Doorbal v. State (983 So. 2d 464, 2008)

PER CURIAM.

Noel Doorbal appeals an order of the circuit court that denied his motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Doorbal also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury convicted Noel Doorbal of first-degree murder (two counts), conspiracy to commit racketeering, racketeering, kidnapping (two counts), armed kidnapping, attempted extortion, grand theft (two counts), attempted first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, first-degree arson, armed extortion, and conspiracy to commit a first-degree felony. See Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940, 951 n. 30 (Fla.2003). These convictions arose from the abduction, extortion, and attempted murder of Marc Schiller, and the abduction, attempted extortion, and murder of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton. See id. at 944-50. For each murder, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four. See id. at 951. In accordance with that recommendation, the trial court sentenced Doorbal to death for both murders. See id. Although trial proceedings were consolidated with those of codefendants Daniel Lugo and John Mese, the charges against Doorbal and Mese were considered and determined by the same jury, while the charges against Lugo were evaluated by a separate jury. See Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 97 n. 31 (Fla.2003). While the factual circumstances surrounding these crimes are extensive (and are fully detailed in our opinion on direct appeal), a brief summary of the facts of the crimes follows.

The Schiller counts — Marc Schiller was a wealthy Miami businessman whose firm, in addition to other pursuits, provided services that were reimbursed by Medicare. See Doorbal, 837 So.2d at 951. Schiller hired Jorge Delgado to assist with the business, and Schiller eventually sold the Medicare-related portion of his business to Delgado. See id. During the period from September through October 1994, Daniel Lugo, a friend of Delgado who at times performed billing work for Schiller and Delgado, informed Delgado of his belief that Schiller had cheated them both. See id. at 945. Delgado asked Lugo to do whatever was necessary to recover the money that was owed to them. See id. Lugo enlisted Doorbal and two other individuals, Stevenson Pierre and Carl Weekes, in a plot to kidnap Schiller, with the intent to force him to sign over assets equivalent in value to that which Delgado and Lugo believed was owed to them. See id. The opinion on appeal provides:

After several failed attempts to locate and capture Schiller, on November 15, 1994, the group finally succeeded in abducting him .... Doorbal and Weekes grabbed Schiller, and Weekes proceeded to subdue Schiller by shocking him with the stun gun. Another participant, Sanchez, assisted Doorbal and Weekes in forcing Schiller into a waiting van. Inside the van, Schiller was handcuffed and duct tape was placed over his eyes. A gun was placed at Schiller’s head, and his wallet and jewelry removed as the van proceeded to a warehouse that Delgado had previously rented. Schiller received additional shocks with the stun gun and was kicked repeatedly.... Lugo arrived at the warehouse shortly after Doorbal and the others arrived with Schiller.

Schiller’s captors demanded a fist of his assets which Schiller initially refused to provide. The refusal resulted in his being slapped, shocked with the stun gun, and beaten with a firearm. Weekes questioned Schiller about his assets, based on information provided by Lugo and Delgado. Schiller testified that after he again refused to provide the requested information, he was told that he was going to engage in a game of Russian Roulette....

The captors further threatened that if Schiller did not cooperate, his wife and children would also be abducted and his wife raped in his presence. Schiller was eventually compelled to agree to cooperate, but only if his wife and children were allowed to leave the country unharmed. In the ensuing days, Schiller began signing over his assets, including a quitclaim deed for his home, various documents granting access to his checking, savings, and IRA accounts, and authorization for changing the beneficiary of his million-dollar insurance policies.

During Schiller’s captivity, Doorbal and Lugo entered Schiller’s home and removed many furnishings and other items. Lugo, Delgado, and Weekes also began charging thousands of dollars to Schiller’s credit cards. Money from the safe in Schiller’s home was divided among Doorbal, Weekes, and Pierre. Three weeks into Schiller’s captivity, Doorbal and Delgado convinced Lugo that Schiller must be killed, because he had likely surmised the identities of some, if not all, of his captors.... In the fourth week, Schiller was forced to consume large amounts of alcohol to make him intoxicated. Lugo drove Schiller’s Toyota 4-Runner into a utility pole on a Miami-area street to create the impression that Schiller had been involved in an accident resulting from driving while intoxicated. Doorbal and Weekes also participated in this episode and Schiller was placed in the front seat of the 4-Runner after it had been driven into the pole. Lugo and Doorbal then poured gasoline on the vehicle and set it ablaze. Lugo, Doorbal, and Weekes had planned to exit the scene in another vehicle that Weekes had driven to the scene, but they noticed that Schiller had somehow managed to exit his burning vehicle, and was staggering in the roadway.... At the urging of Lugo and Doorbal, Weekes used his vehicle to ... run over Schiller. The three left the scene of these events believing they had killed Schiller....

Miraculously, Schiller survived this attempt to take his life and he was rescued. He remembered awakening in a Miami hospital with a broken pelvis, ruptured bladder, bruises and burns, and temporary paralysis. Lugo and the others eventually learned that Schiller had survived, so they visited the hospital where they thought Schiller was recuperating, with a plan to suffocate him as he lay in his hospital bed. Unknown to Lugo and the others, based upon a well-founded fear for his safety, Schiller had already arranged to be airlifted to a New York hospital to complete his recuperation. Lugo, Doorbal, and some of the other captors proceeded to empty Schiller’s home of the remaining furnishings and valuables.

Id. at 945^7 (footnotes omitted).

