) (finding confession to be involuntary where police threatened the defendant with the electric chair, implying that they had power to reduce the charge against him and that his confession would lead to lesser charge), and State v. Sawyer, 561 So.2d 278, 290-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (finding confession to be involuntary where it was the product of enforced sleeplessness resulting from a sixteen-hour serial interrogation during which the defendant was provided with no meaningful breaks and police asked him misleading questions, denied his requests to rest, refused to honor his Miranda rights and used the defendant’s history of blackouts to undermine his reliance on his own memory).

Subject of Decent Burial

Next, Chavez asserts that his confession should be suppressed as involuntary because, on two occasions, officers suggested that Jimmy’s remains needed to be discovered for a decent burial, each of which precipitated incriminating statements. The record reflects that Estopinan did, on two occasions, say to Chavez that Jimmy deserved a decent burial. While one such event prompted an emotional response from Chavez (when he said that Jimmy no longer existed), this occurred only after Chavez had already admitted to having disposed of Jimmy’s body. Neither of the occasions precipitated a truthful account of where the body was located. In context, these questionable requests for information did not coerce Chavez’s confession, nor did they render it “involuntary.” See Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906 (Fla.2000) (finding no error in failure to suppress statements Lukehart made after use. of Christian burial suggestion, where this did not directly result in statements being given).

Sufficiency of Miranda Warnings

Chavez also asserts that his confession must be suppressed as involuntary because he was not properly advised of his right to consult with counsel before questioning. See Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 957 n. 13 (Fla.1992) (observing that “the suspect has the right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated and to have the lawyer present during the interrogation”). Here, Chavez, who indicated that he had a twelfth-grade education, read the Metro Dade Miranda form in Spanish, and initialed it. This form has specifically been upheld as sufficient. See Cooper v. State, 739 So.2d 82, 84 n. 8 (Fla.1999) (approving this warning on the Metro Dade rights form: “If you want a lawyer to be present during questioning, at this time or any time thereafter, you are entitled to have a lawyer present.”). Thus, Chavez’s claim that he was insufficiently informed of his Miranda rights fails.

Request for Death Penalty

Chavez asserts that his confession must be suppressed as involuntary because he expressed his desire to remain silent if not promised the death penalty. However, the record reflects that when Chavez indicated that he would disclose the location of Jimmy’s body only if he were assured a death sentence, he was told unequivocally that he could not be guaranteed that the death penalty would be imposed. Despite having been so advised, Chavez, after a period of silent reflection, elected to confess. As stated in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), ‘Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose between speech and silence, and [the defendant] chose to speak.” As in Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396 (Fla.1987), the record here does not support a Fifth Amendment violation. Cf. Keen, 504 So.2d at 400 (refusing to suppress a statement where the defendant “never expressed to the detectives a desire to speak with counsel on any of the four occasions when he was advised of his rights, he initiated conversations with the detectives throughout this entire time, and signed a waiver of rights form”) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Hoffman v. State, 474 So.2d 1178 (Fla.1985); and Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723 (Fla.1983)).

Chavez’s Alienage

Chavez next claims that his confession should have been suppressed as involuntary because his alienage, lack of prior experience with the United States criminal justice system, and limited understanding of English produced an involuntary confession. Cf. United States v. Fung, 780 F.Supp. 115, 116 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (reflecting that Fung’s poor language skills and ignorance of the American legal system were sufficient to show that she lacked understanding of Miranda rights even though she read them aloud in her native language). In this case, Chavez began the interview process speaking in English; however, Detective Murías translated all questions into Spanish from the beginning, until Estopinan entirely assumed the questioning which was conducted in Spanish (after administration of polygraph tests). Chavez’s lengthy handwritten statement in Spanish (his first version of what happened to Jimmy, in which he recounted having crushed the boy accidentally against the horse farm gate), which is contained in the record, is grammatically correct, reflecting a literate person, and even contains the caveat that Chavez wished “it to be considered that the dates he has included in the statement are not considered to be exact.” In fact, when Chavez’s formal statement was transcribed, he was careful to correct both spelling and grammatical errors. He was repeatedly advised in Spanish of his Miranda rights, and stated that he knew his polygraph test result was not admissible evidence.

