Citations
- 971 So. 2d 763
Full opinion text
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Bar petitions this Court to consider proposed amendments to chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
The proposals are the result of a study by the Bar’s Advertising Task Force 2004 (Task Force) and affect subchapter 4-7 of the rules. The Task Force, which was appointed in February 2004, was charged by the Bar with the following mission:
The Advertising Task Force 2004 is charged with reviewing the attorney advertising rules and recommending changes to the rules if deemed necessary, including any changes to clarify the meaning of the rules and provide notice to Florida Bar members of the rules’ requirements. Included within this charge is an analysis of the advertising filing and review requirement, including consideration of mandatory review prior to dissemination of advertisements.
The Task Force held several meetings, solicited comments from numerous sources, and consulted various Bar sections. The Task Force published information and draft proposals in The Florida Bar News and on The Florida Bar’s website. Thereafter, the Task Force submitted its recommendations to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar (Board).
Athough the Board adopted the majority of the recommendations, two significant areas where the Board declined to adopt the Task Force’s recommendations were proposals dealing -with (1) exempting websites from regulation (the Board seeks regulation of websites); and (2) when to review television and radio advertisements (the Board believes review should occur before dissemination). Thus, some of the Task Force’s recommendations were modified by the Board.
The proposals were published for comment in the August 1, 2005, edition of The Florida Bar News. The Bar did not receive any comments in response to the official notice. Further, in the notice, the Bar directed interested parties to file their comments directly with the Court. Thereafter, on December 14, 2005, the Bar filed the proposals with the Court. The Court received three comments.
The Bar proposes amendments to rules 4-7.1 (General); 4-7.2 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services); 4-7.3 (Advertisements in the Public Print Media); 4-7.4 (Direct Contact With Prospective Clients); 4-7.5 (Advertisements in the Electronic Media Other Than Computer-Accessed Communications); 4-7.6 (Computer-Accessed Communications); 4-7.7 (Evaluation of Advertisements); 4-7.8 (Exemptions From the Filing and Review Requirement); 4-7.10 (Firm Names and Letterhead); and 4-7.11 (Lawyer Referral Services). Further, the Bar proposes the deletion of rule 4-7.9 (Information About a Lawyer’s Services Provided Upon Request).
After considering the comments filed and holding oral argument, the Court adopts The Florida Bar’s proposals, except as follows.
The Bar proposed several amendments to rule 4-7.1 (General), including adding subdivisions that would exempt certain areas from the advertising rules. The proposed exemptions included, along with other areas, communications with family members, communications between lawyers, and communications with current and former clients. We adopt the exemption in respect to communications with family members. We request further information from the Bar as to why communications between lawyers, and communications with current and former clients, should be exempted from the advertising rules, including any research or evidence supporting such exemptions. We defer adoption of those two exemptions at this time.
For similar reasons, the Court deletes a portion of the proposed comment to rule 4-7.4 (Direct Contact With Prospective Clients). The proposal would have added language to the comment that would have stated that the advertising rules did not apply to certain “prior professional relationships.”
Next, current rule 4-7.5 requires a non-lawyer spokesperson who speaks on behalf of a lawyer or law firm to comply with certain requirements. The spokesperson must identify himself or herself as a spokesperson. Also, the spokesperson must disclose that he or she is not an attorney practicing with the lawyer or firm. The proposal for rule 4-7.5 would change the rule regarding affirmative disclosures by spokespersons. Instead of following the established requirements, the proposal would require an affirmative disclosure that a nonlawyer spokesperson is being used only when it is not apparent “from the context of the advertisement that the spokesperson is not a lawyer.” In comparison to the proposal, the established requirements are consistently unambiguous in any advertising situation, simple to apply, and, thus, provide greater protection for the public. Therefore, the Court does not adopt the proposal.
Existing rule 4-7.6 (Computer-Accessed Communications) governs computer-accessed communications such as websites and electronic mail. The proposal would make several changes to the rule. However, the Court notes that the Board has appointed a special committee to review issues regarding websites and Internet communications. The special committee is charged with making recommendations to the Board if appropriate. Thus, it is not efficient or sound for the Court to address the regulation of Internet advertising at this time, while the special committee is studying these very issues. Accordingly, the Court does not adopt the proposal for rule 4-7.6. The Court will consider the regulation of Internet communications when the Bar files the report of the special committee.
Further, the Court requests that the Bar undertake an additional and contemporary study of lawyer advertising, which shall include public evaluation and comments about lawyer advertising, as recommended by Mr. Bill Wagner in his written and oral comments to the Court.
Also, the Bar proposed amendments to rule 4-7.8 (Exemptions From the Filing and Review Requirement), which would have included deletion of existing subdivision (d) (a communication mailed only to existing clients, former clients, or other lawyers is exempt from the filing requirements of rule 4-7.7). However, the Bar subsequently filed a motion requesting that the Court retain subdivision (d) in the rules, while the Bar studied issues raised by related rule 4-7.1 (General). Thus, in light of related rule 4-7.1, we modify the proposal to maintain existing subdivision (d) in rule 4-7.8.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. Deletions are indicated by struck-through type, and new language is indicated by underscoring. The comments are included for explanation and guidance only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The amendments shall become effective on February 1, 2008, at 12:01 a.m.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
BELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
. While awaiting the report of the special committee, the Court herein deletes an incorrect rule reference in rule 4-7.6(b)(3). This modification is simply to remove an inaccurate cross-reference and is not intended to impact the Bar's study of how to classify or address computer-accessed communications.
