Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (894 So. 2d 202, 2005)

Florida Supreme Court 2005-02-03

Citations

Full opinion text

PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar’s Appellate Court Rules Committee (Committee) has filed its biennial report of regular-cycle proposed rule amendments in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.130(c)(4). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

The Committee’s regular-cycle report proposes amendments to rules 9.020 (Definitions), 9.030 (Jurisdiction of Courts), 9.130 (Proceedings to Review Non-Final Orders and Specified Final Orders), 9.142 (Procedures for Review in Death Penalty Cases), 9.145 (Appeal Proceedings in Juvenile Delinquency Cases), 9.180 (Appeal Proceedings to Review Workers’ Compensation Cases), 9.190 (Judicial Review of Administrative Action), 9.220 (Appendix), 9.370 (Amicus Curiae), 9.420 (Filing; Service of Copies; Computation of Time), 9.430 (Proceedings by Indigents), and 9.800 (Uniform Citation System), and proposes new form 9.900(i) (Prisoner’s Motion and Affidavit to Proceed Without Prepayment of Court Costs and Fees). As required by rule 2.130(c)(2), prior to submission to the Court, the proposed rule amendments were published in The Florida Bar News and on the internet web site of The Florida Bar. One comment was received. After submission, the proposed amendments were again published for comment in the March 1, 2004 edition of The Florida Bar News and placed on the Court’s internet web site. Two comments were received.

Subsequently, the Committee submitted a supplemental report proposing an additional amendment to rule 9.331 (Determination of Causes in a District Court of Appeal En Banc). This additional proposed amendment was published for comment in the June 1, 2004 edition of The Florida Bar News and was placed on the Court’s internet web site. No comments were received. Having considered the Committee’s reports, we adopt the amendments proposed by the Committee with one modification as more fully discussed below.

AMENDMENTS '

First, we adopt several amendments to rules 9.020 and 9.331 in order to clarify the effect of motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc on the finality of appellate orders. New subdivision (i) is added to rule 9.020 to specifically define rendition of an appellate order. This new subdivision states that if a timely and authorized motion under rule 9.330 or 9.331 is filed, an appellate order shall not be deemed rendered until the motion is either abandoned or resolved by written order. Rule 9.331(d) is amended to eliminate the requirement that a motion for rehearing en banc be filed in conjunction with a motion for rehearing, to provide that a response may be served within ten days of service of the motion for rehearing en banc, and to require the appellate court to enter a written order disposing of the motion for rehearing en banc.

Next, rule 9.030(b)(1) is amended to clarify the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts over final orders of county courts declaring a state statute or provision of the Florida Constitution invalid. Although under the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes, the district courts clearly have such appellate jurisdiction, current rule 9.030(b)(1) does not expressly provide for. it. Thus, we amend the rule to rectify this problem.

New subdivision (a)(3)(C)(viii) is added to rule 9.130 to make the rule consistent with section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). That section permits a governmental entity to take an interlocutory appeal of a determination that its action has resulted in an “inordinate burden” under the Bert Harris Property Rights Protection Act. However, because there is no provision in the current rules allowing .for such an appeal, the statutory provision is a nullity. See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const, (providing that district courts “may review interlocutory orders ... to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court”); see also Osceola County v. Best Diversified, Inc., 830 So.2d 139 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Accordingly, rule 9.130 is amended to permit these interlocutory appeals.

We also adopt a modified version of the Committee’s proposed amendment to rule 9.142(a)(6) governing the scope of review in death penalty appeals. Currently, this rule requires the Court to review the evidence in death cases to “determine if the interest' of justice requires a new trial, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented for review.” Fla. RApp. P. 9.142(a)(6). The Committee proposed an amendment to this rule deleting the words “a new trial” and substituting the words “remand for appropriate relief.”

In considering this amendment, which is meant to make the rule consistent with this Court’s practice, we note that along with the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, we also review the issue of proportionality of the death sentence regardless of whether that issue is formally presented by the parties. Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of the proposed amendment to rule 9.142(a)(6) as follows: In death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for review, the court shall review the evidence to -determine if the interest of-justice requires a new trial, whether- or not insufficiency ■ of the evidence — is—an—issue—presented—for—re-viewthese issues and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.

Rule 9.145(c)(2), governing non-final state appeals in juvenile dependency cases, currently fails to mention rendition when setting forth the time for filing a notice of appeal from a pre-adjudicatory hearing order. Accordingly, that rule is amended to clarify that the notice of appeal must be filed within fifteen days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Rule 9.180, governing appeal proceedings in workers’ compensation cases, is amended in three ways. First subdivision (b)(2) is amended to provide that failure to request separate findings of fact and conclusions of law after entry of an abbreviated order by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) waives review by appeal of that order, and that filing of such a request tolls the time within which an appeal may be taken. Second, subdivision (h)(1) is amended to delete, as duplicative, the requirement that a copy of an appellant’s brief shall be served on the appellee. Third, the requirement in subdivision (b)(4) that the JCC send a copy of the notice and a certified copy of the order to the Division of Workers’ Compensation as well as to the General Counsel for the Department of Labor and Employment Security is deleted because those agencies no longer require such copies.

Rule 9.190, governing judicial review of administrative action, is amended in two respects. Subdivision (d) of this rule which addresses attorney’s fees is amended to clarify the court’s authority to remand to the lower tribunal for a determination of an amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded or refer the matter to a special magistrate. Subdivision (e)(2)(C) is amended, with an explanatory committee note, to clarify that an agency has ten days to respond to the filing of a motion for stay of an order suspending or revoking a license and requiring the court to grant a stay “unless the agency files a timely response demonstrating that a stay would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state.”

