North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services, Inc. v. State (866 So. 2d 612, 2003)

Citations

866 So. 2d 612

Full opinion text

SHAW, Senior Justice.

Section 390.01115, Florida Statutes (1999), is entitled the Parental Notice of Abortion Act (the “Parental Notice Act,” or the “Act”). Because of concerns regarding the Act’s constitutionality, both the trial and district courts below barred its implementation. The Act never has been enforced. We have for review State v. North Florida Women’s Health & Counseling Services, 852 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), wherein the district court declared the Act valid. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For reasons explained below, we quash North Florida and approve the trial court’s decision holding the Act unconstitutional under our controlling precedent in In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989).

Under the Parental Notice Act, prior to undergoing an abortion, a minor must notify a parent of her decision or, alternatively, must convince a court that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision herself, or that, if she is immature, the abortion nevertheless is in her best interests. The trial court analyzed the Act under T.W. and concluded that, in light of the Legislature’s continued disparate treatment of minors in other statutes governing comparable procedures and practices, the Act fails to further a compelling State interest. Because the trial court properly applied the controlling law as set forth in T.W. and because its findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, we sustain its ruling.

As was the case in Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 762 A.2d 620 (2000), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court struck a similar parental notice statute, our decision today in no way interferes with a parent’s right to participate in the decisionmaking process or a minor’s right to consult with her parents. Just the opposite. Under our decision, parent and minor are free to do as they wish in this regard, without government interference.

When the Parental Notice Act became effective on July 1, 1999, several women’s clinics, women’s rights groups, and physicians (“Women’s Services”) filed suit in circuit court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to block its enforcement, claiming that the Act violates a minor’s constitutional rights under our earlier decision in T.W. The circuit court held a two-and-one-half day evidentiary hearing and on July 27, 1999, issued a temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the Act. The State filed an interlocutory appeal in the First District Court of Appeal (the “First District”), and while that appeal was pending, the circuit court continued with the proceedings on the merits.

The circuit court in December 1999 conducted a five-day bench trial wherein the parties presented numerous exhibits and depositions and the live testimony of various experts. After the trial was completed, the First District relinquished jurisdiction of the State’s interlocutory appeal to the circuit court so that court could enter a final order on the merits. The circuit court on May 12, 2000, relied on this Court’s holding in T.W. and ruled that (a) the Act imposes a significant restriction on a minor’s right of privacy under the Florida Constitution, and (b) the Act fails to further a compelling State interest. The court held the Act unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction barring its enforcement.

The State appealed and the First District on February 9, 2001, reversed, holding that the Act furthers a compelling State interest. Women’s Services then filed a motion in district court seeking to stay issuance of the mandate and also a petition for review in this Court based on statutory validity. The district court granted the stay, effectively blocking enforcement of the Act, and this Court on October 26, 2001, granted discretionary review. The case was argued before this Court on March 4, 2002. After oral argument, the circuit court, on motion of the parties, supplemented the record in this Court twice: once in March 2002, with fifteen volumes of supplemental record, and once in August 2002, with two lengthy documentary exhibits.

Women’s Services contends that T.W. is controlling precedent, that the trial court faithfully applied that decision, and that this Court therefore should approve the trial court’s decision. The State, on the other hand, contends that this case is not controlled by T.W., or alternatively, that this Court should recede from T.W.

As noted above, the trial court conducted a two-and-one-half day evidentiary hearing before issuing a temporary injunction barring enforcement of the Act. The court then conducted a five-day bench trial. The following witnesses testified in person for Women’s Services during trial: attorney Jamie Ann Sabino; Judge Gerald C. Martin; Michael Benjamin, M.D.; Stanley K. Henshaw, Ph.D.; Nancy E. Alder, Ph.D.; and Harry Krop, Ph.D. In counterpoint, the following witnesses testified in person for the State: Rebecca I. Moor-head, M.D.; Peter Uhlenberg, Ph.D.; David Elkind, Ph.D.; and Charles R. Fig-ley, Ph.D.

The trial court, in its written order following trial, first acknowledged the Legislature’s statements of fact contained in the “whereas” clauses in the preamble to the Act. The court then conducted its own inquiry based on the evidence presented at trial and made its own factual findings, which may be paraphrased as follows:

—As to the medical consequences of abortions, I find from the evidence that abortion is one of the safer surgical procedures.

—The risk of mortality or complications from abortion are very low.

—Certainly, in no qualitative sense, are the risks [of mortality or complications] higher, or more unique for abortions than they are for child birth, or for other surgical procedures for which a minor may now lawfully consent without notifying her parents.

—Most minors,' especially older minors, are perfectly capable of following directions for aftercare treatment.

—Some minors have legitimate fears of physical and emotional abuse if their parents are consulted.

—There are some minors who have good reason not to want to have their parents consulted when they see a physician about an abortion.

—The fear of disclosure will motivate some minors to go to great lengths to avoid [disclosure], including delaying their decision to abort, thus increasing the risks, concealing their pregnancy, going to some other state where notice is not required, or seeking an illegal abortion.

