Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc. (905 So. 2d 84, 2005)

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Inservices, Inc. v. Aguilera, 837 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with and also misapplies our decision in Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Knowles v. State, 848 So.2d 1055, 1056 (Fla.2003) (accepting jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of decisional law); Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla.2002) (stating that misapplication of decisional law creates conflict jurisdiction); Acensio v. State, 497 So.2d 640, 641 (Fla.1986) (accepting jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of decisional law). We disapprove the decision under review for the reasons provided in our analysis below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The present dispute arises from a decision of the district court of appeal which orders the trial court to dismiss this action based upon a workers’ compensation insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss asserting immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes (2000). See Inservices, 837 So.2d at 465. When presented with the insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss, the trial court properly denied the motion as it was required to accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and to consider those allegations and any inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Aguilera, the employee. See Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 732, 734-35 (Fla.2002). Accepting the employee’s amended complaint as true, on April 21, 1999, Aguilera was injured in a warehouse when an electric fork lift operated by another employee struck him and pushed him against a pallet. Aguilera suffered immediate injuries to his back and right leg and he was transported to a local emergency room. The medical records re-fleet that, at the time, testing revealed that Aguilera had blood in his urine. He was examined by an emergency room physician and provided a prescription for medication.

Immediately following these injuries, Aguilera received medical care that was supervised and controlled by Managed Care USA Services, Inc., now known as Inservices, Inc., the workers’ compensation insurance carrier, and its employees and agents. Pursuant to the insurance carrier’s instruction, Aguilera was referred to a workers’ compensation clinic and, on May 12, 1999, was discharged to return to limited work with restrictions.

Subsequently, Aguilera began to complain of kidney and bladder pain. On May 24, 1999, after examination by two physicians who both were of the medical opinion that he should not return to work, Aguil-era’s workers’ compensation counsel filed an initial request for care, requesting authorization for Aguilera to be examined and treated by a board-certified urologist. The insurance carrier denied authorization for examination or treatment by a urologist, asserting that Aguilera’s injury was not work-related. On June 17, 1999, the insurance carrier was again notified that urological care was needed now on an emergency basis because Aguilera’s urine had allegedly begun to smell like feces. On June 21, 1999, Aguilera was advised that his workers’ compensation benefits were being terminated as of July 9, 1999, notwithstanding the report of two doctors, including the opinion of the insurance carrier’s own doctor, that he should not return to work.

On June 25, 1999, the insurance carrier intervened and actually blocked Aguilera’s receipt of medication which had been prescribed for him by the hospital emergency physician for his urinary condition. Allegations of this type of conduct of intervening and actually blocking receipt of needed prescribed medication cannot be minimized. On June 30, 1999, the insurance carrier again denied Aguilera’s emergency request for the care of a urologist on the asserted basis that it was not medically necessary. At this time, the insurance carrier actually had within its possession medical documentation which both demonstrated the falsity of its position and clearly established the medical necessity for the care.

On July 7, 1999, the insurance carrier was advised by Aguilera’s treating physician that his need for a urological consultation had become urgent and that his condition was deteriorating. On July 9, 1999, the insurance carrier’s own doctor, Alan Dansky, issued Aguilera prescriptions for various urinary tests, and the appoints ments were in fact scheduled by the insurance carrier’s nurse. However, on July 29, 1999, one of the insurance carrier’s adjusters again intervened and simply unilaterally canceled some of this medical testing. Testing that was ultimately performed, specifically a retrograde urethrogram, revealed that Aguilera had a fistula, or a hole in his bladder.

On August 6, 1999, Mippy Heath commenced service as Aguilera’s new case manager. Heath was specifically advised by Aguilera’s attorney that there should be no direct contact with Aguilera, and the company representative agreed that no on-site intervention or case service would occur and no interference with Aguilera’s care would be attempted.

On August 19, 1999, Aguilera’s counsel alerted the insurance carrier that the injured employee was now in need of emergency surgery for the fistula. Heath refused authorization for the emergency surgery and insisted on a second opinion. On August 25, 1999, notwithstanding the specific agreement with Aguilera’s attorney to the contrary, Heath secretly appeared at the physician’s office for Aguil-era’s appointment with Dr. Campeatore, an IME (independent medical examiner) urologist. Heath again intervened and then urged Aguilera to lie to his counsel and to deceive his attorney by advising that she had not appeared at the doctor’s office contrary to the true fact. This egregious conduct is not just a “common or ordinary part” of the process. Subsequently, Heath insisted that Aguilera submit to the administration of invasive tests that were not 'only painful to Aguilera but also contraindicated by his then-present medical condition. The insurance carrier then proceeded to use Aguilera’s refusal to submit to these painful contraindicated testing procedures as a basis to justify a refusal and denial of his then needed critical, surgical treatment.

By November 4, 1999, Heath, the case manager, and a nurse practitioner also employed by the insurance carrier had changed positions and agreed that Aguil-era needed immediate hospitalization for surgery. However, the insurance carrier’s adjuster again intervened and overruled the decision of medical personnel simply because he wanted a second opinion from a general surgeon. Notwithstanding this intervention, the insurance carrier did not follow its own position and authorize Aguil-era to consult with a general surgeon, but instead again changed course and sent Aguilera to a gastroenterologist. At this point in time, Aguilera had allegedly been urinating feces and blood for over six months.

