Full opinion text
PER CURIAM. We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Michael Albert Hernandez Jr. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Hernandez’s convictions and sentences. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY According to the testimony at trial, in the fall of 2004, Hernandez and his wife, Stephanie Hernandez, moved from Mur-freesboro, Tennessee, to Milton, Florida. In Milton, Hernandez worked with Richard Hartman Sr., one of his mother’s former husbands, and with Christopher Shawn Arnold, who was dating and had a baby with the daughter of Richard Sr.’s wife, Daveine (Tammy) Hartman. On the morning of November 18, 2004, Arnold left the home he shared -with Richard Sr.’s stepdaughter, Michelle Rose, in his car and returned an hour later with Hernandez. Arnold and Hernandez then left in Arnold’s car, bought crack cocaine, and smoked it. Arnold had a crack addiction, and his primary connection for crack was David Everett, who was also known as “Snapper.” David lived with his mother, Ruth Everett, who drove him to work before 8 a.m. on the morning of November 18. That same morning, Hernandez and Arnold later drove to the Everett house, looking for more crack or money. Hernandez and Arnold went up to the door, knocked, and started talking with Ruth. They asked if David was home, and Ruth told them that he was not there. After finding out that David was not there, they decided to get money from her. Arnold told Hernandez to “grab her,” and Hernandez grabbed Ruth and took her inside the house. Arnold made up a stoxy about her son owing him money in an attempt to get money from her, and she told them that all she had was $20. Arnold then asked to use the bathroom and came back with a pillow. Arnold stuck the pillow over Ruth’s face, and Arnold told Hernandez to grab Ruth’s hands, which he did. Hernandez later told different stories about what happened next. Ultimately, Ruth’s neck was broken, and Hernandez stabbed her in the neck with a pocket knife. Arnold then took Ruth’s purse, and they left. They found Ruth’s debit card and PIN in her purse, and they used her debit card at several ATMs. In all, they took $500, which they spent on crack. They also stopped at Arnold’s house and cleaned out his car, and Arnold threw the purse away in a dumpster near his house. David, who had finished up work, called his house at noon. After he did not get an answer, he received a ride home from a coworker. When he entered his home, he saw his mother lying on the couch and called 911. Deputy Charles Stephens of the Santa Rosa County Sheriffs Office responded. The victim was pronounced deceased at the scene. Meanwhile, Hernandez and Arnold spent all of the money from the ATMs on crack. Arnold then dropped Hernandez off at Hernandez’s home and returned to his own home that evening. The next morning, November 19, 2004, Arnold had a conversation with Rose, after which Rose called Tammy, who came over and spoke with Arnold. After they spoke, they went outside to Arnold’s car, and Arnold pulled a pocket knife from under the passenger seat. Tammy placed the knife in a white cloth and observed a brown substance on the knife that she thought was blood. Arnold also told her that he had thrown the victim’s purse in the dumpster and showed Tammy a trash bag with the purse in it. Tammy took the bag (with the purse in it) and the knife to the bed of Richard Sr.’s truck, which she had driven there. Tammy then drove to her home to get Richard Sr. She and Richard Sr. then drove to Hernandez’s house, where Hernandez was with his wife and children. Tammy asked Hernandez if “he wanted to talk to [her] about the crack party he just went on” and if he wanted to tell her “about the lady,” and she told him that she had “the bloody knife and her purse.” Hernandez told Tammy that “[h]e was hoping [she] only knew about the crack.” He also said that the lady “was old and it was her time to go.” At some point while the Hartmans were at the Hernandezes’ house, Tiffany Telin, Stephanie’s sister, and her husband walked into the house. Hernandez and his wife had left their two children in Tennessee with Telin and her husband for a visit, and Telin and her husband had brought the children to Florida to be reunited with the Hernandezes the night before. Telin observed Stephanie crying and asked Stephanie what had happened. Stephanie said that Hernandez and Arnold had killed a woman. Telin then asked Hernandez what had happened. Hernandez told her that he and Arnold had gone over to the house of Arnold’s friend, trying to get crack. Hernandez told Telin that Arnold had come up with the idea to get some money for crack when the friend was not there. Hernandez also told Telin that Arnold got a pillow and “stuck it over the lady’s face.” Hernandez told Telin that Hernandez killed the lady when she was “almost dead” by stabbing her in the throat. Hernandez also said that he and Arnold went to ATMs to get money with the lady’s ATM card. The Hartmans, the Hernandezes and them children, and the Telins then drove over to Arnold and Rose’s house. After discussing it with his wife, Hernandez had decided to turn himself in and was going over there so he and Arnold could turn themselves in. Inside the house, Arnold, Hernandez, and the Hartmans began arguing, and somebody called the police. Hernandez and his wife left, passing the police in them car on their way out. Arnold turned himself in to law enforcement at the house. Richard Sr., who had moved the trash bag with the knife and purse in it from his truck back into the dumpster, got it out, and the bag was turned over to law enforcement. Later that day, Hernandez drove to the Milton Police Department and turned himself in. His wife also brought to the police station the clothing, including a grey T-shirt, which Hernandez had been wearing on November 18. Detective Jeffrey Shu-ler of the Santa Rosa County Sheriffs Office Major Crime Unit transported Hernandez to his office, and he and Detective Lawrence Tynes interviewed Hernandez. An audio recording of Hernandez’s statements was introduced at Hernandez’s trial. According to Hernandez’s statements, the following events occurred on November 18 and 19, 2004. Hernandez left his house at 8:30 a.m. on November 18 to go to work, but he and Arnold instead “went to a crack friend’s house and got some crack ... with the gas money and cigarette money [Hernandez] had for the day.” Although he had used crack before moving to Florida, Hernandez had not used it since moving to Florida. They were “doing crack,” and Arnold suggested going to the house of “Snapper,” an individual whom Arnold knew. Arnold had done cocaine with “Snapper” before, but Hernandez did not know him. Arnold told him “he was going to try and get some money.” Hernandez and Arnold drove to “Snapper’s” house in Arnold’s car. They went to the door and spoke with an “old lady” at the house. Arnold told Hernandez to “grab her,” and Hernandez grabbed the lady by the mouth and pulled her into the house. Hernandez “got her quiet” and told her, “shh, calm down, calm down. We ain’t going to hurt you.” The lady sat down in a chair. Arnold told the lady that “Snapper” owed him $300 and that Arnold had a gun put to his head over this money. Arnold had made up this story. Arnold told her that they would