The court addressed the Legislature’s statements of purpose, which also were contained in the “whereas” clauses, and then framed the key issue facing the court:

The stated purposes for the Act follow logically from the Legislative Findings; e.g. protect minors from their own immaturity, preserve the family unit and parental authority, prevent, detect and prosecute sexual batteries against minors. I can’t imagine any serious disagreement over the importance of these interests to our society. The family unit is the cornerstone of civilized society. We depend on parents to protect, guide, and socialize their children, to help to make them law abiding, productive members of the community. We hold parents responsible for their children— as we should — and we should be about the business of helping them, certainly not hindering them, in carrying out this responsibility.

The issue, though, is not whether these interests and goals are worthy and important. They clearly are. The question is whether the challenged Act is a permissible way under our State Constitution to achieve them. For the reasons outlined below I conclude that it is not.

The court reasoned that the Act imposed a direct and significant intrusion on a minor’s right of privacy because, as the title of the Act implies, a minor would be required to disclose to others — i.e., to her parents, guardians, and sundry court personnel — one of the most intimate aspects of her private life. The court also reasoned that the Act failed to further a compelling State interest in light of the fact that, in the intervening years since T.W. was decided, virtually nothing had changed in the statutory provisions authorizing less restrictive treatment for other comparable procedures and practices. Accordingly, the court concluded that, under T.W., the Act was unconstitutional.

The-district court below did not articulate any standard of review governing its analysis of the trial court’s decision. The court began its analysis not with a review of the trial court’s factual findings and legal ruling, but with its own assessment of the underlying facts. The district court articulated several factual findings, which may be paraphrased as follows:

—Appropriate aftercare is critical in avoiding or responding to post-abortion complications.

—Abortion is ordinarily an invasive surgical procedure attended by many of the risks accompanying surgical procedures generally.

—If post-abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a minor (like an adult) may need medical attention.

—A guardian unaware that her ward, or a parent unaware that his minor daughter, has undergone an abortion will be at a serious disadvantage in caring for her if complications develop.

—An adult who has been kept in the dark cannot ... assist the minor in following the abortion provider’s instructions for post-surgical care.

—The risks [of complication] are significant in the best of circumstances.

—While abortion is less risky than some surgical procedures, abortion complications can result in serious injury, infertility, and even death.

North Florida, 852 So.2d at 262.

Based on those findings, and without addressing the trial court’s reliance on T.W., the district court concluded that one of the State’s interests served by the Act— the protection of minors — was indeed compelling. The court reasoned as follows:

But if the State has established that even one of [its asserted interests] is a compelling state interest and that the Act furthers that interest by means that are no more intrusive than necessary, no court has authority to strike down the Act as facially violating article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.

At least one such interest has been established here. By facilitating the ability of parents and guardians to fulfill their duty to provide appropriate medical care for their daughters or wards, the Act serves a compelling state interest. Parents are legally responsible for their minor children’s health insofar as it is in their power to foster it. They have a duty to stay alert to their minor children’s medical needs, and to secure appropriate medical assistance if they are able to do so.

When the disabilities of nonage disappear, of course, these paternalistic responsibilities disappear along with them. But until a child is emancipated, she depends on her parent(s) or guardian, legally if not always as a practical matter, to arrange for her heath care, including medical treatment necessitated by post-abortion complications.

North Florida, 852 So.2d at 262 (citations omitted). The district court concluded that the Act is constitutional, reversed the trial court’s judgment, and remanded for dissolution of the permanent injunction.

As we did in T.W., we first consider the source and nature of the right of privacy asserted by petitioners. The text of the Florida Constitution begins with the Declaration of Rights, a series of rights that were created to protect each Floridian from government encroachment in his or her life:

The text of our Florida Constitution begins with a Declaration of Rights — a series of rights so basic that the framers of our Constitution accorded them a place of special privilege. These rights embrace a broad spectrum of enumerated and implied liberties that conjoin to form a single overarching freedom: They protect each individual within our borders from the unjust encroachment of state authority — from whatever official source — into his or her life. Each right is, in fact, a distinct freedom guaranteed to each Floridian against government intrusion. Each right operates in favor of the individual, against government. ...

It is significant that our Constitution thus commences by specifying those things which the state government must not do, before specifying certain things that it may do. These Declarations of Rights ... say to arbitrary and autocratic power, from whatever official quarter it may advance to invade these vital rights ... “Thus far shalt thou come, but no farther.”

State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 102-03, 120 So. 335, 347 (1929). No other broad formulation of legal principles, whether state or federal, provides more protection from government overreaching ... than does this “stalwart set of basic principles.”

Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 963 (Fla.1992).

Florida voters by general election in 1980 amended the Declaration of Rights to include an express, freestanding Right of Privacy Clause (the “Clause”):

Section 23. Right of privacy. — Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.

Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const. By amending the constitution to contain this Clause, the electors opted to create a broader, more protective right than that which had existed theretofore:

[The Florida privacy] amendment embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192. The Right of Privacy Clause has been implicated in a wide range of matters dealing with personal privacy.

The seminal Florida case in this area is In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989), wherein this Court held that section 390.001(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), i.e., the Parental Consent for Abortion Act (the “Parental Consent Act” or the “Act”), violated the Right of Privacy Clause. The Act operated as follows:

Prior to undergoing an abortion, a minor must obtain parental consent or, alternatively, must convince a court that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision herself or that, if she is immature, the abortion nevertheless is in her best interests.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1188-89.

