Full opinion text
OPINION W.C. DAVIS, Judge. Appellant was found guilty of capital murder. The jury answered the special issues under Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. affirmatively, whereupon the court assessed the mandatory penalty of death. Appellant raises twenty-eight grounds of error. Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence a brief outline of the relevant facts is necessary to respond to several of appellant’s grounds of error. The indictment in the instant case alleges in pertinent part that, on or about the 27th day of January, A.D., 1984, MARIO MARQUEZ, hereinafter called defendant, did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, namely: RACHEL GUTIERREZ, hereinafter called complainant, by strangling the said complainant with a ligature, and the said defendant did then and there intentionally cause the death of the said complainant while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the offense of AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT upon RACHEL GUTIERREZ: The deceased, Rachel Gutierrez, was the fourteen-year-old daughter of Rosa Gutierrez. The deceased resided at 2210 Hidalgo Street in the Villa Veramendi Courts in San Antonio with her mother, her ten-year-old brother, Daniel Gutierrez, and her eighteen-year-old sister, Rebecca Marquez. Rebecca Marquez was the estranged wife of appellant. The record reflects that on the night of January 26, 1984, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Rosa Gutierrez left her apartment to go to a night club which featured a male strip show. Rosa was accompanied by a neighbor, Kim File, and Kim’s mother, Virginia Stroh. Left behind at Rosa’s apartment were Daniel Gutierrez, Rachel Gutierrez, Rebecca Marquez and Kim File’s three young children. At 2:30 a.m. on the morning of January 27, 1984, Rosa and the others returned to their apartments. Rosa found the door to her apartment locked from the inside so she knocked. She saw appellant look out of a window by the front door and then go upstairs briefly before letting her into the apartment. After appellant unlocked the door to allow Rosa to enter he went directly upstairs. Rosa followed. She tried to enter her bedroom but found the door locked. Appellant, who was standing in the upstairs bathroom, spoke, “Come in, Rose. I’ve got a surprise for you ... I’ve got a surprise for you in the shower.” Rosa replied, “No, I don’t want to see. I don’t want to see anything. I want to go to sleep.” At this point appellant grabbed Rosa, dragged her into the bathroom and threw her to the floor. Appellant placed his hands on Rosa’s throat and began choking her. Then, with one hand free, appellant unbuckled his pants and exposed his penis. He ordered Rosa to remove her clothing and place his penis in her mouth. When Rosa refused appellant hit her twice. Fearing for her life Rosa complied with appellant’s demand for oral sexual contact. Appellant told her, “This is something I’ve wanted to do for a long time.” Rosa’s son, Daniel, was locked in his mother’s bedroom, but upon hearing his mother’s cries he opened the bedroom door and saw her being assaulted in the bathroom. Rosa told him, “No, son. He is killing me. He's going to kill you, too. Don’t — go call the police and run out. Please don’t try to help me. Just get out.” Daniel went downstairs and attempted to telephone the police. Shortly thereafter appellant got scared and released Rosa, pulled up his pants and went down the hall to the bedroom used by Rosa’s daughter, Rachel. Rosa followed. Inside, on the bedroom floor were the nude, brutalized bodies of Rachel Gutierrez and Rebecca Marquez. Appellant admitted to Rosa that he had killed both girls “to get even” and for “vengeance.” Appellant then fled the scene and Rosa went downstairs to call the police. Virginia Stroh and Kim File testified that shortly after entering their own apartment they heard screams coming from Rosa’s apartment. They went to Rosa’s apartment and were let inside by Daniel. Virginia Stroh went upstairs, saw the dead bodies and tried to calm a hysterical Rosa Gutierrez. Stroh also testified that she saw a man exit the apartment through the kitchen although she could not identify him. Kim File identified the man as appellant. Officer Manuel Lopez of the San Antonio Police Department was the first officer on the scene after being dispatched to investigate a “family disturbance.” He arrived at approximately 2:33 a.m. After discovering the dead bodies Officer Lopez called an ambulance, obtained a description and picture of appellant and sealed off the apartment. Shortly thereafter, detectives Eleazar Galindo and Fernando Ceasares arrived at the scene and began collecting physical evidence. Among the items collected were two beer cans found in Rachel’s bedroom. A latent fingerprint found on one of the beer cans matched that of appellant. Rosalio Perez, a neighbor, testified that he was awakened at approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of January 27, 1984, by the noise of police helicopters which were searching for appellant. Perez was again awakened at 6:00 a.m. when he heard a noise in his backyard. He observed a man wearing tennis shoes and dark clothing climbing his fence and running through his back yard. Perez called the police who began searching the area some four blocks from the murder scene. Later, Perez discovered that a jacket he had hung on a clothes line in his back yard was missing. When appellant was apprehended he was wearing the missing jacket. Angelita Vasques testified that on the morning of January 27, 1984, she received a telephone call from appellant who asked to speak to her daughter, Elida Vasquez. Appellant had previously lived with Elida. Angelita informed appellant that Elida was not at home and appellant hung up. Almost immediately appellant called again saying that he was using a pay telephone near an icehouse on Palo Alto Street. He admitted to Angelita that he had strangled two women. Initially, Angelita was scared that appellant had strangled her daughter but appellant told her it was his “other girl.” Angelita identified appellant at trial saying she had known him for ten years and could easily recognize his voice. After the second call Angelita called the police and met Officer Wayne Harrell near the icehouse. Officers Harrell and R.B. Garcia arrived at the comer of Palo Alto and Cree Street at around 7:30 a.m. and observed appellant using a telephone at an abandoned ice-house. Appellant saw the officers and attempted to run away but he was caught and arrested some two miles from the scene of the murders. Appellant was taken to the police station where he was placed in the custody of homicide detectives at around 8:00 a.m. His clothing, which was bloodstained, was taken for analysis by the detectives. Dr. Suzanna Dana, deputy chief medical examiner at the Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Officer performed autopsies on both bodies on the morning of January 27th. The autopsies included external and internal examinations, as well as a rape test. The autopsy performed on Rachel Gutierrez, the deceased in the instant case, revealed that she had been killed by ligature strangulation — that is strangulation using a cord, wire or piece of cloth. Dr. Dana also testified that she found bite marks on the deceased’s right breast and in her pubic area along with superficial lacerations around her anus and perineum