In response to concerns raised in Hill v. Hill, 778 So.2d 967, 969 (Fla.2001) (J. Par-iente, specially concurring), regarding supplementation of appendices in non-final appeal proceedings, the Committee proposed and we adopt an amendment to rule 9.220. This rule is amended to provide that “[i]n any proceeding in which an appendix is required, if the court finds that the appendix is incomplete, it shall direct a party to supply the omitted parts of the appendix.” The amended rule also states that “[n]o proceeding shall be determined until an opportunity to supplement the appendix has been given.”

In Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 827 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla.2002), the Court requested that the Committee consider whether rule 9.370 allows amicus briefs to be considered upon consent of the parties and without court approval. Despite the alternative language of the current rule, the Committee determined that appellate courts exercise their own inherent authority to decide if the brief should be permitted. Accordingly, rule 9.370 is amended to clarify that leave of court is required to file an amicus brief.

In response to the Court’s request in Griffin v. Sistuenck, 816 So.2d 600, 602 n. 4 (Fla.2002), the Committee proposed and we adopt an amendment to rule 9.420 to provide a separate certificate of service for use by pro se inmates and other pro se litigants. The amendment also provides that a certificate of service that substantially complies with the appropriate form will be taken as prima facie proof of service.

In Jackson v. Florida Department of Corrections, 790 So.2d 381, 384 n. 3 (Fla.2001), the Court requested that the Committee “propose amendments to rule 9.430 to comply with the substantive payment portions of the [Prisoner Indigency] Statute and that it suggest procedures (to be placed in the rule) for implementation of the statute.” The result is that new subdivision (b) is added to rule 9.430. This new subdivision allows an appellate court to presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that assertions filed in an affidavit by a prisoner are true and that, in criminal or collateral criminal proceedings, a prisoner who has been declared indigent for purposes of proceedings in the lower tribunal remains indigent. Additionally, in cases which are not criminal or collateral criminal proceedings, it permits the court to require a prisoner “to make a partial prepayment of court costs or fees and to make continued partial payments until the full amount is paid.” In conjunction with this amendment, new Form 9.900(i) is adopted. The form adopted includes a prisoner’s motion and affidavit to proceed without prepayment of court costs, a financial certificate to be completed by authorized prison officials, and two orders for use by the court in determining a prisoner’s indigen-cy.

Finally, rule 9.800 is amended to update citation requirements to reflect current case number practice, to correct apparent minor errors, to delete obsolete citations, to add a citation to the United States Constitution, and ensure examples given cite current rules.

We hereby adopt the amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The amendments will become effective immediately.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 9.020. DEFINITIONS

The following terms have the meanings shown as used in these rules:

(a) Administrative Action. Administrative action shall include:

(1) final agency action as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes;

(2) non-final action by an agency or administrative law judge reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act;

(3) quasi-judicial decisions by any administrative body, agency, board or commission not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act; and

(4) administrative action for which judicial review is provided by general law.

(b) Clerk. The person or official specifically designated as such for the court or lower tribunal; if no person or official has been specifically so designated, the official or agent who most closely resembles a clerk in the functions performed.

(c) Court. The supreme court; the district courts of appeal; and the circuit courts in the exercise of the jurisdiction described by rule 9.030(c), including the chief justice of the supreme court and the chief judge of a district court of appeal in the exercise of constitutional, administrative, or supervisory powers on behalf of such courts.

(d) Family Law Matter. A matter governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

(e) Lower Tribunal. The court, agency, officer, board, commission, judge of compensation claims, or body whose order is to be reviewed.

(f) Order. A decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries.

(g) Parties.

(1) Appellant. A party who seeks to invoke the appeal jurisdiction of a court.

(2) Appellee. Every party in the proceeding in the lower tribunal other than an appellant.

(3) Petitioner. A party who seeks an order under rule 9.100 or rule 9.120.

(4) Respondent. Every other party in a proceeding brought by a petitioner.

(h) Rendition (of an Order). An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal. However, unless another applicable rule of procedure specifically provides to the contrary, if a final order has been entered and there has been filed in the lower tribunal an authorized and timely motion for new trial, for rehearing, for clarification, -for certification, to alter or amend, for judgment in accordance with prior motion for directed verdict, for arrest of judgment, to challenge the verdict, to correct a sentence or order of probation pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1), to withdraw a plea after sentencing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(£), or to vacate an order based upon the recommendations of a hearing officer in accordance with Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.491, the following exceptions apply:

(1) If such a motion or motions have been filed, the final order shall not be deemed rendered with respect to any claim between the movant and any party against whom relief is sought by the motion or motions until the filing of a signed, written order disposing of all such motions between such parties.

(2) If such a motion or motions have been filed, a signed, written order granting a new trial shall be deemed rendered when filed with the clerk, notwithstanding that other such motions may remain pending at the time.

(3) If such a motion or motions have been filed and a notice of appeal is filed before the filing of a signed, written order disposing of all such motions, all motions filed by the appealing party that are pending at the time shall be deemed abandoned, and the final order shall be deemed rendered by the filing of the notice of appeal as to all claims between parties who then have no such motions pending between them. However, a pending motion to correct a sentence or order of probation or a motion to withdraw the plea after sentencing shall not be affected by the filing of a notice of appeal from a judgment of guilt. In such instance, the notice of appeal shall be treated as prematurely filed and the appeal held in abeyance until the filing of a signed, written order disposing of such motion.