The Court in T.W. relied on an earlier decision of this Court that explained the significance of Florida’s Right of Privacy Clause:

This Court in [Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla.1985),] described the far-reaching impact of the Florida amendment:

The citizens of Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion when they approved article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution. This amendment is an independent, freestanding constitutional provision which declares the fundamental right to privacy. Article I, section 23, was intentionally phrased in strong terms. The drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the words “unreasonable” or “unwarranted” before the phrase “governmental intrusion” in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible. Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right to privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal Constitution.

Winfield, 477 So.2d at 548.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1191-92.

The Court in T.W. then articulated the proper standard for courts to apply in determining whether a legislative enactment impermissibly infringes on the right of privacy:

The privacy section contains no express standard of review for evaluating the lawfulness of a government intrusion into one’s private life, and this Court when called upon, adopted the following standard:

Since the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard of review, it is important for us to identify an explicit standard to be applied in order to give proper force and effect to the amendment. The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive means.

Winfield, 477 So.2d at 547. When this standard was applied in disclosural cases, government intrusion generally was upheld as sufficiently compelling to overcome the individual’s right to privacy. We reaffirm, however that this it is a highly stringent standard, emphasized by the fact that no government intrusion in the personal decisionmaking cases ... has survived.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192.

The Court determined that a woman has a reasonable expectation of privacy in deciding whether to continue her pregnancy, more so than in virtually any other decision, and that the right of privacy is implicated in the decision. Significantly, the Court held that both the expectation and right apply to pregnant minors:

Florida’s privacy provision is clearly implicated in a woman’s decision of whether or not to continue her pregnancy. We can conceive of few more personal or private decisions concerning one’s body that one can make in the course of a lifetime, except perhaps the decision of the terminally ill in their choice of whether to discontinue necessary medical treatment.

Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions: first, whether, when, and how one’s body is to become the vehicle for another human being’s creation; second, when and how — this time there is no question of “whether” — one’s body is to terminate its organic life.

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1337-38 (2d ed.1988). The decision whether to obtain an abortion is fraught with specific physical, psychological, and economic implications of a uniquely personal nature for each woman. The Florida Constitution embodies the principle that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision ■... whether to end her pregnancy. A woman’s right to make that choice freely is fundamental.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2185, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986).

The next question to be addressed is whether this freedom of choice concerning. abortion extends to minors. We conclude that it does, based on the unambiguous language of the amendment: The right of privacy extends to “[e]very natural person.” Minors are natural persons in the eyes of the law and “[Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults ... possess constitutional rights.”

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192-93 (citations omitted).

The Court ultimately held that (a) if a legislative act imposes a significant restriction on a woman’s (or minor’s) right to seek an abortion, the act must further a compelling State interest through the least intrusive means; (b) the Parental Consent Act imposed a significant restriction on a minor’s right to seek an abortion; and (e) in light of the Legislature’s less restrictive treatment of minors in other comparable procedures and practices, the Act failed to “further” a compelling State interest:

The challenged statute fails because it intrudes upon the privacy of the pregnant minor from conception to birth. Such a substantial invasion of a pregnant female’s privacy by the state for the full term of the pregnancy is not necessary for the preservation of maternal health or the potentiality of life. However, where parental rights over a minor child are concerned, society has recognized additional state interests— protection of the immature minor and preservation of the family unit. For reasons set out below, we find that neither of these interests is sufficiently compelling under Florida law to override Florida’s privacy amendment.

We agree that the state’s interests in protecting minors and in preserving family unity are worthy objectives. Unlike the federal Constitution, however, which allows intrusion based on a significant state interest, the Florida Constitution requires a compelling state interest in all cases where the right to privacy is implicated. We note that Florida does not recognize these two interests as being sufficiently compelling to justify a parental consent requirement where procedures other than abortion are concerned. Section 748.065, Florida Statutes (1987), provides:

743.065 Unwed pregnant minor or minor mother; consent to medical services for minor or minor’s child valid.—

(1) An unwed pregnant minor may consent to the performance of medical or surgical care or services relating to her pregnancy by a hospital or clinic or by a physician ... and such consent is valid and binding as if she had achieved her majority.

(2) An unwed minor mother may consent to the performance of medical or surgical care or services for her child by a hospital or clinic or by a physician ... and such consent is valid and binding as if she had achieved her majority.

(3) Nothing in this act shall affect the provisions of s. 390.001 [the abortion statute].

Under this statute, a minor may consent, without parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her pregnancy or her existing child — no matter how dire the possible consequences— except abortion. Under In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (parents permitted to authorize removal of life support system from infant in permanent coma), this could include authority in certain circumstances to order life support discontinued for a comatose child. In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned. We fail to see the qualitative difference in terms of impact on the well-being of the minor between allowing the life of an existing child to come to an end and terminating a pregnancy, or between undergoing a highly dangerous medical procedure on oneself and undergoing a far less dangerous procedure to end one’s pregnancy. If any qualitative difference exists, it certainly is insufficient in terms of state interest. Although the state does have an interest in protecting minors, “the selective approach employed by the legislature evidences the limited nature of the ... interest being furthered by these provisions.” Ivey v. Bacardi Imports Co., 541 So.2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1989). We note that the state’s adoption act similarly contains no requirement that a minor obtain parental consent prior to placing a child up for adoption, even though this decision clearly is fraught with intense emotional and societal consequences.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1194-95 (citations and footnote omitted).