The Griga/Fnrton counts — Frank Griga was also a wealthy Miami businessman, and Krisztina Furton was his girlfriend. See id. at 948. When Doorbal learned of the significant wealth of Griga, he determined that Griga would be a prime target for kidnapping and extortion. See id. Doorbal convinced Lugo to participate with him in the crime. See id. After a phony business meeting with Griga and a first failed abduction attempt, Doorbal and Lugo kidnapped Griga and Furton:

When Lugo and Doorbal returned to Griga’s home on May 24, 1995, they had concocted the scheme of inviting Griga and Furton to dinner, with the further goal of luring them to Doorbal’s apartment, where the abduction and extortion would begin. Between 10 and 10:30 p.m., Judi Bartusz, a friend and neighbor of Griga’s, saw Lugo and Doorbal leave Griga’s home in a gold Mercedes, while Griga and Furton left in the Lamborghini.

On May 25, Delgado met Lugo and Doorbal at Doorbal’s apartment. Lugo informed him that Griga was already dead: Doorbal had killed Griga after the two became involved in a scuffle in and around the downstairs computer room in Doorbal’s apartment, [n. 21] Griga’s body had been placed in a bathtub in Doorbal’s apartment. Lugo related that when Furton had heard the scuffling between Doorbal and Griga, she rose from her seat in the living room and began to scream when she realized that Griga had been seriously injured. Lugo restrained her and subdued her with an injection of Rompun. Lugo expressed his anger toward Doorbal for having killed Griga before the extortion plan had been completed.

[N. 21.] Delgado eventually noticed that blood was not only on the walls and carpet of the computer room, but also on much of the equipment and furnishings. The record also reflects that at some point before he was killed, Griga was injected with Rompun [a horse tranquilizer]. Dr. Allan Herron, a veterinarian, provided expert testimony that the presence of horse tranquilizer in Griga’s brain and liver indicated that he was alive when he was injected. Rompun slows respiration and heart rate, and causes salivation, vomiting, and a burning sensation. Dr. Herron stated that there are no clinical uses for Rompun in humans.

Medical examiner Dr. Roger Mittle-man testified that Griga was a homicide victim. While he could not pinpoint the exact cause of death, he opined that Griga died from one or more of the following causes: an overdose of horse tranquilizer; asphyxia from strangulation, with the overdose of horse tranquilizer contributing to the asphyxiating effect; or blunt force trauma to his skull and the consequent bleeding (exsanguination) from this blunt force.

Lugo and Doorbal then turned their focus toward Furton. They suspected that she knew the code to enter Griga’s home. Knowledge of the code would allow Lugo and Doorbal to enter Griga’s home with the hope of gaining access to valuables and, most importantly, to bank account information for access to much of his wealth. Doorbal carried Furton down the stairs from the second floor of the apartment. Furton was barely clad, wearing only the red leather jacket that she had worn when she left Griga’s home the night before and a hood covered her head. Not long after Doorbal placed Furton near the bottom of the stairs, although handcuffed, she began screaming for Griga. At Lugo’s direction, Doorbal injected Furton with additional amounts of horse tranquilizer, causing her to scream again. Lugo and Doorbal then questioned Furton about the security code for Griga’s home. Eventually, Furton refused to answer more questions. Doorbal injected her yet again....

Armed with what he believed to be the access code for Griga’s home security, Lugo took Petrescu [Lugo’s girlfriend] to attempt entry while Doorbal and Delgado stayed behind. After failing to gain access to Griga’s home, Lugo called Doorbal on his cellular phone. As the two talked, Petrescu heard Doorbal say, “the bitch is cold,” which she believed was Doorbal’s indication that Fur-ton was dead. [n. 22]

[N. 22.] Dr. Mittleman, the medical examiner, opined that the effects from horse tranquilizer were consistent with the cause of Furton’s death. He also stated that her death was consistent with asphyxia.

Id. at 948-50 (some footnotes omitted). Lugo and Doorbal subsequently dismembered the bodies of Griga and Furton, and, along with another individual, disposed of the body parts in two different South Florida locations. See id. at 951.

In imposing the death sentence for the Griga and Furton murders, the trial court found five aggravating factors and accorded each great weight: (1) Doorbal had been convicted of a prior violent felony; (2) the murders were committed to avoid arrest; (3) they were committed for pecuniary gain; (4) they were committed in the course of a kidnapping; and (5) they were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). See id. In addition, the trial court found that the murder of Furton was heinous, atrocious or cruel and accorded that factor great weight. See id. at 952. With regard to mitigation:

the trial judge did not find any statutory mitigators, but did find six nonstatutory mitigators: that Doorbal had a difficult childhood, was a hard-working and loyal employee, was a loyal friend and positive influence on others, had religious devotion and the ability to help others with religious beliefs, exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior, and that life imprisonment would remove the menace to society. Each nonstatutory mitigator was accorded little weight.

Id.

On direct appeal, Doorbal raised the following issues: (1) warrants secured to search Doorbal’s apartment, home, and vehicle were not supported by probable cause; (2) witnesses for the State made improper statements directed to the propensity of Doorbal to commit bad acts or to highlight his bad character; (3) during guilt phase closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly commented on Doorbal’s right to remain silent and asserted a “golden rule” argument; (4) during penalty phase closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly commented on mitigation evidence and argued to the jury that Doorbal should receive “no mercy”; (5) the trial court erroneously refused to admit letters to Doorbal that had been written by Lugo as evidence of mitigation; (6) the trial court erroneously found both the aggravating circumstances of pecuniary gain and murder committed while in the course of a kidnapping, which created an improper doubling because the aggravators arose from identical facts; (7) improper doubling occurred when the trial court erroneously found both the CCP and avoid arrest aggravating circumstances, both of which were without evidentiary support; and (8) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). See 837 So.2d at 952-62. This Court denied relief on all claims and affirmed the convictions and sentences. See id. at 944.