© Rendition of an Appellate Order. If any timely and authorized motion under rule 9.330 or 9.331 is filed, the order shall not be deemed rendered as to any party until all of the motions are either abandoned or resolved by the filing of a written order.

Committee Notes

1977 Amendment. This rule supersedes former rule 1.3. Throughout these rules the defined terms have been used in their technical sense only, and are not intended to alter substantive law. Instances may arise in which the context of the rule requires a different meaning for a defined term, but these should be rare.

The term “administrative action” is new and has been defined to make clear the application of these rules to judicial review of administrative agency action. This definition was not intended to conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1975), but was intended to include all administrative agency action as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. The reference to municipalities is not intended to conflict with article VIII, section 1(a), Florida Constitution, which makes counties the only political subdivisions of the state.

. The term “clerk” retains the substance of the term “clerk” defined in the former rules. This term includes the person who in fact maintains records of proceedings in the lower tribunal if no person is specifically and officially given that duty.

The term “court” retains the substance of the term “court” defined in the former rules, but has been modified to recognize the authority delegated to the chief justice of the supreme court and the chief judges of the district courts of appeal. This definition was not intended to broaden' the scope of these rules in regard to the administrative responsibilities of the mentioned judicial officers. The term is used in these rules to designate the court to which a proceeding governed by these rules is taken. If supreme court review of a district court of appeal decision is involved, the district' court of appeal is the “lower tribunal.”

The term “lower tribunal” includes courts and administrative agencies. It replaces the terms “commission,” “board,” and “lower court” defined in the former rules.

The term “order” has been broadly defined to include all final and interlocutory rulings of a lower tribunal and rules adopted by an administrative agency. Minute book entries, are excluded from the definition in recognition of the decision in Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So.2d 177 (Fla.1976). It was intended that this rule encourage the entry of written orders in every case.

The terms “appellant,” “appellee,” “petitioner,” and “respondent” have been defined according to the rule applicable to a particular proceeding and generally not according to the legal nature of the proceeding before the court. The term “appellee” has been defined to include the parties against whom relief is sought and all others necessary to the cause. This rule supersedes all statutes concerning the same subject matter, such as section 924.03, Florida Statutes (1975). It should be noted that if a certiorari proceeding is specifically governed by a rule that only refers to “appellant” and “appellee,” a “petitioner” and “respondent” should proceed as if they were “appellant” and “appellee,” respectively. For example, certiorari proceedings in the supreme court involving the Public Service Commission and Industrial Relations Commission are specifically governed by rule 9.110 even though that rule only refers to “appellant” and “appellee.” The parties in such a certiorari proceeding remain designated as “petitioner” and “respondent,” because as a matter of substantive law the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction is seeking a writ of certiorari. The same is true of rule 9.200 governing the record in such certiorari proceedings.

The term “rendition” has been simplified and unnecessary language deleted. The filing requirement of the definition was not intended to conflict with the substantive right of review guaranteed by the Administrative Procedure Act, section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), but to set a point from which certain procedural times could be measured. Motions that postpone the date of rendition have been narrowly limited to prevent deliberate delaying tactics. To postpone rendition the motion must be timely, authorized, and one of those listed. However, if the lower tribunal is an administrative agency whose rules of practice denominate motions identical to those listed by a different label, the substance of the motion controls and rendition is postponed accordingly.

The definition of “legal holiday” has been eliminated but its substance has been retained in rule 9.420(e).

The term “bond” is defined in rule 9.310(c)(1).

Terms defined in the former rules and not defined here are intended to have their ordinary meanings in accordance with the context of these rules.

1992 Amendment. Subdivision (a) has been amended to reflect properly that deputy commissioners presently are designated as judges of compensation claims.

Subdivision (g) has been rewritten extensively. The first change in this rule was to ensure that an authorized motion for clarification (such as under rule 9.330) was included in those types of motions that delay rendition.

Subdivision (g) also has been revised in several respects to clarify some problems presented by the generality of the prior definition of “rendition.” Although rendition is postponed in most types of cases by the filing of timely and authorized post-judgment motions, some rules of procedure explicitly provide to the contrary. The subdivision therefore has been qualified to provide that conflicting rules shall control over the general rule stated in the subdivision. See In Re Interest of E.P., 544 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1989). The subdivision also has been revised to make explicit a qualification of long standing in the deci-sional law, that rendition of non-final orders cannot be postponed by motions directed to them. Not all final orders are subject to postponement of rendition, however. Rendition of a final order can be postponed only by an “authorized” motion, and whether any of the listed motions is an “authorized” motion depends on the rules of procedure governing the proceeding in which the final order is entered. See Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied 494 So.2d 1153.

Subdivision (g)(1) has been added to clarify the date of rendition when post-judgment motions have been filed. If there is only 1 plaintiff and 1 defendant in the case, the filing of a post-judgment motion or motions by either party (or both parties) will postpone rendition of the entire final order as to all claims between the parties. If there are multiple parties on either or both sides of the case and less than all parties file post-judgment motions, rendition of the final order will be postponed as to all claims between moving parties and parties moved against, but rendition will not be postponed with respect to claims disposed of in the final order between parties who have no post-judgment motions pending between them with respect to any of those claims. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ostrer, 442 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Ideally, all post-judgment motions should be disposed of at the same time. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Robinson, 472 So.2d 722 (Fla.1985). If that occurs, the final order is deemed rendered as to all claims when the order disposing of the motions is filed with the clerk. If all motions are not disposed of at the same time, the final order is deemed rendered as to all claims between a moving party and a party moved against when the written order disposing of the last remaining motion addressed to those claims is filed with the clerk, notwithstanding that other motions filed by co-parties may remain pending. If such motions remain, the date of rendition with respect to the claims between the parties involved in those motions shall be determined in the same way.