which could have been caused by the insertion of an erect penis. In addition, approximately ten short human hairs were found in the deceased’s mouth. Dr. Dana was also of the opinion that because of the loss of blood and bruising, the bite marks as well as the lacerations of the anus and perineum were inflicted while the victim was alive or at or near the time of her death. Fluid found in the lungs of the deceased along with the swelling of her brain indicated to Dr. Dana that, while the deceased might have lost consciousness within seconds, it probably took as long as ten minutes to die from ligature strangulation. Testing revealed the presence of sperm in the deceased’s rectum. The autopsy of Rebecca Marquez yielded similar results. She was also killed by ligature strangulation and had bite marks to the pubic area and right breast. Dr. Dana also found a bottle of cologne inside Rebecca Marquez’s rectum. Testing revealed the presence of sperm in Rebecca Marquez’s vagina. Heather Mann, a forensic serologist, performed blood tests on appellant, the deceased and Rebecca Marquez. She determined that all three had different blood types and that the blood found on appellant’s clothing was consistent with the deceased’s type. The State also presented testimony linking appellant with the murders by matching a cast of his teeth with the bite marks found on both bodies. Dr. Bill Baker, a professor of Dental Diagnostics and Dental Pathology at the University of Texas Health Science Center, was called to the Bexar County Medical Examiner’s Office on January 27,1984, in order to photograph the bite marks exhibited on the bodies. Then, on April 17, 1984, pursuant to a search warrant, Dr. Baker made dental casts of appellant’s teeth. Dr. James Cot-tone, a forensic dentist, testified that a comparison of the photographs and casts showed that the bite marks were consistent with appellant’s teeth pattern. At the close of the State’s case in chief, appellant closed without offering any evidence. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion for instructed verdict. The jury found appellant guilty of the capital murder of Rachel Gutierrez. During the punishment phase of appellant’s trial the following evidence was introduced by the State in an effort to persuade the jury to answer the special punishment issues affirmatively. At the outset Richard Burch, the clerk of the 226th District Court of Bexar County, testified that the records of the court revealed that appellant pleaded guilty to four burglary charges on January 1, 1984. Appellant was released on bail pending sentencing which was to be made on February 2,1984. James A. Schofield, a probation officer, described preparing a pre-sentencing report for the trial court concerning the four burglary convictions. Appellant admitted to Schofield his participation in the crimes, including the theft of guns, and a high speed chase with the police. Schofield’s investigation also revealed that appellant was charged with felony theft in 1977, but that this charge was later reduced to a misdemeanor. Several police officers described appellant’s participation in the high speed chase which occurred on June 29, 1983, in connection with his arrest for the four burglaries. Testimony revealed that the vehicles reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour and, at one point, the getaway vehicle crossed a median and sped down the wrong side of the highway forcing ten to fifteen cars off the road. After stopping the vehicle, police discovered appellant behind the wheel. There was some evidence that shots had been fired from the getaway vehicle. However, there were four men inside the ear and it could not be shown who fired the shots. Several jail guards and fellow prisoners described appellant’s conduct while he was incarcerated for the instant offense and others. Rogelio Garcia, a Bexar County jail detention guard, testified that on April 16, 1984, he ordered appellant to remove some pictures from his cell wall. Appellant became hostile, began cursing, grabbed the cell bars, and refused to remove the pictures. Appellant shouted at Garcia’s superior, “You are not going to take them down either.” Only when the cell door was opened did appellant comply with the order. Jesse Alvarez, a jail guard, testified that he discovered a homemade knife or “shank” fashioned from a toothbrush and a nail on appellant’s person on May 23, 1984. Two other jail guards described fights between appellant and other inmates occurring on March 24, 1984, and May 22, 1984. Another guard testified that appellant threw a coffee pot at a fellow inmate on September 16, 1984. Jimmy Martinez, a former cellmate of appellant, testified that appellant kicked him in the head one morning and accused him of being an informer. During the ensuing altercation appellant stabbed Martinez with a ball point pen. Martinez also testified that on two other occasions appellant tried to choke him by placing Martinez in a headlock. Finally, Martinez testified that appellant carried a sharp glass blade weapon which he concealed in an airvent in the cell. Two trial court bailiffs were called to testify. Bailiff Alex Jasso recalled that appellant admitted killing the two women. Appellant said, “I did it” and “I’m not afraid of the needle” or “I’m not afraid to die.” The final witnesses called by the State during the punishment phase described an altercation occurring at the noon recess on the first day of punishment evidence. As appellant was being escorted down the courthouse hallway, he knocked the camera from the shoulder of one cameraman who was filming his departure and spat on the lens of another camera. Over defense counsel’s objection video tape of the incident was shown to the jury. Finally, bailiffs Frank Pacheco and Albert Barrera, who were escorting appellant during the incident, heard appellant say: “Next time I’ll just run so you will have to shoot me.” At the close of the State’s case the appellant again closed without calling any witnesses. The jury was instructed and heard the arguments of counsel. After deliberation the jury returned affirmative answers to both special punishment issues submitted. In ground of error number seven appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to include within the charge to the jury at the guilt/innocence phase of trial an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant argues that evidence presented during the guilt/innocence phase of trial raised the possibility that appellant, if guilty of an offense, was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, appellant points to evidence that Rosa Gutierrez testified that he looked “furious” and that he told her he had killed the girls “to get even” or for “vengeance.” Also, the bite marks on the bodies were described by Dr. Cottone, the forensic dentist, as “savage.” A perfume bottle had been forced into the rectum of Rebecca Marquez. Angelita Yasquez testified that appellant told her he had killed the girls “because I want to treat people right so they can treat me right and nobody was going to laugh in my face.” V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 19.04 defines “voluntary manslaughter”: (a) A person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual under circumstances that would constitute murder under Section 19.02 of this code, except that