On March 27, 2003, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South (CCRC) filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, Alex Ferrer, asserting that after he imposed the death sentences in the instant case, he testified at the federal Medicare fraud sentencing hearing of victim Marc Schiller in favor of a more lenient sentence. On February 19, 2004, approximately four months before the filing deadline for the motion for postconviction relief, CCRC filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Doorbal. The motion argued that the two CCRC attorneys assigned to represent Doorbal had resigned from CCRC, which necessitated the reassignment of over twenty-five cases. The motion asserted that “[t]he extraordinary volume of Mr. Doorbal’s case makes reassignment an impossible task.” During a March 5, 2004, hearing, the trial court denied the motion to disqualify as both untimely and legally insufficient. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw, and registry counsel was appointed to represent Doorbal on March 26, 2004.

On June 15, 2004, Doorbal filed a rule 3.851 motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, raising a large number of claims. On November 9, 2004, the trial court held a Hujf hearing. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on claim 8(f) (the mental health evaluation claim) but denied the other claims as either mer-itless, proeedurally barred, or insufficiently pled. At that time, the trial court set the evidentiary hearing for February 14, 2005. During a December 21, 2004, hearing, the trial court denied a request by Doorbal to stay the postconviction proceedings. During a status hearing on January 10, 2005, the trial court denied a request by Doorbal for a continuance. In mid-January 2005, Doorbal filed another motion for continuance, in which he contended that the mental health experts needed more time and information to complete their evaluations. On January 20, 2005, the trial court denied that motion, and counsel for Doorbal thereafter filed a written statement with the court in which she outlined that she would not call any witnesses to testify during the evidentiary hearing. The trial court questioned Doorbal as to whether he agreed with the decision of counsel to present no witnesses, and Doorbal stated that he agreed because more time was needed to develop the claim. The trial court then informed Doorbal:

Now, one thing I want you to understand is this may be a tactic to say, to show the Supreme Court that you really feel that you need more time. I can’t tell you that the Supreme Court is going to receive it the way that you hope that they are going to treat it, okay. When your lawyer came into the case in May I specifically told her that you are not going to get additional time. And she was substituting for another lawyer and she said that she had discussed it with you and that you guys had discussed the fact that you had time deadlines and you had to abide by those time deadlines, okay. And we have in some respects I have given her extensions for these doctors where I could. But the hearing is set for February 14 and she has come here and she has asked me to reset it and grant a continuance and I have told her that I am not going to do that, okay. It could be that when you go up on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court that they say too bad, you could have put on evidence and we could have decided whether you need more time or not, but you waived it by saying we are not going to put on any evidence. I don’t know what they are going to say. But that is possible. They could say that, you understand that?

Doorbal verified that he understood. During a February 5, 2005, hearing, Doorbal again verified that he did not wish to present witnesses at the evidentiary hearing that had been scheduled for February 14, 2005.

After affording the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Doorbal had failed to produce a primary basis for relief on claim 8(f) and denied the claim. On February 16, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying Doorbal’s amended 8.851 motion. In response to a motion for clarification, the trial court entered an amended denial order on February 24, 2005. Doorbal now appeals the denial of his motion and presents six claims on review. Doorbal also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he raises eleven claims for relief.

MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Motion to Disqualify

In his first claim, Doorbal asserts that Judge Ferrer erroneously denied his motion to disqualify as both untimely and legally insufficient. While we agree with Doorbal that the motion to disqualify was timely filed, we conclude that the motion was properly denied.

Timeliness — Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160, which governed the disqualification of trial court judges at the time the motion to disqualify was filed, provided that “[a] motion to disqualify shall be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(e) (2004). Whether a motion to disqualify a trial judge has been timely filed generally involves a factual determination and, therefore, is reviewed under the competent, substantial evidence standard. See Amato v. Winn Dixie Stores/Sedgwick James, 810 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

The motion to disqualify filed on March 27, 2003, stated:

Undersigned counsel filed his Notice of Appearance as Mr. Doorbal’s counsel on March 18, 2003. Although undersigned counsel has not received any records on Mr. Doorbal’s case as of today’s date, preliminary research indicates that subsequent to Mr. Doorbal’s conviction and sentence, Mr. Schiller was charged and ultimately pled guilty to felony federal charges. During Mr. Schiller’s federal sentencing hearing, Judge Ferrer testified on behalf of Mr. Schiller as a witness.

The basis for this statement was a January 2000 article titled “Pain and Gain” from the Miami New Times, a local periodical. This information was discovered “soon after” counsel entered the notice of appearance. The State speculates as to various reasons that CCRC counsel could have, or should have, acquired this information pri- or to the entering of the notice of appearance in the postconviction proceedings; however, rule 2.160 establishes timeliness based on when the information was actually discovered. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(e).

Counsel filed the motion to disqualify only nine days after he filed his notice of appearance, and we conclude that the motion was timely filed within the ten-day deadline provided in rule 2.160(e). Although the motion to disqualify fails to reveal the precise date that the federal testimony was discovered, there is no evidence that an attorney for CCRC would commence research of the case of a capital defendant (much less the criminal history of one of the victims of the defendant) before being assigned to represent that capital defendant. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that .counsel did not discover the testimony of Judge Ferrer until after the notice of appearance was filed. The State has failed to provide any concrete evidence to rebut the assertion that counsel discovered the testimony on behalf of Schiller only after filing a notice of appearance in the instant case. We conclude that the holding of the trial court that the motion to disqualify was untimely is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Fear of bias/prejudice — On the merits of the motion to disqualify, Doorbal contends that Judge Ferrer’s testimony on behalf of Schiller during the federal proceedings demonstrated bias against Door-bal. The transcript of the Schiller sentencing hearing reveals that Judge Ferrer testified that Schiller was a crucial witness with regard to the crimes committed against him, and also during consideration of the penalty phase in connection with the Griga/Furton charges. His testimony included the trial description of the abduction, extortion, and attempted murder of Marc Schiller. In response to the questioning, Judge Ferrer expressed his impression from the trial evidence with regard to the ordeal endured by Schiller:

I’m a firm believer that punishment is only punishment if it’s imposed by the government or by the state as a result of the crime committed.