try to get the money from her and that they would leave her son alone if they got the money. The lady told them that all she had was $20. Arnold said, “All right,” and then asked to use the bathroom and came back with a pillow. Arnold stuck the pillow over the lady’s face while she was still in the chair. Arnold told Hernandez to grab the lady’s hands, and Hernandez did. Hernandez and Arnold were “suffocating her” and she was “struggling.” While Hernandez and Arnold were “choking her,” “she stopped moving for a minute.” Hernandez said the following then occurred: “And we let her up and tried to drag her over to the couch and lay her down. And she drops, and I go to grab her, and I grab her head. And her head cracked. And Shawn helped me get her on the couch. And I ... got the knife from him and cut her neck.... After she was dead.” Hernandez had grabbed Arnold’s pocket knife before entering the house and had used it to “chop up a crack block earlier.” Hernandez said he did not know why he cut the lady’s neck. According to Hernandez’s statements, Arnold then took the lady’s purse, and they left carrying it as well as the pillow. They threw the pillow away on the highway. Hernandez and Arnold also went through the lady’s purse together, finding only $40. Hernandez remembered seeing that the lady’s name was “Ruth something.” Hernandez and Arnold then went to get some crack and tried to use the debit card in the purse. Arnold found the PIN written on a card in the wallet, and Hernandez and Arnold then stopped at several ATMs. Arnold obtained money from one of the ATMs, and Hernandez obtained money from the others. They spent the money on crack. They also stopped at Arnold’s house and cleaned out his car, and Arnold threw the purse away in a dumpster near his house. They then went back out and got more crack, using the money taken from the lady’s account. They spent all of the money, and Arnold dropped off Hernandez at his home after they took a last hit of crack that afternoon. The next day, Richard Sr. showed up at Hernandez’s house, and Hernandez told him and Stephanie what had happened. After Hernandez and Arnold were arrested, Tammy visited them both in jail. Hernandez told her that they went to the lady’s house to “get some more crack.” Hernandez told her that they had gone to the door and asked if “Snapper” was home, and the lady told them that he was not home. Hernandez said he thought he heard Arnold say, “Grab her,” so Hernandez “got a hold of her in a choke hold” and brought her in the house. Hernandez told her that Arnold went to the bathroom and came back with a pillow, which he put over the lady’s face. Hernandez said that “the woman just wouldn’t die” when Arnold put the pillow over her face. Hernandez told Tammy that Arnold then took a baggy and tried to help the lady breathe because she was hyperventilating and “so she could calm herself down.” Hernandez said Arnold “was a pussy; he couldn’t do it.” Hernandez told Tammy that Arnold said to him, “I told you we weren’t going to do this.” Hernandez said that he knocked Arnold back. Hernandez told Tammy that he then snapped the lady’s neck, and he demonstrated to Tammy how he did it. Hernandez told Tammy that “she was grabbing him, trying to scratch him, and she just wouldn’t die and he snapped her neck.” Hernandez said that he and Arnold then put the lady on a chair, and Hernandez stuck a knife in her neck. Hernandez told Tammy that he killed the lady and cut her throat “[bjecause she’d seen their faces.” On December 18, 2004, Hernandez was indicted with one count of premeditated or felony murder while carrying a knife and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon. Hernandez was later charged by information with one count of burglary with an assault or battery. The court consolidated these charges, over defense objection. At Hernandez’s trial, the jury heard testimony from Deputy Stephens, David Everett, Michelle Rose, Tammy Hartman, Tiffany Telin, Detective Shuler, and other witnesses (including crime scene technicians and a representative from the victim’s bank), in addition to hearing Hernandez’s statements about the matters discussed above. Hernandez did not present any witnesses. Dr. Andrea Minyard, the medical examiner who had performed the autopsy of Ruth Everett, also testified. Minyard testified that the victim had a wound on her neck that was between one-half-inch and one-inch deep and four-and-a-half-inches across. She testified that the victim’s fifth cervical vertebra was fractured and that she had a laceration to her spinal cord beneath the fracture. Minyard also testified that the victim had bruising on her face and body. She testified that some of the bruising on the victim’s face could have been from being smothered, and some of it could have been caused by a person grabbing her across the face. She also testified that bruising to the victim’s body was consistent with her having been grabbed and forced upon. She testified that the victim’s broken neck was consistent with having been caused by an upward motion. However, she also testified on cross-examination that a pillow being pushed against the victim’s face could have caused a fracture to her neck or that she could have fractured her neck if she had been dropped. Minyard testified that the wound on the victim’s neck appeared to have been caused by a knife being taken across her neck from right to left and that the knife that had been obtained by law enforcement at Arnold’s house was capable of causing the wound. Minyard testified that the victim’s cause of death was “combined effects of blunt and sharp force injuries of the neck.” Minyard explained that either the broken neck with the laceration of the spinal cord or the slash through the neck could have been fatal. Minyard testified that the victim possibly could have survived either the broken neck and lacerated spinal cord or the slashed neck if she had received medical intervention. Minyard testified that there would have been some loss of function from the ruptured spinal cord, but how much was unclear. Minyard testified that the victim could have been seeing and hearing what happened to her after her neck was broken and could have felt pain if she was conscious when her neck was cut. However, she also testified on cross-examination that she could not say whether the victim was conscious after her neck was broken. Minyard testified that based on the amount of blood, she concluded that the victim’s heart was still beating and that she was still alive when her neck was cut. Curtis Browning, a crime laboratory analyst, also testified. He testified that blood on the knife recovered by law enforcement had DNA that matched Ruth’s DNA. He also testified that Hernandez was a possible contributor of DNA found under the victim’s fingernails and that Arnold’s DNA was not present. Browning also testified that DNA obtained from blood found on Hernandez’s grey T-shirt also matched the victim’s DNA. On February 6, 2007, the jury found Hernandez guilty on all three counts: first-degree murder while using, carrying, or possessing a weapon; robbery with a deadly weapon; and burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery. During the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact evidence through Elaine Simpson and Judy