he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. (b) “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation. (c) “Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly provide a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or tenor in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. It is well established that if evidence from any source raises the issue of a lesser included offense or a defensive theory, it must be included in the court’s charge. Ojeda v. State, 712 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). As this court said in Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex.Cr.App.1978): The credibility of evidence and whether it is controverted or conflicts with other evidence in the case may not be considered in determining whether a defensive charge or an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given. When evidence from any source raises a defensive issue or raises an issue that a lesser included offense may have been committed ... the issue must be submitted to the jury. It is then the jury’s duty, under the proper instructions, to determine whether the evidence is credible and supports the defense or the lesser included offense. A charge on voluntary manslaughter should only be given when there is evidence that the defendant acted under the “immediate influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” Ojeda, supra; Hobson v. State, 644 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Cerda v. State, 557 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). We have closely examined the record and can find no evidence that the deceased or another acting with the deceased did anything to provoke sudden passion in appellant. It is not enough that appellant acted mad and upset, the evidence must also show that the anger was the result of an act of provocation on the part of the deceased or a third party acting in concert with the deceased. V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.04(b). Appellant cites Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) for the proposition that if evidence shows a defendant seemed enraged or terrified before acting, a charge on voluntary manslaughter should be given. Appellant has misconstrued Bradley, supra. In Bradley, supra, the provocation element was clearly present. Prior to being killed the deceased kicked down the defendant’s door, “slung” a knife across the room and threatened the defendant with death. After this a struggle ensued during which the deceased was fatally wounded. However, missing from the case, was any evidence that the defendant acted under the influence of sudden passion. The quotation relied upon by appellant here was simply the Court’s explanation that had the evidence shown that the defendant in Bradley, supra, acted under the influence of sudden passion a charge of voluntary manslaughter would have been proper. This is so because the provocation element was already present. The record does not show any evidence of provocation on the part of the deceased or another acting with the deceased. In the absence of such evidence the offense of voluntary manslaughter is simply not raised. Appellant’s ground of error number seven is overruled. Closely related to ground of error number seven is ground of error number eight, in which appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to include in the charge to the jury at the punishment phase of trial, an instruction submitting special issue number three on provocation. Article 37.071(b)(3), Y.A.C.C.P. reads: (b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury: (3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. Appellant cites the evidence relied upon in ground of error number seven plus evidence adduced at the punishment phase which suggested that Rebecca Marquez may have been unfaithful to appellant. “In order to raise the issue of provocation, it is necessary that there be evidence of the deceased’s conduct just prior to her death; also, that evidence must be sufficient to be considered provocation.” Hernandez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). There is no evidence in the record concerning the deceased’s conduct immediately prior to the killing. Appellant suggests that perhaps the infidelity of Rebecca Marquez can be considered as provocation in the instant case. Under the statute the actions of a third party cannot be considered as provocation for the capital murder of another. The statute specifically focuses attention on the action of the deceased. Appellant’s eighth ground of error is overruled. In ground of error number one appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to include in the charge to the jury during the punishment phase of trial an instruction to limit the jury’s consideration of punishment evidence to conduct committed only by appellant himself. Appellant’s argument focuses on the evidence adduced by the State during the punishment phase that shots were fired from a getaway vehicle driven by appellant on June 29, 1983. Several police officers involved in the high speed chase testified that shot were fired at them from appellant’s automobile. However, there were four men inside the vehicle and no one could be sure who had fired the shots. Appellant claims that since the State was unable to show that appellant had fired the shots himself an instruction should have been given to the jury which would limit its consideration of punishment evidence to acts specifically shown to have been committed by appellant. Appellant argues that such an instruction is mandated by this Court’s ruling in Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). We do not agree. In Green, supra, the defendant was found guilty of murder during the course of robbery and was sentenced to death. The defendant was aided by three cohorts and on appeal he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to special punishment issue number one concerning the deliberateness of the defendant’s conduct. This Court found the evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant based on the law of parties under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Secs. 7.01 and 7.02, but held that the law of parties could not be relied upon to prove the special punishment issue of deliberateness. Specifically, the Court found that: The statutes [Sections 7.01 and 7.02] clearly address conviction and guilt for an offense. Neither Sec. 7.01 nor Sec. 7.02 addresses the punishment phase of trial. Indeed, the language of the statute does not concern punishment at all. Rather, the Legislature enacted Art. 37.-071, Y.A.C.C.P., specifically to cover punishment issues in a capital murder case. Those special issues do not define ‘offense’: they are tailored to guide a jury in examining the culpability and conduct of the individual defendant, ... Green, supra, at 286. The Court went on to conclude that: It is error to apply directly the law of parties to any of the punishment issues in a capital murder case — that is, so a capital defendant may be punished for the deliberate conduct of another, the future dangerousness of another or the unreasonable response to provocation of another — without regard to the individual conduct of the defendant whose fate is in question. Green, supra, at 287, quoting Meanes v. States, 668 S.W.2d 366, 376 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Appellant’s reliance on Green, supra, is misplaced. The Court in Green, supra, simply forbade the giving of an instruction on the law of parties at the punishment phase of a capital murder case. However, in cases where a law of parties charge was given during the guilt/innocence phase of a capital case a prophylactic instruction should be given, if requested, which would instruct the jury to limit its consideration of punishment evidence to conduct shown to have been committed by the defendant. Green, supra, at 287, n. 4. The context within which these rules were stated makes it abundantly clear that the Court was talking about the facts of the case itself. The Court was addressing the problem of sentencing a person to death who may have only been a party to the capital murder offense itself. In the instant case no charge on the law of parties was given during the guilt/in-nocenee phase of trial. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that no one was involved in the murder other than appellant. This being the case the rules established in Green, supra, do not apply. Appellant does not contend that evidence presented during the punishment phase of trial was in any way inadmissible. He alleges only that the injection of evidence of possible conduct of another at the punishment phase invokes a requirement to submit the requested charge. Generally, an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of certain evidence is not required when the evidence is admissible to prove a main fact in the case. Porter v. State, 709 S.W.2d 213, (Tex.Cr.App.1986); McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Ruiz v. State, 523 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Lapp v. State, 519 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Dillard v. State, 477 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Lacy v. State, 424 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). During the punishment phase of a capital murder trial the State has the burden of proving that the defendant will probably commit acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Evidence that appellant drove a car down the wrong side of the highway at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour, forcing fifteen other cars off the road, and that shots were fired at the police from that car is very relevant to this issue. This evidence was not admitted for a limited purpose but to prove one of the “main facts” provable during the punishment phase, See Art. 37.071(b)(1), (2), and (3), thus, no limiting instruction is required. Appellant’s first ground of error is overruled. In ground of error number two appellant challenges the trial court’s refusal to include in the charge to the jury at the punishment phase of trial an instruction which would limit the jury’s consideration of extraneous offense to those which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by appellant. A similar contention was made in Santana v. State, 714 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). In Santana, supra, the Court held that the failure to give such an instruction was not error. As the Court explained, Art. 37.071(a), Y.A.C.C.P., provides that during the punishment phase of a capital murder case “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence.” Numerous cases have interpreted this to mean that evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offense are admissible. Santana, supra; Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). The Court in Santana, supra, pointed out that the defendant was adequately protected by the other portions of the charge which required the jury, based on the evidence presented, to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would commit future criminal acts of violence before they could answer the second special punishment issue affirmatively. The instant case contains a similar provision which likewise adequately protects appellant. Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled. In ground of error number twenty-eight appellant complains of the introduction of unadjudicated extraneous offenses at the punishment phase of trial. For example, the State introduced that appellant had led police on a dangerous, high speed automobile chase, was a disciplinary problem while in jail, and had assaulted cameramen during the instant trial. In our discussion of appellant’s second ground we explained that any evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses was admissible if relevant to a penalty issue during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. In fact, this Court has many times so held. See McCoy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 406 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 754 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The evidence of unad-judicated extraneous offenses was clearly relevant to appellant’s future dangerousness. Appellant’s twenty-eighth ground of error is overruled. In ground of error number three appellant argues that it was error to compel appellant to appear and remain in the presence of the jury wearing handcuffs and leg irons during the punishment phase of trial. Appellant argues that such action violated his right to a presumption of innocence, to a fair trial and to due process of law. Additionally, appellant argues that it amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence and diminished the State’s burden of proof with regard to the second special punishment issue on future dangerousness. It must be noted that the only time the jury saw appellant in handcuffs and leg irons was during the punishment phase of trial. Appellant’s right to a presumption of innocence terminated after he was found guilty of capital murder. Thus, at the time appellant was shackled he had no right to a presumption of innocence. The caselaw relied upon by appellant deals exclusively with the situation where a defendant wears shackles before the jury during the guilt/innocence phase of trial. In Walthall v. State, 505 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), where the defendant was brought before the jury in handcuffs and chains during the guilt phase, this Court held that absent any good and sufficient reason for such extraordinary measures, the display deprived the defendant of his presumption of innocence. Similarly, in Gray v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 305, 268 S.W. 941, 269 S.W. 1056 (Tex.Cr.App.1925), this Court pointed out that when a defendant is brought into the courtroom during trial in shackles, reversal must follow unless the record reflects a good and sufficient reason for pursuing this extraordinary course. In Moore v. State, 535 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the defendant was brought into court during the guilt phase of trial handcuffed and escorted by the sheriff on two separate occasions. On three occasions the jury was allowed to see the defendant in handcuffs. This Court held that “the harm a defendant suffers when a jury sees him in handcuffs is that his constitutional presumption of innocence is thereby infringed. Thompson v. State, 514 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Walthall v. State, 505 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.1971); ...” Moore, supra, at 358. Thus, the caselaw relied upon by appellant is distinguishable because the cases involved the guilt/innocence phase not the punishment phase of trial. However, while a defendant’s handcuffed or shackled appearance before a jury at the punishment phase of trial does