Full opinion text
JAMES, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). The assignments of error 1 to 6, inclusive, and assignments 11 to 16, inclusive, are directed to alleged errors in the findings of the judge in reference to issue of custody of the children. We conclude from the evidence that it was sufficient to warrant the disposition made by the judge. In cases of this kind, as in other cases, his conclusion governs the appellate court in mere questions of fact. The law commits to the district judge a sound discretion in the adjudication of such matters, and it is only when it clearly appears that he has abused the discretion that we should interpose and substitute other conclusions for his. .There was evidence to support the general conclusion formed by the court, and which is the predominating one, embodied in the following findings: “No. 12a. The court is of the opinion that, because of the tender age of these children, it is to their best interest that they remain in the custody of their mother, and that the influence that she now has over them should not be broken and destroyed by taking them away from their natural mother and placing them where the ties of blood do not bind. “No. 13. That the home of the relator because of the local environments and the constituents of his family is not the most suitable place for the said children, and it is not to their interest that they be taken away from their mother and given to relator to be raised and educated at Brookshire at the home of relator. “No. 14. That it is to the best interest of the said children and their morals can and will be better cared for at the home of respondent’s father, where she has taken up her abode; that the environments of the said home are better for the said children in the opinion of the court, taking everything into consideration, than the environments at the home of the relator.” Said assignments are therefore overruled. The seventh assignment is that the court erred in failing to conclude as a matter of law that inasmuch as relator is a man of good moral, practical, and industrious habits and offers the children a home, and is ready, able, and willing to support and educate them if he be given their custody, none of his property can be placed in the hands of a trustee for their support and education. The eighth is that upon these facts the court failed to hold that he is not liable for their maintenance and support while they remain in the custody of their mother; the ninth is that the court erred in failing to. hold as a matter of law that it had no authority to decree that a trustee be appointed over relator's property and pay over to Mrs. Bemus for the children’s support and maintenance a certain fixed specified sum per month. The tenth is that the court erred in finding as a fact that the interest of the children and society require that a trust be created in the rents and revenues of lots 9 and 10 for the support and education of said children, the same to be so .devoted being the rent of the telephone booth and the store building, and that the relator be enjoined from interfering with the trustee in the discharge of his said duties and from disposing of said property or the revenues thereof. In connection with these assignments, various questions are' made by appellant. One proposition is that the property of' the husband can only be charged with a trust for the support and education of minor children in the divorce proceedings and as part of the decree of divorce. We overrule this and hold that the judicial power of the courts to enforce the parents’ • obligation for support of the children is not lost by the failure of parties in a divorce proceeding to invoke, in behalf of the children, the exercise of the power. In this instance the judgment of divorce was procured by relator, in the absence of respondent, and upon his pleadings, and he did not in the proceeding inform the court that there were children or property. This forcibly illustrates how unreasonable and unsound is the contention that, except in a divorce proceeding, the children’s right to maintenance cannot be considered. Another proposition ⅜ that the homestead of a divorced husband who has married again, or any part thereof, cannot be charged with a trust for the support and education of his children, save and except in the divorce proceeding and as part of the divorce decree. We overrule this also, for two reasons; one being the reason given in the foregoing paragraph, and, the other, that, in so. far as the homestead use made of lots 9 and 10 is concerned, the decree does not interfere with it, and the portions designated for the trust appear to be segregated therefrom and devoted to other uses. In an oral argument, supplemented by a written one, it is claimed that there was testimony that relator’s children by a previous marriage had some interest in lots 9 and 10, and that the trust was improperly granted for that reason. But this matter is not the subject of any assignment of error. On the contrary, the brief asserts throughout that the property was relator’s. Another proposition is that a divorced wife occupies the same relation to her former husband as a third person, and consequently when she assumes the support and maintenance of their minor children, or is given their custody by the court, the law absolves him from any liability whatever for necessaries furnished them by her or by third persons, and therefore no trust can be ingrafted on his property therefor, especially when he is a good moral man and offers to support them at his own home and to properly raise and educate them. We overrule this also. We need not consider what merit this proposition would have in cases where the wife, against the wishes of the husband and without cause, takes away the children. Here the custody was judicially given to the mother, in a contest between him and her. The fact that they were no longer man and wife, and the fact that the children were thus awarded to the mother, did not terminate his liability for their support and maintenance, arid impose the obligation exclusively upon her. We need not discuss what his legal attitude on this subject might be, if the wife had ample means of her own to fulfill this 'duty' to the children, if the children themselves had an estate sufficient for the purpose. Here both were destitute, save as to what scanty means the mother could earn by her labor. It Is our opinion that under the circumstances of this case neither the divorce nor the order adjudicating the custody of the children to the mother operated to relieve the father from the legal obligation to support them. Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87 N. W. 340; Leibold. v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N. E. 627; Ligon v. Ligón, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 87 S. W. 838. Another proposition is that the court had no power to appoint a trustee over relator’s property to pay over to Mrs. Bemus for the children’s support a certain sum per month ; that the court would only be justified, under proper circumstances, to authorize the trustee to turn over such an amount as is necessary for the support and maintenance each month, not to exceed a certain sum; and that the court should have made provision, if circumstances were such as to require relator’s property to be charged with a trust for the benefit of the children, of such amount each month, not to exceed a certain sum, as the age and necessities of said children would require in view of the condition in life of relator during the period of this long trust. Other courts and this court have held that it is improper for the court to render a personal judgment against the parent for the support of the children, in a proceeding for divorce, and the same rule would seem, to apply in the case here. But there is clear authority that the obligation of a parent to the children may properly be enforced through a trust established on the property of the parent, in a. divorce proceeding. Trimble v. Trimble, 15 Tex. 18; Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58; Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443. And our opinion is that where neither parent, in the divorce case, presents the matter of the custody and maintenance of the children to the court for its action, such failure is not conclusive of the subject, and the matter may subsequently be invoked and adjudicated; and that in a subsequent proceeding between the parents involving the custody of the children, before a court having jurisdiction, both subjects of the custody and the maintenance of the children are within its rightful jurisdiction, in like manner and to the same extent as if they had been invoked in the proceedings for divorce. As already stated, the failure of the court to make the adjudication in connection with the divorce does not put an end to either parent’s liability in this respect. The statute, by authorizing such adjudication in a divorce proceeding, does not restrict the judicial power of the courts in respect thereto and make the matter cognizable only in such proceeding. Suppose the relation had been dissolved by death of the wife, would it be contended that, in a proceeding in which the court found it proper to take the custody of the children from the father, provision for their support, from the father’s property, could not be made? It being proper to provide for the maintenance of the children in the present proceeding, the court had power to create a trust in the property of the relator for that purpose. There is no complaint that the sum of $30 per month to be paid over to respondent is excessive, or oppressive. There is in our opinion no force in the point that the monthly sum should not have been fixed by the decree,- and that the proper decree was to require the payment by the trustee of a sum per month, not to exceed a certain sum. This would have made the trustee the judge of the monthly contributions, and entailed upon the court the labor, monthly perhaps, of passing on the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the sum. The sum fixed, as are all other matters embraced in the decree, is subject to modification by the court at all times, and it is manifest that the sum is not immoderate from the standpoint of the wants of the children, nor oppressive on the relator, in view of his circumstances. The tenth assignment is sufficiently disposed of against appellant by what has already been stated. The judgment is affirmed.