The record clearly reflects that Chavez’s intelligence, education, and alienage did not adversely affect his understanding of his rights during the police interrogation progress. Finding no support in the record, the argument that Chavez’s background caused him to misapprehend his rights in the American system fails.

Probable Cause/First Appearance

Chavez argues that the delay in bringing him before a judicial officer violated Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.130 and 3.133, and therefore required suppression of his confession. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct. See Medina v. State, 466 So.2d 1046 (Fla.1985). However, under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), Chavez had a constitutional right to have a judicial determination that probable cause existed for his continued detention within the first forty-eight hours after his arrest, and the delay in obtaining that determination is presumptively unreasonable. Cf Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83-84, 114 S.Ct. 1280, 128 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (observing that, although the four-day delay involved was presumptively unreasonable under McLaughlin, it did not “necessarily follow, however, that Powell must ‘be set free’ ... or gain other relief, for several questions remain open for decision on remand, [including] the appropriate remedy for a delay in determining probable cause (an issue not resolved by McLaughlin), ... or the district attorney’s argument that introduction at trial of what Powell said on November 7, 1989, was harmless in view of a similar, albeit shorter, statement Powell made on November 3, prior to his arrest.”). In determining whether the trial court erred in denying Chavez’s motion to suppress his confession for this reason, we begin by examining the purpose furthered by the criminal defendant’s right to a prompt probable cause determination and first appearance.

The principles underlying the necessity for a probable cause determination can be found in Gerstein. There, the Supreme Court observed that the Fourth Amendment required such a determination as a prerequisite to a detainee’s further restraint of liberty:

A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication.

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), quoted in Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 118, 95 S.Ct. 854. The limited purpose of the hearing shaped its parameters, as established by the Supreme Court:

The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard-probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.

The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64 — 109 (1969). This is not to say that confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases. In most cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause.

Because of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a “critical stage” in the prosecution that would require appointed counsel. The Court has identified as “critical .stages” those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-22, 95 S.Ct. 854 (footnotes omitted).

While the probable cause hearing may be combined with the first appearance, the purpose of a first appearance is different. It serves as a venue for informing the defendant of certain rights, and provides for a determination of the conditions for the defendant’s release. At first appearance, a judicial officer informs the defendant of the charge (providing the defendant with a copy of the complaint), and further informs the defendant that:

(1) the defendant is not required to say anything, and that anything the defendant says may be used against him or her;

(2) if unrepresented, that the defendant has a right to counsel, and, if financially unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed; and

(3) the defendant has a right to communicate with counsel, family, or friends, and if necessary, will be provided reasonable means to do so.

Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.130; see generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 1.3(k) (2d ed.1992). Thus, the first appearance certainly provides one point at which the right to counsel may become affixed. See generally Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.111(a).

Chavez contends that his last confession was improperly coerced through a deprivation of his right to a first court appearance within twenty-four hours of arrest. We have held that coercion of this type, if properly shown, would be a possible ground for suppression of a confession. See Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396, 399-400 (Fla.1987), disapproved in part on other grounds, Owen v. State, 596 So.2d 985, 990 (Fla.1992). However, where, as here, a defendant has'been sufficiently advised of his rights, a confession that would otherwise be admissible is not subject to suppression merely because the defendant was deprived of a prompt first appearance. “[W]hen a defendant has been advised of his rights and makes an otherwise voluntary statement, the delay in following the strictures of [rule 3.130] must be shown to have induced the confession.” Keen, 504 So.2d at 400; see also Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 648, 660 (Fla.1995) (observing that a confession may be suppressed where it was coerced through deprivation of a first court appearance within twenty-four hours); Williams v. State, 466 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA) (reflecting that no per se rule required suppression of confession- — which was suppressed on other grounds — -because of delay of first appearance until thirty hours after arrest), review denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla.1985).