Ill

As noted above, the Parental Notice Act basically provides that, prior to undergoing an abortion, a minor must notify a parent of her decision or, alternatively, must convince a court that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision herself, or that, if she is immature, the abortion nevertheless is in her best interests. The Act originated in the Florida Legislature as Senate Bill 1598. Upon introduction to the Senate, the bill was referred to the Senate Health, Aging and Long-Term Care Committee, which evaluated the bill and prepared a staff analysis and economic impact statement.

The staff analysis and economic impact statement warned that the bill may run afoul of both the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution and this Court’s decision in T.W.:

Both the notification requirements and the imposition of a 48-hour waiting period between the time the parent or guardian is notified and the time the minor may terminate her pregnancy may be considered by the courts as a violation of a minor’s state constitutional right to privacy. If the provisions in this bill did become subject to interpretation of the court, any state interest would have to pass a compelling state interest standard due to the express privacy provision in the Florida Constitution. It appears that two of the state interests the bill is designed to protect are the protection of the immature minor and preservation of the family unit. In the case of In re T.W., the Florida Supreme Court found “that neither of these interests is sufficiently compelling under Florida law to override Florida’s privacy amendment.”

Fla. S. Comm, on Health, Aging and Long-Term Care, SB1598 (1999), Staff Analysis 8 (revised April 6, 1999) (emphasis added) (available at Fla. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Mgmt., Fla. St. Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).

This warning of constitutional infirmity notwithstanding, the committee nevertheless reported the bill favorably. The bill then was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which prepared a second staff analysis and economic impact statement. When issued, that statement contained a virtually identical warning concerning the Act’s constitutional invalidity. The Judiciary Committee nevertheless also reported the bill favorably, and subsequently both the Senate and House of Representatives passed the bill. The bill was enaet-ed as chapter 99-322, section 1, Laws of Florida, and was codified in section 390.01115, Florida Statutes (1999).

When reviewing the validity of a legislative enactment, Florida courts generally will apply one of three levels of scrutiny: (1) “ordinary” scrutiny; (2) “mid-level” scrutiny; or (3) “strict” scrutiny. Each level has a concomitant presumption of validity or invalidity and standard of proof. Under “ordinary” scrutiny, which applies to most legislation, an act is presumptively constitutional unless proved otherwise by the challenging party:

It should be kept in mind that in the absence of an impingement upon constitutional rights ... an act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. The burden is on the challenger to demonstrate that the law does not bear a reasonable relationship to a proper state objective.

State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1985). On the other hand, under “strict” scrutiny, which applies to legislation impinging on certain fundamental rights, just the opposite is the case. The act is presumptively unconstitutional unless proved valid by the State:

It is well settled that ... if a law “impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional.”

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 466 U.S. 55, 76, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980)).

The Court in Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1999), explained that Florida’s right of privacy is a fundamental right warranting “strict” scrutiny. A legislative act impinging on this right is presumptively unconstitutional unless proved valid by the State:

The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy.

Id. at 1033 (quoting Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla.1985)). This is the settled law that we applied in T.W. and that we again apply today.

An appellate court’s first obligation when reviewing a lower court’s decision is to articulate its standard of review — i.e., its criterion for assessing the validity of the lower court’s ruling. This requirement serves two functions: it informs the parties of the extent of the review and, most important, reminds the appellate court of the limitations placed on its own authority by the appellate process. The Court in Chiles articulated a prime limitation placed on the appellate court:

The findings of a trial court are presumptively correct and must stand unless [they are unsupported by the record.]

Id. at 1034 (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). Application of the wrong standard of review may tilt the appellate playing field and irreparably prejudice a party’s rights.

To assist appellate courts in evaluating a trial court’s ruling concerning the constitutionality of a statute, it oftentimes is preferable to have a record developed in the lower court before a finder of fact. A trial court’s ruling concerning the constitutionality of a statute following a trial wherein the parties introduce conflicting evidence is generally a mixed question of law and fact. We conclude that the proper standard of review in such cases is as follows: the trial court’s ultimate ruling must be subjected to de novo review, but the court’s factual findings must be sustained if supported by legally sufficient evidence. Legally sufficient evidence is tantamount to competent substantial evidence.

The State contends that courts, when addressing the constitutionality of a legislative act, must accede to the Legislature’s statements of policy and fact:

Whatever this Court’s power to act here, this is a social policy issue more appropriately left to the Legislature, which has the ability to hold public hearings and debates, to examine the issue, and to draft appropriate legislation addressing the rights and balancing the interests of the various parties involved— which is precisely what the Legislature did in this case.