LEWIS, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with most of the new amendments, I dissent with regard to the advertising pandering of the new designation termed “expert.” It is this Court’s obligation and duty to prescribe standards of professionalism and ethical conduct for attorneys who are privileged to practice law in the State of Florida. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.; R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-1.2. However, when we abdicate that duty by allowing Florida’s attorneys to foist artfully crafted, bar-sanctioned, advertising-based deception upon the lay public, I must dissent. I, therefore, express my disagreement with the decisions of the majority in In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, SC06-736, — So.2d -, 2007 WL 4440381 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2007), and the instant case, to the extent that these decisions authorize board-certified attorneys to denominate and advertise themselves as “experts.” We often voice concern with regard to professionalism and the declining respect for the legal system, but we fail to follow our own words with corresponding action. In my view, a very significant contribution to this eroding respect can be traced directly to the shift from a professional model to an economic model, which includes progressively-escalating advertising gimmicks. Today the majority adds another bullet to that economic arsenal.
My analysis consists of four observations. First, under the commercial-speech doctrine, this Court remains" free to restrain deceptive or misleading attorney advertising. Second, “specialist” and “expert” are not synonymous; in fact, they are qualitatively different. Furthermore, claims of “expert” status are inherently misleading. Third, the “expert” amendments have “flown under the radar” and have not been adequately or appropriately debated or briefed. Fourth and finally, my view is consistent with both the majority approach across the country, and with Florida’s regulation of another group of certified specialists — board-certified physicians.
THE STATES RETAIN THE ABILITY TO PROHIBIT MISLEADING COMMERCIAL SPEECH.
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), the states have understood that attorney advertising is a form of commercial speech that is entitled to some First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Herrick, 571 So.2d 1303, 1305 (Fla.1990). However, the High Court has made certain to clearly emphasize that the states remain iree to regulate and prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech, especially when used in the context of professional-service advertisements: “Physicians and lawyers ... do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.” Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n. 25, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (emphasis supplied); see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 379, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (“Because the public lacks sophistication in legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers. After-the-fact action by the consumer lured by such advertising may not provide a realistic restraint because of the inability of the layman to assess whether the service he has received meets professional standards.” (emphasis supplied)).
It is axiomatic that “[ajdvertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading ... is subject to restraint.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691; see also Herrick, 571 So.2d at 1305. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that its multi-part commercial-speech framework from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), does not apply if the advertising at issue is misleading:
Under Central Hudson, the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies a test consisting of three related prongs: First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be narrowly drawn.
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (emphasis supplied) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, the Justices presented much of this same analysis in the plurality decision of Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990), which held that the Illinois Commission’s discipline of an attorney for truthfully advertising his trial-specialist certification violated the First Amendment. See id. at 99-110, 110 S.Ct. 2281; see also id. at 113-14, 110 S.Ct. 2281 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). There was, however, no majority opinion in Peel. Where this is the case, the Supreme Court has held that the true holding of the case is “that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
In Peel, the narrowest concurrence was that of Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan. Therein, Justice Marshall stated that even attorney-specialist certifications are “potentially misleading” because specialist certifications, in the absence of proper explanation, imply that certified lawyers are necessarily more adept in the certified field than noncertified lawyers. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 113-14, 110 S.Ct. 2281 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Florida unequivocally endorses the use of properly obtained and explained attorney-specialization certifications. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.2(c)(6), 6-1.2 (prior versions). The telling truth revealed in Peel, however, is that even attorney specialization — where not properly explained — can be misleading for the public. See 496 U.S. at 113-14, 110 S.Ct. 2281 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). As explained below, while attorney “specialization” can be potentially misleading, attorneys’ claims of “expert” status are inherently misleading, and this Court should, therefore, prohibit the use of this misleading moniker. In my view, this is also a breach of the trust advanced in the 1970s and 1980s to secure approval of attorney “specialty” designations in Florida, and constitutes pandering to advertising at the lowest level.
“EXPERT” AND “SPECIALIST” STATUS ARE QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT, AND THE FORMER IS INHERENTLY MISLEADING. MOREOVER, THESE “EXPERT” AMENDMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY DEBATED.
Sellers of goods and services use commercial advertising to increase sales and to make a name for themselves in the applicable market. See Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So.2d 240, 247 (Fla.2005). The consuming public thus becomes their, target audience, and “the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides.” Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, where the advertising at issue is misleading and provides little, if any, valuable information to the consuming public, that advertising must be scrupulously examined and controlled.