On this point, the Court’s analysis in Keen is particularly instructive:

Keen urges three reasons why his statement should have been suppressed. First, he claims that pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130, which requires an arrested person to be taken before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of arrest, any statement made in violation of the rule must be suppressed. Keen points out that the statement at issue here was made more than twenty-four hours after his arrest. While a violation of the rule has been shown, we reject Keen’s suggestion that an otherwise voluntary statement given after twenty-four hours is per se inadmissible. We agree with the reasoning expressed by the First District Court of Appeal in Headrick v. State, 366 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), that each case must be examined upon its own facts to determine whether a violation of the rule has induced an otherwise voluntary confession. Id. at 1191. The court reasoned that when a defendant has been advised of his rights and makes an otherwise voluntary statement, the delay in following the strictures of the rule must be shown to have induced the confession. Id. See also Williams v. State, 466 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla.1985). Sub judice, Keen was advised on his rights to remain silent and his right to counsel on four separate occasions and gave the statement at issue only after voluntarily signing a waiver of rights. Absent a showing that the delay induced this otherwise voluntary statement, we find that the trial court properly denied Keen’s motion to suppress.

Keen’s suggestion that our decision in Anderson v. State, 420 So.2d 574 (Fla.1982), mandates that his statement be suppressed is unpersuasive. Anderson is clearly distinguishable as there the evidence presented to this Court showed that Anderson had been indicted prior to being taken into custody by Florida law enforcement officials who drove Anderson by car for four days from Minnesota back to Florida. The deputies were aware that Anderson had no counsel in Minnesota and that he desired appointed counsel once returned to Florida. Holding that Anderson’s statement should have been suppressed, we found “significant” the fact that the statement at issue came “far after” Anderson should have been brought before a judicial officer “with the attendant advice of rights and appointment of counsel.” Id. at 576. We also found that the record failed to show a valid waiver. Id. The facts sub judice stand in stark contrast. Keen was not indicted until after the statement was given to the detectives, he was advised on four separate occasions of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, and he signed a waiver before giving the statement. It unequivocally appears from the record that Keen knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights before making the statement.

504 So.2d at 399-400.

Applying the same analysis to this record, we conclude that the failure to provide Chavez with a first appearance within twenty-four hours after his arrest did not compel his confession. Here, as in Keen, the record reflects that Chavez was repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights, and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them prior to confessing. Therefore, the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress on that basis. However, the question of whether suppression of Chavez’s last confession is appropriate as a remedy for the failure to provide a prompt probable cause determination remains.

Because Chavez was not afforded a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of having been taken into police custody, the burden shifts to the State to show that the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance justified the delay; otherwise, a McLaughlin violation has occurred. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. Here, record testimony suggests that the police perceived that exigent circumstances existed because of their efforts to locate the missing child, who had disappeared under untoward circumstances. However, given the amount of time which had transpired between Jimmy’s initial disappearance and Chavez’s apprehension, those circumstances were not as compelling as they might otherwise have been had the two events occurred more closely in time. It is therefore unclear whether extraordinary circumstances would excuse the officers’ failure to obtain a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of Chavez’s arrest.

Nonetheless, assuming that the failure to bring Chavez before a magistrate to determine probable cause violated the rule articulated in McLaughlin, we conclude that suppression of his last confession is not an appropriate remedy for the violation. On this record, the unique circumstances leading to Chavez’s last confession weigh in favor of admission rather than suppression. Further, even assuming that suppression were appropriate, given the overwhelming evidence of Chavez’s guilt, the error in admitting his last confession would be harmless.

As stated earlier, probable cause to arrest Chavez in connection with the disappearance of Jimmy Ryce existed at the time of his apprehension. Chavez has not demonstrated that either his arrest on December 6 or his detention during the first forty-eight hours following the arrest was unlawful. During that period of time, Chavez admitted his involvement with Jimmy’s disappearance; admitted shooting the boy; admitted disposing of Jimmy’s remains; and stated that what he had done would never have happened had he not been sexually battered as a boy in Cuba.