... And an armed robber commits an armed robbery and complains to me that he got shot as a result of the armed robbery by the victim, I generally view it as an occupational hazard.

It’s not a form of punishment, I don’t give him any credit for it towards his sentence. For some reason, I feel this case is different. I can’t tell you why. I don’t know a legal reason why.

I know that we can consider anything at sentencing. This case was a very emotional case to sit through. It still bothers me to some extent. And I know that if things were just black and white, they could have computers do our jobs.

But there’s something intangible about this case that makes me feel like what he went through should be given some credit, because I don’t think it could have been any worse if he was a prisoner of war.

Doorbal asserted that as a result of this federal trial testimony, he possessed a well-founded fear that Judge Ferrer would not be fair and impartial during these postconviction proceedings.

This Court reviews a trial court determination on whether a motion for disqualification is legally sufficient de novo. See Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1097 (Fla.2004). Under former rule 2.160, a motion to disqualify must demonstrate “that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1) (2004). The facts alleged in a motion to disqualify must demonstrate that the party has a well-grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial before the judge. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983).

We have carefully considered the testimony of Judge Ferrer during the federal court sentencing hearing, and we conclude that it fails to establish a well-grounded fear on the part of Doorbal that he would not receive a fair hearing. In Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1192 (Fla.2001), the trial judge issued a much more egregious statement to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission to the effect that “the subject is a dangerous and sick man and that many other women have probably suffered because of him.” We rejected the claim that such a statement by a trial court judge provided a basis for the recusal of the trial judge in subsequent proceedings:

[T]he comment to the Commission did not constitute a prejudgment of any pending or future motions that the defendant might file, and was not made outside the official post-sentence investigative process in a manner indicating a predisposed bias against the defendant. Given the facts in this case, the statement to the Commission indicates nothing more than the judge’s opinion after having heard evidence relating to two exceedingly cruel and brutal murders of women who were sexually assaulted. The circumstances of these murders, coupled with Waterhouse’s own admission that he had a “problem with sex and violence,” would lead any reasonable person to conclude that Waterhouse is a “dangerous and sick man.”

Id. at 1195; see also Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 480-81 (Fla.1998) (finding that the written response by the trial judge to a parole commission inquiry that “I am inal-terably opposed to any consideration for Executive Clemency and I believe the sentence of the court should be carried out as soon as possible” was insufficient to disqualify the judge from further presiding over the case); of. Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So.2d 190, 192 n. 1 (Fla.1988) (trial court erred when it denied a motion to disqualify where a newspaper article reported that the judge was pleased with the decision of the governor to sign a death warrant for the defendant and that he did not “believe that [Suarez’s] case merits postponements”).

The testimony before to the federal sentencing court here did not specifically reference Doorbal at any point. We conclude that nothing in the testimony constituted a prejudgment of any pending or future motions that Doorbal might file in Judge Ferrer’s court, nor were any statements by Judge Ferrer indicative of a predisposed bias against Doorbal. Cf. Suarez, 527 So.2d at 192 n. 1. Instead, Judge Ferrer merely responded to the impact of the evidence that was presented during the murder trial with regard to the brutal abduction, torture, and attempted murder that Schiller suffered over a period of almost a month. We conclude that the facts of this case would lead any reasonable person to conclude that the experience of Schiller was traumatic and not entirely unlike that of a prisoner of war.

Moreover, our decision is additionally guided by the fact that every judge who is vested with the responsibility to preside over postconviction proceedings of a capital defendant after he or she has presided over the original trial will have issued a detailed sentencing order that, under Florida law, requires that details of the facts of the crimes committed by the defendant be set forth and weighed by both the judge and jury. Indeed, in the present case, when Judge Ferrer found the existence of the prior violent felony aggravator, he provided extensive facts in the sentencing order, as he was required to do, with regard to the physical and psychological torture endured by Schiller during his abduction. A number of the statements that Judge Ferrer included in the state court final sentencing order were simply repeated during the federal sentencing hearing. If a statement or characterization by a trial judge with regard to the facts of a capital case was sufficient to require the disqualification of that judge, then any and all judges who preside over capital trials could never preside over the postconviction proceedings for that same defendant because statements in the sentencing order would create a fear of bias on behalf of the defendant and a legal basis for disqualification. We decline to mandate such widespread disqualification of judges in capital cases.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to disqualify as legally insufficient. See Waterhouse, 792 So.2d at 1195. Nonetheless, we do emphasize that we do not encourage trial judges to testify on behalf of a victim from one of their prior criminal cases with regard to the ordeal of the victim in that prior case. Judges in Florida are required to maintain an appearance of impartiality. See Fla.Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3. A judge may be unnecessarily forced to walk a fine line when he testifies with regard to how the evidence of the suffering of a victim in a case impacted him.

Motion to Depose

Doorbal next asserts that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to depose the assistant state attorneys (ASAs) who were involved in Doorbal’s criminal trial. Doorbal contends that he had good cause to depose the ASAs because during post-conviction discovery, Doorbal located an email from ASA Gail Levine to her supervisor that indicated the State was aware that Schiller was under investigation for Medicare fraud. Therefore, Doorbal contends that, during the trial, the State both withheld exculpatory Brady evidence (i.e., that Schiller was guilty of Medicare fraud) and committed a Giglio violation because it allowed Schiller to falsely testify that he was not guilty of Medicare fraud. Doorbal asserts that deposition of the ASAs was necessary to reveal additional evidence of the claim.