The State claims that, under the separation of powers doctrine, courts cannot circumvent the “fact-finding prerogative of the Legislature” by giving their own factual findings precedence over legislative statements of policy and fact. We disagree.

While courts may defer to legislative statements of policy and fact, courts may do so only when those statements are based on actual findings of fact, and even then courts must conduct their own inquiry:

The general rule is that findings of fact made by the legislature are presumptively correct. However, it is well-recognized that the findings of fact made by the legislature must actually be findings of fact. They are not entitled to the presumption of correctness if they are nothing more than recitations amounting only to conclusions and they are always subject to judicial inquiry.

Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 549 (Fla.1960) (quoting Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla.1951)).

In point of fact, this Court in Chiles applied the above rule of law to hold unconstitutional a statute barring collective bargaining by government attorneys. The Court consistently deferred to the trial court’s findings and overrode the views of the Legislature:

The trial court examined the statute independently to ascertain whether the committee staffs views, which reflect the state’s position, were borne out. To that end, the trial court took evidence on whether section 447.203(3)(J) serves a compelling state interest and whether it does so by means least burdening state employees’ rights to bargain collectively. The lower court found [that the State’s interest in maintaining the lawyer-client relationship was compelling but that section 447.203(3)© was not the least intrusive means of serving that interest]....

... We have been shown no basis for disturbing the trial court’s findings of fact in this regard.

Id. at 1034-35 (quoting Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So.2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1st DC A 1998)). In sum, legislative statements of policy and fact do not “obviate the need for judicial scrutiny.” The soundness of this rule is borne out in the present case.

Although the official record of Senate Bill 1598 is scant (it comprises only a few documents and audio tapes), that record shows the following. After the bill was introduced to the Senate, it was submitted in preliminary form by its sponsor to the Senate bill drafting service. The bill that emerged from the drafting service included a preamble that contained numerous “whereas” clauses, each of which was a statement of fact or purpose. None of those clauses were designated as findings of fact. Nor could they properly be so designated in light of the fact that the drafting service has neither the authority nor the means for gathering and evaluating evidence and making factual determinations.

After the bill emerged from the drafting service, it was filed with the Secretary of the Senate and then was referred by the President of the Senate to the two committees noted above. Neither committee was charged with fact-finding, and neither committee made a formal effort to gather evidence and render findings of fact. Instead, each conducted a brief public hearing. Because of the committees’ time constraints, only two witnesses for each side were allowed to testify at the first hearing and three witnesses for each side at the second hearing. The witnesses included one registered lobbyist, six individuals affiliated with special interest groups, and one lay person.

The total time allotted for direct testimony (for all witnesses combined) was limited to fifteen minutes at the first hearing, and five minutes at the second hearing. The testimony was pro forma; none of the witnesses were sworn, and none were subjected to formal cross-examination. In fact, only one witness was questioned by committee members. Several of the witnesses testified for less than sixty seconds each. Immediately after the witnesses testified at each hearing, the bill was debated and reported favorably by the committee. When the bill was referred from the second committee to the full Senate and then delivered to the House of Representatives, neither of those bodies conducted any fact-finding; the proceedings in each chamber were limited to the floor debate, reading of the bill, and voting. The voting immediately followed the floor debate and reading of the bill.

In contrast, the certified record of the trial court below is extensive — it fills four large file boxes and comprises thousands of pages of transcript and exhibits — and shows the following. The court conducted a two-and-one-half day evidentiary hearing and a five-day bench trial wherein numerous witnesses testified at length, often for hours at a time. The witnesses were experts in their fields: each had extensive educational credentials, professional affiliations and certifications, and experience. All the witnesses were sworn, and all were subjected to the crucible of cross-examination. The parties also submitted voluminous documents, depositions, and other exhibits. All the proceedings comported with the legal requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and all evidence met the formal requirements of the Florida Evidence Code.

After trial, the matter rested in the sound judgment of the trial court. The court assessed the credibility of the competing witnesses, weighed the conflicting evidence, studied the applicable law, deliberated on the matter, and then issued a detailed eighteen-page written order. Although the court, in its written order, paid due recognition to the Legislature’s statements of fact and purpose, the court properly did not accede to those statements but rather framed the legal issues itself, made its own factual findings, conducted its own analysis, and reached its own conclusions.

Applying the above rules of law to the present case, we first must determine whether the district court, in conducting its review of the trial court’s ruling, erred in a manner that adversely affected its decision. As noted above, the district court articulated numerous factual findings, which it derived from the record. Our own review of the record, however, shows that none of those findings were made by the trier-of-fact. Rather, the district court’s findings in many instances are contradicted by the trial court’s findings on the same point.

Significantly, the district court’s ultimate determination — that the Act furthers a compelling State interest because it allows parents to assist in giving post-abortion care to a minor — is controverted by the findings of the trial court. The trial court found inter alia that, while such parental support is certainly preferable, “most minors, especially older minors, are perfectly capable of following directions for aftercare treatment.” By ignoring the trial court’s findings, the district court violated the basic precept of appellate review articulated in Chiles: “The findings of a trial court are presumptively correct and must stand unless [they are unsupported by the record].” Accordingly, we quash the district court’s decision.