Aguilera’s ultimate surgery, the need for which had been diagnosed as an emergency as early as June of 1999, was not finally authorized or approved until March 22, 2000. By this time, according to the allegations, Aguilera had been urinating feces and blood for over ten months. At the insurance carrier’s insistence, Aguilera had been forced to be seen by no fewer than six doctors in addition to his initial treating physician. Each of the individuals who examined Aguilera concluded that his physical injuries were in fact related to the initial accident and that his condition as a result required urgent surgical treatment.

The amended complaint set forth causes of action for common law bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and declaratory relief. The insurance carrier responded to these allegations with a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that workers’ compensation immunity was applicable to bar all claims, both those initially resulting from the workplace injury and those alleged to have been independently and separately generated by the process. The trial court denied the insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the intentional, outrageous conduct on the part of the insurance carrier had escalated to the point that a viable cause of action based in tort had been presented. See Inservices, 837 So.2d at 465.

The Third District recognized below that the workers’ compensation scheme does not immunize an insurance carrier from wrongdoing that occurs independently of its claims handling. See id. at 466. The Third District incorrectly determined, however, that the allegations in the instant action merely concerned the manner in which Aguilera’s claim was processed by the insurance carrier pursuant to the workers’ compensation insurance contract, and, therefore, no independent tortious acts could ever be sufficiently alleged because they touched upon the claim process. See id. at 468. The court concluded, therefore, that because Aguilera’s allegations were insufficient to establish any exception to the doctrine of statutory immunity provided by section 440.11 of the Florida Statutes (2000), the trial court had erred in its determination that the cause of action was not barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law. See id. The district court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with instructions to enter a final order dismissing the complaint and entering judgment in favor of the insurance carrier as a matter of law. See id. The essence of the decision below is that all acts and conduct, no matter how intentional, egregious or injurious, which occur during the claim process, are always afforded absolute immunity, a view we reject.

Aguilera seeks review of the Third District’s decision, which we have granted. See Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 847 So.2d 975, 975 (Fla.2003) (table).

ANALYSIS

Workers’ compensation laws provide employees limited medical and wage loss benefits, without regard to fault, for losses resulting from accidental workplace injuries in exchange for the employee relinquishing his or her right to seek common law recovery from the employer for those injuries. The obligation of an employer to provide workers’ compensation benefits to employees at the time material here was presented in section 440.10(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), which provided, “Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter ... shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment to his or her employees ... of the compensation payable [under this chapter].” In return for compliance with this requirement, section 440.11(1) provided, “The liability of an employer prescribed in s[ection] 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer ... to the employee.... ” With regard to the liability of a worker’s compensation insurance carrier, section 440.11(4) provided that “[njotwith-standing the provisions of s[ection] 624.155, the liability of a carrier to an employee or to anyone entitled to bring suit in the name of the employee shall be as provided in this chapter, which shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability.” Essentially, the system is designed for employers and insurance carriers to assume responsibility for limited amounts of medical and wage loss benefits resulting from workplace injuries without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on their liability, while the employee would correspondingly receive quick and efficient delivery of limited wage loss compensation and medical benefits. The workers’ compensation system was never designed nor was it intended to act as a shield for those engaged in intentional conduct inflicting injuries upon workers through the benefit process itself. As expressly stated by the Legislature:

It is the intent of the Legislature that the Workers’ Compensation Law be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer. It is the specific intent of the Legislature that workers’ compensation cases shall be decided on their merits. The workers’ compensation system in Florida is based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.

§ 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2000). Fundamentally, the workers’ compensation system establishes a system of exchange between employees and employers, as well as employees and insurance carriers, that is designed to promote efficiency and fairness. Our governing precedent, as well as that of our district courts, has recognized that under this no-fault system, the employee relinquishes certain common-law rights with regard to negligence in the workplace and workplace injuries in exchange for strict liability and the rapid recovery of benefits. Turner, 754 So.2d at 686; see also Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 542 (Fla.1993); Fitzgerald v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); John v. GDG Servs., Inc., 424 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Clark v. Better Constr. Co., Inc., 420 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

It is clear that the scope of the mutuality provided in the compensation law does not give rise to blanket exclusivity and immunity which applies to all forms of conduct committed by employers and insurance carriers. To the contrary, the immunity extends only to “an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis supplied). Functionally, the workers’ compensation system limits liability only for negligent workplace conduct which produces workplace injury, but does not extend to immunize intentional tortious conduct. See Turner, 754 So.2d at 687 (“[W]e reaffirm our prior decisions recognizing, as have our district courts and many jurisdictions around the country, that workers’ compensation law does not protect an employer from liability for an intentional tort against an employee.”). As this Court stated in Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537 (Fla.1993), “When employers properly secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees, employers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee.” Id. at 539; see also Sibley, 596 So.2d at 1050; Kline v. Rubio, 652 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 633 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Mirabal v. Cachurra Corp., 580 So.2d 285, 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Most assuredly, the system does not declare an “open season” with regard to intentional torts against workers.