Morrissey, friends of Ruth. They testified that Ruth was a supportive friend and a hard worker, who was concerned about her son David’s drug use. The State also presented testimony from Santa Rosa County detention deputies concerning Hernandez’s behavior while he was incarcerated. Deputy Matthew Bartley testified about Hernandez’s attack on his codefendant while they were housed in the same cell. The State introduced into evidence Arnold’s medical records concerning his treatment as a result of the altercation and a copy of the judgment of Hernandez’s conviction and sentence for battery upon a jail detainee. The State also presented testimony from Deputy John Wade Jarvis, who testified about being attacked by Hernandez while transporting him to a doctor’s office for a psychological evaluation. The State introduced into evidence a copy of the judgment of Hernandez’s conviction and sentence for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. The State also presented testimony from the defendant’s wife. Stephanie testified that when the Hartmans came to their house on November 19, 2004, Hernandez told them that he cut the victim’s throat “[t]o make sure she was dead.” The defense then presented testimony from Hernandez’s half-brother, Richard Hartman Jr., and Hernandez’s mother, Cheryl Walker, about Hernandez’s dysfunctional childhood in which he was exposed to drugs and violence from a young age. According to them testimony, Cheryl and Hernandez’s father, Michael Hernandez Sr., used marijuana on a regular basis in Hernandez’s presence when he was a child and also used crystal methamphetamine and cocaine. They wandered around the country and were in hiding from the Bandidos, a motorcycle group from which they had fell out of favor. Cheryl later left Michael Sr. and relocated to California with Hernandez. In California, Cheryl, who was no longer using methamphetamines but was drinking heavily, briefly reunited with Michael Sr. They later separated, and Cheryl left Hernandez, who was approximately three years old at the time, with his father while she sold drugs. Michael Sr. lived with the Esterbrooks, who were also using and dealing drugs. Richard Jr. and Cheryl testified that Hernandez returned to live with Cheryl several years later after she met and married Michael Murphy. Murphy, who also abused drugs, beat Cheryl in front of her children and was jailed for putting a gun in her mouth. Cheryl sent Hernandez back to his father because she was afraid for his life when she was with Murphy. Hernandez lived with his father in a hotel room until his father’s death from a drug overdose. Richard Jr. and Cheryl also testified that Hernandez lived with Cheryl and her new husband, Anthony Walker. Anthony was verbally and physically abusive, and Hernandez witnessed him choke, beat, and shake Cheryl. Anthony also once punched Hernandez so hard that he needed an appendectomy. Furthermore, both Cheryl and Anthony used alcohol and marijuana. According to the testimony of Hernandez’s relatives, Cheryl later sent Hernandez to live with the Esterbrooks once more, and Hernandez never lived with her again. Hernandez reported being beaten and molested at the Esterbrooks’ home, and he eventually left their home and was in the custody of the state. In addition, Richard Jr. and Cheryl testified that Hernandez’s paternal grandparents, Al and Barbara Hernandez, later took him to live with them, and he never saw his mother again until he testified for her at her trial for killing Anthony. Hernandez then stayed with Richard Jr. as well as with his other half-brother, Shawn Hartman. Hernandez also lived on the streets. After Richard Jr. found this out, he talked Hernandez into living with him again in Florida, where Hernandez alternated living with Richard Jr. and Richard Sr. Hernandez used cocaine during this time and smoked marijuana. Hernandez later moved to Tennessee with his wife. The defense also presented testimony from Dr. John Bingham, a mental health counselor. Bingham testified that Hernandez met the diagnostic criteria for a chemical dependency to marijuana and cocaine. Bingham also testified that he believed that Hernandez and Arnold’s actions on November 18, 2004, appeared to reflect “an absence of thinking and more reaction to the situation as it unfolded.... All they were interested in is responding in the sense of getting crack cocaine.” Bingham testified that he believed that Hernandez’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of his chronic cocaine use and being under the influence at the time as well as because of the psychological and physical abuse he had experienced. The defense also presented testimony from Dr. Brett Turner, a neuropsychologist. Turner testified that because of Hernandez’s “lack of participation” and lack of motivation several of the tests he had performed were invalid, including the neurological testing. However, Turner testified that Hernandez’s IQ score was accurate; Hernandez’s full scale IQ score was 89, which was in the low-average range. Turner also testified that Hernandez’s achievement testing, which also was valid, identified a learning disability for spelling and written expression. Moreover, Turner testified that while he was not able to substantiate damage to Hernandez’s frontal lobe because of the invalid neurological test score, he believed that Hernandez’s history suggested it. Turner also had several diagnoses, including polysubstance dependence disorder, depressive disorder, posttraumatie stress disorder, impulse control disorder or cognitive disorder not otherwise specified, and antisocial personality disorder. Turner also opined that Hernandez was “under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the offense as a result of a chronic history of emotional instability deficits and behavior control and deficits in his reasoning and cognitive abilities all acutely exacerbated by the effects of cocaine intoxication.” In addition, Turner opined that Hernandez’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired “because appreciate actually means to be fully aware, and I do not believe that he was fully aware at the time of the incident offense. I believe he was engaged in a string of behavioral responses, one leading to the next....” The defense also offered into evidence Arnold’s judgment and sentence for the crimes. Arnold pleaded nolo contendere to felony murder with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The State then presented testimony from Dr. Harry McClaren, a forensic psychologist. McClaren testified that one of the two psychological tests he had administered was invalid due to an overreporting of psychopathology and that the other one was technically valid but also was exaggerated by Hernandez. McClaren also noted that the IQ test showed that Hernandez had a full scale IQ of 89, which was in the upper bounds of the low-average range. McClaren also opined that Hernandez suffered from posttraumatie stress disorder and some form of depression, which was compounded by polysubstance dependence. McClaren also testified that based on a history of head injuries and records indicating a learning disability, Hernandez might have some degree of brain dysfunction, which McClaren characterized as a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified. McClaren