In response, the State asserts that no Brady or Giglio violation ever occurred, and, therefore, Doorbal is neither entitled to relief on his claim of such violations, nor can he demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to depose. Since the validity of the motion to depose hinges on whether a Giglio or Brady violation occurred during the trial, and because Doorbal asserts that the summary denial of the Giglio and Brady claims was error, we review the history of the proceedings in this case with regard to the purported involvement of Marc Schiller in Medicare fraud.

History

During the guilt phase of Doorbal’s trial, in response to questioning, Marc Schiller denied that he was guilty of Medicare fraud. After Doorbal was convicted, Schiller subsequently returned to the United States from Colombia to testify at the Spencer hearing with regard to how the crimes committed against him have impacted his life. Prior to the testimony, the State informed the Court and the attorneys at sidebar that officers from the federal government were outside the courthouse, and when Schiller finished his testimony, he would be taken into federal custody on charges of Medicare fraud.

Doorbal subsequently filed a motion for new trial in which he contended that the State had failed to disclose the federal investigation and pending criminal charges against Schiller. Doorbal alleged that during the penalty phase, the State made references to the Schiller kidnapping as a substantial aggravator and that had knowledge of a pending federal indictment against Schiller been known, it could have been presented to the jury and would have had a substantial impact on whether the prior violent felony aggravator weighed in its decision. During the hearing on the motion for new trial, the court asked counsel for codefendant Mese:

Do you have any evidence that the State knew, never mind suspecting I think that everyone suspected Schiller was being investigated. Everybody knew that Delgado was being investigated. How could Delgado be investigated and his partner not be investigated. That denies [sic] logic. I think everyone suspected that.

The trial court asked counsel for codefen-dant Lugo what information demonstrated that the State knew Schiller had lied when he testified that he was not guilty of Medicare fraud. Counsel for Lugo responded that he could not know until he deposed ASA Levine. The trial court asked whether the defense would find that the State had evidence or knowledge that Schiller was guilty of federal crimes — the court recognized that everyone involved with the trial suspected that Schiller was being investigated and was involved. The trial court then noted that Schiller had been impeached by Delgado, who stated that Schiller was involved in criminal conduct. The court then reasoned that even if Schiller knew he was under investigation, he was not required to admit guilt. Also, this testimony “occurred during a trial and the cross-examination process is specifically for the purpose of weeding out whether someone is lying under oath.” The trial court then afforded ASA Levine the opportunity to speak with regard to the allegations. She stated:

I have absolutely no information about the Federal investigation except for the fact that they were speaking to Mr. Delgado and Mr. Delgado was telling me that he committed the Medicare Fraud with Mr. Schiller and those were the conversations I had and that I shared with the Federal Government that they knew, which made Mr. Schiller in my mind, what I knew was the same thing that the defense knew exactly.

The trial court ultimately held that no violation occurred and noted that, even if such a violation had occurred, there was no evidence that the violation was intentional.

After Doorbal’s conviction was affirmed, and during postconviction discovery, Door-bal located the e-mail from ASA Levine to her supervisor that prompted Doorbal to file the motion to depose. The trial court ultimately concluded that good cause did not exist to depose the ASAs based upon the e-mail:

[T]he defense all throughout the trial was saying that they were certain that he was under investigation, that they felt that the State knew that he was under investigation, that they felt that he knew that he was under investigation. I don’t know how if he did or didn’t, how can the defense come in and say, claim surprise.

Analysis

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidence — either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000). A Giglio violation is demonstrated when (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. See Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla.2006). We conclude that Doorbal has failed to establish either a Brady or a Giglio violation and, therefore, the trial court did not err when it summarily denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing.

First, Doorbal has failed to demonstrate that the State suppressed or withheld impeachment evidence. As noted by the trial court, allegations that Schiller was involved in Medicare fraud with Delgado were spread throughout the trial. During an October 23, 1997, hearing at which the trial judge addressed what questions Delgado would be compelled to answer in his deposition, counsel for a codefendant stated “[a]s soon as [Delgado] is done testifying he will be indicted and Mr. Schiller will be indicted and there’s no one in this courtroom that thinks any different. Once these trials are over they’re federal defendants.” During the same hearing, ASA Levine asserted that the codefendants “know there is some kind of investigation. They’re all hoping to find out where Schiller fits in,” and referred to Schiller as the “alleged kingpin.” Finally, during Door-bal’s trial, Delgado testified on cross-examination with regard to Schiller’s involvement in the alleged Medicare fraud scheme. We, as did the trial court, reject the assertion that Doorbal is entitled to relief on a contention that he did not know that Schiller was allegedly involved in improper Medicare activity or was being investigated by the federal government for Medicare fraud when the record is replete with these allegations in open proceedings in which Doorbal participated. See Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944, 954 (Fla.2000) (“[A] Brady claim cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the defendant”).

Doorbal has completely failed to demonstrate that the State knew Schiller offered false testimony. As the record reveals, everyone (including the codefen-dants and the trial court) suspected that Schiller engaged in Medicare fraud and that the federal government had Schiller under investigation. However, Schiller was not indicted for Medicare fraud, nor did he plead guilty to Medicare fraud, until after Doorbal was convicted. In the instant proceedings, Doorbal has failed to provide any evidence that the State possessed evidence that Schiller was guilty of Medicare fraud at the time of the trial, and then allowed him to testify to the contrary. Absent evidence to demonstrate that the State unquestionably had evidence and knew that Schiller was guilty at the time that he testified, we conclude that Doorbal has failed to demonstrate that a Giglio violation occurred. See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1270 (Fla.2005) (finding no Giglio violation where the defendant had not shown “that the prosecutor had any knowledge of allegedly false testimony”).