Subdivision (g)(2) has been added to govern the special circumstance that arises when rendition of a final order has been postponed initially by post-judgment motions, and a motion for new trial then is granted. If the new trial has been granted simply as an alternative to a new- final order, the appeal will be from the new final order. However, if a new trial alone has been ordered, the appeal will be from the new trial order. See rule 9.110. According to the decisional law, rendition of such an order is not postponed by the pendency of any additional, previously filed post-judgment motions, nor can rendition of such an order be postponed by the filing of any further motion. See Frazier v. Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., 508 So.2d 345 (Fla.1987). To ensure that subdivision (g)(1) is not read as a modification of this special rule, subdivision (g)(2) has been added to make it clear that a separately appealable new trial order is deemed rendered when filed, notwithstanding that other post-judgment motions directed to the initial final order, may remain pending at the time.

Subdivision (g)(3) has been added to clarify the confusion generated by a dictum in Williams v. State, 324 So.2d 74 (Fla.1975), which appeared contrary to the settled rule that post-judgment motions were considered abandoned by a party who filed a notice of appeal before their disposition. See In Re: Forfeiture of $104,591 in U.S. Currency, 578 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The new subdivision confirms that rule, and provides that the final order is rendered as to the appealing party when the notice of appeal is filed. Although the final order is rendered as to the appealing party, it is not rendered as to any other party whose post-judgment motions are pending when the notice of appeal is filed.

1996 Amendment. Subdivision (a) was amended to reflect the current state of the law. When the term “administrative action” is used in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, it encompasses proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act, quasi-judicial proceedings before local government agencies, boards, and commissions, and administrative action for which judicial review is provided by general law.

Addition of language in subdivision (i) is intended to toll the time for the filing of a notice of appeal until the resolution of a timely filed motion to vacate when an order has been entered based on the recommendation of a hearing officer in a family law matter. Under the prior rules, a motion to vacate was not an authorized motion to toll the time for the filing of an appeal, and too often the motion to vacate could not be heard within 30 days of the rendition of the order. This rule change permits the lower tribunal to complete its review prior to the time an appeal must be filed.

2000 Amendment. The text of subdivision (i) was moved into the main body of subdivision (h) to retain consistency in the definitional portions of the rule.

Court Commentary

1996 Amendment. Subdivision (h) was amended to ensure that a motion to correct sentence or order of probation and a motion to withdraw the plea after sentencing would postpone rendition. Subdivision (h)(3) was amended to explain that such a motion is not waived by an appeal from a judgment of guilt.

RULE 9.030. JURISDICTION OF COURTS

(a) Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

(1) Appeal Jurisdiction.

(A) The supreme court shall review, by appeal

(i) final orders of courts imposing sentences of death;1

(ii) decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution.2

(B) If provided by general law, the supreme court shall review

(i) by appeal final orders entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness;3

(ii) action of statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service.4

(2) Discretionary Jurisdiction. The discretionary jurisdiction of the supreme court may be sought to review

(A) decisions of district courts of appeal that5

(i) expressly declare valid a state statute;

(ii) expressly construe a provision of the state or federal constitution;

(iii) expressly affect a class of constitutional or state officers;

(iv) expressly and directly conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law;

(v) pass upon a question certified to be of great public importance;

(vi) are certified to be in direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal;

(B) orders and judgments of trial courts certified by the district court of appeal in which the appeal is pending to require immediate resolution by the supreme court, and6

(i) to be of great public importance, or

(ii) to have a great effect on the proper administration of justice;

(C) questions of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States court of appeals that are determinative of the cause of action and for which there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida.7

(3) Original Jurisdiction. The supreme court may issue writs of prohibition to courts and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction, and may issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies. The supreme court or any justice may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the supreme ■ court or any justice, a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit judge.8

(b) Jurisdiction of District Courts of Appeal.

(1) Appeal Jurisdiction. District courts of appeal shall review, by appeal

(A) final orders of trial courts,1’-2 not directly reviewable by the supreme court or a circuit court?, including county court final orders declaring invalid a state statute or provision of the state constitution;

(B) non-final orders of circuit courts as prescribed by rule 9.130;9

(C) administrative action if provided by general law.2

(2) Certiorari Jurisdiction.8 The cer-tiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal may be sought to review

(A) non-final orders of lower tribunals other than as prescribed by rule 9.130;

(B) final orders of circuit courts acting in their review capacity.

(3) Original Jurisdiction.8 District courts of appeal may issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and common law certiorari, and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of the courts’ jurisdiction; or any judge thereof may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof, or before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

(4) Discretionary Review.10 District courts of appeal, in their discretion, may review by appeal

(A) final orders of the county court, otherwise appealable to the circuit court under these rules, that the county court has certified to be of great public importance;

(B) non-final orders, otherwise ap-pealable to the circuit court under rule 9.140(c), that the county court has certified to be of great public importance.

(c) Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts.

(1) Appeal Jurisdiction. The circuit courts shall review, by appeal

(A) final orders of lower tribunals as provided by general law; 2

(B) non-final orders of lower tribunals as provided by general law;

(C) administrative action if provided by general law.

(2) Certiorari Jurisdiction.8 The cer-tiorari jurisdiction of circuit courts may be sought to review non-final orders of lower tribunals other than as prescribed by rale 9.130.

(3) Original Jurisdiction.8 Circuit courts may issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, common law certio-rari, and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of the courts’ jurisdiction.