During this time, crime scene investigators also had noticed the cement-filled planters on the Seheinhaus property, and suspected that they might contain a cadaver. A “tube of JR water-based lubricant” and a blood-stained part of the wood floor of the horse farm trailer just inside the front door had been collected by crime scene technicians and packaged for transmittal to serology for processing. The murder weapon, containing Chavez’s fingerprint, had already been recovered. While the particulars of how and why Jimmy died and what was done to his body afterwards evolved over this period of time, Chavez’s involvement as the perpetrator of the crimes, and the motivation he ultimately revealed for committing them, did not change significantly from what investigators came to know during the first forty-eight hours, as compared to what Chavez disclosed in his last confession which occurred very shortly thereafter.

A number of courts which have examined the rationale of Gerstein and McLaughlin have concluded that the failure to provide a defendant with a timely probable cause determination does not require suppression of evidence obtained during an interrogation if sufficient evidence existed at the time the individual was first taken into police custody to arrest the defendant for the crime with which he or she was subsequently charged. In United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1063, 116 S.Ct. 745, 133 L.Ed.2d 693 (1996), the defendant was arrested for bank robbery, and arraigned within the forty-eight hour time limit of McLaughlin (some forty hours after his arrest), but he argued that the police delayed his arraignment so that they could gather more evidence against him — specifically, so they could conduct another lineup while Daniels was still in their custody. The Daniels court disagreed, reasoning that McLaughlin prohibited delays designed to gather “additional evidence to justify the arrest.” It observed that the lineup was conducted to bolster the case against Daniels:

Daniels’ argument seems to interpret [.McLaughlin ] to preclude law enforcement from bolstering its case against a defendant while he awaits his Gerstein hearing; that is a ludicrous position. Gerstein and its progeny simply prohibit law enforcement from detaining a defendant to gather evidence to justify his arrest, which is a wholly different matter. Probable cause to arrest Daniels already existed and that is what Ewer’s affidavit reported.

Id. at 314; see also Peterson v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding that interrogation of an arrested suspect does not constitute an unreasonable delay where police had probable cause for arrest); State v. Chapman, 343 N.C. 495, 471 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1996) (holding that the interrogation of a defendant about crimes for which he has just been arrested is not an “unnecessary delay” for purposes of a McLaughlin analysis). As stated in Riney v. State, 935 P.2d 828, 834-35 (Alaska Ct.App.1997):

If McLaughlin were interpreted in the manner Riney suggests [that interrogation of an arrested suspect would constitute an unreasonable delay even where the police already have probable cause for the suspect’s arrest], it would lead to an unjustifiable disparity in treatment between persons arrested on warrants and persons arrested without warrants. Under even the most expansive interpretation of McLaughlin, persons arrested on warrants can be interrogated following their arrest: no Gerstein hearing is required when a person is arrested on a warrant, because the judicial determination of probable cause for the arrest has already been made. See State v. Vice, 519 N.W.2d at 566. Thus, under Riney’s reading of McLaughlin, the existence or non-existence of an arrest warrant would determine whether the police were authorized to question someone they had just taken into custody. Riney suggests no rationale for such a rule, and we perceive no convincing rationale for it either. So long as the police do not detain a suspect for the purpose of gathering probable cause to justify the arrest after the fact, questioning an arrestee about the crime(s) for which he or she has been arrested does not constitute an “unreasonable” delay under Gerstein and McLaughlin.

Here, there was probable cause to arrest Chavez in connection with Jimmy’s disappearance at the time he was detained, and the defendant, who was given his Miranda rights four times prior to confessing, also signed an affidavit waiving his first appearance within forty-eight hours of apprehension. The record reflects ample evidence of Chavez’s informed waiver of his right to counsel, his knowing waiver of the right to first appearance, and his willing cooperation with the police officers in their investigation of Jimmy’s disappearance.

Further, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred due to the failure tó comply with the McLaughlin rule, the record here reflects that Chavez’s confession “was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). As we stated (in a different context) in Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 611 (Fla.1997):

Several years after Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)], the Supreme Court clarified the analysis to be undertaken when determining whether evidence obtained following an illegal detention must be suppressed. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). These factors include whether Miranda warnings were given, the tempora