Attorney “expert” status exemplifies this very type of misleading, useless advertising. Florida has had and secured an attorney-specialization program — based on specified representations and promised limitations — for decades, and has readily permitted attorneys to advertise their certified status as long as they have complied with the relevant rules of professional conduct. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.2(c)(6), 6-1.2 (prior versions); Fla.Code of Prof! Responsibility DR 2-105 (the Code of Professional Responsibility ceased to govern attorneys in Florida as of January 1,1987); see also Herrick, 571 So.2d at 1306-07 (holding that The Florida Bar’s discipline of an attorney for claiming specialization status without having complied with Florida’s rules of professional conduct did not violate the First Amendment). The decision of the majority to allow these attorneys to publicize their status with ever-increasing hyperbole does not change the fact that they were previously permitted to only claim certified specializations, which were adequate descriptors without the addition of the useless, misleading, and qualitatively different appellation “expert.” Substituting “expert” status for “specialist ” status accomplishes nothing apart from increasing attorneys’ capacity to deceive the consuming public, regardless of whether. their deception is intentional or unintentional.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed. unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691. Therefore, in the realm of legal-service advertising, this Court has a heightened responsibility to protect the lay public from potentially deceptive statements and claims: “[T]he public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Where the potential interpretation and perspective of the public is concerned, one must focus on the plain meaning of the communication at issue. To that end, “[o]ne looks to the dictionary for the plain and ordinary meaning of words.” Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2007) (quoting Beans v. Chohonis, 740 So.2d 65, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)) (interpreting the plain meaning of the words used in an insurance policy).
According to a widely used dictionary, “specialist” and “expert” are not at all synonymous terms. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary supplies two germane definitions for the term “expert”: The first definition is a person “having, involving, or displaying special skill or knowledge derived from training or experience”; however, the second definition is “one with the special skill or knowledge representing mastery of a particular subject.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 409 (10th ed.1993) (emphasis supplied). In contrast, that same source defines “specialist” as “one who specializes in a particular occupation, practice, or branch of learning.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1128 (10th ed.1993). Merely focusing upon a particular “branch of learning” is not the same exercise as obtaining “mastery of a particular subject.”
Hence, when a layperson — unaccustomed with the varied and nuanced definitions that the law places upon the term “expert” — sees or hears that a particular attorney is an “expert” in a field of law for which the layperson desires representation, that layperson is likely to labor under the misconception that the advertising attorney is a “master” or a preeminent mind in the particular field. That, however, may not always or even often be the case, as demonstrated by the efforts of many of these so-called experts to exhibit their purported “expertise.” Further, the certification standards for many fields are not overly intensive. For example, one may become a board-certified appellate attorney in Florida by completing the following requirements: (1) practicing law for at least five years; (2) substantially and directly focusing thirty percent of one’s practice on appellate law for the three-year period preceding application (requirement subject to waiver of up to two years); (3) having sole or primary responsibility for five appellate oral arguments during the five-year period preceding application (requirement subject to waiver in “particular instances” for good cause); (4) obtaining forty-five hours of approved appellate-practice continuing legal education (“CLE”) credits during the three-year period preceding application; (5) submitting judicial and collegial references; and (6) passing the appellate-practice examination. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 6-13.3. Does such certification really mean that a newly minted board-certified appellate attorney is a “master,” “expert,” or preeminent practitioner in terms of practicing before Florida’s appellate courts, a federal Circuit Court of Appeals, or before the United States Supreme Court? I think not. This type of certification may, however, mean that the board-certified appellate attorney “specializes ” in appellate law.
In sum, leading members of the public to believe that they are purchasing the legal representation of an “expert” is deceptive because use of that hyperbolic term suggests that the “expert” attorney is better able to obtain a desirable result for the client due to their “master” status. This intimation regarding the quality of an attorney’s potential services is not necessarily accurate or verifiable. I agree with the notion that “advertising claims as to the quality of services ... are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (emphasis supplied); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2265. This Court should never allow attorneys to make these unverifiable, qualitatively based claims, which ensnare inexperienced consumers of legal services. This is particularly true where, as here, there has not been an expansive discussion of the subject prior to the adoption of the amended Bar rules. Therefore, I would refuse to adopt the permissive stance of the majority.
THE MAJORITY’S APPROACH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS AND WITH FLORIDA’S REGULATION OF BOARD-CERTIFIED PHYSICIANS.
Thirty-seven United States jurisdictions and the American Bar Association do not include the term “expert” in their field-of-practice and attorney-specialization rules. Furthermore, at least three jurisdictions indirectly reference the term “expertise,” but refer to field-certified attorneys as “specialists.” Thus, the overwhelming majority approach is to label this classification of attorneys “specialists,” not “experts.” Florida’s consumers of legal services may take little solace in the fact that the majority of jurisdictions reject the approach adopted today and, instead, support labeling board-certified attorneys “specialists,” rather than “experts.” Nevertheless, this fact buttresses my view that the term “specialist” was — and is — more than up to the task of differentiating board-certified attorneys from their noncertified colleagues, without the need for resorting to the “assistance” of the grandiose and deceptive term “expert.” Board-certified specialists do not need an ever-expanding palette of superlatives with which to hawk their wares; “specialist” suffices.
Additionally, in Florida, the professionals that attorneys are most often compared with — physicians—are not permitted to call themselves board-certified “experts.” Section 458.3312, Florida Statutes, states that
[a] physician licensed under this chapter may not hold himself or herself out as a board-certified specialist unless the physician has received formal recognition as a specialist from a specialty board of the American Board of Medical Specialties or other recognizing agency approved by the board. However, a physician may indicate the services offered and may state that his or her practice is limited to one or more types of services when this accurately reflects the scope of practice of the physician.