1. 9.140: Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases.

2. 9.110: Appeal Proceedings: Pinal Orders. .

3. 9.110(1): Validation of Bonds.

4. 9.110: Appeal Proceedings: Final 'Orders; 9.100: Original Proceedings.

5. 9.120: Discretionary Review of District Court • Decisions.

6. 9.125: Discretionary Review of Trial Court Orders and Judgments Certified by the District Court.

7. 9.150: Certified Questions from Federal Courts.

8. 9.100: Original Proceedings.

9. 9.130: Appeal Proceedings: Non-Final Orders.

10.9.160: Discretionary Review of County Court Decisions.

Committee Notes

1977 Amendment. This rale replaces former rales 2.1(a)(5) and 2.2(a)(4). It sets forth the jurisdiction -of the supreme court, district courts of appeal, and that portion of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to which these rules apply. It paraphrases sections 3(b), 4(b), and, in relevant part, 5(b) of article V of the Florida Constitution. The items stating the certiorari jurisdiction of the supreme court and district courts of appeal refer to the constitutional jurisdiction popularly known as the “constitutional certiorari” jurisdiction of the supreme court and “common law certiorari” jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal. This rule is not intended to affect the substantive law governing the jurisdiction of any court and should not be considered as authority for the resolution of disputes concerning any court’s jurisdiction. Its purpose is to provide a tool of reference to the practitioner so that ready reference may be made to the specific procedural rule or rules governing a particular proceeding. Footnote references have been made to the rule or rules governing proceedings invoking the listed areas of jurisdiction.

This rule does not set forth the basis for the issuance of advisory opinions by the supreme court to the governor because the power to advise rests with the justices under article IV, section 1(c), Florida Constitution, and not the supreme court as a body. The procedure governing requests from the governor for advice are set forth in rule 9.500.

The advisory committee considered and rejected as unwise a proposal to permit the chief judge of each judicial circuit to modify the applicability of these rules to that particular circuit. These rules may be modified in a particular case, of course, by an agreed joint motion of the parties granted by the court so long as the change does not affect jurisdiction.

1980 Amendment. Subdivision (a) of this rule has been extensively revised to reflect the constitutional modifications in the supreme court’s jurisdiction as approved by the electorate on March 11, 1980. See art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const. (1980). The impetus for these modifications was a burgeoning caseload and the attendant need to make more efficient use of limited appellate resources. Consistent with this purpose, revised subdivision (a) limits the supreme court’s appellate, discretionary, and original jurisdiction to cases that substantially affect the law of the state. The district courts of appeal will constitute the courts of last resort for the vast majority of litigants under amended article V.

Subdivision (a)(1)(A)© retains the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to review final orders of trial courts imposing death sentences.

Subdivision (a)(l)(A)(ii) has been substantively changed in accordance with amended article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution (1980), to eliminate the court’s mandatory appellate review of final orders of trial courts and decisions of district courts of appeal initially and directly passing on the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or construing a provision of the state or federal constitution. Mandatory supreme court review under this subdivision is now limited to district court decisions “declaring invalid” a state statute or a provision of the state constitution. Jurisdiction to review final orders of trial courts in all instances enumerated in former subdivision (a)(l)(A)(ii) now reposes in the appropriate district court of appeal.

Revised subdivision (a)(1)(B) enumerates the 2 classes of cases that the supreme court may review if provided by general law. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. (1980). Eliminated from the amended article V and rule is the legislative authority, never exercised, to require supreme court review of trial court orders imposing sentences of life imprisonment.

Subdivision (a)(1)(B)®, pertaining to bond validation proceedings, replaces former subdivision (a)(l)(B)(ii). Its phraseology remains unchanged. Enabling legislation already exists for supreme court review of bond validation proceedings. See § 75.08, Fla. Stat. (1979).

Subdivision (a)(l)(B)(ii) is new. See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. (1980). Under the earlier constitutional scheme, the supreme court was vested with certiorari jurisdiction (which in practice was always exercised) to review orders of “commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdiction,” including orders of the Florida Public Service Commission. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1968); § 350.641, Fla. Stat. (1979). This jurisdiction has been abolished. In its stead, amended article V limits the supreme court’s review of Public Service Commission orders to those “relating to rates or services of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service.” Enabling legislation will be required to effectuate this jurisdiction. Review of Public Service Commission orders other than those relating to electric, gas, or utility cases now reposes in the appropriate district court of appeal. See art. V, § 4(b)(2), Fla. Const. (1968); Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(C); and § 120.68(2), Fla. Stat. (1979).

Subdivision (a)(2) has been substantially revised in accordance with amended article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1980), to restrict the scope of review under the supreme court’s discretionary jurisdiction. Under the earlier constitution, this jurisdiction was exercised by writ of certiorari. Constitutional certiorari is abolished under amended article V. Reflecting this change, revised subdivision (a)(2) of this rule substitutes the phrase “discretionary jurisdiction” for “certiorari jurisdiction” in the predecessor rule. This discretionary jurisdiction is restricted, moreover, to 6 designated categories of district court decisions, discussed below. Amended article V eliminates the supreme court’s discretionary power to review “any interlocutory order passing upon a matter which upon final judgment would be directly appealable to the Supreme Court” as reflected in subdivision (a)(2)(B) of the predecessor rule. It also eliminates the supreme court’s certiorari review of “commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdiction” as reflected in subdivision (a)(2)(C) of the predecessor rule.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A) specifies the 6 categories of district court decisions reviewable by the supreme court under its discretionary jurisdiction.