not merit the strict review mandated in the cases above, we will address appellant’s contention that such practice constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence. Review is merited especially in a capital murder case where a defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue. The proper standard for reviewing cases where a defendant was shackled during the guilt/innocence phase of trial has been well established in Texas. In Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 306 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978), this Court explained the proper standard for review. The Court quoted Thompson v. State, 514 S.W.2d 275, 277-278 (Tex.Cr.App.1974): It is within the discretion of the trial judge to require uniforms and handcuffs for a defendant. See Ex Parte Slaton, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 102 (1972); Hernandez v. Beto, supra, [443 F2d 634 (5th Cir.)] and Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1973)_ The test on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the witnesses to appear in jail uniforms and in handcuffs. To enable this Court to review the trial court’s action on appeal, the record should contain factual matters on which the trial court’s discretion was based. It must appear in the record that in exercise of its discretion the trial court had a fair knowledge and understanding of all such factual matters ... In a case where a defendant was tried in handcuffs, this Court wrote that if for security reasons handcuffs were necessary the trial judge should have the record clearly reflect the reasons therefor. That record must affirmatively reflect those reasons, not in general terms but with particularity. See Romero v. State, Tex.Cr.App. 493 S.W.2d 206 (1974). Walthall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., [121 Tex.Cr.R. 5] 505 S.W.2d 808 (1974) And in Gray, supra, 268 S.W. at 949, this Court stated: ... the rule may be fairly stated that if the record discloses no good reason for having the prisoner manacled during the trial the same will be cause for reversal; on the other hand, if, in the sound discretion of the court, it appears necessary to retain his shackles to prevent the escape or self-destruction of the prisoner, or to prevent him from injuring bystanders or officers of the court, or if necessary to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial, the court may try the prisoner without having the shackles removed; his action being subject to the closest scrutiny and review by the appellate court. In the instant case, during the afternoon session of the first day of the punishment phase, the trial judge ordered that appellant be handcuffed and shackled for the remainder of the trial. The judge made the following findings as justification for the order on November 26, 1984, just prior to instructing the jury on punishment. THE COURT: ... I will go ahead and make my findings of fact at this time. The defendant has been found guilty of choking the complainant to death. At the same time he choked his former wife to death. The defendant while in jail has carried deadly weapons on his person. The Defendant while in jail stabbed a fellow inmate with a ballpoint pen. The Defendant while in jail choked a fellow prisoner. In 1983 the Defendant attempted to murder a uniformed officer driving a marked autombiles [sic] while trying to evade arrest for four burglaries. The Defendant endangered the lives of many innocent people while trying to evade arrest by driving on the wrong side of the freeway. Since being found guilty of capital murder while being transferred from the courtroom the Defendant attacked a television cameraman by knocking his television camera to the floor and on the same occasion, spit on another cameraman or spit on a camera. In fact, since being found guilty of capital murder the Defendant threatened prosecutor Ed Garcia in the courtroom. The Defendant on numerous occasions since being found guilty of capital murder has threatened to run and cause the officers to have to shoot him and kill him. Unless his legs are chained there is a danger he will do so. The Defendant is young, powerful and very quick and there is a grave danger he might grab the firearms of an officer and kill officers of the court and onlookers unless he is kept in handcuffs. MR. SPRINGER: May I add something to the court’s findings, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. SPRINGER: I believe that the Court was correct that the Defendant did have the leg brace on at the time that he assaulted the cameraman. THE COURT: That failed to restrain him from assaulting a cameraman who was anywhere from three to five feet away and while counsel for Defendant has frequently referred to the situation as being a circus atmosphere, the court finds that no such atmosphere has existed either in the courtroom or in the hall except that which was brought on by the Defendant himself when he attacked the cameraman. In fact, two disputes took place in the hall and the court immediately removed people that [sic] engaged the defendant in an argument. And there has been absolutely no circus atmosphere tolerated and none will be tolerated. All right. Anything else? MR. SPRINGER: Yes. I believe that the Defendant has told the court that he was thinking about committing suicide and has told the bailiffs and everybody he wasn’t afraid of the needle and he was not afraid to die, which shows that he is an extremely dangerous individual. THE COURT: Well, the court adopts those statements as part of the findings and there is at least one more in the courtroom that has four young children that [sic] is an officer of the court whose life would be in danger. There’s several others with children to be raised. There’s numerous officers of the court, bystanders, people whose lives would be in danger if this Defendant were allowed to not be handcuffed. There is no doubt in this court’s mind that he is a grave danger to the people in this courtroom as well as to himself. At the time the trial judge made his findings he had already heard all of the evidence presented at both the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial. Some of his findings were based on the evidence then presented and summarized at the outset of this opinion. In the interests of time and space we will not review that evidence here. However, certain other evidence, presented close to the time and at the time of trial, obviously bore on the judge’s findings and it will be reviewed. On July 12,1984, a hearing was held on a motion for withdrawal of appellant’s counsel because of appellant’s inability to pay. During that hearing the following testimony was elicited. THE COURT: Obviously you don’t have the money so I’m going to appoint a lawyer to represent you. MR. MARQUEZ: That’s okay, sir, because I ain’t got to talk to him. I ain’t got to talk to no State’s attorney. I would rather be dead than talk to a State’s attorney. THE COURT: That may be exactly the problem you face. You understand that you are charged with capital murder which could result in the death penalty for you? MR. MARQUEZ: That’s okay. THE COURT: So its not one of these things that can be taken lightly. It is a very— MR. MARQUEZ: Anyway I was going to take my life last night. I was about to do it last night. THE COURT: I see you didn’t do it. All right. I want to thank you all very much. On October 18, 1984, a pretrial hearing was held on appellant’s motion to suppress certain oral statements made while in custody. During the course of that hearing Detective Anton Michalec testified as to remarks made by appellant at the police station shortly after his arrest. Q. [by the State’s Attorney]: Did he say anything else about— A. Well, he did indicate that the police officer that [sic] apprehended him where he was apprehended was yellow for not shooting him and he said he wished he would have shot him and just got it over with and he indicated that — by his actions and so forth that — I took it he might try to commit suicide, and I called the jail and notified the jail that he may have some suicidal tendencies at the time, so ‘watch him.’ Q. Did he say whether or not he told the officer that the officer was yellow for not shooting him? A. No, sir. Q. What did he say? A. He just told me in his own words that he felt that the officer should have shot him when he apprehended him and just gotten it over with then and there. Q. Did he say why the officer should have shot him? A. No, he said he wasn’t a man, though, for not shooting him ... ****** Q. [by appellant’s counsel] All right. ‘He said after this he wanted to commit suicide and would hang himself?’ A. Yes. Q. He did say that. A. Yes. Q. Did he specifically mention that he wanted to hang himself? A. Yes, ma’am. It would not be in my report if he didn’t. Q. All right. What did you say to that? A. Well, I made no reply, but like I said earlier, I did call the jail because he made those threats. I was concerned that he might try to harm himself and I told him what he said. Q. All right. Then also he talked of how he wanted the police officer that caught him to shoot him? A. Yes. Later during the hearing evidence was presented to show that appellant was the subject of a prior outstanding arrest warrant for robbery involving a bodily injury. The outstanding, warrant was issued three weeks before the murder in the instant case. On November 26, 1984, one of the State’s Attorneys, Edward Garcia, stated in closing argument that, [A]fter the altercation that was had Monday at the doorway when Mr. Marquez was brought in and sat down by the bailiffs, he was cursing in Spanish and he said something to the effect that ‘I’m tired of people treating me like an animal.’ And I was sitting to his left and Mr. Marquez looked at me and glared at me and said, 'That goes for that guy sitting at the table there.’ Earlier on November 26, 1984, the court, outside the presence of the jury heard the following testimony from Lieutenant Bill-hartz of the Bexar County Sheriff’s Department. THE COURT: All right. Have you been supervising the handling of the Defendant, Mario Marquez, through the time he has been charged with the capital offense? MR. BILLHARTZ: Yes, I have. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this. In your opinion are the threats and actions of the Defendant such that you feel it is necessary that he be handcuffed and have leg irons during the rest of this trial? MR. BILLHARTZ: Yes, I believe they are. ****** Q. [by appellant’s counsel]: Are you familiar with the leg brace Mr. Marquez is wearing right now? A. Yes, I am. Q. What is the purpose of that leg brace? A. To keep a person from running. Q. Okay. Do you have any information that Mr. Marquez has actually run off anytime during this trial? A. Not yet, but he’s made statements to the effect. Q. Okay. But no actual running? A. No. I don’t have any information MR. STEVENS: That’s all we have. THE COURT: If he were not handcuffed, would there not be a danger of his grabbing the pistol of one of these bailiffs. MR. BILLHARTZ: I think that is true. THE COURT: And would the lives of all the court officers be endangered? MR. BILLHARTZ: It would. After this testimony the trial judge made the findings above and overruled appellant’s final objection to the handcuffs and leg irons. Appellant was not displayed to the jury in leg irons and handcuffs prior to their convicting him of capital murder. In light of appellant’s past history and more recent actions close to the time of trial and during the trial we hold that the trial judge was entirely justified in ordering the shackles in order to prevent his escape or self-destruction and to protect other persons present in the courtroom. The judges findings are amply supported by the record. Therefore, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to order appellant shackled during the punishment phase of trial. Appellant’s third ground of error is overruled. In appellant’s grounds of error number four and five he argues that the trial court erred by permitting admission before the jury of the video tapes of his incident with the cameramen outside the courtroom because the tape clearly showed he was escorted by armed guards. Such constituted a violation of his rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The video tapes were shown to the jury only during the punishment phase of trial. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the noticeable deployment of security personnel around a defendant is not as inherently prejudicial as shackling. Appellant argues that the evidence was only cumulative of the testimony of the cameramen themselves and was more prejudicial than probative. We do not agree. As with all evidence that is to be introduced at either stage of a criminal trial, a two-stage test must be met. The evidence must first be relevant to a material issue in the case. Secondly, the evidence must possess probative value which outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial effect. Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The evidence introduced in the instant case is clearly relevant. Appellant’s future dangerousness is a material issue in the punishment phase of a capital murder case. Evidence which shows appellant’s violent nature bears directly on whether he will commit violent acts in the future such that he will be a continuing threat to society. The second inquiry is whether the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Wide latitude has been afforded trial judges in deciding the admissibility of evidence at the punishment phase of a capital murder case. Such latitude has allowed the introduction of unadjudicated extraneous offenses. See Mayo v. State, 708 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Green v. State, 587 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In Granviel v. State, No. 69, 177, 723 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this Court held that evidence of a defendant’s misconduct while in custody awaiting trial for a capital case is admissible. See also Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) Simmons v. State, 594 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Cf. Jordan v. State, 707 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Considering the wide latitude afforded judges in this area, the fact that appellant had already been convicted, and had been handcuffed and shackled, together with the importance of the punishment issue to be decided, we cannot say that the showing of the video tapes which depicted appellant in custody was more prejudicial than probative. Appellant’s fourth and fifth grounds of error are overruled. In grounds of error eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen and fifteen appellant argues that the affidavit used to seize a sample of his blood and to take casts of his teeth is insufficient under the two-pronged standard for analyzing probable cause established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 2 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Additionally, appellant argues that the affidavit is insufficient under Art. 18.01(c), V.A.C.C.P. For these reasons appellant urges that the admission of this evidence constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9 of the Texas Constitution and Art. 