§ 458.3312, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). The differences between these two professions most assuredly do not warrant permitting board-certified attorneys to call themselves “experts,” while prohibiting board-certified doctors from doing the same. This point bears repeating: use of the term “specialist” is sufficient to distinguish board-certified professionals from their noncertified colleagues. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to bestow upon some of Florida’s attorneys a cumulative and deceptive accolade of professed distinction — so-called “expert” status.
. I refer to the prior versions of these rules because, in my opinion, the majority has unnecessarily altered these rules today through amendments that needlessly add the term "expert” to board-certified attorneys’ arsenal of salutations.
. This Court, in In re Florida Bar, 319 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1975), amended the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, and in the process responded to an objection voiced at that time by altering one of the amendments to add language stating that when an attorney designates an area of legal practice, this designation "DOES NOT MEAN that such attorney has been certified by any person or group as an ‘expert’ in any area of law, nor does it mean that such an attorney is any more expert or competent than any other attorney.” Id. at 7-8. Likewise, in Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar Chapter 6 (Legal Specialization and Education), 548 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1989), we approved various "legal specialization” rules, but did not approve or reference "expert” status.
. See A.B.A. Model R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Ala. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Alaska R. Prof'l Conduct R. 7.4; Ariz. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Ark. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Cal. R. Prof’l Conduct 1-400; Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4 (eff. 01/01/2008); Conn. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Del. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Ga. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Haw. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Idaho R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Iowa R. Prof'l Conduct 32:7.4; Kan. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Md. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4 (does not permit specialization outside of patent law, which is arguably unconstitutional in light of the plurality result in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990) (holding that Illinois’ discipline of attorney for truthfully advertising trial-specialist certification violated the First Amendment)); Mich. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4 (does not specifically address the specialization issue, but permits attorneys to list their fields of practice); Minn. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Miss. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.6; Mo. R. Prof’l Conduct 4-7.4; Neb. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; N.H. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4 (eff. 01/01/2008); N.J. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; N.M. R. Prof’l Conduct 16-704; N.Y.Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR-2-105; N.D. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Ohio R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Okla. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Pa. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; S.D. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Tenn. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 7.04; Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Vt. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Va. R. Prof! Conduct 7.4; W. Va. R. Prof'l Conduct (does not permit specialization outside of patent and admiralty law, which is arguably unconstitutional in light of Peel); Wis. R. Prof’l Conduct 20:7.4; Wyo. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; Guam R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4.
. See Ind. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Mont. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4; N.C. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4. Additionally, Rhode Island only mentions "expert” in a court-mandated disclaimer, not in the substantive portion of its rule; South Carolina only mentions "expert” in a list of prohibited terms; Maine only mentions "expertise” without reference to either "specialist” or "expert”; and Massachusetts only mentions "expert” in the comments to its rule. See R.I. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; S.C. R. Prof'l Conduct 7.4; Me.Code of Prof’l Responsibility 3.8; Mass. R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4.
BELL, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would adopt The Florida Bar’s proposed amendments without exception.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
APPENDIX
4-7. INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES
RULE 4-7.1 GENERAL
(a) Permissible Forms of Advertising. Subject to all the requirements set forth in this subchapter 4-7, including the filing requirements of rule 4-7.7, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, including but not limited to: print media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical; outdoor advertising, such as billboards and other signs; radio, television, and computer-accessed communications; recorded messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number; and written communication in accordance with rule 4-7.4.
(b) Advertisements Disseminated in Florida. Subchapter 4-7 shall apply to lawyers admitted to practice law in Florida who solicit or advertise for legal employment in Florida or who target solicitations or advertisements for legal employment at Florida residents.
(c) Advertisements by Out-of-State Lawyers. Subchapter 4-7 shall apply to lawyers admitted to practice law in jurisdictions other than Florida:
(1) who have established a regular and/or permanent presence in Florida for the practice of law as authorized by other law; and
(2) who solicit or advertise for legal employment in Florida or who target solicitations or advertisements for legal employment at Florida residents.
(bd) Advertisements Not Disseminated in Florida. These-rulesSubchapter 4-7 shall not apply to any advertisement broadcast or disseminated in another jurisdiction in which the advertising lawyer is admitted if such advertisement complies with the rules governing lawyer advertising in that jurisdiction and is not intended for broadcast or dissemination within the state of Florida.
(e) Communications With Family Members. Subchapter 4-7 shall not apply to communications between a lawyer and that lawyer’s own family members.
(f) Communications at a Prospective Client’s Request. Subchapter 4-7 shall not apply to communications between a lawyer and a prospective client if made at the request of that prospective client.
(g) Application of General Misconduct Rule. The general rule prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation applies to all communications by a lawyer, whether or not subchapter 4-7 applies to that communication.
Comment
To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. The public’s need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising that provides the public with useful, factual information about legal rights and needs and the availability and terms of legal services from a particular lawyer or law firm. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. Nevertheless, certain types of advertising by lawyers create the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching and can create unwarranted expectations by persons untrained in the law. Such advertising can also adversely -affect the public’s confidence and trust in our judicial system.