Subdivisions (a)(2)(A)® and (a)(2)(A)(ii) are new and pertain to matters formerly reviewable under the court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Under former rule 9.030(a)(l)(A)(ii), the supreme court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction could be invoked if a lower tribunal “inherently” declared a statute valid. See Harrell’s Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So.2d 439 (Fla.1959). The 1980 amendments to article V and this subdivision require a district court to “expressly declare” a state statute valid before the supreme court’s discretionary jurisdiction may be invoked.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iii), pertaining to supreme court review of district court decisions affecting a class of constitutional or state officers, has been renumbered. It tracks the language of the predecessor constitution and rule, with the addition of the restrictive word “expressly” found in amended article V.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) represents the most radical change in the supreme court’s discretionary jurisdiction. The predecessor article V vested the supreme court with power to review district court decisions “in direct conflict with a decision of any district court of appeal or of the Supreme Court on the same point of law.” These cases comprised the overwhelming bulk of the court’s caseload and gave rise to an intricate body of case law interpreting the requirements for discretionary conflict review. With the enunciation of the “record proper rule” in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221 (Fla.1965), the supreme court extended its discretionary review in instances of discernible conflict to district court decisions affirming without opinion the orders of trial courts. Amended article V abolishes the Foley doctrine by requiring an “express” as well as a “direct” conflict of district court decisions as a prerequisite to supreme court review. The new article also terminates supreme court jurisdiction over purely in-tradistrict conflicts, the resolution of which is addressed in rule 9.331.

Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(v) substitutes the phrase “great public importance” for “great public interest” in the predecessor constitution and rule. The change was to recognize the fact that some legal issues may have “great public importance,” but may not be sufficiently known by the public to have “great public interest.”

Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(vi) is new and tracks the language of article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution (1980).

Subdivisions (a)(2)(B) and (a)(2)(C) are new. See art. V, §§ 3(b)(5), (3)(b)(6), Fla. Const. (1980). Certification procedures under these subdivisions are addressed in rule 9.125 and rule 9.150, respectively.

Subdivision (a)(3) is identical to the predecessor article V and rule, except it limits the issuance of writs of prohibition to “courts” rather than “courts and commissions” and limits the issuance of writs of mandamus and quo warranto to “state agencies” rather than “agencies.”

1984 Amendment. Subdivision (b)(4) was added to implement legislation authorizing district courts of appeal discretion to review by appeal orders and judgments of county courts certified to be of great public importance.

1992 Amendment. Subdivision (c)(1)(B) was amended to reflect correctly that the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts extended to all non-final orders of lower tribunals as prescribed by rule 9.130, and not only those defined in subdivision (a)(3) of that rule.

Subdivision (c)(1)(C) was amended to reflect the jurisdiction conferred on circuit courts by article V, section 5, Florida Constitution, which provides that “[t]hey shall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by general law.”

2000 Amendment. Subdivision (c)(1)(B) was amended to reflect that the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts is prescribed by general law and not by rule 9.130, as clarified in Blore v. Fierro, 636 So.2d 1329 (Fla.1994).

RULE 9.130. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW NON-FINAL ORDERS AND SPECIFIED FINAL ORDERS

(a) Applicability.

' (1) This rule applies to appeals to the district courts of appeal of the non-final orders authorized herein and to appeals to the circuit court of non-final orders when provided by general law. Review of other non-final orders in such courts and non-final administrative action shall be by the method prescribed by rule 9.100.

(2) Appeals of non-final orders in criminal cases shall be as prescribed by rule 9.140.

(3) Appeals to the district courts of appeal of non-final orders are limited to those that

(A) concern venue;

(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to modify or dissolve injunctions;

(C) determine

(i) the jurisdiction of the person;

(ii) the right to immediate possession of property;

(iii) the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in family law matters;

(iv) the entitlement of a party to arbitration;

(v) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers’ compensation immunity;

(vi) that a class should be certified; or

(vii) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; or

(viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes.

(D) grant or deny the appointment of a receiver, and terminate or refuse to terminate a receivership.

(4) Non-final orders entered after final order on motions that suspend rendition are not reviewable; provided that orders granting motions for new trial in jury and non-jury cases are reviewable by the method prescribed in rule 9.110. Other non-final orders entered after final order on authorized motions are reviewable by the method prescribed by this rule.

(5) Orders entered on motions filed under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, Small Claims Rule 7.190, Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.270, and Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540 are reviewable by the method prescribed by this rule.

(6) Orders that deny motions to certify a class may be reviewed by the method prescribed by this rule.

(b) Commencement. The jurisdiction to seek review of orders described in subdivisions (a)(3)-(a)(6) shall be invoked by filing 2 copies of a notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

(c) Notice. The notice, designated as a notice of appeal of non-final order, shall be substantially in the form prescribed by rule 9.900(c). Except in criminal cases, a conformed copy of the order or orders designated in the notice of appeal shall be attached to the notice.

(d) Record. A record shall not be transmitted to the court unless ordered.

(e) Briefs. Appellant’s initial brief, accompanied by an appendix as prescribed by rule 9.220, shall be served within 15 days of filing the notice. Additional briefs shall be served as prescribed by rule 9.210.

(f) Stay of Proceedings. In the absence of a stay, during the pendency of a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing; provided that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending such review.

(g) Review on Full Appeal. This rule shall not preclude initial review of a non-final order on appeal from the final order in the cause.

(h) Scope of Review. Multiple non-final orders that are listed in rule 9.130(a)(3) may be reviewed by a single notice if the notice is timely filed as to each such order.