also testified that Hernandez had antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. When asked if the mental health disorders had a causal effect on Hernandez’s conduct in the murder of Ruth Everett, McClaren said no. He testified that posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder might heighten the risk of substance abuse, which “would be an indirect rather than a direct link” to his criminal conduct. McClaren also opined that Hernandez was not under extreme mental or emotional disturbance. McClaren explained that Hernandez was intoxicated on cocaine, which in McClaren’s belief, did not give rise to the level of the statutory mitigating circumstance. McClaren also opined that Hernandez was not acting under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. McClaren further testified that Hernandez’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was not substantially impaired. McClaren testified that while Hernandez was impaired from cocaine at the time, he was not substantially impaired and was able to engage in “goal-oriented behavior.” The State also entered into evidence a copy of Hernandez’s judgment and sentence in Tennessee for misdemeanor theft. On February 9, 2007, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one. The court then held a Spencer hearing on March 9, 2007. As rebuttal to the statutory mitigator of lack of significant prior criminal history, the State offered testimony regarding Hernandez’s conviction for petit theft. The defense then offered unsworn testimony from Barbara Hernandez (Hernandez’s step-grandmother) and Richard Jr., and defense counsel read a statement that Hernandez had prepared. At the sentencing hearing held on March 22, 2007, the court sentenced Hernandez to death. The court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Hernandez was previously convicted of another felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, namely aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with great bodily harm and with a weapon and battery upon a jail detainee (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while Hernandez was engaged in the commission of the crimes of robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery while armed with a dangerous weapon and while the dwelling was occupied by a person (great weight); (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody (great weight); and (4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight). The trial court found the statutory mitigator of lack of significant history of prior criminal activity (some weight). The court also evaluated the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances offered by Hernandez. The court gave great weight to the jury’s recommendation and found that “[although mitigating circumstances exist in this case, the serious aggravating circumstances which have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt greatly outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” The court sentenced Hernandez to death for the first-degree murder and sentenced him to consecutive life sentences for the robbery and burglary. ANALYSIS Hernandez raises eight claims on appeal. We will discuss each of these issues in turn below as well as the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of Hernandez’s death sentence. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Although Hernandez does not raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we have an obligation to independently review the record to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support Hernandez’s convictions. See Bevel v. State, 983 So.2d 505, 516 (Fla.2008); see also Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (“In death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.”). Hernandez was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery. The jury was instructed on both premeditated and felony murder, and the jury found Hernandez guilty on a general verdict form. Because the jury was instructed on both theories of first-degree murder and found Hernandez guilty on a general verdict form, the evidence must support either premeditated or felony murder. See Dessaure v. State, 891 So.2d 455, 472 (Fla.2004). We have reviewed the record, and we find the evidence, as detailed above, sufficient to support Hernandez’s murder conviction on either theory of first-degree murder as well as his convictions of robbery and burglary. MOTION TO STRIKE THE VENIRE Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the venire and motion for a mistrial after a prospective juror, Kevin Mancusi, saw Hernandez in shackles. He argues that the court failed to protect his right to a fair trial and right to the presumption of innocence. However, Hernandez does not challenge the trial court’s determination that shackling was necessary. First, it is well accepted that shackling a defendant during a criminal trial is “inherently prejudicial.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); see Bello v. State, 547 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla.1989). Visible shackling interferes with the accused’s presumption of innocence and the fairness of the fact-finding process. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005); Bryant v. State, 785 So.2d 422, 428 (Fla.2001). For that reason, visible shackles must not be used unless “justified by an essential state interest” specific to the defendant on trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340). But though it is widely recognized that visible shackling is inherently prejudicial to a defendant, it is just as accepted that the right to be free of shackles is not absolute; shackles may be used when warranted by the circumstances. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Bryant, 785 So.2d at 428. The right may be overcome by considerations such as “physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 628, 125 S.Ct. 2007; see also Bryant, 785 So.2d at 428. For example, the necessity of shackles may be sufficiently shown “where there is a history or threat of escape, or a demonstrated propensity for violence.” Jackson v. State, 698 So.2d 1299, 1303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Shackling is a permissible tool to be exercised in the judge’s sound discretion under such circumstances. Bryant, 785 So.2d at 428. Furthermore, to determine whether shackles are necessary to ensure the safety and security of the defendant and the other individuals present during trial, the trial court must hold a hearing if the defendant objects and requests an inquiry into the necessity for shackling. See Bryant, 785 So.2d at 429. In this case, the State sought to have Hernandez shackled on request of the sheriffs office. Upon objection by defense counsel, the trial court conducted the required evidentiary hearing to determine the necessity of shackling. Based on the testimony and arguments presented, the trial court found that shackling Hernandez was necessary and ordered Hernandez shackled. The trial court based its determination on the fact that Hernandez had twice committed a battery against law enforcement officers, had been convicted of battery on his codefendant after fighting with him in their jail cell, had threatened a law enforcement officer when she did not