In order to balance the public’s need for useful information, the state’s need to ensure a system by which justice will be administered fairly and properly, as well as the state’s need to regulate and monitor the advertising practices of lawyers, and a lawyer’s right to advertise the availability of the lawyer’s services to the public, these rules permit public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer’s name or firm name, address, and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer’s fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer’s foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other factual information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.
Regardless of medium, a lawyer’s advertisement should provide only useful, factual information presented in a nonsensa-tional manner. Advertisements utilizing slogans or jingles, oversized electrical and neon signs, or sound trucks fail to meet these standards and diminish public confidence in the legal system.
These rules do not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.
These rules apply to advertisements and written communications directed at prospective clients and concerning a lawyer’s or law firm’s availability to provide legal services. These rules do not apply to communications between lawyers, including brochures used for recruitment purposes. and their own family members, or communications with a prospective client at that prospective client’s request.
RULE 4-7.2 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER’S SERVICES
The following shall apply to any communication conveying information about a lawyer’s or a law firm’s services except as provided in subdivisions (e) and (f) of rule 4-7.1:
(a) Required InformationContent of Advertisements and Unsolicited Written Communications.
(1) Name of Lawyer or Lawyer Referral Service. All advertisements and written communications pursuant to these rules shall include the name of at least 1 lawyer or the lawyer referral service responsible for their content.
(2) Location of Practice. All advertisements and written communications provided for under these rules shall disclose, by city or town, 1 or more bona fide office locations of the lawyer or lawyers who will actually perform the services advertised. If the office location is outside a city or town, the county in which the office is located must be disclosed. A lawyer referral service shall disclose the geographic area in which the lawyer practices when a referral is made. For the purposes of this rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm where the lawyer or law firm reasonably expects to furnish legal services in a substantial way on a regular and continuing basis.if — an—advertisement - or written communication lists a telephone number in connection with a specified geographic area other than an area-containing a bona fide office, appropriate qualifying language must appear in the advertisement
(b) Prohibited- Statements and Infor-matiomPermissible Content of Advertisements and Unsolicited Written Communications. If the content of an advertisement in any public media or unsolicited written communication is limited to the following information, the advertisement or unsolicited written communication is exempt from the filing and review requirement and, if true, shall be presumed not to be misleading or deceptive.
(1)Lawyers and Law Firms. A lawyer or law firm may include the following information in advertisements and unsolicited written communications:
(A) the name of the lawyer or law firm subject to the requirements of this rule and rule 4-7.9, a listing of lawyers associated •with the firm, office locations and parking arrangements, disability accommodations, telephone numbers, website addresses, and electronic mail addresses, office and telephone service hours, and a designation such as “attorney” or “law firm”;
(B) date of admission to The Florida Bar and any other bars, current membership or positions held in The Florida Bar or its sections or committees, former membership or positions held in The Florida Bar or its sections or committees with dates of membership, former positions of employment held in the legal profession with dates the positions were held, years of experience practicing law, number of lawyers in the advertising law firm, and a listing of federal courts and jurisdictions other than Florida where the lawyer is licensed to practice;
(C) technical and professional licenses granted by the state or other recognized licensing authorities and educational degrees received, including dates and institutions;
(D) military service, including branch and dates of service;
(E) foreign language ability;
(F) fields of law in which the lawyer practices, including official certification logos, subject to the requirements of subdivision (c)(6) of this rule regarding use of terms such as certified, specialist, and expert;
(G) prepaid or group legal service plans in which the lawyer participates;
(H) acceptance of credit cards;
(I) fee for initial consultation and fee schedule, subject to the requirements of subdivisions (c)(7) and (c)(8) of this rule regarding cost disclosures and honoring advertised fees;
(J) common salutary language such as “best wishes,” “good luck,” “happy holidays,” or “pleased to announce”;
(K) punctuation marks and common typographical marks;
(L) an illustration of the scales of justice not deceptively similar to official certification logos or The Florida Bar logo, a gavel, traditional renditions of Lady Justice, the Statue of Liberty, the American flag, the American eagle, the State of Florida flag, an unadorned set of law books, the inside or outside of a courthouse, column(s), diploma(s), or a photograph of the lawyer or lawyers who are members of or employed by the firm against a plain background consisting of a single solid color or a plain unadorned set of law books.
(2) Lawyer Referral Services. A lawyer referral service may advertise its name, location, telephone number, the referral fee charged, its hours of operation, the process by which referrals are made, the areas of law in which referrals are offered, the geographic area in which the lawyers practice to whom those responding to the advertisement will be referred, and, if applicable, its nonprofit status, its status as a lawyer referral service approved by The Florida Bar, and the logo of its sponsoring bar association.
(3) Public Service Announcements. A lawyer or law firm may be listed as a sponsor of a public service announcement or charitable, civic, or community program or event as long as the information about the lawyer or law firm is limited to the permissible content set forth in subdivision (b)(1) of this rule.
(c) Prohibitions and General Regulations Governing Content of Advertisements and Unsolicited Written Communications.