In evaluating the present trial court’s decision, we review the court’s ultimate ruling de novo, but we defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. In particular, we focus on two key questions addressed by the court. (1) Does the Parental Notice Act impose a significant restriction on a minor’s right of privacy? And if so, (2) does the Act further a compelling State interest through the least intrusive means?

As to whether the Parental Notice Act imposes a significant restriction on a minor’s right of privacy, the trial court addressed this matter as follows:

The State argues, alternatively, that the Parental Notification Statute is essentially different in character and effect than a Parental Consent Statute, such as was struck down in T.W. After all, the minor is still free to choose an abortion. There is no veto power by the parent over the minor’s decision. Thus, the State argues, the Act is an insignificant intrusion on a woman’s right of privacy and should be permissible. The State cites federal case authority in support of this argument. I am unpersuaded.

[T]he argument that a statute requiring notice to parents is not a significant intrusion on a minor’s right of privacy ignores the realities of the intended and expected effect of the Act. While the requirement of notification is certainly less restrictive than the requirement of parental consent, it is by no means insignificant. The stated, obvious, and intended purpose of the law is to allow the parents an opportunity to exert parental authority and influence over their child, to provide care, comfort and guidance. And, the ability of parents, for better or worse, to persuade, influence, coerce, intimidate, and otherwise affect the decisions and conduct of their children is tremendous. Further, what parent would not do all he or she could; including seeking relief in court, to prevent their child from doing something they felt was not in her best interest.

Even under the best of conditions, there will be some delay and thus increased risk to the minor child in having the abortion performed. Having to speak to a guardian ad litem and/or attorney, coming up before a judge and other court personnel can be embarrassing and intimidating. The chance of a breach in the confidentiality requirement is a real possibility, especially in small communities. Some minors, fearful that a judge will deny their petition, or that their parents will find out anyway, will delay their decision long enough that termination of the pregnancy will no longer be an option. Some children, without doubt, will seek at all cost to avoid telling their parents, including going to other states, having illegal abortions, or self-inducing abortions. Some physicians, unsure of their potential for liability, will be more cautious and less likely to perform an abortion for a minor if there is any question as to proper notification.

I would also suggest that the parental consent and the parental notification statutes are very similar in their intended and expected effect. In both situations, it would be expected that the good parent — the one who would use their parental influence to care, comfort, guide, and assist the minor in her decision, is likely, as the state asserts, to ultimately support their child in whatever decision they make. It is unlikely that that parent will exercise a “veto power” if they have it, if their child decides to terminate the pregnancy. In fact, many parents will lobby in favor of their young daughter having the abortion rather than carrying to term.

Moreover, under both types of statute, the criteria for obtaining a bypass is essentially the same, i.e., establish that she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision, or for some reason, it is not in her best interest to notify the parent or to get the parent’s consent. In both cases, the same group of minors would theoretically be able to bypass either the requirement of notification or consent. And, if the experience of other states with such statutes is any indication, very few petitions would be turned down under either statute. Based on the above, I cannot say that the effect of this legislation on a minor’s ability to freely choose is so insignificant that the compelling state interest standard is not implicated.

Our review of the record shows that the trial court’s ruling on this point must be sustained. First, the court’s main finding — that the notification requirement is similar to the consent requirement in that it constitutes a significant intrusion on a minor’s right of privacy — is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. As noted above, few decisions are more private and properly protected from government intrusion than a woman’s decision whether to continue her pregnancy, and yet the Act’s notification requirement prohibits a pregnant minor from keeping this matter private. And second, the court’s ultimate conclusion — that the Act can meet constitutional muster only if it furthers a compelling State interest through the least restrictive means — comports with the applicable law as articulated in T.W. and other decisions of this Court.

As to whether the Parental Notice Act furthers a compelling State interest, the trial court addressed this matter thusly:

5. The State may be able to establish a compelling state interest justifying intrusion upon a minor’s right of privacy that would not justify the intrusion into the privacy interest of an adult.

7. The State’s interests in protecting an immature minor and fostering the integrity of the family, while important and worthy, do not justify restricting a minor’s right to choose abortion where similar restrictions are not imposed on comparable choices or decisions.

One of the key holdings of T.W. as it pertains to the present case, is Number 7. You can’t say that our interest in protecting immature minors and preserving family unity is so compelling that it justifies interfering with a minor’s choice to have an abortion, where those interests are not deemed sufficiently compelling to justify interference with comparable decisions. It is not enough for the state to say that an interest is compelling. It must be demonstrated through comprehensive and consistent legislative treatment.

In support of this last point, the court cited section 743.065, Florida Statutes (1999), which was the same statutory section we relied on in T.W. The trial court then quoted the following passage from T.W.:

Under [section 743.065], a minor may consent, without parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her pregnancy or her existing child — no matter how dire the possible consequences — except abortion. Under In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (parents permitted to authorize removal of life support system from infant in permanent coma), this could include authority in certain circumstances to order life support discontinued for a comatose child. In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned. We fail to see the qualitative difference in terms of impact on the well-being of the minor between allowing the life of an existing child to come to an end and terminating a pregnancy, or between undergoing a highly dangerous medical procedure on oneself and undergoing a far less dangerous procedure to end one’s pregnancy. If any qualitative difference exists, it certainly is insufficient in terms of state interest.