The workers’ compensation system was never designed or structured to be used by employers or insurance carriers as a sword to strike out and cause harm to individual employees during the claim process and then provide a shield from responsibility for an employee’s valid intentional tort claim for that conduct through immunity flowing under the law. Most certainly, the workers’ compensation system was never intended to function as a substitute for an employee’s right to seek relief in a common law intentional tort action against an employer or insurance carrier, but was only intended to provide employers and insurance carriers with immunity for negligent workplace conduct which produced workplace injury. Minor delays in payments, and conduct amounting to simple bad faith in claim handling procedures of the employee’s compensation claim have been captured within the immunity. Today, we do not alter and recognize the continued viability of the cases holding that the mere delay of payments or simple bad faith in handling workers’ compensation claims are not actionable torts, and that employees are not permitted to transform such simple delays into actionable torts cognizable in the circuit court. See, e.g., Sheraton Key Largo v. Roca, 710 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (stating an employee cannot avoid the exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Law and transform a mere delay in payments into an actionable tort simply by calling that delay outrageous, fraudulent, deceitful, or an intentional infliction of emotional distress); Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 633 So.2d 543, 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“Because Florida’s compensation law contains mechanisms to insure timely payment and provides an array of sanctions which may be imposed when a carrier wrongfully withholds payment, the remedy under the act is exclusive.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (determining that while the employee alleged a bad faith refusal to timely compensate him for his disabilities, the complaint did not allege that the insurance carrier intentionally harmed the employee).

The allegations here simply go far beyond simple claim delay or a simple termination of benefits. The complaint specifically alleges harm caused subsequent to and distinct from the original workplace injury. The statutes do not contemplate and this Court has never permitted compensation insurance carriers to cloak themselves with blanket immunity in circumstances where the carrier has not merely breached the duty to timely pay benefits, or acted negligently, but has actually committed an intentional tort upon an employee. See Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992); Turner, 754 So.2d at 686; Eller, 630 So.2d at 539; see also Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust, 633 So.2d at 545 (“If a workers’ compensation carrier has not merely breached the duty to timely pay benefits but has committed an independent tort against a claimant, the plaintiff may pursue his cause of action in circuit court.”). Under Florida law, we have recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress where a party’s conduct is more than simply bad faith or a breach of contract, but where the defaulting party’s intentional conduct is outrageous. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Fla.1985) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress where the facts are “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency”); see also Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 438 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), approved, 467 So.2d 281 (Fla.1985). The decision below and the dissent would expand immunity far beyond that ever recognized in Florida. The dissent is simply incorrect in suggesting that Florida does not recognize a freestanding tort under claim process circumstances. A freestanding independent tort action has been recognized and authorized for more than twenty years in Florida.

In recognizing that an employee has retained the right to present an independent tort action against an insurance carrier, this Court has acknowledged that employees are not permitted to simply transform a simple delay in payments into an actionable tort cognizable in circuit court. See Old Republic Ins. Co., 442 So.2d at 1079. However, we are confident that Florida courts have been and will continue to be able to analyze an employee’s allegations and ascertain whether the allegations amount to a mere delay in payments, simple bad faith, or truly rise to the level of a separate and independent intentional tort. For example, in Sullivan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 367 So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), the Fourth District addressed the extreme difference between an insurance carrier’s minor delays and conduct intentionally causing harm to a claimant. The Sullivan court reasoned that if “minor delays in getting medical service, such as for a few days or even a few hours, caused by a carrier, could become the bases of independent suits” then “the objective of the Legislature and the whole pattern of workmen’s compensation could thereby be partially nullified.” Id. at 661 (quoting Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal.App.2d 731, 342 P.2d 976, 979-80 (1959)). Moreover, Florida courts are already required to make this distinction in the insurance debtor/creditor context. See, e.g., Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc., 778 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (discussing in the insured/insurer context the difference between causes of action for bad faith and breach of contract and those related to allegations of an independent tort such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rubio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 662 So.2d 956, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (same); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (affirming a verdict assessing damages where debtor sued creditor for intentional infliction of mental distress). Today, we reaffirm that the workers’ compensation legislation does immunize an insurance carrier for mere negligent conduct, simple bad faith, and minor delays in payment, but does not afford blanket immunity for all conduct during the claim process, particularly the insurance carrier’s intentional tortious conduct such as that presented in this case.

As we turn to the issue in this case involving the scope of an insurance carrier’s liability in the context of intentional torts, we reject the notion and premise of the Third District and that favored by the dissent, that an independent tort in this context can never exist within the claims administration process and that for an independent claim to have validity, it must be an act totally separate and apart from the process itself. Such premise is invalid as reflected in our decision in Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992), a decision the dissent attempts to distinguish. The Third District referred to Sibley but incorrectly analyzed its impact and misapplied its holding.

In Sibley, the insurance carrier’s intentional tortious actions actually occurred during the claims process and did' not involve acts or conduct totally separate and independent of the workers’ compensation claim process. Specifically, the insurance carrier there edited material aspects of the employee’s statements obtained during the processing and handling of the workers’ compensation claim, and based in part on the insurance carrier’s fraudulent acts, the carrier had refused to timely pay the employee workers’ compensation benefits. See 596 So.2d at 1050. At that time the applicable workers’ compensation statute provided the identical immunity and exclusivity as contained in the statute applicable here. This Court specifically held that the employee in that instance, notwithstanding his right to process a statutory claim under the Workers’ Compensation Law with the insurance carrier, could also file and maintain an independent common law action in tort against the insurance carrier based on the intentional fraudulent acts committed during the claims process itself. See id. at 1050-51. The dissent presents a statutory analysis argument that ignores the important holding of Sibley as even recognized in the decision below. The dissent also fails to recognize that the identical immunity was in the statute when Sibley was decided as is present in this case.