(1) Statements About Legal Services. A lawyer shall not make or permit to be made a false, misleading, or deceptivey-er unfa-⅛ communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication violates this rule if it:
(A) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or lawor omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(B) is false or misleading;
(C) fails to disclose material information necessary to prevent the information supplied from being false or misleading;
(D) is unsubstantiated in fact;
(E) is deceptive;
(BF) contains any reference to past successes or results obtained-or-is-othe-r-wise likely to create an-unjustified expectation about-results the lawyer can achieve except - as-allowed in the rule regulating-information about- a-lawyeBs sendees provided upon request;
(G) promises results;
(GH) states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(BI) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated; or
(EJ) contains a testimonial.
(2) Misleading or - Deceptive Factual Statements-. — Any factual statement-contained in.any — advertisement or written communication--or any information.-furnished to a prospective-client-under this rule shall-nofe
(A) be.direetly or impliedly false-or-misleading;
(B) be-potentially false or misleading;
(C) fail to disclose material -information necessary to prevent-the information supplied from being-actually or potentially-false-or misleading;
(D) be unsubstantiated in fact;- or-
(E) be unfair or deceptive.
(§2) Descriptive Statements. A lawyer shall not make statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s services in advertisements and unsolicited written communications; — provided—that this provision-shall not apply to information furnished to a prospective client at that person’s — request or to information supplied-to existing clients.
(-4B) Prohibited Visual and Verbal Portrayals and Illustrations. ¥isua!A lawyer shall not include in any advertisement or unsolicited written communication any visual or verbal descriptions, depictions, ib lustrations, or portrayals of persons, things, or events shall-not-bethat are deceptive, misleading, or manipulative, or likely to confuse the viewer.
(§4) Advertising Areas of Practice. A lawyer or law firm shall not advertise for legal employment in an area of practice in which the advertising lawyer or law firm does not currently practice law.
(⅜5) Stating or Implying Florida Bar Approval. A lawyer or law firm shall not make any statement that directly or impliedly indicates that the communication has received any kind of approval from The Florida Bar.
(c) General — Regulations—Governing Content of Advertisements,
(1) Use of Illustrations. — Illustrations used — in-advertisements—shall- contain no features that-are likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse the viewer.
(2) ■ Fields of Practice. — Every advertisement and written communication that indicates 1 or-more areas of law-in which the lawyer-or law firm practices shall conform to-the requirements of-subdivision (c)(3) of this rule.'
(36) Communication of Fields of Practice. A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is “certified,” “board certified,” or a “specialist,” or an “expert” except as follows:
(A) Florida Bar Certified Lawyers. A lawyer who complies with the Florida certification plan as set forth in chapter 6, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, may inform the public and other lawyers of the lawyer’s certified areas of legal practice. Such communications should identify The Florida Bar as the certifying organization and may state that the lawyer is “certified,” “board certified,” or a “specialist in (area of certification),” or an “expert in (area of certification).”
(B) Lawyers Certified by Organizations Other Than The Florida Bar or Another State Bar. A lawyer certified by an organization other than The Florida Bar or another state bar may inform the public and other lawyers of the lawyer’s certified area(s) of legal practice by stating that the lawyer is “certified,” “board certified,” or a “specialist in (area of certification),” or an “expert in (area of certification)” if:
(i) the organization’s program has been accredited by The Florida Bar as provided elsewhere in these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar; and,
(ii) the member includes the full name of the organization in all communications pertaining to such certification.
(C)Certification by Other State Bars. A lawyer certified by another state bar may inform the public and other lawyers of the lawyer’s certified area(s) of legal practice and may state in communications to the public that the lawyer is “certified,” “board certified,” or a “specialist in (area of certification),” or an “expert in (area of certification)” if:
(i) the state bar program grants certification on the basis of standards reasonably comparable to the standards of the Florida certification plan as set forth in chapter 6, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, as determined by The Florida Bar; and,
(ii) the member includes the name of the state bar in all communications pertaining to such certification.
(-4-7) Disclosure of Liability For Expenses Other Than Fees. Every advertisement and unsolicited written communication that contains information about the lawyer’s fee, including those that indicate no fee will be charged in the absence of a recovery, shall disclose whether the client will be liable for any expenses in addition to the fee.
(§8) Period for Which Advertised Fee Must Be Honored. A lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service shall honor the advertised fee or range of fees for at least 90 days unless the advertisement specifies a shorter period; provided that, for advertisements in the yellow pages of telephone directories or other media not published more frequently than annually, the advertised fee or range of fees shall be honored for no less than 1 year following publication.
(69) Firm Name. A lawyer shall not advertise services under a name that violates the provisions of rule 4-7.104-7.9.
(10) Language of Required Statements. Any words or statements required by this subchapter to appear in an advertisement or direct mail communication must appear in the same language in which the advertisement appears. If more than 1 language is used in an advertisement or direct mail communication, any words or statements required by this subchapter must appear in each language used in the advertisement or direct mail communication.
(11) Appearance of Required Statements. Any words or statements required by this subchapter to. appear in an advertisement or direct mail communication must be clearly legible if written or intelligible if spoken aloud.