T.W., 551 So.2d at 1195 (footnote omitted).

Critical to the trial court’s decision — and to our decision today — is the fact that nothing whatsoever has changed in this statutory scheme since T.W. was decided. The trial court explained:

The contrast between the Legislature’s treatment of a minor’s decision to choose an abortion and its treatment of comparable decisions by a minor is as stark today as it was when the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in T.W. Section 743.065, Florida Statutes, continues to allow an unwed pregnant minor to consent to dangerous medical procedures for herself and for her child without any involvement of the minor’s parent. A minor may still give a child up for adoption without any involvement of the minor’s parent or legal guardian. Physicians, health care professionals, and health facilities “may examine and provide treatment for sexually transmitted diseases to any minor” without any parental involvement, and a minor aged 13 or over may obtain mental health diagnostic and evaluative services and outpatient crisis intervention services without parental involvement. In addition, a minor may obtain contraceptives and pregnancy tests from health care providers without any requirement that a parent be notified.-

The court applied the above legal principles to its findings and rejected out of hand the State’s “abortion is different” argument:

As noted above, the health risk to a minor who becomes pregnant and carries the child to term are just as great, or greater, than the risk of having an abortion. All of the expressed state interests sought to be furthered by this Act, are equally applicable, and equally important, to all of these other similar decisions. A minor is no more mature, or better able to make informed decisions as to carrying a child to term, or determining medical treatment for her child, or giving hér child up for adoption. The desirability of parental involvement is no less in these situations than when a minor is considering abortion. Yet, the state does not require notice to parents in any of these other situations.

Again, our review of the record shows that the trial court’s findings on this point are supported by competent substantial evidence and its ultimate conclusion comports with the applicable law.

VII

The State claims that, despite the ruling of the trial court below, we should find the Parental Notice Act constitutional because the United States Supreme Court has approved similar parental notification statutes under the federal constitution. Further, the State relies on the United States Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), wherein a plurality of the Court abandoned the “strict” scrutiny standard in favor of the less stringent “undue burden” standard. The State urges this Court to recede from T.W. and adopt the same “undue burden” standard in Florida. We decline to do so.

First, any comparison between the federal and Florida rights of privacy is inap-posite in light of the fact that there is no express federal right of privacy clause. Florida is one of only a handful of states wherein the state constitution includes an independent, freestanding Right of Privacy Clause. Unlike the citizens of Florida, the citizens of the United States have never amended the national charter to include a freestanding privacy clause. While the United States Supreme Court has read into the federal constitution an implicit right of privacy, that particular right is a weak version of our explicit freestanding state right. As noted above:

[The Florida privacy] amendment em-. braces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1192. Further, the United States Supreme Court, time and again, has made it clear that the individual states, not the federal government, are the ultimate guarantors of personal privacy:

But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy — his right to be let alone by other people — is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes and emphasis omitted).

And second, it is settled in Florida that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the Declaration of Rights is a fundamental right. Legislation intruding on a fundamental right is presumptively invalid and, where the right of privacy is concerned, must meet the “strict” scrutiny standard. Florida courts consistently have applied the “strict” scrutiny standard whenever the Right of Privacy Clause was implicated, regardless of the nature of the activity. The “undue burden” standard, on the other hand, is an inherently ambiguous standard and has no basis in Florida’s Right of Privacy Clause.

In order to adopt the “undue burden” standard, as the State urges, we would have to abandon an extensive body of dear and settled Florida precedent in favor of an ambiguous federal standard. Most important, however, we would have to forsake the will of the people. If Floridians had been satisfied with the degree of protection afforded by the federal right of privacy, they never would have adopted their own freestanding Right of Privacy Clause. In adopting the privacy amendment, Floridians deliberately opted for substantially more protection than the federal charter provides.

The State next alleges that our decision in T.W. has no precedential value because there was no “majority opinion” in that case. The State points to the following language in Justice Kogan’s concurring opinion in Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1994):

On another relevant point, I must express some surprise at the rather widespread practice in Florida of referring to a “majority opinion” in T.W. In actuality there was no “majority opinion” at all. The views of the Justices in T.W. were divided into five separate opinions, none of which garnered the four votes necessary to constitute a precedential “opinion” under the Florida Constitution.

Jones, 640 So.2d at 1091 (Kogan, J., concurring). We disagree.

In T.W., Justices Shaw, Barkett, and Kogan “concurred” in the opinion of the Court, which was authored by Justice Shaw; Chief Justice Ehrlich “concurred specially” in that opinion. Chief Justice Ehrlich’s opinion speaks for itself, commencing thusly:

I generally concur with the majority opinion and the result it reaches. I write only to express my disagreement with the definition of “viability” adopted by the majority and to elucidate my views.

In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1197 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Ehrlich’s sole point of difference with the majority opinion was this: instead of adopting the definition of “viability” set forth in T.W., he would have preferred to adopt the definition set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). He pointed out, however, that this disparity made no difference in the outcome of T.W. because the pregnancy in that case had not yet reached the point of viability under either definition.