In this case, the Third District has interpreted Sibley to hold that an independent action against an insurance carrier is only available when the intentional tort occurs totally independent of the handling or processing of a workers’ compensation claim. It is incorrect to reason that the tortious conduct must absolutely be “independent of the workers compensation claim” itself because without the existence of the claims process these two parties, the employee and insurance carrier, would have never been in contact. See Inservices, 837 So.2d at 467 (emphasis supplied). The district court erred in utilizing the yardstick by which it measured the sufficiency of Aguil-era’s complaint with regard to whether his allegations stated a viable common law cause of action for an intentional tort against the insurance carrier. The Third District should not have limited itself to considering whether Aguilera’s allegations involved wrongdoing totally separate and independent of the workers’ compensation claim process itself. See id. Pursuant to Sibley, if an insurance carrier engages in outrageous actions and conduct that constitutes an intentional tortious act while processing the claim beyond mere short delays in payment and simple bad faith, the carrier is not cloaked with a shield of immunity flowing from the workers’ compensation provisions.

Both Sibley and the instant case involve insurance carriers which, in the process of administering benefits, intentionally injured a worker — this is not the conduct for which the workers’ compensation system wás designed to afford immunity. In both Sibley and this case, the injuries at issue did not occur at the workplace — workplace injuries are covered under the workers’ compensation system — but the injuries were allegedly inflicted by an insurance carrier during the claims handling process. The dissent mistakenly asserts that there is no conflict between Sibley and the district court’s decision below because “Sibley addresses only the question of exclusivity as it relates to section 440.37 ... [which] has long since been repealed and is entirely irrelevant to Aguilera’s specific claim.” Dissenting op. at 106. This conclusion is not supported. The material operative facts are identical. Both Sibley and the instant case involve insurance carriers that intentionally harmed workers in the claims administration process. The identical statutory immunity existed at the time of Sib-ley as existed at the time of Aguilera’s injuries. In analyzing the alleged conduct, the Sibley Court distinguished between the statutory cause of action provided by the Legislature in section 440.37 and the common law action for an intentional tort, recognizing that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate such common law rights of action. See 596 So.2d at 1050-51. This Court specifically held:

[T]hose statutory provisions were not intended to bar recovery for intentional tortious conduct. Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 (Fla.1989); Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So.2d 882 (Fla.1986); Lawton v. Alpine Eng’red Prods., Inc., 498 So.2d 879 (Fla.1986). Given the distinctive characteristics of this statutory action and the common law action, we conclude that the legislature was providing an alternative cause of action and not eliminating a common law right of action for an intentional tort.

596 So.2d at 1050-51 (emphasis supplied and footnote omitted). Significantly, the Sibley Court specifically concluded that the Legislature through the statutory provisions in the workers’ compensation statute was “not eliminating a common law right of action for an intentional tort.” Id. at 1051. In stating that statutory provisions of the workers’ compensation statute were not intended to bar recovery for intentional tortious conduct, the Sibley Court was not limiting its decision to section 440.37, which is apparent from its citations to Byrd, Fisher, and Lawton. See Byrd, 552 So.2d at 1100 (holding that the workers’ compensation statute does not provide the exclusive remedy for a claim based on sexual harassment in the workplace); Fisher, 498 So.2d at 884 (holding that an employer does not commit an intentional tort when he orders his employee to work inside a pipe which the employer knows to be filled with dangerous gas that will in all probability result in injury to the employee); Lawton, 498 So.2d at 880 (holding that an employer does not commit an intentional tort when he instructs his employee to operate dangerous machinery without warning the employee about the machinery’s known hazards). In Sibley, therefore, this Court reaffirmed a worker’s common law right of action for an intentional tort where an insurance carrier has engaged in intentional harmful acts while administering the claim, notwithstanding the workers’ compensation scheme.

In Inservices, the Third District is in conflict with and misapplied this Court’s holding in Sibley by incorrectly concluding that the workers’ compensation scheme does immunize a compensation carrier from wrongdoing which occurs during its claim process. Sibley in fact stands for the proposition that the workers’ compensation system does not immunize a workers’ compensation carrier from any intentional acts of wrongdoing and does not limit a carrier’s accountability for their intentional misconduct exclusively to intentional acts occurring independently of the claims handling process. We have clearly concluded that the workers’ compensation system does not immunize an insurance carrier’s intentional fraudulent actions while processing a claim, and this holding has clear application where an insurance carrier allegedly intentionally causes additional injuries to workers while administering the worker’s workplace injury claim. See Sibley, 596 So.2d at 1050. Thus, contrary to the dissenting view, this Court must address this direct conflict created by the Third District’s opinion and its misapplication of our holding in Sibley. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla.2002) (stating that misapplication of deci-sional law creates conflict jurisdiction).