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. Appellant claims that the affidavit used as an application for a search warrant to procure a sample of his blood violates Art 18.01(c), V.A.C.C.P. Art. 18.01(c) requires that: A search warrant may not be issued pursuant to subdivision (10) of Article 18.02 of this code unless the sworn affidavit required by Subsection (b) of this article sets forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause: (1) that a specific offense has been committed, (2) that the specifically described property or items that are to be searched for or seized constitute evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense, and (3) that the property or items constituting evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particular person, place or thing to be searched ... Specifically, appellant argues that the second requirement is lacking, i.e., the affidavit does not establish probable cause that “the specifically described property or items that are to be searched for or seized constitute evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed that offense, ...” We have reviewed the affidavit and find it hard to believe that such an argument can be seriously made. The affidavit used to obtain the search warrant for blood and pubic hair samples from appellant, along with a plaster cast of his teeth, reads in pertinent part: 3. IT IS THE BELIEF OF THIS AFFI-ANT AND AFFIANT HEREBY CHARGES AND ACCUSES, THAT SAID SUSPECTED PARTY HAS POSSESSION OF AND IS CONCEALING ON HIS PERSON THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PERSONAL PROPERTY TO-WIT: BLOOD, TEETH, AND PUBIC HAIR. 4. AFFIANT HAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SAID BELIEF BY REASON OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS, TO-WIT: your affiant has reason to believe and does believe that the evidence to be searched for is in the location to be searched based on the following information from the police and autopsy reports and sworn statements in San Antonio Police Department Case number 84-30374, indicate that on January 27, 1984, REBECCA MARQUEZ and RACHEL GUTIERREZ were each killed by ligature strangulation in San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. MARIO MARQUEZ, the subject of this application for a search warrant, is at present under indictment for Capital Murder of RACHEL GUTIERREZ, (Cause No. 84-CR-0905), and REBECCA MARQUEZ, (Cause No. 84-CR-0982). He was seen at the residence where the bodies were found, 2210 Hidal-go Street, San Antonio, by ROSA GU-TIEREREZ and DANIEL GUTIERREZ, at the same time the bodies were found. In fact, he led ROSA GUTIERREZ to the room where the bodies were, and stated in her presence, ‘YA ME DESQUITE,’ a phrase in Spanish which generally translates in English to, ‘NOW I HAVE AVENGED MYSELF.’ Also, his fingerprints were found on a beer can in the room where the bodies were found. The bodies of REBECCA MARQUEZ and RACHEL GUTIERREZ were autopsied on January 27, A.D., 1984, by Deputy Bexar County Medical Examiner, Dr. Su-zanna E. Dana. Dr. Dana found ten short black hairs in the mouth of RACHEL GUTIERREZ. Your affiant believes that these may be the pubic hairs of MARIO MARQUEZ, because within a short period of time of showing the bodies of the two deceased women to ROSA GUTIERREZ, MARIO MARQUEZ, sexually assaulted ROSA GUTIERREZ by forcing his penis into her mouth. Also, human spermatozoa were found in the rectum of RACHEL GUTIERREZ, and there were lacertions of her rectum and the perineum between her anus and vagina. After being arrested on January 27, 1984, MARIO MARQUEZ’s person was searched, and he was found to have blood on his undershorts. Affiant believes that this fact is consistent with his having penetrated the anus of RACHEL GUTIERREZ with his penis. For that reason, your affiant requests that a sample of MARIO MARQUEZ’s blood be taken, to be tested, in order to eliminate him as the source of the blood on his undershorts. Also, on the bodies of both deceased females Dr. Dana found human teeth or bite marks to the right nipple and pubic mound of each woman. Your affiant believes these marks to have been made by MARIO MARQUEZ in the course of killing the two women. On January 27, A.D., 1984, at the time of Dr. Dana’s autopsies on the two women, Dr. Bill Baker, a dentist with the Dental diagnostic Sciences Department of the University of Texas Dental School in San Antonio, took [sic] impressions of the bite marks on the two bodies. He then transferred the impressions and is retaining them in his custody for comparison to the bite mark impressions of MARIO MARQUEZ, which your Affiant is requesting. Dr. Baker believes that he can determine by comparing the impressions from the bodies with the known bite mark patterns of MARIO MARQUEZ, whether MARIO MARQUEZ inflicted these bites. Your Affiant believes the above information to be reliable and credible because all of it came either from peace officers or from individuals with no known criminal record. * * * * * * Reviewing the entire affidavit we find the following facts were presented to the issuing magistrate relevant to the taking of appellant’s blood sample. 1. Rachel Gutierrez and Rebecca Marquez were each murdered by ligature strangulation on January 27, 1984. 2. Appellant was under indictment for each murder. 3. Appellant was seen at the residence at the time the bodies were found. 4. Appellant admitted to Rosa Gutierrez that he killed the two women at her residence. 5. Appellant’s fingerprints were found in the room when the bodies were found. 6. Autopsies of the deceased women revealed that ten short black hairs were found in the mouth of Rachel Gutierrez. 7. Human spermatozoa was found in the rectum of Rachel Gutierrez. 8. Rachel Gutierrez had several lacerations surrounding her anus and perineum. 9. After being arrested blood was found on appellant’s clothing. Additionally, affiant stated that he believed that the blood found on appellant’s clothing was consistent with his having penetrated the anus of the deceased and that he desired the blood sample in order to determine whether the blood found on appellant’s clothing was his or that of the deceased. The allegations made in the affidavit are more than sufficient to show that the evidence to be seized constituted evidence of the offense. Turning to appellant’s constitutional claim we again find no merit. Initially, we point out that, because the affidavit in the instant case is sufficient to establish probable cause whether analyzed under the old two-pronged test established by Aguilar v. Texas, supra, and United States v. Spinelli, supra, or the “totality of the circumstances” test established by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), we need not decide whether the “totality” test will now be used under the Texas Constitution. Since this State has always used the stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test for analyzing probable cause under Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution we will review the instant affidavit using this approach. We note that, because the old two-pronged test requires a stricter showing to establish probable cause, should the affidavit be found sufficient under this test, it will necessarily be found sufficient under the “totality” test. Appellant first argues that the affidavit does not show sufficient information supporting the reliability or credibility of the informants. The affidavit reads in relevant part, “your Affiant believes the above information to be reliable and credible because all of it comes either from peace officers or from individuals with no known criminal record.” Appellant alleges that the affidavit must contain some facts to show that the peace officers and other witnesses who provided affiant with the substantive information contained in the affidavit are credible. This argument is entirely without merit. While it is true that such facts must be included when the information contained in the affidavit is given by a confidential informant, as a matter of constitutional law an ordinary citizen as a witness in a case or a police officer is presumed to be reliable and no special showings are required. See Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 (1965); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.1982); Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Kolbert v. State, 644 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1982, no pet.). Additionally, the affidavit states: Your affiant has reason to believe and does believe that the evidence to be searched for is in the location to be searched based on the following information from the police and autopsy reports and sworn statements in San Antonio Police Department Case number 84-30374 ... This language indicates that at least some of the information was gathered by the affiant himself through examination of sworn statements and autopsy reports. This also bears on the credibility of the information contained in the affidavit. Appellant also argues that the affidavit provides no underlying circumstances to show how the informants concluded that the items to be seized constituted evidence of the offense. We have already shown that the affidavits contained abundant information linking the items to be seized with evidence of the offense. The affidavit clearly states that appellant was under indictment for the murder of each woman. The deceased in the instant case had sperm in her rectum and lacerations of her anus and perineum. Appellant had blood on his clothing at the time of his arrest. Based on either test we conclude that probable cause existed to believe that the blood sample to be taken from appellant constituted evidence of the offense involved. Accordingly, the taking of appellant’s blood sample and its subsequent admission into evidence did not violate appellant’s constitutional or statutory rights. See Mulder v. State, 707 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Turning to appellant’s grounds of error concerning the dental casts taken of appellant’s teeth we likewise find no constitutional or statutory violation occurred. In Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court held that there was no constitutional impediment, either as a search and seizure or concerning the privilege against self incrimination, preventing the taking of dental impressions from a criminal defendant. The Court in Patterson, supra, likened dental casts to fingerprints for constitutional purposes. We hold this type of relatively unintrusive identification evidence to be seizable without constitutional implication. Appellant’s eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth grounds of error are overruled. In grounds of error numbers sixteen through twenty appellant complains of the warrantless seizure of his clothing shortly after his arrest on January 27, 1984. The record reflects that appellant was arrested at approximately 8:00 a.m. and immediately transported to the police station. Appellant was taken to the homocide office where Detective Michalec of the San Antonio Police Department had the appellant disrobe, having noticed blood stains on his clothing. Appellant was given a jail uniform to wear. Among the items of clothing taken from appellant and subsequently introduced into evidence over objection were a T-shirt, underwear, blue jeans and a pair of tennis shoes. Appellant contends that the police lacked probable cause or exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless seizure of appellant’s clothing. The warrantless seizure of a suspect’s clothing subsequent to a legal arrest, while in custody or detention, is permissible. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974); Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Stewart v. State, 611 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Deal v. State, 508 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Appellant’s sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth “and twentieth grounds of error are overruled. In ground of error number ten appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to overrule his motion to set aside the indictment because the caption to House Bill 200, 63rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1973, concerning the death penalty statute is not specific enough to give a reasonable reader fair notice of the contents of the bill in violation of Art. Ill, Sec. 35. Specifically, appellant argues that the caption to House Bill 200 which enacted V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03(a)(2) and Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., along with other statutes dealing with capital punishment, is a violation of Art. Ill, Sec. 35 which requires that the subject of a bill be embraced in its title. Notwithstanding the recent constitutional amendment bearing on our power to hold legislation unconstitutional because its caption fails to give fair notice as required under Art. Ill, § 35 we find appellant’s allegation unmeritorious. This court has many times held that the caption to House Bill 200 is sufficient under Art. Ill, § 35. See Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Brown v. State, 554 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Appellant urges that none of the cited cases has ever seriously considered his contention and our research has revealed no recent cases concerning the constitutionality of House Bill 200. Therefore, we will address the merits of appellant’s claim. The caption to House Bill 200 reads: An act relating to the punishment for murder under certain circumstances and conditions; amending Article 1257, Penal Code of Texas, 1925; amending Chapter 19, Subchapter C of Chapter 12, and Section 12.04, Penal Code (Senate Bill 34, Regular Session, 63rd Legislature, 1973); amending Articles 1.14, as amended, 1-15, as amended, 35.17, 40.03, and Subsection (b), Section 2, Article 37.07, as amended, Section 1, Article 26.05, as amended, and Subsection (b), Article 35.-15, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965, and adding Article 37.071; and declaring an emergency. Appellant argues that the caption at issue here is even less informative than that in Ex Parte Crisp, 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The caption in Crisp, supra, reads: An act relating to offenses and penalties under the Texas Controlled Substances Act.