(712) Payment by Nonadvertising Lawyer. No lawyer shall, directly or indirectly, pay all or a part of the cost of an advertisement by a lawyer not in the same firm. Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(D) (regarding the division of contingency, fees) is not affected by this provision even though the lawyer covered by rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(ii) advertises.
(§13) Referrals to Another Lawyer. If the case or matter will be referred to another lawyer or law firm, the communication shall include a statement so advising the prospective client.
(914) Payment for Recommendations; Lawyer Referral Service Fees. A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written or recorded communication permitted by these rules, may pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service or other legal service organization, and may purchase a law practice in accordance with rule 4-1.17.
(10) Language of-Required Statements-Any-words or statements -required by this subchapter to appear-in-an-advertisement or direct mail communication must' appear-in the same language in which- the-adver-tisemenb- appears. — If more--than 1 language-is used in an advertisement or direct mail communication, any words-or statements required by this subehapter must appear-in-each language used-in-the advertisement or direct mail communica-
(11) Appearance — of Required — Statements-. — Any-words or statements'required by-this-subchapter to appear in-an-adver-tisemeat — er—direct- -mail — communication must be clearly-legible if written or intelligible -if-spoken aloud. — If the words-or statements appear in text, then-the-text also-must be no smaller than-one-quarter the size of the largest type otherwise appearing in the advertisement;
(12) Permissible Content of Advertisements-. — The following information in advertisements and written communications shall be presumed not to violate the provisions of subdivision- (b)(l-)- of-this-raleT
(A) subject to the requirements — of this-rale, and rule 4-7.10, the name-of the lawyer or- law-firnq-a- listing of lawyers associated with-the-firm, office locations and parking -arrangements, disability accommodations,-telephone numbers, website addresses, — and-electronic mail addresses, office -and-telephone service hours, and- a-designation such as “attorney” or “law firm”;
(B) date of admission-to The Florida Bar and any other-bars-current membership or positions-heldr-in The Florida Bar, its sections or committees, former membership-or- positions held in The Elorida-Bar — its-seetions or committees, together with dates-of-membership, former positi&ns-of-employment held in the fogal-profession, ■ together with dates the positions were held, years of-experience practicing law) number of lawyers in the advertising, law firm, and a listing-of federal courts and jurisdictions other than Florida where — the.lawyer is li-eensed-to-pr-actice;
(C) technical and-professional licenses granted by-the- state or other recognized ■hcensing authorities and edueational degrees received, inctading-dates and institutions;
^^foreign-language ability;
(-E-)-fields- of law in whidr-the-lawyer practices — including official certification logos, subject to the requirements of subdivdsions-(c)(2) and (c)(3) of-thls-rule;
(F) prepaid or group legal — service plans in -which the lawyer participates;
(G) acceptance of credit cards;
(H) fee for initial consultation and fee schedule, subject te4he-requirements of subdivisions (c)(4) and (c)(5)' of this rule?
(I) a listing of the name and geographic location of-a4awyer or law firm as — a—sponsor of a public-service announcement or charitable, civic, or community program-or event;
(-J-j-eommon salutary language such as -best wishes,” “goedr-luek-,” “happy holidays/’ or “pleased to-announce”;
(K) an illustration-of the scales of justice not deceptively similar to official certification-logos or The Florida Bar logo-,-a-gavel, or traditional renditions of Lady Justicer or a photograph-of the head ancb-shoulders of the lawyer or ■lawyers who are -members of or employed by the firm-against a plain background consisting of a single solid color or — a plain unadorned set of law books; and
(L) a lawyer referral service may advertise — its—name,—iocation,—telephone number, the referral fee charged, its hours of operation, the process by which referrals are made,-the areas of law in which — referrals are offered, the geographic -area in which the lawyers prac-tiee-to whom those responding to-the advertisement will -be referred, and, if applicable, its nonprofit status, its status as a lawyer referral service-approved by The Florida Bar, and the- logo of its sponsoring bar association.
Comment
This rule governs all communications about a lawyer’s services, including advertising permitted by this subchapter. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer’s services, statements about them must be truthful. This precludes any material misrepresentation or misleading omission, such as where a lawyer states or implies certification or recognition as a specialist other than in accordance with this rule, where a lawyer implies that any court, tribunal, or other public body or official can be improperly influenced, or where a lawyer advertises a particular fee or a contingency fee without disclosing whether the client will also be liable for costs. Another example of a misleading omission is an advertisement for a law firm that states that all the firm’s lawyers are juris doctors but does not disclose that a juris doctorate is a law degree rather than a medical degree of some sort and that virtually any law firm in the United States can make the same claim. Although this rule permits lawyers to list the jurisdictions and courts to which they are admitted, it also would be misleading for a lawyer who does not list other jurisdictions or courts to state that the lawyer is a member of The Florida Bar. Standing by itself, that otherwise truthful statement implies falsely that the lawyer possesses a qualification not common to virtually all lawyers practicing in Florida. The latter-2- examples of misleading omissions also-are examples of unfair advertising.
Prohibited information
The prohibition in subdivision (b)(l)(B)(c)(l)(F) of -statements-that may create “unjustified expectations-’-preeludes advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer’s record in obtaining favorable verdictsrand-advertise-ments containing client endorsements or-testimonials. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances.