Our assessment of the misinterpretation of Sibley below is not intended to nor does it discredit the long-established rule that the conduct alleged by an employee must rise to the level tantamount to intentional tortious conduct to preclude an insurance carrier from prevailing with statutory immunity. An employee’s complaint must, indeed, allege conduct that is or is tantamount to an independent tort. See Wausau Ins. Co. v. Haynes, 683 So.2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust, 633 So.2d at 546; Old Republic, 442 So.2d at 1079; Sullivan, 367 So.2d at 661. Therefore, we turn to the sufficiency of Aguilera’s complaint in this action, specifically Whether Aguilera has alleged facts which constitute a cause of action against the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for intentionally harming him which would preclude application of statutory immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

The district court below held that Aguil-era had not sufficiently alleged a cause of action against the insurance carrier for intentionally harming him. According to the district court:

Here, all of Aguilera’s allegations deal with the manner in which his claim was handled by the [insurance carrier] pursuant to the workers’ compensation insurance contract. Since all of the allegations relate to the [insurance carrier’s] alleged breach of contractual obligations under the workers’ compensation policy, no independent acts have been alleged and thus there is no independent tort. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So.2d at 658. Aguilera’s injuries arising from any delays in medical treatment were incidental to his original injury and compensable by his employer’s compensation carrier. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So.2d at 1079.

Inservices, 837 So.2d at 468 (footnote omitted). The Third District erred in holding that statutory immunity was applicable as a matter of law, because the egregious conduct flows from the claim process itself.

This case is before the Court based on the district court’s decision that the workers’ compensation insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss the complaint must be granted and the action dismissed with prejudice. As we have stated, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we do so from the perspective of viewing Aguilera’s complaint in a light most favorable to him, and must consider all facts and reasonable inferences to his advantage. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1182 (Fla.2000); see also Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (stating that when considering the merits of a motion to dismiss, facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleader); Clark v. Gumby’s Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, an appellate court must assume that all material factual allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader.”). Here, Aguilera clearly alleged a pattern of intentional, outrageous and harmful conduct that would serve to establish the existence of an independent tort. The insurance carrier not only denied Aguilera any authorization for urological treatment, claiming it was not work-related; advised Aguilera that his workers’ compensation benefits were being terminated, notwithstanding the report of two doctors to the contrary, including the insurance carrier’s own physician, that he should not return to work; but actually blocked Aguilera’s receipt of prescription medication prescribed to him by the hospital emergency physician for his serious urinary tract condition. The carrier not only denied Aguilera’s emergency request for the care of a urologist on the basis that it was not medically necessary, notwithstanding that at that time, the insurance carrier actually had within its possession medical care information to the contrary showing that it was necessary, the insurance adjuster even unilaterally canceled medical testing prescribed by its own physician. Aguilera’s case manager not only refused to authorize necessary emergency care, but insisted on a second opinion, and notwithstanding her agreement with Aguilera’s attorney, actually intervened and attended Aguilera’s urological appointment with Dr. Campea-tore, and then not only violated the prohibition of contacting a represented person but outrageously urged Aguilera to lie to his own counsel about her presence. The case manager proceeded to insist on the administration of tests that were both painful to Aguilera and contraindicated by his then-present medical condition. Finally, the insurance carrier precluded Aguil-era’s surgery, diagnosed as an emergency in June of 1999, until March 22, 2000, by which time Aguilera had been urinating feces and blood for over ten months. Measured by the standards of human decency and societal expectations, one would certainly cry “outrageous” in the face of this conduct. In the words of the dissent, just a “common or ordinary part” of a claim process — we think not.

In addition to alleging all of the acts above, Aguilera specifically alleged in his amended complaint that the insurance carrier “did everything in [its] power to block medical treatment that it had actual notice [Aguilera] needed, and by doing so recklessly endangered [Aguilera’s] life, and engaged in a pattern of action substantially certain to bring about his death.” (Emphasis supplied.) This is the conduct that adoption of the dissenting view would shield from responsibility as just part of the “bargained for balance.” Aguilera’s allegations clearly do not involve a mere delay in payments or simple bad faith, but, at a minimum, allege intentional misconduct that was substantially certain to harm Aguilera. The conduct alleged by Aguil-era is, most certainly, sufficient to establish an independent tort. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Fla.1985) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress where the facts are “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency”). At a minimum, the allegations of Aguilera’s complaint that the insurance carrier “engaged in a pattern of action substantially certain to bring about his death,” together with the supporting outline of outrageous and egregious facts, most assuredly withstands a motion to dismiss on the basis that workers’ compensation immunity would bar the action as a matter of law. Whether Aguil-era can actually prove the facts as alleged during a trial is a far different issue than we decide today as our decision must be based upon an acceptance of the facts alleged as true in the present procedural posture.

Here, the allegations reflect individuals using the power of the insurance carrier and its position of authority to affirmatively inflict damage upon Aguilera separate from and in addition to the initial workplace injury. Certainly, the facts demonstrate that Aguilera was placed at the mercy of the carrier and misdirected representatives at every step of the process. The insurance carrier’s actions here go beyond a mere delay in payments or simple bad faith. The complaint outlines intentional behavior by the insurance carrier, the insurance carrier’s case manager, an adjuster and others, who all went to the extent of even invading the privacy of Aguilera’s medical appointments, and then having the audacity to suggest and actively encourage that Aguilera lie to his counsel and conceal the true facts. Contrary to the dissent, we simply cannot sanction the behavior and conduct alleged here as being acceptable “standard” claims practices according to societal norms. The cases upon which the dissent attempts to rely are not at all applicable to the conduct alleged here. We cannot place a cloak of immunity around this conduct and to do so would be a one-sided perversion of that which has been contemplated by our legislature in our workers’ compensation system. Indeed, it would be inconceivable to characterize this intentional behavior of the insurance carrier, which includes invasion of privacy and encouragement to lie and erode the attorney-client relationship, as a simple delay in payment.