Committee Notes

1977 Amendment. This rule replaces former rule 4.2 and substantially alters current practice. This rule applies to review of all non-final orders, except those entered in criminal cases, and those specifically governed by rules 9.100 and 9.110.

The advisory committee was aware that the common law writ of certiorari is available at any time and did not intend to abolish that writ. However, because that writ provides a remedy only if the petitioner meets the heavy burden of showing that a clear departure from the essential requirements of law has resulted in otherwise irreparable harm, it is extremely rare that erroneous interlocutory rulings can be corrected by resort to common law certio-rari. It is anticipated that because the most urgent interlocutory orders are ap-pealable under this rule, there will be very few cases in which common law certiorari will provide relief. See Taylor v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 131 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).

Subdivision (a)(3) designates certain instances in which interlocutory appeals may be prosecuted under the procedures set forth in this rule. Under these rules there are no mandatory interlocutory appeals. This rule eliminates interlocutory appeals as a matter of right from all orders “formerly cognizable in equity,” and provides for review of certain interlocutory orders based on the necessity or desirability of expeditious review. Allowable interlocutory appeals from orders in actions formerly cognizable as civil actions are specified, and are essentially the same as under former rule 4.2. Item (A) permits review of orders concerning venue. Item (C)(i) has been limited to jurisdiction over the person because the writ of prohibition provides an adequate remedy in cases involving jurisdiction of the subject matter. Because the purpose of these items is to eliminate useless labor, the advisory committee is of the view that stays of proceedings in lower tribunals should be liberally granted if the interlocutory appeal involves venue or jurisdiction over the person. Because this rule only applies to civil cases, item (C)(ii) does not include within its ambit rulings on motions to suppress seized evidence in criminal cases. Item (C)(ii) is intended to apply whether the property involved is real or personal. It applies to such cases as condemnation suits in which a condemnor is permitted to take possession and title to real property in advance of final judgment. See ch. 74, Fla. Stat. (1975). Item (C)(iii) is intended to apply to such matters as temporary child custody or support, alimony, suit money, and attorneys’ fees. Item (C)(iv) allows appeals from interlocutory orders that determine liability in favor of a claimant.

Subdivision (a)(4) grants a right of review if the lower tribunal grants a motion for new trial whether in a jury or non-jury case. The procedures set forth in rule 9.110, and not those set forth in this rule, apply in such eases. This rule has been phrased so that the granting of rehearing in a non-jury case under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 may not be the subject of an interlocutory appeal unless the trial judge orders the taking of evidence. Other non-final orders that postpone rendition are not reviewable in an independent proceeding. Other non-final orders entered by a lower tribunal after final order are reviewable and are to be governed by this rule. Such orders include, for example, an order granting a motion to vacate default.

Subdivision (a)(5) grants a right of review of orders on motions seeking relief from a previous court order on the grounds of mistake, fraud, satisfaction of judgment, or other grounds listed in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.

Subdivision (a)(6) provides that interlocutory review is to be in the court that would have jurisdiction to review the final order in the cause as of the time of the interlocutory appeal.

Subdivisions (b) and (c) state the manner for commencing an interlocutory appeal governed by this rule. Two copies of the notice must be filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of rendition of the order. Under rule 9.040(g) the notice and fee must be transmitted immediately to the court by the clerk of the lower tribunal.

Subdivision (d) provides for transmittal of the record only on order of the court. Transmittal should be in accordance with instructions contained in the order.

Subdivision (e) replaces former rule 4.2(e) and governs the service of briefs on interlocutory appeals. The time to serve the appellant’s brief has been reduced to 15 days so as to minimize interruption of lower tribunal proceedings. The brief must be accompanied by an appendix containing a conformed copy of the order to be reviewed and should also contain all relevant portions of the record.

Subdivision (f) makes clear that unless a stay is granted under rule 9.310, the lower tribunal is only divested of jurisdiction to enter a final order disposing of the case. This follows the historical rule that trial courts are divested of jurisdiction only to the extent that their actions are under review by an appellate court. Thus, the lower tribunal has jurisdiction to proceed with matters not before the court. This rule is intended to resolve the confusion spawned by De la Portilla v. De la Portilla, 304 So.2d 116 (Fla.1974), and its progeny.

Subdivision (g) was embodied in former rule 4.2(a) and is intended to make clear that the failure to take an interlocutory appeal does not constitute a waiver of any sort on appeal of a final judgment, although an improper ruling might not then constitute prejudicial error warranting reversal.

1992 Amendment. Subdivisions (a)(3)(C)(vii) and (a)(6) were added to permit appeals from non-final orders that either granted or denied a party’s request that a class be certified. The committee was of the opinion that orders determining the nature of an action and the extent of the parties before the court were analogous to other orders reviewable under rule 9.130. Therefore, these 2 subdivisions were added to the other limited enumeration of orders appealable by the procedures established in this rule.

Subdivision (a)(3)(D) was added by the committee in response to the decision in Twin Jay Chambers Partnership v. Suarez, 556 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). It was the opinion of the committee that orders that deny the appointment of receivers or terminate or refuse to terminate receiverships are of the same quality as those that grant the appointment of a receiver. Rather than base the appealability of such orders on subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii), the committee felt it preferable to specifically identify those orders with respect to a receivership that were non-final orders subject to appeal by this rule.

Subdivision (c) was amended to require the attachment of a conformed copy of the order or orders designated in the notice of appeal consistent with the amendment to rule 9.110(d).