The prohibition in subdivision (b)(l)(-D-)(c)(l)(I) of comparisons that cannot be factually substantiated would preclude a lawyer from representing that the lawyer or the lawyer’s law firm is “the best,” “one of the best,” or “one of the most experienced” in a field of law.
The prohibition in subdivision (b)(l)(-E-)(c)(l)(J) precludes endorsements or testimonials, whether from clients or anyone else, because they are inherently misleading to a person untrained in the law. Potential clients are likely to infer from the testimonial that the lawyer will reach similar results in future cases. Because the lawyer cannot directly make this assertion, the lawyer is not permitted to indirectly make that assertion through the use of testimonials.
Subdivision (b)(4)(c)(3) prohibits visual or verbal descriptions, depictions, or-portrayals, or illustrations in any advertisement which create suspense, or contain exaggerations or appeals to the emotions, call for legal services, or create consumer problems through characterization and dialogue ending with the lawyer solving the problem. Illustrations permitted under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), are informational and not misleading, and are therefore permissible. As an example, a drawing of a fist, to suggest the lawyer’s ability to achieve results, would be barred. Examples of permissible illustrations would include a graphic rendering of the scales of justice to indicate that the advertising attorney practices law, a picture of the lawyer, or a map of the office location.
Communication of fields of practice
This rule permits a lawyer or law firm to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer’s or law firm’s services, such as in a telephone directory or other advertising, provided the advertising lawyer or law firm actually practices in those areas of law at the time the advertisement is disseminated. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted so to indicate. However, no lawyer who is not certified by The Florida Bar, by another state bar with comparable standards, or an organization accredited by The Florida Bar may be described to the public as a “specialist” or as “specializing,” “certified,” “board certified,” being an “expert” or having “expertise in,” or any variation of similar import. A lawyer may indicate that the lawyer concentrates in, focuses on, or limits the lawyer’s practice to particular areas of practice as long as the statements are true.
Paying others to recommend a lawyer
A lawyer is allowed to pay for advertising permitted by this rule and for the purchase of a law practice in accordance with the provisions of rule 4-1.17, but otherwise is not permitted to pay or provide other tangible benefits to another person for procuring professional work. However, a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in lawyer referral programs and pay the usual fees charged by such programs, subject, however, to the limitations imposed by rule 4-7:1-14-7.10. Subdivision — (c)(9)This rule does not prohibit paying regular compensation to an assistant, such as a secretary or advertising consultant, to prepare communications permitted by this rule.
Required disclosures
Required disclosures would be ineffective if they appeared in an advertisement so briefly or minutely as to be overlooked or ignored. Thus -the-type size to be-used for-required disclosures-is- specified to-ensure that-the disclosures-will be conspicuous. Thus, required information must be legible if written or intelligible if spoken aloud to ensure that the recipient receives the information.
RULE 4-7.3 ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC PRINT MEDIA
(a) Generally, Advertisements disseminated in the public print media are subject to the requirements of rule 4-7.2.
(b) Disclosure Statement. — Except-as otherwise-proYided4m-this-subdmsioB — all-advertisements other-than-lawyer referral service advertisements-shall contain — the following disclosure: “The hiring of a lawyer-is-an important-decision that should not be based-solely upon advertisements. Before you decide, ask us to send you free written information about our qualifications and experience.” — Lawyer refer-r-al service advertisements shall contain the following disclosure: “The hiring of a-daw-yer is an-important decision. — Before you deeide-to hire the lawyer to whom- you are referred, ask that lawyer for-written information about-that lawyer’s -qualifications and experience.” — Outdoor advertisements may contain^ in lieu of the above disclosure, the following-abbreviated version: “Before choosing a lawyer, ask for written information about the lawye4s-legal qualifications and experience.” — These disclosures» however, need not appear- in advertisements in the public print-media that contain no-illustrations and no information other than-that listed in subdivision (c)(12) of rule 4-7.2, or written communications sent in compliance with rule 4-7.4.
Comment
The disclosure required by-this rule is designed to-encourage the informed selection^of- a lawyer. — A prospective client is entitled to-know- the experience and qualifications of-any lawyer seeking to repre-senLthe prospective-client.
RULE 4-7.4 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
(a) Solicitation. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. A lawyer shall not permit employees or agents of the lawyer to solicit in the lawyer’s behalf. A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee for professional employment obtained in violation of this rule. The term “solicit” includes contact in person, by telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient and includes (i) any written form of communication directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of this rule, and (ii) any electronic mail communication directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of subdivision (c) of rule 4-7.6.
(b) Written Communication Sent on an Unsolicited Basis.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer’s behalf or on behalf of the lawyer’s firm or partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, an unsolicited written communication directly or indirectly to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
(A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication;
(B) the written communication concerns a specific matter and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person to whom the communication is directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter;
(C) it has been made known to the lawyer that the person does not want to receive such communications from the lawyer;
(D) the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation, or undue influence;
(E) the communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive, or unfair statement or claim or is improper under subdivision (b)(-l-)(c)(l) of rule 4-7.2; or
(F)the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.
(2) Written communications to prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining professional employment are subject to the following requirements:
(A) Written communications to a prospective client are subject to the requ