The dissent asserts that the majority’s decision will “severely erode[ ]” the workers’ compensation doctrine of exclusivity. Dissenting op. at 105. To the contrary, the present case demonstrates, under the allegations presented here, a compensation process gone awry for which no immunity was ever designed or intended by the workers’ compensation act. The majority is not eroding the doctrine of immunity in this case because this immunity was never intended to apply to the facts such as these. The workers’ compensation system was designed for •work-related injuries, not for injuries intentionally caused by an insurance carrier during the administration of the worker’s work-related injury claim. We cannot ignore facts or mischar-acterize that which allegedly occurred as being a simple delay and termination of benefits. These facts, if proven, exemplify how a workers’ compensation system should not operate. The present case is not merely a simple delay of payment but a situation in which an insurance carrier has exacerbated Aguilera’s situation by conduct that caused further subsequent and distinct injury in addition to his injury at the workplace.

Finally, we recognize the strong feelings and strong objections voiced by the dissent but find them misdirected here. The worker’s compensation system was designed and intended as a mechanism to fairly and equitably resolve workplace injuries and it was never contemplated that it would operate as a system to inflict injuries on workers during the administration process with absolute immunity. We must be concerned with upholding the system as intended and fairly protecting the rights of all parties involved, not just the immunization of insurance companies from responsibility for egregious intentional contact.

Although the dissent voices the view that a worker subjected to abuses such as these would find relief in section 440.25(4)(h) of the Florida Statutes (2000), see dissenting op. at 104, it fails to consider that this provision addresses procedures for mediation and hearings that are available after a petition for benefits is filed under section 440.192. As well reasoned by Judge Shevin below, there are no statutory remedies in place and available to address the core situation presented and the subsequent, distinct injuries:

[T]he imposition of criminal penalties on the carrier, suspension of the carrier’s license, penalties for late payments, attorney’s fees, dispute resolution procedures, or further procedures to dispute IME requests may punish the carrier or expedite a claim process but those measures do not compensate Aguilera for the injuries he suffered as a result of the carrier’s intentional wrongful acts. The carrier’s actions including alleged lies as to available benefits, refusal to schedule physician appointments, attempts to deprive him of medical care, and insistence upon tests contraindicated by his medical condition amount to intentional wrongful actions distinct from its breach of contract.

Inservices, 837 So.2d at 472 (Shevin, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The allegations here do not involve a simple benefit dispute. Aguilera’s complaint provides allegations of conduct rising to the level of intentional infliction of additional injuries by an insurance company. Section 440.25 is not an available optional procedure that provides relief or compensation for these separate and distinct injuries inflicted. No emergency hearing would have provided Aguilera a remedy for the intentional tortious acts committed by the insurance carrier, as alleged in his amended complaint, or the injuries he allegedly sustained. An emergency hearing was never intended to be a remedy for the injuries resulting from outrageous circumstances as alleged in this case.

We reiterate today that, notwithstanding the immunity the workers’ compensation system provides for workplace injuries negligently inflicted, our Workers’ Compensation Law was never designed or intended to eliminate a common law right of action for intentional tortious conduct. An insurance carrier who utilizes the process of administering benefits to intentionally injure a worker is not afforded immunity. Only injuries that occur within the system, “workplace injuries,” are covered under the workers’ compensation law, not injuries intentionally inflicted by an insurance carrier during the claims administration process.

CONCLUSION

We express no opinion with regard to the ultimate outcome of these allegations at trial. We simply hold that here the allegations presented in the pleading collectively are sufficient to preclude a dismissal under a theory of immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, we disapprove Inservices, Inc. v. Aguilera, 837 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), to the extent of conflict with Sibley and the reasoning presented in this opinion, quash the district court’s decision, and remand with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAJD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

BELL, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

. The petitioner initially sought review based on conflict between the decision below and the decisions in both Sibley and Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683 (Fla.2000). In Turner, this Court reaffirmed the existence of an intentional tort exception to an employer’s workers’ compensation immunity and held that the conduct of the employer must be evaluated under an objective standard. See 754 So.2d at 684.

. Judge Shevin in his well-articulated dissent below cautioned that "[a]ny summary of the facts works an injustice to the events leading up to the lawsuit, and pale the magnitude of the injuries intentionally inflicted upon the Aguileras.” Inservices, 837 So.2d at 469 (Shevin, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).

. In the instant action, the amended complaint also asserted a cause of action for common law bad faith. Dismissal of Aguilera’s simple bad faith count was proper. Florida does not recognize a common law bad faith action in this context. See Talat Enters., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Fla.2000). While Florida does recognize a statutory bad faith cause of action, see § 624.155, Fla. Stat. (2000), such cause is inapplicable to insurance carriers in workers' compensation cases. See § 440.11(4), Fla. Stat. (2000) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of s[ection] 624.155, the liability of a carrier to an employee or to anyone entitled to bring suit in the name of the employee shall be as provided in this chapter, which shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability.”). Therefore, even if Aguilera had asserted a statutory bad faith action, in addition to or as opposed to a common law bad faith action, it would have been properly dismissed.