1996 Amendment. The amendment to subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vi) moves the phrase “as a matter of law” from the end of the subdivision to its beginning. This is to resolve the confusion evidenced in Breakers Palm Beach v. Gloger, 646 So.2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), City of Lake Mary v. Franklin, 668 So.2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and their progeny by clarifying that this subdivision was not intended to grant a right of nonfinal review if the lower tribunal denies a motion for summary judgment based on the existence of a material fact dispute.

Subdivision (a)(3)(C)(viii) was added in response to the supreme court’s request in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187 (Fla.1994). The court directed the committee to propose a new- rule regarding procedures for appeal of orders denying immunity in federal civil rights cases consistent with federal procedure. Compare Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 804, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 288 (1995), with Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The Florida Supreme Court held that such orders are “subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”

2000 Amendment. The title to this rule was amended to reflect that some of the review proceedings specified in this rule may involve review of final orders.

Subdivision (a)(1) was amended to reflect that the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts is prescribed by general law and not by this rule, as clarified in Blore v. Fierro, 636 So.2d 1329 (Fla.1994).

Subdivision (a)(3)(C)(iv) allowing review of orders determining “the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief’ was deleted so that such orders are not appealable until the conclusion of the case.

Subdivision (a)(7) was deleted because it is superseded by proposed rule 9.040(b)(2), which determines the appropriate court to review non-final orders after a change of venue.

RULE 9.142. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

(a) Procedure in Death Penalty Appeals.

(1) Record. When the notice of appeal is filed in the supreme court, the chief justice will direct the appropriate chief judge of the circuit court to monitor the preparation of the complete record for timely filing in the supreme court.

(2) Briefs; Transcripts. After the record is filed, the clerk will promptly establish a briefing schedule allowing the defendant 60 days from the date the record is filed, the state 45 days from the date the defendant’s brief is served, and the defendant 30 days from the date the state’s brief is served to serve their respective briefs. On appeals from orders ruling on applications for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 or 3.853, and on resentencing matters, the schedules set forth in rale 9.140(g) will control. In addition to filing paper copies of transcripts, the court reporter shall file with the clerk of the lower tribunal, on clearly labeled computer disks in a format approved by the supreme court, sufficient copies of these transcripts for the clerk of the lower tribunal to include the disks in the record transmitted to the court and to the parties.

(3) Sanctions. If any brief is delinquent, an order to show cause may issue under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840, and sanctions may be imposed.

(4) Oral Argument. Oral argument will be scheduled after the filing of the defendant’s reply brief.

(5) Petitions for Extraordinary Relief. In death penalty cases, all petitions for extraordinary relief over which the supreme court has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writ of habeas corpus, shall be filed simultaneously with the initial brief in the appeal from the lower tribunal’s order on the defendant’s application for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.

(6) Scope of Review. In death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for review, the court shall review the evidence to determlne-if the interest of justice requires- a -new-trial — 1whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue-presented for reviewthese issues and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.

(b) Petition Seeking Review of Nonfi-nal Orders in Death Penalty Postconviction Proceedings.

(1) Applicability. This rule applies to proceedings that invoke the jurisdiction of the supreme court for review of nonfinal orders issued in postconviction proceedings following the imposition of the death penalty.

(2) Treatment as Original Proceedings. Review proceedings under this subdivision shall be treated as original proceedings under rule 9.100 unless modified by this subdivision.

(3) Commencement; Parties.

(A) Jurisdiction of the supreme court shall be invoked by filing a petition with the clerk of the supreme court within 30 days of rendition of the nonfinal order to be reviewed. A copy of the petition shall be served on the opposing party and furnished to the judge who issued the order to be reviewed.

(B) Either party to the death penalty postconviction proceedings may seek review under this rule.

(4) Contents. The petition shall be in the form prescribed by rule 9.100, and shall contain

(A) the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the court;

(B) the date and nature of the order sought to be reviewed;

(C) the name of the lower tribunal rendering the order;

(D) the name, disposition, and dates of all previous trial, appellate, and postcon-viction proceedings relating to the conviction and death sentence that are the subject of the proceedings in which the order sought to be reviewed was entered;

(E) the facts on which the petitioner relies, with references to the appropriate pages of the supporting appendix;

(F) argument in support of the petition, including an explanation of why the order departs from the essential requirements of law and how the order may cause material injury for which there is no adequate remedy on appeal, and appropriate citations of authority; and

(G) the nature of the relief sought.

(5) Appendix. The petition shall be accompanied by an appendix, as prescribed by rule 9.220, which shall contain the portions of the record necessary for a determination of the issues presented.

(6) Order to Show Cause. If the petition demonstrates a preliminary basis for relief or a departure from the essential requirements of law that may cause material injury for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to show cause, within the time set by the court, why relief should not be granted.

(7) Response. No response shall be permitted unless ordered by the court.

(8) Reply. Within 20 days after service of the response or such other time set by the court, the petitioner may serve a reply, which shall not exceed 15 pages in length, and supplemental appendix.

(9) Stay.

(A) A stay of proceedings under this rule is not automatic; the party seeking a stay must petition the supreme court for a stay of proceedings.

(B) During the pendency of a review of a nonfinal order, unless a stay is granted by the supreme court, the lower tribunal may proceed with all matters, except that the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause pending review of the nonfinal order.

(10) Other pleadings. The parties shall not file any other pleadings, motions, replies, or miscellaneous papers without leave of court.

(11) Time Limitations. Seeking review under this rule shall not extend the time limitations in rule 3.851 or 3.852.

RULE 9.145. APPEAL PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES

(a) Applicability. Appeal proceedings in juvenile delinquency cases shall be as in rule 9.140 except as modified by this rule.

(