Finally, even if the State withheld evidence or knew that Schiller testified falsely (which it did not), Doorbal cannot demonstrate prejudice under Brady or Giglio. Under Brady, nondisclosure of impeachment evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 563 (Fla.2001). Under Giglio, false testimony is material if there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence affected the judgment of the jury. See id. Doorbal sought to introduce evidence of Schiller’s Medicare fraud in an attempt to demonstrate that Schiller was a dishonest witness who should not be believed by the jury. Nonetheless, even if Doorbal had been allowed to impeach Schiller with this testimony, we conclude that neither of the above standards for prejudice would have been satisfied. Id.

First, during trial, Delgado impeached the testimony of Schiller on this specific issue. Second, the testimony of Schiller with regard to his abduction and kidnapping was corroborated by Delgado, who provided a detailed explanation of the plot to kidnap Schiller and extort his assets. Delgado admitted that Schiller was held in a warehouse that Delgado leased, and that during the kidnapping Delgado had the responsibility to remain at the warehouse to watch Schiller. Delgado testified that during Schiller’s kidnapping, Doorbal beat Schiller, slapped him, and burned his skin with cigarettes to obtain information about his assets.

Delgado testified that when the codefen-dants decided to kill Schiller, Lugo, Door-bal, and two others placed Schiller in a car and set it on fire. According to Delgado, Lugo explained that after the fire erupted, Schiller managed to escape the burning vehicle. He then admitted to Delgado that they ran Schiller over twice with his (Lugo’s) car. When Delgado informed Lugo that he did not believe Schiller would have died from his injuries, Lugo began to phone hospitals to see if Schiller had been admitted. During the trial, a photograph of Schiller’s scorched vehicle was introduced into evidence. Finally, as noted in the opinion of this Court on direct appeal, “[w]hen warrants were executed at Door-bal’s apartment, police found the following: computer equipment and jewelry belonging to Schiller, receipts for purchases on Schiller’s credit card, a receipt relating to the changing of locks at Schiller’s home, and handcuffs.” Doorbal, 837 So.2d at 947 n. 12.

Given the significant evidence presented at trial that corroborated the ordeal experienced by Schiller at the hands of Doorbal and Lugo, we conclude that even if additional evidence of Schiller’s involvement in improper Medicare activity had been presented to the jury, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of this trial would have been different. See LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So.2d 236, 239 (Fla.1998) (no Brady violation occurred where the evidence presented at trial was so overwhelming that there was no reasonable probability that outcome would have been different had the State disclosed the evidence). Similarly, this evidence, and the fact that Delgado did present evidence which called the credibility of Schiller into question, demonstrates that there is no reasonable probability that any false testimony by Schiller affected the judgment of the jury.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that no Brady or Giglio violation occurred during the trial proceedings. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to depose the ASAs.

Summary Denial of Postconviction Claims

Under this claim, Doorbal contends that the trial court erroneously denied all but one of his claims without an evidentiary hearing. However, we conclude that this issue is insufficiently pled. This Court has held that vague and con-clusory allegations on appeal are insufficient to warrant relief. For example, in Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 800 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 587, 166 L.Ed.2d 436 (2006), the defendant contended in his brief that during the eviden-tiary hearing, the trial court improperly precluded him from presenting “some evidence” on some of his Brady and Giglio claims. This Court rejected the claim for two reasons, one of which was that the contention was vague and conclusory. See id. We noted that in the initial brief, the defendant did not identify any evidence that was improperly excluded, nor did he specify any claim that the court wrongfully excluded from the evidentiary hearing. See id. Further, this Court has stated that the purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points on appeal. See Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1063 n. 12 (Fla.2003). Therefore, to merely refer to arguments presented during the postconviction proceedings without further elucidation is not sufficient to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived. See id.

With regard to this issue, the argument by Doorbal is entirely conclusory. Door-bal provides a timeline of the case and details the standard to be applied for review of the summary denial of claims, but the remainder of his argument with regard to this claim consists of the following:

Doorbal’s Motion to Vacate Judgments of Convictions and Sentences, trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct and effective assistance of counsel claims in Doorbal’s Rule 3 were raised in his Motion to address a pattern of deficient conduct demonstrated by counsel and because this Court was forced to apply a fundamental error analysis when reviewing unpreserved claims raised on Door-bal’s direct appeal.

In this case, the trial Court summarily denied Doorbal’s claims without an evi-dentiary hearing and failed to provide this Court with an Order stating its rationale or attaching to its Order those specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion.

Doorbal neither states the substance of any of the claims that were summarily denied, nor provides an explanation why summary denial was inappropriate or what factual determination was required on each claim so as to necessitate an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that this general, conclusory argument is insufficient to preserve the issues raised in the 3.851 motion, and, therefore, this claim is waived. See Randolph, 853 So.2d at 1063 n. 12.

In light of this conclusion, we are compelled to remind attorneys who represent capital defendants of the importance of compliance with minimal pleading requirements to allege a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla.1984), this Court explained that a defendant who seeks to present such a claim must (1) identify a specific omission or overt act upon which the claim is based, (2) demonstrate that the omission or act was a substantial deficiency which fell measurably below that of competent counsel, and (3) demonstrate that the deficiency probably affected the outcome of the proceedings. If a capital defendant fails to plead in accordance with these criteria, the claim will not meet the threshold for facial sufficiency. As a result, claims may not receive an evidentiary hearing or be considered by the trial court on the merits.