provide him with a razor after one of the attacks on a law enforcement officer, had self-mutilated with a razor during a previous trial, and was indicted for capital murder which could result in the imposition of a death sentence. The trial court also determined that a stun belt would not be as effective as shackles, as it could malfunction and might not prevent Hernandez from suddenly engaging in an act of violence against himself or others. Furthermore, upon determining that shackling was necessary but aware of its obligation to ensure that Hernandez receive a fair trial, the trial court immediately ordered that precautions be implemented to prevent the jury from seeing Hernandez’s shackles. The trial court ordered that the counsel tables be formed into “L” shapes to block the shackles from the jury, that no “All rise” instruction would be given when the jury entered or left the courtroom, that the State stack boxes under chairs parallel with the jury box to form an additional visual barrier between the jury and Hernandez, that bunting be placed around the bottom of the counsel tables to keep the jury from seeing beneath them, and that a podium be used as a visual block in the courtroom. Despite the trial court’s efforts, one prospective juror, Kevin Mancusi, informed the court during individual voir dire that during a break, he saw the shackled ankles of a person whom he believed to be Hernandez underneath a chalkboard set up in the hallway outside the courtroom. Man-cusi indicated difficulty in maintaining a presumption of innocence after seeing the shackles. However, Mancusi did not know whether any other prospective jurors present in the hallway at the time saw the shackled individual, and he did not discuss it with any other members of the venire. He also stated that he did not see anything inside the courtroom that led him to the conclusion that Hernandez was shackled but that the measures that had been taken were obvious to him “after the fact.” The trial court excused Mancusi for cause. After Mancusi’s individual voir dire, the defense moved to strike the venire and for a mistrial. Even though the trial court agreed with defense counsel that shackling was “inherently prejudicial,” it denied the defense’s motions, explaining that it was aware of the possibility that members of the jury would eventually become aware that Hernandez was shackled, despite the steps taken by the court, and noting that it did what was necessary under the circumstances. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. England v. State 940 So.2d 389, 402 (Fla.2006) (citing Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347 (Fla. 2005)). A trial court’s decision on whether to dismiss a venire is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Valderrama v. State, 816 So.2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We have long held that a juror’s or prospective juror’s brief, inadvertent view of a defendant in shackles is not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 976 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that the jurors’ brief glances of the defendant while he was being transported in prison garb and shackles, standing alone, were not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial); Stewart v. State, 549 So.2d 171, 174 (Fla.1989) (finding that a new trial was not warranted where the defendant’s shackles were ruled unobtrusive and necessary by the trial court and were only barely visible beneath the table); Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 214 (Fla.1984) (holding that the jurors’ possible inadvertent and brief sight of the defendant being transported into the courtroom in chains did not justify a mistrial); Neary v. State, 384 So.2d 881, 885 (Fla.1980) (concluding that the jurors’ inadvertent sight of the defendant being brought into the courtroom in handcuffs was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial). Thus, the mere fact that a prospective juror saw the shackled ankles of a person whom he believed to be Hernandez underneath a chalkboard set up in the hallway outside the courtroom is not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a mistrial or dismissal of the venire. Moreover, the fact that Hernandez’s shackles may have become visible to even all of the jurors does not mean that the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial or motion to strike the venire. Although a court cannot place a defendant in visible restraints as a routine matter, the Constitution “permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Shackles are permissible if the trial court determines that such restraints are necessary to ensure the safety and security of those present during trial. See Bryant, 785 So.2d at 428. This clearly suggests that a trial court, in its discretion, may legitimately deny a motion for mistrial or motion to strike the venire that may have seen a defendant shackled, provided that it has made the requisite findings that such shackles are necessary. As explained above, the trial court found that shackles were necessary and gave multiple, case-specific justifications for its decision. Furthermore, the trial court made extensive efforts to prevent the jury from seeing Hernandez’s shackles. In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial and motion to strike the venire, given that the record merely indicates that one prospective juror saw the shackled ankles of a person whom he believed to be Hernandez underneath a chalkboard set up in the hallway outside the courtroom, the trial court took numerous precautions to reduce the visibility of the shackles, and the trial court had a substantial foundation to find that shackles were necessary and relied on that foundation to justify their use. JUROR CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Hernandez’s challenge for cause to juror Martina Lindquist. Hernandez contends that because there was a reasonable doubt about Lindquist’s ability to render an impartial verdict, the trial court violated his constitutional rights by not excusing her. Hernandez argues that a reasonable doubt existed because Lindquist had personal encounters with substance abuse through family members’ drug addictions and had extensive contacts with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to an impartial jury. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). Under Florida law, “juror impartiality is a firm basis for excusing a prospective juror for cause.” Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 99 (Fla.2004). “The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.” Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984) (citing Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959)). If any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses an impartial state of mind, the juror must be excused for cause. Busby, 894 So.2d at 95. “In reviewing a claim of error such as this, we have recognized that the trial court has a unique vantage point in the determination of juror bias. The trial court is able to see the jurors’ voir dire responses and make observations which simply cannot be discerned from an appellate record.” Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 635-36 (Fla.1997) (citing Taylor v. State, 638 So.2d 30, 32 (Fla.1994)). Thus, it is within the province of the trial court to determine whether a challenge for cause is proper. Busby, 894 So.2d at 95 (quoting Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999)). The decision whether a challenge for cause is proper presents a mixed question of fact and law that will not be overturned in the absence of manifest error. See Smith, 699 So.2d at 636. While the record reflects that Lindquist had experience with substance abuse through family members’ addictions and had connections with law enforcement, the record does not support Hernandez’s claim that her background and her responses during voir dire raised a reasonable doubt about her impartiality. With regard to questions about how substance abuse and alcohol abuse had impacted her life, Lindquist indicated that it had affected her life in “numerous ways through numerous family members.” Lind-quist explained that her first husband’s abuse of marijuana caused her first marriage to end. She also explained that her oldest son had been addicted to marijuana and that she had two cousins with substance abuse issues, which caused stress on the family. Lindquist also stated that her ex-brother-in-law’s fiancée had a substance abuse problem and overdosed and died. However, when the States asked, “Do you think if drug addiction or the use of drugs becomes an issue in this case that, that you can put aside you family’s involvement with substance abuse, and base your verdict solely on the evidence and the law in this trial?” Lindquist responded, “Yes, I do.” Furthermore, when asked by defense counsel about whether the ingestion of alcohol or cocaine could rise to the level of a mitigating factor in her mind, Lind-quist responded affirmatively. In sum, while Lindquist indicated that her life had been affected by substance abuse, she did not give an equivocal response about her ability to base her verdict solely on the evidence and law, and she never indicated that her experience would play a role in how she decided the case. With regard to her connections with law enforcement, Lindquist indicated that she was a probation office supervisor for the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) of Santa Rosa County. As Hernandez concedes, this fact, alone, would be insufficient grounds for a cause challenge. Cf. Busby, 894 So.2d at 95 (explaining that the mere fact that someone is a correctional officer is not per se grounds for a challenge for cause). Lindquist also agreed with the State’s assertion that she knew a lot of people in law enforcement. For example, she said that she was engaged to a former deputy and law enforcement officer in the Air Force, who was employed with the DJJ. She said that she knew three people in law enforcement personally and between fifty-five and sixty individuals professionally in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. Among those people, she said that she knew Detective Shuler, one of the investigators in Hernandez’s case who later testified at the trial. She said that she had worked with him approximately five times in the previous ten years, mostly over the phone. She unequivocally stated that her knowledge of him would not prohibit her from being fair and impartial in a case where he was the case agent, that she could weigh his credibility the same as any other witness, and that she did not know anything about him that would give her reason to give him more credibility. Significantly, the State also asked her if her knowledge of persons in law enforcement or her work would prejudice her in any way in deciding the case. She responded, “I don’t believe so.” The State then asked, “Can you assure Mr. Hernandez that you can listen to the evidence in this case and the law that the judge instructs, and base your verdict solely on the evidence and the law?” Lindquist responded: Yes, I can. I work for a neutral agency, and we work with all parties involved. But we are very neutral. We don’t work for the Public Defender, the State Attorney or law enforcement. And we look at the totality of the big picture. And I am also a Quality Assurance Reviewer for the Department of Juvenile Justice. And I review our policy and procedure on that, as well as a Regional Administrative Review Liaison from Tallahassee with the Department of Juvenile Justice. So I look at facts. Although Lindquist initially responded, “I believe so,” rather than responding “Yes” to the question of whether her employment and knowledge of persons in law enforcement would prejudice her in deciding the case, this response was not equivocal enough, in light of the entirety of her questioning, ' to generate a reasonable doubt about her fitness as a juror. As this Court explained in Busby, “The mere fact that a juror gives equivocal responses does not disqualify that juror for service.... ‘In evaluating a juror’s qualifications, the trial judge should evaluate all of the questions and answers posed to or received from the juror.’ ” 894 So.2d at 96 (quoting Parker v. State, 641 So.2d 369, 373 (Fla.1994)). Lindquist gave unequivocal responses to other questions regarding her possible prejudices and biases and regarding her understanding of and ability to follow the law. A review of the entirety of her voir dire supports the court’s denial of the cause challenge. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Hernandez’s challenge for cause to juror Lindquist. WITNESS’S EXEMPTION FROM SEQUESTRATION Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by excusing the State’s mental health expert from the rule of sequestration and allowing the expert to remain through the presentation of lay and expert testimony during the penalty phase of his trial. Hernandez asserts that this error unfairly allowed the State’s expert to specifically tailor his testimony to do the most damage to Hernandez’s case. Hernandez argues that the trial court abused its discretion and that the court’s error was inherently prejudicial. At the beginning of his trial, Hernandez invoked the rule of sequestration. Then, after the presentation of victim impact evidence during the penalty phase, the State requested that Dr. Harry McClaren, a licensed forensic psychologist who was appointed by the court as the State’s mental health expert before trial and who examined Hernandez after the jury returned a guilty verdict, remain in the courtroom during the presentation of evidence by the State and defense: MR. ELMORE [prosecutor]: Judge, the State has — as the Court is aware, has secured the services of Doctor Harry McClaren, a licensed forensic psychologist for possible rebuttal testimony in this ease. He has requested of me leave of the Court to sit in on the information that comes before the Court from this point forward concerning Michael Albert Hernandez, Junior. THE COURT: He’s an expert. Do you have any problem with that? MR. ROLLO [defense counsel]: I think he’s entitled to sit through the presentation of our experts, but I don’t know that he can gather facts that go into — that help him base his opinion on whatever their rebuttal opinion is, which by the way I haven’t had a chance to talk to him about. Based on the factual presentation of evidence expert opinion is one thing and fact witnesses I think are another. THE COURT: Are you objecting? MR. ROLLO: I am. MR. ELMORE: Judge, the factual witnesses, such as the State’s aggravating evidence, as well as the background evidence that will be presented concerning the defendant, are the very type things that a psychologist bases their expert opinion on. And that’s why he’s asked to be allowed to— THE COURT: Either of you have any law on this? Do you think it’s discretionary? MR. ELMORE: Judge, the law is that it’s discretionary with the Court. THE COURT: I think it’s discretionary. He’s an expert and subject to cross. I’ll permit it. Dr. McClaren stayed in the courtroom during the penalty phase and testified. The practice of sequestering witnesses has been used for centuries, and it came to the United States as part of our inheritance of the common law. See 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1837, at 455-56 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1976). The United States Supreme Court has described its purpose as two-fold: “It exercises a restraint on witnesses ‘tailoring’ their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; and it aids in detecting testimony that is less than candid.” Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); see also Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423, 430 (Fla.1998) (“The purpose of the rule of sequestration is ‘to avoid a witness coloring his or her testimony by hearing the testimony of another,’ thereby discouraging ‘fabrication, inaccuracy and collusion.’ ” (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 506 (1998 ed.))). Under the common law, this Court emphasized the discretionary nature of the trial court’s decision to exclude witnesses from the rule of sequestration. See, e.g., Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984) (“The trial judge is endowed with a sound judicial discretion to decide whether particular prospective witnesses should be excluded from the sequestration rule.”). Thus, while recognizing that some cases had approved an exception for expert witnesses from the general rule of sequestration, we held that the exception of an expert witness from the rule was a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d 694, 696 (Fla. 1954). Moreover, we applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision to exempt a witness from the rule. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729, 731 (Fla.1961) (“Unless a trial judge can be said to have abused the discretion which is his to exercise in such situations, then his judgment will not be disturbed.”). Furthermore, we placed the burden on the complaining party to demonstrate an abuse of discretion with resultant injury. See, e.g., id. In Burns v. State, 609 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1992), we addressed the exemption of the State’s mental health expert witness under the common law. In Bums, the trial court first ruled that the State’s psychologist would be allowed to remain in the courtroom during testimony by the defendant and the defense’s psychologist, and the trial court later ruled that the experts for both the State and the defense would be allowed to remain in the courtroom for the entire penalty phase of the defendant’s capital trial. Id. at 606. The trial court determined that these exemptions from the rule of sequestration were necessary because it had determined that the defendant was not required to submit to an examination by the State’s expert. Id. We held that because “this was the only avenue available for the state to offer meaningful expert testimony to rebut the defense’s evidence of mental mitigation,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in exempting the expert witnesses from the rule. Id. In 1990 (before we decided Bums but apparently after the case was tried), the Florida Legislature codified the rule of sequestration in section 90.616, Florida Statutes. See ch. 90-174, § 2, at 743, Laws of Fla. Section 90.616, Florida Statutes (2006), states in pertinent part: (1) At the request of a party the court shall order, or upon its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses except as provided in subsection (2). § 90.616(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). While our decisions under the common law emphasized the discretionary nature of the decision to sequester witnesses, section 90.616 adopts the view that sequestration is de-mandable as a matter of right. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 655 (2008 ed.). Nevertheless, the codified rule of sequestration also includes categories of witnesses who may not be excluded. See § 90.616(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). As one of those categories, section 90.616(2)(c) provides that a court may not exclude “[a] person whose presence is shown by the party’s attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause.” § 90.616(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006). We have recognized that in applying the exception in section 90.616(2)(c) for those persons whose presence is shown to be essential to the presentation of the cause of one of the parties, “the trial court ‘has wide discretion in determining which witnesses are essential.’ ” Knight, 746 So.2d at 430 (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 509 (1998 ed.)); see also Strausser v. State, 682 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla.1996) (citing § 90.616(2)(c) and finding no abuse of discretion in allowing the mental health expert to remain present in the courtroom while the defendant testified). Under section 90.616(2)(c), the burden is on the party seeking to avoid sequestration of a witness to demonstrate why the presence of the witness is essential. In Strausser, we addressed the exemption of the State’s mental health expert witness under the codified rule. In Strausser, the defense attempted to show that the defendant was insane at the time of the murder, and the trial court permitted the State’s mental health expert to remain in the courtroom to hear the defendant’s testimony. 682 So.2d at 540-41. We reasoned that because a main issue in Strausser was the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime, the trial court may have reasonably concluded that the expert’s presence during the defendant’s testimony was “essential to the presentation of the ... cause.” Id. at 541 (quoting § 90.616(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1993)). We also noted that the State’s expert was only present for the direct examination of the defendant. Id. Thus, we held that there was no abuse of discretion. Id. Hernandez argues that because the State did not demonstrate a need for Dr. McClaren to sit through the entire penalty phase, his case is distinguishable from Bums and Strausser. However, we need not resolve that issue, because we conclude that any error did not result in prejudice to Hernandez. Hernandez contends that the State bears the burden of proving that prejudice did not result from the trial court’s ruling. He contends that this Court should use the harmless-error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986), which places the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the outcome.. See id. at 1135. Hernandez also relies on federal case law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 615, the federal codification of the rule of sequestration, to