WELLS, J.,

dissenting.

I join in Justice Bell’s well-reasoned opinion. On the merits of this claim, I believe it to be a mistake for this Court to diminish the effectiveness of the bar to common law tort actions that are integral to workers’ compensation actions. The effects of the majority’s decision will be to allow the pleading around of the exclusive remedy and undermining of the quid pro quo upon which the Legislature founded the workers’ compensation system. This Court refused a similar attempt to use intentional emotional distress to be a basis for a cause of action in delayed payment of insurance benefits in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 279 (Fla.1985). See also Baker v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 559 So.2d 284, 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). I believe we should apply the law of these wise decisions in this case.

I would, however, not reach the merits of this case because Justice Bell is clearly correct that the present decision of the Third District Court of Appeal does not conflict with this Court’s decision in Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992). The decisions were plainly on different facts. This is important in respect to this Court’s jurisdiction because the majority does not find that there is a conflict in the rule of law of the two cases but, rather, bases jurisdiction upon misapplication conflict.

Misapplication conflict is a narrow constitutional basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, only provides for jurisdiction for any decision of a district court “that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.” The Constitution does not use the words “misapplication jurisdiction.”

Misapplication conflict jurisdiction was discussed and limited from the time of the creation of the courts of appeal in 1957. In the landmark opinion of Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808, 811 (Fla.1958), Justice Drew, writing for this Court, stated:

A limitation of review to decisions in “direct conflict” clearly evinces a concern with decisions as precedents as opposed to adjudications of the rights of particular litigants.

Similar provisions in the court systems of other states have been so construed: “A conflict of decisions ... must be on a question of law involved and determined and such that one decision would overrule the other if both were rendered by the same court; in other words, the decisions must be based practically on the same state of facts and announce antagonistic conclusions.” 21 C.J.S. Courts § 462.

In Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731, 734-35 (Fla.1960), Justice Thornal wrote for this Court:

We do not here suggest that if we had been charged with the responsibility of the Court of Appeal in the instant case we would have arrived at the same conclusion which they reached. In fact, it is altogether possible that we might have arrived at an entirely different conclusion as to the ultimate effect of the circumstantial evidence and the justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Cf. Majeske v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, [117 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959).] Such a difference of view, however, is not the measure of our appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of Courts of Appeal because of alleged conflicts with prior decisions of this Court on the same point of law.

While conceivably there may be other circumstances, the principal situations justifying the invocation of our jurisdiction to review decisions of Courts of Appeal because of alleged conflicts are, (1) the announcement of a rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by this Court, or (2) the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case disposed of by this Court. Under the first situation the facts are immaterial. It is the announcement of a conflicting rule of law that conveys jurisdiction to us to review the decision of the Court of Appeal. Under the second situation the controlling facts become vital and our jurisdiction may be asserted only where the Court of Appeal has applied' a recognized rule of law to reach a conflicting conclusion in a case involving substantially the same controlling facts as were involved in allegedly conflicting prior decisions of this Court. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So.2d 697 (Fla.1959).

When our jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to this provision of the constitution we are not permitted the judicial luxury of upsetting a decision of a Court of Appeal merely because we might personally disagree with the so-called “justice of the case” as announced by the Court below. In order to assert our power to set aside the decision of a Court of Appeal on the conflict theory we must find in that decision a real, live and vital conflict within the limits above announced.

(Emphasis added.) This analysis was followed and reaffirmed in Mancini v. State, 312 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla.1975):

Our jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because we might disagree with the decision of the district court [or] because we might have made a factual determination if we had been the trier of fact, Kincaid v. World Insurance Co., 157 So.2d 517 (Fla.1963). As pointed out in Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, Fla., 117 So.2d 731, our jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of appeal because of alleged conflicts is invoked by (1) the announcement of a rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by this court or another district, or (2) the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same facts as a prior case. In this second situation, the facts of the case are of the utmost importance.

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, in our historic precedent we limited “misapplication jurisdiction” to cases which involve “substantially the same controlling facts” as a prior case disposed of by this Court.

Sibley does not involve “substantially the same controlling facts.” This Court set out the facts in Sibley to be:

Sibley’s complaint alleged that, while he was hospitalized in a heavily sedated condition, his statement was taken by William Adams, an employee of the workers’ compensation carrier. Furthermore, Sibley claimed that the statement taken by Adams was inaccurate and had been edited in material respects and that, because of Adams’ fraudulent acts, the carrier refused to pay Sibley workers’ compensation benefits. Sib-ley’s complaint charged that such acts were intentional misconduct and not negligent conduct protected by chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1989).

596 So.2d at 1050. In Sibley, this Court expressly stated that the case was a tort action by an employee who claimed to have been defrauded. Id.

In the present case, the district court set out these facts:

Aguilera was injured in a work-related accident when he was struck by an electric fork lift in April of 1999. Inserviees referred Aguilera to a workers’ compensation clinic where he was treated and eventually discharged to return to work with restrictions.

A few weeks later, Aguilera began to complain of kidney and bladder pain. After examination by two doctors who both recommended that Aguilera not return to work, Aguilera’s workers’ compensation attorney requested examination and treatment by a board certified urologist. Inserviees denied the request claiming the injury was not work-related.