Various claims raised by Doorbal in this 3.851 proceeding were plagued by a lack of sufficiency in that Doorbal failed to allege a specific omission or overt act upon which his claim of ineffective assistance was based. For example, in claim 8(a), Door-bal contended that the death of the father of trial counsel Anthony Natale immediately prior to trial and the illness of his mother interfered with his representation of Doorbal and caused him to render ineffective assistance. During the Huff hearing, the trial court refused to grant an evidentiary hearing on claim 8(a) because Doorbal had not specified actions which counsel Natale failed to take during the trial:

COURT: I don’t think I need an evi-dentiary basis for [claim 8(a) ]. I think that an attorney can for whatever reason fail to preserve error, and that is the problem, and an attorney could also have his father die and do a completely effective trial the next day and not have error at all. So I don’t think that [8(a) ] is really the key point.

COUNSEL: What did your Honor just say? An attorney’s father could die and you could—

COURT: And he could proceed to trial the next day and do a completely effective job.

COUNSEL: Did you decide a case where that happened?

COURT: No, I am not citing a case. Wdiat I am saying is that it is not a factual issue of whether the attorney was so disturbed at the death of his father or the attorney and their father had a very lousy relationship and he really didn’t feel displaced that his father had passed away, that is not the factual issue. The factual issue is did the attorney provide sub-par representation. And if he did, he did. And if he didn’t, he didn’t. Regardless of whether his father had passed away or his mother had passed away.

... I don’t see it.

Later in the hearing, the trial court elaborated that the only omissions alleged by Doorbal were the failure of counsel Natale to object to trial court error and prosecu-torial misconduct, but that these claims of error had been raised on direct appeal, and this Court determined that these omissions did not rise to the level of reversible error. See Doorbal, 837 So.2d at 954-59. Therefore, the trial court concluded that these omissions could not serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

During oral argument before this Court, counsel for Doorbal asserted for the first time that counsel Natale was ineffective because, due to the poor health and ultimate death of his father, he was not present at “most” of the witness depositions. When asked how many depositions counsel Natale failed to attend, postconviction counsel could not provide the number. Instead, counsel responded that she would have obtained that information had Door-bal been granted an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

As the foregoing demonstrates, the rule 3.851 proceedings in the trial court, and on appeal before this Court, have been plagued by generality and lack of specificity. Counsel for Doorbal appears to operate under the incorrect assumption that conclusory, nonspecific allegations are sufficient to obtain an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and specific facts and arguments need not be disclosed or presented until the eviden-tiary hearing. We strongly reiterate to those who represent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must comply with the pleading requirements enunciated by this Court in Downs at the time that the initial rule 3.851 motion is filed to be legally sufficient under the rule.

The Amended Rule 3.851 Motion

Under this claim, Doorbal contends that although he timely served an amended rule 3.851 motion, the trial court only allowed him to amend the mental health claim and improperly struck the remaining portion of the amended motion. We conclude that this claim is without merit. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(4) provides in pertinent part:

A motion filed under this rule may be amended up to 30 days prior to the evidentiary hearing upon motion and good cause shown. The trial court may in its discretion grant a motion to amend provided that the motion sets forth the reason the claim was not raised earlier and attaches a copy of the claim sought to be added.

(Emphasis supplied.) The refusal of a trial court to grant a party leave to amend a 3.851 motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See generally Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810, 817 (Fla.2005) (stating that the Court “review[s] discretionary acts by trial judges under an abuse of discretion standard” and holding that “the trial court abused its discretion in striking the initial motion without granting leave to amend”). The record reflects that Doorbal mailed his amended motion to the trial court on Saturday, January 15, 2005. Thus, the earliest the trial court could have possibly considered this motion was on Tuesday, January 18, 2005, twenty-seven days before the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, Doorbal’s amended motion was untimely filed under rule 3.851(f)(4).

It should be noted that during the Huff hearing held on November 9, 2004, post-conviction counsel actually recognized that the thirty-day deadline to amend the 3.851 motion fell on Friday, January 14, 2005, and the trial court warned Doorbal that amendment to any claim other than claim 8(f), the mental health claim, might not be permitted:

COUNSEL: I have up to 30 days before the evidentiary hearing to amend the claims and I intend to do so.

COURT: I think your amendment is probably going to be limited to the claim that I did not deny an evidentiary hearing on.

COUNSEL: That is your position. Let me do my thing. So January 14th, is that our understanding that claims shall not be amended after that report day?

STATE: For [the mental health] claim.

Despite the untimeliness of the amended rule 3.851 motion, the trial court permitted Doorbal to amend claim 8(f), the only claim upon which an evidentiary hearing was granted. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Doorbal’s request to amend the remaining portions of his initial 3.851 motion, especially in light of the fact that Doorbal agreed that the last day to amend the motion fell on January 14, 2005, over two months prior to that deadline.

Moreover, this Court has held that “[a] defendant may not raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by refining his or her claims to include additional factual allegations after the postconviction court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required.” Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201, 212 (Fla.2002) (concluding that trial court did not err in denying rehearing of an order granting an evi-dentiary hearing on only one claim where defendant on rehearing “for the first time made factual allegations relating to his claim that counsel was ineffective in investigating and presenting mental health mitigating evidence”). In his amended motion, Doorbal did not seek to introduce any new claims. Rather, the amended motion consists of the original motion replicated nearly verbatim, but various claims are supplemented with additional facts. We conclude that Doorbal’s amended motion contains the type of post-Huff hearing “piecemeal” supplementation that we condemned in Vining. See 827 So.2d at 212.

More importantly, some of the added facts are merely repetitious of assertions that Doorbal has made throughout the postconviction process. For example, in claim 3 (the denial of public records claim), Doorbal asserts in his amended motion that three e-mails between state attorneys were discovered in 140,000 pages of public records and alleges that “over the eight-year time frame that the State has been involved in this case there are more than three e-mails available for review.” During the hearing to depose the ASAs held on July 9, 2004, more than five months before the amended motion was filed, counsel for Doorbal referenced the e-mail from ASA Levine and stated “I have one e-mail but I guarantee you that there is more than one e-mail. And [the State’s] confidential work argument is not going to fly against a Brady and Giglio claim that I have.”