argue that the prosecution has the burden to show that the accused was not prejudiced by the witness’s exception from the rule of sequestration. Accepting appellant’s contention that we should apply the harmless-error test of DiGuilio, we conclude that Hernandez was not prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to allow Dr. McClaren to remain in the courtroom during the penalty phase. Importantly, Dr. McClaren did not directly rebut any factual assertions made by lay witnesses during the penalty phase, including the abuse Hernandez suffered as a child or his history of drug abuse. In fact, Dr. McClaren acknowledged the abuse endured by Hernandez as a child and Hernandez’s extensive history of substance abuse. Furthermore, his testimony correlated with that of the other experts regarding Hernandez’s diagnoses, the tests administered, and Hernandez’s past. Moreover, while his testimony correlated with the other experts’ testimony regarding these matters, there is no indication that his expert opinion was based upon the other experts’ testimony. Dr. McClaren’s testimony mainly differed from the testimony of the other experts with regard to the mental mitigators. He disagreed with Drs. Bingham and Turner on whether Hernandez’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Dr. McClaren also disagreed with Dr. Turner regarding whether the crime was committed while Hernandez was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. While Dr. McClaren’s testimony may have differed from the other experts’ testimony regarding the existence of mental mitigators, the jury was aware that this difference was solely the result of a difference in professional opinion rather than a disagreement with any of the factual circumstances related to the case or appellant’s life. For example, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Q [defense counsel] No. And just as you said, all of those factors, a person can be suffering from multiple mental disorders, disabilities, brain trauma, PTSD, and a person can know the difference between right and wrong. But similarly a person could not. And you just happen to disagree in this case, right? A [Dr. McClaren] Yes, I do. Q But that’s your professional opinion. Your professional opinion is that you disagree. Not that it is impossible that Michael Hernandez was in fact meeting the statutory criteria. You disagree professionally with Drs. Bingham and Turner? A Absolutely. Yes. Furthermore, the jury was aware at all times that Dr. McClaren had listened to the testimony of the other witnesses during the penalty phase. On both direct and cross-examination, Dr. McClaren explained that he listened to testimony of the witnesses during the penalty phase, including Hernandez’s mother, half-brother, and wife. Further, defense counsel was free at all times to explore this fact with Dr. McClaren during cross-examination and there is no suggestion on appeal that defense counsel was limited in any way during this examination. In sum, Dr. McClaren did not refute the factual testimony of the witnesses during the penalty phase and admitted that he had observed the testimony of other witnesses during the penalty phase. Only his professional opinions differed from those of the defense expert witnesses. Further, there is no suggestion that either his opinions or the factual predicates upon which those opinions were based would have been different if he had not been allowed direct access to the other testimony elicited during the penalty phase. In fact, Dr. McClaren was presented with a view of the defendant’s background that the defense itself relied upon for its case in mitigation. Therefore, we conclude that Dr. McClaren’s presence throughout the penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. FAILURE TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT Hernandez next argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment. Before trial, Hernandez filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the indictment filed against him. Hernandez argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), required the aggravators to be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State had not alleged the aggravating circumstances, Hernandez argued that the indictment should be dismissed. In the alternative, Hernandez requested an order requiring the jury to make unanimous findings of fact with respect to each aggravator and to indicate those unanimous findings on a special interrogatory verdict form. The trial court denied this motion. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment. See, e.g., Coday v. State, 946 So.2d 988, 1006 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the failure to allege the aggravating circumstances in the indictment renders a sentence unconstitutional under Ring); Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 473 (Fla.2006) (noting that the defendant’s claim that the indictment was defective because it did not provide notice of the aggravators had been addressed adversely to the defendant); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So.2d 650, 654 (Fla.2003) (observing that this Court had rejected the argument that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment); Kannondy v. State, 845 So.2d 41, 54 (Fla.2003) (explaining that Ring does not require notice of the aggravating factors that the State will present). Similarly, we have also rejected Hernandez’s alternative argument that a special verdict form indicating the aggravating factors found by the jury should have been used. See, e.g., Ibar, 938 So.2d at 473 (noting that the defendant’s claim that the verdict forms should have indicated which aggravators the jury found had been addressed adversely to the defendant); Kormondy, 845 So.2d at 54 (observing that Ring does not require a special verdict form indicating the aggravating factors found by the jury). We have not receded from these decisions, and we do not recede from them now. Accordingly, we find no error. INSTRUCTION ON VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE Hernandez argues that the trial court erred in giving the jury instruction on victim impact evidence approved by this Court in Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119, 1132-33 (Fla.2000), and Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 330-31 (Fla.2002). He argues that the instruction is confusing, and he requests this Court to reconsider its opinions in Kearse and Rimmer. At a charge conference hearing before the penalty phase, the State requested that the trial court give the victim impact evidence instruction approved in Kearse. Over defense objection, the court ruled that it would give the approved language from Kearse. Thus, after each of the two victim impact evidence witnesses testified, the court gave the following instruction: Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve heard evidence that concerns the uniqueness of Ruth Winslow Everett as an individual human being and the result and loss to the community’s members by Ruth Win-slow Everett’s death. Family members are unique to each other by reason of their relationship and role each has in the family. A loss to the family is a loss to both the community of the family and to the larger community outside of the family. While such e