In the final analysis, the opinion in T.W. that was authored by Justice Shaw garnered a total of four votes except for the definition of “viability,” upon which Chief Justice Ehrlich disagreed. On that point alone, Justice Shaw’s opinion garnered a total of three votes. Thus, in all respects, except for the definition of “viability,” Justice Shaw’s opinion in T.W. was the “majority opinion” of the Court and is binding precedent. In point of fact, the majority opinion in T.W. subsequently has been relied on extensively by this Court in developing and refining our State privacy jurisprudence. In contrast, the construction of T.W. urged by Justice Kogan was rejected by the entire Court.

Finally, the State claims that we should recede from T.W. based on the following grounds:

T.W. is flawed because the Court failed to recognize that there are ... fundamental differences between abortion and prenatal care which justify the Legislature treating those two subjects differently. Additionally, the T.W. Court failed to recognize that the parental consent statute was consistent with our State’s historic treatment of children differently than adults. For these reasons, T.W. is flawed and should not be followed.

The State in effect is asking this Court to recede from T.W. because it was wrongly decided. We decline to do so.

The doctrine of stare decisis, or the obligation of a court to abide by its own precedent, is' grounded on the need for stability in the law and has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries:

For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the lands; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *69 (emphasis omitted). The doctrine was part of the English common law when the State of Florida was founded and thus was adopted and codified by the Florida Legislature in 1829. The doctrine was memorialized by this Court nearly a century and a half ago and has since been addressed extensively by the Court.

Before overruling a prior decision of this Court, we traditionally have asked several questions, including the following. (1) Has the prior decision proved unworkable due to reliance on an impractical legal “fiction”? (2) Can the rule of law announced in the decision be reversed without serious injustice to those who have relied on it and without serious disruption in the stability of the law? And (3) have the factual premises underlying the decision changed so drastically as to leave the decision’s central holding utterly without legal justification? The presumption in favor of stare decisis is strong, and where the decision in issue was a watershed judgment resolving a deeply divisive societal controversy, the presumption in favor of stare decisis is at its zenith.

Applying the above criteria to our decision in T.W., we conclude that T.W. passes muster. First, T.W. in no sense has proved “unworkable” due to reliance on an impractical legal fiction. For purposes of comparison, a classic case wherein a decision of this Court proved unworkable in this regard was Amlotte v. State, 456 So.2d 448 (Fla.1984). There, we relied on several legal fictions to uphold the existence of the criminal offense of attempted felony murder. Those legal fictions, however, subsequently proved too abstruse for courts to maintain and we ultimately receded from that decision. In contrast, our decision in T.W. was not based on any legal fiction and thus has not proved to be unworkable in this regard.

Second, the extent of reliance on T.W. unquestionably has been great. During the past fourteen years, Floridians have organized their personal and family relationships based on the constitutional right articulated in that decision, and a generation of Florida women has matured during that period and has had an opportunity to participate equally in the social and economic life of this State due in part to the ability to make personal decisions based on T.W. Further, T.W. has been relied on by Florida appellate courts more than fifty times and has been utilized extensively by this Court in formulating Florida’s privacy jurisprudence. Additionally, T.W. has served as a model in other jurisdictions.

And third, no premise of fact has changed in the intervening years so as to render T.W.’s holding utterly without legal justification. Although federal case law indicates that, due to scientific advancements, there may have been slight changes in (a) the safety of abortions and (b) the point at which a fetus becomes viable, both the former and latter were anticipated in T.W. and were expressly factored into that decision. Further, both those changes are of a technical or evolutionary nature and are not the type of precipitous factual upheaval that would be required in order to render a prior decision of this Court utterly without legal justification.

Based on the foregoing, we decline the State’s invitation to recede from T.W. We cannot forsake the doctrine of stare decisis and recede from our own controlling precedent when the only change in this area has been in the membership of this Court. Justice Stewart of the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue over a quarter-century ago:

A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding, mission to serve.

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

We agree that a basic change in Florida law at this point would constitute an unprincipled abrogation of the doctrine of stare decisis and would invite the popular misconception that this Court is subject to the same political influence as the two political branches of government. Nothing could do more lasting injury to the legitimacy of this Court as an institution. It is in issues such as the present — where popular sentiments run strong and conflicts deep — that stability in the law is paramount and that the doctrine of stare deci-sis applies perforce, particularly where a watershed decision of this Court is concerned. Accordingly, we forswear any change in the controlling law in this area absent the most special and extraordinary circumstances.

VIII

We recognize that the legal issue of abortion has been one of the most gut-wrenching, emotionally laden issues of past decades in Florida. ■ As ordinary citizens, our hearts and our respect go out to all the well-intentioned, civic-minded individuals on both sides of the present debate who have worked passionately within the confines of the law to instill in Florida’s youth a sense of moral rectitude and accountability, to prevent teenage pregnancies, and to make this State a better, more wholesome place for our youth. The data and vignettes adduced by the advocates for each side are at once thought-provoking, harrowing, and heart-breaking. We do not question the strength or sincerity of the parties’ convictions.

Sitting as a Court, however, we cannot be ruled by emotion. Rather, we are sworn to uphold the law of this State and to decide each case deliberately,