In June of 1999, Aguilera notified In-services that he was passing feces through his urine and was in need of immediate urological care. Three days later, Aguilera was advised that his workers’ compensation benefits were being terminated. Inserviees denied the emergency request for medical care claiming it was not medically necessary.

Several weeks later, Aguilera’s treating physician again advised Inserviees that the need for urological care was urgent and that his condition had deteriorated. The results of a retrograde ure-thogram revealed Aguilera had a hole in his bladder. A new case manager was assigned to Aguilera’s case, defendant/appellee Mippy Heath (“Heath”), however, Heath rejected Aguilera’s request that a general surgeon perform immediate emergency surgery on his fistula. She insisted on a second opinion and the administration of tests which, according to Aguilera, were painful and contraindicated by his medical condition. Heath thereafter sent Aguilera to a gas-troenterologist.

After seeing six doctors in addition to his initial treating physician, and after urinating feces and blood for over ten months, Aguilera’s surgery was authorized on March 22, 2000. Aguilera filed suit against the defendants, seeking damages for common law bad faith and breach of contract against Inserviees, for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Inserviees and Heath, and seeking a declaration that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is unconstitutional to the extent it eliminates claims for subsequent malfeasance of a carrier.

837 So.2d at 465.

We have repeatedly held that conflict between decisions must appear within the four corners of the majority decisions. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish jurisdiction. Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829 (Fla.1986). When placed side-by-side, the facts set out in Sibley and the facts set out in the majority opinion in the district court in this case simply do not meet the standard for “misapplication jurisdiction” required by this Court’s historical precedent.

Obviously, this is a case about which the present majority in this Court and Judge Shevin in the district court feel very strongly. I respect those feelings. But it was precisely about our not having the power to take cases on bases upon which we conclude the district court was wrong or that an injustice had been done that this Court’s historic precedent instructs and informs. I believe we must have the self-discipline to adhere to these teachings, for they are the very foundation upon which our Court system is built.

CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

BELL, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent from the majority opinion for two reasons. First, we do not have jurisdiction to take this case. The decision of the Third District in Inservices, Inc. v. Aguilera, 837 So.2d 464 (Fla. 8d DCA 2002), does not expressly and directly conflict with the question of law we answered in Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992). Second, on the merits, I agree with the Third District that the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation statute bar Aguilera from filing an independent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising directly out of a claims handling dispute.

Because this decision will have serious, adverse impact upon a compensation scheme that is so vital to the people of this state, I will address the substantive question of exclusivity first. I will then explain our lack of jurisdiction in this case.

I. EXCLUSIVITY OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STATUTE

As the Third District properly concluded, Aguilera’s independent claim is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. In exchange for a renunciation of common law rights and defenses, the Act provides relief mechanisms specifically designed to remedy claims-handling difficulties such as those experienced by Aguilera. Inexplicably, he never pursued these statutory remedies. The majority does not view Aguil-era’s complete neglect of these statutory remedies as any barrier to pursuing an independent tort claim. I strongly disagree. The exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act is critical to its efficacy. Allowing Aguilera to ignore these statutory remedies and to proceed with an independent action further erodes the doctrine of exclusivity and unnecessarily undermines the workers’ compensation scheme.

A. The Exchange of Common Law Remedies for Statutory Remedies

“The workers’ compensation system in Florida is based on a mutual renunciation of common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.” § 440.015 Fla. Stat. (2000). As the majority states, Florida’s workers’ compensation immunity protects an employer from most work-related tort lawsuits, but the exclusivity provision of section 440.11 does not insulate an employer from intentional tort lawsuits brought by employees. In other words, “employers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee.” Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1993). Workers’ compensation carriers enjoy the same immunity. See § 440.11(4), Fla. Stat. (2000). As the district court in Aguilera stated, an exception for “carrier immunity” under the Act exists where the carrier commits an intentional tort that is independent of a breach of its contractual claims-handling obligations. See Aguilera, 837 So.2d at 467; see also Associated Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 633 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). This is so because an independent tort requires proof of facts separate and distinct from a breach of contract. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So.2d 1238 (Fla.1996).

Relying on Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683 (Fla.2000), and Sibley, Aguilera alleges that the actions of his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier constituted an intentional tort outside the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Aguilera’s amended complaint pleads causes of action for common-law bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and declaratory relief.

The factual basis for Aguilera’s claims is that Inservices engaged in improper claims-handling delay and wrongful termination of benefits. Obviously, a workers’ compensation carrier is entitled, under appropriate circumstances, to require a claimant to obtain second opinions or to terminate benefits. Therefore, disputes over delays or termination of benefits are an inevitable part of the claims-handling process. However, if the delays are inappropriate or the termination of benefits is wrongful, a claimant must have appropriate remedies. And the Act contains such remedies. It expressly provides for remedies against carriers who engage in unnecessary delays or wrongful termination of benefits. And, until today, these remedies were considered exclusive unless a tort truly independent of the claims handling process was committed.

The majority relies on Sibley to support its decision to allow Aguilera to escape the exclusivity of the Act. Admittedly, Sibley can logically be extended to include Aguil-era’s claim. However, I believe Sibley and Aguilera are also logically and prudently distinguishable on their facts. In Sibley, it was alleged that the claims adjuster committed fraud by altering Sib-ley’s statements. Of course, unlike a claim denial or termination of benefits, fraud is not a common or ordinary part of the claims-handling process. Though a carrier may deny a claim or