Other facts asserted in the amended motion are vague and nonspecific. For example, in the amendment to claim 8(c) (counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate claims of innocence with regard to the Schiller counts), Doorbal asserted that his trial counsel “failed to provide Mr. Doorbal with a crime scene expert who would have been able to testify to the implausibility of testimony provided by the State.” Door-bal failed to specify what testimony provided by the State could have been undermined by a crime scene expert. In his amendment to claim 8(d) (counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate claims of innocence with regard to the Griga/Furton counts), Doorbal asserts that “Delgado stated that another person had knowledge about the crimes against Mr. Griga and Ms. Furton, but trial counsel failed to follow up on his questioning with Mr. Delgado or investigate statements made by Mr. Delgado.” Doorbal does not name who this other person was or what information this person allegedly possessed with regard to the Griga/Furton counts.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Doorbal to amend those claims upon which an evidentiary hearing was not granted.

Motion to Continue

Doorbal next contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a continuance of the postconvietion proceedings. The postconviction mental health experts retained to evaluate Doorbal had reported to the trial court that they would not be able to complete a review and prepare expert opinions on or before the date of the evidentiary hearing. In light of this fact, Doorbal asserts that the trial court should have continued the proceedings so that the experts could complete their evaluations.

With regard to motions for continuance, this Court has stated:

A court’s ruling on a motion for continuance will only be reversed when an abuse of discretion is shown. An abuse of discretion is generally not found unless the court’s ruling on the continuance results in undue prejudice to the defendant. This general rule is true even in death penalty cases. While death penalty cases command our closest scrutiny, it is still the obligation of an appellate court to review with caution the exercise of experienced discretion by a trial judge in matters such as a motion for a continuance.

Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So.2d 721, 730 (Fla.2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Israel v. State, 837 So.2d 381, 388 (Fla.2002); Cooper v. State, 336 So.2d 1133, 1138 (Fla.1976)). We have held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a motion for continuance of a postconviction evidentiary hearing where counsel filed a motion to depose two witnesses thirteen days before the evidentiary hearing. See Scott v. State, 717 So.2d 908, 912 (Fla.1998). We explained:

The decision of this Court was issued March 16, 1995, and Scott knew from that time that Coffin’s and Dixon’s statements would be in issue during the hearing. Scott, however, did little to secure the testimony of these witnesses until the eve of the evidentiary hearing and used this as a basis for seeking a delay. We find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a continuance at that late date.

Id. The State contends that denial of the requests for continuance of the evidentiary hearing by Doorbal did not constitute an abuse of discretion because the requests were necessitated by the delays of counsel. To evaluate whether counsel for Doorbal engaged in dilatory tactics, we present a timeline of the proceedings in this case.

Timeline

The actions that counsel took prior to the Huff hearing are not well documented in the record on appeal of the postconviction proceedings. An invoice for attorney expenses dated April 28, 2004, indicates that counsel for Doorbal agreed to accept the appointment on March 18, 2004. According to the invoice, between the dates of March 18 and April 2, counsel interviewed Doorbal, read the opinion on direct appeal, met with CCRC counsel, met with her investigator and a paralegal, and participated in two court conferences. On June 1, 2004, counsel filed motions seeking the release of records from the Records Repository and the Office of the State Attorney. On June 15, 2004, counsel filed the 3.851 motion to vacate. That same day, counsel also filed the motion to depose the assistant state attorneys. According to a letter from the Department of Financial Services, between June 16 and October 25, 2004, counsel billed 494.4 hours for representation of Doorbal. The majority of these hours were dedicated to the following tasks: the review of public records (240 hours), research of case law and facts, as well as the preparation of a response to the State’s opposition to the motion (100 hours), and review of the notes and files of trial counsel (100 hours).

During the Huff hearing held on November 9, 2004, the trial court granted Doorbal an evidentiary hearing on only one of his claims. At that time, counsel for Doorbal moved for a continuance. When the trial court suggested that a thirty-day time period was sufficient for the mental health experts to complete their evaluations, counsel objected and asserted that thirty days was not enough time because “these experts deserve the opportunity to go through some of the documents that I gave them. This is a massive documentary case.” When counsel requested between sixty and ninety days to complete testing, the trial court granted Doorbal sixty days, but indicated that there would be no further extensions. The trial court urged that counsel stress to the experts the importance of completing the evaluations in a timely manner, and further informed counsel that if the retained experts could not evaluate Doorbal within the time constraints, she should retain others who could. The trial court then ordered that all mental health reports be provided to the State by January 10, 2005. The trial court then scheduled the evidentiary hearing for February 14, 2005. During a November 16, 2004, hearing, counsel requested that Doorbal be transported to Miami-Dade County rather than requiring the experts to travel to Florida State Prison to evaluate him. The trial court instructed the parties that the matter would have to be scheduled for a hearing at which Florida Department of Corrections officials could appear.

On December 21, 2004, counsel for Doorbal requested a stay of the proceedings in light of the fact that she had not been paid for months. The trial court advised counsel that he would do everything possible to ensure that she received payment, but he would not stay the case. The trial court then stated to counsel:

[W]hen you took this case I remember having a discussion with you that there is [sic] not going to be any more delays on this case. You recognized when you stepped into this case at that point I was not going to extend any guidelines [sic] and you explained that to Mr. Doorbal. And the answer was yes, yes, yes, I will work with you as much as I can.

At that time, counsel asserted that the experts still had not seen Doorbal because she had not been able to provide the records to them. Counsel also explained that she would prefer